UNIVERZITET U SARAJEVU
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DEVELOPMENT OF NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD AND ITS REFLECTION ON BiH

-magistarski rad-

Kandidatkinja:
Tatjana Mutlak
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SUMMARY

Throughout its history, NATO has been confronted with a succession of existential threats and external challenges – from the Soviet Union during the Cold War and now from Russia; from violent extremist groups operating in theatres where NATO is deployed; and from international terrorism networks and hybrid adversaries targeting Allies. The Alliance has also had to contend with more than a few internal crises, involving one or more Allies, that challenged its political cohesion and the coherence of its military arrangements (e.g., Suez, 1956; France's gradual withdrawal from military integration, 1959-1966; Cyprus, 1964 and 1974, and Greece's own withdrawal from military integration between 1974 and 1980; Portugal's "Carnation Revolution", 1974; the North Atlantic "cod wars", 1958, 1973 and 1976; domestic tensions over the deployment of NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces in 1979-1983; transatlantic tension in 1981-1982 over the extension of the Soviet Trans-Siberian gas pipeline to Western Europe, and the "near death" moment over the 2003 campaign aganist Iraq). Yet, the Alliance has endured, the Allies' constancy of purpose strengthened by their shared view that NATO – transformed, enlarged, and constantly adapting – remains indispensable for their common defence and for the security of the wider Euro-Atlantic area.

Key word: BiH, Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO, North, Atlantic, Treaty, Organizations, military;

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INTRODUCTION

To an extent, steering the NATO ship through the waters of the Cold War and on to the post-Cold War era has been an odyssey of a strategic nature. Literature on NATO often alludes to Thucydides and his chronicle of the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens, five centuries before Christ. Classical scholars and modern-day political analysts often see in Thucydides the founder of political realism, captured by the phrase "the strong do what they want, the weak suffer what they must".

Yet, the current narrative claims that the Alliance suffers from a number of flaws: weak internal cohesion, a loosening of the transatlantic link, the East-South divide, diminished relevance, unequal burden-sharing, and a questionable ability to meet future challenges, such as uncontrolled migration, home-grown terrorism, or China. The crisis appears to be profound, and the literature published on NATO's achievements and limitations for its 70th anniversary, is often harsh about the state of the Alliance. Seventy years after its inception in 1949, NATO is arguably still the most powerful military alliance and has assets that make it a credible defence and security actor in the face of the many tangible threats confronting its members.

In this context, however, a long-term analysis of what NATO has been about since 1949 paints a picture that depicts NATO as an extraordinary instrument of cohesion-building between its member states.

In this Master thesis argues, that in spite of the many crises over seven decades, NATO has been a forum in which Allies were able to stand together, build a common purpose, most notably through a process of strategymaking. What is strategy-making and why is it important? Strategy-making is mainly about building a shared sense of strategic thinking and doing within the Alliance; it is about making the Alliance a cohesive and credible defence actor that draws on a solid and Alliance-wide political and military posture. This is achieved through a process of constant consultation, planning, policy-making, shared threat assessment and buy-in by all member states.

Strategy-making is important because it determines the long-term success of the project. This was true in the past, but still holds today, at a time when the Alliance is re-embracing a deterrence and defence agenda. If, strategy- making has been the "key ingredient in sustaining a constancy of purpose in often turbulent times", then it must continue to be so, as

external and internal challenges – in the post-Cold War era more than ever – question the relevance of the Alliance.

At the end in this thesis we recounts the strategic odyssey in systematic and meticulous detail: from the very first steps of the Alliance's establishment, to the post-Cold War adaptation, through the doctrinal evolutions of the 1960s, to NATO's strategic and operational renaissance in the '70s and '80s. Throughout, draws on a rich mix of NATO's archives and declassified documents, secondary sources, and his own expertise of the institution's life. The result is inspiring, and will no doubt become a reference document on NATO's nature and ability to navigate through turbulent strategic waters. One may simply hope that the fate of the Alliance does not resemble that of the Odyssey's hero.A transformed, enlarged and constantly adapting NATO is turning 70. A decade from now, its post-Cold War performance will match in durability its Cold War record, putting to rest already now any notion that the Alliance was not fit for strategic circumstances other than those that prompted its creation in 1949. At the same time, turmoil and uncertainty in international relations on a scale seemingly unprecedented since the end of World War 2 have shaken confidence in the West in the resilience of the new, enlightened and benevolent international order established in the early post-war era. Inevitably, such crises of confidence are seen to threaten the most those institutions, such as NATO, and relationships, such as the transatlantic link, that sit at the core, and are most representative, of resilient Western purpose, strength and influence. The resulting paradox is to see everywhere a weakening of purpose and a diminished relevance, rather than look for the available evidence of, and draw strength from, enduring resolve and persistent cooperation.

As the Atlantic Alliance commemorates the 70th anniversary of its foundation, this *Research Paper* addresses the Alliance's seven decade-long historical record to demonstrate and document how and why NATO's high level of political and strategic resilience, as well as its strong institutional capacity for adaptation to changing circumstances and evolving requirements, should help inspire confidence in its durability and continuing relevance. This record indicates unmistakably, that, despite often contrarian winds, the Allies have remained faithful to NATO's underlying core principle – standing together. They have done so, in particular, by maintaining a remarkable constancy of purpose and engaging in a continuous, mostly consensual, sometimes conflicting, process of strategy-making. Together, constancy of purpose and strategy-making helped achieve a melding of the necessarily different, often disparate, and sometimes contradictory, perspectives and interests of an increasingly larger

number of Allies. They helped translate the undertakings embedded in the North Atlantic Treaty – a shared commitment to purpose and a mutual pledge to protect and defend against attack – into tangible and reliable institutional and operational arrangements. Lastly, they helped ensure that the common legacy of standing together during the Cold War could be converted into a shared readiness to address together the often very different and diverse security challenges of the post-Cold War era. Constancy of purpose and strategy-making have involved deploying troops together to faraway countries, such as Afghanistan, to help prevent the return of terrorist havens, cooperating with NATO's partners to reduce the sources of persistent instability on the Alliance's southern periphery and, more recently, strengthening NATO's deterrence and defence posture comprehensively to counter Russia's new belligerence. As a result of these enduring patterns of common endeavour, this *Research Paper* contends that NATO's seventy year-long record can best be described as a unique "strategic odyssey".

This report is structured into four parts. It addresses first strategy-making, as the looking glass for assessing and understanding NATO's strategic odyssey, and the resulting insights regarding a constant attention by the Allies to preserving the primacy of strategic and operational coherence, and the persistent challenge of matching political intent and military capability. Strategy-making has been, first and foremost, about pursuing and delivering coherent plans and operational arrangements that meet the aims of assurance, deterrence and defence, while also ensuring the provision of advice and training, as well as the execution of varied peace enforcement and security assistance missions. Yet, as the record shows, a perfect alignment between political ends and military ways and means can never be taken for granted. Strategy-making is also about helping ensure that consistency.

In the second and third parts, the *Research Paper* examines NATO's historical record from 1949 through 2014, through the lens of the Cold War's long haul and the post-Cold War "out-of-area" pivot, before turning, in the last part, to the post-2014 strategic "reset" following Russia's illegal occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. For each period, the report highlights the attendant objectives, constraints and trade-offs in fulfilling the purposes and core tasks set out in the Treaty and successive Strategic Concepts. In each case, strategy-making has involved aligning complementary, but sometimes competing, strategic, geographic and resource considerations – for instance, nuclear deterrence and conventional forces; the Alliance's various regions and "flanks"; and the Allies' diverse assets and contributions – and, in so doing, securing an indispensable constancy of purpose.

Since 2014, following Russia's illegal occupation and annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula, NATO has resumed performing more deliberately its deterrence and defence core task. It has done so while remaining engaged in projecting stability, notably through the initiation of the "train, advise and assist" Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, following the disbandment, in December of that year, of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).[1]

[1] I. Hope (ed.), "Projecting stability: elixir or snake oil?", *NDC Research Paper* No.1, NDC, Rome, December 2018.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

One of the basic principles on which the founding of NATO was based - *the perception of common vulnerability* - changed significantly after the end of the Cold War. The international security environment has changed radically with the dissolution of the former Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of some other multinational states (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia), the emergence of new states as subjects of international relations, the end of bipolarity in international relations etc.

For the NATO member states, the most important thing was the disappearance of the key danger for their security - namely the possible military confrontation with the USSR, so the question for the continued existence of NATO was raised. In the early 1990s with the disappearance of the main security threat to NATO members, many politicians, researchers of international relations and security, expected that NATO itself would cease to exist.

The basis of the existence and operation of NATO even today is basically the same conception of the alliance as the formation at the time of its creation. The effectiveness of NATO action in the future will depend on how quickly it manages to adapt to ever-changing international security circumstances, which require a restructuring of primarily military capabilities in the direction of greater use of these forces and a more coordinated approach by all members in ensuring international security.

Research subject

The research subject is the course of development and emergence of NATO's strategic concepts in the post-Cold War period, and how these strategic concepts reflected and what kind of impact they had on Bosnia and Herzegovina. How these strategic concepts play a role in empowering the national security worldwide? Is NATO synonym for “peace and security”? What kind of issues NATO is facing in the path of strategic concepts implementation, and how these concepts are crucial for national security? How NATO member states shape the NATO activities through the strategic concepts?

All these, and many more questions, are going to be elaborated and encompassed through this research paper, with the main focus on the strategic concepts goals, and thus how the new

strategic concepts and actions have affected the work of NATO, Alliance's partners and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is necessary to explain the NATO's global role in the post-Cold War period, and to affirm does NATO succeed to implement changes into security and defense through the strategic concepts.

This master thesis will have a theoretical and empirical part, and comprehensive impression how the Balkan citizens support joining NATO.

Research problem

NATO followed up the peace process by its long-term and robust presence in BiH, legitimizing itself trough BiH as a favorite of the new security architecture from Atlantic to Urals. After using force in Bosnia, the Alliance (un)expectedly easily further deployed its military power to Kosovo, Serbia, and Macedonia, confirming the fact that Bosnia had far-reaching implications for Euro-Atlantic community, both in theory and in practice. As Bosnia became the first country where the new post-Cold War strategy was practically implemented, it was pumped with a new geopolitical content which determined it as a different country. It became geopolitically important for NATO as a messenger of the new security approach, but also geo-strategically, as a territory pacified enough to enable NATO to dominate fully and to work out different scenarios of strategic game.

What have changed in NATO's activities in BiH since 1990s until today? Does BiH's accession to NATO mean better security and development for BiH?

Some of the questions that will be answered in this master thesis: How the geopolitical and geo-strategy role of NATO have changed after the Cold War? How did strategic concepts affect the work of NATO and what changes did these concepts bring to NATO members? How NATO managed to win over important countries as its partners in the Alliance? Does BiH degradation can be stopped by including it into the world's leading military and political Alliance?

Research goals

The research goals of this master's thesis are to contribute to a better understanding of NATO's role at the global level, the development and existence of the NATO Alliance. Also,

the role of strategic concepts throughout history to date will be elaborated. Each period will be analyzed separately in order to better understand the issue, and to understand the goal of the existence of NATO and its role today in collective defense and security. Also, various contents will be analyzed, through which it will be noticed what NATO's responsibility is, what is the role of the members of the Alliance and how they cooperate, and what kind of cooperation NATO offers to the Balkan countries, and NATO's influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Hypothetical framework

General hypothesis

Through the development of strategic concepts during the Cold War, NATO anticipated possible geopolitical developments, and in the post-Cold War period it shaped geopolitical frameworks, which was reflected in its role in BiH through interventions and participation in the peace operation.

Alternative hypothesis

- The history of NATO is determined by the relations of the great powers
- NATO's post-Cold War strategic concepts are shaped by the Alliance's changing role
- The relationship between NATO and BiH is conditioned by the discrepancy between the goals proclaimed in Bosnia and Herzegovina's foreign policy and doctrinal documents and the practical action of domestic political actors.

PART ONE: HISTORY OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The Treaty was signed by the founding members and contains of 14 Articles, where the main principles of the organization are listed. NATO was established as an organization of collective defence against the rising power of the Soviet Union. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a political and military organization originally constituted of twelve members from Europe and Northern America, with Washington Treaty as its cornerstone. As Western European countries felt threatened by the Soviet Union´s conventional capabilities, they asked the United States to maintain its political and military presence in Europe beyond the end of Second World War. The result of the negotiations between the United States and the European countries was the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on April 4, 1949. NATO was the only multinational organization which institutionally bound the USA to the European security also with concrete security guarantees. "*The Alliance was so successful as a deterrent that it never resorted to Article 5 or deployed the substantial military forces under its umbrella during the Cold War*" (Lindley-French, 2007). NATO since its establishment had to undergo many changes and face many challenges.

In order to adapt to the new security challenges, NATO has broadened its mission, reformed all its structures, established new partnerships, and developed new tools to achieve its strategic goals (Ondrejcsák and Rhodes, 2014). At the time of this writing (2014), NATO is facing another breaking point, the Ukrainian Crisis or Russian-Ukrainian War. Currently, NATO consists of 28 member states and is the most powerful regional military and political organization in the world. Soviet Union led to the "reassessment" of the role of the Alliance. As Lindley-French argues, it was important to keep the United States and non-European members (Canada) engaged in Europe. Another breaking point in NATO's development were the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

NATO's Principles

If an armed attack occurs against one of the NATO member states, each member state will consider this as an act of violence against all member states and consider if they will take the actions necessary to help the attacked member states. North Atlantic Alliance is based on collective defence and mutual assistance among the member states. The collective defence is considered as a main principle or cornerstone of the Alliance. The right to self-defence is considered as a basic right of each state and is enshrined in the Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nation (1945): "*nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of collective or individual self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.*"

Here is important to state that each member state of the Alliance should build and possess its own defence capacities against the aggression. Collective defence of NATO member countries is enshrined in the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As Bátor (2013: 105) states: "*the Treaty commits each member to share the risk, responsibility and benefits of collective security. It also states that NATO members form a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.*" Article 5 was invoked only once.

