



UNIVERSITY OF SARAJEVO

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

MIGRATION CONTROL AS A TOOL IN FOREIGN POLICY

- Master Thesis -

Candidate

Gluhalić Melisa

Index number: 1034/p

Mentor

Prof.dr. Damir Kapidžić

Sarajevo, April 2021



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD – (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı / Disaster and Emergency Management Authority)

AKP – (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi / The Justice and Development Party)

CEM – (Coercive engineered migrations)

CSDP - (Common Security and Defence Policy)

EP – (European Parliament)

EU – (European Union)

EUTRA – (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement)

FPA – (Foreign policy analysis)

IOM – (International Organization for Migration)

IR – (International Relations)

KRG - (Kurdistan Regional Government)

LFIP – (Law on Foreigners and International Protection)

MENA – (The Middle East and North Africa)

NATO – (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

NGO – (Non-governmental organization)

OECD – (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)

OHCHR – (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights)

PM – (Prime minister)

TPR – (Temporary Protection Regulation)

TİKA – (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency)

UN – (United Nations)

UNHCR – (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)

UNSMIS – (United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria)

INTRODUCTION

In this changing world, where globalization has made life easier for people in many fields, it has at the same time made the future of many uncertain. And so by promoting liberal ideas under the auspices of ‘freedom of movement’ many have found themselves in front of closed doors and experienced firsthand the hypocrisy of this global policy that is seemingly advocated only in theory. Thus, despite efforts to preserve state sovereignty, it became initially inevitable accepting the argument that human movement has existed since the time of prehistoric civilizations to modern times. And consequently, the fact that it is a movement that is impossible to stop, no matter how many ‘walls’ someone builds. Despite this, reactions and responses to this issue always vary. And while we have those who will always try to understand the excruciating suffering and the path that people who find themselves in this situation go through, we also have those with no empathy, who always express their resilience and resistance, and finally, those who will try to extract certain benefits from such situations. Usually, the main populist argument is that the majority are ‘economic migrants’, although more recently, the frequent reason for the migrations were numerous wars and planned expulsions due to which people were forced to leave their homes.

But although responses to this issue differ, what is characteristic of every migration, including refugees and migrants who marked the 2015 European Migration Crisis, is that these people are very often not accepted by the communities and countries they seek or come to. Not to mention that they often come across problems with integration into societies, as well as with maintaining their own identity. This obviously represents a very extensive area, especially the ability of different people to cope with the whole situation. Yet, ironically, in spite of all these barriers, the main problem we face here is the simple fact that very often the main focus is not even on people as suffering human beings, but rather on some entirely different issue that is being politicized. Therefore, precisely because this presents a major obstacle to effective problem solving, the research question addresses this anomaly.

The politicization of the migration crisis is a phenomenon that is not new in foreign policy but this example is certainly the most prominent in its field for the 21st century. After more than a million refugees and migrants arrived in Europe in 2015, including those fleeing the civil war

in Syria, people escaping violence from Afghanistan, Iraq, and economic migrants, the European Union was hit by an issue for which it had neither a plan nor a solution at the time.

This has caused an additional crisis, and that is within the Union in terms of how to manage and respond to this problem most effectively. Simultaneously, while some encounter problem after problem, there are always others who enjoy the fruits of other people's work, which in this case was Turkey. Namely, thanks to its enviable geopolitical position, before the EU itself, Turkey was exposed to arrivals ever since 2010 but also has accepted the huge influx of migrants much easier. This was both because of the cultural similarities and because at that time Turkey felt like a regional power that has been an example of a rising Islamic democracy since the beginning of the decade. In an effort to show its good face, Turkey has undergone a very turbulent transformation through the last decade, from the greatest humanitarian, who was applauded by everyone, to the creation of the image of an authoritative political regime under the rule of one man. And thus, the fate of millions of migrants became the main link between the European Union, which accepted as the only common conclusion that they must secure external borders and protect themselves from foreign savages, and Turkey, which, seeing the panic created within the EU, tried to turn this situation to its advantage by all available means and use migrants as bait for negotiations with the EU.

This eventually brings us to the fundamentals of the work, i.e. a detailed analysis of relations between the European Union and Turkey in terms of regulating the migration crisis, which in essence depicts all possible opportunities, troubles, embezzlement, and manipulation that through this case study give a clear insight into all likely obstacles in managing such and similar issues. What is further important is that this case study can serve as a worthy example for any further research in the field of migration. Since, with its scope is a relevant enough for any following migration management, in order to avoid making the same mistakes and provide more efficient responses to the problem itself.

Thus, for the research itself to get a clear structure, the first chapter of this paper begins by identifying the theoretical framework as a foundation that will serve to explain and understand motives, discussions, negotiations, and different moves as clearly as possible. By determining the theoretical part, we can get a clear insight into which direction the topic is developing, as well as on what considerations the various policies are based on. Nonetheless, since the research is multidisciplinary, it is impossible to base the paper on just one theory. But despite

its scope, it will be reduced to two basic theoretical analyzes. The first relates to 'Foreign Policy Analysis.' This is very important for this case study, as it does not fundamentally deal with states as actors, but goes much deeper and identifies leaders as decision-makers, what influences those decisions, focusing on the processes themselves, rather than on the outcomes. It is further significant because Turkey's head of the state has the role of a 'great leader' who generally makes all decisions independently. For that purpose, we must think about questions and motives that will provide an answer to better understand Turkey's moves. For the case of the European Union, it is also vital to understand decision-making processes, as it as a community represents a much more parliamentary and diverse electorate. All this helps us to make logical conclusions and to be able to compare their methods in dealing with an issue. But also to understand what it takes for two completely different sides to find a common language.

The second theoretical framework is based on an old-fashioned approach, yet equally relevant to the present. I refer to realism, as the dominant school of thought. The paper will address the entire development of this theory. Since, I believe that each course carries certain specifications, whose ideological principles are reflected in the harsh approach to migration policy. This mainly refers to the effort to preserve sovereign integrity, and to avoid in any sense undermining the authority of individual member states, but also of the Union as a whole. It was mostly projected through fear of foreigners, and through negotiations with Turkey, where there was a struggle over the balance of power. And eventually, it was very clear through the use of military power and several military operations that Turkey conducted directly to protect its border with Syria, although there will not be so much talk about it.

The second chapter deals with some basic specifications of migration studies and serves to show a clear correlation between migration flows and foreign policy in international relations. It offers clear definitions of who is a migrant and who is a refugee. As well as the way in which they are defined by international law through generally accepted norms, which mainly serve as a basis for a common understanding of this phenomenon. This is important because it is on the basis of these definitions that international organizations perceive them, and 'expect' the rest of the world to do the same. Also, this chapter clearly indicates how the migration crisis can be used as an extended arm of foreign policy and how adaptable it can be depending on the context and situation.

The next, or third chapter, provides an overview of Turkey's position in the Middle East. It looks back at all the major developments since the beginning of the 21st century. This chapter contains vital information for understanding the overall context, since it gives a clear insight into how Turkey primarily perceives its role in the region, but also in the world. Here, then, we have a clear historical account of what Turkey looked like at the turn of the century, what its relations were with the countries of the region, especially with Syria, but also with the European Union. This chapter also explains to us how Turkey rose from the ashes, in every sense, including economic, political, and social developments. Furthermore, with this, at least for some (Western academic circles), we have a pure paradoxical example where Erdogan, spreading the soft power of Turkey, at the same time returns to a rooted Ottoman identity, giving essential importance to tradition and religion. Through the analysis, we also come to the conclusion that Turkey, precisely by nurturing a common identity, has managed to improve relations with its neighbors and present itself as a successful Islamic democratic regional power. The chapter concludes with a review of the infamous course of events, the beginning of the Arab Spring, especially the civil war in Syria, where Erdogan, relying on overconfidence, tarnished Turkey's reputation in the region but also ushered in a new era of different events.

Finally, the fourth chapter, which is crucial for this research, deals with a detailed review, practices, and analysis of all events that are clear indicators of the abuse of migration in order to achieve political goals, personal interests, and implementation of foreign policy doctrines. After a brief review of developments in Syria, this chapter analyzes the work of several prominent authors who have very clearly theoretically identified the ways how to recognize when migration is being instrumentalized, - including all possible blackmails, opportunistic ambitions, and manipulations.

Furthermore, referring to the article by Altiok and Tosun (2019) that talks about this topic, I came across the division of Turkish migration crisis management which is divided into three different phases, - (2011 to 2013; 2013-mid-2015; post-2015). I then, decided to base the rest of the paper on this distribution, and give a detailed account of the situation. This includes the way in which Turkey responded, the existing legal frameworks, negotiations and relations with the European Union, new agreements, different patterns of behavior, and all other important events that marked this period. After I have finalized the abovementioned phases, I made a brief review of the overconfidence effect, some reflections on the nature of leaders,

and how this approach reflects on the very outcome of their desired goals. And eventually, by personal insight and summarizing the research came to the end in the form of a conclusion.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 RESEARCH TOPIC

The research topic reveals different ways in which it is possible to try to control the migration crisis in order to achieve national, domestic, and foreign policy objectives with the focus on the period from late 2010 to 2016. Further, it shows the development and existing outcomes of this still ongoing situation, even though the central point is on the analysis of the abovementioned period due to possible everyday changes. A framework of the analysis is built on the case study of Turkey, - given that Turkey was at the forefront in instrumentalizing the current situation – how it has altered their foreign policy and goals, but also, including the negotiations with the European Union. Prior to this, a brief analysis of the preexisting role of Turkey in the Middle East is going to be presented, for sharper insight into question why Turkey believes they have the right to take the role of the regional leader. I also find necessary to review usage of the migration as an instrument through a theoretical framework based on the theory of foreign policy analysis and realism. In this context, foreign policy analysis will help us with the academic base for a better understanding of decision-making procedures within Turkey and the European Union, the role of the bureaucratic system, and how it altogether reflects on foreign policy, relationship with the EU and the “board game” these two actors are playing. Another theory worth mentioning is realism, which mostly explains aspiration for becoming a regional and global power, for instance, achieving national interests through the use of existing means and ascertaining its position within the anarchic system. Or more specifically, negotiating its position in relation to the EU, in attempt to maintain a balance of power among greater powers and eventually to ensure its own survival.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION

As a part of the methodological framework, the research question tempts to answer how migration and refugee crises can be instrumentalized and used in pursuing domestic and foreign policy goals. In order to answer this question, I found it important to focus on both, theoretical and empirical pieces of evidence. For that purpose, foreign policy analysis with the dose of realism will explain decision-making procedures, negotiating processes between Turkey and the EU, implementation, and outcomes of specific policies. While, the case of how Turkey manages migration and refugee inflows is going to serve as a practical example explaining how different interests can be met through the exploitation of existing resources. In this case, migration controls. In addition, outcomes from the past ten years have shown that migration control is not a one-way process and therefore, it can produce different implications for state actors, on both, domestic and international scenes. That is why explaining phenomena in the context of how it has affected Turkey's domestic politics, its position in the region, and the relationship between the European Union and Turkey in the period from 2010 to 2016, including the consequences of Turkey's over-engagement after 2016 is the ultimate goal.

Therefore, the research question can be drawn up in a subsequent way:

Is it possible to benefit from controlling refugee and migration flows in the international arena and at the domestic scene?

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The essential purpose of this work is to fulfill the existing gap and to contribute to the literature that has not sufficiently explored the instrumentalization of the migration in foreign policy. Turkey is taken as an example, as a contemporary case, meaning that, they use modern and existing methods in negotiations, warfare, social structures, addressing the public, and accomplishing all other objectives. The analysis of how Turkey is handling this situation is a very important for the study, primarily because this is a quite new and unexplored insight into this topic, and it could serve as an example for other countries on how

to prevent the abuse of migration situation or how to use existing means for acquiring domestic and foreign policy goals.

The main scientific objectives of the research are to analyze cause and effects relationships. In other words, international relation theories that are in relation to the migration management, i.e. foreign policy analysis and realism, to help us to understand and to more easily identify characteristics and attribute that are specific to this kind of behavior in any future crisis. Regardless of if, it is the case of a charismatic leader, undemocratic government or any other structures. It is especially important to fill this void in the literature given that the issue of migration and refugee crisis has emerged as one of the key issues in modern times and that any state could experience the same situation at any time. Therefore, the case study of Turkey can serve as an illustration of possible recommendations. In addition, a mixture of foreign policy analysis literature and the case of Turkey can serve as a motivation for other scholars and state actors to try to place themselves in the international arena and learn how to make the most from the given situation, even if they are not a great power.

The social objective of the research is to get as clearer as possible insight into the presence of this “new” political discourse at one place. The results obtained can serve as a basis for further discussions and analysis. In that context, identifying key social and non-scientific problems related to the topic of migration and foreign affairs that the world is facing today is the main motive for this research. Further, as already mentioned, because of the insufficient literature related to this topic, this paper could also be used for educational purposes, and therefore, is in the service to scholars, students, and society. And finally, it is vital to emphasize and hope to open up some space for reflection in the context of further developments and thinking about existing resources that each country has at its disposal in order to improve position both of immigrants and the society in general.

1.4 HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION

1.4.1 General hypothesis

Having explained everything abovementioned, the general hypothesis can be formulated as follows: *Control of the refugee and migration crisis movement can be used as a tool in achieving both national and foreign policy goals.*

1.4.2 Auxiliary hypotheses

AH1: Realism and foreign policy analysis serve as a fundamental theoretical framework for explaining Turkey's approach to combine soft and hard power tactics on migration control.

AH2: Governments use the significant presence of migrants and refugees to maximize economic and political benefits in domestic and international affairs.

AH3: Domestic and foreign migration control policies elevate the relevance of a country in international politics.

AH4: The European Union will make broad concessions (to Turkey) in order to ensure external border protection.

AH5: Depoliticization of migration (and focus on peace processes) would create more durable solutions.

1.5 RESEARCH METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

For this study, I am going to use qualitative methods based on the content analysis, through secondary gathered information. I will analyze:

- Official documents and reports on the movement and development of refugees and migrants during the crisis by various government bodies, non-governmental organizations and international institutions.
- Official documents and statements by members of the Turkish and EU governments who testify to Turkey's relationship with the EU, their handling of the issue, and efforts to resolve the crisis.
- Books, written articles, audios and online media sources reporting on these issues by different authors, journalists, and human rights activists.

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL APPROACH

1. FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

For each move, decision, or action that is undertaken by a specific actor, group, or country there is an attempt by social sciences scholars to analyze and to give a reasonable explanation for those activities by relying on the field of their expertise. In relevance to that, the discipline of International Relations has purposefully offered explanations through various theories that connect the historical, political, economic, social, ethical, and security context. And thereafter, we say that the IR discipline is interdisciplinary and indispensable for a better understanding of interaction at the international level among state and non-state actors. Since all these activities are created, organized, or guided by different human beings it was an inevitable move to try to understand and develop a theoretical approach to explain the fundamental components that make up the whole system, that is, people. In other words, each event that (re)shaped the world and that has ever started, been interrupted, or completed is the outcome by specific decision-makers. More precisely, their actions, reactions, and interactions are what Foreign Policy Analysis is trying to explain. However, even though the FPA is seen as a subfield of IR, Hudson (2014) believes that the relationship between them is not enough theoretically integrated, mostly because the FPA is contrary to IR, focused on actor-specific theory. Despite this, by analyzing the FPA, this chapter will point to the necessary coherence between IR and the FPA.

1.1 GRASSROOTS

Before getting into a deeper analysis of the FPA theory, we should briefly examine evolution and the background of the theory in order to understand why IR theories were not complete without elements that Foreign Policy Analysis incorporates. That is, explaining foreign policy behavior. Hudson (2008), for instance, identified three fundamental works for which she claims are the pillars of the FPA.

- *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* written by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin in 1954 is considered to be an umbrella for any further research due to two main reasons. First of them is related to the involvement of actors themselves. Acknowledging the role of human decision-makers, according to Hudson, was a key component that IR theories were lacking and as Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962: 74, 53) supported this by stating that “the central concept of decision-making may provide a basis for linking a group of theories which hitherto have been applicable only to a segment of international politics or have not been susceptible of application at all.” And the second one refers to the distribution of power below the nation-level “by emphasizing decision-making as a central focus we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society.”
- Then, there is a book chapter *Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy* dating back from 1964, where Rosenau “attempted to enumerate the causes of foreign policy per se, and did this through positing foreign policy behavior to be a dependent variable, with independent variables being those of the size, level of economic development, and the nature of political accountability of the states concerned.” (Smith, 1986:18)
- And finally, *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* by Harold and Margaret Sprout from 1956. Their main contribution suggested that “understanding foreign policy outputs (which they associated with the analysis of power capabilities within an interstate system) without reference to foreign policy undertakings (which they associated with strategies, decisions, and intentions) was misguided.” (Hudson & Vore, 1995: 213) They consider this to be possible by referring to “psycho-milieu” of either groups or individuals who are in charge. In other words, it is the perception of the decision-makers, space between reality and subjective context, an environment in which decisions are being made.

Some may connect this with the role of emotions, questioning the objectivity of the actors. However, the FPA does take into consideration the role of emotions too, which will be later discussed. For now, it is important to understand that these ideas raised many questions, such as, the role of the behavior of the human agent, political psychology, a background of decision-makers, the role of the group, group-thinking, interconnection between external factors and domestic actors, bureaucracies, and many others... all these did provide a basis for the development of the theory and thereafter for defining a framework and what the theory itself represents. During later developments, in the post-Cold War era until today, the FPA evolved in such a way that it became possible to make a clear division within the concept and issues that the theory deals with.

Since, it is familiar that realism was dominant theory during these times, Alden and Aran (2017: 5) believed that “the roots of FPA lie in its reaction to the dominance of realism and its depiction of the state and its interactions with other states, whether through direct bilateral relations or through multilateral institutions such as the UN, and a general dissatisfaction with realism’s ability to provide credible explanations of foreign policy outcomes.” In response to the inability of realism to answer the question of the role of individuals in international events and the Westernized peaceful integration of society, the FPA has developed so that today it can clearly define and give reasonable explanation for the segments that the theory deals with. Hudson (2014: 32) addressed and divided these major issues in the following way:

- “A commitment to look below the nation-state level of analysis to actor-specific information;
- a commitment to build middle-range theory as the interface between actor-general theory and the complexity of the real world;
- a commitment to pursue multicausal explanations spanning multiple levels of analysis;
- a commitment to utilize theory and findings from across the spectrum of social science;
- a commitment to viewing the process of foreign policy decision-making as important as the output of the theory.”

1.2 THE FPA DEFINED

Based on the abovementioned principles while developing as ‘a separate field of the study’ from the IR, many authors attempted to define the discipline. What all of them have in common, is shared opinion that the purpose the FPA is to keep its focus on foreign policy processes rather than the outcomes. Starting with Hudson (2013: 4, 185) who claims that “FPA traditionally finds itself most interested in decisions taken by human decision-makers in positions of authority to commit the resources of the nation-state, though it is quite possible to analyze decision-makers who do not hold such positions.” He then developed several different levels of the analysis in the FPA, including “personalities of decision-makers, small group effects, large group effects, culture, domestic politics, national attributes, systemic influences.” By emphasizing that all of them are equally important for the purpose of theoretical integration in order to have as complete as possible “perspective on foreign policy decision-making.” Alden and Aran (2011:3) defined FPA as the study of the conduct and practice of relations between different actors, primarily states, in the international system... They further agree that “at the heart of the field is an investigation into decision making, the individual decision makers, processes and conditions that affect foreign policy and the outcomes of these decisions. By adopting this approach, FPA is necessarily concerned not only with the actors involved in the state’s formal decision-making apparatus, but also with the variety of sub-national sources of influence upon state foreign policy.” In their textbook Morin and Paquin (2018:1) confirmed previous standpoints. They also argue that “FPA provides a unique opportunity to integrate analysis at different levels. At the crossroads between the theories of international relations and public policy analysis, FPA is not limited to the study of the international system that fails to take account of its component parts, or to the study of one-off decision-making processes in the international context. Instead, FPA focuses on the continuous interaction between actors and their environment.” Thus, the FPA clearly does not neglect the link between external and domestic forces, which is another important dimension of the theory. Viz. the research paper created by Anadolu University (2018:6) found similar results, “there is a strong domestic dimension of every foreign policy decision. As representatives of different states are displaying foreign policy behavior they also have to market their “international” decisions and actions to their domestic stakeholders and constituencies. The direct result of this phenomenon is a broader decision-making process... Hence, the study of foreign policy represents a challenge to understand how states, institutions

and peoples engage amongst themselves both within, and with, a vibrant and complex international system.”

All of these authors are raising many valuable questions when it comes to the role of leaders as decision-makers in the international and domestic environment. Not only that, but they further clearly show the need for a real understanding of their personalities so we can better understand or even predict their actions. For instance, some of the issues that need to be considered in more depth, may concern “how does the group come to share an interpretation of the situation? How does a group change an established interpretation?” Similarly, we can also ask questions at the whole societal and country levels “how can we discern culture’s influence on foreign policy? Can national role conception be reconfigured to serve as the theoretical interface between a society and the individual members of that society that come to lead it and make its foreign policy decisions? Does the type of political system impact foreign policy?” (Hudson, 2013: 33) For this reason, determining more clearly what the theory has to say about the personality traits of individuals and groups is a logical next step.

1.3 HUMAN ACTORS AS DECISION-MAKERS

1.3.1 Rational Choice Theory

Let us assume that political leaders are chosen by the people based on their skills, positive performances - in a both domestic and international environment, effective communication with citizens, including empathy, and most importantly because they are trustworthy - which also implies that people who live in a specific country consider their leaders to be objective, to make smart decisions and to simply do what is the best for the country. - These characteristics are primarily prescribed to leaders in the Rational Choice Theory, which Nakaska (2010: 127) claims is “a utility- maximization methodology, by which choices are made on the basis of the “best interest” of the actor making the selection. Yet, actors can be defined differently depending on whom they represent; in that case, it could refer to pursuing individual goals, groups, or in politics often to national interests, states per se.

The reason why the RCT is important for this case is due to the assumption that actors are rational in the exercise of political functions which logically suggests that “by maximization of utility, we mean that a state first identifies and prioritizes foreign policy goals; it then identifies and selects from the means available to it which fulfill its aims with the least cost.” (Alden & Aran, 2017: 21) However, these presumptions can be challenged by many opinions, “political decisions, as Freud insisted, are often besotted with factors such as emotion, culture, history, and tradition.” Nakaska (2010: 138)

At the same time, even though, different authors discussed these issues, majority of differences they found are minimal. For example, while Alden and Aran (2017) identified that three the most discussable issues are interaction of psychology, cognition, and personality during the making of these rational decisions. Hudson (2014: 42) made a diagram and labeled sensory inputs as perception, explaining that “the mind apparently builds a “filter” that helps it decide which sensory inputs are worthy of more detailed processing, which processing we would call cognition. These filters might include stereotypes, biases, and heuristics.”

Harold and Margaret Sprout, who were leaders in the 20th century in the study of international environmental issues, were among the first to make the most comprehensive critique of the theory of rationality. According to them, human beings, including political leaders operate within two different environments. First of them is known as “‘operational environment’ – which they posit as objective reality – and the second, ‘psychological environment’ – which they hold to be subjective and under the influence of a myriad of perceptual biases and cognitive stimuli. Foreign policy decision makers take decisions on the basis of their psychological environment, relying upon perceptions as a guide, rather than any cold weighing of objective facts.” (Alden & Aran, 2017: 24)

Meanwhile, the final things to keep in mind, - before explaining the three main intellectual processes, - are personal goals and self-interests of the leader. In other words, the seriousness of the intention to achieve these goals will be largely conditioned by the elements further developed and at the same time, it will pose one of the main challenges to the concept of rationality.

