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Replaying Yugoslavia

Foreign Policy Analysis of Serbia

Master paper

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Key terms: *Populism, Foreign Policy, Yugoslavia, Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, SNS, Kosovo*

1. Abstract

The paper revolves around the implications of populism on foreign policy making. The case study of Serbia is used in order to depict how populism can shape foreign policy making. The period of the study is from 2012 to today, as of writing the conclusion of this paper June, 2019. This time period is used in order to analyze the influence of Aleksandar Vučić and his party, Srpska Napredna Stranka (SNS), as populist actors who won the election in 2012. The object of analysis in this paper is to investigate the influence of populism as an ideology, in the form of normative rhetoric, and its impact on shaping foreign policy decision making. The author claims that Vučić uses elements of Yugoslavian foreign policy in order to mobilize left-leaning, just as he mobilized the liberal elements of Serbian society with the European Integration of Serbia.

2. Introduction

Populism and foreign policy are two terms that do not coalign in the academic community of Political Science. Although populism has become very popular today in the academic community, with a variety of actors being depicted as populist due to its broad definition, the topic of populism and its effect on foreign policy has been touched little upon. The academic community focused more on the role of populism in the domestic elections, against traditional ideologies. However, the goal of this paper is to analyze the implications of populism of Foreign Policy and the use Foreign Policy as a tool for populism and Serbia has been chosen for this research as it represents a contemporary subject. Its president, Aleksandar Vučić, is the most vocal of all leaders of South-Eastern European nations, or as the academic community in the West would call them Western Balkan nations. However, the term Balkan has negative connotations so it will not be used in this paper as much. Furthermore, Vučić and his party, SNS, have managed the one thing that has eluded all democratic parties, a win over 50% of the votes in the 2016 elections in Serbia (Stat.gov.rs, 2016). It just shows how much Vučić managed to mobilize the various segments of Serbian society, which will later be explored in this paper. Furthermore, an analysis of the foreign policy has to be conducted first, in order to see how populism effected the foreign policy making of Serbia. But first, the analysis of the foreign policy of Yugoslavia must be made, as the point of this paper revolves around the notion that Vučić uses Yugoslavia and Tito in his rethoric as a mean to mobilize the voters of the left in Serbia.

This paper is conceptualized as following. The first issue that is tackled is the academic background of the research, ranging from plain foreign policy analysis, through the issues of populism and European integration up to populism in foreign policy, although not much has been written upon this topic. Afterwards, the historical background of modern Serbia and Yugoslavia is given. The foreign policy of both countries is analyzed and compared. Then, the issue of populism in Serbia comes into play, as the analysis of SNS and Aleksandar Vučić is conducted through the analysis of norms presented in interviews and speeches by Vučić and other SNS officials, combined with official party documents and statements by the FPM of Serbia. Afterwards, the conclusion is reached and analyzed, the way how of populism influenced the foreign policy of Serbia, in the terms of SNS using the foreign policy of Serbia in order to mobilize voters.

3. Methodology

The methodology used in this paper is qualitative. As the research is focused on only two case examples, Yugoslavia and Serbia, the consequential decision was to use qualitative methodology as the sample size is small and thus allowed for the in-depth study of the cases and their foreign policy on one side through statements and documents, as well as populism on the other, whose analysis is conducted on a normative basis of speeches and other public rhetoric, such as interviews and statements.

The research question of this paper is: *Is Serbian foreign policy reminiscent of the foreign policy of Yugoslavia and what is the reason behind such foreign policy decision making?* Based on this research question, two main hypotheses can be deduced. The first hypothesis is: *Serbia continued using multiple foreign policy elements of former Yugoslavia.* The second hypothesis is semi-independent of the first, as it directly links to some part of it as it will be presented in the paper. The second hypothesis is: *Populism is the main driving force behind Serbian foreign policy.*

The method used is discourse analysis and qualitative document analysis. Discourse analysis is used on a longitudinal basis, from 2012 and the point that SNS took power in Serbia, by analyzing the speeches and statements by Vučić and other party officials. The norms derived from the discourse analysis are used both in explaining SNS as a populist party, as well as in predicting foreign policy moves and possible outcomes of the same. Qualitative document analysis is done through the analysis of SNS party documents, such as the *Bela Knjiga*, as well as through the analysis of statements made by the Foreign Policy Ministry of Serbia.

The research on populism is conducted mainly upon the normative principles of SNS, mainly set up by Aleksandar Vučić as the undisputed leader of the party. The operational code used behind the analysis of Vučić is active-negative, meaning that Vučić uses foreign policy only as a tool in enhancing domestic support. The speeches, interviews and statements by Vučić are compared to other examples mentioned in the theoretical background and populist elements are derived from them. Thus, a populist rhetoric is identified by using other examples and by deriving populist elements from them, such as anti-elitism, the connection between Vučić and populism is established.

The paper contains a comparative study between the foreign policy elements of Serbia and the foreign policy elements of Yugoslavia. The main elements of foreign policy of the two states are deduced and from them the comparative analysis is conducted. The deduced elements are grouped into 3 separate groups, from which the comparative study is done further in the paper. The three groups are: regional leadership, leadership of the Third World/ Revoking of international recognition of Kosovo and balancing between East and West, with Yugoslavia balancing between NATO and the Soviet Block, while Serbia is balancing between NATO, the EU and Russia. The sources used for this part of study are official statements from the Ministries of Foreign Policy of Serbia, official statements by both the European Union (including reports by the EU as well as statements by commissioners) and the Russian Federation (most notably the Russian foreign ministry), as well as from historical records and the work of the academia upon this topic. The study is done on a longitudinal basis, from the period of 1948- 1990 for the study of Yugoslav foreign policy and from 2012- present for Serbia. The year 2012 is chosen as it was the year when the party SNS (Serbian Progressive Party) won the elections and became the majority in Serbia.

The integration process of Serbia is analyzed using academic articles in order to describe both the Enlargement Policy and EU integration as described by the academic community. The comparative usage of the sources both by the European Union and the Serbian government allows for a comprehensive understanding of the process, as seen by the two sides involved. Moreover, the paper will analyze whether SNS has a populist ideology and whether this ideology is the main driving force behind the foreign policy conduct of Serbia, based on the theoretical works what populism entails. Based on the elements of populism as presented in academic literature, a comparative study will be done in order to analyze whether Serbian foreign policy is driven by populism.

4. Theoretical Background

The main theoretical works used in the analysis of this paper are works by Chris Alden and Amnon Aran *Foreign Policy Analysis* and by Chris Hill *Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century*, along with *Foreign Policy Analysis* by Valerie M. Hudson and Marijke Breuning *Do leaders shape foreign policy*. These works are used as the basis for the analysis of the Foreign

Policies of both Serbia and Yugoslavia. The theory about populism is deduced from works of Jasiewicz, Jones and Heinisch. Brückner, Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, Leuffen and Börzel works are used to describe the EU integration process of Serbia, as one of the key aspects of Serbian foreign policy. Furthermore, an analysis of *Populism and World Politics: Exploring Inter- and Transnational Dimensions* by the authors Stengel Frank, MacDonald David and Nabers Dirk is conducted as well to see how the academic community merged populism with International Relations. *Populism and Foreign Policy: The Case of India* by Johannes Plagemann and Sandra Destradi serves, moreover, as an example of how a study of this scale, which is quite new to the field of international relations, has been conducted. These works serve as the basic guidelines on how foreign policy and how populism influences foreign policy decision making is conducted. The content entailed within them is used as the base for the research conducted in this paper.

4.1. Foreign Policy Analysis Theory

Before we can consider analyzing populism in foreign policy, a study of how foreign policy analysis is conducted must be made and this part represents the largest and the most immersive part of the theoretical background. Alden and Aran are the first authors used in this part of the paper. The authors discuss the various schools of thoughts that are used in the analysis of foreign policy. The first school of thought that is analyzed is realism. In realism, the states are considered as individual and rational actors. Each state has its own set of goals in which it wants to exceed over others. These goals are defined as “national interest.” The authors mention Morgethau as well, another prominent realist thinker, who described national interest as synonymous to power. The key concept in this school of thought is power. Power is defined either in economic terms (the gathering of material wealth) or in military terms, otherwise known as hard power. Furthermore, the situation and position of the state, both in the geographical sense and in the material sense, is seen as key in determining and analyzing the foreign policy of a certain nation. One of the main weakness of this school of thought is its inability to include the individuality of decision makers and their interest in the decision making process of foreign policy. The behaviorist school of thought identifies foreign policy as a series of decisions made by individuals, whose decision may not always be considered rational, while the realist school always interprets state actions as rational. Another school of thought analyses the mechanisms behind the foreign policy decision making.

This groups is called the bureaucratic school of thought. It takes into analysis the various other actors, such as the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Defense, in the decision making process. Furthermore, it takes into account the various other actors within these institutions, such as lobby groups, as taking a considerable part in the foreign policy making of a particular state. The authors furthermore mention the liberal school of thought and the way how this school perceives foreign policy making. The liberalist take into account various factors, such as norms and perceptions in international arena and the normative thinking is that states are willing to cooperate due to the mutual gain due to the cooperation. They take into account globalization and the new international scene that has arisen due to it. This is mostly depicted in the multiple new international actors, most notably international institutions and multinational companies, whose interest play, as for them, a major part in the decision making process. The most prominent of these institutions is the United Nations and the norms and values set up by them. This is reflected in the creation of international courts for settling disputed peacefully and the norms of international law created, the UN Charter being the most prominent of them. International law combined with the interest of international actors, such as the UN, created a new international arena in which, according to them, the self-interest and self- survival of states as depicted by Realist thinkers, does not play the pivotal role it used. Furthermore, a separate topic that is analyzed by Alden and Aran is the domestic sources in the decision making process of foreign policy. The authors provide a critique of the realist perspective on the domestic sources of foreign policy, as this approach replaces them with a unilateral approach from all domestic groups to foreign policy. There are three approaches, according to the author, about the analysis of the role of the domestic sources in foreign policy shaping. The first approach looks on the way the state is organized structurally (institutions and regimes). This approach relies on the constitution, operationalism and the various interest groups which operate within the state. Traditionally, this approach suggest that the executive has the power to formulate and conduct foreign policy. However, the key difference is between the regime that is present within the state and to what extent does the executive possess the power to conduct foreign policy. The authors here note that the democratic peace theory (meaning that no democracies ever waged war, having in notion that the public does not want war and thus is not likely to support a warmongering leader) has support within the empirical works, suggesting that authoritarian regimes are more prone towards waging war as a mean of foreign policy. The authors introduced here the notion of “*middle power*,” thereby describing states that use foreign policy to promote

certain norms and values, such as Canada and Australia. The second approach analyzes as the main source the economic conditions and the economic elites as playing an essential role in the shaping of foreign policy. This approach is Marxist in nature and looks upon the economic and class system as the driving force behind foreign policy conduct. More capitalist nations are prone to conduct their foreign policy in accordance to the interest of the elite within the state, meaning that the foreign policy is centered on gathering resources for the elite and expanding markets for them. Using institutions such as the World Bank, the major power players are able to expand their foreign policy goals on third world countries in order to create a market for the elites of the capitalist nations. The local elites support such change as it fosters their exploitation of the lower classes and asserts their dominance within a society. Furthermore, they seek legitimization from the capitalist states in order to stay in power and protect their gains. Liberalization and an open market are seen by this approach as the core policies of economic exploitation. National interest is, for this approach, the interest of the economic elites of a country. The third approach sees foreign policy as an outcome of the pluralist society and the various interest groups within. This approach is widespread among the academic community. The major role in the decision making process in this approach play the interest groups and in return, they offer widespread political mobilization for the electoral support. Interest groups are either labour unions, industrialist elites, academia, the religious group representatives etc. These groups set aside their issues in terms of national security. Public opinion is another fact that plays a vital role in the decision making process in this approach. In the modern day and the large role that the media plays when it comes to elections of leaders, the traditional notion that public opinion does not play a major role in foreign policy has become obsolete. The major example of the role public opinion and media played in foreign policy making is the case of the Vietnam War and the US withdrawal from Vietnam due the amounting public pressure. Furthermore, the author notes that certain leaders use nationalist rhetoric when conducting foreign policy in order to mobilize the masses for political support. This is most notable in authoritarian regimes, as a lack of democratic expression and debate is supplemented by the creation of an external threat. All three approaches have in common that the pivotal role in shaping of the foreign plays the state apparatus. Furthermore, the authors mention the domestic culture and the norms that arise within them as important for the shaping of foreign policy of a certain country. Furthermore, the authors note that the political parties within a democratic society play a role as well, although not researched enough. They suggest that in a pluralist democracy, other political

parties in coalition with the ruling party try to promote their agenda on foreign policy and are successful somewhat due to the nature of the democratic system. However, the authors note that the decision-making process is influenced as well by globalization and the fact that culture is shifting rapidly around the world. Moreover, the authors note that because of this globalization trend, the foreign policy making is under pressure both from the domestic factors as well as from the international factor, meaning that multinational corporations, as well as international NGOs may play a significant role in shaping the foreign policy of a certain country (Alden and Aran, 2016).