Besides the collective defence, NATO serves also as a place for discussion about political and military issues or threats under the Article 4. Article 4 allows each member state to consult mostly political issues with its partners. Bátor (2013: 106) argues that Article 4 "*gives NATO its political dimension and also because of this principle NATO is characterized as a political-military organization.*" September 2001 after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the North Atlantic Council "*decided unanimously to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, saying that the attack on 9/11 was not just an attack on the United States, but an attack on all the members of NATO*" (Daadler, 2011).

After the end of the Cold War the security situation in Europe has changed and therefore NATO made some necessary steps in order to ensure its further develop and to accommodate the newly arisen situation. There were three main changes in European security: first, the dissolution of the Soviet Union practically temporarily diminished the conventional threat it constituted for the Western Europe; second, the former Soviet satellites in the Baltic Region and Central and Eastern Europe have started on their incremental transition to democratic countries and integration into European and NATO structures. Third, the emerging security challenges outside the territory of NATO became considered a threat for the Alliance's members (Carpenter, 2013).

Historical development of NATO

The development of the Alliance can be fully understood only after the analysis of its history. The historical development of NATO can be divided into the following four periods (with certain level of methodological simplifications for the aims of this publication)– Cold War period (1949-1989), Post-Cold War period (1989-2001), Post-9/11 period (2001-2014) and Post-Ukrainian Crisis/Russian-Ukrainian War period (2014-ongoing).

Strategy and Cold War Period (1949-1989)

The Cold War period can be divided into the following three areas: first – military competition and nuclear deterrence. According to Rearden (1984: 5), at the start of the Cold War the army of the Soviet Union's Red Army, excluding its satellite states, "consisted of 4.100.000 men and had stabilized at about 175 line divisions, all effectively organized for combat and supported by substantial tactical air force" all of which could be used in the armed attack against Western Europe. On the other side, the advantage of conventional forces of the Soviet Union over the West was balanced by the nuclear deterrence capabilities of the United States.The Cold War period can be characterized as a permanent competition between the West and East blocs, or between the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its satellite states.As Eichler and Laml (2010: 23) argue, the creation of NATO can be best

characterized as the "*strategic revolution,*" because Western European countries openly admitted that they were unable to protect themselves in the case of strategic Soviet attack on

Western Europe. It is important to say that during the Cold War, there was no direct confrontation between the main actors, the United States and the Soviet Union. All confrontations took place as proxywars (Korean War, Vietnam War, etc.). NATO successfully fulfilled its role, in deterring the Soviet Union from open confrontation with the West. This competition created the security dilemma. It "*refers to a situation in which actions by a state intended to heighten its security, such as increasing its military strength or making alliances, can lead other states to respond with similar measures, producing increased tensions that create conflict, even when no side really desires it*" (Jervis, 1978: 167-174). The tactics of both actors were aimed at deterring the other side from armed attack.

Second – the Cold War represented the ideological confrontation between the Western and Eastern bloc or between democratic values and communism. The Western bloc promoted free trade, human rights, democracy and freedom of speech, while the Eastern bloc promoted centrally planned economy, collective ownership, and the rule of one party. In addition, the media in the Easter bloc were under strong censorship.

Third – economic isolation. The Cold War period is also characterized by the economic isolation of the Western and Eastern bloc. Each bloc tried to weaken its opponent by economic sanctions and to support their allies or satellite states. The United States has supported the Western European countries by the so-called Marshall Plan aimed at helping Europe to recover after the devastation of World War II, to improve European industry and to strengthen its economies. The Soviet alternative to the Marshal Plan, the "Molotov Plan" later known as COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Development) was aimed at rebuilding the countries in the Easter bloc. However, the real goal of COMECON was to prevent Soviet satellite states from looking for help or moving towards the Western Europe. Stalin was "*anxious to keep other powers out of neighboring buffer states rather than to integrate them into a new mammoth economy*" (Wallace and Clark, 1986).

Strategy and Post-Cold War Period (1989-2001)

Without the main military and political opponent NATO was able to redefine the notion of security, by shifting its focus to new threats in international security, such as terrorism, the

proliferation weapons of mass destruction, failed and rogue states. The Soviet Union had dissolved in 1991 and soon afterwards NATO lost its main conventional enemy and strategic

opponent. Therefore, NATO aimed its activities at cooperation with the former Soviet Union satellite states and their integration into the organization as well as into other international organizations, such as the European Union, as well as to widening the zone of security and stability in Europe. The main change in this period was the shift from the strictly defined territorial defence to the defence of the security interests of the Alliance. As US Senator Lugar stated in 1993, NATO has to "go out of area or out of business" (Good, 2012).

This meant that NATO was prepared, besides the territorial defence of its member states, to engage in crisis management operations outside its own borders to prevent rising threats to the Alliance. In this periodNATO engaged in missions outside its borders – for example through the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, followed by air campaign in Kosovo and Serbia (1999), followed still by KFOR and many other missions.

Post-9/11 Period (2001-2014)

The main transformation in this period was that NATO has re-focused its attention to "*active engagement in operations out of area of the Alliance (outside the European territory)*. *Majority of NATO member states adapted their capabilities for the crisis management operations* (Korba and Majer, n.d.). After the 9/11, the threat of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue states and failed states became the top discussed issues in the majority of states and international organizations of the trans-Atlantic space. 9/11 attacks gave the impulse for the next round of post-Cold-War transformation of NATO.

Furthermore, NATO shifted its efforts from the relative short air operations to the long-term ground offensives far away from its territory. The relative secure environment in Europe allowed these strategic changes, because NATO states had lost a big military opponent in their neighbourhood, although the main threat to the Alliance at that time came from Afghanistan and the broader Middle East. To be successful in foreign operations NATO "*needed to reform itself.*" The Alliance needed to "*strengthen its operation capabilities*" (Bátor, 2013). Foreign operations also contributed to better interoperability between member states, who have sought more effective cooperation. The best example of NATO long-term

operation out of Europe was the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan launched on the basis of Resolution 1386 of the United Nations Security Council

in December 2001 (United Nations Security Council, 2001). Initially, the ISAF mission was to punish Al-Qaeda for the 9/11 attacks and to defeat the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Later, the mission changed to securing Kabul and its surroundings from Al-Qaeda and Taliban. In 2003, "*NATO took over the operation from the UN (upon the request of the government of Afghanistan)*" and the ISAF mission had expanded through all the territory of Afghanistan (Majer, 2013). The main goal of the ISAF mission was to train and develop the Afghan National Security Forces to be able to provide security across the territory of Afghanistan, "*to ensure that Afghanistan can never again become a haven for terrorists*" (Bátor, 2013). In Afghanistan the allied forces were also involved in the counterinsurgency missions which called on NATO to develop the capabilities to be able to project force and equipment to the state far away from Alliance territory. According to NATO sources (2014), 48 nations had contributed to the ISAF mission with 34.512 troops in 2014, but more than 100 thousand at its peak, just a few years before. Among top contributors were the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Georgia, Jordan, Turkey and Australia.

Post-Ukrainian Crisis/Russian-Ukrainian War Period (2014-ongoing)

The current crisis in the Eastern Europe (2014-ongoing) can be characterized as the fourth and the most recent period of NATO's development. According to Ondrejcsák (2014) there are three main changes in this period from the previous one. First, the Russian aggression against the Ukrainian territory and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula showed that Russia is still a security threat for Europe and for the Alliance. Second, NATO member states were unable to effectively react to this situation, and there was not set, so-called, effective "red line" at the first phase of the Russian invasion. Third, most of the NATO member states lacked sufficient military capabilities to defend their own territories, and Central Europe was missing strategic infrastructure. The perception of relative security in Europe and absence of strong military opponent near the borders of the Alliance affected the military spending of most NATO member states. According to SIPRI (2013), in majority of states the defence budgets were decreasing. In fact, the Alliance was unprepared for the aggression from the Russian side. In 2010 at the Lisbon Summit, the new Strategic Concept (Swami, 2010) was approved, where it was literally stated that "*conventional military attack against NATO*

territory is low." This has proven as false and Alliance had to take measures to reverse this negative trend and to strengthen its own security.

So we have important aspects:

1. **First** − majority of the member countries promised to increase defense spending.. Many NATO members announced, even before the NATO Summit, that they will spend more on defence to secure the territory of Alliance against Russia. According to Croft (2014), "*Poland aims to increase the defence spending to the 2% by the year 2016. Latvia and Lithuania have pledged to reach the 2 percent target by the year 2020. Romania has promised to increase its defence spending gradually until 2016. Czech government has said it aims to reverse the trend of declining defence spending.*"
2. **Second**− building of the new strategic military infrastructure in Central Europe and Baltic states (military and logistical bases, joint military exercises). The joint military exercises should, according to Ondrejcsák and Rhodes (2014), strengthen the interoperability of the armed forces of the NATO member states, which will be a crucial challenge for members after the end of the current ISAF mission in Afghanistan, which improved the Allies' armed forces ability to act and fight together significantly to unprecedented level. As an example of the joint military exercise, we can mention the international exercise Ground Pepper, which took place in the training area of the military base Lešť in Slovakia. The aim of this exercise was to "*strengthen the interoperability of the armies, which is one of the most important goals for the Alliance after the Wales Summit*" (Maxim, 2014).
3. **Third** – strengthening of the military presence of the Alliance forces on the territory of its eastern members. The Wales Summit Declaration (2014) stated that the measures to strengthen the security of the Alliance will include the "*continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis. They will provide the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are flexible and scalable in response to the evolving security situation.*" Some of these measures were already taken, for example, the "*deployment in March and April of an additional six F-15 fighter jets to the Baltic Air Policing mission; deployment in March of an aviation detachment of 12 F-16s and 300 personnel to Lask Air Base in Poland; deployment of 175 marines to Romania to supplement the Black Sea rotational force, [...], and deployment of 150 paratroopers each to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia*" (Belkin, 2014).

4. **Fourth** – the creation of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force where NATO member states commit to enhance the NATO Response Forces "*by developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats.*" The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) "*will be able to deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO's periphery*" (Wales Summit Declaration 2014). It is part of the new Readiness Action Plan, which is aimed at strengthening the collective defence of its states.
5. **Fifth** – the need for the stronger partnership with states outside of the Alliance. According to Ondrejcsák (2014), NATO "*should strengthen the existing partnerships, start to develop the new ones from Moldavia to Central Asia and to re-launch the enlargement process.*"

Wales Summit (2014) also noted that NATO's doors will stay open "*to all European democracies, which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership…*"NATO member countries also have endorsed the package for Georgia that includes "*defence capability building, training, exercises, strengthened liaison, and enhanced interoperability opportunities."*

Strategy and new security threats for the Alliance

Further argues that there are three main areas that Russian invasion to Ukraine has changed: "*the territorial integrity of Ukraine that is considered crucial for the strategic independence of Central Europe; the Russian armed forces will approach Central Europe, mainly due to future Russian air bases in the Crimea; and that the war is no longer "taboo" for Russian foreign policy in enforcing its the power interests in Europe.*" Andrzej Karkoszka, former Deputy Minister of National Defence in Poland, said in his speech at the international conference NATO 2020: Alliance Renewed (2014) that *"Russia is using Russian minorities as tools of influence. We are seeing very visible military build-up in Russia, which is trying to reinstate itself as a superpower.*"Alongside the security threats such as – terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber defence and energy security is NATO facing the security threat right in its neighbourhood in Ukraine. The Russian "*invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula changed not only the previous political*

realities of Eastern Europe, but also the strategic balance that had been there since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union" (Ondrejcsák, 2014).

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The main tools used by NATO to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, but NATO uses also all conventional measures to prevent the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, such as The Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Centre; Combined Joint CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) Defence Task Force; Joint Centre of Excellence on CBRN Defence; standardization, training, research and development of the necessary capabilities; or the improvement of civil preparedness. NATO 2012 Chicago Summit emphasized that "*proliferation threatens our shared vision of creating conditions necessary for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).*" However, NATO contribution is strengthened by the cooperation with other states or international organizations. "*NATO is committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency, and keeps armaments at the lowest possible level*" (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2014).

Cyber defence

Cyber attacks have a potential to pose threats at strategic level and seriously affect both civilian and military infrastructure. Wales Summit established cyber security as "*a part of the Alliance's core task of collective defence.*" NATO has an ambition to develop the capabilities to build effective defence against cyber attacks and to share these capabilities with other NATO member states. Cyber attacks are the new phenomena in security. The 2014 Wales Summit incorporated cyber attacks to the Article 5 of Washington Treaty, but every cyber attack on the NATO member state will be considered individually. In addition, the Alliance has developed NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), which "*protects NATO's own networks by providing centralised and round-the-clock cyber defence support to the various NATO sites. This capability is expected to evolve on a continual basis, to maintain pace with the rapidly changing threat and technology environment*" (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2014).

