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Diaspora Policies and Remittances
A comparative Case Study of the Western Balkan 6
Master Thesis

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Table of contents:

- Acknowledgments 4
- 1. Introduction..... 5
 - 1.1. Research question, hypothesis, and argument..... 6
 - 1.2. Problem and the significance of the study..... 7
 - 1.3. Methodology 8
 - 1.3.1. Data collection..... 8
 - 1.3.2. Data processing 10
 - 1.3.3. Limitations of the study..... 12
- 2. Theoretical background: Diaspora institutions, policies, and remittances..... 14
 - 2.1. Diaspora institutions 16
 - 2.1.1. Types of diaspora institutions 18
 - 2.1.2. Tapping perspective 20
 - 2.1.3. Embracing perspective 20
 - 2.1.4. Governance perspective..... 21
 - 2.1.5. Future of diaspora institutions – Road to global migration governance?..... 22
 - 2.2. Diaspora policies 22
 - 2.2.1. Home-state – diaspora relations 24
 - 2.2.2. Current developments in diaspora policy research 26
 - 2.2.3. Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) – theoretical backgorund 29
 - 2.3. Remittances..... 32
 - 2.3.1. Remittances and economic growth..... 34
 - 2.3.2. Remittances and equality..... 37
- 3. Western Balkan 6, diaspora policies and remittances – analysis..... 38
 - 3.1. Republic of Albania..... 39
 - 3.1.1. Citizenship/Nationality 41
 - 3.1.2. Suffrage 42
 - 3.1.3. Administration..... 43
 - 3.1.4. Symbolic policies 44
 - 3.1.5. Economic policies 45
 - 3.1.6. Cultural and social policies 45
 - 3.1.7. Participation of diaspora in the country’s institutions and their obligations 46
 - 3.2. Bosnia and Herzegovina 47
 - 3.2.1. Citizenship/Nationality 49
 - 3.2.2. Suffrage 50

3.2.3.	Regulation of the political competition.....	52
3.2.4.	Administration.....	52
3.2.5.	Symbolic policies	53
3.3.	Kosovo*	55
3.3.1.	Citizenship/Nationality	56
3.3.2.	Suffrage	57
3.3.3.	Administration.....	59
3.3.4.	Symbolic policies	59
3.3.5.	Economic policies	60
3.3.6.	Cultural and social policies	61
3.3.7.	Participation of diaspora in Kosovo institutions and their obligations	62
3.4.	Montenegro.....	62
3.4.1.	Citizenship/Nationality	63
3.4.2.	Suffrage	64
3.4.3.	Administration.....	66
3.4.4.	Symbolic policies	67
3.4.5.	Economic policies	68
3.4.6.	Cultural and social policies	69
3.4.7.	Participation of diaspora in the country's institutions and their obligations	70
3.5.	Republic North Macedonia.....	71
3.5.1.	Citizenship/Nationality	72
3.5.2.	Suffrage	73
3.5.3.	Regulation of political competition.....	74
3.5.4.	Administration.....	75
3.5.5.	Symbolic policies	75
3.6.	Republic of Serbia.....	76
3.6.1.	Citizenship/Nationality	77
3.6.2.	Suffrage	78
3.6.3.	Regulation of the political competition.....	80
3.6.4.	Administration.....	81
3.6.5.	Symbolic policies	81
3.6.6.	Economic policies	82
3.6.7.	Cultural and social policies	83
3.6.8.	Participation of diaspora in the country's institutions and their obligations	83
3.7.	Emigrant policies index – Western Balkan 6	84
3.7.1.	Emigrant Policies Index – Comparison with previous research	89

3.7.2. Diaspora policies and remittances	92
4. Policy Recommendations	94
5. Conclusion	100
6. Literature:.....	104
6.1. Useful websites:	109
7. Appendix.....	111

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1. Introduction

For almost a century now, countries around the world have tried to find different institutional frameworks to take advantages that diaspora governing brings. Mostly, countries invest their resources to reach out to diaspora and establish a connection between home country and its expats. Parallel to changing contexts, the relationship with diaspora tends to evolve as well, it changed over the years, especially after the end of Cold War. This has been triggered by the mass migration towards Western Europe due to the vanishing of the political boundary, known as the fall of the Iron Curtain, coinciding with the end of the Cold War. As Gamlen (2014, 181) notes, until recently diaspora engagement initiatives were “typically uncoordinated: Various origin state-agencies targeted or interacted with emigrants and their descendants in different direct and indirect ways.” The main reasons behind countries rising interest into institutionalizing diaspora governance are high levels of emigration and even higher levels of remittances, which can be defined as “household incomes received from abroad, resulting mainly from the international migration of workers. (Yang 2011, 129)”

In this thesis, I research the influence of diaspora policies created by governments measured by the emigrant policy index (EMIX) in the Western Balkans. The ‘Western Balkan 6’ (WB6) is a newly forged term formed by European Union. It is the region of six non-EU members that all have a strategic goal of joining the Union. Namely in the Western Balkan 6 we count Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*¹, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. Here needs to be highlighted that there is no common solution that all the WB6 countries implemented when it comes to diaspora policies. Rather, countries have individually created institutions according to their interests and even changed it over the years. Remittances played a major role in the decision-making process considering that in some countries like Montenegro remittances have 25.4% share of national gross domestic product (GDP) (Kondan 2020).

Throughout this thesis I build on the established literature on the topics of diaspora institutions, policies, and remittances. I consider the theories of respected authors and apply them to the countries of the Western Balkan region. The empirical results I presented show

¹ *- This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

that there are several similarity traits between the countries like the historic periods of emigration, positive relationship with their diaspora and trend of strengthening the connections between home country and emigrants abroad. Even though I mostly examined current laws that influence state-diaspora relationship, I also acknowledge the opinions of respected authors. Finally, after conducting this research I was able to formulate multiple policy recommendations both for the region as well as for single countries.

In the first part of this thesis, I present the research problem and the significance of the study, define key terms, present my research question and methodology. The following section is devoted to the theoretical background and literature review, focused namely on, diaspora policies, diaspora institutions, and remittances. The theoretical underpinning of the emigrant policy index, developed by Lucy Pedroza and Pau Palop-García will also be presented in this part. The third section of this thesis analyses each of the countries diaspora policies followed by the calculations of the emigrant policy index (EMIX) as recommended by Pedroza and Palop-García (2017a, 2017b). The following section takes a comparative perspective of the WB6 with those in Latin American and Caribbean region. The fourth section contains several policy recommendations, including for every country separately and then for the region. The concluding section reflects on the work done and the impact of the findings on current discussions about diaspora policies and remittances.

1.1. Research question, hypothesis, and argument

Even though some of the research has already been made when it comes to diaspora policies the cases that were taken into the consideration were in Latin America (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, 2019) or more theoretical (Ragazzi 2014, Gamlen 2014). On the other side, the research about remittances is wide, authors examined migrant remittances (Yang 2011), the influence of remittances on the development (Rapoport, Docquier 2006), inequality (Milanovic 1987, Newman 2004) or civil war (Regan, Frank 2014). Reading the current literature and research about the topics of diaspora policies and remittances, and influenced by the paper by Lucy Pedroza and Pau Palop-García (2017) I constructed the following research question for my thesis: *What is the influence of countries diaspora policies on its level of remittances?*

Following the research question, I am trying to prove the following hypothesis: *Higher the score of diaspora policies – higher the amount of formal monetary remittances will be.*

Detailed description of the means of measurement for diaspora policies, as well as for the remittances are described in the methodology part of this thesis.

I argue that when a country's government decides to engage with its diaspora, it creates new and upgrade current policies, which leads to the creation of the political and legal framework for financing of the diaspora institutions. These diaspora institutions take concrete political actions and create projects (cultural, educational or even financial) that help engagement with diaspora. This leads to re-connecting between home country and diaspora, who is now more informed about the possibilities to remitt and invest in the home country. Finally, diaspora decides to remitt more then before.

1.2. Problem and the significance of the study

Studies about diaspora and diaspora policies are relatively new. With the ever-growing globalization comes the faster migration. With the development of new technologies as well as, integration into bigger trade treaties like European Union, CEFTA and NAFTA people became more mobile, as these treaties usually broth free flow of labor force. This created big communities of emigrants around the world that have higher influence on their homelands then it can be expected. My research examines this from another perspective. Considering that most of the developing countries have significant inflow of remittances from emigration abroad (Kondan 2020) the problem that I research is what did the home countries of these emigrants do to attract their diasporas to remit more. Keeping in mind that the proportion of the monetary remittances in the countries' gross domestic product (GDP) in Western Balkan 6 ranges from 4 to 25% (Kondan 2020) and that trends of emigration from these countries is getting higher with every year the cases that were chosen for this study are justified.