Another source that is used as the guideline for the explanation of the domestic mechanism and decision making in foreign policy is “*Foreign Policy Analysis*” by Valerie M. Hudson. The authors analyze the role of the individual leaders in the conduct of foreign policy, as well as the role that culture and identity play in the conduct of foreign policy. Furthermore, the role that the domestic political system and flows within it play in conducting foreign policy is analyzed as well. The author discusses that, while the academic community finds the psychological analysis of leaders as something that should not be prioritized while researching foreign policy, the US government, for example, has a department within the CIA which conducts psychological analysis of leaders and constructs their psychological profiles. This, in turn, allows policy makers to have a more developed approach towards leaders of other countries when conducting foreign policy, as all of their traits are presented to them. So, for the government, psychological analysis of leaders is an important trait while conducting foreign policy. The author argues it is more beneficial to analyze leaders in one-man dictatorships rather than in well-established parliamentary democracies, while the latter is also not excluded. The ability to understand dictators and their approach to foreign policy, whether they are interested or not, may prove as an advantage in the long run while conducting foreign policy. Furthermore, the author discusses that diplomatic training plays an important role in the way leaders behave on the foreign policy scene. The example of Bush senior, who in contrast to his son, had diplomatic training and served in that field for many years, serves to illustrate this fact, as Bush senior was far more capable in this field than his son. This is most notable in the overseeing the dissolution of the Soviet Block and the fall of the Berlin Wall, two crises which resulted in peaceful resolutions. Two important psychological traits that the author mentions are perception and cognition. A leader might be able to perceive its environment correctly, thereby gaining insight to potential dangers. However, it is the way he reacts to those

inputs that define his cognition. A leader's cognition may be altered by the stereotypes and biases that the leader might possess. Furthermore, the author tackles the issue of rationality. He states that leaders cannot know everything and thus analyze everything correctly due to bounded rationality. The author mentions short term and long term memories, stating that those can be organized into a scheme that affects our future behavior based on these experiences. Schemes can overshadow our rationality, as schemes tend to be very strong preconceptions. Moreover, the author states as well that research has shown that humans are very bad at calculating probabilities. The author mentions emotions as playing an essential part in the decision- making process. However, emotions are often downplayed as not having an essential role in the decision making process. According to the author, emotions can cause rash decision making and thereby have bad consequences. Furthermore, emotions about an issue may result in a decision not being made due to the difficulty of a situation. Mental illness is another topic that is discussed in this chapter. The author notes that the majority of world leaders suffer from narcissism and paranoia. This can, in turn, affect decision making in foreign policy to a large extent. If a leader, due to paranoia, perceives a neighbor as gearing for war, he is more prone towards launching a preemptive strike, thereby resulting in an unnecessary conflict. The author mentions Saddam Hussein as the pivotal example of such behavior. The personal interest of Saddam Hussein became the national interest of Iraq. Furthermore, the author notes that some leaders may suffer from problems caused by alcohol and drugs, which can seriously affect their decision making capabilities. Furthermore, the leader and his actions depend on the situational context of the given issue. A leader is more likely to react if he has the support of his inner circle, as well as the support of the public. The stakes of the situation will also alter the action of a certain leader in responding to a certain situation. The author also mentions that a large role in the decision making process plays on what the leader perceives as the mental model of the world. The leader is more likely to react according to his own perception of the situation, in the sense that the response suits his moral beliefs and attitudes. Values play a key role here as well, most notably in the interventionist policies of the Western governments of the 1990s and early 2000s, where some of the interventions, such as Somalia, were purely out of humanitarian reasons due to the values that the presidents had and bestowed upon the foreign policy. The author sums this mental model up as following: *..perceptions are filtered, and only certain perceptions become cognitions. Cognitions are both new inputs and a function of the mental model that makes them possible in the first place* (Hudson, 2014, p. 25). The mental model is shaped by the personality of the leader as

well, with personality presenting the combination of traits possessed by the leader. When analyzing a leader, a few methods can be employed. The first method is the construction of a psychobiography of a certain leader, entailing all elements of his life and how those elements shaped the leader. The active- passive, active- negative leadership analysis will be explored further in the paper. The second method is content analysis. The content analysis method entails that, when conducting a psychological analysis of a particular leader, all the written and said materials are gathered. Then, those materials are searched for patterns which exemplify the beliefs and values of the leader, as well as his reactions to certain events. By doing this, a psychological portrait can be constructed of a leader and thus valuable insight in his foreign policy conduct can be gained. By doing this, the future actions of a leader can be predicted to a certain extent. The example of Saddam Hussein shows that only a combination of different methods can produce a psychological profile of a leader. The author further analyzes the role that culture and national identity play in the shaping of the foreign policy of one country. During the period of the cold war, the role of culture and identity was downplayed in foreign policy in favor of the ideology. The author states: *National identity and culture shape the domestic motivations and imperatives that now seem as or more important than international balance- of- power considerations in foreign policymaking* (Hudson, 2014, p. 120). This is of upmost important on the leadership scale. The author mentions an important example of how culture influences foreign policy making. This example is the resentment that Asian countries hold against Japan, following the historic experience of those nations in regards to Japanese colonization and conquest. The author defines further the notions of nation and what does a nation do and against who those actions are directed. The nation is, according to the author, defined by its heroic history. Heroic history represents the collective actions of a nation during a certain point in history, where individual interest was downplayed for the interest of the nation. Due to this national unity, the nation was able to achieve memorable gains in its history and come out, in most cases, as a victor. However, the author mentions that memorable failures as well help a nation guide its foreign policy, such as the case of the Vietnam War in US foreign policy. The concept of the *other* is mentioned as well. This concept represents the role that other actors, most notably leaders and nations, played in the historic discourse of a nation. This is most notable, according to the author, in preventing authoritarian leaders in seizing territory and power. For example, Saddam Hussein was compared to Hitler in his territorial ambition (it is known to what consequences the appeasement policy directed the world). Furthermore, the author tackles the issue of culture in

shaping national identity. Hudson states: *We cannot speak of issues of national identity without reference to culture as it arises from the continual and dynamic process of social discourse* (Hudson, 2014, p. 127). The author mentions further the definitions of culture, but for the purpose of writing this paper only one will be used. It was Geertz who came up with this definition in 1973 and it states: *Culture is a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life* (Hudson, 2014, p. 128). The studies of culture had led in the past to the very problematic issue of “racial studies,” resulting in genocide during the Second World War. However, in the modern day a new approach has been accepted towards the study of culture. These new approaches can be differed into three sub-approaches. The first approach is the approach that regards culture as the organization of meaning. This approach regards that culture is a social construction of different meanings about the perceived norms and values. The best methodology for testing this is through polling the public about a controversial issue, such as abortion, in order to test whether a society is more liberal or conservative. The second approach regards culture as value preferences. This approach revolves around the notion that culture is the reason behind our preferences, desires and thus the value that we attribute to things. The issue of individualism is widespread in this approach, with implications both in economic and war-related issues. The third and final approach regards culture as a template of human strategy. This approach regards that the values held by members of a culture is not substantial enough to explain the actions of group members. In this approach, the culture as a whole does not matter as much as chunks of that culture in regards to certain issues. Furthermore, the author mentions how the issue of how culture and foreign policy making intertwine. This is most noted in the shared systems of meaning in foreign policy and foreign policy making. In contrast to traditional scholars, a new generation of scholars examines the links between the norms that go into foreign policy and foreign policy, with the issue examination of the origin of those norms. Various scholars tried to connect culture and political culture to issues in foreign policy making. These authors most notably examined the American society in face of the NAFTA agreement and how it would benefit or harm the US economy. The mobilization around this issue was centered on two figures, Gore and Perot. Gore tapped into American perceived values (strong, optimistic) to mobilize the public around the issue of NAFTA, while Perot mobilized around the beliefs that the US public tries to ignore, most notably in the perception of the American public as scared and

pessimistic. Moreover, this perception of norms in foreign policy can be applied to the whole foreign policy of a country, not just a specific issue like NAFTA, such as in the case of Pakistan and his alignment with great powers in order to counter India, his perceived enemy. Another example where culture plays a major role in foreign policy making is China. In China policy, both domestic and foreign, is driven by the Confucian culture of superior virtue and morality, with moral judgment of the conduct of other nations being one of the basic elements of Chinese foreign policy. Furthermore, culture can impact the organization of the ministry of foreign policy of a country. For example, research noted that despite being the same country for almost one hundred years, the Czech and Slovakian foreign ministries had very different organizational structures, with the latter being much more hierarchically organized. The author further analyzes the role of culture in creating a template of responses in foreign policy. This is again noted in Chinese foreign policy, as the responses for certain situations can be found in the past of the country and are repeated like scripts. This is most noted on the Chinese approach towards Taiwan. In conclusion, culture plays a significant role in international relations, with foreign policy being shaped by the culture of a nation. Moreover, the author analyzes the role that the domestic politics play on the foreign policy making process. The author begins this part by arguing that it is in the very nature of human beings to seek power. Power is the most potent incentive. This is thus reflected on foreign policy through domestic policy and the domestic struggle for power, especially in democratic societies. The author further analyzes how the academic community perceives the differences in the power struggles of both authoritarian and democratic regimes. This differentiation is done through the analysis of the institutional organization of certain countries and regimes. In democracies, institutions are created as means of checks and balances. In the US, for example, there is a need of 2/3 majority in the Senate in order to ratify an international treaty. This can have both direct and indirect implications of foreign policy making. In the direct sense, the example of the US sale of Weapons to Iran during the Reagan administration, in order to fund rebels in Nicaragua despite the Congressman ban on such affairs, was conducted with the knowledge of the chief executive, in the form of the President, despite the opposition of the Congress and the public for such affairs and conduct in foreign policy. The role of the media is mentioned as well by the author, in the form of the CNN effect, which can in turn drive short- term foreign policy. Furthermore, the author mentions electoral accountability when it comes to foreign policy shaping. The example of the Israel- Palestine issue in the United States illustrates how foreign policy can be directed by the will of the public and its view of world

events. The author proceeds further in the chapter to analyze to how do domestic politics and actor within it influences foreign policy decision making. He identifies actors as either media, political parties, powerful individuals, religious groups, political action parties or businesses as domestic actors who can influence foreign policy making. On the other hand, there are external actors as well which can influence foreign policy. These external actors can be other states, foreign media, IGOs such as the United Nations or the WTO. However, the impact of these actors varies. This variation in the impact is attributed to five different dimension. These dimensions include: the proximity of the actor to the regime, cohesion of the actor, difference in the viewpoint between the actor and the regime in power, the size of the actor and the level of activity that the actor possesses in order to promote certain policies. This is noted on multiple examples, with the most notable example being the business lobbies in the US in the form of the military industrialists, such as Lockheed and Boeing, and their investment in US representors in order to promote a certain type of weapon and its production. This example, in the form of the fighter aircraft F-35, has serious implications on the hard power of a state. If the aircraft is too costly and difficult to maintain, this flaw could prove as fatal in any potential conflict, thereby seriously affecting the foreign policy conduct of the United States. Furthermore, the complexity of the democratic system is sometimes beneficial in foreign policy. This is noted mostly in negotiations in the form *it would never pass back home*. This allows for far less maneuver space in negotiations, but however may result in an outcome that is far more favorable for the side which possesses a democratic system. Furthermore, an accomplished foreign policy goal may result in cementing power domestically, thereby foreign policy may be used only to further domestic support. In order to enhance domestic support, regimes may use different tactics. There are two types of direct tactics. The first is to ignore or refuse to engage the opposition. The second is to harass the opposition. There are indirect tactics as well, with them being summed up into a coercive effort to gather popular support around the regime policy so that there is no need for opposition, thus the opposition becomes worthless. This is done through traditional democratic methods, most notably in speeches and interview in the media. This campaign of persuasion is conducted via the media, who play an essential role in this tactic. The second indirect tactic is to gather support from other groups within the society around a certain issue, who thus in turn promote regime- friendly policies and support for the regime. The third indirect tactic is to rally the public around a new issue, thereby ignoring the failing policies around the old one. The last and final tactic is compromise, which is the rarest of all. The influence of

international actors cannot be understated when it comes to foreign policy decision making. The author mentions the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 as an example. The speech that was given in the UN before the US invasion, sought only to gather domestic support in the US and not the international support, as the invasion proceeded without the support of the UN. The author concludes this chapter by the example of how domestic politics influenced the US war in Vietnam. This case example illustrates to the full extent to which opposition parties, societal groups and movements influenced the foreign policy of a country. However, both political parties and their respective governments oversaw a huge failure in foreign policy in Vietnam. A government, despite the initial popular support, due to the influence of media about the war and no end goal of the foreign policy, lost confidence in the way how the war progressed and thus was forced to abandon a South East Asian country to be overtaken by the communist. This was the first major foreign policy failure of the United States and its implications can be seen in US foreign policy to this day (Hudson, 2014).