Energy security

In addition, NATO commits itself in Strategic Concept 2010 to "*develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning.*" Energy security was introduced to NATO's agenda at the Riga Summit in 2006, recognized as a key element of Alliance's security. *"The disruption of the flow of vital resources could affect Alliance security interests*" (NATO Multimedia Library, n.d.). There were five key areas identified, where NATO can provide added value – information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical infrastructure. Energy security can be interpreted in two ways. First, it is the energy security of each member state of the Alliance. And second, it is the energy security of the forces on the battlefield, where they need enough energy to secure their basic needs for successful combat operations (Bátor, 2013).

NATO Enlargement and Partnership Policy

To second category encompasses relations with European states without NATO membership aspirations (Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland), while the third category represents NATO global partnerships, which can be sub-divided into individual partnerships with important international actors like Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan and relations with the states within the NATO institutional framework (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Mediterranean Dialogue and Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council). Currently, we can define several categories of NATO partnership policies. The first category represents relations with states with NATO membership aspirations (Georgia, for example).

Partnership for Peace Programme

NATO's PfP programme is closely connected with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. There are two approaches for states' participation in the programme. Participation in the PfP programme could be understood as a pre-accession phase for countries with NATO membership aspiration. In its other role, PfP programme would "serve" as a communication

tool for countries like Austria, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden, which wish to intensify relations with NATO, but without current aspirations for membership. However, they do not want to stay on the side lines of the current development and cooperation and see NATO as a means to strengthen their international position and security.Despite some of its shortfalls and limited flexibility to adapt to the current situation, The Partnership for Peace programme is still the most important institutional cooperation framework for the Alliance. The role of PfP was also enhanced at the recent Wales Summit: *"Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council are, and will continue to be, a part of our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace"* (Wales Summit Declaration, 2014, par. 82). In general, one can describe PfP as tool of practical and pragmatic cooperation between NATO and partner states. The PfP allows participating country to choose own priorities of cooperation with NATO (Partnership for Peace Programme, 2014). The programme was launched in 1994.

NATO strategy of Accession Conditions

The idea of NATO collective defence is based on this precondition. According to the Article 51 of the UN Charter *"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations"* (UN Charter, 1945), every state has a right to ensure own security by individual or collective measures. The Enlargement represents a crucial tool how to spread the area of security and predictability. The question who can be or who cannot be NATO member is defined in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty: "*The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty*"(Washington Treaty, 1949). Thus, the Washington Treaty set up geographical limitations to future members of NATO.

The democratic regime of Greece was changed when Greece was a full NATO member and was governed by the military junta at the same time[2] (Barett, 2014). However, there are also other conditions for states aspiring for NATO membership. Democratic principles are crucial for NATO members as well as for future NATO members. As it is stated in the Preamble of the Washington Treaty: "*they are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and*

[2] The Greek military junta was in charge from 1967 to 1975

civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" (Washington Treaty, 1949). Those principles are also repeated in the "Study on Enlargement," which was published in 1995. This document highlighted democratic political system, market economy, fair minority rights, commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts as basic preconditions for future members (NATO Enlargement, 2014). Nevertheless,the democratic conditions for NATO membership were not always upheld. In 1949, Salazar's Portugal became a founding member of NATO. However, we have to understand these exceptions in the context of the Cold War. The democratic principles became a crucial precondition for NATO membership after the Cold War and the level of democratic standards played a crucial role in the inviting of new members to the NATO in 1997. Although Slovakia was originally considered as a "first-line" candidate together with Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, was excluded from the first round of membership because of the lack of domestic democratic standards during the Mečiar government.

First Round of Enlargement

During the Madrid Summit in 1997, NATO launched the first round of enlargement after the Cold War. At that time, the North Atlantic Council invited only three countries: Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland, which formally joined NATO in 1999.

Second Round of Enlargement

At the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO invited to the Alliance Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Romania and Slovenia, which became Alliance members in 2004.

Third round of Enlargement

Practical process of NATO accession starts with the official political declaration of an aspiring county. Later, the Alliance may set up special partnership framework to facilitate relations with the aspiring candidate. The second step in the process could be the invitation to join the Membership Action Plan (hereafter MAP). At the Bucharest Summit, NATO continued in inviting the new members from South-East Europe, which was a signal of the significantly improved stability in this region. In 2008, the Alliance invited Albania and

Croatia and Macedonia. However, Macedonian accession to NATO was unilaterally blocked by Greece, because of the dispute over the country's constitutional name of Macedonia/FYROM.

So, "The MAP is a set of criteria that the country needs to fulfil to show its progress in the military reform process, but also in the general democratic and political development process" (Cameron, 2008). However, MAP does not guarantee future membership of the participant country in NATO. On the other hand, an invitation to the MAP symbolized strong political message toward candidate country (McNamara, 2008). MAP was launched in 1999 and took into account experiences from the candidate process of newly joined countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (Membership Action Plan, 2014). In its practical dimension, the Membership Action Plan consists of 4 branches: (1) Annual National Plan (ANP), which covers political and economic issues, defence/military issues, resource issues, security issues and legal issues (see below); (2) feedback mechanism, which means Partner Progress Assessment; (3) preparation of domestic institutions for security assistance and (4) establishment of agreed targets (Simon, 2000).

Political and economic issues

From our point of view, the most important provision of MAP´s political and economic issues relates to territorial and ethnic disputes: *"Aspirants would also be expected to settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles and to pursue good neighbourly relations"* (Manifesto of North Atlantic Council, 1999). Each candidate country has to take responsibility for obligations and commitments which arise from the Washington Treaty. As we noted above, Preamble of the Washington Treaty points out the democratic nature of NATO; MAP´s "political and economic issues" transform those values as a precondition for future membership.[3]Moreover, states aspirating to NATO membership have to establish appropriate civil control of their armed forces.

[3]"*Future members must conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty such as democracy, individual liberty and other relevant provisions set out in its Preamble"*(Manifesto of North Atlantic Council, 1999).

Defence and military issues

Defence and military issues are related to the commitment of each member country to contribute to collective defence and to improve own defence capabilities. The nature of this commitment arises from Article III of the Washington Treaty, when each member state is responsible for own defence individually and then collectively.

Resource issues and strategy

Customarily, member countries should allocate 2 % of their GDP to the defence spending, which was also mentioned in several communiqués from ministerial meetings or summits. The main focus of resource issues is on the obligation of each state to allocate sufficient financial resources to the defence budget. Even though the issue of defence spending is the question of the day, we have to note that NATO has no mechanism to push member states to spend more on defence. At the recent Wales Summit, NATO countries reaffirmed their commitment to halt the decline in defence expenditures, to increase defence budget as GDP grows, and to move defence expenditures to the 2% of own GDP in order to meet NATO Capability Targets (Wales Summit Declaration, 2014).

Security and legal issues

Security and legal issues focus on the capacity of a candidate state to protect intelligence information, which is shared between NATO member states. Legal issues address the capability of a candidate state to cope with the NATO legal framework. After the accession to NATO, new member country is obliged to adopt 'NATO acquis', which consists of several international treaties as well as technical arrangements; for instance the Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces (London SOFA) (London, 19th June 1951), the Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty (Paris Protocol) (Paris, 28th August 1952), the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International Staff (Ottawa Agreement) (Ottawa, 20th September 1951), the Agreement on the status of Missions and Representatives of third States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels Agreement) (Brussels, 14th September 1994). At the time of this

writing, there are 4 states with NATO membership aspirations, but only two of them were invited to the Membership Action Plan.

Strategy and potential member states

Montenegro

The Montenegrin government fulfilled almost every requirement with certain reserves (Šolaja, 2013).[4]Montenegro joined the Partnership for Peace in 2006, shortly after the declaration of independence from Serbia. In 2009, NATO invited Montenegro to join the Membership Action Plan. At the Chicago Summit, the Allied Head of States announced that NATO is committed to maintaining stability of the strategically important Balkan region (Chicago Summit Declaration, 2012) which −together with supportive political signals − created a "strategic momentum" for Montenegro to be a partner country with most serious chances to become a NATO member. One of the key challenges for the Montenegrin leadership is the public support for membership, which is a sine qua non for any serious aspiration to join the Alliance. According to public surveys of the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM) 44.5% of Montenegrin citizens are against the country's membership (Policy Association for an Open Society, 2014).

Macedonia/Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

Macedoniajoined the Membership Action plan in 1999 (NATO-FYROM relations, 2014). Formally, the country fulfils all criteria for entering NATO, but the Macedonian government has to settle the dispute regarding the constitutional name with Greece (NATO- FYROM relations, 2014). The Greeks point out that this dispute is not about the "name," but about the territorial integrity of the Hellenic Republic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, 2014). At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, Greece had blocked Macedonia's NATO membership.

[4] There are problems with reform of intelligence services and Security Sector Reform (Šolaja, 2013)

Georgia

Moreover, the political declarations are followed by very high public support for NATO membership. According to the opinion polls by National Democratic Institute Public more than 72% of the public supports Georgian government´s goal to join NATO (NDI, 2014).[5]NATO-Georgia relations have officially commenced in 1994, when Georgia jointed the Partnership for Peace programme. Since that time, the relations have progressively intensified *"Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of the top foreign and security policy priorities of Georgia"* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2014). Political will and public support are clear evidence of Georgian intention to become a fullfledged NATO member. These important aspects are also followed by practical steps in favour of NATO accession. One of the clearest commitments is the country's participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, where Georgia represented the biggest non-NATO contributor of troops (together with Australia) to the ISAF mission. On May 2014, more than 1.570 Georgian soldiers were deployed, mainly to the Helmand province operating with U.S. contingent (Rubin, 2013).

The political watershed for Georgian membership aspirations was the Bucharest Summit in 2008. *"NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO*" (Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008, par. 23). However, the Bucharest Summit Declaration did not set up any clear date or roadmap to the membership (Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008). The Membership Action Plan was not granted to Georgia (and Ukraine) due to French and German positions (Enlarger, 2008). Those countries stressed that Georgia and Ukraine were not prepared enough at that time (Enlarger & Lee Myers, 2008), but we cannot exclude the so-called Russian-factor in considerations of key European NATO-members.

As a reaction to the Russian invasion to Northern regions of Georgia in August 2008, the Alliance established NATO-Georgia Commission as a forum for deeper consultations (Bátor, 2013). Despite strong political message which the Membership Action Plan for Georgia would bring, there are some opinions that Georgia technically did not need the MAP. "*What Georgia needs, more than any membership plan, is actual membership in the alliance, buttressed by bilateral security guarantees provided by the United States"* (Joseph and Tsereteli, 2014). What's more, Edward Joseph pointed out that the interoperability of

[5] Public Survey was conducted in August 2014.

Georgian troops and the level of political reforms reach the point, where is no need to do mid step through Membership Action Plan (Joseph and Tsereteli, 2014). There are also other factors in favour of future Georgian membership in NATO. First one, there is a strong commitment of the United States towards Georgian NATO´s perspective; Second, Georgia is crucial in terms of the geopolitics of the entire South Caucasus; and last, but not least, as we noted above, there is a strong Georgian political commitment and public support for integration and Euro-Atlantic orientation (Ondrejcsák, 2012). However, despite the above-mentioned facts in favour of Georgian membership, the Wales Summit Declaration only repeated commitment to future Georgian membership without any exact date. *"At the 2008 Bucharest Summit we agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO and we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions*" (Wales Summit Declaration, 2014).

PART II: NATO STRATEGY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Strategy-making as the looking glass

Strategy-making is the political and institutional genetic code that enables NATO to attain three overriding objectives concurrently: deter potential adversaries; assure individual Allies; and not least, in pursuing the first two objectives, ensure a shared awareness and understanding of the *strategic intent* underpinning a concept, a plan, a cooperative undertaking or an exercise. Such an awareness and understanding are essential for effective deterrence and reliable assurance. Furthermore, strategymaking is the common endeavour that allows the larger Allies to involve the other Allies in a collective enterprise that is dependent, for its political legitimacy and operational success, on their participation and contributions. Nowhere is the Alliance's constancy of purpose more evident that in the process of strategy-making that has underpinned NATO's commitments and arrangements, in changing circumstances, over seven decades. In this *Research Paper*, the terms "strategy-making" should be understood in an expansive meaning. They cover the "ends, ways and means" construct: (i) the design of strategies and underpinning military postures that conform to the purposes set out in the North Atlantic Treaty and successive NATO Strategic Concepts; (ii) the consultation process and associated planning procedures to develop and agree the strategies and postures being sought; and (iii) the establishment and refinement of a large spectrum of agreements and arrangements, as well as plans and exercises, aimed at setting in place the agreed undertakings, collectively within NATO and multilaterally among the Allies (including, after the end of the Cold War, with partner nations as well).

The role of Iceland in relation to antisubmarine warfare and rapid reinforcement comes to mind. In this endeavour, the remarkably persistent role of NATO's European and North American "middle-size" Allies, as a "glue" between the United States and the larger European Allies, on the one hand, and the many smaller Allies, on the other, cannot be over-stated. Time and again, their political instincts and military contributions helped ensure a broad Alliance approach to strategy-making and engagement in operations and missions that was critical to helping ensure political solidarity, equitable burden-sharing and operational effectiveness. Strategy-making also enables the smaller Allies to share ownership of, and have an influence over, decisions regarding European security and Western strategy that, in

the absence of NATO, would likely have involved only the larger Allies, thereby contributing to the legitimacy and reality of the notion and the aim of an "Atlantic community".[6]

This collective strategy-making has been an essential enabler in generating buyin through successive generations of political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic – the notion that membership confers a right to partake in the governance of the Atlantic enterprise, as well as a *freely-accepted obligation* to make contributions across the board; a failure to do so by any Ally risks a loss of standing and marginalisation. NATO's participatory nature is its fail-safe mechanism, and all of its arrangements depend for their effectiveness on all Allies' enduring readiness to contribute their fair share. In this exceptional enterprise, the contribution of the United States has been exemplary, in its scope as well as durability, thereby setting a standard of ambition and achievement for all other Allies to emulate on a mutual basis.