1.3.2 Perception

One of the three main preconditions that oppose the understanding of the theory of rational choice is the role of perception. Professor Robert Jervis, explained this in his research stressing that political decision-makers make their foreign policy decisions constructed on their own perception rather than on ‘objective reality’. “His studies demonstrate that individual leaders draw upon a personalized understanding of history in their efforts to both interpret international events and devise appropriate responses to them. These interpretations are rooted in a relatively stable set of beliefs which, when coupled with the cognitive drive for consistency, produce a deliberate (if unintended) reinforcing of the leader’s evolving foreign policy prescription and the underlying beliefs upon which they are based.” (Alden & Aran, 2017: 26)

Perception may play an important role in some unusual situation, such as, in the time of crisis. Even if the leader is not preoccupied with the foreign policy, there are situations when decisions need to be made at the top of the hierarchy. “A related context that may allow a leader’s personal characteristics to play more of a role in decision-making is in ambiguous or uncertain situations, our fourth contextual variable. When advisors are unable to “read” a situation because information is sparse or contradictory, a leader may be called upon to exercise his or her judgment so that a basis for foreign policy decision-making is laid.” (Hudson, 2014: 41)

1.3.3 Cognition

Cognition as a mental process could simply be explained as a method of acquiring knowledge and understanding the world around us. It consist of various types, including our attention, language we use, learning methods, the way we memorize things, our daily thoughts, and finally the way we interact with the world. (Cherry, 2020) When put in the context of the FPA, it is not hard to understand that it is a fundamental component for decision-making. “Robert Axelrod suggests that this interrelationship between individual leaders and their environments can best be explained through the development of a ‘cognitive map’ that combines perception, prejudice and an understanding of ‘historical lessons’ and applies these to the task of decision making.” (Alden & Aran, 2017: 27)

What we also need to take into consideration is that the world today is strongly globalized. And it is enough to start thinking about the existence of international institutions and organizations to cross-national NGOs and many other different forms of networking. Consequently, it is not only that individuals but countries are cooperating too on the daily basis, whether through economic, political or social nets, as a result, “in the twenty-first century foreign policy-makers are increasingly recognizing their dual responsibility to their own citizens and to international society... Linklater (1998, p. 211) puts this in a philosophical context by arguing that rationalism requires an acceptance of ‘multiple communities of discourse [which] can promote new relations between universality and difference’”. (Hill, 2015: 134)

1.3.4 Personality

The final element that could influence foreign policy decision-making is the personality of the leader itself. For instance, some scholars believe that if a leader is driven by the power or is familiar with the use of the military there are higher chances that their agendas for foreign policy could be more aggressive or confrontational. (Alden and Aran, 2017)

In so far, when talking about personality, many types of research usually refer to “the Big Five traits - including openness to experience, conscientious, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (or emotional stability).” (Carnes & Houghton & Ellison, 2014: 362) As Breuning (2007: 33) put it together, “personality focuses on the enduring qualities of the person and assumes that we can predict the actions and reactions of leaders once we understand the personality or character of that individual.” That is why many scholars study the life of leaders from the earliest days since many believe that personality is being formed in the early stages of life. In the context of politics, another thing that could matter a lot is simply the charisma of the leader. It is not crucial but it is definitely an advantage, and therefore, some leaders can naturally have a lot of followers.

In his book *The Presidential Character*, James Barber claims that dysfunctional personalities should never be elected as leaders; he explained this by making a “scheme” and using two axes:

- The active-passive dimension - taps into the leader’s energy level and sense that personal effort can make a difference in human affairs.
- The positive-negative dimension - addresses the leader’s motivation for seeking office and overall outlook on life, probing whether the leader was basically optimistic or pessimistic, trusting or suspicious, motivated by feelings of neediness or shame or obligation or motivated by feelings of confidence and joy in the work to be done.” (Hudson, 2014: 59)

Although eventually, regardless of the leader’s character, the best outcome is one in which leaders manage to see their personality traits, and thus try to understand how a certain behavior affects their leadership.

1.3.5 The Role of Emotions

What is quite individual for each state is the system setup that will define who is the decision-maker. This is, as already mentioned, in some countries the president, in some other ministers, and in some small group of people. In that case, two important factors matter. First, as Hill (2015) said, political culture plays a big role, which can significantly determine the scope and reach of the power of that leader. While the second dilemma may be clarified by answering the question what actually drives the leader to deals with foreign policy issues, and what are their interests in this matter, which points to the very effort they will make to get the outcome they want.

We may identify many factors that could influence decision-making, and while some of them emphasize the role of the leader, others might point to their limitations, - either because of the foreign environment or because of the political system of the country. Despite, what cannot be contradicted is the fact that leaders are constantly in the eyes of the public, and thus they play a significant role in decision-making, policy-making, and policy implementation, which logically puts a lot of pressure on them, making it almost impossible to exclude emotions from the whole story. “There is a recognition that emotion affects judgment: individuals in a

positive mood tend to rely on general knowledge and make judgments on the basis of stereotypes, prior judgments, and other mental shortcuts, whereas decision-makers in a sad mood tend to be much more attentive to detail and engage in careful step-by-step analysis of the situations they face... and that is why emotion influences not only the decision-making process but also judgments about the object of attention.” (Breuning, 2007: 47) Hudson also believes that emotions affect our tolerance to risk. She claims how “prospect theory has shown that losses hurt more than gains, please. After a substantial loss, people are much more willing to take risks to regain what they perceive to be theirs.” (2014: 50)

Admittedly, what is understandable is that political leaders as any other human beings have emotions and cannot be in complete control of them. Moreover, their positive or negative attitudes toward a given topic are what usually affect their judgments. There are at least two examples that can confirm this. First, as already stated, experiences from the past are what can influence leader’s decision-makings. This being said, the linkage between personality traits and emotions is theoretically explained as a concept of ‘discrete emotions’, especially in the case of researching political leaders. For them Marcus (2000: 234) claims to depend on “the underlying attribution of the subject and the subject’s prior experience. Discrete emotions are, in general, held to arise from the attribution of the self (for example, a characterization of the self as weak or strong) and the circumstances.” He confirms that, “these discrete emotions constitute an important element of personality.” And secondly, leader’s reactions to specific events and the way they maintain foreign policy relations is the space in which the way they control their emotions is most visible.

Here, emotions and culture are also closely interrelated, and not only because of the way have we perceived different peoples, but also because of the way we interpret and consequently react to the behavior of others. Breuning (2007: 47) described this problem as one of the central to foreign policymaking, as he argues that “interpreting the foreign policy behaviors of other countries and their leaders is rarely straightforward. Emotions affect these judgments. Preexisting positive or negative feelings about other countries and their leaders influence judgments about their foreign policies.” This is why very often the general opinion and emotions that prevails in society about other society or state can often influence leader’s decision-making, depending on whether we consider them to be villains, extremists, partners or friends. Another interesting finding is also that because of the cultural roots and practices, “we may not be able to predict choice and construction of a particular response by a particular

member of the culture, but we can know what is on the shelf ready and available to be used or not.” (Hudson, 2014: 124)

On the other hand, the role of emotions does not have to be necessarily bad, for instance, being emphatic or having a strong sense of consciousness in specific situations sometimes is necessary, especially from the perspective of emotional intelligence, where the ability of leaders to transmit their energy, their visions, and their spirit either for the placement of the new law or to motivate soldiers to win the battle is more than desirable.

1.3.6 External Influence

Interesting findings are that the same – perception, cognition, personality - contradictions may be applied to the group decision-makings too. One of the situations we may encounter here are weak characters, i.e. those who are ‘drowning’ in the masses, where the individual adapts to the group or accepts an opinion that is considered socially acceptable or the effort of the whole group to fulfill a particular task to satisfy the leader of the group rather than to do some common good. However, those findings are also suggesting something else, and that is, that these individual characteristics are not the only indicators that influence leader’s decision-makings. As we can see, decision-makings can be constrained by external factors, including separation of power at the state level, bureaucracies, will of the people, and position of the country in the international arena.

In their book, Alden and Aran (2017: 33) are mentioning one important fact by Herbert Simon who suggests that “while decision makers cannot achieve pure rationality, they nonetheless conduct themselves along the lines of ‘procedural’ rationality when faced with a particular policy dilemma. Foreign policy makers, therefore, operate within the framework of what Simon calls ‘bounded rationality’, that is, they act rationally within the context of partial information and other limitations placed on decisions.” In other words, since we are not capable of understanding and knowing everything around us, we simplify the knowledge we possess and behave rationally according to that.

Even though, on contrary, as Hill (2015) noticed, when it comes to foreign policy, in the most of political systems there is the head of the government, who usually has broad powers in his/her hands so we have cases when those executives became foreign policy ministers

themselves. He further argues that political culture¹ can play a significant role in it, for instance, “some political cultures are more resistant to the cult of personality than others (the Scandinavian states have generally produced neither dramatic foreign policies nor charismatic leaders), and that many governments simply do not last long enough for an individual leader to make a major impact.” (2015: 66)

As the truth is always somewhere in between, and since it is being said that the environment effects may constrain leader’s power, that does not have to mean that the influence cannot be reversed. Consider, for instance, link between the leader and the external forces, is also how they organize the staff around them. Nonetheless, even though administrative workers may not change, during the shift of the government they do change circle around them, such as close advisors. This is why “the organizational structure of this group of advisors and the regulation of access to the leader are dependent on the latter’s preferences, which are in turn dependent on personality.” (Breuning, 2007: 33)

Finally, - although, we may consider that the authors imagined the most of these situations in conditions where state institutions are democratic, and where it is possible to exercise some control over the government, - we should not ignore the fact that authoritarian regimes exist as well. In foreign policy, if we exclude nowadays usual practice of superpowers to interfere in the internal relations of a given country, if the leader is not constrained by the parliament or similar bodies, those rulers still must adhere to international rules because they have a certain position in the international sphere and they are not the most powerful one at the global level.

From all the above, most of us could come to the conclusion that executives, cabinets and those in the office are constantly under the great pressure for which reason decisions they make are never fully rational. Yet, most of decisions are conditioned by a mixture of individual personality traits, which can usually be manifested, as far as the state apparatus allows. As well as with the external environment, such as bureaucratic apparatus which consist of other individuals who have their own perceptions, cognitions, and personalities which should theoretically result in a balance of power. And for that reason, “a number of

¹ Hudson (2014: 126) argues that definition of political culture does not differ from definition of general culture. She claims that, “political culture is all the discourses, values, and implicit rules that express and shape political action and intentions, determine the claims groups may and may not make upon one another, and ultimately provide a logic of political action. Cross out every political: “Culture is all the discourses, values, and implicit rules that express and shape actions and intentions.”

authors who have examined leaders and decision making have concluded that good leadership is often a matter of fit between the person and the circumstances.” (Breuning, 2007: 34)

1.4 BUREAUCRACY

There is not a single ruler in the world, nor has there ever been one who was so independent that he could be completely dependent on himself. Even when taking the historical framework from before the Christ, it can be clearly said that leaders have since then had certain staff performing tasks. Those could be advisors, who in the worst case have to tell the leader what they wanted to hear, or cabinets that in the last few hundred years are holding various offices in governments. Thus, although even in monarchical and dictatorial regimes where the authorities are highly centralized, it is simply impossible for leaders to take all matters into their own hands due to the amount of work. In the past, it was specific for diplomats and diplomatic offices to take care of foreign affairs, however, over time, and due to many reasons – from the resources to development of foreign-services, - different hierarchical orders have been created. This altogether started to range from various ideological regimes to state, local, and international institutions that developed such a strong bureaucratic apparatus whose role in the decision-making processes became so significant that you cannot ignore it, especially today.

“In all human collectives, large and small, there exists both a diversity of viewpoint and an unequal distribution of power. These characteristics lend themselves to an unsurprising result: power struggles.” (Hudson, 2014: 141) Nowadays, due to the large amount of the work, each modern country has their ministries of foreign affairs and the diplomatic services, they perform “three vital functions, including information gathering, policy-making, and memory (collecting documentation).” (Hill, 2015: 91) However, the problem is that these functions no longer belong entirely to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and very often when leaders and staff find themselves in negotiations with one of the countries, they have in front of them an intertwined network of different roles. Often these structural organizations have their own interests, and usually their common goal is to enhance their influence, resources, and power. (Alden & Aran, 2016) Hill (2015) distinguished these ‘rivals’ according to four groups:

□ The military –

Which in principle should work with the foreign ministry, but which has its own sizeable vested interests and direct links with equivalents overseas.

□ Economic ministries –

One of the main issues here is that in more developed countries financial sectors, including ministries, “dispose of more money than foreign ministries and become protective of their prerogative.”

□ Intelligence –

It can serve for mass surveillance which generally results in the growth of state power, and as the author explains, “both the military and the security services can claim a special expertise which puts the generalist politician on the back foot. Given this, one of the most remarkable phenomena of recent times is the ability of Erdogan in Turkey to break the structural power of the military, and thus the secular legacy of Kemal Ataturk. It is difficult to imagine that he could have done this without significant help from the intelligence services.”

□ Bureaucratic politics –

It refers to the all staff, ranging from “the prime minister’s office and/or cabinet secretariat (in a parliamentary system), the president’s personal ‘cabinet’ (in a presidential system) or the party machine in a one-party state. They exploit their closeness to the head of government and their capacity to take an overview of the whole system.” (2015: 97, 99, 102)

If we exclude the fact that the majority of the first and the second world countries are trying to develop a completely independent system of e-governance to reduce the bureaucratic apparatus, we will still have people in the abovementioned offices who often might have their own vision on how to get a job done. Thereafter, one of the crucial issues, that at the same time points to ‘the biggest weakness of the theory’ which according to Hill (2015: 104), question the will and the choice. More specifically, “if policy-makers prefer to pursue the interests of their own ministry, department or office, instead of liaising to construct an effective national position, why should this be so? How do they profit if the state as a whole is served less well than their parochial departmental interest?” Thus, in any country that has separation and balance of power decisions will in all probability be result of ‘inter-agency compromises.’

Hudson (2014: 74) claims similar thing, “groups wherein the leader holds primary power will behave differently from groups wherein the president may have considerable power but must share that power with other members at the table, such as the military chief of staff in a nation heavily dependent on the military’s sanction for rule.”

What should be noted, now that the roles have been distinguished, is what matters the most for the FPA? The answer to this question is the way these actors shape their ‘functional behavior’ and how it eventually affects leader’s preferences while making decisions. When talking about small groups, these members may understand their roles differently, and while some of them may see themselves as “loyal staff, whose presence must help facilitate promotion of the leaders’ preferences... others may see themselves either as delegates of external entities or autonomous actors, are completely beholden neither to the leader nor to an external entity. These are often some of the most powerful players in the small group.” (Hudson, 2014: 74) In any case, the role of bureaucracies cannot be neglected here, and often it is hard to exclude them from policy-making. It should also be emphasized that decision-makers must not be naive and take these actors for granted, mostly because “organizations are motivated primarily by factors such as essence, budget, influence, and autonomy. These will not be sacrificed for the sake of executing orders or requests for information issued by policymakers.” (Hudson, 2014: 93) As a matter of fact, domestic politics will have an impact on foreign policy, whether, there is a competition between different actors, such as staff, ministries, or small groups, or there is manipulation of information for pursuing ‘personal’ goals, or in general if significant attention is paid to the opposition, their influence on foreign policy will be visible.

Yet, political culture, as in the case of individual decision-makers, plays a significant role. Even though, in countries with developed and strong institutional systems, where rule of the law exists, foreign policy decisions are almost always made in a group and even if not, it is generally, less expected to have unpredicted interferences coming from administrative professionals. This is mostly because these actors prefer to have established practices they will continuously follow.

1.5 FOREIGN POLICY IN A MULTI-LEVEL REALM

So far, the focus has been on foreign policy actors and as already discussed, many factors can influence the actor's decisions and decision-making procedures. This could range from those inherent in the individuals performing the function, to the way these characteristics are manifested and transformed into policies when are in a group. Including also thoughts about how different systems including the bureaucracy, staff, laws, and the outside world can personally influence the outcome in a given situation. Although the focus is on the actor-specific role, what has not been worked out so far, and which plays an inevitable part are global events that individuals cannot influence or at least cannot get the outcome they envisioned. These worldwide events can range from economic crises, stock market crashes, rising oil prices, bilateral and multilateral relations between countries, natural disasters, some geopolitical changes, to migrant crises, institutional developments, or simply technological advances and general progress in the world. Therefore, there are obviously many factors that decision-makers cannot influence on their own.

For this reason, foreign policy analysts, different from realist scholars for instance, when they focus on a specific country or a region usually see them as a part of one big system, in which all actors are forced to interact with one another. This again supports the thesis that foreign policy analysis is not only a basic subfield of IR, rather, it also appears to be more as a challenge to traditional IR theories as it introduces new actors (agencies) into existing arrangements, and seeks to incorporate them into the contexts of existent structures. Just as Hill (2015: 174, 176) says, “decision-makers tend to perceive international relations as a system. That is, that they are part of a regular pattern of interactions between separate societies, across most of the issue areas affecting human life... Indeed without the actors and their actions there would be no international system, only ecology.”

Among other things, foreign policy analysts clearly recognize border importance and the role of geographical locations of states and their impact on political actions, but still do not consider them to be a fundamental preoccupation of mankind. The FPA further recognizes political and economic interdependence, the importance of the international law, and informal norms². This resulted in a theoretical viewpoint where scholars agree that “the external

² “By ‘norms’ is meant the general principles and working assumptions that states acknowledge in their routine relationships. They are in a condition of evolution, and head in various directions simultaneously. Among the

environment in the widest sense is therefore vital to an understanding of all foreign policy decisions. 'External' does not mean just those things outside the territorial boundaries of an actor; it means all those things which are outside the social and political processes by which the actor comes to its choices." (Hill, 2015: 183)

In the same manner, most of them similarly see cultural involvements. It has been pointed out that culture can play a significant role in the decision-making processes for a leader and can influence their knowledge, reactions, and the way they perceive different situations. However, what is not taken into account is culture as an external factor, where this equally important aspect determines the way society sees its leaders and influence their roles. This way of thinking imposes a sense of responsibility that decision-makers - at least in democratic societies - have for their electorate, but also for society as a whole, given that, every country is seen in the context of global structures. (Hill, 2015)

Accordingly, decision-makers care about public opinion and civil society, and they usually use media as a communication tool, and even if public are not really interested in politics in a broad sense. On the other side, organized opinions such as lobbying and interest groups are those who strive to have a direct impact on decision-makers. "Pluralism creates a web of activity in which governments as well as interest groups get caught... In foreign policy this has produced a number of examples of the cumulative impact of a range of groups operating in parallel to box a government in." (Hill, 2015: 280) These individuals or groups do not have to operate specifically within a framework of their own countries, they can transfer their influence to neighboring states and due to the development of information technologies, both political and economic interdependence, and more frequent and easier mobilization of people and their influence, they are considered to be highly transnational.

most prominent are: *pacta sunt servanda*; the illegitimacy of aggressive war, the value of peaceful coexistence; the rights of non-intervention and to self-determination; the illegitimacy of terrorism; the right of interested parties to an action to be consulted; the right to sell goods abroad. Many of these principles are articulated either in the UN Charter or in some particular international convention." (Hill, 2015: 188)

1.5.1 Two-Level Game

Informal actors are not the only group considered being transnational. This theoretical perspective refers to official governmental circles and came to life in 1988 when Robert Putnam developed a *two-level game* theory, explaining linkages between domestic and international strategic interactions. According to the theory, “at the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.” This theory is a metaphor for showing the complexity of the whole process of foreign policy decision-making, and what the author actually wanted to show is precisely the double responsibility imposed on decision-makers, as “each national political leader appears at both game boards.” (Putnam, 1988: 434)

Decision-makers, who find themselves at such a negotiating table, very often have to make decisions in accordance with other authorities. On the domestic scene it can refer to “party and parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies, representatives of key interest groups, and the leader's own political advisors,” while, “across the international table sit his foreign counterparts, and at his elbows sit diplomats and other international advisors.” (Putnam, 1988: 434) The theory assumes that each side is represented by a single leader known as “chief negotiator” who advocates the so-called ‘win-set’ model, that is, “the set of possibilities for international agreement that would be acceptable by political and social actors at the domestic level.” (Morin & Paquin, 2018: 235) Once the chief negotiator determines a win-set model, he or she is able to develop a clear strategy for any further moves.

There are three main circumstances identified that might affect win-set size, first, “the size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions, that is, the degree of cohesion and mobilization of social actors, including companies, NGOs and ethnic minorities. If actors express their preferences forcefully, the chief negotiator cannot ignore them, which reduces his room for maneuver,” then, “the size of the win-set depends on political institutions, in other words, the extent of the institutional constraint. For example, a country’s constitution may require approval from parliament, the federal states or even a referendum in order to ratify a treaty. This constraint is likely to reduce the negotiator’s

flexibility.” And eventually, “the size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the negotiators.” (Putnam, 1988; Morin & Paquin, 2018: 236) Nevertheless, “for Putnam, a win-set is only achieved when the outcome reflects the shared interests of all the relevant actors and is in tune with the imperatives of the domestic environment.” (Alden & Aran, 2017: 22)

That being the case, the two-level game theory doubtlessly explains the interconnection between domestic and international levels of decision-making, wherein chief negotiators seek domestic approval through a defined win-set in order to engage effectively in international bargaining. On the other hand, the importance of the theory is reflected in the fact that Putnam focused on the right things, instead of trying to prove whether domestic politics is determining international relations or vice versa, the author tried to show that, “what is happening in international politics cannot fail to have an effect on domestic politics. And the exigencies and outputs of domestic politics will certainly have an effect on international politics.” (Hudson, 2014: 145)

In short, decision-makers and agencies today obviously operate in a globalized, multi-level environment in which they develop different relationships from normal and functional to competitive and hostile. What is certain is that in a changing world like this one, both governments and leaders do not have many options but to adapt and try to keep up with everyday developments and changes, including various governmental and non-governmental actors, international institutions, and all other informal threats. Despite this, the existence of a structure and hierarchical system does not refute the fact that decision-makers have significant power just by holding office. Nonetheless, what makes leaders and decision-makers powerful is the ability to act and to project power. This is why the 21st century is so specific for the development of the FPA, especially because leaders have extended tools at their disposal, ranging from hard to soft powers which even more emphasizes a quite autonomous position of the FPA, - thanks to the ability of scholars who managed to acknowledge and deliver a complete, incorporated theory about the relationship between the state, actors and foreign policy.

2. REALISM

Realism is a broad notion that covers almost all aspects of human life. Although in this context, it is known as political realism, which is rightly considered one of the fundamental and predominant schools of thought in international relations. With the long history reaching back to the times of classical political theorists from Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli to Thomas Hobbes, more modern theorists have been inspired to develop a concept of political realism or simply put realism. And just as other political theories have evolved, such as liberalism which is in complete contradiction to it, so realism has evolved as well. Hence, as the best possible way to understand the theory in more detail, the concept will be processed through the division into three versions, by referring to the most prominent authors of their kind. Therefore, it will be classified as follows:

- Classical realism;
- Neorealism or structural realism (defensive and offensive);
- Neoclassical realism;

2.1 CLASSICAL REALISM

After publishing *Politics among Nations* (1948) Hans J. Morgenthau's work became one of the foundational books that established realism as a dominant paradigm within the field of IR. The author mainly focuses on nation-states and their struggle for power with the argumentation that nation-states are the most important actors in international politics. He claims that in international politics, every move and all policies pursued are conducted for the sake of the throne and power. But the question of power is not only manifested in international politics, in Morgenthau's (1948: 21) terms, both domestic and international sources operate on three simple patterns, - "a political policy that seeks to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power." For the first case, in which the country tries to maintain the current state as it is because it is most likely to its advantage, we say that the state maintains the status quo. In the second case, which throughout history has often proved to be the most dominant, states seek to either expand their territories or take over other nation's resources, in other words, situations, when one nation tries to expand its influential power, is familiar as imperialism. And finally, when a nation wants to display its power for

the purpose of maintaining the current situation or for increasing its own powers, we say they are forcing a 'policy of prestige.'

Because a system is so unstable, and domestic affairs reflect upon the international system, so does the balance of power is questionable. After evaluating different methods and structures of the balance of power in the international arena, the author (1948: 152, 155, 163) pointed up the three main weaknesses of the balance of power. The first dilemma Morgenthau has referred to the *uncertainty* of the international system, according to him, "this uncertainty of power calculations is inherent in the nature of national power itself. It will, therefore, come into play even in the simplest pattern of the balance of power, that is when one nation opposes another. This uncertainty, is, however, immeasurably magnified when the weights in one or the other or in both scales are composed not of single units, but of alliances." The very next questionable component is the *unreality* of the balance of power itself, as the author argues, the system is so uncertain that no nation can actually calculate clearly the distribution of power, and therefore, "all nations actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance, that is, equality of power, but at the superiority of power in their own behalf. And since no nation can foresee how large its miscalculations will turn out to be, all nations must ultimately seek the maximum of power available to them." The last weaknesses point to the *inadequacy* of this balance; it further questions whether the balance alone was the only factor that helped resolve previous conflicts or wars. Morgenthau rather calls upon different intellectual and moral elements than pure political balance. "The confidence in the stability of the modern state system that emanates from all these declarations and actions derives, it will be noted, not from the balance of power, but from a number of elements, intellectual and moral in nature, upon which both the balance of power and the stability of the modern state system repose."