In the 2007 book by Marijke Breuning, *Foreign policy analysis*, the second chapter, *Do leaders shape foreign policy*, is yet another source which is used in order to gain insight into the analysis of the topic of this paper. In the article, the author discusses the impact of particular leaders upon the foreign policy decision making. The most notable historical example that the author offers is the case of the Belgian king Leopold II. Leopold managed to conduct the foreign policy of his country, in his own vision, despite unfavorable domestic and international opinion. His lifelong quest was to acquire a colony in Africa. He managed to do that by presenting himself as humanitarian, mainly wanting to bring civilization to the tribes of Congo. He presented himself as a benevolent leader, but in a spirit of a true Machiavelli managed to deceive both the domestic and international public. His rule in Congo was marked by largescale atrocities against the domestic population, mainly driving by the quest for his own enrichment in the form of rubber trade. The Belgian state even loaned money to the king to manage its colonial possession, even though the public *casus* of the King was, as mentioned before, to enhance the wealth of the Belgium state. The author mentions Leopold II as the ruler who singlehandedly managed to conduct foreign policy. Only later, when parliament managed to assert power in the Belgian state and international and domestic pressure rise against the atrocities, did Leopold revoked his control over Congo as his personal possession and passed it to the Belgian state. As the case of Leopold II illustrates, accountability is the key term mentioned by the author in regard to domestic opinion. Elected

leaders have to make consents to the public in terms of foreign policy in order to stay in power. Advisors make up a considerable part of foreign policy decision making as well, according to the author, as not all leaders take a peculiar interest in managing foreign policy of a certain country. The author discusses further the various methodologies of studying leaders and their behavior. To quote the author: *Accurate assessment of leaders provides useful knowledge* (Breuning, 2007, p. 28). Operational code as a methodology of studying leaders. *The operational code as a methodology seeks to describe a leaders fundamental beliefs, which provide norms, standards, and guidelines for decision making* (Breuning, 2007, p. 38). The operational code methodology allows us to study the mind of the leader, based on a series of questions, thus interpreting the foreign policy decisions that the leader makes. The author mentions four type of leaders that can be differentiated based on the methodology mentioned above. The first type of leader is the active-positive leader. This type of leader spends a lot of energy into decision making and derives a lot of satisfaction from it, taking advice from advisors and listening to different perspectives in the process. The example of John F. Kennedy suits the description of this leader. The second type is the active- negative leader, who perceives foreign policy as a chore. These leaders take an active part in creating foreign policy, micromanaging foreign policy, mainly due to the reason of the will to stay in power. The example of such a leader, as mentioned by the author, is Richard Nixon (referring to his foreign policy around Vietnam). Every foreign policy decision revolves around how the policy may echo domestically. The third type is the passive- positive leader. This type of leader leaves much of the decision making to experts and staff. Ronald Reagan is mentioned here as the example. The fourth and last type of leader is the active- negative leader, who perceives foreign policy rather as a chore and does it referring to the sense of duty to his country. Dwight D. Eisenhower is the example of such a leader. The other methodology used in the analysis of leaders is the leadership trait analysis. This methodology focuses on content analysis of text, looking for specific words when referring to a certain issue. These words might show confidence (words like certain, always, indisputable) when regarding a specific foreign policy issue or a level of uncertainty (usage of words like possibly, maybe, perhaps). Furthermore, the author concludes that to a certain type of leaders, emotions play a large scale in the managing of foreign policy, most notably in an irrational way. The most notable example of such a leader would be Adolf Hitler (Breuning, 2007).

The last author that is mentioned in regards to foreign policy analysis is Christopher Hill. In his 2015 work, *Foreign policy in the twenty-first century*, Hill discusses the contemporary issues of conducting foreign policy and how foreign policy has changed due to the events such as globalization and the rise of the internet. The author analyzes the way the domestic sources influence foreign policy. The author mentions Serbia during the 1990s as an example where domestic pressure, in the form of nationalism, led to the wars of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the author mentions how domestic changes, either in the way of protests or riots, can lead to the shift in the strategic foreign policy conduct. Hill states: *The relevance of society to foreign policy can have a more straightforward dimension, in the terms of the way class, interest groups and public opinion may affect decision-makers' calculations, through their own leverage or via their place in the values of the political system*(Hill, 2015, p. 230). The author highlights that there is a two-way flow between the international events, meaning the foreign shaping of the same, and domestic politics, with a third dimension of transnationalism added to the foreign policy shaping. The author also mentions the influence of diaspora communities in this new globalized world on the shaping of the foreign policy, both in the countries in which the diaspora groups is present as well as in the countries in which those groups originate. The author further tackles the issue of national interest in the modern day and age and what that national interest and who it represents. There are three main approaches to the idea of who shapes national interests and thus foreign policy. The first approach is that elites, with their pre-shaped interest, form the policy on a consistent basis during a large period of time. The second approach is that foreign policy is shaped by its makers, meaning that the central role in shaping foreign policy is within the cultural norms and beliefs (which can shift) of the policy makers. The third approach is that the national interest is like a political football. This approach suggest that national interest is in fact shaped by the pluralist democratic society and within it, which group manages to acquire the largest power shapes the foreign policy, with each groups claiming to be acting in the national interest of a country. An alternative view of the national interest in shaping foreign policy is the antagonist view. The author states that this view entails that foreign policy is shaped in accordance to the actions of a particular state which is considered an enemy. This view is most notable in the cases of India and Pakistan. Further in this chapter, the author explores the issue of multiculturalism and multiculturalism in shaping the foreign policy of a country. Here he identifies three key concepts: multiculturalism (referring to the fact of cultural diversity, meaning that many groups identify themselves separately

from the nation state), multiculturalism (an ideology which revolves around accepting different groups and their rights) and ethnicity. A multi- ethnic society may not be multicultural and vice-versa. Multiculturalism is, according to the author, the driving ideology behind the EU and Western democracies, with immigration laws being the epitome of acceptance of various groups into European societies. However, post 9/11, the issue of multiculturalism as the leading Western ideology has come into question. This was reflected in the fact that foreign policy, previously a branch of the government semi- autonomous to domestic issues, has become much entailed in them. This is most noted, according to the author, in the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US led coalition. Furthermore, in this paper, the fifth chapter of his books is analyzed, called "*The Rationality in Foreign Policy.*" Rationality is a key issue in shaping foreign policy. From a realist perspective, it plays the key role in shaping it as every state tries to gain the maximum out of foreign policy decision making, thus making rational choices. The author states that different schools of thought, when thinking about international relations, accept rationalism as the leading narrative behind decision making. For example, the realists perceive rationalism as an integral part in the decision making process of gaining the most in the game theory, as well as in preserving state security. On the other hand, liberals perceive rationalism as the guiding way towards cooperation, as states tend to acquire more from cooperation than from self- sufficiency, and towards the "society of states." Author mentions further in the article Herbert Simon and his procedural and substantive rationality. Procedural rationality entails: "*an actor engages in a systematic process, including reasoning, to enable him or her to achieve the goals in mind.*" Substantive rationality, on the other hand, identifies correct outcomes, in reference to specific goals. Leadership rationality is the aspect of rationality that is used in the analysis of this article, as it is suited for the topic that is analyzed in this paper. Leadership rationality revolves around the idea that the leader, the person in power, whether in a democratic or authoritarian regime, is most prone towards behaving rationally in the field of international relations. This is due to two intertwining factors. The first factor is the survival of the state. If the leader makes irrational decisions, consequences from them may cause either war or sanctions, thereby hindering either the economic survival or the survival of the nation and its people as a whole. The second factor is the survival of the leader in power. If the irrational decision making causes either war or economic sanctions, the stability of the state and the leader in power comes into question. Thus, the leader has the incentive to behave rationally in order to survive in power and to ensure the survival of the state that he leads. Moreover, the concept of bound

rationality is analyzed as well. This concept suggests that democratic societies tend to have a more developed and sophisticated foreign policy, due to the fact that a number of actors are included in the decision making process. This is reflected in the fact that for a decision to be made under such circumstances, it has to go through various actors who tend to crystalize the decision into a rational one. Another aspect that is mentioned by the authors is the decision not to act deliberately in certain situations. This can be done in foreign policy in order to increase the space for maneuver in certain situations and to gain time in order to assert power and increase the chance of making a gain from a situation that, in the situation when the decision not to act is being made, far outweighs costs from benefits. Historical thinking is another aspect in foreign policy decision making. This is done either individually or through the collective of decision making in the foreign policy system. Lessons learned from history are implemented in the foreign policy of today, making the policy more resistant to critique and minimizing the risk that the policy results in failure. The failure in all of these cases is, according to the authors, war. The end goal of all foreign policy is to minimize the risk of conflict arising between states. The reasons from the leadership perspective were illustrated by the authors before by the authors. In conclusion, the authors refer to avoidance of war and the maximum gain from that avoidance as the ultimate goal of foreign policy. All actors in foreign policy try to behave as rationally as possible, with history showing only a few examples where rationality was downplayed for illusions (Hill, 2015)

The theoretical background behind foreign policy analysis is concluded with Hill. From the four authors, several notes are made and used through the paper. From Alden and Aran, the main school of thought that is deduced is the behaviorist, which means that foreign policy is an outcome of individual decision making. Furthermore, the individuals are limited by state organization, incorporating the institutions and regime types in it, with interest groups and public opinion playing an essential role in foreign policy shaping. On the other hand, Hudson argues as well that leaders play an essential role in the shaping of foreign policy. Leaders make decision in accordance to their own convictions and rationale. These convictions are shaped by norms and values of the culture from which the leader originates, thus culture plays an essential role in foreign policy decision making, as the leader can usage political mobilization around certain values and norms. This is also reflected on the issue of the “*other*” in foreign policy, as some cultures regard others as perpetual enemies, thus compromise is far less likely. Moreover, the nation plays an essential role in the foreign policy shaping, as authors can mobilize around a heroic history in order to conduct certain

foreign policy goals. The author notes the role of the media as well in shaping foreign policy by shaping the public opinion. Interest groups come into play here as well, as the author suggests that they can influence foreign policy based on their proximity to the regime in power. The author suggest further the role that the state organization plays in foreign policy, mainly in the form of institutional barriers, such as the fact that international treaties must be ratified by parliaments. The issue of domestic support is also mentioned, as a leader may chose to ignore opposition or to rally it behind a cause, either foreign or domestic, in order to diverge the spotlight from the opposition. An analysis of the leader can be conducted by analyzing the leader's speeches and interview, a method that will be used in this paper. Breuning expands this analysis further by suggesting the construction, based on this methodology, an operational code of the leader in order to predict his future moves. The leader classification, suggested by him, is used in the case of Aleksandar Vučić. He will be analyzed through the lenses of an active- negative leader, meaning that he creates and micromanages foreign policy in order to enhance his domestic support. Hill also states that culture can also be used in the sense of political mobilization. Furthermore, Hill notes that the leader must behave rationally in order to stay in power, most notably in the usage of historic lessons in conducting foreign policy today. Moreover, the author notes the role of interest groups as well in creating foreign policy. All of the authors have in common the acknowledgment that leaders shape foreign policy and that the leader can be influenced by various interest groups, as well as restricted by state organization. The next topic that is analyzed is promoted by the leader that we analyze in this paper as the most important foreign policy goal of Serbia.

4.2. European Integration and European Foreign Policy Theory

The topic of European Integration and European Foreign Policy is used as an essential field in the understating of the Foreign Policy of Serbia in regards to one if its main foreign policy goals, European Integration. This topic discussed in this paper is first analyzed through the work of five authors. This part serves as an academic background analysis of the enlargement policy of the EU. The first work is 2004s *(Re-) United We Stand? The Agenda of European integration in 2004 and the future of European Union foreign policy* by Uli Brückner. In the article, the author discusses the policies that have brought the EU enlargement of 2004. The author discusses the notion that the European integration itself does not reflect a creation of a common European identity, because

of the diversification and particulate of national identities. Furthermore, the author claims that the European integration was focused entirely on economic aspects, rather than social, meaning that instead of connecting people, the policy makers focused on interconnecting member states economies. However, in 2004, the European Union member states agreed to enhance the role of the EU as a single international actor, which was reflected in the appointment of a single commissioner for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. That role can be understood as a strive by the member states towards a creation of a single European foreign ministry. However, the case of Iraq and the involvement of the EU member states individually illustrates the difficulties of the European common foreign policy (Brückner. 2004).

The second work is that by Sophie Vanhoonacker & Karolina Pomorska: *The European External Action Service and agenda-setting in European foreign policy*. The authors discuss the events around and after the Lisboa treaty, reflected in the creation of the European External Action Service and the relationship of the service with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a function which was also created in Lisboa. The foreign policy making in the European Union is very difficult because of the composition of the Union and the various member states that conduct its own foreign policy, with no mechanism of punishing those who deter from the same, reflected by the authors on the case example of Poland. This was one of the strategies of the High Representative, the establishment of EU authority on foreign policy making in member states, which proved unsuccessful. However, the function was most successful when it came to capacity building. However, because of the domestic issues mentioned earlier, the EEAS and the High Representative were unsuccessful when it came to focusing on foreign issues (Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013).

The third work that is discussed is Leuffens: *Differentiated integration*. The author discusses the intergovernmentalist theory of European integration, the theory which will be the guiding theory of this paper. According to this, the national governments chose integration in relation to how much autonomy they retain. Hereby, the governments rationally outweigh the costs and benefits of integration. An interesting notion mentioned by the author is that states choose to integrate if they feel threatened externally, as followed by traditional intergovernmentalism. On the other hand, the liberal intergovernmentalism states that the key role in the integration process play interest groups and whether integration is in their interest. The integration process is described as

a process of bargaining between states and the Union, with traditionalist (represented by Moravscik) regarding parties in the process as equal, while the liberal school sees it as a reflection of domestic policies and the interest of the interest group at home. For the intergovernmentalist theory, integration and the institutions and policies that come out of it are just a reflection of the bargaining process between the state and the Union as equal actors, with each pursuing its own interest. The level of integration is conditioned by the necessity for the same, both in international and domestic terms (Leuffen, 2013).

The fourth work that is discussed is that by Tanja Börzel: *Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States*. The author discusses the dimensions, mechanisms and outcome of Europeanisation. The author identifies two dimensions: bottom-up (meaning that the member states influence the policies of the Union) and top- down (meaning that the policies of member states are influenced by the Union). As it comes to mechanism, they are mostly reflected in the policies that are imposed by member states to the Union or that the Union imposes upon member states or those trying to become member states. These mechanisms are mostly reflected in the institutional changes, such as the creation of new EU bodies or the inclusion of new responsibilities upon the existing ones or in the changing of domestic institutions in order to fit into EU regulations and norms. As for the incomes, the author states that they change from states to states as from the top- down perspective (in regards to EU integration process) (Börzel, 2005).

The conclusion behind European integration works can be summed up in a few sentences. Interest groups play an essential role in the integration of certain states into the European Union. This liberal intergovernmentalism. The foreign policy of the Union is not always a single minded approach, yet it is composed of various opinions and decisions upon certain foreign policy goals. The integration process is analyzed through the top- down approach. As it will later be analyzed, this approach can be used by populist leaders in order to justify certain policy reforms. Because of the position of Serbia, the analysis between EU- Russia relations needs to be conducted in the next part of the paper.