Illustrative examples of the strategy-making impulse underpinning NATO that are addressed in this *Research Paper* include the extension of US and UK nuclear deterrence to the Alliance as a whole; the standing up of a common air defence system across Europe; the extension of NATO's air defences to encompass missile defence against ballistic missile threats originating from beyond Europe; and the conduct of multinational operations to help prevent a crisis from escalating into a wider conflict or bring hostilities to a close and enforce a fragile peace.

In each case, strategy-making involved approving a common strategic goal, for instance, during the Cold War, defending Alliance territory as far East as possible; agreeing an operational concept – Forward Defence – to translate that intent into a collective endeavour; and, lastly, setting in place the operational arrangements and force contributions to implement that undertaking. Or, after the end of the Cold War, approving the operational extension of ISAF's footprint across the whole of Afghanistan; agreeing on the broadest possible participation by Allies in taking that intent forward, in successive phases; and, finally, using framework nation arrangements in the standing up of ISAF regional commands, borrowing from the experience with multinational divisions in IFOR and multinational brigades in the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). Almost without exception, this strategymaking process involves successive rounds of consultation and planning, in a spiral dynamic, that helps

[6] Portugal illustrates this point well. In the 1950s, in order to break its geographic isolation from the rest of the Alliance, at a time when Spain was not yet a member, Portugal made the commitment to reinforce Central Europe in wartime. In 1956, Portuguese jet fighters deployed to France to take part in a NATO exercise. In the 1970s, Portugal renewed and updated its reinforcement commitment by regularly deploying on NATO exercises a mechanized infantry brigade and fighter squadrons to Italy.

generate awareness, buy-in and, ultimately, adherence and support by Allies. The results of this strategy-making dynamic were readily apparent during the 2014 Wales, 2016 Warsaw and 2018 Brussels Summit meetings, which agreed NATO's post-2014 strategic adaptation.

Strategic Concepts are high-level statements of purpose that translate the Allies' evolving political ambitions for the Alliance and NATO's updated military requirements, against the background of the Treaty's enduring aims and a changed security landscape. As will be seen, changes in operational concepts, structures and arrangements have often anticipated, rather than coincided with, the approval of a new Strategic Concept, because important strategic and operational developments have often taken place between Strategic Concepts. For instance, the agreement in 1963 of a revised model of extended deterrence and, that same year, the movement to a full Forward Defence posture in Central Europe, were tied more directly to political developments, such as the 1961 Berlin crisis, that set the scene for approval of the Strategic Concept (Military Committee (MC) 14/3) in December 1967, than to implementation of the earlier MC 14/2 Concept of May 1957 (see Figure 1 on the next page for a summary description of NATO's evolving Cold War posture).[7]

Likewise, NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept set out a strong NATO role in crisis management, building on the experience of leading peace enforcement operations in the Balkans, but could not foresee, in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, that in 2002 Heads of State and Government meeting at Prague would issue guidance that NATO must be able to act in a way that is no longer constrained geographically to Europe. Lastly, the reorientation towards a stronger posture of collective defence in Europe after 2014 was undertaken despite Russia's new belligerence not having been anticipated in the 2010 Strategic Concept, which remains the Alliance's current higher guidance below the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO's post-2014 reaction to Russia's belligerence underscored NATO's capacity to reach consensus and adapt to strategic circumstances that do not conform to earlier anticipation and guidance.

[7] NATO's first strategic concept, *Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area*, was promulgated as a document of NATO's Defence Committee (DC 6/1) on 1 December 1949. The Defence Committee brought together NATO Defence Ministers. Military Committee guidance for the implementation of DC 6/1 took the form of document MC 14 *Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Regional Planning*, issued on 28 March 1950. Following the Defence Committee's dissolution in May 1951 and the assumption of its responsibilities by the North Atlantic Council itself, successive Cold War strategic concepts were promulgated in the Military Committee's MC 14 document series. Evolving military guidance for the implementation of the MC 14/2 and MC 14/3 strategic concepts was issued in the MC 48/2 and MC 48/3 documents. See G. W. Pedlow, *The evolution of NATO strategy, 1949-1969*, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Brussels, 1999.

Arguably, it is the compelling logic of this constancy of purpose in meeting the aims of the Treaty, rather than, merely, external dangers, that has sustained NATO, and will likely continue to do so in the years ahead notwithstanding the threats from potential adversaries or the challenges from within the Alliance.

Table1. ***NATO's Cold War deterrence and defense posture, 1949-1989***

Strategic Concept	MC 14 March 1950	MC 14/1 December 1952	MC 14/2 May 1957	MC 14/3 December 1967
Conventional defense posture in Central Europe	Piecemeal force deployments	Initial, structured force deployments	Allied Forces deployed in structured Army Corps sectors ("layered cake")	"Winning the first battle" (as of 1977) and Conventional Followon Force Attack (1984)
"Forward defense" concept in Central Europe	"Retardation" operations and firm defence on Rhine Ijssel line	"Retardation" operations and firm defence on Rhine Ijssel line	Firm defence on Lech and Weser Rivers (as of 1958); nuclear support "from the outset" of conflict	Firm defence at FRG's eastern borders (as of September 1963); no "early" first use (as of early 1970s)
Non-strategic nuclear deterrence posture in Europe		Initial US Air Force (USAF) nuclearcapable fighterbombers stationed in the United Kingdom and US Army surface-to-surface missiles in the FRG (as of 1952-1953)	Nuclear capacity with US and other Allied forces in Europe (fighter-bombers; surface-tosurface missiles; surface-toair missiles). RAF *Canberra* and *Valiant* bombers	US LRTNF (*Pershing* 2 ballistic missiles and Gryphon-groundlaunched cruise missiles), starting in 1983.
Strategic nuclear deterrence support to NATO		Royal Air Force (RAF) and USAF bombers deployed in the United Kingdom	RAF and USAF bombers; UK *Thor* and Italian and Turkish *Jupiter* IRBMs. *Thor* missiles replaced by RAF "V" bombers and *Jupiter* missiles by US *Polaris* SSBNs/SLBMs* as of 1963	UK and US *Polaris* SSBNs/SLBMs (US *Polaris* replaced by *Poseidon* as of 1972).

* SSBN: Nuclear-powered ballistic missile-launching submarine. SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

The primacy of strategic and operational coherence

Eventually, NATO's new Concept of Maritime Operations in the early 1980s, with its balanced focus on complementary maritime campaigns, set out how the prospect of powerful Allied maritime operations in the Norwegian Sea and in the eastern Mediterranean could help deter the Soviet Union and, if deterrence failed, divert Soviet forces from being engaged in the Western strategic direction towards Central Europe.[8] Similarly, the focus of the US

[8] IMSM-CBX-226-80, *Statement Regarding TRI-MNC Concept of Maritime Operations*, NATO Confidential, 21 May 1980, NA.

Army's 1982 "Air Land Battle" doctrine on mobile operations and "deep attack", aimed at "out-manoeuvring" the Soviet Army, was sometimes perceived as contradicting the political commitment to defending forward and not yielding Allied territory. SACEUR's 1984 Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) sub-concept sought to reconcile the requirement to defend forward with the need to survive and prevail in any "follow-on battle", as the Soviet Army developed its capacity to commit additional echelons of fresh forces. Even a recognition that changes in operational arrangements or national contributions do not coincide necessarily with the approval of a new Strategic Concept cannot always capture the impulses and complexity of NATO strategymaking. On occasion, seemingly divergent operational concepts had to be reconciled within the same strategic framework. In the late 1970s, the US Navy's new "Maritime Strategy", with its emphasis on operating aircraft-carriers and other naval forces, from inside Norwegian fjords and from behind the Greek island of Crete[9] to deter and counter a Soviet attack on NATO's northern and southern flanks, was seen by some observers as undermining the necessary focus on deterring a Warsaw Pact theatre strategic operation in the Alliance's critical Central Region.[10]

After the end of the Cold War, the enduring focus on making the NATO Command Structure deployable, through the adoption of successive constructs (Combined Joint Task Force headquarters; Deployable Joint Staff Element; etc.), had to contend with the distinct command and control requirements of different NATO-led expeditionary operations and a widening range of command and control options offered by an increasingly strong and diverse NATO Force Structure. NATO's adaptation of the Command Structure in 2018 aims, *inter alia*, at command arrangements that balance the strengths of both structures and leverage 25 years of operational experience.

At the same time, key aspects of NATO's posture were often the subject of extended consideration and effort, and their implementation seldom realised fully, as a result of evolving strategic conditions, changing operational perspectives and persistent resource constraints. In the conventional field, forward defence at the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) eastern borders was agreed upon in 1963, but the operational capacity to "win the first battle, while outnumbered" was not rehearsed regularly until the second half of the 1970s, with the Autumn Forge exercise series. Likewise, NATO initiated an effort in 1967 to ensure

[9] J. Lehman, *Oceans ventured*, New York, NY, WW Norton & Company, 2018, pp.169-170.

[10] R. W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy versus Continental Defense", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.60, No.5, Summer 1982, pp.1124-1144.

that Europe's northern and southern flanks would be properly reinforced in times of tension[11], responding to concerns expressed several years earlier, but a comprehensive Rapid Reinforcement Plan for the whole of Western Europe came into being only in 1983, after a build-up process started in 1975.[12]

In the nuclear domain, the extended deterrence arrangements agreed upon in 1963 and subsequently updated in 1971and 1976 were challenged by the replacement of older generation Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) by the new SS-20 Saber IRBM in the late 1970s. This development triggered a countervailing NATO response to strengthen deterrence, in the form of Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and Gryphon ground-launched cruise missiles. Lastly, the provision of dualcapable US delivery systems to the Allies in the early 1960s formed the backdrop to the approval of *Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weaponsby NATO* in 1969.[13] Those guidelines, however, were placed at risk by the deployment by Warsaw Pact forces of modern nuclear-capable field artillery and short-range ballistic missiles, such as the SS-21 Scarab, in the early 1980s. The combination of the SS-21 and SS-20 at the lower and higher ends of the non-strategic nuclear spectrum translated, effectively, into a new Soviet capacity to intimidate NATO, by attempting to deny the Alliance the prospect of being able to restore deterrence successfully in a hypothetical conflict. That episode was a compelling example of the Soviet Union removing the prospect of nuclear weapon employment by either side, in order to exploit fully its conventional advantage over NATO.

Matching political intent and military capability

In Afghanistan, the scale and persistence of force commitments to the ISAF by Allies other than the United States and by partners (numbering, at their peak, some 40,000 troops deployed at once), alongside US forces (numbering, at their peak, some 90,000 troops), were

[11] DPWG/D(67)4, *Study on External Reinforcements for the Flanks*, NATO Secret, 9 March 1967, NA.

[12] DPC/D(82)23, *SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan (OPLAN 10002)*, NATO Confidential, 24 November 1982, NA.

[13] D. S. Yost, "The history of NATO theater nuclear force policy: key findings from the Sandia Conference", *Journal of Strategic Studies,* Vol.15, No.2, June 1992, p.231.

remarkable. NATO confirmed successfully its capacity as an alliance to be the core of a much wider coalition. The depth of political engagement in Kabul, at the United Nations and in

Allied capitals in sustaining that exceptional military commitment, however, was often erratic and inadequate, given the stakes for the Alliance involved in stabilising Afghanistan.[14] Experience, however, has pointed to the difficulty of always matching satisfactorily political resolve and military capacity in the complex and rapidly changing circumstances of crisis response operations, where the unifying impetus of collective defence does not apply to the same extent. In spring 1999, for example, the Allies were remarkably united in supporting the conduct of an air operation to counter Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's policies of repression and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The air campaign, however, was under-resourced by many Allies and its extended duration, over several months, did not match the urgency of the political intent to stop the bloodshed rapidly and, at times, strained the Allied consensus.

Restoring NATO's collective defence capacity since 2014 is a good starting point to review the Alliance's "strategic odyssey", starting with NATO's Cold War years. Strategy-making during two decades of post-Cold War operations, in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, as well as in relation to NATO's contribution to counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and NATO's engagement in Libya in 2011, illustrated, even more starkly than the Cold War record, NATO's preeminent political purpose, which is essential to unlocking its military component. At the same time, NATO's reorientation, in part, towards deterrence and defence in Europe since 2014 has underscored the necessity of restoring the practices of a mutual defence alliance, notably a standing NATO with commands, forces and infrastructure that are inbeing.

The Cold War's long haul (1949-1989)

NATO's post-Vietnam revival started in earnest in 1975, following a so-called "lost decade"[15], with the implementation of initiatives aimed at strengthening durably the Alliance's conventional, as well as nuclear, posture, in the face of a relentless Warsaw Pact

[14] A. Mattelaer, *The political-military dynamics of European crisis response operations: planning, friction, strategy*, London, Palgrave-MacMillan, 2013; and D. P. Auerswald and S. M. Saideman, *NATO in Afghanistan: fighting together, fighting alone*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2014.