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia have all introduced some diaspora policies in their laws. To date, the level of the introduction of these policies has not been analyzed comparatively by research, neither qualitatively nor quantitatively. This problem of under research of the diaspora policies in this area is tackled

in this thesis, as well as, the different policy and institutional designs and solutions countries adopted to address their diasporas abroad. While primarily analysing laws that countries of Western Balkan have that are in close connection with emigration, I expect to fill the gap that exist in the diaspora research in this region.

This study offers quantitative and qualitative background for the future research in the topic of diaspora studies in Western Balkans. This methodological foundation as well as social and economic background of the study makes it scientifically significant.

Another reason to claim the significance of this study is the possibility to influence the policy makers of the respected countries to align their diaspora policies towards the diasporas of national minorities that live in the respective homelands. Considering the current political situation in Western Balkans, I need to say here that while the scenario of a cooperative approach of these countries towards their diaspora is highly unlikely, theoretically, this study can help future policy makers compare, adapt and introduce different diaspora policies in order to get the most effective and productive result for their countries' economies and societies.

1.3. Methodology

1.3.1. Data collection

Data for this master thesis was collected with the help of the CodeBook provided by Prof. Palop-García. I followed the rules of the Emigrant policy index and searched for specific information that is requested for the creation of the index. Data was collected, with breaks, from March until November 2021. For the EMIX data I have used the laws and constitutions of the respective countries. Roughly 75% of the data was collected this way. The other 25% were collected differently from country to country. For the Republic of Serbia, the questionnaire was answered by Consulate General of the Republic of Serbia in Salzburg and its chief Svetlana Lala Stanković. In the case of Albania and Kosovo* most of the information

were found online and in the respected diaspora laws. For Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia no data could be found and the representatives of these countries were not responsive to my messages through official e-Mails. Finally, in case of Montenegro, I was helped by the consul Nikola Perović from Consulate of Montenegro in Frankfurt who pointed me to Montenegro's diaspora – emigrants law.

As it will be seen later in the paper, data necessary for calculating the Emigrant policy index has two sub-components: policy and administration. For both subcomponent qualitative data was coded in accordance with the Codebook (2017) provided by Prof. Palop-García. More about codification of the data will be explained in the next chapter as well as in appendix. Policy subcomponent is more complicated than the administration, considering that it has more values that need to be collected in order to do the final count. These values are citizenship, suffrage, regulation of political competition, economic policies, obligations, cultural policies, social policies, symbolic policies, exit and transit policies and institutional participation (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017).

To gather knowledge about citizenship laws of countries included in this research, I completed an analysis of the legal landscape. In the case of suffrage (active and passive voting rights) my main source of information were electoral laws and rulebooks. For Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia this electoral code is same for all the elections held in the country. On the other side, for Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo* and Serbia I needed to look through different laws for specific elections (presidential, parliamentary or referendum). These laws were also helpful for the subchapter about regulation of political competition. Still, here I need to highlight that none of the countries in this research have any exact regulation when it comes to campaign, political representation and competition abroad. Data about economic policies was the most complex as it is constituted by programs and projects that are not always transparent in Western Balkan. In case of Albania, Kosovo* and Montenegro this data as well as the data about social, symbolic, cultural, exit and transit policies and institutional participation was found in the respective diaspora laws. In the case of Republic of Serbia, the data about economic policies was gathered through the interview with Consul General of Republic of Serbia in Salzburg Svetlana Lala Stanković. The answers from this interview can be found in Appendix II of this paper. For the answers that could not be given by Ms. Stankovic, I used Serbia's diaspora law and online resources (official government webpages). In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, no data

could be found online about the economic, cultural social and symbolic policies aimed towards their diaspora.

Finally, administration subcomponent is divided into two parts – administration exterior and administration home. The data for this subcomponent was collected solely from the websites of Ministries of foreign affairs of countries in Western Balkan region. More detailed information about the constitutes of these sub-subcomponents can be found in the Table 1 provided in the Appendix of this thesis.

The remittances data was found on World Bank Open Data website for the year 2020 considering it is the last financial year before this research. To secure better presentation and understanding of the data I have divided remittances data with the estimated number of emigrants for every country in this research. The data about the total number of emigrants was collected from the Migration Policy Institute website, except for Kosovo* where World Bank data was used.

1.3.2. Data processing

As for the data gathering, data processing for the Emigrant Policy index was mostly guided by EMIX Codebook (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017). All the qualitative data (except data about number of diplomatic missions of the respective countries) was coded with the values between 0 and 1 on the ordinal and interval scale. More detailed explanation about codification of every single value needed for the paper can be found in the Appendix.

As mentioned above, Emigrant Policy Index is calculated in an equation that includes policy and administration sub-component. Both sub-components are constructed by calculating the values of sub-subcomponents (citizenship, suffrage, social policies, economic policies...) that are calculated with the values coded from qualitative data that was gathered. Considering that I do not have an explicit permission from the authors to publish full EMIX CodeBook with the codification rules and calculations I will present only the final calculations of sub-components and final Emigrant Policy Index equation.

When it comes to policy, the formula used in this research is:

$$POLICIESp2 = 0,2 \times Citizenship + 0,1 \times Suffrights + 0,1 \times Inst + 0,15 \times Eco + 0,05 \times Obligation + 0,1 \times Cultural + 0,1 \times Symbolic + 0,05 \times Exitrans + 0,05 \times Soc + 0,1 \times Polcomp$$

Where *Citizenship* resembles the citizenship laws and rules country has, *Suffrights* passive and active electoral rights, *Inst* institutional participation, *Eco* economic policies, *Obligation* obligations that emigrants must home country, *Cultural* cultural policies adopted by the home country aimed towards cultural promotion in diaspora, *Symbolic* for symbolic policies, *Exitrans* for exit and transit policies, *Soc* for social policies and finally *Polcomp* for political competition. The range of results is from 0 to 1 where 0 means that home country “has not adopted any of the policies included in the scheme” and 1 means that home country “has adopted all the policies included in the scheme” (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, 34-35).

On the other hand, administration formula used in this research is:

$$ADM_p2 = 0,6 \times ADMHOME + 0,4 \times ADMEXT$$

Where *ADMHOME* stands for diaspora institutions developed by home country on its territory and *ADMEXT* stands for diplomatic missions and services provided abroad. The range of results is from 0 to 1 where 0 means “no home administration dedicated to emigrant issues” while 1 means that home country “counts with a home administration dedicated to emigrant issues and it is placed at the “ministry” level in the administrative hierarchical structure. (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, 34)”

Finally, Emigrant Policy index score is calculated by adding the previous two sub-components and goes as following:

$$EMIXp2 = 0,7 \times Policesp2 + 0,3 \times ADMp2$$

The range is as always from 0 to 1 where 0 means that home country “has not adopted any of the policies included in the scheme, neither developed an administration setting to coordinate and implement emigrant policies” and 1 means that home country “has adopted all the policies included in the scheme and developed an administration setting to coordinate and implement emigrant policies. (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, 35)”

Considering that my data set includes only 6 countries of Western Balkan area I had problems with finding the suitable statistical model to research the statistical correlation between EMIX score and countries’ remittance rates. Therefore, the main scientific method used to test my hypothesis is the comparative method. In 3.8. I present the data I gathered and did the comparison of the values of remittances and already counted EMIX score.

Finally, the method chosen for this thesis, namely comparative method needs an explanation of its virtues. The comparative method is superior to statistical methodology when it comes to the smaller number of cases considering the limited samples (Steinmetz 2021). Having on mind that in this thesis I use only six cases the comparative method seems like a perfect fit. Additionally, as Steinmetz (2021, 174) argue, this method “involves analyzing the relationship between variables that are different or similar to one another.” In the sense of this thesis, several similarities can be found between the countries of Western Balkan: Excluding Albania, all of the countries were members of former SFR Yugoslavia, nominally all of the countries are on their way towards European Union and all of them have diaspora all across the world that emigrated in similar time waves.