In this part of the academic background the EU- Russia relation is shortly analyzed, as for this paper there is a need to have such an analysis because of the peculiar position of Serbia between the two. The first article that is explored is “*Ukraine and Europe: Reshuffling the boundaries of order*” by Kataryna Wolczuk. The author discusses the perception of Ukraine as being more

European and open to European values than Russia. However, the author also discusses the Russian influence in the region, stating that Russia is perceived as threatened by the European expansion into the area. Furthermore, Russian action in Ukraine has inadvertently contributed to the enhancing of the Ukrainian societies perception of itself as European (Wolczuk, 2016).

The second article is *2011s Russia–EU Relations, or How the Russians Really View the EU* by Tumanov, Gasparishvili, Romanova. In the article, the authors discuss the problems between Russia and EU in their neighborhood. It analyzes that Russia has no open hostilities towards the neighborhood policy of the EU, however it perceives countries that have a more European approach as hostile, as illustrated by the cases of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. This hostility is perceived both by the elites and the public, which is thus reflected in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation (Tumanov, Gasparishvili and Romanova, 2011).

The third article that is used is by Anna A. Dekalchuk & Aleksandra Khokhlova *Russian and Western scholarly perspectives on EU–Russia relations in Justice and Home Affairs: how ‘indigenous’ is the Russian scholarship?* The authors discuss the lack of academic dialogue between Russian scholars and Western ones. This lack of dialogue is thus reflected in the fact that the expert level groups on the multilateral talks, especially between the EU and Russia, fail to produce a compromise solution (Dekalchuk and Khokhlova, 2018).

The fourth and final article that is discussed is *2012s EU-Russia energy relations: a critical analysis* by Lisa Pick. The author discusses the aftermath of the gas crisis of 2006, when Russia used the energy monopoly in the form of gas to exert force over the European Union. Both EU and Russia are in a very uneasy relation that the gas crisis illustrated, with the EU funding research in alternative energy sources since then. However, interdependence is the element that keeps this relation at the status quo level (Pick, 2012). A notice that has to be made is the Ukraine crisis, which has just further complicated the relations between the two actors.

In conclusion, the perception of norms, the gas dependence and the academic discussions are all discussed on the case of Serbia in order to have a comprehensive understanding about the foreign policies of both Russia and the EU in the case of Serbia. This part concludes the academic

4.3. Populism Theory

This part of the paper is devoted to the definition of populism in order to get a theoretical background for the topic that is analyzed, as in order to study populism in foreign policy we must first define populism. A good starting point for the analysis of populism is the 2017 book by Mudde and Kaltwasser, *Populism: An Very Short Introduction*. The authors here describe two perceptions of populism. The first perception of populism is populism as a movement, related to populism being rather a social movement than a strong ideology. This is based on the notion that populism can include elements from either the right or left political specter. On the other hand, the authors describe populism as: *A thin- centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people* (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017. p. 6). The authors continue in describing populism as a “thin-centered ideology.” They do so by arguing that populism encompasses elements of both left and right, with ideologies serving as a collection of norms of how society should be governed. The authors further identify three key elements of populism: the people, the elite and the general will. The definition of people ranges from their socio- economic status to them belonging to a specific nation, thus belonging to a certain state. Moreover, this identification of the people with the nation can result, in populist movement, in nationalism where members of another ethnic group can be described as the corrupt elite (*idem*).

The second article that is used for analysis is *The New Populism in Poland: The Usual Suspects?* by Jasiewicz. In the article, the author describes the political discourse in Poland by analyzing the two populist political parties that emerged on the 2006 elections and failed to win any votes, but whose slogans were adopted in the end by the governing parties. The author implies that: *“Both share a vision of the (Polish) people that is homogenizing and exclusivist. Both articulate a strong sense of crisis, although each with its own distinct emphasis: For Self- Defense the most important issue is the economic fate of ordinary people, whereas the LPR focuses more on moral issues and alleged threats to Poland’s cultural identity* (Jasiewicz, 2008, p. 8).”

Another article that is used for this paper is *Populism in Europe* by Eric Jones. In the article, the author describes populism as being: *“European populists organize movements and not parties, they appeal to voters and not activists, they focus most of their attention on discrete issues and they*

seem to care less about how their programs hang together (Jones, 2007, p. 15).” The third article that is used is *Right-Wing Populism in Austria: A Case for Comparison* by Reinhard Heinisch. The author describes the characteristics of the Populist Party FPO in Austria as a populist party, which engages primarily in emotional appeals and mobilizes voters through simplistic and dichotomist rhetoric, the use of scapegoats, and spectacular acts (Heinisch, 2008,).

In conclusion, populism is defined by the academic community as nation oriented, perceiving the nation as being threatened by a source from outside, with less regard towards how their programs co-align. The movements use simple rethoric and scapegoats in order to mobilize the voters. This will be analyzed further in the paper on the case of Serbia. Furthermore, after an essential theoretical background has been established on populism, the next topic that is analyzed is the role of populism in shaping foreign policy.

4.4. Populism and Foreign Policy Theory

The final part of the theoretical background revolves around the 2019 book *Populism and World Politics: Exploring Inter- and Transnational Dimensions* by the authors Stengel Frank, MacDonald David and Nabers Dirk. This part of the literature combines populism with foreign policy and, as this topic is quite new in the academic community, this source represents one of the rare works that combine these two field. The authors discuss how populism became a major issue in the world following the possible implications of the election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States. Furthermore, the authors note that populism is not adjacent to one side of the political spectrum, rather it represents a collection from both sides of it. The leadership figure, they regard as the essential component of populism and thus its impact on world politics cannot be understated. The authors note that populism is not a threat to either European integration or international commitment, as it seeks nominally to restore power to the people. However, this restoration of power back to the people from the elites may have international implications, such as the case of Britain exiting the European Union or popularly called Brexit. The authors state: *Populism is likely to have an impact on both foreign policy- the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually but not exclusively a state) in international relations and world politics, the larger totality of different actors' interactions that takes place across*

national boundaries (Stengel, MacDonald and Nabers, 2019, p. 14). Through the book, on various case examples such as Trump, the authors research the impact of populism on foreign policy. The conclusion they have reached was a three step model of researching populism in foreign policy. The first step is to identify the type of populism in place in a certain actor, either country leader or movement. Left- wing populism may be Eurosceptic due to the neoliberal reforms conducted by the European Union, while the right- wing populism Euroscepticism is mostly centered on cultural issues and the cultural identity of a certain group or nation. Furthermore, right- wing populism tends to be more skeptical on international cooperation than that of the left- wing specter of the political scale. Moreover, the domestic constraints and structure play a vital role in shaping the foreign policy of a country and thus populism as well has to adopt to the same. This is most noted in countries where populist form coalition governments, thus their impact on foreign policy is constrained by their coalition members. Moreover, institutions such as the parliament play a significant role in foreign policy as those institutions ratify international agreements. Institutions such as an independent judiciary may as well play a role in the shaping of foreign policy, such as in the case of Trumps ban on entering of Muslims into the United States, where this decision was ruled over by the Supreme Court. This represents the second step in the model suggested by the authors, the domestic opportunity structure, as even populist actors, as shown in the case of Trumps ban on Muslims, are not free to play on their own. The third step is the international context. This is most noted, as the authors' state, in the funding of right- wing populist movements in Europe by Russia. However, the most important issue to note here is the leadership figure in populism. It plays an essential role in shaping populist policies as the cases of Trump, Orban and other populist leaders illustrate. Populism is essentially a leadership oriented ideology, where the leader serves as a guide in moving the nation and protecting it. Populist leaders, however, tend to shape foreign policy by making harsh decisions without analyzing the possible implications of the same. Once again, the Muslim ban by Trump illustrates this case. Thus, populism and foreign policy are intertwined and further research is needed in order to connect the dots (Stengel, MacDonald and Nabers, 2019).

The second work that is used in this part is *Populism and Foreign Policy: The Case of India* by Johannes Plagemann and Sandra Destradi. It was written in December 2018 and presents one of the few examples of academic works with case example of the combination of the fields of populism and foreign policy. The authors use India as the case example for combining populism and foreign policy. The authors conduct an analysis of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's

foreign policy. In 2014, Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) were elected to power. The authors define the BJP as a Hindu- nationalist party. Modi is regarded as a populist leader and the authors focus on two elements of populism within his conduct. These elements are anti-pluralism and anti- elitism. They define anti- elitism in purely moralistic terms. The populist element is that the leader is regarded as a champion of the people, the one individual who had the courage to oppose the elites of the nation, most often in the form of influential businessman or either the establishments such as the WTO and WB. The leader acts in the interest of the people, promoting their rights instead of economic reforms driven forward by those actors. The authors further define the element of anti- pluralism. They define this element as the notion that only the leader and his party represent the people and their interest. No other political party on the national scene is able to champion the rights of the people, except in this case, the BJP and Modi as its leader. The authors suggest five hypotheses, but for the writing of this paper we will use three hypotheses. The first suggests that the populist leader is less likely to engage in *“populists in power will be more likely than their non- populist counterparts to develop a transnational understanding of their “people” and to engage such a transnational audience in their foreign policy* (Pagemann and Destrade, 2018, p. 288). This hypothesis is mostly related to the diaspora communities of a nation and the supposed care for them. Furthermore, the authors suggest that a populist leader is not a protectionist in economic terms, meaning that some populists are willing to conduct open- market reforms and focus on trade with foreign partners. The second hypothesis that the authors suggest is that the *decision-making process in the foreign policy of populists in power will be more centralized and personalistic with fewer formalized opportunities for alternative viewpoints than under a non- populist leadership* (Pagemann and Destrade, 2018, p. 289). The populist leader, in this case, suggests himself as the sole champion of the interest of the country. Any alternative viewpoints on how to conduct foreign policy are depicted by the leader as an attack on the national interest of the country. Populism in India was, however, present from the beginning of the independence of that country. The authors suggests that the key feature of populism in India, historically, was the anti- elitism element. Both Indira Ghandi and Nehru used their position to present themselves as champions of the Indian nation. Both of them used the position to declare themselves as the opposition to the conservative elements of society, thereby becoming champions of the poor. However, Indian populism did not entail anti. Pluralism, as both Nehru and Ghandi were pushing forward for political pluralism. On the other hand, Mori incorporated that element as

well into his political strategy, aside for the anti- elitism. Furthermore, the “*other*” in the case of Modi represents the Muslim minority in India, with several policies being directed against them. The authors move further in the paper on the analysis of the foreign policy of India while Modi is in power. On the issue of global governance, the position of India has not changed much. India contributes to peace- keeping in the United Nations mission, ranking it among top 3 contributors. Furthermore, India has positioned itself as one of the guarantees in regional security in Asia and as a factor of peace and stability. In the sense of multilateralism vs bilateralism, India under Modi has shown a clear pattern of increase in bilateral negotiations, while at the same time the multilateral component of foreign policy, most notable in the UN and its commitment to UN affairs, and has not shown a decrease in Indian commitment. Modi has depicted itself as a champion of the India diaspora, holding rallies in Singapore as well as in London. However, he has shown a shift from the traditional India as leader of the third world policy towards a more Western approach, thereby attracting foreign investment into India and thus boosting Indian economy. Modi has as well downplayed the role of the Ministry of External Affairs of India, positioning himself over the ministry and conducting foreign policy on his own, becoming India’s chief diplomat. Another aspect is the usage of social media as a new source of communication, most notably Twitter. The authors conclude that populism had an impact on the foreign policy of India and that the impact is centered most on the personality of Modi, thereby replacing traditional means of diplomatic conduct, such as the Minister of External Affairs, by the office of prime minister and Modi as its representative (Plagemann and Destrade, 2018).

This concludes the chapter of this paper that analyzes the academic background. Foreign policy analysis is conducted on the basis of leadership decision, which is in turn limited by state design and influenced by public opinion and interest groups. Leadership decisions can be analyzed by the type of leader, which in the case of this paper is active- negative. Thus, behaviorism is the main theoretical school behind the analysis of Serbian foreign policy. Liberal intergovernmentalism is the main theory behind the European integration of Serbia, as interest groups such as Serbia diaspora play an essential role in the integration process of Serbia. The various factors, such as gas dependency as well as the top- down process, play an essential part in the integration of Serbia into the European Union and it will certainly be interesting to analyze how a leader uses this in order to justify certain policy reforms. Populism as a political movement, defined by its care and protection of the people from an outside threat, plays a major role in shaping foreign policy. Populism revolves

around a central figure that shapes policy and thus guides the nation. As in the case of India, the Prime Minister Modi has been shown to represent a populism in anti- elitist and anti- pluralist elements. These traits will later be analyzed on the case of Aleksandar Vučić and Serbia, as well if the nation is depicted on the world scene by him as India is depicted by Modi.