The fact that each state must take care of itself is confirmed by the weaknesses of international law too, which the author also points out. "Thus the great majority of rules of international law are generally unaffected by the weakness of its system of enforcement, for voluntary compliance prevents the problem of enforcement from arising altogether." (1948: 230) Morgenthau further criticizes international law for questioning the sovereignty of states. That criticism is directed toward the attempt of 'reinterpretations, revisions, and attacks' of the sovereignty. His beliefs rely upon the fact, as he claims, that "the supranational forces... which bind individuals together across national boundaries, are infinitely weaker today than

the forces which unite peoples within a particular national boundary and separate them from the rest of humanity.” (1948: 268) Therefore, the renunciation of part of sovereignty for the sake of greater interdependence, according to the author, greatly calls into question the security of the nation as well. In fact, there is only one possible way in which common security would be functional, and that is a situation in which all countries of the world would agree to such a status quo. But as the idea of collective security in this context is unrealistic, “the attempt to put collective security into effect under such conditions... will not preserve peace, but will make war inevitable.” (1948: 335)

Taken into consideration everything above explained, Morgenthau’s ground is quite clear. In his stance, bringing into light the international government, world state, and even international law will not help to achieve international peace. On the contrary, in it has been shown in practice that such frameworks are in complete contradiction with the ‘moral, social, and political conditions.’ The answer to this question and the only way to preserve the world peace order is by preserving national sovereignties with the simultaneous existence of functional diplomacy. Morgenthau (1948: 445) concludes his work with critical thinking of the possible outcomes and comes to the expectedly-objectivist conclusion by claiming “diplomacy can make peace more secure than it is today, and the world state can make peace more secure than it would be if nations were to abide by the rules of diplomacy. Yet, as there can be no permanent peace without a world state, there can be no world state without the peace-preserving and community-building processes of diplomacy.”

As Morgenthau’s work is one of the fundamental works in this field, it made a great impact in academic circles, and consequently, many other theorists and scholars continued to discuss his work but also continued to upgrade the theory. For instance, Vasquez (1999: 48) simplified the concept based on three main assumptions. First of them proposes that ‘politics consists of a struggle for power, and in order to be a political actor a person or group must wield significant political power,’ the second claim that, ‘in international politics, during the modern state system, only nations wield significant power,’ and ultimately, ‘in international politics, during the modern state system, only nations are actors (conclusion).’ Or, as resources of Stanford encyclopedia (2010) explained, power or interest is the central concept that makes politics into an autonomous discipline. Rational state actors pursue their national interests. Therefore, a rational theory of international politics can be constructed. Such a theory is not concerned with the morality, religious beliefs, motives or ideological preferences of

individual political leaders. It also indicates that in order to avoid conflicts, states should avoid moral crusades or ideological confrontations, and look for compromise based solely on satisfaction of their mutual interests.”

Politics among Nations is explained in more detail because it represents a comprehensive thought of the school. However, there are of course many other prominent theorists of this time who gave a rise to the course of classical realism. For instance, in his work, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, E.H. Carr (1939: 97, 105) asserts next, “politics are, then, in one sense always power politics.” Carr puts focus on hard powers, such as the military because “the supreme importance of the military instrument lies in the fact that the *ultima ratio* of power in international relations is war,” The second pace is reflected in the use and control of the economy as a means of political power for a purpose of influencing international order and gaining advantages. Carr does not diminish the importance of economic power in international relations, and further believes that the full potential is the best used with a combination of these two powers “since economic strength has always been an instrument of political power, if only through its association with the military instrument.” He also introduces the concept of morality in the international order. Morgenthau also elaborated this in his work, where he argues that although economics and military power are predominantly important in regulating relations between countries, the international order would be dysfunctional if based only on power, and on the basis of this principle, morality plays an important part.

Although these two fundamental pioneers of the idea deal with the question of ethics and morality, it is the fact that their existence is in no way sufficient for realists to curb their suspicions toward other actors. Barry Buzan (1996: 50) argues that “realists see insecurity, and particularly military insecurity, as the central problem, and power as the prime motivation or driving force of all political life. Their analytical focus is on the political group rather than on the individual, and because it commands power, especially military power, most effectively, the key human political group is the state, whether understood as tribe, city-state, or national state.” Thus, this systematic understanding of the concept almost completely negates the role of man as an individual and puts the main focus on the crude nature of the international system in which the leading motives are the general interests of a country. And in which individuals actually exist for those political interest. However, this perception of human nature as a robotic mechanism in which humans as individuals, but also as a

community, are acting entirely for the benefit of the state seems to be the result of skepticism and distrust of the people, therefore, the only way to curb it is to establish itself in the system. This was best explained by Brian Leiter (2001: 249), American philosopher and legal scholar, who explained human nature based on two simple assumptions, first of them suggest that “classical realists view human beings as essentially selfish (or self-interested), and their actions as essentially immoral or amoral... and secondly, people are largely self-serving in their behavior, yet are prone to irrational behavior and are simpleminded, easily fooled, and susceptible to being controlled and used.” Although most of these authors wrote modeled on the fathers of classical realism and tried to be cruel enough in explaining these relationships, some observers believe they are not harsh enough.

Critics argue, “E.H. Carr would have described Hans Morgenthau’s work as containing too little realism and too much utopianism to be truly valuable.” (Proctor, 2015: 1) Whether true or not, it is an indisputable fact that Morgenthau, like Carr, is considered the architect of realism as a completely new theory in international relations, which arose from revolt and as a response to idealism. While in practice, it proved to be a theory that deservedly took the top spot in explaining human nature and human interrelationships, at least during the time in which it developed. As early as the early 1960s, new thinkers emerged questioning the postulates set by classical realists, mostly due to accelerated technological development and increasing interdependence which cast a shadow over centralized power and military might. In response, new names occurred on the stage, which defended the ultimate idea of realism under a new guise better known as neo-realism with new concepts that were adapted to the times.

2.2 NEO-REALISM, i.e. STRUCTURAL REALISM

Neo-realism arose in response to various currents that began to emerge in the 1960s, mostly to respond to new political turmoil that intertwined issues of political economy, transnational governments, and the development of increasing interdependence among states. As the theory that primarily focused on rapid military development began to lose relevance and be questioned by theorists from various political persuasions, so did the need for new, reformatted realism answers to burning questions. Kenneth Waltz was one of the first realists to give an adequate answer to these problems under the guise of neo-realism. The concept is

also known as structural realism, and it is preferred “by those who seek to widen Waltz’s analysis so that it can be combined with work in the liberal tradition that focuses on economic relations, regimes and international society.” (Buzan, 1996: 49) The whole conception emerged as a ‘counter-attack in this intellectual joust’, but this time it went in a direction that deviated from the original conservative ideas of human nature. It did remain faithful to the idea of the power politics, only this time viewed from a different angle, that is, from the context of anarchic structures. The concept continued to evolve by continuing to defend the central authority of states, which, as Buzan (1996) argues, the Cold War only further confirmed, and served this theory as extra support.

Walt (1998: 37) elucidate that this theoretical tradition is not a single theory, in fact, it evolved considerably throughout the Cold War. An important determinant he noted is the split between offensive and defensive neo-realists, he summarized their views claiming that “defensive realists such as Waltz, Van Evera, and Jack Snyder assumed that states had little intrinsic interest in military conquest and argued that the costs of expansion generally outweighed the benefits... while on the other stand, offensive realists such as Eric Labs, John Mearsheimer, and Fareed Zakaria argue that anarchy encourages all states to try to maximize their relative strength simply because no state can ever be sure when a truly revisionist power might emerge.” At this point, their views coincide when it comes to an argument that the system is anarchic and that there is or can always emerge great power that can provoke another state into conflict, so each state needs to take care of itself because it is the greatest guarantor of security and stability as opposed to interdependence. Although to obtain a comprehensive perception of challenges that neo-realists see, the best method is to make a clear distinction among their viewpoints.

2.2.1 Defensive Realism

Defensive realism represents one of the two competing versions of structural realism, and it was first introduced in 1979 by Kenneth N. Waltz in his book *Theory of International Politics*, which genuinely affected the school of neo-realism. In Waltz’s view, political structures and interacting parts are what make a system. In domestic politics, there is a hierarchical order that consists of units, with the exact order of super- and subordination, which gives us a clear picture of how that structure works and how units relate to each other.

Moreover, we can tell the role of political actors based on the function they perform. On the opposite, this is much more complex in the international system, Waltz expresses his view on international structures by breaking them into three separate, but also interdependent filters, which, according to his explanations, give concrete answers to the structures of relations.

The first of them refers to *ordering principles* but unlike in domestic structures which are centralized and hierarchic, international systems are “in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic.” (1979: 89) Therefore, domestic and international structures are incomparably different, in the first case, sovereign states have a political system that governs internal relations including institutions, offices, and agencies with the exact top to bottom authority where every unit knows their exact role, while on the other hand, international structures do not have one organized world-government that could make a clear, distinct rules which all are obliged to respect. And as Waltz (1979: 88, 89) notice, in the international system, it happens very often that “authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capabilities. In the absence of agents with system-wide authority, formal relations of super- and subordination fail to develop.” The whole purpose of this pictorial description is to point out that “structure is organizational concept... and therefore, how can one think of international politics as being any kind of an order at all?”

Waltz (1979: 91, 92) uses the example of classical economic theory and international markets to describe how these concepts are spontaneously ‘self-governed’ and to make it clear that the whole system is composed of individualistic actors whose “aims and efforts are directed not toward creating an order but rather toward fulfilling their own internally defined interests by whatever means they can muster.” In the same way, the international-political system works, it is reduced to the idea of a self-help system in which those who are most resilient will succeed in surviving and preserving themselves in a system that is self-regulating in nature. Nevertheless, in addition to these basic motives, there are many reasons why states would deviate from standard behavior, “beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied: they may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone... The survival motive is taken as the ground of action in a world where the security of states is not assured... some states may persistently seek goals that they value more highly than survival.”

The second concept refers to the *character of the units*, and while in the domestic space character of these units is determined based on roles they play, “the states that are the units in international-political systems are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform.” It is clear that here too an anarchic structure prevails, and therefore uncertainty remains the primary element determining the behavior of all units. An important characteristic is a sovereignty, Waltz argues that being sovereign does not mean being able to do as states wish, rather, it means being ‘free from others’ influence’, that is one part of the puzzle that makes all units similar, the other one is the fact that ‘state are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform them.” (1979: 93, 96) Differences between countries can be reflected in their importance and influence depending on their geographical location, natural resources, size, wealth, military power, and many other characteristics, but what is certain is that each of them will strive to be more successful than others and thus gain a greater advantage in the international field. Yet, to do so they very often look after what other states do, so each of them mostly imitates other countries, which ultimately resulted in them having similar characteristics.

The final pillar *the distribution of capabilities* is closely related to the above explanation, within anarchic structure units are hardly different based on their functions, and they are mostly distinguished “by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks... while the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units.” (1979: 97) It is then expected that the capabilities of units will also define their positions within the whole system and thus determine their behavior. Moreover, international structure as such is composed of different units whose behavior, capabilities, personal vision of oneself, and interests are something that cannot be influenced by international-political structures, therefore, ‘we take states with whatever traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may have’ which ultimately emphasizes, even more, the anarchic nature and uncertainty that each of them may encounter.

As obvious, the system is composed of a large number of states, i.e. units, which can vary greatly according to their size, position, economic power, political system, the culture and tradition they nurture, for this reason, all of them can be expected to behave differently, of course, there are certain parameters, such as the ones already explained, that will affect and limit wild behavior, but that still does not disprove the fact that “because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so-or live at the mercy of their militarily

more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war. This is meant not in the sense that war constantly occurs but in the sense that, with each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may at any time break out.” (1979: 102) One of the ways in which units work to build greater mutual trust and lasting peace is through greater interdependence, which by the time Waltz wrote this book had suddenly begun to become more prevalent, but as the author explains, it still doesn’t change the nature of states, instead, they are rather focused on ‘division of possible gains that may favor other more than itself.’ And the final way to maintain peace Waltz sees in a multipolar system, he argues that a bipolar system is unstable, while the existence of more great powers contributes to the better functioning of the structures. “With more than two states, the politics of power turn on the diplomacy by which alliances are made, maintained, and disrupted.” (1979: 165) In other words, since at least three states participate in a multipolar system, each of them will have certain interests and goals that will not overlap with the goals of the others, for this reason, their relationship will be much more flexible, especially in the military context, because not all power is focused into the hand of just two sides, and for that reason, they will have to be more interdependent and more willing to cooperate to make collective efforts to manage common problems.

Walt (1985: 5, 6) believes that states are entering into alliances mostly as a response to the threat, in that case, they can either be in balancing or bandwagoning position. While balancing means “states will join alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger powers... bandwagoning is the belief that states will tend to ally with rather than against the dominant side is surprisingly common.” Another possible outcome, which is also very likely, is for states to unite against the one who poses the greatest threat to them, or who is probably the most powerful at the moment, even though, as the author concludes balance as the alliance is the most probable outcome. There are, of course, those who would not agree with this statement, offensive realists are one of them, according to their style, such a strategy is unlikely, and above all dangerous, because it calls into question their own survival. Their position is much more cautious, and in order to understand it more clearly, it will be discussed below.

2.2.2 *Offensive Realism*

Offensive realism is the other side of the coin, the system is still seen as anarchic, but unlike defensive realism, the authors who advocated these views may be even a little closer to the original form of realism. One of the most prominent scholars of this field is certainly John Mearsheimer, who with his work *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* encouraged a new stream of theoretical thought. With the main aim of pointing out the danger that reigns in the world, the author did not hesitate to state his views sharply, although, in 2001, when the book was published, it seemed that mankind was moving towards a better world. This of course proved to be the opposite, which only strengthened the stance Mearsheimer advocated.

The book began to be written after the end of the Cold War, which probably justifies Mearsheimer's (2001:40) basic idea, which is that the great powers strive for hegemony, of course, not a one in which all nations are equal, but for one in which only one force is called a superpower without having competition. The principle means "domination of the system, which is usually interpreted to mean the entire world."

In order to clarify this view, Mearsheimer addressed five assumptions as an explanation of why nation-states compete for hegemony in the international system. First of them is the classical idea that the international system is anarchic, meaning that there is no world government as a ruling body over the sovereignty of independent states. The second one argues that each state poses more or less offensive military capacity, and therefore, each of them has good enough reason to be worried about its own survival. The third assumption refers to the uncertainty of the world system, i.e. certain states can never be fully aware of all intentions that other states have, and for that reason, they need to keep their offensive capabilities. Fourth, all states seek to survive, to do so, they need to protect their territorial borders and independency of domestic structures. All these elements mean that external security and internal order are fundamental goals of each state, however, not the only one. And the final premise claim that 'great powers are rational actors.' They reasonably think about their environment which makes them aware of all threats, challenges, and dangers they may encounter. Because they strategically observe situations they also 'consider preferences of other states' and they analyze their behavior to be more prepared for any given issue. Based on these five assumptions, Mearsheimer (2001: 31) postulates that altogether they create a strong enough network for great powers to "think and act offensively with regard to each

other. In particular, three general patterns of behavior result: fear, self-help, and power maximization.”

Fear, self-help system, and power maximization are also reasons why great powers cannot maintain the status quo, in other words, all countries will use any given opportunity to maximize their power to protect themselves due to the listed reasons. This, of course, does not mean that all great powers will just go around and attack anybody on their way, instead, they act very calculated and think wisely about their gains and losses, “if the benefits do not outweigh the risks, they sit tight and wait for a more propitious moment.” (2001: 38) This does not mean that military conflict is the only way how states can either maintain a balance of power to maximize their gains, in specifically determined conditions they establish cooperation too. In that case, they need to be concerned about the distribution of power and goods among them, and they will do so by deciding whether they chase absolute or relative gains. Mearsheimer believes they will more often seek relative gains, just in case not to disrupt the current balance of power or to not worsen their current position with some random uncontrolled events.

Eric Labs (2007: 12) is also one of the well-known theorists who argues that offensive realism provides more logical explanations for state behavior in international structure, he criticizes defensive realists and supports the premise that great power will always try to maximize relative power in order to maximize their security. He similarly asserts that not “all states are motivated by blind ambition (though some may be). States calculate rationally the best way to expand their relative power.” Labs is aware that offensive realism cannot provide a detailed explanation of how to maximize their relative power because not all states are the same, they have different economics, military capabilities, geopolitical positions, in general, different strength which will affect the outcomes, but ultimately, it does provide less naïve understanding of states behavior.

State’s persistence to either maintain or gain more power than all other states raises a question, why are states, at the end, ready to fight hegemonic wars and why do they want to have the most power? Gilpin believes that having a hegemonic order will enable the greatest power to change the system as they please. Nevertheless, those who win the war are able to serve their own interests. “The great turning points in world history have been provided by these hegemonic struggles among political rivals; these periodic conflicts have reordered the

international system and propelled history in new and uncharted directions... even more to be said, hegemonic war historically has been the basic mechanism of systemic change in world politics.” (1981: 203, 210) Therefore, the answer to the question looks predictable, justifying Gilpin’s and perception of all other offensive realists about the world, where the primary fuel for any actions are first survival, then political, economic, and all other self-interests, yet, those the most powerful will consequently alter a system.

Always possible and hardly controlled changes are also a reason why states are worried so much about their own survival, which further points to a clear dividing line between offensive and defensive realism. Mearsheimer stated next “I do not adopt Morgenthau’s claim that states invariably behave aggressively because they have a will to power hardwired into them. Instead, I assume that the principal motive behind great-power behavior is survival. In anarchy, however, the desire to survive encourages states to behave aggressively.” (2001: 53) To end Mearshimer’s pessimistic thinking about the world, it is important to mention one obstacle he emphasizes that can be positive for many weaker units within a structure, but also other great powers. It refers to an idea, that even in the case if one state would believe they could dominate a globe, it would rarely be feasible, and not because of the military incapacabilities but because of geopolitical structures. Since the world has evolved significantly, humanity is more connected than ever, it would simply not be possible to have everything under the control, “the principal impediment to world domination is the difficulty of projecting power across the world’s oceans onto the territory of a rival great power.” For this reason, “the best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon and possibly control another region that is nearby and accessible over land.” (2001: 41)

2.3 NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

Neoclassical realism is the fourth and the latest theoretical approach that belongs to the original concept of the school of realism and, the notion was first introduced in 1998 in Gideon Roses’s paper *Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy* as a reference to the books by Thomas Christensen, Randall Schweller, William Wohlforth, and Fareed Zakaria. Unlike previous versions of the realism, supporters of this thought do not neglect the role of human actors, on the contrary, neoclassicists tried to answer unresolved questions and sought to fill a gap that their predecessors had failed. “Neoclassical realism identifies states as the most important actors in international politics,” (Taliaferro et al., 2009: 4) but they differ

from classic and structural realists as they are not focused only on states, - as inanimate objects, - as the only rational actors and sources of power in international structure, instead they admit the role of individuals in foreign policy. Rose (1998) acknowledge the fact that choices in foreign policy are made by political leaders and elites which may result in having different objectives depending on the composition of the office and the government, as well as that, available resources, political system, and culture are important indicators that will determine the scope of freedom to act of those in power. Thus, the need for a closer look and a more detailed analysis of domestic structures, as well as the relationship between politics and policy is what makes neoclassical realism unique.

“This volume examines the intervening role of the “state” in neoclassical realism,” in other words, it attempts to arrange the puzzles by bringing into a logical connection to the cause-and-effect relationship between domestic and external factors. To answer these questions, they look closely into internal characteristics of states, - such as the role of different actors and institutions, including a political and military base, the influence of different interest groups, NGOs, civil society organizations, - and do they actually and to what extent will influence politicians and leaders in decision-making. Obviously, neoclassical realism explains the way system “posits an imperfect “transmission belt” between systemic incentives and constraints, on the one hand, and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies states select, on the other.” (Taliaferro et al., 2009: 4)

Having similar thoughts, Rose (1998: 151) openly criticize defensive and offensive realism, and innenpolitik theories, – who stand the opinion that domestic factors such as political, economic, and cultural elements will eventually determine the behavior of the state in foreign policy – for whom, he believes are misleading because “the neoclassical realists believe that Innenpolitik preferred independent variables must be relegated to second place analytically because over the long run a state’s foreign policy cannot transcend the limits.” Yet, the neoclassical standpoint is more supportive of defensive realism, “like other variants of realism, neoclassical realism assumes that politics is a perpetual struggle among different states for material power and security in a world of scarce resources and pervasive uncertainty... Neoclassical realism argues that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country’s relative material power” (Taliaferro et al., 2009:4, 5) but they differ from other variations, as they “assume that states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external


environment. Regardless of the myriad ways that states may define their interests, this school argues, they are likely to want more rather than less external influence.” (Rose, 1981: 152)

This is perhaps the most reasonable approach as it best explains the modern international order, in which there is no bipolar order, so that the system is not centralized and directed in only one direction, where even the role of hegemon can be contextualized due to the relativity of power. So what this branch has explained perfectly, - compared to others, - is the effort of states to protect themselves from uncertainty by keeping as many threads as possible under their control. Of course, if everything goes as they planned, and if power continuously accumulates in their hands, it is a historically proven fact that states become greedier, which will reshape their ambitions that will consequently be reflected in the international sphere.

Neoclassic realists also believe that the distribution of power and behavior of other states rarely influences national behavior in the long term; instead, the state’s own increase in relative material power will lead to expansion. In neoclassical realism, one can also see the interference of the theory of foreign policy analysis, so Rose (1981: 167) claims that, during the correspondence, “the process will not necessarily be gradual or uniform, however, because it will depend not solely on objective material trends but also on how political decision makers subjectively perceive them.” This of course does not mean that states are simply fulfilling the wishes of decision-makers or other groups, rather, they rationally “define the national interests and conduct foreign policy based upon their assessment of relative power and other states’ intentions, but always subject to domestic constraints.” (Taliaferro et al., 2009: 25)

In that case, what this theory basically does is, tracing how “relative material power is translated into the behavior of actual political decision makers,” (Rose, 1981: 168) which is why they disagree with the standard understanding of the balance of power theory, which implies a ‘constant mobilization capacity,’ or in other words, it does not take into account different access to resources. Instead, Schweller (2004: 169) explained that ‘structural characteristics of society and government’ will influence the final outcome, he further noted that neoclassical realists see the balance of power differently, and “unlike standard balance of power theory as articulated by Waltz and other structural realists, in which states respond in a timely and systematic way to dangerous changes in relative power, the theory proposed here

presents a more elaborate causal chain of how policy adjustments to changes in relative power occurs:



Neoclassical realism as the last form of already old-fashioned realism, in its description, is in many ways a mixture of classical and structural realism. Foulon (2015: 635) described it as “the “logical next step” in the realist tradition (Rathbun 2008): it bridges the domestic–international divide and includes cognitive factors.” Classical realism is in the first place concerned with the state as the only source of power, it does not recognize any other actors, and it believes that power distribution is intended only for the states. It supports the view that states are rational actors and that humans are by nature self-interested, aggressive, and always ready to attack due to the fear of the uncertainty prevailing in the international system, - given that there is no world government to regulate their relations. In contrast, neorealism sought to mitigate this approach by presenting states as units operating in an anarchic international structure. The concept developed further by splitting into two basic directions of defensive and offensive realism. And while in the first case theorists advocate the view that states make alliances as a balancing strategy to respond to threats and seek to maintain the status quo and moderate power relations with others as a response to threats, offensive realists believe that it is necessary to maximize power and influence in order to protect oneself from other states in an anarchic and uncertain international structure.

As a result, neoclassical realism emerged as a complex version that took some characteristics of both directions, but at the same time introduced new elements that corresponded to the needs for explaining contemporary challenges. As in classical realism, they do not question the fact that the state is a central and fundamental actor, but they also accept the view that the international order is anarchic and unpredictable, and therefore, states react out of fear of possible threats. When all put together, neoclassical realism is an approach that takes care of the survival and interests of the state, - as the most important actor, but also that does not have a general, rough approach that can be applied to all states in the same way but seeks to understand the behavior of both the state and those who represent them, i.e. politicians, leaders, and other bodies, in foreign affairs. It advocates the position of relative power, and that states will take advantage when they have the opportunity to maximize their goals, but also takes into account domestic constraints, such as the fact that not all actors have equal access to resources, nor that they have the same starting points. Thus, neoclassical realism can best be understood as a moderate compound of realism with elements of foreign policy analysis.

CHAPTER 2

3. MIGRATION FLOWS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN IR

Migration is a phenomenon that exists since the beginnings of the human race, - all the way from the period of before the Christ, through the Migration Period, to the more recent times in history dating back to the last three to four centuries. Some were either economic and voluntary resettlements such as the European expansion, then industrialization and migration to the New World, and finally the post-World War II labor migration that happened to prevent further collapse of post-war European economies. While on the other hand, other types of mass migrations such as slavery today would be characterized as a movement of forcibly displaced persons. Although, that is not the case, since the use of terminology that clearly defined who is a migrant, who is a refugee, or who is a forcibly displaced person did not come to life until the middle of the last century and until the development of international institutions, including the development of their branches, that is, agencies who began to take the concept of human rights seriously and globally.