1.3.3. Limitations of the study

Considering that I use both qualitative and quantitative methods in my thesis the general limitations of both can be applied. When it comes to quantitative research, the limitations are: improper representation of the target population, lack of resources for data collections, inability to control for the environment and requirement of extra resources to analyse the results (Chetty, 2016). Having in mind that calculation of the EMIX score includes only simple mathematic operations, for this research I have used Microsoft Excel because of the accessibility and user-friendly design.

The main hypothesis testing method used in this research is comparative method. Considering the small sample number, this was the best method to examine the relationship between diaspora policy score and remittances. Still, it needs to be highlighted that this method has number of limitations. As Azarian claims, “in the absence of enough independent, self-contained cases to be compared in order to identify casual patterns, the researcher is thus often left with a substitute, namely that of narrating a story instead” (Azarian 2011, 120). Indeed, as it can be seen in section 3.8. the correlation between my two variables is explained trough the narration of two values. Furthermore, the absence of large enough number of cases prevents the analyst from using the conventional statistical methods, because of this comparative method remains the most valuable method (Azarian 2011). This creates “an inherent bias in the structure of comparison, with far reaching implications for the validity of the outcomes of these studies especially with regards to their generality” (Azarian 2011, 121).

Finally, in order to tackle these problems Azarian recommends that following questions need to be seriously addressed: “in what aspect and to what extent these given units are really comparable; what conditions are required to make any comparison among them meaningful; how we are to safeguard ourselves against the pitfalls in comparing incomparable units belonging to different contexts; and what are the alternative comparisons that could be carried out with possibly different sets of units, pointing at possibly different solutions” (Azarian 2011, 121) . These questions will be answered further in the thesis.

Two other methods that were taken into consideration when it comes to hypothesis testing were ordinary linear regression and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). When it comes to ordinary linear regression my model could not be investigated by this method because of already mentioned small number of cases. When it comes to QCA the problem was of different nature, my hypothesis included examination of the influence one specific variable (diaspora policies expressed through EMIX) has on the other (remittances). Unfortunately, QCA is not a method that can do this but rather possible outcomes of multiple combinations of the variables (Simister, Scholz, 2017).

On the other hand, qualitative research has the following problems: no result verification, difficulty to investigate causality (Chetty, 2016). To tackle this issue, I have compared my results to the ones done in the previous research. This was important to be sure that the results I got were on the right track and ready for the codification.

Other limitations of the study come from the data accessibility problem. Most of the data was collected throughout reading the laws and constitutions of the respective countries. Some of the laws needed for this study were not available online or were hardly accessible due to lack of website navigation. Additionally, it should be taken into account that in case of the Republic of Albania the data was collected with the help of online translation services considering that I do not speak the language. For the other countries, I read the laws and articles on the original language.

In the section about diaspora institutions, overreliance on one author Alan Gamlen (2014, 2017, 2019a, 2019b) can be argued. Here needs to be highlighted that even though I tried to diversify the literature all the authors would return to Gamlen and use his theory of diaspora outreach. Other notable authors (Mahiu 2019, Délano, Mylonas 2019, Liu 2022) also have significant inputs in the theory of diaspora institutions and their work is mentioned further in

the thesis. Still, in connection with the structure of this thesis Gamlen's work remains the most common.

Finally, another limitation that needs to be mentioned is the territorial constraint of the study which leads to the lack of generalisability. This master thesis is limited to the area of Western Balkan and therefore cannot be generalized to other regions of the world. Similar research was conducted by Pedroza and Palop-Garsía (2017) for the region of Latin America and Caribbean. Authors are invited to apply this research to other regions to create a wider picture how do diaspora policies rank around the world.

2. Theoretical background: Diaspora institutions, policies, and remittances

This section focuses on current research in the diaspora with a specific focus on diaspora policies and economic remittances. Even though diaspora institutions are not the central part of this thesis, it is important to have a short analysis of government solutions having in mind that at these institutions are the creators of diaspora policies.

The term 'diaspora' is not easy to define. Throughout history the terms meaning changed significantly multiple times. For the purposes of this thesis, I will use the definition of diaspora proposed by International Organization for Migration (IOM). IOM defines diaspora as "migrants or descendant of migrants, whose identity and sense of belonging have been shaped by their migration experience and background; they maintain links with their homelands, and to each other, based on a shared sense of history, identity, or mutual experiences in the destination country" (IOM Glossary on Migration, 2019). Broader term in the sense of diaspora studies – emigrants for the purposes of this thesis are defined as people "who have left their country of origin, be it because they reside abroad or because they are in transit journey, with or without travel documents, and also those who, by virtue of belonging to an emigrant community could claim citizenship/nationality, even if they do not have it presently" (Pedroza, Palop-García 2021, 363).

As Ozturk and Hoyo (2020, 2) claim, “the institutional or factual relationships between home states and their emigrants have always existed, at least in the traditional form of consular protection or in very specific areas, such as the economy (i.e. remittances).” Still, we can say that the real expansion of diaspora institutions and policies came into effect in the last quarter of century. The goal was always the same to bring all the diaspora around the globe under the same umbrella of the home state. Sometimes home countries are focused more on the cultural heritage, other times it’s solely because of the remittances, but the better ways of reaching out for its emigration are always researched and applied. In general, diaspora related literature is focused on a variety of topics such as the relationship of state and diaspora, evolution of this engagement through diaspora policies and the different tiers that characterize diaspora engagement policies (Ozturk, Hoyo 2020).

Diaspora scholars explored diaspora politics from different perspectives some of them including international relations, sociology, anthropology, history and peace and war studies with a special focus on diaspora mobilization (Ozturk, Hoyo 2020). Multiple articles have been written by scholars from all around the world describing the relationship between state and diaspora. In the focus were not only the relationship between home state and its emigration but also a perspective of host state (or the country emigrants went to) and its engagement with immigration, as well as with specific ethnic groups. Ozturk and Hoyo return to Elise Feron’s theory of “diaspora mobilization through vertical interactions among different diaspora groups and transnational networks that go beyond home and host state corridors of engagement” (Ozturk, Hoyo 2020, 3). This theory is also important to understand that some of the scholars’ research went out of the mainstream framework of state-diaspora research and introduced the space that diaspora uses and it is not (or it is very little) controlled by any country.

With this short retrospective of other approaches that research diaspora from other perspectives, I continue to the theoretic discussion of the core topics in this master thesis: diaspora institutions, diaspora policies and remittances. The subtitles that will follow are organized in the same order.

2.1. Diaspora institutions

The rise of diaspora institutions is closely connected with the globalization of the world mainly because of the new ways of communication as well as faster and safer possibilities of traveling. These institutions are sometimes ignored mostly because of their newness but also because they are in so called ‘gray’ zone between internal and external politics, an area that is growing and is more dynamic and important as the time passes (Gamlen 2014). On the other side, Page and Mercer (2018) claim that the key actor in this development were the governments in the Global South which are mostly seen as diaspora-sending countries.

Diaspora institutions are defined in this thesis as „formal state offices dedicated to emigrants and their decendants” (Gamlen 2014, 182). This definition includes “full ministries, shared ministries, departments, and interdepartmental committees within the executive branch of government; it also includes legislative-branch institutions, such as parliamentary standing committees, dedicated seats in the upper or lower house of the legislature, and councils formally appointed to advise on legislation affecting diaspora groups” (Gamlen 2014, 182).

The relationship of the state towards its diaspora also changes throughout the years. It is important to highlight that “émigré groups once spurned by their homeland governments as defectors are now honored as national heroes, bestowed with awards, and celebrated in national congresses and holidays; they are granted new categories of ‘external citizenship’ and opportunities for political participation” (Gamlen 2014, 181). In the home-countries around the globe, emigrants were once labeled as victims, deserters, or traitors but now they are more referred to as altruistic heroes. This is an important change in the approach towards the diaspora which lead first to the creation of the new institutions and later to diaspora policies. Until recently diaspora engagement was rarely coordinated, different states approached their diaspora in different manner, sometimes directly sometimes indirectly (Gamlen 2014). As Gamlen in his later work claims, “to support and coordinate these initiatives, a growing number of home countries have established diaspora institutions” (Gamlen et al. 2017, 493).