5. Historical background

In order to understand the topic that this paper revolves around, the history of Yugoslavia and its foreign policy must be analyzed. The origins of socialist Yugoslavia are traced to the communist partisan struggle of the Second World War. The leader of this movement was Josip Broz Tito. The communist were prosecuted and banned by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the monarchy which emerged in the aftermath of the First World War. The communist party was a rare multinational party in the Yugoslavia. Thus, when Germany and its allies invaded Yugoslavia, the communist resistance movement, the Partisans, stood up to the invasion. Due to the multinational character of the organization, the movement aimed at shaping Yugoslavia on a new, federal basis. Brotherhood and unity among the various national groups was the official state policy. However, Tito still answered to the Comintern in Moscow, as Moscow and the Soviet Union were considered the origins of communism and as Tito was trained and supported by the Soviet Union. After he emerged victorious with the help of the Red Army in 1945, he was determined to show that he was loyal to Moscow (Benson, 2004). In 1945, the first Trieste crisis emerged. Yugoslav forces liberated Trieste from the Italian fascists. However, Trieste was formally a part of the Italian territory. The Yugoslav forces refused to retreat and this caused the first crisis, which resulted in Yugoslavia gaining some parts of the Trieste countryside, while the Italians controlled the city itself. In 1945, Yugoslavia also refused to be a part of the Marshall program for the rebuilding of Europe after World War Two. Furthermore, in 1946, Yugoslav air forces shot down American planes that were trespassing in Yugoslav airspace (Imamovic, 1998). These events shaped Tito as a reliable ally to Stalin. They also showed that the Yugoslav foreign policy was oriented to the East, meaning that Yugoslavia follows the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Tito during this time proposed a so-called Balkan union, a federal unit consists of all communist Balkan states that will be led by Yugoslavia and Tito (Benson, 2004). This, together with some events in

party organization and functioning which are too broad to be discussed in this paper, show that Tito always wanted to keep Yugoslavia semi dependent and not under total control of the Soviet Union.

In 1948, because of these tries by Tito to make Yugoslavia more independent from the Soviet Union, the Tito- Stalin split happened. The resolution of the Informbiro, the main international communist party organ under Stalin, consisting of representatives from all Soviet puppet states, condemned Tito and the Yugoslav communists as being too liberal and as acting against communist ideals. Tito used this moment to turn his foreign policy to the Western nations, asking them for support against Soviet expansion. Due to the geopolitical situation in the world at that moment, the Western allies greeted Yugoslavia and provided them with both economic and political assistance against Stalin and the Soviet Union. With the support provided by the Western allies and most importantly the United States, the Soviet Union was deterred from installing a coup against Tito and Yugoslavia, like it did latter in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. During this period of the Cold War, Yugoslavia was the only communist state to have open and friendly relations with Western nations (*idem*).

1950s brought a change in Yugoslav foreign policy. Stalin died in 1953 and the new leadership under Nikita Khrushchev did not want to continue the hostilities with Yugoslavia that were caused by Stalin in 1948. So, in 1955, Khrushchev organized a state visit to Yugoslavia in order to better the relations with Yugoslavia and Tito. This enabled Tito now to balance between both East and West. The West praised him as the man who said no to Stalin and the Soviets, while the East praised him as a WWII hero and communist revolutionary (Lampe, 2010). With the position of Yugoslavia secured from both the East and the West, this enabled Tito to concentrate his diplomatic efforts elsewhere. As a result of this, the non-aligned movement was formed in 1956 on the Brijuni Island in Yugoslavia (*idem*). During the next 25 years, Tito successfully balanced between East and West, while at the same time strengthening the non- aligned movement and cementing Yugoslavia's role in it as the leading one.

In 1980 Tito died. His funeral was attended by diplomatic envoys across the world and it represented a sort of a diplomatic summit. However, for Yugoslavia, after Tito both economic and political crisis spread across the country. This period is also marked by the weakening of Yugoslavian diplomatic power as well, both by the shifts occurring in the global powers, brought by the end of block politics after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 (Imamovic, 1998).

1990s bring a culmination to this crisis. After 10 years, the country dissolution in a war (*idem*). The foreign policy of socialist Yugoslavia continued to be harbored by Milosevic's Serbia together with Montenegro, named at that time the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The foreign policy of Serbia is shaped by the events in Yugoslavia and the world during the 1990s. First, on the global scene, the Cold War era bloc division of the world was destroyed by the events following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Gorbachovs reforms and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the democratization of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, during this period socialist Yugoslavia was falling apart along the lines of the republics of which it consisted. Milosevic, as the leader of Serbia and the rest of Yugoslavia (Consisting of Montenegro and Serbia and named Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) during this time, showed support towards Serb irredentist in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and, as such, faced economic sanctions by the UN in order to stop the war in Yugoslavia (BBC, 1995). This had the effect that Yugoslavia lost most all of its diplomatic power base during the period of 1990-1995. The only some-sort of ally during this period who was ready to diplomatically intervene for Federal Yugoslavia was Yeltsins Russia.

Sanctions and isolation further crippled Yugoslav foreign power during the 1990s. However, one event would prove fatal to Federal Yugoslavia. In 1999, the events at Kosovo as Yugoslavia was accused of creating a humanitarian crisis in that region. The NATO led coalition bombed Federal Yugoslavia (without Montenegro who was spared of the bombing) and new economic sanctions followed. This position isolated Federal Yugoslavia even further from the rest of the world and thereby crippled its position in diplomatic terms. During this time, only Russia tried to position itself as an ally of Serbia, but due to domestic problems following the dissolution of the Soviet Union its capability to act was limited (Ramet, 2005).

On the fifth of October 2000, Milosevic was toppled down by the democratic opposition in Serbia. There was a considerable foreign influence in toppling down Milosevic, as mostly the United States viewed him as the axis of all evil in the South- Eastern Europe. The countries name was transformed into Serbia and Montenegro (RTS, 2015).

The new state was founded on democratic principles. The new government under Zoran Đinđić promoted the EU integration of Serbia. However, the no NATO principle became a motto of all political options in Serbia, due to the bombing of Serbia in 1999 (Demokratska stranka, 2018).

These principles of foreign policy have not changed up to this date and present the core elements of Serbian foreign policy.

In 2006 Montenegro left the union with Serbia in a peaceful referendum (BBC, 2006). However, in 2008 Kosovo declared independence. The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, which was considered a region of Serbia, prompted Serbia to pursue a diplomatic offensive in order to halt the recognition of the new republic. Once again, Russia showed itself as an ally of Serbia as it acted against the independence of Kosovo (Weller, 2009). By no way did Russia do this as an act of good will to Serbia. Russia sees Serbia as the only potential ally in the Balkan region, as most other Balkan nations have joined both NATO and the European Union. Only Serbia remains neutral when it comes to accession to NATO (B92.net, 2017).

Elections in 2012 brings Aleksandar Vučić as the prime minister of Serbia. His government continues to reign up to this date. The main foreign policy goals of this Serbia government continues to be EU integration on one hand, and regional leadership on the other. Also, stopping the foreign recognition of Kosovo as a state continues to be one of the most important elements of Serbian diplomacy today (Mfa.gov.rs, 2017).

6. Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia

Based on the history of Yugoslavia and its conduct of foreign policy, three main elements can be drawn:

- 1. Balancing between East and West - Neutrality*
- 2. Regional leadership*
- 3. Leader of the third world (non- aligned movement)*

The first element represents the balancing of Yugoslavia between the Eastern and the Western block of nations during the Cold War. Because of this, Yugoslavia managed to maintain its sovereignty by remaining neutral during the Cold War.

The first block consisted of the Western nations led by the United States of America. In 1949, NATO was formed as the core of the European and American relations. The first predecessor of

the European Union, the European Coal and Steel community was formed in 1953. Yugoslavia found itself on the borders of these new political blocks. Since the 1948 split with Stalin, Yugoslavia had a new and even more powerful ally. This new political block that emerged in 1949, granted Yugoslavia guarantee its independence. Yugoslavia was enjoying multiple benefits from its position of balancing with the West. These benefits included: economic relations and financial help, exchange of technological ideas (collaboration with Italian Fiat in the automobile industry as an example) and from 1967, Yugoslavia became the only socialist country to allow the free flow of people to and from Western countries (Benson, 2004). Because of this, Yugoslavia benefited much from its relation with the West.

The second block consisted of Eastern nations under Soviet Union leadership. The Eastern bloc was formalized like the Western block, by a creation of a military pact. The Warsaw pact became a reality 1955, as a direct result of the creation of NATO 6 years earlier. Yugoslavia was now positioned between two military alliances and ideological blocks. Khrushchev's visited Yugoslavia in 1955 and gave Tito the invitation to join the Warsaw pact. Tito refused this, stating that Yugoslavia will remain neutral in this bloc conflict (Lampe, 2010). Because of this, Yugoslavia was still very important to Soviet side as well. This cause Yugoslavia to benefit from economic relations with Eastern bloc nations. Tito saw the Eastern bloc as an ideological ally. Due to this, the exchange of ideas was promoted, both in technological (especially in the military technology terms, as Yugoslavia produced licensed copies of Soviet arms and sold it to third world nations) and ideological terms of social governance. Yugoslav citizens enjoyed free travel to the Eastern bloc countries as well (Benson, 2004). In conclusion of this element, Yugoslavia enjoyed both benefits from the Eastern and Western bloc and it was the only country in Europe to do so.

The second elements is the presentation of Yugoslavia and Tito as the leader on the South-Eastern Europe.

The Balkan Union idea was proposed by Tito together with Albanian and Bulgarian leaders. The idea proposed the creation of a federal union between the Balkan nations which would represent a new power on the European scene, of course oriented and guided by communist principles. Tito wanted to position Yugoslavia as the leader of this new political block. But, the Tito- Stalin split brought an end to this idea. (Benson, 2004) However, with the non- aligned movement and

Yugoslavian balancing between East and West, Yugoslavia was considered by the both as the leader of this part of Europe.

The third element is the presentation of Yugoslavia and Tito, as its leader, as the leader of the third world. This third world is represented through the non-aligned movement.

Non-aligned movement was formed in 1956 on the Brijuni Island in Yugoslavia. The founding father of the non-aligned movement was Josip Broz Tito, together with Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Sukarno (Indonesia), Nkrumah (Ghana) and Gamal Abdel Naser (Egypt). The movement was mostly comprised of ex colonial countries (Potter, 2017). It had several aims. The first aim was the battle against the block politics of that time. The world was obviously divided between the Western block under USA leadership and the Eastern bloc under Soviet leadership. This third world block would fight against these types of block politics in order to ensure a safer political environment in the world. The second aim was the battle against racism. As the majority of these countries were ex colonies, they were very much familiar with racism and segregation. So this movement took up the fight against racism as one of its core principles. The third aim was combating poverty that has been ravaging the third world countries. The fourth aim of the program was mutual noninterference in domestic affairs and mutual non-aggression between the member states (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2019).

7. Foreign Policy of Serbia

The main school of thought that is used in the foreign analysis of Serbia is realism. In short, Serbia has lost the status and prestige during the 1990s that it had when it was a part of Yugoslavia. Both the economic and military power had diminished during the transitional period and due to the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The material position of Serbia, the years of economic hardship and the NATO intervention in 1999 had caused Serbia to lose much of its military power in the region. Furthermore, afterwards the period of transition and the slow build-up of the Serbia economy are seen as the main reasons for the pursuit of such a foreign policy, depicted in the fact that the main foreign policy goal of Serbia is European Integration. All of these reasons are analyzed in person further in this paper. Even though the realist school of thought does not incorporate the individuality of leaders, like the behaviorist school of thought does, this paper

tries to incorporate the behaviorist approach with the realist, mostly in the form of the decision making of the President of Serbia in foreign policy.

The elements of populism that can be drawn from these theoretical works are the following: following voter preferences, not ideology; simplistic rhetoric used for voter mobilization; economic fate of the ordinary voter; a homogenizing vision of its people; a strong sense of crisis. After analyzing the theory behind populism and the characteristics of the same as presented by the authors, the second chapter focuses on the analysis of populist elements in the leading party in Serbia, Serbian Progressive Party.

Based on the history that was presented in the previous chapter, two main elements of foreign policy can be drawn:

1. *Balancing between EU, NATO and Russia - Neutrality*
2. *Regional leadership*
3. *Stopping of the foreign recognition of Kosovo as a state*

The first element represents the balancing of Serbia's foreign policy between EU and NATO on one side and Russia on the other side. All of this is done in a sense that projects Serbia as wanting not to choose sides and as being able to have good relations with both sides.

Arming of Serbia by Russia is one of the most notable elements of Russian influence in Serbia. Russia is arming Serbia with mostly outdated Soviet- era military systems for a very cheap price or even for free. Russia is by doing this strengthening its position in Serbia and most notably, it is enhance the national sentiment of the population of Serbia that Russia is the only true friend that they have in the world (B92.net, 2019).

On the other hand, Serbian military is conducting joint exercises with NATO, despite the events of 1999 (Vs.rs, 2017). By doing this, Serbia is showing that it wants to be good with both the NATO bloc and Russia, in the period when NATO- Russian relations have reached a peak in tensions, the highest since the end of the Cold War. This shows the ability of Serbian leadership to balance, even though its populace is mostly sentimental to the Russian side, while stressing out the military neutrality of Serbia (Vs.rs, 2019).

7.1. EU Enlargement policy

“The Treaty on the European Union states that any European country may apply for membership if it respects the democratic values of the EU and is committed to promoting them... The EU also needs to be able to integrate new members. ((European Commission, 2019).” As based on the official commission explanation, the enlargement policy is thereby focused solely on Europe and the countries stationed in it. Furthermore, a conclusion can be drawn from the commission statement that the member countries decide whether a new country will join the Union, whether or not it has fulfilled the membership requirements.

Furthermore, the policy is described as: *“The EU's enlargement policy deals with the countries currently aspiring to become members of the European Union. ... For the purpose of accession negotiations, these are divided into 35 different policy fields (chapters). A number of cross-cutting policy issues are of concern to most countries aspiring to join the EU, including: Rule of Law, Freedom of expression and media, Civil Society, Regional Cooperation, Economic governance, SME Performance Review (idem).”*

As it can be seen from the commission statement above and from the Copenhagen criteria, which represent the membership requirements as decided in 1993, the requirements for joining the Union can be classified into three distinct areas: member state having a market economy, being a democracy and the ability to take up the obligations as member.