One of these organizations is the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which was created in 1951, and agreed on a definition of a migrant to meet their own purpose. And while most countries of the world accepted the UN definition, to this day a universal definition of a migrant has not been adopted. Therefore, according to the IOM (2019: 132, 103, 102), it is, “an umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not

specifically defined under international law, such as international students.” Since the phenomenon itself is quite complex, the definition of this term can be further differentiated, one of them refers to the term immigrant, who is “from the perspective of the country of arrival, a person who moves into a country other than that of his or her nationality or usual residence, so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence,” it is also important to note that there are legal immigrants, who most often belong to one of the above groups, and illegal immigrants, which IOM defines as “migrants in an irregular situation and undocumented migrant.” As a result, because there is no unique definition of migrants, many authors offered alternative approaches, for instance, Hughes (et al., 2019: 1) referred to migration as “a term that encompasses a wide variety of movements and situations that involve people of all walks of life and backgrounds. More than ever before, migration touches many countries and people in an era of deepening globalization.” Or Koser (2007), who perhaps best divided this trend into three main categories, first of them is a basic distinction between ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migrants, then, those who move for either political or economic reasons, and finally, divergence among ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ immigrants, but also, who emphasized the fact that clear dividing line between some of these categories is very often blurred in reality, and that some of them are usually overlapping.

Just a year prior to the creation of the IOM, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was found, and as early as 1951 they published the Refugee Convention, which was later amended by the 1967 Protocol, together representing fundamental legal documents on human rights and the work of the organization. Article I states that the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who has a „fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.“ (1951: 14) They further defined forced displacement as a „departure of a person from his/her home or country due to, e.g., to a risk of persecution or other form of serious or irreparable harm. Such risk can exist due to armed conflict, serious disturbance of public order, natural disasters, or the inability or unwillingness of a State to protect the human rights of its citizens.“ (2011: 280) The website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) offers a similar but even more precise definition, in that term forcibly displaced persons are those

“who are forced to move, within or across borders, due to armed conflict, persecution, terrorism, human rights violations and abuses, violence, the adverse effects of climate change, natural disasters, development projects or a combination of these factors.”

In a globalized world where migration has become more frequent, and above all simpler and more feasible than ever before, it is very important to know the difference between migrants and refugees, primarily because the reactions of states give us a clearer insight into their intentions and shows their true views. Different countries respond differently to these challenges, which also might depend on whether it is a refugee crisis or economic migration, but the fact is, regardless of the situation, that each of them will be ready if they are given the opportunity to try to politicize each situation, either to achieve domestic goals or to advance their position in international politics. For this reason, states have either developed or are constantly working on developing new tools and approaches to respond to this ongoing trend. Probably the most contemporary example is the European migration crisis, including the Southeastern European coast, - as the most popular route for most migrants. Therefore, in order to deal with the crisis these countries, including the EU and Turkey have been working on various policies domestically and internationally to meet the crisis but also their own needs. As a result, the field of *migration diplomacy* has flourished. Adamson and Tsourapas (2019: 115) defined it as “states’ use of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility.” They further brought this connection into a logical sequence by explaining that migration not only influence domestic policymaking, but also has an impact on international relations with other states, and that could reflect in negotiations, international treaties, alliances, agreements, and many other forms of either favorable or hostile relations. “Heightened migratory flows across national borders affect states’ diplomatic interactions with other actors in the international system and become the object of interstate diplomacy,” including both state and non-state actors, such as international organizations and NGOs.

Beyond this, the authors described three main conditions that could be applied to migration diplomacy and the way it works, first, it “refers to state actions and investigates how cross-border population mobility is linked to state diplomatic aims... emphasizing, that very often “states engage in migration diplomacy vis-à-vis international organizations.” Yet it is important to note that even though they work closely with international organizations, it does not bring into question their sovereignty, instead, “a key feature of modern nation-states is

that they not only have a monopoly over the legitimate means of violence, but also the legitimate means of movement. Their territorial logic means that they have an interest in maintaining and controlling their national borders as an aspect of their domestic, Westphalian, and interdependence sovereignty.” The second notable thing to mention is that not all migration policies are part of migration diplomacy, in lieu, these policies are relevant only when the state decides to include them. Therefore, the focus is not only on policies but rather on negotiations, meaning that, “migration diplomacy can include both the strategic use of migration flows as a means to obtain other aims or the use of diplomatic methods to achieve goals related to migration.” And eventually, “migration diplomacy highlights the importance of the management of cross-border mobility as an international issue,” (Adamson & Tsourapas, 2019: 116, 117) as the ability of countries to find a common solution, be it through the diaspora or some other networks, but it surely shows true interstate skills. The fact that Adamson and Tsourapas identified only three conditions does not limit states to react differently and have different approaches toward this issue, in fact, it is largely conditioned by the position in which that country finds itself, in other words, depending on whether it is a country of immigration, emigration, or transit-migration country. Their reactions, whether from a position of power, bargaining, or an attempt to extract at least any deal from the negotiations will largely depend on this typology. Despite, what is common for all of them is that discussions about migration diplomacy are always related to security issues, whether they are real or states are trying to securitize them. As well as that, if given chance, they will always attempt to create linkages with any other field that could possibly be profitable, “such as enhancing their security, achieving economic interests, or boosting their soft power via cultural or public diplomacy.” (Weiner and Münz, 2019: 118, 120) Nevertheless, there are usually various instruments at their disposal that they could possibly use as strategies for acquiring at least some of their goals.

While probably the first association is on immigrant countries and the way they could use peoples for enchanting their aims, Weiner and Münz (1997: 28) have looked on this issue from a different perspective, arguing that immigration states will often develop as many strategies as possible to keep emigrants in their home countries, whether it includes “the use of trade, foreign investment and development assistance to stimulate improvements in the wages and employment of sending countries... international assistance to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees after favourable changes in their home country; various types of ‘safe havens’ to provide in-country or third country places of protection for refugees;

exit control policies; political and diplomatic strategies to improve human rights standards and minority rights in order to reduce refugee flows; and, finally, military intervention.” Therefore, from the perspective of immigrant countries, it seems much easier to do everything they can to prevent the arrival of legal and illegal migrants, as well as refugees than to deal with this problem on their own ground, which ultimately proved true in the last European crisis, clearly because “even a small percentage of a large population represents many millions of people.” (Teitelbaum, 1984: 430) Another reason is that the citizens of the developed North, in the last three decades, have increasingly begun to express disapproval of open-door policies to migrants, which has automatically reflected in declining support for political parties advocating this. And as all of them aim to be in power, so too have their goals and policies begun to change in line with public opinion. Kiseleva and Markin (2017: 377) have noticed this phenomenon in recent refugee crisis as well, their argument is based on assumption that anti-immigration sentiment is a result of concerns that many are not even asylum seekers, instead, they have used a situation for economic migration. Although they still acknowledge that the problem is much more deeply rooted, and they cite three reasons that date back all the way to the last century. “While shifts in attitudes towards asylum seekers and migrants were prompted by numerous factors, scholars point to three critical turning points: the signing of the Schengen Agreement; the collapse of the Soviet Union; and the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001.” For all these reasons, governments today are developing an increasing number of policies for the prevention and intervention of emigration flows.

From the many strategies and policies discussed, theorists have been able to reduce this division to three basic answers in regards to mass emigrations, “one is to seek better instruments of control, to establish and enforce stricter border regimes and restrictive migration and refugee laws, to try to repatriate those who enter unlawfully or do not qualify for asylum. A second is to accept and absorb a certain number of refugees and economic migrants and to address the social, economic and political consequences posed by the flows. A third response is to develop prevention and intervention strategies towards countries that actually or potentially generate mass emigration.” Although probably the most effective method, it is a combination of all three, while the dominance of one of them will depend on the context of the situation. Thus, for example, if there is no war in a country, the countries of the first world, - depending also on the bilateral and multilateral relations of these countries, - will mainly focus on foreign investments, and improving the economic and working

conditions in the countries characteristic of emigration. But if the state of war is still ongoing or the conflict is over, strategies are mainly focused on peace talks, peace-building and ultimately peace-keeping, with the direct help of international institutions, to improve the situation as soon as possible and facilitate voluntary return. Teitelbaum (1984: 434) noticed that “foreign policy may also be directly employed to facilitate or to restrain existing refugee outflows. Diplomatic pressures, economic sanctions, and direct military intervention have all been employed to such ends.” Yet, what is certain, and what Rosemarie Rogers claims about the case of returnees, -but what also applies to emigrants is, - “that decisions to return are influenced much more by the political and economic situations in the home countries than by return incentives or reintegration assistance targeted at returnees.” (Weiner and Münz, 1997: 26, 35)

Moreover, the possibility that foreign policy decisions may also negatively affect migration flows should not be overlooked either. Such outcomes can often occur if the possible consequences of interventions are not well-considered and if the current climate prevailing in a given country, as well as culture, tradition, ideology, and economic factors, are not taken into account. Teitelbaum (1984: 443) warns that “foreign-policy makers rarely evaluate such effects seriously when considering intervention. Instead, they perceive the possible refugee consequences (if they consider them at all) more as a problem for “others,” if the flow is to other countries, or alternatively as an obligation that the intervenor owes to local collaborators, if the intervention proves unsuccessful.” Although the practice has shown that this can be the case in other situations as well, as the recent events related to the migrant crisis in the EU have proven a similar thing. “For a long time, the EU’s foreign policy on migration has focused on deterring irregular migration by outsourcing responsibility to other countries. The core argument has always been that for the Schengen area to function, its external borders must be tightly controlled to prevent unauthorised entry. The Union and its member states aim to achieve this through various forms of cooperation with non-EU countries of transit and origin, coupled with financial and development aid.” (Dimitriadi, 2016: 2) On contrary, the truth here is twofold, especially if we refer to the last few decades when society has increasingly had the opportunity to encounter migratory trends. Thus, countries that both send and receive migrants are increasingly using this situation as a foreign policy tool too. Teitelbaum (1984: 438, 440) himself has recognized a few attempts, the first relates to an unarmed attempt to destabilize and undermine the sovereignty of the recipient country, “generally stated, this policy involves governmental encouragement of civilian rather than

military movement into claimed territories for the purposes of establishing effective control or sovereignty.” Another example is the perception of recipient countries that some peoples have been deliberately expelled to certain countries in order to discredit that country and make it incapable of dealing with problems in the international sphere. Or cases when “refugees have also been used as tools of what might be termed “private foreign policies.” Such use arises when nongovernmental groups opposed to particular foreign regimes see mass exodus from those countries as a weapon to dramatize the reasons for their opposition.” Professor Christopher Mitchell (1989: 682, 683) of New York University also addressed the same issue, as he noticed, there is a number of different ways how migration is intertwined with foreign politics, yet, he managed to reduce it to three basic dimensions:

- “International relations help to shape international migration: the defining characteristics of migration flows are found at the level of social and economic organization and international politics, not among individual perceptions and motivations.
- Migration may influence and serve the goals of national foreign policies: Both sending and receiving governments have found that migration may acquire marked importance in their bilateral dealings, serving varied roles as stakes or instruments in state-to-state interaction.
- “Domestic” immigration laws and policies may have an unavoidable international political projection.”

From all the above, it is clear that the migration crisis used as a tool can definitely serve as an extended hand of foreign policy. Depending on the context, it can be easily adapted to the needs of society, states, and interest groups, and due to the role of international organizations, it can even bring into question the sovereignty of states. Although very often the harsh nature of the system prevails and depending on the position of power, states often try to extract personal interest. As a result, the phenomenon of migration is one of the most vivid examples of how diplomacy, foreign and domestic policy, as well as interstate relations, intertwine. Yet, the best way to explain this more clearly is to take one of the more recent examples which by combining the above elements are a clear indication of possible instrumentalizations, for that occasion, it would be appropriate to explain recent relations between Turkey and the European Union. That is, to discuss whether Turkey managed to turn the tables in its possible favor.

CHAPTER 3

4. TURKEY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

For many reasons, Turkey has had geopolitical significance for the region and the world for hundreds of years, and with its specific position as a Eurasian transcontinental country, it became usual that Turkey is almost always facing different obstacles and opportunities. During the Cold War, it was part of NATO and served as an important shield against the Soviet bloc, as a result, from back then until the end of the last century, the country was almost completely pro-Western with the main focus on meeting the necessary accession requirements. Focusing on Western values, the Turkish government has somehow put in the background the development of relations with other countries and cultures in the region, including the Middle East. However, this changed significantly with the beginning of the 21st century, and with the rise of the Justice and Development Party (JDP/AKP), more specifically, Turkey has begun to take its other identities more seriously and use its geopolitical position to achieve other goals as well. Bearing in mind that they are an important factor for the West, at least because of their position as an energy transfer country, they comprehend that they can use the advantages they have and play multiple roles at the same time. The main reason for this is the fact that the new ruling elite took the broader concept into account, and realized that glorifying the West was not the only and best choice for Turkey in either way.

To this end, the AKP has become increasingly committed to forcing an identity that is fundamentally much closer to Islamic civilization, Middle Eastern culture, and the sharing of common values based on a common religion, history, and culture. Advocating for such rhetoric, nurturing, and developing these relations through the use of soft power and economic cooperation, Turkey has set out very successfully to present itself as one positive example of a desirable and ‘liberal Islamic’ country while imposing itself as a regional power. This has of course changed significantly over the last 20 years, with numerous ups and downs, intending to sustain its rise and Turkey as the leader of the region.

4.1 GRAND STRATEGY

Regional powers may be defined as countries with “a capacity and ability to lead their neighbours... But they can also be defined “as states exercising influence in a restricted geography and having capacity to act alone.” (Dal, 2016: 1427) However, as the world is changing so are conditions countries have to meet in order to become regional leaders or ‘middle powers.’ While examining that, different authors have tried to summarize these necessary conditions through several key moments. Öniş and Kutlay (2017: 166) classified this into four main groups, “(1) the ability to serve as role models based on their soft-power resources—i.e. the quality of their developmental and democratic credentials; (2) the capacity to build effective coalitions with both established and emerging powers on the basis of a consistent set of normative principles; (3) governance capacity based on a recognition of the limits of middle-power influence and avoiding a mismatch of expectations and capabilities; and (4) the capacity to identify niche areas in regional and global governance where they can make a distinct and unique contribution.”

At the same time, Schoeman (2000) addressed the issue through “internal dynamics (having an economically and politically stabilizing and leading role in the region), willingness (assuming the role of a peacekeeper or stabilizer), capacity (having the capacity to influence regional affairs), and being acceptable to others in the role (being accountable to countries in the region for regional security.” And as for Flemes (2007), the success of regional powers can be distinguished through the following four frameworks, “claim to leadership, power resources, employment of foreign policy instruments, and acceptance of leadership by third countries.” (Sever, 2020: 3) Although, these authors have formulated priorities differently

they all acknowledge the importance of the ability to use economic and political means efficiently, at both domestic and foreign scenes, as well as the recognition of a particular country as a regional power by its neighbors and the world at large.

How successful Turkey was in fulfilling this agenda could be best described through the analysis of its policies toward the Middle East. In doing so, many analysts have compared the AKP after winning 2002 elections with the work of the previous governments. Theorists and scholars did this by writings about ongoing foreign policy activities through the lens of political ideologies known as ‘Kemalism’ and ‘Neo-Ottomanism.’ Kemalist tradition is specific for the 20th century and their choice not to get too involved in the Arab world. This political discourse is actually best illustrated in practice in the above explained period when Turkey fully nurtured Western values and sought to identify with them. The practice has also shown that it is not difficult to notice the differences between these two directions either. And so, “where Neo-Ottomanism favors multiculturalism and a more moderate version of secularism, Kemalism prefers militantly secularist measures against political Islam and assimilationist policies vis-a`-vis Kurdish ethnic identity.” Such an effort to counter the opposition, regardless of the consequences, cost their government in economic terms as well. Köstem (2018) states that precisely because of these obstacles and fear of returning to Islamic roots, they did not use the opportunity to create liberal and inclusive strategies, but instead remained security-oriented. Similarly, Taspinar (2012: 130) argues that incompatibility and inconsistency with the principles of one identity is reflected even in the case of the accession to the European Union. In that case, “if Neo-Ottomanism favors pursuing EU membership and good relations with Washington, Kemalism is actually increasingly resentful of the European Union and the United States.” In their defense, the main reason for this behavior is Kemalists’ understandings who believe that the current government is trying to devalue the values that a secular republic should have, and instead is forcing the Islamization, as much as ironic it could sound.

Thus, given that the previous convocation of power was identified with the Kemalists, the newly elected government of the AKP party successfully managed to identify with the idea of neo-Ottomanism. Resulting from that, Taspinar (2012: 126, 129) identified three elements of compatibility between neo-Ottomanism and the AKP. The first concerns the reconciliation between modern Turkey and the Ottoman heritage, but in a way that there is no imperialist aspiration towards the Arab world, instead, the focus is on exercising soft power and

“embracing the Ottoman great power legacy, and most importantly”, by calling “for a redefinition of Turkey’s strategic and national identity.” For this theoretical framework the rhetoric of multiculturalism is also characteristic, “this is most visible in its rejection of assimilation-oriented nationalism... Since Neo-Ottomanism is at peace with the imperial and multinational legacy of the country, it opens the door to a less ethnic and more multicultural conceptualization of Turkish citizenship.” The last aspect seems all-encompassing, as its goal is not only to develop relations with the Islamic world, but to embrace the West and the East at the same time. Hüseyin Işık (2018: 19) also argued that “the neo-Ottoman foreign policy understanding is based on three pillars. The first pillar is the “indivisibility of security,” meaning that it is impossible to ensure stability if the whole region is not stable. Then, economic interdependence, as the second pillar, in which the successful implementation of this step is needed to build lasting peace. “The last pillar is cultural harmony, mutual dialogue, and respect. This pillar is significant as it involves recognizing and respecting the political differences that are at the core of many regional problems.”

Opposed to this, Morozov (2015) and Zakarol (2011) believe that the AKP, as a conservative party, invokes neo-Ottomanism as it relies on the imperial legacy. “Turkey’s historical responsibility is to play a facilitating role among the ‘brotherly’ nations of the Middle East, who were forcibly distanced from each other by Western colonial powers.” Köstem (2018: 730) According to their understanding, it helped them to influence and shape the national identity of Turkey. Because ruling elites are the ones who have the power to interpret history, and thus shape their power position in the region. Therefore, this theory perfectly explains the attitude of the Erdogan government towards the Middle East, and other countries that are historically connected to the area of the Ottoman Empire, i.e. today’s modern Turkey as the heir to the throne. Therefore, this theory perfectly explains the attitude of the Erdogan government towards the Middle East and other countries historically associated with the territory of the Ottoman Empire, i.e. today’s modern Turkey as heir to the throne. With that being the case, it helps us to further understand the foreign policy that the AKP advocated after coming to power.

4.2 FOREIGN POLICY IN THE PRE-ARAB SPRING ERA

Foreign policy has been one of Turkey's chief matters for the past two decades. At the beginning of the 21st century, precisely in 2002, Turkish party the AKP under the leadership of the current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power and made a sudden turn in its foreign policy towards the Middle East. This resulted in numerous trade and political agreements, mediation in various negotiations, taking on the role of conciliator and many other activities they engaged in when they had the opportunity. This initially began with building relations with Syria, after Crown Prince Bashar al-Assad came to power. From the very beginning, it has been marked by high-level visits between Ankara and Damascus, including top officials. The main reasons for this were varieties of new bilateral agreements that ranged from free-trade agreements to visa liberalization. (Günay, 2017) In 2008 Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu stated that “the extensive cooperation between Turkey and Syria in the last decade stood as the most striking example of the success of Turkey's policy of zero problems with neighbors” (Demirtaş-Bagdanos, 2014, p. 139). One of the most visible indicators was visa liberalization which has not only contributed to the flow of people, but also to the creation of joint civic organizations, greater commerce, the development of companies, and various non-governmental activities. Therefore, this period is also known as the ‘golden age’, which marked the relations between Turkey and Syria, mostly because of the successful trade and significant flow and mobilization of people. Their severe reliance on soft power and economic interdependence also show how serious the AKP's intentions were. As part of that, they very often sent high-ranked officials to attend meetings, negotiations, and ceremonies, including Erdogan himself. Just for an example, “as Prime Minister, Erdoğan has visited the Middle East more than any other region of the world between 2003 and 2011. He made 45 official visits to the region.” (Sever, 2020: 6)

Apart from improving bilateral relations, Turkey under the rule of the AKP has always wanted to portray itself as regional power and to do so they have to become a nation that belongs to the region. Accordingly, the AKP had to establish friendly relations with other countries in the region too. They openly called for it, for instance, in 2007, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül stated that “Turkey and the Arab world has a long history. Our peoples are friends and siblings. We share our geography. We share the same religion. We are affected by the same problems, we face the same opportunities. There has been a unity of fate among us since centuries. Improving our relations with the Arab world in every respect,

contributing to stability, security and prosperity in the Middle East are among the priorities of our foreign policy.” (Günay, 2017: 199) Although this is just one example, what emerges from a series of various speeches, not only by Gül but also by other senior officials, is precisely the call for a common and peaceful approach to improving these relations, which will result in a win-win outcome, as they always underline. What is certain is that by relying on identity politics, Turkey has doubtlessly managed to improve its image in the Middle East. Köstem (2018: 730) argued that “the content of national identities, which are historically shaped and continuously redefined by political agents, also shape the forms that economic cooperation can take, from more hierarchical, coercive and exclusive policies to more liberal and inclusive ones.” What can be concluded is that with the improvement of these relations and the development of regionalism, a greater degree of interdependence has developed between Turkey and the countries of the Middle East. In such a course, almost until 2009, events were happening exactly in a way Turkey hoped for and that certainly refers to the maintenance of stability in the region. Because, as the AKP believed, it was a necessary step to be preserved in order to continue profiting.

So, what is clear so far is that it is important to memorize the moment when Turkey identifies itself with the civilization of the Middle East. Although, Davutoğlu and other AKP ministers emphasized that because of Turkey’s specific geographical position as a central country, it would be impossible to reduce their identity to a single, unambiguous central character. (Langan, 2017) Instead, they wanted to show that Turkey is a successful example, not only to countries in the region but to the world, which is why, “building on the role as a regional collaborator, Turkey has actively presented itself as a force for reform and innovation in the region... An important aspect of this role is that Turkey is presented as an Islamic country, which has managed to achieve the synchronisation between Islam and ‘contemporary civilization.’” (Günay, 2017: 202) The architect of this approach to foreign policy is considered to be Ahmet Davutoğlu, who as Minister of Foreign Affairs and later Prime Minister, developed a strategy which he described in his book ‘Strategic Depth’, which was basically based on the paradigm of multilateralism and the use of soft power on the path to becoming a regional leader. This approach relates to “multilateral foreign policy that diversified Turkey’s international relations options, giving it a regional soft power role with arbitrary involvement in international conflicts, particularly in the Middle East and the wider Muslim World, in order to promote Turkey as a ‘central country’ in global politics.” (Özerim, 2018: 170)

Attributing this role, the AKP government has also given itself the right to present itself as a mediator in conflict resolution. So for example, after 2002, with the JDP government, Turkey adopted an enthusiastic mediator role in the region including the Arab-Israeli conflict, further, they took mediation role between Syria and Israel, it then sought high-level diplomatic efforts to assist in the early stages of the 2003 Iraq crisis, and eventually got engaged with Brazil over the Iranian nuclear issue. (Günay, 2017: 203; Dal, 2016: 1429) Unlike the previous government, which considered it dangerous to negotiate and give rights to other peoples living on their territory, such as the Kurds, the policy of neo-Ottomanism, and thus the AKP, was such that they tried to resolve with the same policy domestic issues as well. “The AKP also tried to solve the domestic Kurdish issue through its new policy in Iraq, and in its second term it finally began to engage directly with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).” (Altunışi & Martin, 2011: 571) Although the coexistence of Turks and Kurds has not proved to be long-term to date, it has certainly been much better in this period than it has been today, or evermore since the start of the war in Syria. Good neighborly relations have not been preserved even in the case of other countries and peoples. So, already during 2009, relations with Israel deteriorated. Although, this may not be so strange, given that if the way Turkey presented itself to the world was sincere, it is logical that at one point as a ‘growing regional power’, they had to make a clear statement on the case of Palestine and Israel. Even earlier than relations with Israel deteriorated, after the 2006 victory of Hamas, Turkey improved its relations with Palestine, they provided “humanitarian and development aid and ‘has been involved in capacity and institution-building activities, such as supporting political reform processes.” (Günay, 2017: 198)

The transformation of one identity into another was primarily set to develop under the rule of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu who repeated several times on various occasions that Turkey’s destiny is to become a regional and global power referring to its history and geographical position. “According to Davutoğlu, Turkey should undertake the role of an order-providing country and peace-builder in the region, the historical roots of which was to be found in the common Ottoman legacy that Turks, Kurds and Arabs shared. Davutoğlu was also calling for a transformation in Turkey’s geopolitical identity from a ‘bridge country’ to a ‘central country.’” (Köstem 2018: 741) Although Turkey’s identity has changed almost entirely since 2002 compared to that forced by the previous government, it is essential to know that it has been changing since 2002 as well, in accordance with different situations and events in the world and the region. This all was defining the approach the AKP

had to them. Some authors argue that even though, “Turkey continued to promote Iraqi territorial integrity, competed with Iran for regional influence, promoted regional stability and prosperity, supported the resolution of the Palestinian issue. What has changed was how these problems were defined and what kinds of strategies were developed to deal with these problems.” (Altunışi & Martin, 2011: 571) In résumé, the way the AKP shapes its identity and different methods they were using from the moment they got the power until the beginning of the crisis, which came together with the Arab Spring, has certainly reshaped over the years depending on their geostrategic goals and priorities.