[15] J. Galen, "NATO's lost decade: restoring the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance: the art of the impossible", *Armed Forces Journal International*, September 1978, pp.30-40.

build-up in all categories of military power and a deteriorating military balance for NATO.[16] The 1950s and 1960s were a period of strategic experimentation, as well as upheaval, for NATO, as Allies strove to come to terms with the implications of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles for deterrence and defence, as well as explored the scope for *détente* and arms control with the USSR. The period extending from 1969 to 1989 was characterized by the gradual setting of a widening strategic consensus, in the face of a rising Soviet military challenge and despite the political misgivings generated by an erosion of *détente*. Starting at the Ottawa ministerial meeting in 1974, that consensus gradually included France, after it had left the Alliance's Integrated Military Structure in 1966.[17] NATO's strengthened deterrence and defence posture in the 1980s undoubtedly induced Soviet restraint at a time of considerable East-West tension, by reflecting the image of a resolute, as well as increasingly capable, Alliance. That process of renewal extended through 1987; by this time it had become clear to the new Soviet leadership that the policy, dating back to Leonid Brezhnev's assumption of power in 1964, of seeking to attain a position of uncontested military pre-eminence in Europe had been counterproductive politically.[18] NATO's competitive stance, by defeating Soviet attempts to achieve a position of uncontested military dominance in Europe, also exerted an increasingly unbearable burden on the Soviet economy, which, when combined with the costs of the USSR's large military engagement in Afghanistan, also contributed to bankrupting the Soviet Union.

This second part of the *Research Paper* illustrates how NATO was able to sustain a four decade-long competition with the Soviet Union, through a continuous process of strategy-making and operational adaptation to the changing strategic circumstances and operational conditions of Cold War deterrence and defence. Strategy-making had to encompass, at once, the on-setting of the nuclear age; the evolution of technology and the expanding availability of missiles as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapon employment; the rapid and extensive mechanisation of land forces; the growing speed and range of jet-powered combat aircraft; and the increasing role of aircraft carriers and submarines. Strategy-making, through the

[16] IMSWM-189-77, *SACEUR's 1976Combat Effectiveness Report*, NATO Secret, 16 August 1977, NA; IMSWM-45-78, *1977 Supplement to SACEUR's 1976 Combat Effectiveness Report*, NATO Secret, 20 February 1978, NA.

[17] At the Ottawa ministerial meeting in June 1974, NATO acknowledged formally the contribution of France's independent nuclear deterrent to the overall strengthening of the Alliance's deterrence posture. See *Declaration on Atlantic Relations,* Ottawa Ministerial meeting, 19 June 1974.

[18] The internal dynamics that drove Soviet defence decision-making during the Brezhnev era are addressed in J. C. Hines, E. M. Mishulovich and J. F. Shull, "Factors in Soviet force building and strategic decision-

continuous interaction between the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Military Authorities, and among the Allies, sought to generate common and adapted responses to the strategic and operational implications of these developments for the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture. As will be seen, NATO endeavoured, in this challenging environment, to keep up with a generally unfavourable balance of forces with the Warsaw Pact, reduce its dependence on the first, early, tactical use of nuclear weapons as an increasingly problematic way to compensate for conventional weakness, while increasing the overall credibility of its nuclear extended deterrence posture, and ensure equal protection for all Allies, across the whole of Western Europe, irrespective of their geographic position, through robust forward defence and rapid reinforcement.[19]

First steps (1949-1954)

This evolution responded to the imperative of reacting to the growing perception of an increased Soviet threat prompted by the Soviet blockade of Western Berlin initiated in June 1948, the USSR's acquisition of the atom bomb and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, in September and October 1949 respectively, and by the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea in June 1950. It also reflected the political requirement for the Alliance to assume responsibility, on a transatlantic basis, for the collective defence of Western Europe that, since the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty in March 1948, had been exercised by the Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO). NATO's first five years witnessed several processes: the evolution of the Alliance into a highly institutionalised standing organisation, including an Integrated Military Structure of unprecedented scale in peacetime; the transformation in West Germany of the former occupation forces from a disparate assortment of weak and operationally disconnected contingents into an increasingly coherent whole; and agreement of initial coordination arrangements to extend US nuclear deterrence making", to Western Europe. In many ways, NATO's first steps helped define the Alliance's key features, institutionally (the "machinery" of NATO), as well as operationally (conventional defence underpinned by a nuclear deterrent), for decades to come. Early on, the practices of consultation, planning and decision-making set a standing procedure that has helped foster consensus and that has endured to this day.

[19]Soviet Intentions 1965-1985: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, vol.II, report prepared by BDM Federal for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 22 September 1995, pp.48-67.

Taking over from WUDO

Defending West Germany with the few forces available at that time became the main focus of WUDO's planning during the two-and-a-half years, between autumn 1948 and spring 1951, when it was in charge. That mission could not have been undertaken without US involvement, including the promise of reinforcement from the United States. Within months of the signature of the Brussels Treaty by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom, a highly developed structure of civil and military bodies came into place, including a ministerial Council, a Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee (WUCOS) and a Commanders-in-Chief Committee. While the higher political and military bodies met in London, the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, chaired by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, was located at Fontainebleau, to the southeast of Paris. The committee included commanders-in-chief for land and air forces, a flag officer for naval forces, and a multinational staff structure known as Uniforce.[20] To that end, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed Major General Lyman Lemnitzer as their liaison to WUCOS in London.[21] Concurrently, Uniforcein Fontainebleau entered into a process of collective planning with the American, British and French military governors in Germany, through their combined planning staff located at the headquarters of the US Military Governor, General Lucius Clay, in Wiesbaden. However, following the end of World War 2, US forces had been withdrawn almost entirely from Europe. The US Army presence in Germany had fallen from some 3.1 million troops in May 1945 to less than 400,000 a year later and, in 1948, it was limited to a single infantry division and a constabulary force.[22]WUDO was Western Europe's first collective military organisation. Its significance in NATO's early history lies in the initial measures that were taken to bring together British forces and those of its Western Union allies. **They included:**

- plans for delaying operations in West Germany against advancing Soviet forces and a firm defence on the Rhine-Ijssel Rivers, in case of war;

[20] For a detailed description of WUDO and its legacy, see L. S. Kaplan, *NATO 1948: the birth of the transatlantic Alliance,* Lanham, Maryland, Roman & Littlefield, 2007, pp.139-164.

[21] Kaplan, *NATO 1948: the birth of the transatlantic Alliance, op. cit.*, pp.144-148. Subsequently, Lemnitzer served as Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff (1960-1962) and SACEUR (1962-1969).

[22] D. A. Carter, *Forging the shield: the US Army in Europe, 1951-1962,* Washington, DC, United States Army Center of Military History, 2015, pp.7-8.

- multinational exercises;
- the nucleus of a collective air defence system; and
- a commonly-funded infrastructure programme.

These measures laid the ground for NATO taking over from WUDO in a quicker and smoother way that might have been the case otherwise.[23]

Strengthening NATO's nascent institutions

In parallel with the taking over from WUDO, and in response to the outbreak of the Korean War, NATO strengthened its institutions beyond the initial bodies that had been created in 1949: NATO's governing body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC); the Defence Committee (DC) bringing together defence ministers; the Military Committee (MC); the MC's executive agency, the Standing Group (SG); and five Regional Planning Groups established to take over and expand the focus of WUDO planning beyond Central Europe.[24] Between August and December 1950, NATO agreed to the:

- establishment of a standing Council of Deputies and a standing Military RC, acting on behalf of the NAC and the Military Committee, respectively, between their periodic meetings;
- strengthening of the role of the Standing Group, as the military body providing strategic direction, by delegation from the Military Committee, initially to the five Regional Planning Groups for Northern, Central and Southern Europe, the North Atlantic Ocean, and North America, and, following the activation of the Integrated Military Structure, the Major NATO Commanders;
- appointment of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as NATO's first SACEUR[25] and of a Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT);
- promulgation of guiding principles for defence, notably "defence as far to the East as possible, including western Germany";

[23] DC 10/1, *Relations Between the North Atlantic Defense Organization and the Brussels Treaty Defense Organization*, NATO Secret, 12 December 1949, NA.

[24] Once NATO established a permanent headquarters, the North Atlantic Council was located in Paris. The Military Committee and the Standing Group were located at the Pentagon in Washington.

[25] Eisenhower assigned special importance to the education of a cadre of NATO-minded officers from across the Alliance and in December 1951 he activated the NATO Defense College in Paris.

- development of tailored military preparations for the defence of Denmark and Norway in the north and of Italy in the south, as well as command arrangements for the Mediterranean Sea;[26]
- the desirability of a strong German military contribution to the common defence,[27] and the possible implications for NATO of the establishment of a multinational "European Army" (the ill-fated European Defence Community).[28]
- Without doubt, the key decisions were the creation of a NATO Integrated Military Structure and the appointment of a US general officer as SACEUR.[29]

Assuming command throughout the North Atlantic Treaty area

During the Cold War, the Integrated Military Structure did not include distinct command and force structures as has been the case since the 1990s: national land, air and naval formations belonging to the Allies were directly subordinated to the various NATO military headquarters, at each level of command. The Integrated Military Structure came into being, in steps, between 1951 and 1953, with the successive appointments of SACEUR, SACLANT and, as the third Major NATO Commander (MNC), the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Channel (CINCHAN).[30] The structure included four levels of command: at the top, the three MNCs; and, below, their Major Subordinate Commanders (MSC) and their own Principal

[26] DC 24/1 *Reorganization of the NATO Military Structure*, Cosmic Top Secret, 26 October 1950, NA, pp.78. The initial idea that NATO might include a Middle East Command was made mute by the creation of the Baghdad Pact Organisation, renamed Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and the establishment of bilateral information exchange links between NATO and CENTO that extended through the latter's dissolution in 1979. SG 80/4, *Command in the Mediterranean and Middle East,* Cosmic Top Secret, 22 August 1951, NA; PO(59)123, *Military Liaison Between NATO and the Baghdad Pact Organization,* NATO Secret, 26 January 1959, NA; and MCM-50-72 Attendance of CENTO Observers at NATO *Exercise Deep Furrow 72*, NATO Confidential, 20 July 1972, NA.

[27] DC 29, *German Contributions to the Defence of Western Europe*, Cosmic Top Secret, 26 October 1950, NA.

[28] DC 29/1, *German Contributions to the Defence of Western Europe*, Cosmic Top Secret, 13 December 1950, NA, p.6. It is important to note that the European Defence Community (EDC) was not conceived as an alternative to NATO and the EDC Treaty foresaw EDC multinational contingents being placed under the command of SACEUR.

[29] DC 24/3, *The Creation of an Integrated European Defense Force, the establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe and the Reorganization of the NATO Military Structure*, NATO Confidential, 12 December 1950, NA.

[30] The last two major military headquarters completing the Integrated Military Structure – Allied Forces, Mediterranean, at Valetta, Malta, and Allied Forces, Central Europe, at Fontainebleau, France, were activated in

Subordinate Commanders (PSC) and sub-PSC commanders.[31]That practice had the advantage, in a context of high tension, when transition to war could have happened in a matter of days, of creating strong bonds in peacetime between NATO commanders and the national forces that they would have led into combat. In 1954, the North Atlantic Council amplified considerably SACEUR's authorities – in the fields of force dispositions, force effectiveness, training, and logistics, to help ensure that he could discharge his responsibilities fully in the post-EDC circumstances of West Germany becoming a member of NATO.[32]

Once fully activated, the Integrated Military Structure underwent many small revisions, but remained essentially unchanged during the rest of the Cold War, until the first, post-Cold War reforms in 1994. SACEUR had three Major Subordinate Commanders – CINCNORTH, CINCENT and CINCSOUTH, responsible for northern, central and southern Europe, respectively – and, during limited periods of time, four: CINCAFMED was a NATO maritime commander for the Mediterranean between 1953 and 1967 and CINCUKAIR was a NATO air commander between 1975 and the end of the Cold War overseeing Royal Air Force units stationed in the United Kingdom and committed to NATO. SACLANT initially had Major Subordinate Commanders for the western and eastern Atlantic; a third MSC for the south-eastern part of the North Atlantic area of operations, designated Commander-in-Chief, Iberian Atlantic (CINCIBERLANT), was activated after much delay in 1968.[33]

Starting nearly from scratch

The starting line was a devastated Europe, still recovering economically and socially from a highly destructive war, with very limited resources for defence, few forces in being, virtually

March and August, 1953, respectively. See G. W. Pedlow, "The Evolution of Allied Command Europe, 19512001", *NATO's Nations*, iss. 1/2001, p.110.

[31] For example, for Southern Europe, SACEUR's MSC was the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH); one of CINCSOUTH's PSCs was the Commander, Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), and one of COMAIRSOUTH's sub-PSC commanders was the Commander, 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (COMFIVEATAF).

[32] C-M(54)85, *Draft Resolution to Implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference*, NATO Confidential, 19 October 1954, NA, pp.3-6. On the occasion of the accession of Germany and Italy to the 1948 Brussels Treaty, the original Western Union was renamed Western European Union (WEU). The WEU was disbanded in 2011.