Rise of diaspora institutions happened in phases. Gamlen identifies three phases of diaspora institutions development (Gamlen 2019a):

- a.) Accompaniment to post-totalitarian nation-building projects of the twentieth century (from Second World War until roughly the 90s)
- b.) Product of the acceleration of cross-border flows withing the EU and similar regional integration schemes (from 90s to 2000s)
- c.) Product of an international effort spearheaded by the United Nations to create a global governance regime for migration (from 2000s)

Since the 1980s we have seen the rapid growth in the number of diaspora institutions. From a handful number of government bodies in the 80s now over half of all states in the United Nations have one (Gamlen 2014). The question is, what is the function of these now widespread institutions? As Gamlen claims, “Diaspora institutions extend domestic realms beyond national borders, projecting infrastructural power extraterritorially, shaping migrants’ senses of self, and reconfiguring the spatiality of states in ways unimagined by modernist geopolitical thinking, where the competitive, territorially, discrete nation-state unit is the ideal organizational form” (Gamlen 2014, 183). Until 2000 the number of diaspora institutions was relatively low, only 41 states had some kind of diaspora institutions. By 2005, after a period of promotion of diaspora institutions by United Nations under Kofi Annan this number grew up to 52 states. In the next ten years situation changed dramatically, 118 states had diaspora institutions, 31 of these had ministries (Gamlen 2019b, 182). We can see here that just in few years diaspora institutions went from rare and regional creation to the global model promoted around the world. To explain this (un)expected growth, Gamlen uses the world society theory, which claims that “international organizations, migration experts, consultants, advocates, and advisors of various kinds have developed professional expertise about diasporas, which is now cast as a specific kind of policy problem to be solved rationally by a specific kind of organization: a diaspora institution” (Gamlen 2019b, 186).

Finally, the activities of these diaspora institutions are widespread. Page and Mercer (2018, 321) include “identifying and mapping the diaspora; building trust with the diaspora through initiatives such as extending dual citizenship, holding cultural events and providing services to those abroad, and finally incentivising individuals in the diaspora to invest in their homeland through information centres, tax breaks, ‘diaspora days’ and other policy fora.” In section 3 of my thesis I am taking a step back and examine how are these activities applied in the countries of Western Balkan.

2.1.1. Types of diaspora institutions

Even though the rise of diaspora institutions was rapid one question still remains unanswered, namely what types of diaspora institutions exist? Diaspora institutions are usually formed to rationalize ad hoc government policies that have a goal to impact emigrants and their descendants in a rather uncoordinated way (Gamlen 2019a). It is important to say that diaspora institutions often have similar functions as consulates of the respective countries. Still, “the legitimate scope of consular relations, defined in the Vienna Convention, includes issuing passports and travel documents, acting as notary and civil registrar, protecting unaccompanied minors, and arranging appropriate legal representation where needed” (Gamlen 2019a, 41). It is important to highlight that diaspora institutions do not always exist for the reasons they say they do, as “consular services may provide cover for diplomatic and military intelligence activities, diaspora engagement policies may exist for range of unstated reasons” (Gamlen 2019a, 42).

To catch the gap between stated and actual functions of diaspora institutions Gamlen proposes to compare the aims of diaspora departments with the aims of their wider parent ministries.

When it comes to diaspora departments, it is usually associated with the economic functions of the institution. Still, as Gamlen highlights it is surprising that they are almost never in the jurisdiction of economic development or labor ministries, (Gamlen 2019a) These departments are there to protect the rights of the workers both in the home country or host country. They can also have political function as a governmental body with the task to ‘round’ all of its diaspora and share cultural and social heritage of the home country with them. As said before, formation (and dissolution) of these departments is dependent on the political will in most of the world’s countries and mostly come as an ad hoc reaction of the establishment.

On the other side, diaspora ministries are higher level of the diaspora institution with sole function of engaging with diaspora. In practice, these ministries are rarely independent and just for diaspora policies. Usually, they are sharing the office with the ministry of foreign affairs or social services. As Gamlen claims, “in a reflection of the increasing importance states have been attributing to diasporas, more than fifty fully fledged diaspora ministries have been established” (Gamlen 2019a, 45). The other types of diaspora institutions can be

interdepartmental committees, legislative committees, advisory councils and special electorates (Gamlen 2019a).

Diaspora institutions do not even need to be clearly connected to the government, some of the sub-state actors' motivations and objectives in relations to diaspora are "formed separately from state policies and institutions, which on a occasion lead to more positive reactions from the populations that they target" (Délano, Mylonas 2019, 478). The prime example of these unconventional types of diaspora institutions are religious institutions, which take the role of the centre of diaspora engagements mostly for the countries where government structures are weak and there is no coherent diaspora policy.

As we will also see later in the diaspora policy chapter the main part of Gamlen's diaspora theory are three government perspectives (or explanations) towards diaspora (Gamlen 2014, 2019a, 2019b, Gamlen et. al 2017):

1. Tapping perspective
2. Embracing perspective
3. Governance perspective

Before I go deeper into Gamlen's analysis of types of diaspora institutions it is important to present the theory by Rilke Mahieu (2019) who classifies the interests of the home-country based on rationality. Mahieu (2019, 194) examining Moroccan diaspora institutions and policies argues that there are two types of government's institutions rationality: homeland-centered and diaspora-centered. This means that diaspora institutions are influenced by the changing interests of the government. Namely, throughout time government can have an interest to support investments in the homeland to rise development of the country. This can be done with the help of diaspora institutions that will, for example, create tax relives on direct investments from diaspora. On the other hand, diaspora-centered rationality means creating policies that embrace diaspora making them feel respected and remembered by home country.

2.1.2. Tapping perspective

In order to explain the tapping of diaspora resources Gamlen goes a step backwards and ‘borrows’ an explanation from new economics of labor migration (Gamlen 2014, 186-187):

- a.) Migration is driven by demand for migrants’ remittances, which have grown to outstrip development aid and can tide families through tough times while generating ‘multiplier effects’ for the wider economy.
- b.) Costly skills lost with educated emigrants can be recouped when diaspora remain connected, using new information and communications technologies to transmit expertise and facilitate access to global decision-makers and opinion shapers.

When we take this into account, we can say that considering the ‘tapping’ perspective, diaspora institutions emerge as home states ‘tap’ the possible economic resources (remittances) of their diasporas. These resources can be used in times of crisis or transferred to development funds to re-build a country. How and where are these remittances used is explained in the part of the thesis that examines diaspora remittances. On top of that, Gamlen highlights those economic reasons are not the only reasons why countries ‘tap’ their diaspora, “security and foreign policy interests may also drive state to do so; exile fosters nationalism, creating both threats and opportunities for origin states” (Gamlen 2014, 187).

2.1.3. Embracing perspective

With the goal to understand embracing perspective, I need to add here that the important pre-requirement for the ‘tapping’ perspective is thinking of the nation states as rational actors. On the other side, transnationalism, which is also undividable part of diaspora, refers to “the multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states; it includes not just the money migrants sent home, but also their transformative political, cultural, and ‘social’ remittances” (Gamlen 2014, 188). Having this theory on mind, Gamlen concludes that “diaspora institutions represent ‘state-led transnationalism’; they project states’ domestic policies beyond their borders into populations that both reside abroad and also

remain involved at home” (Gamlen 2014, 189). This means that there is a fundamental difference between tapping and embracing perspective. While tapping operates in the world of real and ‘countable’ benefits of the engagement, embracing perspective goes outside of this framework and goes into the world of ideas, feelings, and general knowledge.

2.1.4. Governance perspective

To overcome the theoretical gap created by tapping and embracing perspective, Gamlen introduced new approach that relates more toward the global governance. This approach is simply named ‘diaspora governance’ (Gamlen 2014, 192). Gamlen claims that governmentality is gaining ground in studies of state-diaspora relations because “governments lack reliable coercive powers beyond their legal jurisdictions, and therefore, the effectiveness of extra-territorial policies depends on the ability to make migrants self-identify as loyal, self-disciplining subjects” (Gamlen 2014, 193). It is possible to affirm that countries simply want more control and power, even if it is beyond their state borders. To achieve this aim, they create the institutions that target that diaspora ‘discipline’. Existing studies on this perspective “focus a lot on origin-state efforts to make migrants think and act as loyal diaspora communities, but very little on global efforts to make states think of themselves as members of an international community responsible for people beyond their own borders” (Gamlen 2014, 194).