Identity politics has received considerable attention on the domestic scene as well. This has even brought to the surface the greatest differences between Kemalist and neo-Ottoman advocates. This can be deduced from the numerous statements of the Kemalists, who responsibly claim that “Turkey was ‘both European and Asian’, whereas with the JDP rule the argument was switched to Turkey as part of the Islamic civilisation (Bilgin and Bilgiç 2011). This approach is also evident in the Minister of Foreign Affairs Gül’s statements, who argued that ‘the completion of Turkey’s EU accession process would be a proof that a Muslim society can be compatible with the European societies, united on the basis of common, universal and democratic values.’” Although the AKP was not opposed to joining the European Union from the outset, during their first term from 2002 to 2007, “Ankara implemented significant reforms in human rights and democratization in the first years of JDP’s rule within the framework of Turkey’s EU candidacy.” Köstem (2018: 741) It seems that as Turkey’s accession negotiations with the European Union fell into a stagnation during 2005, so did the support for neo-Ottoman ideas by Erdogan and Davutoğlu were growing. Therefore, the extra wind beneath the wings and self-confidence was certainly the result of the AKP’s growing popularity at home so that their interest in meeting the conditions for accession to the European Union became secondary.

It is also interesting the view of some that Turkey has managed to improve relations with the Middle East, precisely because Europe has shown interests in Turkey. According to an analysis by several journalists, interest in improving relations with Turkey would very likely have declined at the time or even failed to improve if they had not been in the process of accession. They believe that the valuation of Western lifestyle and economic progress is what has managed to attract the attention of other countries in the region, especially the emerging middle classes. This thinking even makes sense, especially in the context that other Middle

Eastern countries probably believed in the possibility of perhaps improving their relations with Europe through Turkey, and hence, they viewed Turkey as their green card. Confirmation of this thinking might be even drawn from the very words of the ruling elites, “one senior politician who held a high-profile foreign policy post in the early years of the first JDP government (personal communication, 23 June 2010) acknowledged that Turkey’s EU candidate role was a major leverage for Ankara in the Middle East.” (Günay, 2017: 205)

Although Turkey placed great emphasis on a common identity and values, what should certainly be questioned are the reasons why it was important to them. There are criticisms, which are certainly rational, who claim that Turkey has taken on all these roles to present their real interests in a slightly more acceptable light. And that is, to create new and expand existing markets and trade, with the Turks being the main profiteers. As the statements and speeches of politicians are one of the most vital pieces of evidence, so in this case, we can refer to the statement of a Turkish diplomat who claims that this new foreign policy activism was closely related to Turkey’s economic interests: “The priority is not mediation or conflict resolution per se; we are not really achieving many results, and that’s perhaps not the point anyway. The point is to be visible, to look like a power, to make our neighbours like us, to achieve stability which will help economic growth and to increase trade and investments.” (Günay, 2017: 206) Observed from this perspective, Turkey’s effort to connect at all levels with other countries in the region is above all a wise step because as such it creates a greater dose of trust between the actors, which certainly facilitates the business itself. And given that Turkey itself is at the forefront of economic development, such relations will only help them to influence other countries even more easily and achieve strong political influence in the end.

Köstem (2018: 741) developed a theory in which he tries to explain how economic domination is used to become a politically regional force. According to him, the Turkish government has opted for liberal ideas in the context of economic cooperation, where either side can emerge as the winner. Therefore, they do not aim to exercise power over their neighbors, instead, the aim is to achieve efficient coordination. “Turkey’s former ambassador in Tehran and Moscow, for example, argued that it would be impossible that Turkey undertook a coercive or imperialist leadership vision in the Middle East – a region with the people of which it shared a common civilization. According to him, economic instruments were the most effective in achieving Turkey’s ‘socio-political goals’. Similarly, the AKP emphasized that “the Ottoman Empire never engaged in the full-fledged ‘colonialism’ of

European powers,” while they further strive to prove that nothing has changed even today, and therefore, “in the modern era, the neo-Ottoman identity is presented as a benevolent force in the Global South in contrast to Western hegemony, within an ‘anti-colonial’ narrative.” (Langan, 2017: 1403)

Taking all this into account, it is likely that each hypothesis is at least partially right. While on the one hand, of course, Turkey aims to expand its market, strengthen its economy, and thus, collect additional points on the international and domestic scene, with an argument, to contribute to peace in the region if given the opportunity. On the other hand, given that the AKP is a conservative party, there is likely to be a sincere national awareness and a desire to restore Islamic values and cultural recognitions among countries that share the same history and religion.

Although, regardless of whether the opinion is divided according to one or the other side, the statistics clearly show that due to a series of foreign policy trade strategies and economic reforms that took place between 2001 and 2011, Turkey experienced an economic revival and trade boom in the region. Data show that “between 2002 and 2012, Turkey’s exports to the Middle East increased from \$3.4 to \$42.4 billion. While their exports to MENA from approximately €3.2 billion in 2002 to nearly €29 billion by 2012.” (Öniş, 2014: 206; Guida & Göksel, 2018: 156) Turkey accordingly has achieved the most success in the Middle East through its foreign economic strategy and by “signing free trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs).” Köstem (2018: 743)

The seriousness of the AKP’s intention to improve the country’s position is also reflected in the fact that they first carried out a series of economic reforms at home. “Following the devastating 2000–1 economic crisis, Turkey embarked on a series of major economic reforms, which spanned from strict regulation of the financial sector to the establishment of a broadbased macroeconomic discipline with a particular focus on the financial balances of the state.” (Öniş and Kutlay, 2017: 171) Taking into account the previously explained dilemma about Turkey’s ‘selfless intentions’, what resulted from the whole story was globally achieved success largely legitimized in the eyes of majority. Langan (2017: 1405) argued that “Turkish foreign policy intervention was on the basis of its enlightened nature,” and the promotion of ‘win-win’ strategy between equivalents. In addition, what this approach has enabled Turkey to do is to delegitimize the European Union, “as well as distance Turkey from the need to join

such an 'imperial' entity." This does not seem so unacceptable, especially if we consider that Turkey was able to provide equal benefits, based on the free movement of goods and good earnings, while at the same time being culturally closer to the region and therefore more attractive.

The AKP has managed to nurture soft power and develop good neighborly relations continuously during its first two terms. However, in its third term between 2007 and 2011, the situation has begun to change significantly. Some of the crucial moments were the deterioration of relations with the Iraqi Kurds, Israel, and the direct support of Iran in the context of the nuclear program, (Barkey, 2011) which all together greatly contributed to the disruption of Turkey's very position of power. Worthy of note is that Turkey tried to employ variety of soft power instruments before any military means, although, it looked like it was not possible to sustain such a policy in the long run. This is also evident from the deficiency of the tendency in which the AKP advocated for the promotion of democracy in the context of the Middle East during the first two terms, which subsequently began to be lacking. (Altunışi & Martin, 2011)

As the reason, after the onset of the Arab Spring, and the outbreak of unrest throughout the region, Turkey became aware that it needed to change its approach. The biggest change came after the outbreak of the war in Syria, and the beginning of the refugee crisis, which resulted in a massive influx of refugees moving towards the Turkish border. At the very beginning, according to polls, "the majority of the respondents listed Turkey as playing the most constructive role during the Arab uprisings, while Turkish Prime Minister (PM), Erdogan, was mentioned as the most admired global leader." (Ayata, 2015: 96) But unfortunately, due to security threats, Turkey abandoned a value-based foreign policy and moved to military actions given the whole situation. And yet, what is important for this period until the beginning of the Arab Spring is not the military turmoil of Turkey and the region, but the way in which it has used its power up to that point. Therefore, more detailed look at its soft power use should be addressed.

4.2.1 *Soft Power*

One of the main reasons why Turkey served as a role model and a representative of liberal Islamic thought is large since through its identity and foreign policy it has managed to incorporate the idea of a country of ‘raising soft power’. Over and above, the whole policy is based on the doctrine of “*Zero Problems with Neighbors*,” developed and popularized by Ahmet Davutoğlu in his book “Strategic Depth”, which sought to improve current relations with neighbors that would be based on friendship through economic cooperation, cultural interactions, and diplomatic relations. The main principle of the doctrine is to address the core problems that Turkey has not only with its neighbors but globally and to develop sustainable and efficient foreign policies, where zero problems would be based on a win-win approach. (Askerov, 2017) Many of the above-explained factors, including invoking a common identity, history, culture, as well as economic interdependence are key elements that imply the use of soft power. Without a doubt, it all together helped in the recognition of Turkey as a potential regional leader in the world. The AKP government saw an opportunity to contribute to the transformation of the country’s existing bad relations with the rest of the region through economic development, and overtime began to use this as a means of soft power. As a result, they have used these development methods for regional foreign policy for years. And they mostly relied on “trade deals, diplomatic mediation, economic cooperation schemes, and cultural exchanges.” (Sever, 2020: 6)

Once again, it is noteworthy that even in this context; opinions are intertwined as some believe the whole irony is that Turkey has made such successful progress because it cooperated with the European Union. For example, Öniş & Kutlay (2017: 13) claim, “a boost to Turkey’s soft power in the region, since the government introduced a series of liberal reforms regarding human rights, freedom of expression, and minority rights,” thereafter, the EU served as an ‘invisible’ backup for Turkey to build its reputation.

The main emphasis of the AKP’s soft power is on economic cooperation and as long as Cagaptay (2020: 65) is considered, a strong export sector is a pivotal fact. This includes a broad range of products, ranging from food export, film industry, especially Turkish soap operas, to textile and clothes. The author also emphasizes that Turkey’s service sector should not be ignored in any way. Especially if you take into account Turkish Airlines, which after Erdogan came to power expanded its airbase to almost the whole world, including even smaller towns and cities in various countries. This is why many believe “Turkish Airlines

helped spread Ankara's political wings around the globe." As a result, "in the last decade, Turkey has also become the country that received the most tourists from the MENA region mostly due to its visa-free agreements." (Guida & Göksel, 2018: 156)

When looking at the whole period from 2002 to 2011, it can clearly be seen how far Turkey has come. In 2012 Turkey was among the top 20 countries in its soft power survey, including measures such as diplomacy, government, culture, education, and business and innovation. This was also manifested through communication tools such as language and higher education system attracting foreign students from around. The AKP sought to focus on all spheres of life, including increased development and humanitarian aid. And to accomplish this, they had to develop existing and create new agencies, public institutions, and non-governmental organizations to monitor the entire process.

So for example, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) delivered data which proved quite a high spending on public diplomacy, including "Turkish Radio and Television Corporation's (TRT) international broadcasting and for the organisation and hosting of international summits and forums in the country, further, Kızılay (Turkish Red Crescent), TOKİ (Housing Development Administration of Turkey), and AFAD (Emergency Disaster Management Presidency), were set up to advance Turkey's humanitarian activities throughout the world, which also played a significant role in its soft power projection in the Middle East. Or for instance, in 2010, the government established the Office of Public Diplomacy linked to the Prime Ministry, which is responsible for the promotion of the activities of the Turkish government abroad." (Dal, 2016: 1434; Sever, 2020: 7; Guida & Göksel, 2018: 160) Moreover, the analysis showed that "when compared to the 28 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries, Turkey ranked in 11th position in 2013, providing more assistance than donors such as Italy, Switzerland or Denmark." (Dal, 2016: 1435) The state has paid a lot of attention to this sector, and as far as Davutoğlu is concerned (especially during early beginning of the migration crisis), "humanitarian diplomacy [has become] one of the explanatory principles of Turkish foreign policy, probably the most significant one." (Öniş and Kutlay, 2017: 173)

4.2.2 *Free-Fall*

The practice has shown that Turkey-Syria relations have been undoubtedly the most significant project of this policy since the early 2000s, which brought them to the very top. However, as this relationship initially helped Turkey, it is believed that it is also responsible for its decline. Sever (2020) argued that intervention in Syria is an inevitable element that has affected Turkey's soft power. He even believes that this is perhaps the most important element responsible for the downfall of Turkey, and not only in Syria but in the Middle East in general. Thus, with the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Turkey was put in a rather awkward position, while on the one hand, it advocated for peaceful relations with its neighbors, on the other hand, it could not remain completely indifferent to the new turmoil. Reasons for such opinion are twofold, one stance, Turkish journalist Mustafa Akyol (2016) for the New York Times wrote, "some of the regimes with which Ankara was seeking to have "zero problems" were authoritarian ones — a picture that conflicted with the A.K.P.'s self-defined role to be a beacon of democratization in Turkey." On the contrary, Coşkun (2015) argued that the biggest success of Ankara was a result of its trade relations with authoritarian regimes. Yet, what is evident is that Turkey did not need to interfere in the resumes of other Middle Eastern countries until it itself was potentially threatened. This certainly raises the question of the stability of the Davutoğlu strategy and indicates the shortcomings that are not addressed by his strategy, of crisis response.

Eventually, this vision and use of its strategic and geopolitical position governed Turkey's foreign policy under the rule of the AKP for more than a decade. During these times the country has become a model of stable democratic and Islamic civilization. They became conflict mediators, and they have developed a net of soft power tools to assist other countries in the region. These include areas from humanitarian aid, financial support, economic development, technical expertise, civil sector development-boosting, and all the way to support for building and developing democratic state institutions. With the growing problems affecting the region, there were growing concerns at the domestic scene as well. They mostly concerned questions such as whether Turkey needed to intervene in these issues and more importantly; they started to question the legitimacy of the AKP government.

But these were not the only problems Turkey faced at that time. Ever since the beginning of 2012, it has found itself at a crossroads between several different currents. The reason why the AKP was found at such a crossroads, intertwined in several different networks, with

numerous actors, is mainly because they reacted to similar problems differently in regional countries, which betrayed their bias. When looking at the whole period from today, these reactions were largely determined by Turkey's foreign policy goals at the time. But what is certain even though these responses have differed greatly is the fact that a massive influx of migrants and refugees began to arrive in Turkey during that period. Primarily from Syria and then from other countries, which resulted from growing problems and unrests in all these countries no matter of the Turkish response. Nevertheless, this was certainly one of the key moments when Turkey may have completely abandoned its "Zero Problems with Neighbors" policy, and dressed in a new guise and reshaped its foreign policy approach to respond to emerging problems as efficiently as possible. And probably, as would find new ways to achieve none other than its own goals in the international arena.

From all that, two important emphasize have to be made. First to ask questions, to what extent does democracy actually play a role in defining foreign policy? Then, do decision-makers that live in better-founded democracies than those in transitional democracies, - such as Turkey have been considered since the Cold War, - have greater responsibility first to the society in their countries and then to other actors and international organizations with which they negotiate? This further raises a key question, that is, does the lack of democratic government reflect on international negotiations, and what advantage does it give to regimes that basically refuse to play by 'Western' rules?

And the second is the fact that all negotiations and answers coming from Turkey in the period from 2011 to the present, refer exclusively to Turkish pragmatism. It ranges from pro-Western orientation, through turning to the Middle East, calling for a common identity, to increasingly hostile attitudes towards those same countries, and finally returning to negotiations with the EU. Thereafter, in the following, I will be guided by the thesis that the migrant crisis in the last decade has been presented as the most effective mean of instrumentalization to achieve Turkey's foreign policy goals. That being said, discussion in as much detail as possible about the concept of how Turkish pragmatism and the migrant crisis intertwined and how it could be understood as a lesson for all other less successful countries in international negotiations will be raised.

CHAPTER 4

5. MIGRATION AND INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE MOVEMENT

5.1 WHAT IS GOING ON IN SYRIA?

Soon after the beginning of resistance throughout the region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), many countries around the world have been waiting impatiently to see how events will unfold. At the same time, they were giving support to the various sides in the conflicts, in accordance with their interests. Turkey did not differ much either, so, for example, its support for the regime in Libya was completely different from the reaction it had towards Syrian revolts. The AKP and the Turkish government have become some of the loudest critics of the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and his regime. First in an effort to persuade him through diplomatic means to resign, and then when it did not work out, through multiple and unavoidable interventions. Nonetheless, from the beginning of the crisis in early 2010 until today, the consequences are being felt, for some better, for some worse. But what is certain is that Turkey, through its participation, especially in relations with Syria, has given a significant lesson and revived a dormant issue in foreign policy. So, although the whole situation is very complex, with a large number of actors and different goals, I will try to maintain as much focus as possible on the key hypothesis. And that is the service of migration policy in achieving state and foreign policy interests.

But to grasp how Turkey came to the position of leading the negotiations from a position of power, it is necessary to refer to the background of the story that reveals the motives and why

its participation was so active. The first endeavor in resolving the crisis, as I stated, was an attempt to use diplomatic means. The then Prime Minister Erdogan, using television to address the public and Assad himself, as well as various other types of media, called on Assad to save the country from civil war and further decline. As the PM stated in one of his speeches “it is not heroism to fight against your own people... Just remove yourself from that seat before shedding more blood, before torturing more and for the welfare of your country, as well as the region.” (Arsu, 2011) Most of his statements were of this type, some of them sounding even more unpleasant. One of the more significant roles was also played by the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. So apart from public efforts to end the catastrophe, at that time, Turkey focused on the official visits to Syria. Davutoğlu, was the one who led the negotiations, so in April 2011 he offered the President to leave peacefully, and stated that Turkey would give all the necessary assistance for the implementation of reforms. But with a series of visits that followed, Turkey’s official messages were every following time much sharper, concise as possible, putting as much pressure as possible on Assad. This was all in order to stop the bloodshed between the army and the people, although, as obvious, these visits were unsuccessful. (BBC, 2011) Many believe that Turkey was quite convinced of its diplomatic capabilities at the time and for this reason that it sought to hold talks with Syria so persistently. This is all understandable if we take into account a whole previous decade in which economic, cultural, and political cooperation between these two countries flourished successfully. On the other hand, it also sends the message that it was in Turkey’s interest to preserve its well-off position, including the growth and influence of its regional and soft power.

Another very important moment why Turkey became so actively interested in the situation in Syria is certainly its geographical position. “From Turkey’s point of view the Syrian crisis was almost an internal problem - their shared border is more than 800km (500 miles) long.” (BBC, 2011) In practice, this was a much more complex problem, first because trade between the border areas was widespread, then many families lived on both sides, and third because of such proximity, Turkey was well aware that unrest in one country could easily spread. As a result, at some later period, a terrorist organization the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) has repeatedly targeted and bombed Turkish territory. To return to the course of events, after unsuccessful diplomatic negotiations, the next step taken by Turkey was to address the United Nations and call for joint international intervention. However, this attempt to react was doomed from the beginning, given the fact that Russia and China are the ones who still

support the regime, and at the same time have the right to veto in the Security Council. In a 2012 press release, the United Nations stated that “due to negative votes from two permanent members, the Security Council today failed to adopt a resolution that would have extended the mandate of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) and which would have threatened sanctions on the country if demands to end the spiralling violence were not met.” Eventually, Turkey began to unilaterally impose economic sanctions on Syria, only to cut off all trade with the country in 2012. (Sever, 2020)

It was also the first country to host a conference that will unite the opposition against the regime. In April 2012, “the second meeting of the “Friends of Syria,” the coalition of Arab and Western countries set up to provide some support for the Syrian opposition and ease Bashar al-Assad out of power.” (Balci, 2012) This is therefore the way in which third party interference in the Syrian civil war began. This later developed into a much more complex network, which was so complicated, that at certain moments the collaborators were even becoming enemies on the battlefield. “Since then, the AKP government has exhibited a variety of biased intervention in a civil war, including arms transfers, intelligence cooperation, extending logistical support, or providing economic assistance to opposition groups and eventually sending troops.” (Sever, 2020:10) This also meant the eventual disappearance of soft power as a means of political action, and a complete turn to military action. It was followed by a series of interventions, including four major cross-border operations Euphrates Shield (2016 to 2017), Olive Branch (2018), Peace Spring (2019), and the latest one to this moment Spring Shield (2020). (Stanicek, 2019; Daily Sabah: 2020)

From everything that happened from the very beginning, a much bigger problem arose, and that was the influx of refugees who were fleeing the civil war and Assad’s brutality. This provoked a humanitarian crisis, which was also one of Erdogan’s main arguments for insisting on the early global intervention. In addition to his ‘good intentions’ and Open-Door policy, he was primarily concerned with all the consequences that Turkey could potentially bear at the time. Thus, his approach at the beginning was initially seen as humanitarian (when the AKP still relied on soft power), and later when the government turned to protecting Turkey’s borders, including interventions, his attitude toward the refugee crisis also changed. So, with the start of thinking about military operations, not only did a different policy towards Syria begin, but the instrumentalization of the migration issue and negotiations with the West also experienced a plot twist.

5.2 SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY

After the mass arrival of refugees fleeing Syria to save their lives, Turkey, perhaps not knowing for sure what had befallen it, welcomed all these people generously and with open borders. It is therefore very important to understand that from that moment Turkey may or may not have planned (opinions differ) everything that happened, but in any case, their responses were certainly something that was brought and developed in line with the situation on the ground, where policies were adapted to current interests. Talks, negotiations, new bilateral/multilateral agreements, reactions, and moves regarding migration policy, as well as regarding foreign politics, are constantly changing over the months and years in accordance with both favorable conditions for one side and unfavorable ones for the other. Thereby, it should be noted that it is very difficult to analyze and try to give a final cross-section and overview of events. Mostly because these processes are not complete, in any way, including resolving the issue for all these people, as well as negotiations between Turkey and the West, primarily the European Union. Also, another obstacle that is encountered in order to more clearly understand the situation is the fact that in international relations there is not much literature that directly addresses these concepts and phenomena and combines them into one whole. There are several authors who specifically address the problem of the use of human migration as instruments to achieve other goals, - Miller & Papademetriou, 1983; Teitelbaum, 1984; Greenhill, 2010; Tsourapas, 2010, - and although some of them are mentioning these recent events, they do not elaborate into details on the case study of Turkey. However, this is even reasonable, considering it is a fairly new and ongoing issue.

Although it was stated earlier that Turkey did not, as it certainly could not know at the moment, how the situation would unfold in great detail, some authors believe that such ‘welcome policies’ are always part of bigger political and previously elaborated agendas and goals. Therefore, the main assumption is that policies have been altered in line with changes in foreign policy priorities. Birce Altiok and Salih Tosun (2019) are one of them, and in their jointly written article, they argue that an open-border policy, as well as all humanitarian and religious rhetoric, was a part of the strategy to make it easier to disguise and justify their response to the refugee crisis. They believe that it was in Turkey’s interest to establish a new government in Syria which will show even greater gratitude and loyalty to Erdogan and the Turkish government. But after things took an unexpected turn, involving Russia, the Kurdish question, the emergence of the terrorist organization ISIS, Turkey had to focus its arguments

on the rhetoric of securitization and protection of its borders, as the mainstay for justifying foreign policy interests.