7.2. EU Integration

The EU Integration is the process in which a member country transforms, according to the Copenhagen criteria, into a member state. First, the aspiring state must fulfill 35 chapters, each from a different policy area. The process itself includes not just a fulfillment of the 35 chapters, but also an endorsement of European values by the aspiring member state. Another aspect of joining the Union is the mutual defense assistance, obliging each member state that in the case of hostile action against a member state, the other member states have the obligation to assist in the defense (European Parliament, 2018).

The integration today consist of endorsement of European values, allowing for a solid foundation upon to which the Union and upon which to conduct a coercive policy, whether domestic or international, following Brückners work. Whether the process is today more of a top- down one or down- top, in line with Börzels work, as well as if the EU conducts as a single author, in line with the work of Sophie Vanhoonacker & Karolina Pomorska, will be illustrated on the example of Serbia.

7.3. EU Integration of Serbia

The theoretical background behind the analysis of this process is intergovernmentalism, as illustrated by Leuffen. The integration process of Serbia is governed by the Copenhagen criteria. Serbia started its integration process in 2000, when the democratic system was established in Serbia. In 2009 Serbia filled to the Commission the candidacy status. That status was ratified in September 2013, when the accession negotiations started (Mfa.gov.rs, 2019).

However, the path to the accession process can not only be analyzed in the terms of the pre-negotiation process related to the implementation of the acqui and the preconditions that are derived from it in order for a country to reach candidate status. The other element that has to be mentioned when discussing the European integration of Serbia is the implementation of international agreements, relating to the Dayton agreement and the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in Hague, Netherlands (Esiweb.org, 2019). This cooperation, most relevantly in the cases of Karadzic, Mladic and Hadzic, was deemed in the eyes of the European Union as not being done in its full capacity. It was viewed as slow and inefficient, even to some extent being perceived that some elements within the government were deliberately hindering the existing cooperation and assisting in hiding the fugitives, as the 2008 government change illustrated. When Boris Tadic who came to power in 2008 placed a new chief of the Intelligence service, Karadzic was apprehended in a matter of months (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2019). This precondition was the first of its kind imposed to a country willing to join. It can be analyzed in the terms of willingness to cooperate and uphold to international agreements, both pivotal elements for a countries ability to function within the European Union. Another issue that hindered Serbia from reaching the status of candidate was the issue of Kosovo, as some conservative political parties

demanded that the precondition of Serbia joining the European Union was the withdrawal of the recognition of Kosovo by EU member as a country in order for Serbia to start the accession process (Esiweb.org, 2019).

The accession process is divided into 35 chapters. However, the relationship with Kosovo is regarded in these chapters, as a separate topic in article 35, other chapters. Furthermore, the integration process is proceeding as multilateral conferences between Serbia and the EU member states governments. So far, three conferences were organized in regards to this, where some of the chapters were opened and discussed (Mfa.gov.rs, 2019). Up to the point of writing of this paper, Serbia has opened up 11 chapters of the accession talks. It has provisionally closed two chapters, Science and Research and Education and Culture (European Commission- 2019). The Cooperation and Stability Agreement (SSP) between EU and Serbia was signed in 2013. It defined the cooperation between Serbia and the EU in the terms of foreign policy, energy, trade and the rule of law (Mfa.gov.rs, 2019). This represents a short introduction into the negotiating process. In the next part, the two reports, by Serbia and by the European Commission, are comparatively analyzed.

The first report that is analyzed is that by the MFA of Serbia. In it is stated that Serbia strives towards being an EU member and towards accepting the *acquis communautaire*. It is stated that Serbia will protect its interest in these negotiations and that it will protect its interest, in the form that the EU will have to make compromises in the negotiating process. The integration process is done through multilateral conferences (Mfa.gov.rs, 2016). This report is from 2016 and it is the most recent report that I could find about the integration process of Serbia. It is written before the conclusion of some negotiating chapters in 2017, Science and Research and Education and Culture (European Commission- 2019). It is also a more descriptive report from the government of Serbia that is available to the public.

On the other hand, the European Commission issues reports for the integration process of Serbia. The report is comprehensive and includes a report on each of the 35 negotiating chapters, open or not, and whether Serbia has made progress in regards to EU standards. The first issue that the Commission regarded is the transparency of the elections in Serbia, regarding the first Copenhagen criteria, a democratic society. The second issue that it regarded in these terms is that Serbia: “*No progress was made towards establishing an enabling environment for the development and financing of civil society* (Ec.europa.eu, 2018).” A It is stated further that Serbia has some

preparation level when it comes to the rule of law, but that there is an institutional framework for the same. Serbia has made progress in regards to transforming into an open market economy, the second Copenhagen criteria. In regards to the third criteria, assuming membership obligation, Serbia has made progress in the form of reforms conducted, however it will need to maintain the pace of the reforms. Furthermore, Serbia has been instructed by the Commission in the report about which steps to take in the process, most notably in conducting a public financial management reform and creating an enabling environment for freedom of expression and media freedom. As for the issue of Kosovo, the issue is briefly mentioned in the terms that further efforts need to be made for the normalization of relations (idem).

EU integration remains one of the most important goals of Serbia foreign policy. The European Union integration would represent a major foreign policy victory of Serbia and it is doing hard to satisfy Brussels in the accession process. The Serbian leadership suggests that the foreign policy of Serbia must be integrated with the European Union, as the future of Serbia lies within a unified Europe (N1 Srbija, 2017).

Based on the reports both by Serbia and the EU, the conclusion can be made that the process is a top- down one. EU is imposing demands upon Serbia, with concrete steps to be made in order to integrate and become a member state. A liberal traditional intergovernmentalist approach can be used to describe the relationship, in regards to the fact that Serbia is surrounded by EU member states and because of this it feels threatened by the EU and wants to become a part of the same. On the other hand, the liberal intergovernmentalist approach can't be used to describe the integration process, as the first negotiating chapters being closed in education, culture and science. Serbia has still a long road to follow on the integration path. In two years Serbia has not concluded any negotiating chapters and we will see if this negative trend follows. The report on Serbia is not optimistic that the country will become an EU member state any time soon. Furthermore, the question arises if Serbia and its population will ever be fully integrated in the term of adopting European values and accepting a European identity.

The second element represents Serbia's attempts to establish itself as a regional leader.

Serbia mostly concentrates to establish itself as a regional leader of the countries of former Yugoslavia. In order to do so, Serbia funds and hosts multinational conferences with the aim of establishing regional cooperation. While this is a noble aim, it projects the image of Serbia as a

regional leader and a factor of peace and stability in the Balkans, thereby strengthening its diplomatic position (Mfa.gov.rs, 2017).

The third element represents the diplomatic efforts of Serbia to stop the foreign recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state.

This effort represents the most of Serbia's diplomatic offensive and the largest of any other diplomatic offensives in the region that was conducted since the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia. Using diplomatic pressures and lobbying, Serbia has been semi- successful in pushing states to not recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state and to stop its accession into international organizations, most notably the UN and its organs. In these efforts, Serbia is mostly supported by Russia who seeks to stop Serbia from having close relations with the Western countries (Mfa.gov.rs, 2017).

Furthermore, aside from the stopping of the foreign recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state, Serbia has taken a firm stance when talking about the Serbian people living in this area, pledging to provide them institutional help and protection. The diplomatic effort is mostly excelled at the Resoultion 1244 of the Security Council of the United Nations, a resolution that defines Kosovo as a part of Serbia (Mfa.gov.rs, 2019).

8. Comparison of the Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia with the Foreign Policy of Serbia

In this chapter of the paper the main point of it is analyzed. This main point is, to repeat, that today's Serbia is replaying the foreign policy that socialist Yugoslavia conducted. This paper proves it by looking at two elements of the foreign policy of both Serbia and Yugoslavia:

- *Balancing between East and West (with neutrality being its core feature)*
- *Regional leadership*

The first element represent the balancing between the East and West, with neutrality being the pivot of this element of foreign policy of both Yugoslavia and Serbia.

Serbia is balancing between EU and Russia. On the other hand, Yugoslavia was balancing between the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc. It is too soon to judge the balancing skills of Serbia, even

though it may seem from the examples given above that Serbia is doing a good job in this. On the other hand, history has judged the balancing abilities of socialist Yugoslavia, as it serves now as an example of a successful balancing between blocks.

The second element represents the role that both Serbia and Yugoslavia portrayed to play in the Balkans. That is the role of the regional leader.

Conferences serve here as the best representation of Serbia using diplomatic power to establish itself as a regional leader. These conferences are both funded and hosted by Serbia and represent an attempt to foster regional cooperation. To the rest of the world, this projects an image that Serbia is the leader of the region and the fact of peace, stability and prosperity in it. Yugoslavia did this just by being neutral and by possessing the diplomatic power of the leader of the non-aligned movement.

Serbia and Yugoslavia differ in their foreign policy in the terms that the world has changed. It is not as bipolar as it was during the Cold War. Today, the non-aligned movement which represented the basis of Yugoslav diplomatic power is, even though it exists, a marginal movement on the stage of world politics. On the other hand, unlike Yugoslavia who did not portray its internal struggles into its foreign policy as much, Serbia does this very effectively in conducting a diplomatic offensive to stop the recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state. These two features represent the main differences in the foreign policies of Yugoslavia and Serbia. Further in the paper, we will analyze how these features are reflected in the rhetoric of Aleksandar Vučić and how he uses this replaying of the foreign policy of Yugoslavia in order to mobilize the left-oriented voters in Serbia.

9. Historical Analysis of Srpska Napredna Stranka

The political party that is analyzed in this paper is Srpska Napredna Stranka (SNS), or the Serbian Progressive Party. This party draws its origins from the far right political party spectrum on the political scene of Serbia. It originated from the Srpska Radikalna Stranka (Serbian Radical Party - SRS), whose leader, Vojislav Seselj, was tried in Hague for war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. In 2008, a dispute over the position of Serbia and the EU led Tomislav

Nikolic, the right hand man to Seselj, to leave the party and form its own political group, the Srpska Napredna Stranka (SNS). The policy of the Srpska Radikalna Stranka was close integration with Russia and a strong anti- EU stance. However, Nikolic disagreed with the official party policy over the EU and thus formed his own political option. Nikolic saw that this policy was going against the ratings of the party, not enabling the party to become a part of the ruling majority, as the public opinion in Serbia was overwhelmingly in support of EU integration. Nikolic was later that year joined by Aleksandar Vucic, the third man of the Srpska Radikalna Stranka. Today, Nikolic has retired from party politics, after a term serving as president, leaving the party to Aleksandar Vucic. Vucic served as prime minister under Nikolic, while now he is serving as the president of Serbia and the president of the largest and most powerful party in Serbia today, SNS (BIRN, 2018).

From this, the conclusion can be drawn that the main disagreement within the Srpska Radikalna Stranka was over the relationship between Serbia and the EU. While the official party policy was against EU integration, Nikolic was a supporter of the same idea. This policy shift rose not of firm support for the principles that the EU stood for, but rather out of the will to become the ruling majority. So, the foreign policy of Serbia was the major factor that led to the formation of the party and to the rise of that party to prominence, which is reflected in it being in power since 2019. In this case, we can identify in the forming of the party the following populist characteristic: following voter preferences instead of ideology.

10. Populism and SNS

This part of the paper is dedicated to the analysis of the political party of Srpska Napredna Stranka (SNS) and whether or not the party entails populist elements, related primarily to its foreign policy views. Dawson in his 2016 work *“Cultures of Democracy in Serbia and Bulgaria: How Ideas Shape Publics”* analyzes to what extent populism elements are entailed in Vučićs political conduct and that of his party, SNS. Dawson describes SNS as a political party who has not issued anti- democratic means in the election campaign, despite having a very elaborative one. Despite being a populist party, SNS managed to do something that its critics were not able to predict. While being populist, the author suggests that this sentiment was not the drawing force behind the policy making of SNS. In contrast, SNS managed to avail the fears of the liberal section of Serbian society

and not to drag Serbia into isolationism as Milošević did in the 1990s. Despite using populist rhetoric, Vučić and his party managed to maintain a very rational approach, pursuing for dialogue with Priština over the Kosovo issue and continuing on the EU integration path that the liberal section of Serbian society sought. Thus, Vučić and SNS managed to encompass various portions of Serbian society under its banner. This resulted in a 48% win for SNS and Vučić in the 2014 elections, with many liberal portions of Serbian society abandoning their traditional democratic parties, who barely managed to cross the threshold of 5% for the parliament, for whom they voted, in favor of Aleksandar Vučić and SNS. Thus, traditional liberalists in Serbia have abandoned their pre-conceived notions about Serbia being a pluralist liberal democracy in favor of a more pro-European authoritarian approach (Dawson, 2016). From Dawson's work, we can note the following. Serbia is a democratic system and in it, Vučić managed to win 48% of votes, thus giving him an unprecedented amount of maneuver when forming the government. Furthermore, Vučić managed to include all the segments of Serbian society into his movement, from the portions of society that are regarded as liberal to those who are regarded as rigid traditionalist.

We cannot speak of SNS unless we mention Aleksandar Vučić, the current leader of the party. To a major extent, the conduct of SNS and its members is directly linked to Vučić, who serves as the sole leader of the party. We have seen this example earlier in this paper on the case of India. In India, Modi is associated with his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and vice versa. In fact, the conduct of BJP is effectively the projection of Modi's will and stances. This model is exemplified as well in the case of Vučić and SNS. The conduct of SNS is the projection of the stances and views held by Aleksandar Vučić. In this paper, a short comparative analysis is presented in order to illustrate the defining traits of populism in Serbia, using the example of Modi and India. Anti-elitism and anti-pluralism are two core features of populism that is conducted by Modi in India. Anti-elitism is mostly directed against either the rich or the establishment within the government. The core feature of anti-elitism is its support for the common man, whom the elites use in order to enhance their power and wealth. Thus, anti-elitism is directed towards the common man, against perceived elites (Plagemann and Destradi, 2018).