From the governing perspective “diaspora institutions further an ongoing international quest for a coherent system of global governance in the area of migration” (Gamlen et al. 2017, 500). This is important not only for the present of the diaspora institutions and policies but also for the future. The question: is what will these new globalized institutions bring to the diaspora governance in general? Beforehand, a clarification regarding how this perspective can influence the current institutional solutions is needed. Gamlen and his co-authors claim that “the global migration governance agenda may also have had indirect effects on diaspora institution emergence; diaspora institution ‘models’ and ‘best practices’ may also have spread through shared benchmarking processes where different institutions observe, imitate and learn from each other recursively” (Gamlen et al. 2017, 501).

2.1.5. Future of diaspora institutions – Road to global migration governance?

In his work Gamlen critiques the lack of global governance like the World Trade Organization or International Monetary Fund which already regulate the global flows in their areas. Instead, the global migration governance is a multi-layered patch-work of regulatory institutions and practices. (Gamlen 2019a, 186) As he later claims, “in the spirit of renewed partnership between states and markets, the world needed a global migration regime ‘based on a principle of regulated openness – a principle which shuns the doctrine of exclusion but does not advocate free and unfettered movements across sovereign states’” (Gamlen 2019a, 187). Unfortunately, considering the difficulties of the bi-polar world and the complexity of the international relations, multilateral cooperation of diaspora institutions never succeeds, and we are still at the level of regional blocks.

Especially now after the escalation of conflicts in Syria and Afghanistan, the global governance of diaspora is needed, and multilateral actions are necessary. Around the world it is possible to notice that there are the different regional solutions and diaspora offices with the prime example in the European Union (Gamlen 2019b). Still, when it comes to the region of the Western Balkans, there is no multilateral institution that governs the migration of this area created by the respective countries in this part of Europe. The main institution for the migration is International Organization of Migration with its regional offices and headquarters in Vienna. Although some of the institutional solutions in the Western Balkan are similar there is no coherent and planned development, but more of ad hoc institutions and ministries that are created for daily political needs.

2.2. Diaspora policies

Mainstream scholars of migration policy are still more concentrated on immigration policy, although it is needed to be said that “formal state initiatives towards emigration and emigrants have also recently become a widespread feature of politics in many parts of the world” (Délano, Gamlen 2014, 43). The focus of this part of the thesis are the products of the diaspora institutions – diaspora policies. It is important to understand that diaspora policies

are usually perceived as integral part of the international relations and goes hand in hand with countries politics and type of government. As Ragazzi (2014, 74) claims, “an increasing number of governments and international organizations have developed policies intended to incorporate populations abroad in a variety of domains, such as citizenship, economic development and diplomatic service”. This means that diaspora policies are not represented only in one specific field (e.g. social policies), but occur across different areas of politics and laws such as citizenship, economy, culture and social services.

Diaspora (emigrant) policies are defined as policies “that states develop to establish a new relation towards or keep the link with their emigrants” (Pedroza, Palop-Garsía 2017, 168). This concept “includes but is not limited to dual nationality, remittance facilitation or external voting policies, which are policies that have been used before as indicators of states’ interest and engagement with diasporas” (Pedroza, Palop-Garsía 2017, 168).

As we could see in the part about diaspora institutions, diaspora did not concern the governments before the 1980. With the rise of diaspora institutions came, naturally, the rise of diaspora policies. The question is, what caused that change, why did countries all over the world decide to suddenly make an ‘diaspora turn’ (Ragazzi 2014). It is important to highlight that “after being ignored or rejected from the national discourses for many years, populations abroad are now being represented as constitutive elements of the national population, passing from ‘traitors to heroes’; the term “diaspora” itself has proliferated as a positive signifier to designate populations abroad and their symbolic link to the homeland” (Ragazzi 2014, 75). This led to the re-integration of diaspora to the home state. At first, it was through bureaucratic processes and afterwards through different manifestations in the countries all over the world. The next step was redesigning of the representation, “with governments extending political rights to their population abroad through the right to vote, the right to have dedicated representatives and the right to be elected” (Ragazzi 2014, 76). In the thesis how deep the countries of Western Balkan implemented these policies.

As said before, governments used the diaspora policy as a simple extension of its position in international relations. The most important current development is that “many governments consider the permanent stay of their populations abroad as an asset for the development of the economy” (Ragazzi 2014, 76). Due to this reason, Ragazzi (2014, 76) highlights that “identifying the characteristic features of diaspora policies is key to assessing the ability of explanatory frameworks to account for these characteristics and their regularities.” In conclusion, it is possible to affirm that “diaspora policies are not located on one side or the

other of the traditional divide between ethnic and civic conceptions of citizenship, they are, instead, the framework within which a new geography of citizenship is legitimized and invested by conflicting conceptions of ethnicity and belonging” (Ragazzi 2014, 86). This thesis also carries on about citizenship policies and the importance that laws have on diaspora policies overall, furthermore, in this field, different solutions lead to different outcomes regarding diaspora engagement and remittances.

On the other side, Nir Cohen approaches the problem of diaspora policies from another perspective. Instead of using the term ‘diaspora policies’ Cohen introduces ‘diaspora strategies’ making it more of a planned development of government’s engagement towards its diaspora than a simple ad hoc solution. Cohen (2017, 2) claims that “the popularity of diaspora strategies as a tool in the policy arsenal of sending states, which is linked to a broader ‘diaspora turn’ in policy sciences, has been accompanied by a proliferating scholarly literature”. Confronted with the new problems of economic development and globalization governments turned towards the ‘diaspora option’. Even though it changes through time, this is originally referred to “the idea of capturing financial remittances (and other economic contributions) made primarily by skilled emigrants” (Cohen 2017, 3).

2.2.1. Home-state – diaspora relations

The term ‘diaspora’ is controversial. Before it was reserved for “a few archetypal groups that had managed to maintain an intact identity despite traumatic dispersal in the distant past, but now it is seen more as an indicator of identity in flux” (Délano, Gamlen 2014, 44). Because of this, diaspora policies were not always universal for all the members of country’s emigration. Some of these policies included few while excluding others. Cohen claims that there is “a range of material and discursive practices by which states – through strategies (policies) – use specific identity makers to (dis)claim specific individuals and groups” (Cohen 2017, 5). This is especially true for the governments with unsolved problems between different ethnic groups within the country. Considering this theory, it is expected that governments such as Turkey, with number of Kurdish diaspora will exclude them from their diaspora policies in order to stop the escalation of violence in the country. As Cohen claims (2017,5), these

“neglected emigrants” may also be discriminated on the ground of “their gender, class, race, ethno-religious heritage, or time of emigration”. The change of the relationship between home country and its diaspora is dependant on “the characteristics of the diaspora, the political nature of the regime in the country of origin, official and societal perceptions of emigration, reliance on emigrants’ economic investments and remittances, the role of the diaspora in domestic and international affairs of the country, citizenship laws or state capacity” (Délano, Gamlen 2014, 44). Some authors even argue that governments can have significant financial losses when it comes to diaspora engagement. It is important to highlight that “significant and logistical costs involved in campaigning and organising the electoral process in diaspora are regularly hard to justify with the usually meagre participation rates of diaspora voters” (Délano, Mylonas 2019, 477). It is not only the elections that government can lose a lot of money on. Investment in diaspora is risky, money that goes on the education of diaspora abroad can be lost if the people do not show any interest into teaching their kids the language and the culture of the home country. The question that arises now: is why do countries engage then?

Following previous work, Délano and Gamlen (2014) examine diaspora policies through three perspectives: tapping, embracing, and governing. Considering tapping perspective, governments engage with their diaspora creating diaspora policies mostly in order to gain economic benefits from it. In order for this to work remittances are only one part of the bargain. As Délano and Gamlen (2014, 44) claim, “the wider aim of engaging diasporas is for origin states to help achieve an international ‘win-win-win’ outcome from migration, in which migrants exercise the freedom to move and benefit themselves materially, while destination states get cheap labor and skills and origin states – if they tap their diasporas wisely – share in this success”. This means that diaspora policies are created to relax and simplify money transfer between emigrant workers and their relatives in the home states. On top of that, governments do everything in their power to secure strong connection between diaspora and home with different cultural and social events. On the other hand, as mentioned before, embracing perspective is more about identity flux and transnational feelings. Considering this, “state-diaspora relations are a clear example of transnationalism: they involve states spilling across their borders in search of their own people” (Délano, Gamlen 2014, 45). This means that countries nurture transnational feelings of their diaspora, through policies they will make the diaspora feel like the part of the society in home country. Policies made with this perspective on mind would be citizenship policies that allow dual (or multi) citizenship.