Despite all these issues that did not benefit Turkey, it nevertheless managed to reap significant benefits at the negotiating table. The movement of mass migration, regardless of which part of the world takes place, is a question that requires an international (preferably uniform) answer, because very often consequences are of global proportions. Tsourapas (2019: 465, 468) as one of the leading scholars in this field, instituted the term “*refugee rentier state* to describe states that employ their position as host states of forcibly displaced populations to extract revenue, or refugee rent, from other state or nonstate actors in order to maintain these populations within their borders.” The author further developed the concept by dividing the strategy into two basic practices of exercising its power, “(1) by *blackmailing* - threatening to flood a target state(s) with refugee populations within its borders, unless compensated, or (2) via *back-scratching* - promising to maintain refugee populations within its borders, if compensated.” Although these two strategies seem much alike, there is one key difference between them. While in the first case, the blackmailers are the ones who look solely at their own interest, by invoking the potential losses of the other party, and acting exclusively unilaterally. In the case of back-scratching, the situation can be viewed through the perspective of mutual interest. This is very often achieved through multilateral rather than bilateral negotiations, where states mostly refer to international law and norms, which in the first case is not so common. Therefore, the second phenomenon can be said to be based on some more rational calculations, as it takes into account the current position of power and both one’s own and one’s opponent’s strength. This, as the author states, can be measured in different ways, but in this case, it mainly refers to the size of refugees in the country, rather than some other indicators.

But whatever the situation is, depending on the moment, profit-making states usually have an advantage over developed countries (global North), mostly because of the irrational feeling among them that their territories will be flooded with unknown savages from the global South. This fear lies in the fact that people who are coming are culturally, religiously, and traditionally different from them, and that for that reason their culture will be completely overcome and forgotten. This poses a major security threat for the West, and because of this panic, they are willing to make big concessions to their ‘abusers’, including opening various negotiations, but also giving large sums of resources and money just to keep migrants across

the borders. This altogether reveals another characteristic of the rentier state and that is that they rely “financially on external income linked to its treatment of these group(s). Refugee rent may come from international organizations or third states in a variety of forms, including direct economic aid or grants, debt relief, preferential trade treatment, and so on. As per the expectations of rentier state theory, refugee host state actors are not engaged in the generation of such rent, but on its distribution or utilization, which may or may not directly relate to the domestic management of forcibly displaced population group(s). Finally, a refugee rentier state’s government remains the principal recipient of this rent.” (2019: 467)

Another extremely important author who even expanded her work after the collapse of the situation in Turkey is Kelly M. Greenhill, who in her book with a very striking title “Weapons of Mass Migration” develops a concept that serves as a very important theoretical framework for understanding Turkish foreign policy and migration movement. What she is trying to explain is that coercive behavior, although most commonly referring to the use of military force, can be quite effectively used either to influence or prevent changes in political discourse through the use of threats, intimidation, blackmail, and other various practices. She coined a new notion, known as *coercive engineered migrations (or migration-driven coercion)* (CEM) where she refers to “cross-border population movements that are deliberately created or manipulated in order to induce political, military and/or economic concessions from a target state or states.” (2010: 13) In her study she listed a broad number of cases when this practice was taking the place, even stating that since the Refugee Convention at least once a year there is an attempt to exploit migrants. Nonetheless, given these troublesome statistics, the fact that even more adequate literature has not been offered for this framework is worrying.

Greenhill also tried to offer an answer to the question of who uses this method, stating that it is possible to make a typology based on three currents. The first two are (1) *generators* and (2) *agent provocateurs* who are directly responsible for the creations of mass movements and their manipulations. They are easily recognizable, often because of their brutality, using blackmailing and threatening as tools to address the international community and neighboring countries about their abilities to create chaos. Unlike them, to the third group belong (3) *opportunists*. They simply engage in enjoying the fruits of other people’s labor. Despite the fact that there are disputes over whether something was produced on purpose or not, in this case, we will stick to the appearance of the obvious, and thus place Turkey in the last group.

“Opportunists play no direct role in the creation of migration crises, but simply exploit for their own gain the existence of outflows generated or catalyzed by others. For instance, opportunists might threaten to close their borders, thereby producing humanitarian emergencies, unless targets take desired actions or proffer side-payments.” (2010: 30) Another characteristic cited by the author, which has been observed, is that opportunists acting from their position usually offer their services to mitigate, prevent further expansion or try to stop the crisis completely, mainly in exchange for political or monetary gains.

Therefore, how useful the direct or passive intervention in crisis was, could be best infer from how successful the challenger was in achieving his goals. In other words, it is important to be familiar with what success means for a ‘bully.’ Generally speaking, this would by definition mean the achievement and realization of all or significant goals for them. Greenhill states that accomplishments can also be measured through ‘partial success’ meaning achieving most goals or through ‘failure’, which is defined according to a scale from only a few goals to none of them. To achieve any of these goals coercers very often implement a combination of different mechanisms to influence their targets. This is often based solely on the success of manipulating their target group, by influencing the behavior and attitudes of their own population. In other words, this refers to the use of the theory of securitization, which in the case of migratory movements refers to the spread of fear on the principle of potential punishments (of any kind).

Among different methods, two can be singled out that are exclusively non-military in nature. The first one is *capacity swamping* where the focus is on “manipulating the ability of targets to accept/accommodate/assimilate a given group of migrants or refugees,” and on *political agitation* focusing on “manipulating the willingness of targets to do so.” (2010: 38, 39) Capacity swamping proved to be highly effective even in countries that have democratically based and legitimate institutions with well-developed administrative systems. Taking this into consideration, some of the previous crises, including the European migration crisis, have revealed negligible signs of cracks in these systems of varying proportions. These anomalies were ranging from the insufficient ability to cope with a problem in a short time, to the uneven rhetoric that would give them bargaining power. However, Greenhill noticed one important thing, which later in practice proved to be very true, and it refers to the preference for the use of political agitation in the developed world. According to her, the challengers mainly rely on “norms-enhanced political blackmail” where governments must try to

reconcile the heterogeneity of political and social interests, i.e. national interests with migration politics, and above the top of that to manage to satisfy different public opinions and groups the local, state and interstate levels. This confusion creates nothing less than space for the challenger to get the best possible outcome.

Thus, what all the authors previously addressed have in common is the idea that migration policies and humanitarianism are intertwined with the plans that Turkey had from before as a regional power, including its plans for Syria. For that purpose, it is very important to emphasize that although the focus is on Syria; the influx of people moving towards Turkish borders was not purely Syrian but included other peoples from both the East and from the South. This information supports the above statement of unclear plans in a way that it reflects Erdogan's different responses to the migrants who were arriving. Accordingly, the flexible behavior of Turkey and the calculations based on their interests is something that many took as proof to support opportunistic claims.

In the name of that, Altıok and Tosun (2019: 5) referred to Greenhill's CEM theory and made three-dimensional categorization to serve as a framework for explaining "foreign-asylum-policy nexus" in practice. This division refers to different phases of Turkish interventionism in the context of the migration crisis and the way it unites this issue with foreign policy. Therefore, given its comprehensiveness in the rest of the paper, it will serve as a fundamental basis for a final explanation of the link between migration control and foreign policy.

It consists of the following periods:



5.2.1 Assertive Response

Immediately after the outbreak of the conflict in the Syrian civil war in 2011, the Turkish government started with the so-called open-door policy towards Syrian refugees. They announced that all people moving towards Turkey would be allowed into the country to escape the war without facing any border issues. First refugees arrived by the end of April 2011 when around 250 Syrians crossed into Turkey. Already in June of the same year more than 7000 people were there. In September Turkish government decided to set up six refugee camps to accommodate all these people. However, the problem was that numbers were growing so rapidly that, according to statistics, in January 2012 there was more than 9,500 people, and in mid-2012 the number tripled to 35,000 refugees. At the end of the year, it reaches the figure of as many as 120,000 registered Syrians. And even more so, the data do not even include all those who were in a better financial situation, so after crossing the border they went to other towns and villages and rented private accommodation there, such as houses and apartments. (Özden, 2013) As the situation in Syria worsened, various physical and ruthless clashes began to spread through other cities and settlements, and the army and police who were on the side of the regime spared no one. Seeing how serious the situation had become and that anyone could become a victim of armed conflict and violence, Syrians began to leave their homes en masse and flee the country. Thanks to the open-door policy, it can be said in fact that Turkey has saved the lives of many, regardless of the background story. So in this period, thousands and thousands of Syrians crossed the Turkish-Syrian border every day, and as early as the beginning of 2013, this resulted in more than 675,000 displaced persons. (Ilgit & Davis, 2013)

But opening the borders and letting people enter the country freely has not proved as simple as it sounded. Only after the arrival of this huge number of ordinary people (which grew continuously) did it become clear that only then would the real confrontation with this problem follow. It was necessary to provide security and existential conditions, which at a given moment of chaos and confusion were of course not worked out. Thus, the first serious problem encountered related to the very definition and controversy over refugee status. Namely, from the very beginning, the Turkish authorities addressed Syrians as “Syrian guests” and not coincidentally as refugees. According to the logic of the authorities at the time, they expected that they would resolve the crisis very quickly and that they would be able to send the Syrians home after that. “The authorities had not asked the Syrians why they had come and were not asking them why they were leaving either. They were looked upon as

trusted guests.” However, as no one, in reality, could know when this would actually happen, and there were no such indications, this status began to mean a bigger problem. That is, refugee status implied greater rights and protection than the very notion of a ‘guest’. Given that a certain amount of pressure started to form from different sides, as well as that the number of refugees was increasing enormously, it was clear that the Turkish government had to do something. Thus, in October 2011, they made the decision to guarantee Syrian refugees and stateless persons a *Temporary Protection Regime*.

Bearing in mind that Turkey was a signatory of the 1951 UNHCR Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, international community was considered them obliged to respond more quickly and adequately. Here things have become a little more complicated, as “Turkey, through the declaration made under Article 1(B) of the 1951 Convention and the declaration made upon accession to the 1967 Protocol, has ratified the Convention with the geographical limitation and still maintains the limitation. This altogether means that only those fleeing as a consequence of “events occurring in Europe can be given refugee status.” (UNHCR, 2014: 1; HRW, 2000) According to Asylum and Migration Legislation, all non-European asylum seekers who were currently qualified to seek international refugee status in Turkey have been granted the right to temporary asylum until UNHCR decides what will happen to them. However, the first problem was encountered when they realized that the bureaucratic procedure, as usual, is very complicated. It was extremely time consuming, and in this case, it could have lasted for several years. This has put huge number of refugees in a very ungrateful position, as temporary residence has many disadvantages, such as not having a work permit and the like. Korkut (2016)

As Özden (2013) explains, under such legislation, the problem arose even when Syrians wanted to seek asylum. In that case, asylum seekers coming from outside Europe would be prosecuted in co-operation with the Turkish authorities and the UNHCR. And then, those that would be determined to be able to obtain refugee status would be further sent to some third countries. Thus, this practice establishes that Syrians within Turkey cannot be granted refugee status under the ‘law’ at all. Moreover, Syrians were not even in a position to register through the UNHCR for asylum procedures. Initially, several cases were prosecuted, but the government did certain amends to the law that have prevented this practice for the future. Some of the official main arguments were the extensiveness of the procedures themselves and the administrative problems. Additionally, such a practice resulted in criticism by some

journalists and experts who argued that by the interference of third bodies, Turkey would lose complete control over the Syrian issue, and therefore decided to involve the other parties as little as possible.

Instead, what Turkey offered as part of its ‘temporary protection regime’ was “(1) an open border policy, (2) no forcible returns and, (3) registration with the Turkish authorities and support inside the borders of the camps.” (Özden, 2013: 5) This practice has been considered problematic by many critics, as refugee status in society carries special weight, including protection and a lower degree of vulnerability, which the Syrians did not have at this time. Moreover, this policy, by definition, did not allow the integration of Syrians into Turkish society by not offering them the opportunity to acquire permanent residence or citizenship status. “In practice, temporary protection means the provision of services to those in camps, but a lack of similar protection to those outside the camps.” (Korkut, 2016: 2) Although critics say Turkey has tried to solve the problem on its own, hoping to emerge victorious on its own, without the help of the international community, it quickly became apparent that they were not up to the task. One of the reasons is security threats, which have become increasingly serious, especially after the bombing began in the border areas. In return, Turkey had to take certain measures, one of which concerned “zero-point delivery,” including a wide range of humanitarian aid at the borders. Eventually, in 2012 Erdogan called on the United Nations to take certain steps, such as creation of a ‘safe haven’ inside Syria but as there was no adequate response, they suspended the open-door policy and left only official border crossings as an option for refugees.

Selective-humanitarianism

With the reception of refugees, it is clear that Turkey has also gained in global importance, as many world powers have gradually begun to take an interest in this problem. Thus began the interference of foreign policy with the migration issue. One of the theories claims that Turkey believed that it would be the one that would successfully solve this problem, and thus in the eyes of the Syrians become an eternal friend and partner. Another theory similar to this is also based on the perception of Turkey as a world humanitarian and savior. Both theories certainly support the thesis that Turkey would once again emerge as a regional power, gaining control by emphasizing religious and cultural similarities. In fact, emphasizing common

predispositions is certainly another thing that went in favor of the policy that Erdogan advocated for, and on the other hand, “discursive emphasis on Syrian refugees’ victimhood has become convenient for the Turkish government in responding to the mounting international criticism against Turkish foreign policy in the region.” (Memisoglu & Ilgit, 2017: 328)

Guided by this kind of diction, crisis management has been given another characteristic, and that is selective humanitarianism. Under this terminology the authors refer to giving preference to Syrian refugees as Sunni Muslims, and the AKP’s support for Sunni forces in the Syrian conflict. This was reflected in the extension of temporary-protection legislation in 2014, and it became apparent because the new rules applied exclusively to Syrians. Although according to the data, a large number of refugees of other backgrounds (including non-Sunni Syrians) also reside in Turkey. (Korkut, 2016) Turkish humanitarianism was further reflected through the construction of special narratives. It contributed in two important stances, first, by picturing Syrians in a public space as a vulnerable group in need of protection, and second, causally, by getting approval for all government’s moves to regulate this crisis. This was therefore possible because, by invoking a friendly narrative, the AKP managed to portray Syrians as guests and not as someone who came to take their land from them - as was the case in Western culture.

However, an obstacle to selective humanitarianism was placed by other refugee groups, especially the Syrian Kurds (who are known to have had territorial and ethnic problems with Turkey from much earlier) and the Iraqis. (Korkut, 2016) This posed a new problem for Turkey, as they were tempted whether to pursue humanitarianism or address it as a security issue. Eventually in 2014, they made a decision giving priority to security issues, by deciding to discriminate against non-Syrians through legislation, in a way that temporary protection status did not apply to everyone. Namely, one of the ways in which they managed to gain control over the migration crisis was achieved through hierarchical management of the same. Kirişçi (2014), for example, states that, from the entry of the first Syrians into the country and onwards, the role for their registration and coordination was given to the AFAD, that was purposefully designated in May 2011. So first thing to remember, it was directly accountable to the Prime Minister Erdogan. In this way, Erdogan had a direct influence on the development and management of the situation, as well as access to the most important data. And although the AFAD was indeed in charge of assisting the most vulnerable groups

nationwide, Turkey has sometimes used this in an empirical way to justify its humanitarianism.

Yet, on the bright side, thanks to the good coordination of the agency, a significant contribution has been made in creating shelters and providing health care to many refugees. According to the data, “after almost two years, the direct cost to the main Turkish disaster agency is \$750 million. To this, some officials add another \$400 million in extra costs to the health and education ministries and other government agencies.” (International Crisis Group, 2013: 5) Even at some point, the international community itself has acknowledged the weight of the burden that Turkey has borne at this time. So we could hear comments from EU officials, such as, “we welcome the fact that Turkey has an open border and is taking on a significant burden. We are not emphasising the lack of status issue or lecturing Turkey. We are not exactly welcoming these refugees with open arms in the EU ourselves.” (International Crisis Group, 2013: 6) Thus, this utilitarian normative ethical approach was probably much more sincere in the very beginning, when the unfolding of events was not known, compared to what it later turned into.

But by allocating funds, Erdogan found a basis to complain about the EU’s ineffective behavior towards the Assad regime and thus justify its actions. The ICG reported that by 2013 Turkey received only about \$ 100 million, which is nothing compared to what they have singled out. Henceforth, they called on their partners to join more actively and give more support in co-financing, emphasizing that this is about “a global failure at the UN Security Council and the West’s inability to address the Assad regime’s culture of impunity.” In response, “the EU and its member states have now offered €600 million, of which €461 million has been disbursed.” Nevertheless, the only conflict of interest the two sides had encountered to that moment has been related to the AKP’s desire to send funds directly to the AFAD and the European Union’s practice of allocating funds to partner organizations, such as international NGOs and UN agencies. (International Crisis Group, 2013: 6) The reason for this is the simple practice of the EU for greater transparency and better control over the funds allocated.

To continue where we left off, Turkey may not be the only one to invoke selective humanitarianism in this case. Although working under the auspices of norms, laws, and regulations, it is true that similar criticism can be leveled at the very practice of the European Union towards its treatment of illegal migrants. In this situation, the concept of irregular

migration by definition has no final form but is treated in relation to the countries in question and their parameters. In one of the definitions, Teitelbaum (1984) presented the link between migration and foreign policy as an action in which some of these priorities influence migration policy and thus have a broader impact, including, for example, border control or international migration cooperation. Gökalp Aras and Mencütek (2018: 70, 71) argue that “while Teitelbaum did not elaborate on the point explicitly, this latter linkage can also, in order to control transit to the destination, incorporate political bargains among source states, the immediate receiving states that share a border with the source states, and destination countries or regional entities.” This is important at the moment because the very fact that Turkey did not give Syrians refugee status or the possibility of seeking asylum, classified itself in the domain of transit countries, and thus gained an advantage in negotiating with the countries of destination. They flowingly claim that Europe is the final destination for all irregular migrants, and therefore Turkey had to direct its foreign policy towards negotiations and reaching a joint agreement with the European Union. The most compelling evidence of this selective humanitarianism is clear after looking at the safeguards and objectives that the EU wants to achieve at all costs. The policy they prioritize is known as a ‘remote control’ with a view that “border externalization or “burden-sharing of the European borders with bordering countries, and the set-up of migration management policies in the countries of origin, and especially illegal migration, following European interests” is the best solution for keeping unwanted immigrants outside of their territory. But as practice has shown, it looks like the EU does not really want any migrants. Yet this gave Turkey a significant advantage because, without its help and cooperation, the EU would not be able to ‘successfully implement’ its goal.

Even more so, looking back at Europe’s behavior in the very beginning, it could be said that Turkey has responded much more effectively and readily to the challenge it faced. For example, in this period, the EU planned to implement together with the UNHCR the Regional Protection Program, “to enhance the capacities of authorities and organizations in neighboring countries, such as Turkey, to cope with refugees in compliance with international standards... An RPP, however, will not diminish the EU’s responsibility to take on a larger share of the refugee burden and should not serve as a way to restrict refugee flows within Syria’s neighborhood. According to ongoing discussions, the program might explore a resettlement scheme to EU member states, which should be strongly encouraged.” (International Crisis Group, 2013: 6) But what was seen so far suggests that the EU is a very difficult negotiator,

which does not respond quickly in crisis situations, but in the confusion of bureaucracy and inconsistent rhetoric copes quite poorly. And even worse, above all, they have shown an unwillingness to accept refugees into their countries at first.

So, this period was marked by great confusion, where Turkey itself did not know clearly what was happening, while at the same time the European Union also did not have a concrete solution. The best proof of this is the fact that it took even two to three years to unravel certain things, sign old-new agreements, and try to find long-term solutions. Although, it is evident that in this period these solutions were not found, but at least certain legal frameworks and agreements have finally begun to move from the deadlock that should have benefited both parties as much as possible, which will be elaborated in the following section. Nevertheless, three things could be concluded so far, first that the only thing the EU was sure of at this time was that it did not want these foreigners within its territories, second, that they tried to take minimal responsibility, and third, as well as set aside minimal amounts of financial resources. Accordingly, due to the scale and severity of the situation, the problem of course had to be approached differently, of which each side became more and more aware every day, and therefore began to advocate negotiations more seriously only in 2013.

5.2.2 Internationalization through the United Nations

If we want to discuss internationalization through the United Nations, it is only possible to talk about the assistance that Turkey has received from the UN agencies, such as the IOM or the UNHCR, and their financial contributions. What is more, Turkey has persistently complained about the UN's failure to find an adequate political solution to the Syrian issue, as well as generally to the lack of international burden-sharing. And this is particularly evident from the data on the resettlements of a number of migrants to other countries. Accordingly, "the international intake of Syrians from the region as a whole was also low, reaching only 22,229 departures over the same five-year period." (Çorabatır, 2016: 17) For this reason we may treat internationalization only in a particular and bilateral way and, mostly in relation to the EU as a supranational body.

The internationalization of migration has been a very complex process, and it has encountered many ups and downs along the way. In addition to the lack of accountability on the part of the

EU that existed before they realized the seriousness of the situation, it seemed that Turkey itself did not understand the full extent. That is why a global or at least a regional approach to what will later turn into a European migration crisis has met with resistance from different sides. Thus, for example, Turkey considered that it was strong enough and that it had sufficiently developed capacities to deal with this problem. However, over time, they proved to be wrong, where the government had to make certain concessions and give greater access to the international community in jointly finding the most appropriate solutions. This period was further marked by the signing of several agreements, which could be of historical importance for both parties, as well as the beginning of a relative change in the position of power. This shall be elaborated on below.

The previous phase showed that foreign policy and migration are connected by a large, which is evident from the fact that the war in Syria had a direct impact on the mass movement that Turkey faced due to its geopolitical position. What is further clear is that this situation could have been avoided had Erdogan managed to persuade Syrian President Assad to step down peacefully. However, since this was not the case, the situation failed so that the relationship between foreign policy and migration was reduced to resolving other issues. At the moment, Turkey was focused on selective humanitarianism, hoping to have eternally grateful neighbors after the Syrians return to their country. But with the arrival of other groups with different ethnic and religious backgrounds, they started to approach this issue from a different perspective, focusing on securitization. Such a policy began to be much more advocated, especially after the EU joined the game. Even though solving the security issues has become primary for both sides, they were still encountering an obstacle in finding a common definition and viewpoint of what security means to them. Özerim (2018: 165) argues that in this context “the nexus between migration and Turkish foreign policy manifests itself in three forms: (i) border and asylum policies as part of Turkey’s involvement in regional conflicts; (ii) visa policies for rapprochement; with target countries and (iii) co-ethnics and kinship policies for extending spheres of influence.” The last, i.e. the third point, has already been explained, as one of the first aspects in which a significant linkage between these concepts was seen, while the first two phases have reached their full potential in the coming period.

Noteworthy is that we are talking about Turkey but this phenomenon is very common in other countries too, especially those who act from a position of power. For instance, the European Union very often uses migration and the visa regime as a tool in foreign policy and decision-

making. “In particular, the EU can offer visa-free travel and visa facilitation as ‘carrots’ to trigger reforms in neighbouring countries or persuade them to implement EU policy choices, as can be illustrated by examples from trade relations, and justice and home affairs.” Özerim (2018: 167) On the contrary, Aras (2019: 50) describes this Turkish phenomenon as resisting EU conditionality. “The “logic of consequences” brings with it the concept of “conditionality”, defined as “the EU pays the reward if the target government complies with the conditions and withholds the reward if it fails to comply.” However, due to the specific geographical location, where many mainly view Turkey as a transit country, the problem of migration once again further links to a much broader picture. This puts Turkey in a specific position, that if certain changes in foreign policy occur, which it does not like, it can directly affect the course of migration, and thus the relations between these forces. And for that reason, the EU itself has become aware that they cannot completely ignore the demands that Turkey makes to them, and that they cannot be the ones who manage the anchor unilaterally.

Thus, the migration crisis has become a key issue on which EU-Turkish relations revolved and which led to the renewal and opening of new foreign policy agendas. Nevertheless, this altogether points to the fact that the concept of migration and foreign policy, in this case, are inseparable. As well as, Turkey as a transit country had to play a significant role in managing illegal migration, but also that it could not escape the influence of EU policy.

Yet, what is specific to this case is precise that many of the things agreed upon during this period have dragged on for many years, dating back to the period from 2005 when Turkey was supposed to join the European Union. “In this vein, Juliette Tolay (2012) argues that Ankara has been “using [the] process of reforms along EU guidance as a means to negotiate particular advantages” in its overall relationship with Brussels.” Thus, the migrant crisis has once again spurred certain negotiations between Turkey and the European Union, but as already mentioned, in order for them to be successful, the EU and Turkey had to overcome certain obstacles and find a common language on the same issues. However, as some authors state, the problem is that Turkey selectively accepts only certain elements of European culture and practice. Which turned out to be the case again. For instance, “Saime Özçürümez and Nazlı Şenses (2011, 233) argue that the Europeanisation of migration policy in Turkey reflects a process of “absorption with reservations”. This in a figurative sense means that certain changes and reforms have certainly taken place, although there is constantly at least some resistance from the Turkish authorities. Some of Turkey’s key criticisms of the EU since

2005 relate to “the EU’s self-oriented and narrow-minded security-based perspective; the framing of Turkey as a buffer or ‘dumping zone’ in the fight against irregular migration; the EU’s ignorance of economic, social and political dynamics in Turkey; and the lack of burden-sharing on the part of the EU.” (Aras, 2019: 49, 53) This according to some logical sequence can probably be attributed to different cultural and historical backgrounds.