[33] MCM-47-65, *Activation of IBERLANT Command,* NATO Secret, 25 March 1965, NA.

no modern military equipment, and an austere infrastructure of obsolescent airfields, barracks and harbours. The task facing the Allies and SACEUR in the early 1950s was of a scope and scale unprecedented for a peacetime alliance: NATO had to be prepared to defend against attack and invasion of a vast treaty area extending from north Norway to, after the accession of Greece and Turkey to the Alliance in 1952,[34] the Black and eastern Mediterranean Seas and eastern Turkey, and from Portugal to North America. To that end, peacetime arrangements had to be set in place of an ambition sufficient to enable forces scattered across Europe to sustain together a credible deterrence posture and, should deterrence fail, fight and prevail over a formidable potential adversary with a very large standing army. Doctrine and force structures reflected largely the legacy of Allied operations in 1943-1945.[35] Awareness of the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on a large scale and of their implications for strategy and tactics was virtually non-existent. Most West European forces had some experience fighting alongside American, British and Canadian forces, but only a limited familiarity with the concept of operating together as an Allied team and using common tactics.

While strengthening NATO militarily required initiating many engineering projects to build command bunkers, microwave relay stations and pipelines, NATO's most critical contribution to the collective effort had more in common with the skill set of an architect than that of an engineer: a broad perspective that transcends national boundaries and helps motivate the individual nations to work together for a higher level of collective ambition. In this sense, starting seven decades ago, NATO has been a transformation "elevator" that challenges Allies' military establishments and helps lift them to higher levels of performance.[36]

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[34] General A. M. Gruenther, SACEUR, 1953-1956, "I am charged with defending all of Western Europe, not just the easy portions", cited in *SHAPE History: The New Approach, 1953-1956*.

[35] The first generation of senior NATO commanders were all veterans of World War II allied operations in North Africa, Italy and France and in the Pacific. NATO's first SACEUR and Deputy SACEUR were Eisenhower and Montgomery, respectively. The first Commanders-in-Chief of Allied Land and Air Forces, Central Europe, were Generals Alphonse Juin and Lauris Norstad. The first Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces, Mediterranean, was Admiral Lord Mountbatten. At the same time, NATO's first guidance for planning cautioned that "the North Atlantic Treaty nations should not be misled into planning in the frame of mind prevailing at the end of World War II". MC 14, *Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Regional Planning,* Cosmic Top Secret, 3 March 1950, NA, p.4.

[36] NATO uses the notion of "reasonable challenge" to challenge Allies to pursue and deliver military capabilities that are necessary to meet collectively the agreed, aggregate NATO military requirement.

Several examples, at both the strategic and tactical levels, illustrate the farreaching impact, which often extends to today, of that original impulse to build a collective military capacity:

- development of Emergency Defence Plans that set out the conventional defence missions to be executed in wartime and provided a single, multinational framework of reference for preparing and training the forces and for commanding them as a single, combined force;
- activation under SACLANT of the Striking Fleet, Atlantic, to which over half of NATO's Cold War member nations contributed ships and aircraft. When assembled once a year for a major exercise, it was the world's most powerful Fleet ever, until its disbandment in 2005;[37]
- formulation of a blueprint for the coordinated air defence of Western Europe, which set the stage for the activation under SACEUR of the NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS), and for a tropospheric communications network – the ACE High system – linking SHAPE to all of its subordinated headquarters across Europe;
- expansion of the number of airfields in Western Europe meeting exacting NATO criteria and commonly funded by the Allies.[38]

These developments were underpinned by an increasingly ambitious and demanding exercise programme aimed at training forces and staffs, refining operational skills, and evaluating formations and headquarters against agreed NATO force standards.

Building up the conventional "shield"

The outbreak of the Korean War altered fundamentally the West's strategic calculus. It triggered fears that North Korea's attack could foreshadow Soviet aggression in Europe and prompted a rapid increase of NATO, notably US, military strength in West Germany. In

[37] The Striking Fleet, Atlantic was composed of a carrier strike force bringing together UK and US aircraft-carriers and their surface escorts; a UK-led anti-submarine warfare force; and an amphibious landing force comprising a combined UK-Netherlands component and a US Marine Corps component.

[38] The lasting impact of the practice, initiated in the 1950s, of financing collectively, through the NATO Infrastructure Programme, the development of modern airfields capable of handling state-of-the-art combat aircraft was underscored by the extensive use of many air bases in France, Greece and Italy to support the NATO air campaign in Libya in 2011. That operation prompted a rediscovery of the neglected importance of NATO's infrastructure, as a strategic enabler, and of the need to fund commonly its proper maintenance and modernization.

September 1950, President Harry Truman decided on a major build up of US forces in Europe.[39] Within a year, the US Army strength in Europe had expanded considerably, from a single division to four infantry divisions and an armoured division, setting a baseline of five divisions for the remainder of the Cold War. In the Federal Republic of Germany's southern half, the new 7th US Army joined the 1st French Army in forming NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG). In West Germany's northern half, the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) and a Canadian brigade joined a Belgian and a Dutch corps to form NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). By the time that SHAPE was activated in April 1951, the number of corps-size fighting formations had almost doubled, from four to seven. The number of divisions increased to about a dozen, although many were poorly equipped, supported by a growing tactical air component. Canada alone based twelve fighter squadrons in France and Germany. Initiation of the US Mutual Defense Assistance Program resulted in a steady stream of deliveries of armoured vehicles and jet fighter aircraft. By June 1951, a year into the war in Korea, the United States had delivered 1.6 million tons of materiel to allies worldwide, of which nearly two thirds was to NATO Allies in Western Europe alone.[40] Canada also initiated its own security assistance programme to the European Allies.

NATO's strategic and operational renaissance (1975-1987)

In the mid-1970s, NATO entered strategically a period of maximum danger. In the United States, there was a growing apprehension that the Soviet Union did not adhere to the concept of "assured destruction" underpinning mutual deterrence and was pursuing actively a "damage limitation" capacity to prevail in a nuclear war. Such a capacity included, notably, the hardening of Soviet strategic command facilities, coupled with new ballistic missile attack capabilities against exposed US strategic command and control nodes and vulnerable bomber airfields.[41] In Europe, the USSR was on the way to reaching uncontested military preponderance over NATO in conventional and, increasingly, non-strategic nuclear

[39] H. Zimmermann, "The improbable permanence of a commitment: America's troop presence in Europe during the Cold War", *Journal of Cold War Studies,* Vol.11, No.1, 2009, p.7.

[40] J. A. Huston, *One for all: NATO strategy and logistics through the formative period, 1949-1969*, Newark, Delaware, University of Delaware Press, 1984, p.50.

[41] D. E. Hoffman, *The dead hand*, New York, NY, Anchor Books, 2009, pp.150-154; and D. A. Ruiz Palmer, "Military exercises and strategic intent through the prism of NATO's Autumn Forge exercise series, 19751989", in B. Heuser, T. Heier and G. Lasconjarias (eds.), *Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact*, Rome, NDC, 2018, pp.74-79.

capabilities deployed opposite NATO.[42] Soviet force developments confirmed operational trends that had been underway since the late 1960s:

- an expansion of the focus of combined-arms warfare from the *Front* level to the much wider theatre of military operations (TVD);
- the standing up of high commands for the Western and Southwestern TVDs (opposite Denmark and West Germany; and Greece and Turkey, respectively);
- the activation of two Soviet strategic air armies and two combined Warsaw Pact naval fleets supporting the two TVD high commands;
- the regular conduct of Zapad, Soyuz and other Warsaw Pact exercises in the two TVDs;
- an increased emphasis on preparations for a short-warning attack, by "front-loading" the theatre strategic operation and the execution of encirclement operations aimed at enveloping and breaking NATO's forward defences apart and led by fast-paced, purpose-built raiding forces – the "operational manoeuvre group" (OMG).[43]

The new SACEUR, General Alexander Haig, warned in successive Combat Effectiveness Reports of persisting capability shortfalls and growing dangers.[44]

Regaining the initiative

As awareness of a steady shift in the balance of forces in Europe against NATO spread, the Carter Administration led a post-Vietnam NATO strategic and operational "renaissance", with strong support from the Congress.[45] Once in place, the momentum of renewal

[42] For a detailed assessment of this period, see D. A.Ruiz Palmer, "The NATO-Warsaw Pact military competition in the 1970s and 1980s: a revolution in military affairs in the making or the end of a strategic age?", *Cold War History*, Vol.14, Iss.4, 2014, pp.533-573.

[43] D. A. Ruiz Palmer, *Theatre Operations, High Commands and Large Scale Exercises in Soviet and Russian Military Practice: Insights and Implications, op. cit.*, pp.10-15.

[44] IMSWM-189-77, *SACEUR's 1976Combat Effectiveness Report*, NATO Secret, 16 August 1977, NA; IMSWM-45-78, *1977 Supplement to SACEUR's 1976 Combat Effectiveness Report*, NATO Secret, 20 February 1978, NA.

[45] Senator Sam Nunn, *Policy, Troops and the NATO Alliance*, Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 April 1974; Nunn and Senator Dewey F. Bartlett, *NATO and the New Soviet Threat*, Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 24 January 1977. Nunn was a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and he deserves credit for having generated in the Senate, almost single-handedly, considerable support for NATO's post-Vietnam renaissance. It resulted, among others, in funding in Fiscal Years 1975 and 1976 for the stationing of two additional US Army Brigades in West Germany – designated "Brigade 75" and "Brigade 76" – compensating for the withdrawal of two brigades in 1968.

strengthened further during President Ronald Reagan's two terms, extending into the late 1980s. NATO's revival combined strategic-level measures by Haig aimed at improving the readinessof Allied forces, enhancing NATO's reinforcement capability, and rationalizing mutual support arrangements among Allies, under the heading of SACEUR's "3Rs" (readiness, reinforcement, and rationalisation)[46]; an extraordinary commitment by the United States at the 1978 NATO Summit in Washington, to double, from three to six, the number of US Army reinforcing divisions for the Central Region with their equipment prepositioned in Europe;[47] and an across-the-board enhancement of NATO's conventional and nuclear posture, in the form of the Long-Term Defence Programme (LTDP). In the early 1980s, growing US defence expenditures and a commitment to introduce rapidly a new generation of weapon systems into the US Army and Air Force, to replace legacy systems dating back to the 1960s, transformed the US military presence in Europe – for example, 600 F-4 Phantom combat aircraft stationed in Europe were replaced by new generation F-15, F-16, F-111 and A-10 fighters, fighter-bombers and close-air-support aircraft.

Haig's "3Rs" initiative was underpinned by the "Flexibility Study" initiated by Goodpaster two years earlier. By the time the Flexibility Study effort was completed in 1981, 479 recommendations had been submitted and 463 acted upon.[48] Headline items, such as rationalisation, were supported by recommended measures in each domain. In the land domain, they translated into new tactics, techniques and procedures aimed at improving "rationalisation, standardisation and interoperability" (RSI) among Allied armies in NATO's Central Region. The planning of coordinated operations across the boundaries of adjacent Allied army corps that could be threatened, in wartime, by targeted Soviet OMG raids, received special attention. They were rehearsed during two purpose-built field training exercises staged in West Germany, exercises Constant Enforcer in 1979 and Carbine Fortress in 1982.

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[46] M. Honick, "Haig: the diplomacy of Allied Command", in R. S. Jordan (ed.), *Generals in international politics*, *op. cit.*, p.171; and Enclosure to IMSWM,127-77, *Autumn Forge 77 Exercise Series*, NATO Unclassified, 3 June 1977, NA, p.1.

[47] *Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Meeting with the Participation of Heads of State and Government*, 30-31 May 1978, para. 23. Eventually, the prepositioning in Europe of the equipment for six US Army divisions translated into the storage of materiel for 16 armoured and mechanised infantry brigades, in effect doubling the US Army strength in West Germany, within ten days of a reinforcement decision, to 32 brigade equivalents. That was a strength comparable to the 32 active *panzer* and *panzergrenadier* brigades of the Bundeswehr.

[48] MCM-CXG-55-81, *ACE Flexibility Studies (NU)*,NATO Confidential, 3 September 1981, NA, p.1.

An overall construct for deterrence and defence takes shape

Under Haig, the vision, going back to Norstad's tenure, of a single, NATO-wide strategic construct, whereby all of the components of the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture would work together seamlessly across the entire North Atlantic Treaty area came fully into focus. This construct combined forward defence operations (General Defence Plans); the air defence battle (NATINADS); the offensive air support operations (COMAO); the maritime campaigns (CONMAROPS); and the reinforcements flows and their supporting arrangements (RRP). In this enterprise, the United States played a pivotal role in generating the Alliance's core operational capability across all regions. By the early 1980s, the United States had committed to NATO three Army corps and twelve divisions, two Navy fleets, four Air Force air forces, and two division-size Marine Corps amphibious forces, or more than two thirds of the total, worldwide, US conventional strength. Most of the external reinforcements would have been deployed to Western Europe, ready to defend, within 30 days of a reinforcement decision, many within ten days.