Establishing schools that would teach the language of the home country in the host countries would also be one of the ways to “embrace” diaspora all over the world. Délano and Gamlen (2014, 46) argue that “states increasingly base their legitimacy claims not on standards of territorial sovereignty but instead on appeals to popular sovereignty, as representatives of the nation.” Finally, when it comes to governing perspective “the policy mobilities approach depicts policy actors as socially embedded agents rather than instrumentally rational individuals and emphasizes that policy ideas do not move as fixed models, but instead mutate as they move, Chinese-whisper-like, among political actors in an increasingly complex and decentralized array of sites and scales of governance” (Délano, Gamlen 2014, 47). For the governing perspective all of the policies created for diaspora are just one more step towards a more power and rule outside of the territory made of international borders; Diaspora policies become not only transnational but also transborder.

2.2.2. Current developments in diaspora policy research

Diaspora policy research is controversial, considering the reasons why countries decide which policies they implement and the motivation behind it. As Délano and Mylonas (2019, 477) claim, “even though some studies argue that a majority of states have some form of diaspora policies, it is necessary to discern what types of policies are being adopted, how and by whom they are implemented, when and where they matter in practice, when and how they change, how they vary in their interactions with different groups within the diaspora as well as to explore cases where these policies may not exist.” As it is possible to notice, the current state of art in the diaspora policy research has left number of questions unanswered.

Armanda Klekowski (2009) provides a typology of the states considering their position towards diaspora. This typology is made having in mind which types of diaspora policies country uses to engage its diaspora. In this case countries can be divided to:

1. Transnational Nation States – which includes both economical and political emigrants
2. Strategic, Selective States – engage in selected ways, economic or political, whether through bases of legal inclusion or established programs.

3. Disinterested, Denouncing state – which considers the migrants as traitors to the cause, due to the abandonment of their homeland.

Diaspora studies mostly consider the perfect matches between diaspora and a home state. This would mean that for every national community outside of the country there is just one home country. This does not need to be the case. Mylonas (2012) argues that in these cases countries will try to apply assimilation policies to connect communities that speak the same language, have same ethnic and religious origin, and even dress the same. This process, although not violent, trespasses the conventional borders with a goal of national integration (Mylonas 2012). Especially in the context of this thesis it is highlighted that in the area of Western Balkans countries are fighting for the influence and appeal to the emigrants that have nothing to do with them (at least considering the territory). This means that some policies also have national prerequisites that lead to e.g. Serbia introducing policies aimed at its diaspora that identifies as Serbian no matter if the family roots of the individuals are in other surrounding countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro). This is also applicable for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania in connection with Bosniaks in Serbia and Albanians in Kosovo*.

Some authors as Gamlen researched about policy mobilities or how are policies that are applied in one country “transferred” (copied) in another. Gamlen (2019c, 228) claims that “policy mobilities is a fast-growing field; because of its focus on socio-spatial processes, including migration and transportation, the mobilities paradigm has a large following amongst urban geographers”. It is important to highlight that policy mobility is not flawless and perfect process. This process is “a turbulent one in which policies morph, mutate, and hybridize as they move through a constrained multilevel socio-political environment” (Gamlen 2019c, 228). This is essential in the context of empirical part of this thesis. Examples as how some policies that are transferred from other countries worked and how the others failed mostly because of different socio-religious-national circumstances are also given in this thesis.

Tatsiana Kulakevich (2021, 1) introduces an innovative theory, claiming that “countries with weaker rule of law face particularly strong incentives to adopt diaspora engagement policies and engage in initiatives attracting diaspora investment as opposed to the countries with stronger rule of law.” This approach is different than the others in the field of diaspora research because it moves away from the single case studies and gives us a comprehensive view on the influence of rule of law on the level of diaspora engagement. This study also answers the question “why do countries engage?” from a different perspective than other

author (Gamlen 2014, Délano, Gamlen 2019). Kulakevich's (2021, 2) argument is that "countries scoring lower on rule of law scales as opposed to those scoring higher on rule of law scales face particularly strong incentives to adopt diaspora engagement policies and engage initiatives at tracing diaspora investment." For some countries this could be the question of existence. In the situations in which foreign direct investments are limited considering the bad situation in the country (or even sanctions), governments need to turn towards other sources of income. In this case we can expect higher engagement with diaspora through favourable diaspora policies. This is because "countries with weaker rule of law scores are more likely to make conscious decisions to target their diasporas for investment than countries with stronger rule of law that already attract FDI by ensuring competitive environment for all foreign investors" (Kulakevich 2021, 3). Simply said, considering Kulakevich, the countries have two ways in front of them, to improve their rule of law and attract foreign direct investment or to keep the current position but engage with its diaspora, call out patriotic feelings and get direct investment through remittances or diaspora investment.

Another interesting approach in studying diaspora policies is the one that claims that type of regime has a strong influence on the success of diaspora policies (Mirilovic 2016, Klekowski 2019). Mirilovic introduces dyadic approach that emphasizes the connection between both home and host countries as important when it comes to the behaviour and success of diaspora. He claims that "democracy-democracy dyads play a key role in allowing diaspora groups to promote cooperative policymaking between their country of origin and their country of residence; this is the case because diaspora groups can appeal to shared democratic norms and benefit from positive branding effects and because democracy leads to increased transparency, which can lessen concerns over diaspora influence" (Mirilovic 2016, 348). On the other hand the position of both diaspora and involved countries gets more complicated when one (or both) of the countries are not democratic. For these diaspora groups it would be difficult to "successfully push for and participate in formalized international cooperation" (Mirilovic 2016, 350).

The area of Western Balkan went through devastating civil wars in the last decade of 20th century. Because of this it is important to have a look on the theory of diaspora policies in the post-conflict societies. As Mylonas and Žilović (2019, 614) claim "the politics of ethnic return migration do not only concern first- or second-generation emigrants who can easily trace their roots to the homeland, but anyone perceived to fit the criteria of membership to the

respective ethnoculturally defined nation-state.” This is unfortunately not the case because countries can target certain part of their diaspora with these policies to achieve other political goals while excluding the other. Mylonas and Žilović (2019, 616) highlight the importance of “geostrategic interests when accounting for variation nation-building policies toward various non-core groups – i.e. groups perceived as unassimilated by the ruling elites of a country.” Considering all of this, these authors argue that states will “adopt favourable ethnic repatriation policies when they have no revisionist claim toward the state from which the co-ethnic groups is coming; conversely, absent a revisionist claim favourable policies are more likely (Mynolas, Žilović 2019, 616). Implications are meaningful for the empiric part of my thesis. These types of policies would be expected especially from Serbia and Albania considering the revisionist nature of these two countries’ foreign policies after the Yugoslav war.

2.2.3. Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) – theoretical background

The authors and the theories mentioned up to this point have given scientific input in two categories examined by this research diaspora institutions (Gamlen 2014, 2017, 2019a, 2019b; Délano, Mylonas 2019; Mahiu 2019; Liu 2022), diaspora policies (Ragazzi 2014; Cohen 2017; Mylonas 2012). To successfully examine the diaspora policies in the Western Balkans I needed means of measurement. The work of Lucy Pedroza and Pau Palop-García (2017a, 2017b, 2019, 2021) on Emigrant policy Index (EMIX) is chosen for this thesis. This index was already applied to the region of Latin America and Caribbean and further I will examine how does it fit with Western Balkans.

Lucy Pedroza and Pau Palop-García (2017) introduce the quantitative measurement of diaspora policies. In this part of the thesis, explored the theoretical background of such an index and present what lead to the creation of it. The methodology of the EMIX is discussed in the chapter of the thesis devoted to methodology.

As Pedroza and Palop-García claim, “the broad literature on diaspora agency in state-diaspora relations tends to identify state policy making in voting rights, dual citizenship and remittances” (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, 165). Authors shift gears and introduce a study

that will take all of the variables above into an account in order to establish quantitative measure of diaspora policies. They critique the small N (and single case) studies that were predominant in the diaspora literature. Their study is concentrated on most of the states from Latin American and Caribbean region. The general literature of diaspora studies so far lacks “an understanding of emigrant policies that derives inductively from a systematic collection of policies for a whole region, allowing different profiles to emerge and display variations before explaining those variations with theory” (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, 165-166).