Despite these criticisms, in the context of partnership and diplomacy, Turkey and the EU have had to co-operate. Because compared to the data from 2013, the number of Syrian refugees in 2014 more than tripled, reaching the figure of 1.5 million people. Where, in addition to the Syrians, about 100,000 Iraqis arrived this year, fleeing violence from their country. Later, in the period of 2015, due to instability in the Middle East, not only Syrians arrived, but also citizens of other countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran... This year, it is estimated that 2.5 million Syrians and 250 000 migrants of other nationalities were residing in Turkey. (UNHCR, 2014, 2015) From this, in 2015, the European Migration Crisis was born, which served only as an additional driver for accelerating the negotiations between the EU and Turkey and trying to find a solution in protecting external borders as soon as possible. Last but not least, ever since the 2013 period, the EU has sought almost identical things as it demanded from 2005 onwards, including support for EU external borders, Readmission Agreement, and abandoning geographical limitations. And in return, on the principle of ‘conditionality’, the EU has promised things such as financial support, visa liberalization, and membership in the union. Therefore and consequently, several agreements arose from this.

The Path to New Agreements

Treating migrants in an unclear manner lasted until 2013-14 when Turkey adopted its very first asylum law. In this context, two new pillars related to migration management have been added. In April 2013, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) was passed. On the basis of this new law, individual protection of foreigners was extended at all levels, including “at the borders, the border gates or within Turkey” area. (Turkey: Law No. 6458, 2013: 1) Despite this, the geographical limitation has not been removed, and thus, according to Article 62, it is clearly stated that refugee status still applies exclusively to Europeans. Without that being affected, it is evident that the law was not enacted to remove existing barriers, but only to further promise protection to all those who cannot achieve refugee status.

Lately, in 2014 the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) emerged on the legal basis of Article 91 LFIP, “which forms the basis for UNHCR’s strategy and support to the Government of Turkey.” (UNHCR, 2018: 1) In other words, it allows for interference and defines the roles that the international community would have in case of massive influx. Not to mention, that the law was created in cooperation with international bodies and Turkey, where they worked jointly all the time. Reshaping the status of refugees and migrants is not something that emerged overnight; on the contrary, as the European Union has been negotiating with Turkey on accession to the Union since the 2000s, this issue has found itself among them. And now, with its formation, for the first time, the status of foreigners in the country was specified and provided regulatory protection to asylum seekers on the basis of jurisdiction, ending the time of fragmented legislation regarding this issue.

At the same time as Turkey was making internal political reforms, in December 2013, after almost two decades of negotiations, the European Union and Turkey signed the Readmission of Persons Residing without Authorization (EUTRA), what EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström called “a day of historical importance.” (European Commission, 2013: 1) This was significant for both sides, firstly because it was one of the main criteria that Turkey have not meet on their path toward accession to the Union, and at the same time, it was of great significance for the EU to strengthen its external borders. And after a long time, the migrant crisis was obviously a big enough reason to make this agreement official. But to fully understand what exactly this means, we will look at the definition, according to what “the one’s admittance once again in a process or to a place or organization... the persons to be readmitted in terms of ‘third country nationals’, ‘stateless persons’ and ‘own nationals’ of the Contracting Parties. A broader categorization is admissible for ‘refugees’ and ‘ex-citizens’ depending the requirements of the Readmission Agreement or relevant legal measure.” (ÜN, 2019: 4) Therefore, in the current context, the greatest importance of this agreement is precisely in the legal framework that allows resolving the issues of all illegal immigrants and stateless persons. This was an important moment for Turkey because as Aras (2019: 54) states, “the EUTRA marked the moment when Turkey began to use conditionality more intensively in its relations with the EU.” Which is based on the fact that the visa-free regime was negotiated immediately afterward.

The Roadmap towards a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey came into being. After the European Council approved negotiations related to visa liberalization in 2012, a year later they

submitted the detailed conditions they demanded were met in order to exercise the right to free entry into European countries. (Knaus, 2014) These terms numbered 72 conditions, of which importance was placed on “documents security; migration and border management; public order and security; fundamental rights.” (Roadmap, 2013: 1) But the primary focus remains on regulating migration and illegal movement. In general, in Turkey’s view, in the Readmission, there were not any significant gains for them, and in order to compensate for such a perception, the treaties were made so that “Turkey has the right to suspend the agreement if the EU does not meet the terms of the visa liberation roadmap. Equally, for the visa liberalization to occur the readmission agreement has to come into force and actually work.” (Yilmaz, 2014: 24) Further conditions have been set so that if all requirements are successfully implemented, this agreement should enter into force in 2018. However, what followed had many ups and downs, and in future negotiations, this issue continued, and to this day have not been implemented in practice. Therefore, it remains to be seen in what ways this issue will be attempted to be exploited.

Still, the turning point came in 2015 when what is known as the European refugee crisis officially began, marked by a massive influx of irregular migrants moving to European Union countries. The EU in this period, as well as today, did not have a single opinion and approach by which this problem should be solved, due to the different currents that circulate unilaterally and were leading different politics. However, what they made an agreement upon was the need to protect the Union’s external borders, and Turkey, as a transit, the bordering country gained even more importance due to the given reason. As a response to the crisis, in May 2015 the European Commission published ‘A European Agenda on Migration’ addressing the need to strengthen partnerships with third countries, as something of critical importance. According to the document, “migration will become a specific component of ongoing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions already deployed in countries like Niger and Mali, which will be strengthened on border management.” (2015: 5) As part of this border management map, the EU-Turkey Action Plan was adopted on 29th November 2015 which referred to assistance in the form of staff and finances, but which we will discuss in more detail below.

As mentioned in the previous paragraph, one of the types of assistance offered by the EU, as well as other world institutions, was related to assistance through the participation of international organizations, the non-governmental sector, their staff, as well as financial

incentives. However, this is also one of the areas where disagreements initially arose between the international community and Turkey. The problem was that Turkey did not trust these institutions, and therefore did not want to give them full and open access to its territory, and thus to the camps themselves. As a result, there was a lack of transparency in the beginning, which also affected the allocation of funds. As already mentioned once, the practice of international bodies is usually that money is given to different agencies, rather than directly to state governments. Although we should praise Turkey as it certainly evolved in this area after some time, especially after realizing the extent of the problem, and that it cannot deal with it alone.

Building International Networks

In the period from 2011 until almost 2014, Turkey was very skeptical of all foreign actors operating on its territory. Of course, major international organizations have been actively involved in crisis management assistance almost from the beginning. There was “in particular closer collaboration with the UN agencies, mainly with the UNHCR, World Health Organization, International Organization of Migration, the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme in a number of areas, including technical assistance on registration, monitoring of repatriation/resettlement processes, and access to education, health and food.” (Memisoglu & Ilgit, 2017: 330) But this has not been the case with the civil sector. One of the reasons can be seen through the classical approach of realism by escaping any chance of eroding sovereignty, and the other can be related to the fact that Turkey wanted to prove that it can solve the problem on its own as a regional power. The truth is probably somewhere in between, but what is certain is that this approach has largely blocked the contributions that were supposed to arrive as an aid. Such a lack of transparency only contributed to limiting funds from international donors, since they always prefer to send help through NGOs.

However, as there were no clear laws regarding regulating the migration, it is expected that there was no special legislation to regulate the work of international non-governmental organizations either. Bureaucrats have even claimed that to get work permits could take up to a year. As a result, by the middle of 2013, there were only three international NGOs that were fully registered in the country. A huge number of complaints have been registered regarding

Turkey's relationship with international networks. For instance, during the escalation of the crisis Turkish government asked the International Red Cross to close its office in Ankara because they accepted Republic of Cyprus as a member speaks volumes about how politicized this issue was. Or blocking certain organizations because they argued they once had ties to Iraqi Kurds. They were also criticized for completely banning organizations and the civil sector from accessing all camps where the EU and the UN were not present. (International Crisis Group, 2013) "Turkish authorities have been very strict about not allowing any independent observers, journalists, NGOs, national or international humanitarian relief organization to Syrian Refugees in Turkey enter the camps." (Özden, 2013: 8)

Since they did not have good cooperation and access to the camps, the government relied mostly on the domestic organization IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, to deal with those residing outside the camps, from the earliest days of 2011. Another problem was a poor organization, so even after other organizations got involved, it often happened that certain groups did the same job in the same area or that some received funding more than once and others never. The reason for this was the lack of knowledge and experience while refusing to cooperate, which eventually did not benefit anyone. In the end, this situation altogether, at least, pushed Turkey to develop more institutionalized frameworks and start taking civil society organizations more seriously.

Despite this, even though the international community encountered obstacles, according to 2013 data, there were more than 37 NGOs on Turkey's southern border working under the permission of local authorities. (International Crisis Group, 2013) By 2017 it was estimated that more than 80 international NGOs operate with migrants staying out of camps. (Memisoglu & Ilgit, 2017) Although, data shows that in comparison to other countries, including Jordan and Lebanon, INGOs "have a lesser presence inside Turkey simply because of the limitations placed on their activities." (Çorabatır, 2016: 14) But again, we return to the fact that the workload is enormous given the number of migrants living in these areas, and that Turkey would not be able to deal with this problem without outside help, no matter how much they want to neglect it. Therefore, the work of local and international NGOs is filling gaps, no matter how much the government liked it or not.

So, it is clear that at this stage there were sudden turns in several different fields. First, the international community has begun to notice the real situation on the ground and is paying the

necessary attention to it. Then Turkey started cooperating more transparently and openly on this issue with other institutions and countries. Which ultimately led to a certain “win-win” situation at least at this point, where it seemed like both sides were going to get what they wanted.

5.2.3 Opportunistic with regard to the European Union’s securitization agenda in the post-2015 period;

Securitization Theory

At this stage, special attention should be paid to one word, which has found its place in the title itself, and that is securitization. Namely, this term defines a complex area that has developed into a separate theoretical unit in international relations, becoming the dominant theory in critical security studies. It was found in 1980s by the Copenhagen School who gave a whole new meaning to this approach. Unlike, in the case of realism where insecurities are perceived through objective threats, securitization theory is transforming subjects into security issues. Balzacq et al. (2015: 495) explains this best, arguing that “the key idea underlying securitization is that an issue is given sufficient saliency to win the assent of the audience, which enables those who are authorized to handle the issue to use whatever means they deem most appropriate.” It further requires several components to become securitized issue, “the securitizing actor (i.e. the agent who presents an issue as a threat through a securitizing move), the referent subject (i.e. the entity that is threatening), the referent object (i.e. the entity that is threatened), the audience (the agreement of which is necessary to confer an intersubjective status to the threat), the context and the adoption of distinctive policies (‘exceptional’ or not).”

Thus, although the process cannot be completed if any of these elements do not fulfill their purpose, they do not all carry the same weight. So, for instance, the referent subject can always find a new foothold, but acceptance by the audience will again be something that is crucial and decisive for the success of this theory. But the existence of the audience does not refer to addressing the ‘audience’ as one; rather, it is complex and consists of different layers. Salter (2008) succeeded in reducing its existence to four basic groups, “(1) popular, (2) elite, (3) technocratic, and (4) scientific.” As an example, we may take the UK’s decision to invade

Iraq, where we saw the possible influence of two different audiences, where for instance, “the general public can offer ‘moral support’, while the political elite (Parliament) offers ‘formal’ support that enables a securitizing actor in a democracy to implement the measures considered necessary to mitigate the existential threat.” Ghincea (2017: 2) From this, we clearly see that the audience is the deciding factor, but also that their influence sometimes is not equally robust. So, while one side may perceive the case as a threat, it may happen that the other type of audience, which might have a legal and legitimate role, does not experience it in the same way. Although more often it happens that decision-makers are actually the ones who create a security threat and then simply seek the support of citizens of that country.

In any case, when it comes to the European migration crisis, both Turkey and the European Union have sought to securitize the same problem, only for different purposes. While Turkey sought to develop a positive feeling between migrants and the local population, most representatives of EU countries, such as France, Denmark, and the entire Eastern bloc, further inflamed and disrupted any potential dialogue on peaceful coexistence. Simultaneously, while Erdogan’s government was working for peace at home, it was also working to present this problem as dramatically and as much as possible abroad. In either case, the EU certainly saw this as a huge threat, which they did not know how to deal with, and in an effort to prevent immigrants from coming to their countries, they tried to create as much panic among citizens, as well as to protect their national and joint borders of the Union. Nevertheless, as proof of how much they did not know how to deal with the influx of illegal immigrants, best shows the fact that “in May 2015, the EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, sought UN Security Council authorization for the use of military force against human smugglers and their vessels off the shores of Libya.” (Park, 2015) In other words, she asked permission to carry out an armed attack on all vessels of dubious origin, which were moving towards Europe, and on which, of course, there were people.

With this in mind, in his article, Branko Milanovic (2015) explains why he believes that ‘migration into Europe is a problem with no solution’ by emphasizing five factual arguments. Firstly, the demographic characteristics of the MENA region are such that they far exceed those of Europe, while on the other hand the economic figures are on the side of Europeans. For this reason, as the author states, even if Europeans manage to stop the current wave, it does not mean that they will be able to stop the migration movement forever. Then, the next reason they fear these arrivals, in addition to cultural and religious differences, is that the EU

do not have a developed culture as being ‘immigration country.’ Third, the European Union itself has contributed to the disruption of peace within these regions, which on the contrary, contributed to destabilizing their own borders, e.g. participation in the overthrow of Gaddafi. Fourth, the problem with immigrants has strengthened right-wing currents, which has further contributed to the creation of a negative atmosphere and aversion to migrants. And finally, Milanovic claims that the EU does not have a clear policy and strategy, and in order to improve this situation, it must first start cooperating with other countries in Africa and the Middle East, and create a multilateral approach with adequate coordination.

All of this is largely true from the standpoint of objective analysis, of which the EU itself was aware, and it is for this reason that it has sought to postpone this problem as long as it could. Moreover, it is clear that the EU has fallen into a web, in which fear of the unknown, unpreparedness, and uneven political opinions combined with threats coming from Erdogan have led to acceleration and concessions in negotiations by the EU to Turkey. Thus, as noted earlier, the only area where the EU had a harmonized position was that they must protect external borders. Therefore, from all the above, the securitization is considered to have been successful in this case. This was clearly shown from all the meetings and bargaining that followed.

EU-Turkey: A Roller Coaster Timeline

What is evident in the period that followed in 2015 and continued its series in 2016 are the increasingly frequent meetings of EU leaders with Turkish officials in order to reach a joint solution to the prevailing migration crisis. It is especially characteristic that they sought to find a common language by employing various means and reviving the already (un)successful agreements, which, if the situation had been different, would probably not have been discussed again. Certainly, there are two reasons why the EU was so concerned, first, because in 2015, according to official UNHCR figures, over a million people flocked to Europe. More specifically, “UNHCR’s latest figures show that some 1,000,573 people had reached Europe across the Mediterranean, mainly to Greece and Italy, in 2015. Of these, 3,735 were missing, believed drowned.” In addition to this fear of being overwhelmed by foreigners, the EU had a moral and public obligation to try to find a solution and rescue all these people who risked their lives to reach the European shore. In order to achieve the desired effect, a series of

increasingly frequent negotiations with Turkey followed which became a key area and the main focus of the EU.

The second reason and moment that was prevalent and crucial for these relations, referred to the direct and public threats that Erdogan made to the EU if they did not meet Turkish demands. According to the Greek website euro2day.gr, and as Center for American Progress (2016) reported, the first scandal that came to light happened when “the leaked minutes of an October 2015 meeting between President Erdoğan, President of the European Council Donald Tusk, and President of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker demonstrated Erdoğan’s hard-edged tactics: At the meeting, he threatened that if the European Union failed to meet his demands, “We can open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria anytime and we can put the refugees on buses.” It did not take long for the Turkish president to go public with these intimidations, so shortly after this, almost the whole world was buzzing about Erdogan’s words. And just after NATO decided to send ships to try to return migrants in an attempt to reach the Greek and Italian coasts across the Aegean Sea, on 11th February Erdogan stated “we do not have the word ‘idiot’ written on our foreheads. We will be patient but we will do what we have to. Don’t think that the planes and the buses are there for nothing.” He then confirmed leaked suspicions, claiming the following, “I am proud of what I said. We have defended the rights of Turkey and the refugees. And we told them [the Europeans]: ‘Sorry, we will open the doors and say goodbye to the migrants.’” (The Guardian, 2016)

During this period, Turkey had over 2.5 million Syrian refugees, plus migrants from neighboring countries, and thus holding the EU as a hostage, it used this situation to seize other opportunities as well. For instance, a month after the EU migrant deal, the AKP referred to the slow process of visa liberalization. According to Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, if the EU does not abide by the agreement by June, Turkey will not honor its side either. Although aware that they have not met all the conditions required by the EU (claiming that they will soon), Davutoğlu stated “The deal we struck with the EU is very clear. We want this human tragedy to end, our citizens to travel visa free, and the customs union to be updated, "he said in a speech to the parliament." If the EU doesn't keep its word, including the migrants deal we will cancel all agreements.” (France24, 2016) So, from all of the above, given the complexity of the overall situation, the EU did not have much room to consider whether Erdogan’s threats were empty promises or not, which consequently resulted in a confusing game of the cat and the mice.

Although this is only briefly explanation, it is still necessary to return reciprocally to the middle of 2015, in order to gain a clearer insight how these negotiations were perceived from the side of the European Union, so to understand how they led to ‘the end results.’

A good starting position would be to show a change in the power ratio (setting requirements), starting with the general annual report of the European Union on political, economic, and social freedoms within Turkey. Just a year earlier, this report was published on October 8, 2014, but as the media reported, in 2015 Brussels agreed to postpone the publication of this report until the end of the elections scheduled for November 1st. According to sources, this was a direct request from Erdogan, which the EU agreed to in order to keep Turkey in the game over an unstable migrant agreement. (Barker & Wagstyl, 2015) How obvious this agreement was is best evidenced by the fact that immediately nine days after the election, the Commission released a highly fragile report on Turkey emphasizing that “there was significant backsliding in the areas of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.” (European Commission, 2015) Although the AKP may not have heard what it wanted with this report, the European Union nevertheless managed to agree through the next three meetings with Turkey on all the negotiations and concessions that were crucial to defining these relations, the first of which followed very soon after this report.

On November 29, 2015, a meeting of EU heads of state with Turkey was held. This meeting was particularly important for the further management of migration, and what has emerged from it is known as the *EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan*. The purpose of the Plan was to address the issue together in order to achieve more efficient results. It consisted of three main conceptions on how to approach the crisis, “(1) by addressing the root causes leading to the massive influx of Syrians, (2) by supporting Syrians under temporary protection and their host communities in Turkey, and (3) by strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU.” (European Commission, 2015) In essence, Turkey and the EU have pledged to deliver certain results, - where the EU has promised to provide financial assistance of 3 billion euros and to deliver humanitarian aid through relevant organizations. It also promised to help in order to prevent illegal migration, to try to prevent human trafficking, to provide assistance involuntary returns, and to provide financial assistance to Turkey to meet the conditions for visa liberalization. In return, Turkey needed to continue to respect the law on foreigners, ensure their registration in camps, and provide them with access to health care, education, public goods, and the like. Although, what is most important for this agreement

itself is the strengthening of border crossings on land and sea, better cooperation with Greece and Bulgaria, and all other bodies to combat human trafficking and illegal migration to EU territory.

Although what actually mattered for Turkey here was that “the EU and Turkey agreed to re-energise Turkey’s accession process to the European Union. High-level dialogue between both parties will be reinforced through more frequent and structured meetings including the organisation of summits twice a year.” (European Council, 2015) In addition to this, what was equally important for Turkey is that this ‘Plan’ again mentions the negotiation of a visa-free regime. As a result, on March 4, 2016, the European Commission issued a second report on Turkey’s progress towards visa liberalization. And in this report, they largely praised their efforts, placing a particular emphasis on reforms and requirements Turkey has promised to meet on the Readmission Agreement. But while this sounded promising on a ‘paper’, what followed, as certain examples have already been given, were the threats made publicly by the AKP party, complaining that the EU was doing nothing to put this dialogue into practice.

What was still happening in this period was the increasingly frequent visits and meetings between the Turkish Prime Minister and the President of Tusk, so on March 3, 2016, Tusk went to the official visit to Ankara, which was actually going on to prepare the ground for the new coming agreement. And already on March 7th, 2016 European Council President Donald Tusk chaired a meeting with Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to reaffirm this shaky deal they have made. The main reason for this meeting was to speed up the return of irregular migrants to Turkey and to establish that NATO still keeps its ships in the Aegean Sea because a month earlier the very same Davutoğlu threatened to withdraw from the agreement, for the given reason. (European Council, 2016) Simultaneously, a broader range of proposals was put forward to tackle the migration crisis, which President Tusk was to discuss and elaborate before the next European Council meeting. And who were largely incorporated into the next official agreement between Turkey and the European Union, better known as the “EU-Turkey deal.”

Following the Council of Europe meeting held on 17 and 18 March 2016 on the future of crisis management, on March 18th the European leaders met on the third official meeting with Prime Minister Davutoğlu and signed a final agreement in which they advocated for further

regulation of both their relations and control of the migration crisis. As a result of this officially known “EU-Turkey statement” the following points have been agreed upon:

- “All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey... The costs of the return operations of irregular migrants will be covered by the EU.
- For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria.
- Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate with neighbouring states as well as the EU to this effect.
- Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or at least have been substantially and sustainably reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated. EU Member States will contribute on a voluntary basis to this scheme.
- The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all participating Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, provided that all benchmarks have been met.
- The EU, in close cooperation with Turkey, will further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and ensure funding of further projects for persons under temporary protection... Once these resources are about to be used to the full, and provided the above commitments are met, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion euro up to the end of 2018.
- The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the Customs Union.
- The EU and Turkey reconfirmed their commitment to re-energise the accession process as set out in their joint statement of 29 November 2015.
- The EU and its Member States will work with Turkey in any joint endeavour to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria, in particular in certain areas near the Turkish border which would allow for the local population and refugees to live in areas which will be more safe.” (European Council, 2016)

Based on the first and second reports “on the progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement” that followed in April and June of the same year, the European Commission found that the number of illegal crossings had visibly decreased and that they had thus effectively managed to put an end to migrant smugglers and human traffickers. In the context of visa liberalization, Turkey has so far met 65 of the 72 conditions, of which two conditions were finally impossible due to the still active migration crisis, which in a way further aggravated the situation for Turkey. Furthermore, the EU has also had some criticism for respecting fundamental human rights and freedoms, finding that when it comes to this, no concessions can be made.

Continuously, according to European Commission reports that followed at the end of that year, illegal entry into Greece fell by as much as 98% but relations between the EU and Turkey deteriorated at the same time. Following the attempted coup in Turkey on 15 July 2016, the European Union strongly condemned this attempt, stressing that they recognize and give their full support to the current Turkish government. But towards the end of the year, according to the High Representative’s declaration on the situation in Turkey, the EU began to increasingly criticize the government’s attitude towards citizens, which involved mass arrests, eroding freedom of expression, and undermining democracy. In that regard, “the EU and its Member States recall their condemnation of the 15 July coup attempt and, while recognising the need for Turkey to take proportionate action, call on Turkey to safeguard its parliamentary democracy, including the respect for human rights, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and the right of everyone to a fair trial, also in conformity with its commitments as a candidate country.” (European Council, 2016)

As a result of these turbulences, on November 24, 2016, the European Parliament voted for a non-binding decision to freeze Turkey’s accession process to the European Union. The aim of this was to put pressure on President Erdogan, for whom they claim that his “leadership has taken an even more authoritarian turn since a failed coup attempt in July.” (, 2016) To which Erdogan responded perhaps more than expected, threatening to open the border doors for 3 million migrants and to let them enter Europe freely.

Thus, the period from 2015 to the end of 2016 was somehow crucial and reached its peak in the negotiations between these two sides. Everything that followed from 2017 onwards was largely marked by the disruption of these relations, which was entwined with threats from

Turkey and delays by the European Union in fulfilling its promised conditions. And, nevertheless, to this day, not much has changed.