At the core of this construct stood the notion that successful deterrence and defence across the whole of Western Europe rested on devoting particular attention to five inter-dependent "hinges": northern Norway and the Norwegian Sea; the Danish Straits; West Germany; West Berlin; and the strategic area formed by northern Greece, western Turkey, the southern Black Sea and the central and eastern Mediterranean Sea. Protecting and holding on to these hinges would help ensure that, in a conflict, the Soviet Union would not be able to execute successfully any of the following five threatening options in whatever sequence or combination:

- a strategic envelopment of northwest Europe from the High North and the geographic isolation of Norway from the rest of the Alliance;[49]
- an encirclement of Denmark from the northwest and the southeast;
- a dash across northern West Germany to the North Sea and the English Channel;
- a conquest of West Berlin as a supporting diversionary operation; and
- a strategic envelopment of Greece and the geographic isolation of Turkey from the rest of the Alliance, extending from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean Sea and

[49] In March-April 1984, denial of NATO's control of the Norwegian and North Seas was rehearsed during the Soviet Union's largest ever maritime exercise in the North Atlantic, labelled *Springex 84* by NATO. See R.W. Apple, "Soviet is holding big naval games", *The New York Times*, 4 April 1994; and "Sowjetunion: Manöver der sowjetischen Kriegsflotte", *Osterr. Milit. Zeitschrift,* No.4/1984, pp.371-372.

leading towards the Strait of Sicily, as well as towards the Mediterranean basin's eastern shore.[50]

All plans and exercises were designed to ensure the integrity of the NATO strategic construct referred to above in all circumstances (see Figure 2below*)*.

Table2. ***Comprehensive NATO approach to deterrence and to defending the five "hinges" in the 1970s-1980s.***

Threats to NATO "hinges"	**Soviet intentions as revealed by Soviet/Warsaw Pact exercises**	**NATO and Live Oak live exercise rehearsing deterrence options and defence responses**
Strategic envelopment of northwest Europe and isolation of Norway	Large-scale maritime exercises in March-April 1984 and May-June 1985[1]	*Ocean Safari, Teamwork*
Encirclement of Denmark	*Zapad 77, Soyouz 80* *Zapad 81, Soyouz 83* *Zapad 83, Zapad 84*	*Bold Game/Grouse/Guard, Northern Wedding*
Dash to the English Channel	*Zapad 77, Soyouz 80* *Yug 81, Zapad 81, Soyouz 83* *Zapad 83, Zapad 84*	*Crack Force/Central Enterprise,* *Cloudy Chorus/Cold Fire, REFORGER – Crested Cap[2],* *Magic Sword*
Seizure of West Berlin	*Bordkante*	*Live Oak* exercises *Bold Gauntlet* and *Treaty[3]*
Strategic envelopment *Soyouz 78, Shchit 82, Soyouz 84 Deep Furrow/Display Determination* **of Greece and isolation of Turkey**		

Systematically, NATO targeted each area of growing Soviet strength, including in the nuclear area. In 1979, as an extension of the Long Term Defence Programme, NATO approved the deployment of Pershing 2 and Gryphon missiles, aimed at denying the Soviet Union the option, in a crisis, of intimidating NATO into submission with the SS-20 Saber missile.[51] This "dual-track" decision preserved explicitly the option of not proceeding with the deployment, if the Soviet Union were to agree to withdraw its rapidly expanding arsenal of SS-20 missiles from service and restore the conditions for strategic stability in Europe, which it did not.

This was NATO strategy-making at its best: steady political support, underpinned by a compelling concept for deterrence and defence, both translated into an operational

[50] D. A. Ruiz Palmer, "Paradigms lost: a retrospective assessment of the NATO-Warsaw Pact competition in the Alliance's Southern Region", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol.9, Iss.3, 1990, pp.265-286.

[51] Development and deployment of Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces was Task 10 of the LTDP.

transformation of NATO of growing scope and reach. By the time General Bernard Rogers succeeded Haig as SACEUR in 1979, the momentum towards countering and defeating Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's quest of unchallenged Soviet military primacy in Europe was strengthening steadily.

PART III: DEVELOPMENT OF NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

NATO's post-Cold War "out-of-area" pivot (1990-2020)

This third part of the *Research Paper* addresses the aims, achievements and challenges of NATO's post-Cold War transformation. Agreement of the new Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Concept for the conduct of so-called crisis response operations in 1994 and the standing up of IFOR in Bosnia andHerzegovina in 1995 reflected a new post-Cold War determination to address security risks that did not involve a threat of aggression to NATO. These developments were followed, during the next decade, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, by the initiation of a large-scale security assistance and stabilisation operation in Afghanistan. Several decisions taken in 2002-2003 combined to sharpen NATO's reorientation towards addressing security threats originating beyond Europe and conducting expeditionary operations accordingly. Following the end of the Cold War, strategy-making in NATO underwent a major reorientation away from a single focus on collective defence towards the conduct of "non-Article 5" conflict resolution and peace enforcement operations inside Europe (but "out-of-area"). As a result of NATO's growing engagement in helping prevent or bring conflicts to an end and its widening partnerships, crisis management and cooperative security assumed gradually the status of Alliance core tasks, alongside collective defence.

Key decisions included: the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council at the NATO-Russia Summit near Rome in May 2002, which confirmed NATO's partnership with Russia initiated in 1997; the statement at the 2002 Prague Summit that NATO "must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed"; the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the renaming of Allied Command Europe (ACE) as Allied Command Operations (ACO); and NATO's take-over of ISAF in Afghanistan.[52] NATO's successive post-Cold War transformations and widening operational undertakings were underpinned by successive enlargements and broadened partnerships that brought an expanding number of nations into NATO's strategy-making process and continuing "strategic odyssey".

[52] D. A. Ruiz Palmer, "The Road to Kabul", *NATO Review*, 2003.

Leaving the Cold War behind and accepting new tasks

These important steps to overcome Europe's Cold War division and set the scene for a new security order on the continent were quickly overshadowed, however, by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in summer 1990 and by the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the deepening civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While NATO as such was not involved in the US-led Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait, the Alliance took defensive measures to protect Turkey by deploying NATO's airborne early warning (AWACS) force, as well as the air component of the Allied Mobile Force. Operations Anchor Guard and Ace Guard to defend Turkey were NATO's first ever real-world operations. In contrast, the Alliance was engaged collectively nearly from the start in helping the international community contain the spread of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO's engagement in the western Balkans foreshadowed a two decade-long period of intense operational activity, with troop levels numbering in the tens of thousands deployed across several theatres (approximately 80,000 SFOR and KFOR troops in 1999; and approximately 140,000 ISAF and KFOR troops in 2010), that extended through the standing down of ISAF in Afghanistan at the end of 2014.

NATO marked formally the end of the Cold War with a special Summit meeting in London in summer 1990 and the approval of a new Strategic Concept at the Rome Summit in autumn 1991. This new concept broke new ground almost completely, not the least by being a public document that addressed NATO's enduring purpose and new tasks in a wider setting than strictly that of operational strategy. Of note, the 1991 Strategic Concept stated that "all the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West... The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared". It further set out that "the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated (by the Allies) are therefore even more remote".[53] The build-down of forces was codified in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. US Presidential Nuclear Initiatives resulted in a reduction of NATO's nonstrategic nuclear forces and nuclear stockpile in Europe by over 90 percent, which, significantly, was not reciprocated by Russia

[53] *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept,* NATO Summit, Rome, 7-8 November 1991.

in relation to its own non-strategic nuclear weapons and launchers of less than 500km in range.[54]

Containing conflict and enforcing the peace in the western Balkans (1992-1999)

First steps in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina

Between 1992 and 1995, NATO initiated, in sequence, under successive United Nations mandates, a maritime operation to monitor movements of merchant ships into and out of harbours along the former SFRY's coastline and, thereafter, to enforce a UN-mandated arms embargo; to monitor Bosnia-and-Herzegovina's airspace and, subsequently, to enforce an air-exclusion zone; and, lastly, to provide close-air-support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Because the United Nations does not have standing, deployable headquarters, NATO also loaned to the UN the mobile headquarters of the former NORTHAG command as the core of the UNPROFOR Force Headquarters near Sarajevo. Effective UNNATO coordination required complex arrangements between the UN and NATO headquarters in New York and Brussels, and the respective chain of command staff entities at Zagreb and Sarajevo for the UN and at Mons, Naples and Vicenza for NATO.[55] In addition, to facilitate an efficient use of limited assets, maritime interdiction operations in the Adriatic Sea undertaken separately by NATO and the WEU were merged in 1993 under a combined chain of command responding to both organizations. In each instance, NATO was able, within a short time, to develop and approve the applicable Operation Plans (OPLAN), drawing on its unmatched multinational planning experience and capacity.

Gradually, lessons learned from operations and reforms of command and force structures and revision of planning procedures merged into a pattern of interaction between the one and the other that endured for the next two decades.[56] Strategymaking now involved not only

[54] S. J. Koch, *The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992*, Case study 5*,* National Defense University, Washington, DC, September 2012, pp.11-12.

[55] NATO's Balkans Combined Air Operations Centre was located near Vicenza, Italy.

[56] D. A. Ruiz Palmer, "The enduring influence of operations on NATO's transformation", *NATO Review*, Spring 2008, pp.24-28.

conducting real-world engagements for the first time since the Alliance was established in 1949, but also an enduring requirement to appraise the scope, content and phasing of those engagements in the context of changing political and operational circumstances on the ground, wider international diplomacy dynamics, and domestic considerations among troop-contributing nations. Agreement of the scope of the initial Concept of Operations and the tailored Rules of Engagement and force contributions associated with each OPLAN often required a considerable amount of consultation among the Allies and with other troop contributors and international actors, and the recurrent provision of detailed military advice. Henceforth, political consultation and military planning and execution would interact on a continuous basis, with no longer a sharp sequence between the one and the other. A key focus of strategy-making was on balancing the complementary, but also competing, needs to generate the required military contributions for an operation and to ensure participation by the broadest possible number of Allied and partner nations, even at the risk of complicating support arrangements and interoperability. Planning had to account for the fact that, unlike the plans of the Cold War, the nationality and nature of individual contributions to an envisaged operation or mission were not preordained and would need to be accommodated and optimised as they were notified, through tailored "force sensing, generation and balancing" processes.

First post-Cold War reform of the NATO Command structure

Later that year, allied combat aircraft conducted offensive air support sorties against Bosnian Serb positions encircling the Gorazde and Bihac enclaves, including against a supporting airfield. In 1994, NATO approved its first post-Cold War Command Structure, which sanctioned the disbandment of CINCHAN and the merger of the CINCHAN and CINCUKAIR headquarters located in the United Kingdom with the CINCNORTH headquarters in Norway into a new scaled-down CINCNORTHWEST in Britain. It also included the activation of a new, strategic-level, ACE Reaction Forces' Planning Staff (ARFPS) at SHAPE overseeing the old AMF, the new UK-led ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and, for air forces, a Reaction Forces (Air) Staff, reflecting a new emphasis on preparing NATO for short-notice, crisis-response operations and on tailored planning. In the meantime, the tempo of NATO's air engagement in enforcing the UN-mandated air exclusion zone and supporting UNPROFOR on the ground accelerated, including the shooting down in February 1994 of two Bosnian Serb combat aircraft, in compliance with the UN-mandated

enforcement of the air exclusion zone, in the first ever use of force by NATO since 1949.[57]In late summer 1995, the conduct of the Deliberate Force air campaign against Bosnian Serb forces, in conjunction with the engagement of a UN-mandated Rapid Reaction Force on the ground in the vicinity of Sarajevo, brought the hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to an end and a cease-fire came into force.[58] This decisive action set the stage for NATO assuming responsibility for enforcing the Dayton Peace Agreement and for a NATO-led IFOR succeeding UNPROFOR.

The growing impetus for operational and institutional reform

The gradual standing up of a new NATO Force Structure (NFS) through the 1990s, composed of air, land and maritime high readiness, multinational headquarters, led by one or several framework nations, that were evaluated and certified by SHAPE and declared to NATO, accelerated the demise of the "heavy metal" force structures associated with the old Forward Defence concept. By the mid-1990s, NATO was firmly "out-of-area" and in business. Defence and operations planning processes at NATO Headquarters were revised and reoriented to identify and meet the requirements associated with operations conducted beyond Alliance territory. The Crisis Management Exercises (CMX) that succeeded the Cold War's HILEX and WINTEX exercises provided a tailored vehicle to refine internal planning procedures and rehearse consultations with non-NATO troop contributors and with other international organisations.[59]The standing up of the ARRC was followed by that of the Eurocorps, as a multinational formation available to both the EU and NATO, as well as by that of the 1st German-Netherlands Corps and other, similar, rapid reaction corps headquarters led by France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey. The headquarters of the Cold War's LANDJUT Corps, part of the former BALTAP command, was relocated from Germany to Poland, to become the new Multi-National Corps Northeast. The ARRC's attainment of full operational capability in 1994 made it possible for the Alliance to call upon it to lead the land component of IFOR in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina in 1995 and of KFOR in Kosovo in 1999.

[57] M. R. Gordon, "NATO craft down four Serbian warplanes attacking Bosnia", *The New York Times*, 1 March 1994.

[58] Colonel R. C. Owen, "The Balkans air campaign study", Part 1, *Airpower Journal*, Summer 1997, pp.4-25; and Part 2, *Airpower Journal*, Fall 1997, pp.6-27.

[59] I. A.D. Ferrier, "NATO strategic level political military crisis management exercising – history and challenges", in Heuser, Heir and Lasconjarias, *Military Exercises*, *op. cit.*, pp.141-162.

This development of the NFS, eventually reaching some 18 multinational air, land and maritime headquarters, was decisive for the creation of the NRF in 2002, because these multinational headquarters, and the forces affiliated with them, were called upon to play the role of air, land and maritime component commands of the NRF. In the mid-1990s, therefore, IFOR, ARFPS and the new NFS reflected the emergence of new, flexible and deployable post-Cold War NATO, against the backdrop of a deepening engagement in the Balkans.