Eror, Walt, Walt and Traub in *The Foreign Policy Journal* published an article about Vučić in 2018. This article represents the situation in Serbia. They describe "*Vučić's control over Serbia's centers of power is so complete and the democratic process is so skewed in his favor that dissent poses no threat to*

his rule.” The article continues: “*EU officials are also wary of exerting too much pressure on Vučić lest he look east instead. The Serbian president maintains close ties to the Kremlin, and some of his local critics have accused him of leveraging that relationship against Brussels. Vučić is adamant that, unlike neighboring Montenegro, Serbia will never join NATO, and he refused to follow the lead of Western powers in imposing sanctions on Russia. This is because pro-Russian sentiment runs high in Serbia: The two countries are connected by their shared Orthodox Christian faith and Slavic heritage.*” These elements will be explored further in the paper, but the culturological tie represents one aspect that is mentioned by the authors and that can be related to the theoretical background of this paper, most notably in the fact that culture is one of the elements that influences foreign policy decision making. The authors conclude that this attitude towards Moscow is mostly rethorical, as annually Serbia hold more military drills with NATO than it hold with Serbia, which is another interesting fact that is explored in this paper. The authors conclude the article with: “*The EU’s tolerance of Vucic may be politically pragmatic and an easy way of maintaining stability in the Balkans, but it’s also deeply cynical. Indeed, the EU is undermining its own moral authority* (Eror, Walt, Walt and Traub, 2018). “

11.Foreign Policy Characteristics

In the main part of the paper, the foreign policy characteristic of the Serbian government are analyzed and compared to the official SNS policies, with the remark on the usage of foreign affairs as a tool to legitimize the rule of Aleksandar Vučić and SNS.

Before we conduct an analysis of Serbia and the populist elements of Serbian foreign policy, it is important to note again that Serbia is not the sole example of how populism influences foreign policy. Plagemann and Destradi used the example of India, which we have analyzed earlier in the paper, as how populism influences foreign policy decision making. Furthermore, the arguably most powerful country in the world, United States, have also seen its fair share of populist decisions in foreign policy. Anton in his article in Foreign Policy analyzed Trump and the foreign policy under him. He stated that the foreign policy under Trump is, in fact, a back flash to their foreign policy conduct that has existed before the Second World War. Instead of international cooperation, the Trump doctrine, as it is often called, prioritizes the self- interest of the nation. Thus, compromises

are not as often as they were before in the US foreign policy and the US has, in fact, turned to some form of isolationism from the beginning of the 20th century. Trumps “*America First*” doctrine, while populist in nature, has managed to shift the foreign policy conduct of the United States. Instead of being dedicated to international cooperation, the official US foreign policy has slightly shifted towards protecting the interests of the US businesses and interest, culminating in the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, an agreement that was sponsored and promoted by the Obama administration before (Anton, 2019). From the example of both India and the United States, a clear understanding can be drawn that populism does in turn influence foreign policy decision making. The foreign policy of Serbia and its elements, and whether they are connected to populism, are analyzed further in the paper.

The first topic that is analyzed in this part is Serbian relation to the EU. The EU accession is clearly stated as a policy goal in the program of SNS, called *Bela Knjiga*, as the fourth priority, after economic growth and the statement that Kosovo is a part of Serbia (SNS, 2011). It is also stated in article 7 of the program of SNS (SNS, 2012). The Ministry of Foreign affairs has a subsection on its page devoted to the European path of Serbia, declaring it as the first strategic foreign policy goal of Serbia. Furthermore, it is noted that the EU is the single most important economic, trade and investment, partner of Serbia today (Mfa.gov.rs, 2019).

According to the survey of the Institute of Social Sciences in 2018, two major currents are noted existing in Serbian society. The first current is supportive of the EU and the European path of Serbia. The second current is mostly pro- Russian (IDN, 2018). Based on this, we can draw a conclusion that SNS and its policies reach to both end of Serbian society. This is illustrated that the EU aspect is supported by SNS policies. The pro- Russian segment is analyzed in the next part of the paper.

The relationship with Russia is stated in article 7 of the statute of SNS: “*The enhancement of the international position and reputation of the Republic of Serbia in the world, joining the European Union, the development of close ties with the Russian Federation, USA, China and other friendly countries in the world* (SNS, 2012).” It is illustrated here that the goal of SNS is EU accession, while at the same time maintaining close relations with the Russian Federation.

Furthermore, the claim that the priority of Serbian government to present the relations with the Russia Federation is backed up by the official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Serbia. It is stated that Serbia and Russia have a long history of diverse, rich and friendly relationship. It is stated that the current relationship is based on cultural, religious, Slavic language similarities and a traditional friendly relationship between the two states. Economic relations are stated as ranging above 2 billion euros, with imports from the Russia Federation exceeding the exports to it by over 600 million euros. Moreover, it is stated that this relationship was further enhanced with the Strategic Partnership Declaration, signed in 2013 (Mfa.gov.rs, 2019). Unlike the EU- Serbia relationship, that has a whole subchapter on the website dedicated to it, the relationship between Serbia and Russia is presented as a very friendly bilateral one, with no reference to the investment segment of the relations.

This investment segment was however mentioned by the two Presidents, Aleksandar Vucic and Vladimir Putin, during Putins state visit to Belgrade on the 19th of January, 2019. It was stated that the economic cooperation is getting better every day, with Russia ready to invest over 1.4 billion euros just in the infrastructure in Serbia (N1 Serbia, 2019). Here we can note the skillful management of national feelings by the President of SNS and Serbia, Vucic, where he used Putins visit to reduce the support to anti- government protests and to turn the public opinion against them, by stating that 100.000 people were at the government rally organized for Putin, while on the other hand on the opposition protests there were only 5.000 people (N1 Serbia, 2019).

The EU- Russia relation in Serbian foreign policy can be classified by two populist elements. The first is related to EU accession, where the element of care for the economic situation of the common man can be identified as a populist trait. On the other hand, the relationship with Russia is played on the simplistic rhetoric used for voter mobilization, appealing to the emotions of voters in order to mobilize them.

The role of one of the most influential interest groups, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), cannot be understated. The most of the Serbian nation is under the religious authority of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the church played an essential role in the shaping of the Serbian nation, using Kosovo and the Battle at Kosovo, fought in 1389 between the Ottoman Empire and the Serbian nobility as the rallying call of the Serbian nation. The version of the SPC is a tale of sacrifice by the nobility, where the Serbian nobility chose to battle despite the abysmal chances of success. The battle resulted, according to the SPC, in a Serbian defeat, with most of its leadership killed in it. However, a nobleman managed to slay the Ottoman sultan by sacrificing himself, providing for a

more elevated story of sacrifice. The leader of the Serbian nobility, duke Lazar, has been venerated as a Saint by the SPC. Although the battle happened more than 600 and the circumstances have changed a lot since then, the shaping of the public opinion of the Serbian public is still influenced by it. Kosovo and the Battle of Kosovo is portrayed as the birth ground of the Serbian nation. It was used later, at the end of 1980s, as the rallying call by Milošević for Serbs to come under his banner and repeat the sacrifices made by their predecessors. Thus, it served as a mobilization tool for the wars of the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Malcolm, 1998). As such, the issue of Kosovo plays a major part in the shaping of foreign policy in Serbia to this day. The norms shaped by the SPC continue to have an impact the foreign policy of Serbia, aligning with the academic background that we have explored earlier how cultural norms still influence the shaping of foreign policy. This notion is explored in the further in the paper.

Vučić is using the SPC in order to bolster his popularity among the voting masses. As we have explored earlier, the norms and the role of the SPC are very influential among the Serbian nation. The Patriarch, the leader of the SPC, held a meeting with Vučić and other members of the SPC regarding the issue of Kosovo. The Patriarch, after the meeting, stated for the national television of Serbia: *“President Vučić is fighting courageously for Serbia, Kosovo and Metohija and all that is tied to the Serbian name. This is not my personal stance, it is the stance of the Serbian Church and all of its clergy.”* The Patriarch continued: *“We will fight and we shall not back down in the defense of Kosovo. We do not question the work and good will of the president, whom we see. I pray to God to give him strength and wisdom to do the role of the president in the best way possible.”* (RTS, 2019). This served as a boost towards Vučić and his party, whose implications we are yet to see.

The relationship with the Serbian diaspora was explored in this paper, regarding to the Serbs living in Kosovo. Another aspect that has to be explored is the relationship between Vučić and the Serbs living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the meeting with the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church Milorad Dodik, the Serb member of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was also present. After the meeting, Dodik stated: *“Without the common stance of all important factors in Serbia and Serbs as a whole, we cannot deal with such a vital national and state issue. I saw honesty in all of the discussions and the stance that Vučić has taken was very clear and left no dilemmas, as well as the conclusions that we have reached* (RTS, 2019).” Thus, from this we can

see Vučić rallying support not only from the chief religious authority in Serbia, but from the largest groups of Serbs that are living outside of Serbia and their representatives. This gathering of support from the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina is seen as well in the numerous meetings with their representatives, both before Milorad Dodik and with him. This projection of the maintenance of close ties with the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also noted in the military parade that was held in Niš, due to the commemoration of the end of the Second World War, as well as in the commemoration of the beginning of the bombing of Serbia by NATO in 1999. Both leaders were present at the events and both held speeches, implying a strong connection between the Serbs in Serbia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the commemoration of the beginning of NATO bombing of Serbia, held in March 2019, Vučić stated that Serbia today is ten times stronger than it was in 1999. Furthermore, he touched the Serbs in Kosovo by stating: *“We will not leave them alone and hanging, we will never allow them to be attached and killed.”* He further repeated the notion that Serbia will not join NATO. Dodik, on the other hand, stated that he will not allow the NATO integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it would cause a rift between the Serbs in Serbia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the NATO bombing brought harm to both Serbs in Serbia as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina (N1 Serbia, 2019). As for the military parade, held in May 2019, again Vučić and Dodik were present.

Another aspect of populism is noted in the foreign policy of Serbia that is tied to SNS and its party policies. In the statute of SNS, article 7, subparagraph 5, it is quoted: *“Help, cooperation and maintaining good relationship with members of the Serbian nation and the citizens of Serbia who live outside its borders (SNS, 2012).”* Furthermore, in the program of the SNS, the cooperation with the diaspora community is quoted as: *“Homeland and diaspora- undivided whole (SNS, 2011).”* This stance is reflected in the official foreign policy of Serbia. One of the duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia is, as stated: *“...to inform immigrants, individuals of Serbian origin and the citizens of Serbia about the policies of the Republic of Serbia...in order to promote the stance of the Government of Serbia on the international stage (Mfa.gov.rs, 2019).”* This clearly reflects the stance of SNS about the integration and usage of the Serb diaspora for its political goals. In this case SNS presents the Serbs as a homogenous nation, reaching to the emotion of the Serbian diaspora and their connection to the homeland, both of which can be classified as populist characteristics. This is most noted in the aspect of the protection of Serbian people in Kosovo. In 2018, a Serb politician in Kosovo, Oliver Ivanović, was murdered. Vučić used this event in an anti-

pluralist way. A strongman image is noted here. He stated that he will not allow for Serbia to become a mafia state, while at the same time noting that the killing of Ivanović was a terrorist attack. He further replied to the Kosovo government, who stated that the murder was done by Serbian Secret Service, stating that those accusations only serve in the interest of bringing the Kosovo military to the north of Kosovo, mostly populated by Serbs. He further stated that this attack was not only an attack on Ivanović and his family, but an attack on Serbia as a whole. Again, the image of the compassionate strongman was projected, as he stated promised to the wife of Oliver Ivanović that he will find the ones responsible for the murder (N1 Serbia, 2019). Furthermore, after the murder, Vučić organized a trip to Kosovo. To note, the murder and the visit was conducted amidst large opposition protest against Vučić and his SNS in Belgrade, organized by the political opposition. The trip was followed by statements by the vice-president of SNSs coalition party, SPS. The vice-president, Aleksandar Antić, stated that the visit showed the Serbs in Kosovo that they can rely on the support and the protection of their state in any moment (N1 Serbia, 2019). Moreover, Vučić used the assassination to describe the opposition in Serbia as “*the ones who have robbed Serbia,*” stating that he has nothing to talk about with them in this dire situation (N1 Serbia, 2019). Furthermore, Vučić stated that the opposition is run by tycoons who have robbed the people of Serbia (N1 Serbia, 2019). This was yet another attempt of Vučić to gather support of the wide population of Serbian society, as the issue of Kosovo is a cultural one, which we have explored earlier in this paper. He rallied the support of the people amidst anti- government protests, posing as the only one who is ready to take action when it comes to Kosovo. He deliberately ignored the opposition in Serbia and turned the spotlight towards the issue of Kosovo. This anti- pluralist elements is also noted in India, which we have explored earlier in the paper. Like Modi used the Indian population in London, Vučić used the Serb population in Kosovo to gather domestic support when faced with opposition. Vučić, furthermore, used this opportunity to depict himself as anti-elitist, leading the fight against the tycoons who have robbed Serbia of its wealth.