5.2.4 From 2017 Onwards

First and foremost, before bringing this discussion to its end, it is best to refer to Soler and Lecha (2019) who summarized post-2016 period according to several key issues:

- “Democracy and human rights – abuse of the rule of law, including attacks and persecution of journalists;
- Politicisation and electoral opportunism;
- Territorial disputes and problematic neighbourhood relations – especially in relation to Greece and Cyprus;
- The Kurdish issue and the war in Syria;
- The Armenian issue has lost prominence, but may resurface;
- The Western alliance has seen better days;
- Customs Union, visas and refugees: technical cooperation can also be politically sensitive.”

Then, since this period from the end of 2016 until today has been largely marked by a series of turmoils that have occurred between the EU as a community, but also between individual member states and Turkey they deserve some attention. These turmoils were generally not marked by anything positive, nor did their relations and cooperation continue to flourish. However, given that many things are intertwined, it would simply take too long to analyze everything that happened since then separately. Further, what is even more problematic is that previously signed agreements have never been completed, so it is impossible to discuss them as something that reached its end. Instead, what can be done at the moment is to look briefly at the most important events that occurred until today.

As a result of these disagreements, the EU and Turkey have begun to diverge significantly, while gatherings between its officials have become less frequent since 2016, therefore, it would be important only to point to crucial meetings in the following years.

During 2017, meetings, monitoring, and dialogue were certainly active, as this is a very close period to the previously established agreement. Although this year was primarily marked by a constitutional referendum in an effort to shift parliamentary into the presidential political system. In order to do so, Erdogan wanted to ensure a safe passage, so the AKP party attempted to hold rallies in the EU in areas where there is a high concentration of Turks. Countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and others, of course, did not allow this, and in return, Erdogan referred to the broken promises from March 2016. “You don’t let my minister into the Netherlands. You revoke the landing rights of my foreign minister. You prevent [us] holding meetings at the General Consulate building, which is my land. But after that you’d expect us to do this [re-admit migrants]. That’s not going to happen.” (BBC News, 2017) Still, while emphasizing that Turkey is a sovereign state, according to a joint statement by High Representative / Vice President Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn, they expressed high concern for Turkey’s democracy, which at the time seemed highly eroded. Considering that too much concentration of power was placed in the hands of one person, which was contrary to EU standards, the EU cited this as a reason for refusing to approve rallies. Not to mention that after an unsuccessful coup d’état consideration to reintroduce the death penalty speaks volumes about the illiberal path Turkey chose.

At large, the EU knew they had to do something concrete about this downfall of democracy. In this regard, the sequence of events was as follows, “in November 2017 the European Council decided to cut Turkey’s preaccession funds and in March 2019 the European Parliament (EP) urged to suspend the negotiation process. The decision of the Parliament is the result of a process in which part of the traditional supporters of the accession negotiation process had lost faith in the willingness of the current Turkish government to reform.” (Soler & Lecha, 2019) The 2019 Commission Report mentioned 29 times that Turkey was backsliding, arguing that “accession negotiations have effectively come to a standstill, no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernisation of the Customs Union can be currently foreseen.” On the contrary, on 22 July 2019 “the Turkish government officially announced the suspension of the EUTRA in response to the EU’s sanctioning of Turkey’s gas drilling operations in Cypriot waters. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced that the government suspended its readmission agreement with the EU “not only due to the EU’s recent sanctions. The decision was also taken because the EU still has not introduced the agreed-on visa-free regime for Turkish citizens.” (Aras, 2019: 57)

In-between, in 2018, the Turkish and EU delegations met in Varna, Bulgaria, to discuss key common issues, primarily on migration and counter-terrorism, where both sides agreed on the need to continue co-operation. Then, there was a talk of the rule of law in Turkey, where Donald Tusk expressed deep concern in undermining human rights. The EU also said it considered that Turkey's ventures in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea are not in line with international law and that they relate to non-compliance with good neighborly relations. And finally, participation in the Syrian war was discussed, (European Council, 2018) while according to Turkey, the EU provided minimal support in stopping this conflict, and that Turkey must therefore deal with this crisis on its own.

In 2019, the 54th meeting of the Association Council between the European Union and Turkey was held in Brussels, where the EU was represented by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms. Federica Mogherini. What was established here did not differ much from the previous year, in which the emphasis was placed on the fact that the Turkish rule of law must overlap with the EU's perception of it. Extra evidence that the Turkish authorities continuously were not in line with the way the EU institutions work proved to be correct after Turkey decided to repeat local elections in Istanbul in 2019. Since the EU was covering the elections from the beginning, they saw no reason to do so and used this as another reason to criticize the country in the annual report that followed. Furthermore, they called to remain cooperative in the context of the 2016 Statement on the regulation of the migration issue, and to continue the dialogue in the form of foreign policy when it comes to the problems in the Middle East. They, of course, called on Turkey to smooth relations with Cyprus. And finally, the emphasis was on economic cooperation and the Customs Union, because both sides were aware that their partnership in this area is important for each side. (European Council, 2019)

Despite the European Commission's 2019 report and Brussels's emphasizes that the EU's borders are much stronger today, with better coordination, a protection system, and more people on borders than in 2015, they can never really be completely sure that this will be enough. This is why Turkey still holds certain cards up its sleeve. Although the problems remained the same as before, 2020 was quite turbulent. After the Syrian government destroyed 33 Turkish troops by airstrikes, Erdogan highly criticized insufficient support from NATO and the European Union. As a result, "refugees headed to the land border with Greece, taking minibuses and taxis from Istanbul." (Voice of America, 2020) This was followed by

the visit of the president of the European Council Charles Michel to Ankara to discuss the migration situation on “the EU’s sea and land border.” Just five days later, on March 9, 2020, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with EU leaders in Brussels. “The leaders discussed bilateral relations, the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement on migration, security and stability in the region and the crisis in Syria.” (European Council, 2020) And most importantly, at this meeting, they decided once again to fully clarify the ways in which each side interprets the EU-Turkey statement, which in line with everything that was currently happening, seemed necessary.

Another problem, of a geostrategic nature, which intensified in 2020, is Turkey’s attitude towards Eastern Mediterranean waters. There is an unresolved border issue between Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey in this area, which came to the fore after “in August 2020, Greek and Turkish frigates collided,” after it was established that “the Turkish ship had been escorting a Turkish seismic survey vessel... mapping for potential future oil and gas resources in waters disputed by Greece and Turkey.” (Sipri, 2020) In response, the European Union offered Ankara two options, first, sanctions, stating that it would not resort to using all available means or that if Turkey withdraw its navy, they will see improvement in their relations as the bloc has “agreed to launch a positive political EU-Turkey agenda.” (DW, 2020) Erdogan eventually withdrew the vessels, arguing that they continue to see possible positive outcomes in these relations and urging the EU to drop all possible sanctions they have considered.

The last important event set to date, happened on December 17, 2020. It was after Turkey implemented for the first time since 2016 its promise to open its borders, - which happened earlier in February 2020, - if the EU does not pay all the promised money to Turkey. On this day, the EU delegation issued a statement that they have paid the final installment of €6 billion in EU support to refugees and host communities in Turkey. (Wallis, 2020)

From which we can clearly see that, although a very long time has passed since this agreement, Turkey, as well as the EU, did not let it fall into oblivion, because it still contains very important elements for each of the parties, which can be instrumentalized according to the occasion.

5.2.5 *Overconfidence Effect*

What remains is to consider the nature and sagacity of the moves in this relationship that Turkey has entered as an inferior player. It is essential to think about what results emerged from the actions that Erdogan made in the previous decade and whether they led certainly to the common good? But in order to gain a broader picture of decision-making itself, which is always conditioned by the character of the leader in illiberal states, it is important to resolve what role ego and overconfidence may play in these games. Although, if we are guided by the premise that it is necessary to take risks if we want to succeed, then we should think about whether too much self-confidence is sometimes good too? Imran Demir (2017: 10) has dedicated an entire book to the analysis of this very issue, in which he claims that overconfidence is simply manifested “when people’s subjective probability estimates deviate (miscalibrate) from the objective probability of an occurrence.” Therefore, if we take into account the efforts of all authoritarian rulers to keep as much concentration of power in their hands as possible, makes this phenomenon very likely. “Another form of overconfidence that is closely related to exaggerated positive views of self and illusion of control is better-than-average effect or over-placement.” (Demir, 2017: 11) This could be seen in the case of Turkey from the very beginning, including the reaction to the Arab Spring, the way it approached the management of the migration crisis, to the negotiations with the EU. At the outset, Turkey referred to past successes, but also to the fact that at the time it was considered an exemplary democratic regional power. This initially led to the first catastrophic disruption of relations in the region, when Erdogan failed to persuade Assad to hand over power, but on the contrary, only provoked a new conflict.

In particular, Erdogan does not seem to have learned much from his mistakes with Assad, rather, he continued with the same approach which is why his arrogance led him to a blind spot with the European Union as well. What is best witnessed by the following statement, “excessive confidence in Turkey’s capacity to control outcomes and too much reliance on their knowledge, however, opened the way for self-defeating errors in judgment and misled Turkish policy makers to overlook a number of factors that turned out to be consequential in determining the course of events and ensure the survival of the regime.” (Demir, 2017: 64) Thus, in this way, Turkey failed to maintain the status of a ‘democratic role model’ in the region, failed to maintain the image of a country that nurtures European values, just as it failed to maintain a positive image and public support for joining the Union, as different

studies have shown. A similar example has been proven through the policy of accepting refugees, where Turkey still speaks from high ground. “Constructing scenarios of success without too much consideration for potential setbacks, Turkish policy makers displayed extraordinary optimism in believing that, as the only democratic Muslim country in the region with a strong experience in democratic consolidation, they were bestowed with the capacity and capabilities as well as a moral mandate to lead the transformations.” (Demir, 2017: 112)

Regardless, we should not completely ignore the fact that Turkey has done good things during this period too. One of the reasons for overconfidence is certainly the fact that Erdogan built an empire which is no longer a small helpless state, but a strong country with a much-built economy, large population, military, and enviable geopolitical position. Combining this with the fear the EU had, this opened a window of opportunities for Turkey as a gatekeeper. Although ultimately, what could be seen so far is an attempt to maximize its prey, where they went for all or nothing and had a more aggressive approach to negotiation, setting out their goals very clearly. But if we take a complete overview of events, we see that the storm has subsided, that the EU has managed to strengthen its borders and keep migrants out of them, and that in return it has offered almost Turkey fair and correct conditions. On the other hand, Erdogan, blinded by power, did not obviously look at this opportunity from any other perception but his own, and thus, by violating human rights and disrespecting the law did not use the chance he got. So, in a moment, a flash of time, it may happen again that Turkey comes to such a position that it makes absolute demands. Although, now that the situation has calmed down, looks like that this approach has not paid off in the long run.

Even though, up to the present, things did not turn terribly for Turkey. The accession process has not been completely suspended, and given the current course and development of the situation, it seems like it is best to look for alternative ways to integrate Turkey and the European Union. One possible path is sector-specific cooperation. “In such cooperation, Turkey will be a part of “one or several coalitions of the willing (countries) working] together in specific policy areas” – migration, energy, transport, and economic relations – in a more functional and transactional format.” (Aras, 2019: 58) Besides, as Aras further states, the final reward for both sides will probably not be a full membership - but it seems that conditionality, as the main product of these agreements, - will eventually lead to more functional integration.

6. CONCLUSION

Every time we start to show interest in a certain topic or issue, it is normal for us to begin with trying to find some most basic starting points, to reduce the problem to the simplest possible explanation. In this way, we all strive to understand the world around us and thus act according to our goals, plans, and desires. Bearing this in mind, the beginning of this discussion was according to some general logic and unwritten rule, first explain in the introduction to the paper what migration is, why it is important and how it is relevant for us. Thus, without much thought about the very root of the word, I started to think about the definition of migration by stating that it is a certain ‘process’. However, after stopping here for a second, I thought it would be important to understand what is actually meant by the process itself. The Cambridge Dictionary allegedly claims that this is “a series of actions that you take to achieve a result,” which I, after some consideration, can say that I consider being a very complex, too extensive, and rather inaccurate notion. Therefore, starting to define migration as a ‘process’ is by no means enough to understand what it is in essence. And that is a timeless, comprehensive, and inexhaustible action that intertwines an infinite number of events, stories, ideologies, and human destinies, which this work proved to be true. And which, regardless of its complexity, can reduce its essence to two basic things in common, including the mass movement of people from one place to another - under duress or voluntarily, and that, there is always the cause and reason of movement. For this reason, this point to the inexhaustible purpose of this and similar research, which are certainly always relevant both for understanding politics and for understanding the society and the world around us.

Therefore, this research, which was conducted to clarify the course of events, various situations, the level of efficiency, and diplomatic capacities of Turkey and the EU to cope with the crisis, aimed first to show through different indicators their gaps and weaknesses. The next goal was to clearly define and anticipate all the non-functionalities that exist so that they can be recognized from the very beginning in the future. Finally, after clearly identifying the development of events, and determining the parameters on the basis of which we can identify these patterns of behavior, it is necessary to go at the beginning by look at the methodological part of the paper to examine the accuracy or inaccuracy of the statements I advocated for.

First, the work began with the identification of the research question. Here, I focused on the very essence of human nature, that is, examining whether there are tendencies to benefit from the control of this unfortunate situation, i.e. migration and refugee movements in foreign policy, but also within the state. To examine this, I looked back to the period preceding the migration crisis itself and through an analysis of the actions of the Turkish authorities, especially the Prime Minister and later President Erdogan, it is very clear that there were aspirations for both personal promotion and striving to return Turkey to its former glory. It later emerged that the migration crisis came as an ideal opportunity for these goals. Therefore, based on the negotiations between the European Union and Turkey, it has become clear that it is possible to achieve certain benefits through manipulations and different games. Although a completely different question is how to approach this instrumentalization, and how long-termed these benefits can be.

After the research question proved credible, the focus of the work shifted to examining the methods and means that Turkey used to gain an advantage to control this movement. Accordingly, the main hypothesis examining whether migration control can be used as a tool to achieve national and foreign policy goals is accepted as true. First, looking at the relevant literature of prominent authors dealing with this topic, it has been proven that this phenomenon exists and that throughout history there have been many situations where this abuse has been observed. Then, the investigation revealed that Turkey, led by Erdogan, acted as an “opportunistic state.” The proof is the usage of migrants as hostages on several different occasions and threats to the European Union that if they do not receive a certain amount of money, a visa-free regime and membership within the Union, that they will not keep these people within their borders. Furthermore, Turkey is constantly using its geopolitical position, first to show the European Union that it is in a position to be an equal negotiator, and then for its historical past and proximity to the Middle East to present itself as a regional leader and friend of the Islamic world so they could spread their influence. Nevertheless, looking back at the three phases of the ‘response’, that were presented in Chapter 4 it was also shown that, depending on the context, Turkey is changing its objectives and aspirations, and thus adjusting its policies according to available tools.

However, the European Union itself is not so innocent. Migration has been instrumentalized within the Union too, which could also be seen in the way this crisis is managed. The first example is perhaps the very fact that it was prepared to postpone a “negative” progress report on Turkey in 2015 at the time of the election, at the request of the AKP. Although this deviation from one’s own values and moralizing proved to be quite irrelevant compared to the xenophobic and racial behavior that was manifested during this period. Furthermore, the EU used this occasion to conclude negotiations that have been ‘dragging’ with Turkey on the EUTRA agreement since 2005. Since this was crucial for the Union because in that way it additionally protected its borders and solved the problems of illegal crossings. Besides, there are various examples where populist narratives have been used to try to come to power, which has been seen through the growth of right-wing currents within EU countries, although there has not been much talk about this topic in the paper. Finally, according to the latest data to this day, several events have taken place, from various currents within the Syrian civil war to the EU’s failure to deliver on its promises, to the current Mediterranean crisis, in each of which Turkey has pulled the strings and threatened to overwhelm Europe with migrants if its conditions were not met. Therefore, the general hypothesis definitely proved to be accurate.

This paper is accompanied by auxiliary hypotheses too, in which the first of them claim that realism and foreign policy analysis are the basic theoretical frameworks for understanding the use of soft and hard power in migration control. This has proved to be correct, and even more so, this issue has seen the gradual development of the theories. Initially, Turkey had a very good reputation in the region, known as a country that, with its soft power, has managed to improve its status through trade relations, diplomacy, aviation, and film industry. Aiming to stay in this position, after receiving thousands of refugees in the first phase from 2011 to 2013 Turkey approached solving this problem in the same way. Over time, such an approach has changed, which is why the paper also deals with the securitization theory, where Turkey has moved from an ‘open door policy’ to negotiations with the EU on building a wall and strengthening borders with Syria. This was later followed by multiple military operations which is why realism depicts the situation on the ground, while foreign policy analysis helps us to understand decision-making through the role of the ‘great leader.’

The second auxiliary hypothesis examines whether governments use the presence of migrants to maximize their economic and political interests, which has also proved accurate, but on the contrary, not entirely possible in practice. As a piece of evidence, although Turkey demanded a total of 6 billion euros from the European Union to help supply migrants on its territory, on several occasions Erdogan and Turkish officials themselves were complaining that this crisis cost them ten times as much. So we can probably expect that Turkey will continue to seek additional funding again, in an attempt to cover its costs.

What I also found important to examine was the impact and consequences of the way the problem was formulated. That is, whether the policies that are created and how the migration crisis is presented within the country, but also in foreign policy, can have an impact on the very positioning of that country in international politics. Not only has this proved to be true, but this is one of the issues that I consider to be crucial, both in the social and in the political segment of life. The reason is very simple, how a particular question is formulated and approached will in itself 'solve half the problem.' Therefore, a comparison of Turkey's and the European Union's approach is the best empirical indicator. On the one hand, Turkey has approached refugees as 'friends, visitors, and a fraternal nation' in need of help, and thus encountered approval from the broad masses, compassion, and a desire for help. At the same time, the EU approached this as a security problem, where politicians and the media constantly bombarded citizens with bad information, leading to the spread of fear, panic, and lack of empathy. Simultaneously, in foreign policy, completely opposite narrative has been adopted. The EU has approached this problem from high ground, using more formal patterns of behavior, primarily to use it as a reason to reject again Turkey's membership and the implementation of a visa-free regime due to unfulfilled conditions. This was mostly in an attempt to condemn all policies by Turkey that in any way underestimate 'European democratic values', and thus create a specific image of Turkey and gives it a specific place at the negotiating table, based on their unfulfilled conditions.

The above explanation is also sort of an answer to the following hypothesis - is the European Union willing to make major concessions to protect its borders? It seems that if this analysis is taken more seriously, this statement appear to be partially accurate. The European Union has proven to be a serious and difficult negotiator. Although at the moment when it was 'burning under their feet,' the EU agreed to reopen a series of negotiations for which the procedure would probably be slower to restart if the situation had not been so critical. But in

practice it turned out that the EU is not so hasty in fulfilling the given promises. Of course, without neglecting the statement that decline of democracy in Turkey and authoritarian behavior has had a significant impact on this. But in general this situation has shown that in crisis situations, if acting wisely, the desired goals can be achieved at least in partially.

Finally, the thesis that depoliticization of migration would lead to more durable solutions proved to be more than true. First of all, if we summarize the overall migration management, it seems to be the least of what is best for these people. Second, trying to reach goals that are not related to migration management unnecessarily complicates the whole situation, requires more time and can lead to tensions in international affairs between states. And third, the xenophobic behavior of European Union countries has made it impossible to provide adequate assistance to migrants. Because, instead of evenly distributing people throughout Europe, where they would have the opportunity to continue their lives normally, they still live today, after almost 10 years, in camps throughout Turkey, where they are daily forced to remember the fate that befell them. And eventually, it should not be forgotten that creating unnecessary tensions in international relations while there is more important issue to be addressed, never in the history proved to end up well, and therefore any form of politicization must be avoided.

Thus, according to the analysis of the data presented twofold results can be reached. Of which the first is to identify specific policies and principles that would be desirable to have developed in advance in order to reduce the abuse of the migration crisis. What I was able to identify through this paper are certain indicators, which each state should examine to more easily recognize opportunistic behavior and thus prepare properly from the beginning. These indicators could be measured through three key parameters:

1. The political situation within the opportunist country - starting from the analysis of constitutional rights, - first, to compare how well they are exercised in practice and second, whether they define migrant rights at all. Because, as case study of Turkey showed, they did not even have adopted legislation on this issue; and then, looking at the hierarchy of government and the degree of democracy it governs, - this is significant because it says a lot about the decision-making processes, the influence of political actors, the willingness to cooperate, as well as the legitimacy of the judiciary;
2. Past and present foreign and domestic immigration policies - an indicator of how safe migrants actually are within the country; to determine whether the given country had

ever used migration as an instrument before; to examine relationships with neighbors - to know more precisely whether they would be willing to help or 'take revenge' for something from the past;

3. A detailed analysis of the current position of power and reflection on the possible benefits of the migration crisis for a particular state - in this way we would initially have an idea of the requirements, aspirations, leadership, economic and political goals of abusive countries, - which altogether would ultimately lead to greater crisis response.

And secondly, it is interesting to consider the analysis of this issue from the perception of opportunistic states too. Although in theory and academic circles, the authors basically criticize any attempt to instrumentalize this problem, there are also those moments when the theory simply does not coincide with the practice. For example, we can always say that the European Union did not treat Turkey correctly and that it refused to share the burden more seriously. Rather they were willing to provide a huge financial support, instead of just receiving migrants which is a much longer-term expense. This, of course, is just one of the examples. Then, the continuous criticism and insufficient commitment hidden behind norms and the promotion of democratic values are reason enough for a state that already has a huge number of refugees to respond to such behavior with similar or worse ones. Wherefore, this conflict of ethics as a philosophical discipline and *realpolitik*, in this case, decides in favor of dystopian discourse, i.e., *realpolitik*, - within which, Turkey has assessed its possibilities, and in accordance with them used the given opportunity. For this reason, abandoning ideological values and being pragmatic is the reality we live. Of course, if it is about academic circles or an effort to 'smear the eyes' through diplomacy use; any other approach would signify an exclusively missed opportunity. Therefore, the lessons we have learned from Turkey are:

1. Migrants, as well as everything else that is in our 'garden', can be used as a resource, which, if there is enough consent, can always be cashed;
2. Each state should, first of all, analyze its needs and try to achieve the desired goal on the basis of realistic requirements, - for as this case has shown in part, sometimes when we ask too much we get nothing;
3. Although decision-making is sometimes more centralized and unilateral than desirable, it can still lead to the desired benefits and results precisely because there is consensus within the country;

4. Equally, it is important to have a diverse opinion, because too much power in the hands of one person often leads to blindness, excessive self-confidence, and ultimately failure to achieve the goal;
5. It is very important to use the media and choose words carefully in order to create a certain public opinion, - because if there is no public approval, it usually means that the government will have a hard time or that their popularity will probably be in decline;

Regardless of which group a particular country belongs to what is currently even more relevant to this topic, as a concluding mark, is that the gap between the global South and global North continues to grow and that it represents one of the main causes of instability in the world. This gap forces people living in the global South to leave their states, for economic and political reasons, and rush towards a rich and developed Western civilization. Of course, such movements over the years have provoked outrage, different negative rejections, with many attempts to resist the influence of other cultures and religions in an effort to secure the walls of their beautifully landscaped states in various ways. However, forcing of the protection of external borders, on the one hand, shows how weak these states and their communities really are. Because if they were not, they would have no need to fence and defend themselves. That fear was re-projected in the European Migrant Crisis in 2015 when, in a desperate attempt to cross the Mediterranean route, millions of refugees began arriving on European soil. Nonetheless, the problem is not so much that Europeans have received a certain number of people at a given moment. Its essence lies in the fact that Europeans, like other developed countries, are aware that despite all those who do not succeed on a particular route and do not reach the goal, will continue to try, because, the people who choose this path, generally have nothing to lose. And so while thousands die, millions of new people come. At the end of the day, regardless of all visa regimes, border controls, and building walls, migration is something that cannot be stopped. And as long as there are migrations, there will also be close-minded groups and countries that will try to defend themselves from the spirit of multiculturalism. As well as, we will have those who can recognize this fear and take advantage of it. While for this exact reason, the instrumentalization of migration as a tool of foreign policy deserves much more attention than it currently has as it seems by all accounts it will stay around for a while.

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DECLARATION

As a master's student at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, I hereby declare that for the purpose of writing this Master Thesis titled "MIGRATION CONTROL AS A TOOL IN FOREIGN POLICY":

- I have read documents related to plagiarism, as defined by the Statute of the University of Sarajevo, the Code of Ethics of the University of Sarajevo, and the rules of study relating to the I and II cycle of studies, integrated study program I and II cycle and III cycle a study at the University of Sarajevo. As well as for instructions on plagiarism listed on the University of Sarajevo website;
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