A further reform of the Command structure was approved at the Madrid Summit in summer 1997, resulting in the merger of the CINCNORTHWEST and CINCENT positions and their headquarters into a new CINCNORTH headquarters at Brunssum. A new Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) reporting to SACEUR and SACLANT replaced the ARFPS at SHAPE and three, operational level, CJTF headquarters were activated at Brunssum and Naples to lead land-based CJTF operations and at Lisbon to plan a sea-based CJTF operation that would be directed from the US Navy's USS Mount Whitney command ship. CJTF operations were rehearsed during the large-scale Strong Resolve live exercise in 1998. The exercise involved 50,000 troops contributed by 15 Allies and ten partner nations and included successive non-Article 5 crisis response and Article 5 collective defence phases, conducted in Portugal and Spain and in Norway, respectively.

The CJTF Concept became the organising construct to facilitate the transition from the Cold War's structure of static commands with pre-assigned forces to deployable headquarters overseeing a tailored force package. Implementation of the concept also involved France taking the first steps since 1966 to modify its military relationship with NATO, through attendance by the French Defence Minister and Chief of Defence of high-level NATO meetings, alongside their colleagues, participation by French officers in the CJPS and CJTF staffs, and contribution of French forces to NATO-led operations. In the end, however, France's expected military reintegration into NATO on the occasion of the Madrid Summit did not take place.[60]

[60] See G. Delafon and T. Sancton, *Dear Jacques, Cher Bill… : Au cœur de l'Elysée et de la Maison Blanche, 1995-1999*,

PART IV: NATO STRATEGY: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND GLOBAL FRAMEWORKS

Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO

Bosnia and Herzegovina aspires to join NATO. Support for democratic, institutional, security sector and defence reforms are a key focus of cooperation. The Alliance has been commited to building long-term peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the early 1990s, when it started supporting the international community's effort to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

The internal constellation of Bosnia and Herzegovina makes the reform effort harder and only external motivation (integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures) can effectively overcome the domestic political deadlock. The aspiration of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO membership should be understood in the broader perspective of the Western Balkan stabilization. The candidate status to NATO (and to the European Union) advances the requested reforms, which could potentially stabilize the domestic political situation.The country's cooperation with NATO is set out in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Reform Programme. This Reform Programme outlines the reforms the government intends to undertake and facilitates the provision of support by NATO towards this efforts.In general, the integration of all Western Balkan countries are considered as a last step to enduring stability in this region. In 2010, NATO formally invited Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the MAP but, the first Annual National Programme under the MAP will be accepted only if BiH authorities will resolve the issue with immovable defence property. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision on future membership. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to continue pursuing democratic and defense reforms to fulfil its NATO and EU aspirations and to become a well-functioning independent democratic state.

NATO integration - Regional perspective

A new national poll by the International Republican Institute's (IRI) Center for Insights in Survey Research from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) reveals strong feelings of pessimism among citizens and indicates vulnerabilities to external influence.

The combination of high levels of pessimism, concerns for the country's security situation and the belief that ethno-nationalism is the most common type of extremism is disturbing. There is a danger that these sentiments could be manipulated by illiberal forces both within and outside of the country to fuel extremism. It is crucial that the government of BiH take steps to address the issues contributing to these negative attitudes (International Republican Institute, 2018).

A clear majority (86 percent) of respondents think the country is heading in the wrong direction, while only 9 percent believe it is heading in the right direction. A striking 53 percent find the country's security situation to be unsatisfactory, with 42 percent of respondents expressing the view that ethno-nationalism is the most pervasive type of extremism in the country. Despite this attitude, the survey suggests that opportunities for engagement by Western institutions exist across the region.

The survey also suggests that while most respondents are supportive of key transatlantic institutions, many are also in favor of cooperating with Russia on security interests, and do not think the U.S. should play a role in European security. A combined 56 percent either "strongly support" (37 percent) or "somewhat support" (19 percent) joining NATO, and a combined 75 percent either "strongly support" (49 percent) or "somewhat support" (26 percent) EU accession. Despite these pro-Western stances, 48 percent of citizens believe that Russia should be considered as a partner in European security, while just 28 percent want the U.S. to play a role in European security.

The split in attitudes toward Western institutions and Russia indicates that citizens of BiH could be vulnerable to manipulation by the Kremlin. It is vital that transatlantic stakeholders invest in engagement in BiH to ensure that the country remains on a European and democratic trajectory.

Table 3. ***Survey I***



Table 4. ***Survey II***



The data indicates that increased Western engagement by transatlantic institutions can help to bring these countries firmly into the fold of the democratic West. These results also clearly show that the great power game is underway in the Western Balkans and that people in the region are torn over how to align themselves.

With the exception of Kosovo (53 percent), respondents from BiH, North Macedonia or Serbia generally do not feel that they belong definitively to either West or East. The

survey indicates that a majority of citizens in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia broadly favor a Western approach to "morality and values" and "culture and intellectual" life, while Serbia favors a Russian approach. On "bread and butter" issues such as employment, healthcare and social benefits, a majority of respondents across all four countries wish to have more in common with the West than Russia. Many respondents favor some level of engagement with NATO (Kosovo: 91 percent; North Macedonia: 87 percent; BiH: 67 percent; Serbia: 49 percent).

Although affinities toward the West and East are complex, the data indicates that there is an appetite for further Western engagement, which respondents associate with economic prosperity.

Table 5. ***Survey III***



NATO Global Partnerships

NATO has developed complex systems of relations with key international players, mainly with international organizations and states outside Europe. However, partnership building is a complex and never-ending process. Partnership policy serves as a tool to reach NATO´s strategic objectives, with the stated objectives as follows: "*Enhance Euro-Atlantic and international security peace and stability; promote regional security; facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest; prepare eligible nations for NATO membership; Promote democratic values and reforms; enhance support for NATO-led operations and missions"* (Marônková 2012: 145). Beside the Partnership for Peace programme, there are three multilateral cooperation frameworks - The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which create the institutional framework for discussions between NATO and partners.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

EAPC is the successor of North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which had transformed itself to the new form in 1997. Currently, EAPC encompasses 50 countries around the world.[61] EAPC has served as a forum for dialogue and consultations among all the involved states. Technically, EAPC has set up a two year action plan focusing on pre-agreed political and security related topics (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 2006). EAPC is one of the crucial tools, which represents NATO's global role in international affairs.

The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)

Practical cooperation includes transfer of know-how through educational programmes. Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994 as a consultation forum, which now includes countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, namely Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. As in the previous case, MD has two dimensions of cooperation: one of these is political dialogue, which represents regular meetings between

[61] Including 28 NATO member states

representative of NATO and participating states.Participating countries can also join common military exercises in the Mediterranean area.

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)

ICI represents NATO's needs to bilaterally enhance relations with the Gulf countries, as this region has the strategic importance and is still considered a place of future tensions. The ICI was created to strengthen the confidence among partners on the North-South Axis (Borgomano-Loup, 2005). At the time of this writing there are four cooperating countries (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates) and two countries, SaudiArabia and Oman, are considering their deeper involvement. The relevance of this initiative was demonstrated during the Libyan crisis when Qatar and United Arab Emirates had actively participated in the Unified Protector operation with own Air Forces. Qatar deployed six Mirage 2000 fighters plus two C-17 Globemaster transport aircrafts. The United Arab Emirates contributed with six F-16 aircrafts. Both states used mainly Greek base of Souda on Crete for launching missions (Gertler, 2011). The involvement of the Arab countries in combat mission against Libya increased the legitimacy of the whole mission and thus the operation Unified Protector got broader geographical and geopolitical dimension and could not be understood as a purely NATO operation.

Global Partners

Relations of NATO with countries like Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan have several strategic dimensions. Thefirst dimension could be the participation of those countries in NATO-led missions. The second dimension encompasses common commitment to democratic principles, i.e. the same value system that ensures a greater likelihood for common positions in the event of an international crisis. Those countries and NATO member countries do not share only common democratic principles but also specific threats like international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Global partners strategy and important issues

Australia and NATO

As the former Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen declared in 2012 *"Australia and NATO share the same commitment to freedom, democracy and human rights*" (Rasmussen, 2012). Australia contributed to the NATO-led mission ISAF for more than decade (Marônková, n. d.). In addition to that, Australia-NATO partnership has institutional framework based on the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, which was signed on February, 2014. This document sets up main areas of cooperation like enhancing interoperability, combating maritime piracy, exchange of cyber issues, addressing global threats and others (Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, 2013) Beside this, Australia has been developing close relations with individual NATO members *"In addition to the close partner relations with NATO countries of Britain, the United States and Canada, Australia has developed remarkably close ties with France – particularly French forces based in New Caledonia. Similarly, with Portugal having close and strong ties with East Timor Australia has had cause to work closely alongside Portuguese forces as well"* (Blaxland, 2014).

New Zealand and NATO

Relations between New Zealand and NATO are of similar nature as relations with Australia. New Zealand signed its own Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme with NATO in 2012. The main aim of this accord is strengthening interoperability in the NATO-led operations, promoting security in the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific relations and promoting democratic values (Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, 2012).

South Korea and Japan

Relations between NATO and South Korea and Japan have the shared objective of addressing global security challenges. Beside this, South Korea and Japan are also contributing with financial and development aid to the NATO-led operations. For instance, Japan is one of the biggest financial aid contributors to Afghanistan (Poole, 2011).

CONCLUSION

Current engagement of NATO in the international crisis management operations demonstrated the Alliance's important role in addressing the global security challenges. NATO and its members were involved in the Alliance's mission in Afghanistansince 2001which came to an end in 2014, in the KFOR mission in Kosovo. In addition The Alliance has staged two maritime missions in the Mediterranean Sea (Active Endeavour) and spearheaded the antipiracy mission Ocean Shield in the Gulf of Aden. What's more, the crisis in Eastern Europe underlined NATO's principal role − the collective defence of NATO member countries. However, the Eastern Europe crisis does not mean that previous threats have disappeared. NATO is still facing threats such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD or rogue states. This situation would lead to double-hatted role for the organization. On the one hand, NATO will put emphasis on its principal role as a guarantor of territorial integrity of its own members; on the other it has to face other unconventional threats outside of the European and North Atlantic territory. For instance, NATO has to extend the provisions of Article V to unconventional threats, such as cyber attacks or attacks of non-state actors. In addition, NATO has to maintain the "Open Door Policy" for the states with membership aspirations to continue the enlargement policy. These commitments help the organization to continue to be a reliable partner for other states and international actors.

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APPNDIX

List of abbreviations

AAFCE	Allied Air Forces, Central Europe
ACE	Allied Command Europe
AFCENT	Allied Forces, Central Europe
AFMED	Allied Forces, Mediterranean
AMF	Allied Mobile Force
ARFPS	ACE Reaction Forces' Planning Staff
ARRC	ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BALTAP	Baltic Approaches
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
CAST	Canadian Air-Sea Transportable brigade Group
CENTAG	Central Army Group, Central Europe
CFI	Connected Forces Initiative
CINCAFMED	Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean
CINCEASTLANT	Commander in Chief, Eastern Atlantic Area
CINCENT	Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe
CINCHAN	Allied Commander in Chief, Channel
CINCIBERLANT	Commander-in-Chief, Iberian Atlantic Area
CINCNORTH	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe
CINCSOUTH	Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
CINCUKAIR	Commander-in-Chief, United Kingdom Air Forces
CJPS	Combined Joint Planning Staff
CJTF	Combined Joined Task Force

CLO	Commander, Live Oak
COMAO	Composite Air Operations
COMNORTHAG	Commander, Northern Army Group, Central Europe
CONMAROPS	Concept of Maritime Operations
CSPMP	Comprehensive, Strategic Political-Military Plan
DC	Defence Committee
DIP	Defense Investment Pledge
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
EDI	European Deterrence Initiative
EDP	Emergency Defence Plan
EEAW	European Expeditionary Air Wing
ERI	European Readiness Initiative
EU	European Union
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Force
FALLEX	Fall Exercise
FOFA	Follow-On Forces Attack
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FTX	Field Training Exercise
GIUK	Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
IFOR	(Peace) Implementation Force
IMS	International Military Staff
IMSM	IMS Memorandum
IMSWM	IMS Working Group Memorandum
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

JEF	Joint Expeditionary Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LANDJUT	Land Forces Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein
LTDP	Long-Term Defence Programme
MARCONFORLANT	Maritime Contingency Force, Atlantic
MC	Military Committee
MCM	MC Memoranda
MNC	Major NATO Commander
MRBM	Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
MSC	Major Subordinate Commander
NA	NATO Archives
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATINADS	NATO Integrated Air Defence System
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDC	NATO Defense College
NFS	NATO Force Structure
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group, Central Europe
NRF	NATO Response Force
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
POMCUS	Prepositioning Overseas of Materiel Configured in Unit Sets
PSC	Principal Subordinate Commander
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAP	Readiness Action Plan
REFORGER	Return of Forces to Germany

RRP	Rapid Reinforcement Plan
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SETAF	Southern European Task Force
SG	Standing Group
SGM	SG Memorandum
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SSBN	Nuclear-powered ballistic missile-launching submarine
STANAVFORLANT	Standing Naval Force, Atlantic
STRIKFORNATO	Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO
TACET	Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training
TLP	Tactical Leadership Programme
TVD	Theatre of Military Operations (in Russian)
UK	United Kingdom
UKAIR	United Kingdom Air Forces
UN	United Nations
US	United States