The original Emigrant Policies Index aimed to fill this gap by measuring diaspora policies for the 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries with different migration profiles, avoiding to devote the study only to one or two countries with the biggest emigration such as Mexico and Columbia. In the case of Latin American and Caribbean countries EMIX reveals that “countries follow diverse strategies to keep or create link with their non-resident citizens, adopting certain concrete policies while disregarding others” (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, 166). It is safe to say that “the EMIX makes a crucial contribution to the very conceptualization of the concept of emigrant policies and to its measurement, serving both the academic and the policy communities by providing transparent information on the emigrant policies of the region” (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, 166).

The Emigrant Policy Index was created as a reaction towards the mainstream datasets that were concentrated more on the immigration, integration and policies that allow access to citizenship. In comparison to this “comparative research focusing on a wide range of policies developed by states of origin to engage with citizens living abroad has developed greatly, ordering the well studied cases into typologies around theoretical models of citizenship or as types of sending-state-diaspora relationships” (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, 166). The authors find it as imperative to „develop a rigorous conceptualization of 'emigrant policies' and, second, to exhaustively screen all policies that fit such a conceptualization” (Pedroza, Palop-García 2021, 362).

It is important to highlight that “the purpose of an index is to explain a phenomenon by looking at the different items that capture its multiple facets” (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, 167). Considering this the best measure for the wide scope of diaspora policies would be creation of an index that can capture all the details that could differ one country from the other. With index like this there is no space for misinterpretation of the results considering that it's rigorousness. The interest of authors while creating the index was to “let the data guide theory development as far as possible, starting from a reflection on the attributes of

emigrant policies as a concept” (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, 167). Authors argue that the concept of diaspora (emigrant) policies is composed of two main components (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017):

1. Policies
2. Administration setting developed to cope with policy design and implementation

Both main components are made of multiple sub-components, more about them as well as about the measurement of these components will be explained in the methodology part of this thesis.

In the region of Latin America and Caribbean the results have shown that there is plenty variation across countries with regards to EMIX score. Brazil, Mexico, El Salvador and Ecuador scored the higher values while the lowest was registered in Paraguay, Jamaica, Venezuela, Belize, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017).

In their updated study of Emigrant Policy Index, Pedroza and Palop-García introduced another dimension of their index – time. In their paper *Do Diaspora Engagement Policies Endure? An Update of the Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) to 2017* (2021) authors present their longitudinal study comparing diaspora policies from 2015 and 2017. The idea was that “some emigrant policies (e.g. citizenship policies) endure more than others (e.g. social policies)” (Pedroza, Palop-García 2021, 361) This updated study found that “all countries in the sample have developed several components of emigrant policies and yet, that there is significant variation in the studied region... while no country in the sample had a drastic change in its overall degree of adoption of emigrant policies or in their policy mix (the dimensions of policy developed) all countries adjusted different dimensions of emigrant policy within just two years” (Pedroza, Palop-García 2021, 369).

Having in mind everything written about diaspora policies, and EMIX I was able to identify the gap in the literature considering the area of Western Balkan 6. In the rest of this thesis I apply the theoretical framework of Pedroza Palop-García on the mentioned region and see how do 6 respective countries compare to each-other when it comes to the level of engagement with their diaspora.

2.3. Remittances

Diaspora remittances became an important part of diaspora studies since the 1990s. In this part of the thesis, the influence of remittances on the home countries is explained, as well as the reasons behind this phenomenon. Remittances are as old as migration. People sent material and non-material remittances home even in the first wave of global migration. But it is important to highlight that since the late 1990s “remittances sent home by international migrants have exceeded official development assistance and portfolio investment, and in several years have approached the magnitudes of foreign direct investment flows” (Yang 2011, 129). This exponential growth of migrant remittances led to the higher interest of the authors from different fields about this topic. Still, the main source of research about the remittances is economy considering the higher influence in countries GDP. Even though most of the literature is concentrated on the influence of remittances on economic growth (Yang 2011, Rapoport, Docquier 2005, Catrinescu et al 2009, Giuliano, Ruiz-Arranz 2009, Chami et al 2003), other authors approach this topic from the perspective of social equality (Mina 2019, Ling Shen et al. 2010, Milanovic 2007). Still, there are authors who take a more innovative approach examining the influence of transaction costs (Freund, Spatafora 2008) or civil wars (Regan, Frank 2014) on remittances.

Remittances are “household income received from abroad, resulting mainly from the international migration of workers; Remittances may be sent as cash or in kind, and may flow through a variety of formal or informal channels” (Yang 2011, 133). In this thesis I examine only remittances that are sent in monetary form through official (formal) channels, considering that the data about the remittances that I gathered was provided by the official statistic institutions of the respective countries.

The remittances can be separated into three different categories (Taylor 1999):

1. Worker remittances – the value of monetary transfers sent home from workers abroad for more than one year
2. Compensation of employees – the gross earning of foreigners residing abroad for fewer than 12 months
3. Migrant transfers – the net worth of migrants who move from one country to another

Countries around the world decided to establish public agencies for harnessing remittances, the reason for this is exploiting the development potential even as “countries seek to expand their scope “beyond remittances” to activities such as promotion of foreign direct investment by diaspora” (Yang 2011, 131). These developments targeted diaspora as the source of income. In 2010 the largest remittances receiving country were India and China which both received over \$50 Billion (Yang 2011). Considering the gross domestic product of these countries it may not be much but for some countries it can be a big portion of it. For example, in Tajikistan remittances make 35% of GDP, in Tonga 28%, Lesotho 25% and Moldova 23%. (Yang 2011) Putting this into perspective of Western Balkan countries, Montenegro is the leading country considering the percentage of remittances in GDP – 24,4%, it is followed by Kosovo* with 15,6%, Bosnia and Herzegovina at 10,9%, Albania 9,4%, Serbia 8,1% and North Macedonia on the last place with just 2,5% (Kondan 2020).

It is widely accepted not only by scholars of economic or political sciences but also by official monetary institutions such as International Monetary Fund and World Bank, as well as financial institutions of the respective countries that formal remittances are just one part of the general remittances that one country gets. The real amount of remittances diaspora sends back to home country is hard to determine but observers suspect that “globally, informal flows range from 50% to 250% of recorded flows” (Freund, Spatafora 2008, 357). In the case of this thesis, I use the data provided by the financial institutions of the respective countries. The result of Freund, Spatafora research is important for the reader to take into the account the problem of remittances and their measurement. These formal channels of remittance include “money transfer services offered by banks, post office banks, non-bank financial institutions, foreign exchange bureaus, and money transfer operators like Western Union and MoneyGram” (Freund, Spatafora 2008, 357). Taken into the account the transaction cost for these formal channels of transfer, it is assumed that with the lowering of the transaction costs, the inflow of remittances will be higher.

Considering that Western Balkan area can be discussed as post-conflict one because of the civil wars in the 1990s, it is vital to highlight the theory of Regan and Frank that argue that “migrant remittances can serve as a smoothing mechanism that provides for social welfare needs outside the formal mechanisms of the state, and therefore act to reduce the incentive for rebellion” (Regan, Frank 2014, 502). This would mean that remittances can also have an influence on political stability of the country. The argument behind this is that countries that are going through the economy decent are more prone to go to civil wars because of the social

inequalities that occur between the groups in the country. This can be 'fixed' by the inflow of remittances from the diaspora abroad which would help the common people to overcome the struggle produced by economic crisis.

To approach the problem of remittances from the different perspectives the theories that look on the influence of the remittances on economic growth, social equality and other theories with the look at the future of diaspora remittance research are taken into consideration.