In 2019, during a speech in a village in Serbia regarding the pre-election campaign, Vučić tackled the issue of Kosovo by stating that “*I do not allow Serbia to be small or weak, nor to be humiliated.*” Vučić stated further in his speech that, if KFOR (the international troops in Kosovo) does not protect Serbs in Kosovo, then somebody will do it, refereeing to Serbian police and armed forces. He further stated that the Kosovo government sees him as the “hardest opponent” when it comes to the international recognition of Kosovo (N1 Serbia, 2019). As it comes to the opposition

parties in Serbia, the issue of Kosovo is used by Vučić as well in order to tackle the opposition. Two trends in this anti-pluralist rhetoric can be identified. The first trend is that Vučić tackles the opposition only the times of crisis, like in the case of the murder of Oliver Ivanović. Despite avoiding for months confrontation with opposition leaders, Vučić stated that he would face 10 of them at once. The second trend is seen in Vučić choosing to ignore domestic issues and diverging the spotlight on the foreign policy issue of Kosovo. He did this after tackling, in the same speech, the issue of Kosovo and stating that for him, there is no issue that is more important than Kosovo. This was done after the opposition accused Vučić of domestic issues, after the storming of the National Television RTS by a Vučić associate, Bujošević (N1 Serbia, 2019). The two trends that are noted here are anti-pluralism in nature. Vučić is presenting the image of a strongman, a leader that is willing to act on behalf of the endangered population of Serbs in Kosovo. He is using the situation on Kosovo in order to quell domestic opposition. Vučić is stating that they are not the ones who will act on behalf of Kosovo, unlike him who is willing to dedicate his time in identifying the issue. Thus, the opposition in Serbia is not ready to act on foreign policy issues and that leaves the voters in Serbia with Vučić, the only politician who is ready to act on behalf of Serbia in regards to Kosovo.

The revoking of the foreign recognition of Kosovo, under the premise that Kosovo is a party of Serbia, is a priority mentioned in the program of SNS (SNS, 2011). This is reflected in the enhancing of small foreign policy victories in the media, such as the revoking of the recognition by the small Pacific republic of Palau (Mfa.gov.rs, 2019). In this case as well, we can identify the appealing to the voter's emotions and reflection of a strong sense of crisis and victory, both elements of populism, as mentioned before.

The contemporary issue that has emerged in the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo is the Brussel agreement. The Brussel Agreement represents a multilateral agreement, signed between Kosovo and Serbia with the European Union serving as a mediator and guarantee of the agreement. The agreement represented a major win for European diplomacy, showcasing the EU as being a capable mediator and a diplomatic power in solving an international issue right at its border. Moreover, the agreement represented the first effort in five years both from the Serbian, as well as the Kosovar side, in reaching a compromise and conducting some form of negotiations. The agreement was reached in the first year that SNS and Vučić were in power. The major diplomatic

victory for Serbia in this case was the creation of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. This association would have its own executives, in the form of president and vice-president, and an assembly, however the association will have only a representative role to the Kosovo government. Furthermore, both the police and judicial government will be placed under the government of Kosovo, thereby creating a common judicial and police force for all of Kosovo. However, the 4 largest municipalities with Serb majority, located in the north of Kosovo, would have an autonomous police commander and a separate court, both of which fall under the central control of the Kosovo government, but each will be composed of Kosovo Serbs representatives. The members of other Serbian Security Forces in Kosovo will be integrated into the Kosovo security system. Furthermore, all of the Serb municipalities will fall under the rule of Kosovo law, adhering to it (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 2013). The agreement has a slow process of implementation. The judicial element of the agreement was completed in 2015 (N1 Srbija, 2015). The issue of the border between Kosovo and Serbia is a tackling issue as well, with it being touched with the incorporation of Kosovo Serbs into the Security Forces of Kosovo. This, in turn, resulted in the opening of multiple border crossings between Kosovo and Serbia (N1 Srbija, 2015). In Serbia, the agreement caused mixed reactions. A portion of the society felt that Serbia betrayed Kosovo and its national interest in Kosovo, as Kosovo was placed under the central authority of the Kosovo government. As Kosovo is regarded as an integral part of Serbia by the constitution of Serbia, the agreement which in turn gave all legislative and executive authority from Serbia to the Kosovo government was seen as a betrayal and political action was taken against it. A caucus was moved to the Constitutional Court of Serbia regarding the issue of the Brussel Agreement. However, despite DSS (Democratic Party of Serbia) failing complains that SNS and its leaders caused the court to act un-constitutionally, under the pressure of SNS, the ruling was: *“Political agreements do not fall under the authority of the Constitutional Court (N1 Srbija, 2014).”* In 2014, the European Commissioner Johannes Hahn, stated that *“Serbia will only begin negotiations with the Union at the time that it completes its obligations from the Brussels Agreement (N1 Srbija, 2014).”* Thus, the EU exercised soft power upon Serbia in completing their obligations. This resulted in Serbia completing its side of the agreement. However, the Kosovo side does not oblige to its part of the deal. The major issue of the Agreement is the formation of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. This part of the agreement resulted in the blockade of the Kosovo parliament and government, due to the fear that the decision-

making process within Kosovo would be affected by the Association, whom the opposition regarded as having veto- like powers, even though this is not the case as it was not specified within the agreement (N1 Srbija, 2016). This public pressure resulted in the statement by the Kosovo president, Hashim Tachi, that Kosovo will not accept the creation of the Association of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. Tachi declared: *“I will not allow the creation of the Republic of Srpska in Kosovo.”* The reaction was predated by the introduction of customs in the rate of 100% on all goods coming from both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia to Kosovo. This statement resulted in a harsh reaction from Belgrade, while the reaction of the EU was seen in the creation of conferences in Bratislava and Berlin between Kosovo and Serbia, with the EU as mediators, as well as in the call for appealing to international agreements reached by the two sides, thereby enhancing Serbia’s position in future negotiations. Vučić meanwhile stated that the inability of the European Union to react to the breaking of the Brussels Agreement meant the death of international law (N1 Srbija, 2019). This crisis was followed up by the Bratislava conference, in which Vučić stated that there cannot be further dialogue between the two sides, unless the customs are lifted. However, the pressure from both the EU and Serbia resulted in Thaci softening his stance, stating that he has no issues with the creation of the Association of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo, with Kosovo politicians working together a draft of the statute of the same together with the Serbs in Kosovo (N1 Srbija, 2019). Furthermore, due to the issue with the Brussel Agreement and further policies that Vučić made in regards to Kosovo, such as the plan of demarcation with the Kosovars, Vučić stated that: *“Kosovo will gain independence on all of its territory, but not because of me.”* He stated further that the issue of Kosovo cannot be solved unless the society does not want to listen and that nobody wanted to listen what he had to offer (N1 Srbija, 2019). With this, he implied that Kosovo will gain independence on all of its territory due to the critique of the Kosovo policy that was made by the opposition leaders. Because they didn’t want to listen to what he had to offer, Serbia lost all of its province to the Kosovar Albanians. The Brussel Agreement has been seen as the benchmark and the first major success in the negotiations with Kosovo in 5 years. Vučić and the SNS have been accused of betraying Serbia, while on the other hand they were portrayed as the ones only willing to make compromise in regards to Kosovo, thereby enhancing their reputation within the European Union. Furthermore, due to the concessions made, Serbia has portrayed the image as the country who is willing to make an agreement over Kosovo, while the Kosovo government has been depicted as the ones who are not willing to adhere to international standards.

This might have been an unpopular move for Vučić for the conservative sections of Serbian society, however by doing it, he managed to mobilize the liberal portions of society under him.

A further aspect is the negative stance of the Serbian population against the integration of Serbia into NATO (IDN, 2018). This is reflected in the official program of SNS, which states in chapter 7, subparagraph 10: “*Military neutrality of Serbia, with involvement in UN peace mission, as well as work on the modernization of the Army of Republic of Serbia (SNS, 2012).*” This stance is most prominent amongst the Russian oriented segment of the Serbian society, who is also militarist oriented (IDN, 2018). SNS and its leader, Aleksandar Vučić, appease this segment of the society during the meeting with Putin. He stated that, with the support of Russia and Putin, Serbia will modernize its military. Furthermore, he stated that Serbian military neutrality policy will not change, a statement which was supported by Putin (N1 Serbia, 2019). Vučić and SNS are thereby applying to the pro- Russian segment of the Serbian society, winning over their support in a time of opposition protests, as it was mentioned earlier in this chapter. In this case, we can identify the appealing to the voter’s emotions and reflection of a strong sense of crisis and victory, both described as elements of populism.

12. Conclusion

All of these elements can be included in the replaying of Yugoslavia as a populist move by Vučić in order to appeal to voters. In May 2019, during the victory parade commemorating the end of the Second World War, Vučić paraphrased Tito by saying: “*We live as peace would last for one hundred years, but we must be ready to defend the country at any point (N1 Serbia, 2019).*” This is the last example of when Vučić used the rhetoric used by Tito in his speeches. The point of this paper is to analyze the foreign policy implications of populism in the terms that Vučić tries to replay Yugoslavia in the terms of foreign policy. Even though Vučić and his SNS represent a right-oriented political party, Vučić as for mobilizing the liberal portions of Serbian society, which was mentioned earlier, he mobilized the left oriented members of the Serbian society. This was shown during the last elections in Serbia, where he, despite being able to form the government just by his party, he included the Socialists in Serbia in the coalition. Moreover, his replay of Tito does not include only the rhetoric used by Tito. On the other hand, Vučić tries to position himself between

East and West just as Tito did. Earlier in this paper, the analysis of the comparison of the Foreign Policies of Serbia and Yugoslavia was conducted. Two key elements of the foreign policy similarities have been identified: balancing between East and West and regional leadership. Regional leadership is a concept that is appealing to all countries in the world, especially small countries with small influence on the world scene. Thus, their projection of power is limited to the region in which they are positioned. Vučić is using the Serbian foreign policy to present himself as the factor of peace and stability in the Balkan region, most notably supported by both the European Union and Russia as being presented as the key to peace and stability in the Balkan region (Novosti.rs, 2019). Vučić is also boosted by Milorad Dodik, with the relations between the two being explored earlier in the paper. Vučić bolsters the relationship with the Serbs living outside of Serbia, just as Modi uses Indians living outside India. In turn, Dodik gives open support to Vučić and his policies, stating that Serbia is the most prominent factor of peace and stability in the Balkans and that Vučić does everything to present Serbia in that light (N1 Serbia, 2019). Furthermore, Vučić presented a friendly rhetoric towards Bosniaks, calling for reconciliation and stating that Serbia is willing to help in every way possible (N1 BA, 2017). Vučić took the initiative as well in the relations with Croatia, meeting with the Croatian President Kolinda Grabar- Kitarović at the border between Serbia and Croatia and presenting her flowers as a token of good will (N1 HR, 2016). Thus, the notion that Serbia is the key to peace and stability in the whole region of the South-Eastern Europe is boosted by the European Union, Russia and the member of Presidency of neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina. Vučić plays the key role in this rhetoric and as such, this rhetoric serves to boost his domestic support and to mobilize voters under him and his party.

The other element is the balancing between East and West. Serbia is trying to position itself between NATO and Russia just as Yugoslavia did. Again, Vučić is through this balancing appealing to the leftist oriented voters. As Yugoslavia has been judged by history as an able balancer, Vučić is thus using the historical judgment by posing Serbia under his leadership to be able to do just the same. However, the EU integration is another element to be considered here. As there is no longer an influential third world, the EU represents a multilateral institution, with huge economic benefits, that Serbia and Vučić can use in order to enhance their foreign policy power.

SNS can be classified a populist party with populist rhetoric. The populist traits were identified by the authors mentioned in the theoretical part and the traits were just applied to the analysis of

foreign policy of the Serbian government. From the analysis conducted, the conclusion can be drawn that SNS uses populist rhetoric in order to both conduct and justify foreign policy.

Populism in foreign policy is a fairly new topic to the academic community, as populism is fairly new to the political landscape. Plagemann and Destradi used the case of India and Modi to illustrate the implications of populism on the foreign policy of a country. On the other hand, in the case of Serbia, populism is illustrated by two elements. The first element is the care for the diaspora communities, notable in the care for Kosovo Serbs and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as for the Serbs living in EU countries. With this care, EU integration presented itself as the first foreign policy priority for Serbia under Vučić. The second element is the anti-pluralism, which is also noted in India. Anti-pluralism is illustrated most notably in the case of Kosovo, where Vučić represented the opposition as not wanting to do anything in the interest of Serbia, unlike him who is willing to sacrifice everything for his country. Vučić's rhetoric is that the political opposition in Serbia is not able to represent Serbia the way he can and thus it will lead Serbia into ruin and despair. Vučić used Tito and Yugoslavia in foreign policy in order to appeal to the leftist voters in Serbia, just like he did with EU integration to appeal to the liberal portions of Serbian society. This replaying of Yugoslavia is most notable in two elements of foreign policy: regional leadership and balancing between East and West. In the case of modern Serbia, this balancing is oriented in the balancing between NATO and Russia, with Serbia holding military drills with both. This type of rhetoric is used by Vučić to mobilize the left-oriented portions of Serbian society. The issue of Kosovo and the support of the SPC is crucial in the mobilization of the right-oriented portions of Serbian society, while EU integration is used to gather the support of the liberal portions of Serbian society. Thus, Vučić managed to mobilize all aspects of Serbian society behind him, thereby securing him supremacy in all elections in Serbia held since 2012, culminating in the 2016 elections where he managed to take over more than 50% of the votes. These results show that his populist tactics are very effective in Serbia and they illustrate the ease with which voters, from all political spectrums, can be mobilized under one banner. Moreover, the truly astonishing aspect is the use of foreign policy of Yugoslavia and the replaying of the same in order to mobilize the left-oriented portions of Serbian society, which is the purpose of this research. This case, however, represents only a small fraction of the implications of populism on the foreign policy of Balkan countries. Further research is required in order to comprehend to extent to which populism influences foreign policy and to which extent foreign policy can be used to mobilize the left-oriented portions of

society in all countries of the South- Eastern Europe. We can only hope that populism does not culminate in the creation of aggressive tendencies towards neighbors in the South- Eastern Europe.

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