2.3.1. Remittances and economic growth

It is easy to assume that the influence of remittances on the economic growth will be the highest in the developing countries. Characteristics of these countries are fertile for the high inflow of remittances. Here it is possible to highlight three characteristics of developing countries that make them get the most of remittances (Rapoport, Docquier 2005):

1. High levels of poverty, inequality and income volatility
2. Pervasive capital markets imperfections with no response to the needs for credit and insurance
3. Private transfers are informal social arrangements within extended families and communities

Before going into macroeconomical implications of remittances, it is crucial to take a look at micro economy and the reasons why members of diaspora remit. Considering that micro economy is mostly about single persons and families, we can assume that "the most common motivation to remit is simply that migrants care of those left behind: spouses, children, parents, and members of larger kinship and social circles" (Rapoport, Docquier 2005, 9). The family that is left behind needs to be considered and diaspora members usually send money back in order to support some projects, investments or bare existence of the people left behind. This aligns with migration that is recognized as "an informal familial arrangement, with benefits in the realms of risk-diversification, consumption smoothing, and integrational financing of investments, and remittances are a central element of such implicit contracts"

(Rapoport, Docquier 2005, 10). More precisely, the risk of losing monthly assets is lowered considering that emigrants almost always go to the countries with higher standard and wages. In this way, the family left behind is sure of an additional income in the case of emergency. On the other hand, this can be a planned activity in order to aggregate capital (money) and invest it into a family project. To answer the question why diaspora remit we need to take into the account several components (Rapoport, Docquier 2005, Chami, Fullenkamp, Jahjah 2003):

1. Altruistic component – diaspora remit because of the emotional connection with the homeland and co-patriots left behind
2. A repayment of loans component – member of family remits money back home to help covering the loans
3. Insurance component – remittances are the back-up source of income of the family
4. Inheritance component – while remitting person wants to keep the inheritance right of the assets in homeland
5. Exchange of variety of services

The combination of the components above could be labelled as ‘impure altruism’ and highlights that there is no simple answer to why diaspora remit but multiple of different causes that intervene with each other that brings a person to decide and remit. Everything considered, remittances can be both the cause and the consequence of the migration.

When it comes to macroeconomic influence of the remittances and therefore countries growth authors find themselves in different positions. The question in diaspora literature still stays open: do remittances have positive or negative influence on the growth? Taylor claims that “governments in migrant origin countries may increase the development potential of remittances through a variety of economic policies; creating a fertile ground for remittances to contribute to broad based income growth in migrant sending areas is a key to promoting development from migration” (Taylor 1999, 63). This is an important implication that some countries become emigrant countries by plan while they calculate the better income to the GDP through it.

Here we can make a connection between altruistic characteristic of remittances and countries development by arguing that: (Taylor 1999)

1. Migration decisions are part of family strategies to raise income, obtain funds to invest in new activities, and insure against income and production risks

2. Remittances, or in some cases simply the potential for remittances, consequently set in motion a development dynamic by loosening production and investment constraints faced by households in poor developing country environments.

The influence of remittances on the development is dependent on the geographic area they go to. Therefore, we can say that they produce “the largest income multipliers when they flowed into rural households, whose consumption and expenditure patterns favour goods produced domestically, with relatively labor-intensive production technologies and few imports; when migrant remittances go to urban households, more of the money leaks out of the country in the form of import demand” (Taylor 1999).

On the other side, other authors explore the connection between remittances from another perspective. Catrinescu et al. (2009, 83) argue that “the effect of remittances on growth could work through different channels with institutions being one of the most important ones.” From the point of this thesis this research is valuable considering that the relationship between remittances and institutions will be closely examined. Catrinescu et al. (2009) also highlight the two problems that can occur when the country is too dependent on its remittances:

1. “Dutch Disease” – inflow of remittances causes a real appreciation, or postpones depreciation of the exchange rate
2. Moral hazard problem – permitting the migrant’s family members to reduce their work effort

Having in mind the first problem, so called ‘Dutch disease’ it needs to be said that inflow of remittances in this case can cause lower export performance and therefore lower employment rate. On the other side, creating moral hazard problem will allow people to stay on the worker market for longer period considering that they do not need a job after the remittances they get from the relatives abroad. Additionally, Glytsos (2002, 19) highlights that “because remittances are private transfers, market forces alone cannot channel them to productive uses in a way that contributes to lasting development, so appropriate policies are needed.” This puts countries’ governments in the front as main instances of ‘remittances control’.

Finally, in their work, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009, 144) examine the relationship between local financial sector and remittances. They argue that better constructed local financial sector leads to higher amount of remittances. Their research shows that “remittances boost investment, especially in countries with a less developed financial sector.” This examination is in line with Taylor (1999) which claims that remittances could be used as an

asset when country applies to the funds from various international organisations, as well as for international credits. Therefore, we can assume that in the countries of Western Balkan remittances also brought the investment not only from the diaspora abroad but also from the companies of developed countries.

2.3.2. Remittances and equality

When we talk about remittances and (in)equality we need to highlight that most of the effects that remittances produce considering this are negative. This is because of the nature of remittances as voluntary contributions. The pioneer of this research Branko Milanovic (1987, 24) claims that “the impact of remittances on income distribution in the home country depends on three elements: who migrates, how much migrants earn abroad, and how much they remit”. When it comes to who migrates it could be argued that lower income people are more prone to migrate than those with higher income. This is true only in the peace times while in the case of war migration is more chaotic and includes all classes of population. Even though we could assume that higher income citizens could have more information about the opportunities abroad, they are less probable to migrate considering that they have better chance of finding satisfactory work in the home country (Milanovic 1987). How much diaspora remit is naturally dependent on how much they earn abroad. People who have an extra income that can also support their family at home remit more than those who are struggling to keep up until the end of the month in the host country. Milanovic (1987, 35) concludes that “in social groups where diffusion of information is relatively even regardless of income differences, migration may be expected to be more uniform across income groups than in social groups where the access to information depends primarily on the level of income”.

On trace of Milanovic’s work, Shen et al. (2007, 218) go deeper in examining the influence of remittances on the wealth inequality. Their conclusions differ from the ones of Milanovic. They claim that “whether in the short or the long runs, migration and remittances always reduce wealth inequality, through a proportionally larger increase in wealth for the poor”.

Authors prove that the effects of the remittances do not need to be always negative, at least for the poor of the society.

Finally, when it comes to the influence of remittances on poverty reduction, Newman claims that “remittances have a direct impact on poverty reduction, since they tend to flow directly to poor (although not necessarily the poorest) households and are used primarily for basic needs such as food, shelter, education and health care” (Newman 2004, 2). This means that there is nothing wrong with remittances being spent only privately without a systematized plan of spending. I will reflect on this later in the thesis and we will see how Western Balkan 6 countries position themselves when making the decision should the spending of remittances be guided by the government.

3. Western Balkan 6, diaspora policies and remittances – analysis

Western Balkan is still a developing region of South-East Europe. As in other developing regions in the world, countries of WB6 are heavily dependent on foreign direct investments (FDI) and remittances from their emigration abroad. Considering this, countries have two approaches to focus their policies on relaxing the obstacles to direct investments from international companies or (and) focus them on reaching out to the diaspora across the World, what Gamlen (2014) would call ‘tapping perspective’. These two approaches do not need to be conflicted and mutually excluding but countries can put more emphasis on one or another. As mentioned before, on this trace Kulakewich (2021) conducted research that puts a focus on the rule of rights in connection to foreign direct investments. Thus, the second approach, namely reaching out to diaspora with a goal to attract more remittances is the topic of this thesis and countries of Western Balkans scale differently. When it comes to the remittances that enter the country and their part of national gross domestic product (GDP) we can see strong differences in this region. The country with the highest level of remittances compared to GDP is Montenegro with 25%. On the other side there is North Macedonia with just 2.5% of gross domestic product being remittances from diaspora (Kondan 2020). I argue that diaspora policies have a direct influence on this percentage of remittances.

Having in mind the vast emigration during the 90s, but also before and after this turbulent decade, many scholars have conducted research about the diaspora engagement, policies, institutions and remittances of countries in this region. (Mai, Schwander-Sievers 2003; Barjaba 2015; Kadusic, Sulic 2018; Karabegovic 2017, 2018; Karabegović, Hasić 2019; Jakobsen, Strabac 2014; King, Vullentari 2009; Rajovic 2011; Damjanovski 2008; Balalovska 2012; Aziri 2013; Panev, Predojevic-Depic 2012; Gamlen 2017; Kondan 2020) These authors conducted important research in different policy areas but focused their results on one of the countries of Western Balkan. Kondan (2020), on the other hand, presents the remittance inflows of all of the countries included in this research with the addition of Croatia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. Still, the comprehensive research of diaspora policies and its influence on countries amount of remittances in the region of Western Balkan is not conducted. Although, authors like Zahide Erdogan (2021) did conduct notable research that had a focus on some of the topics of this thesis. Namely, Erdogan (2021) researched the voting rights of Western Balkan diaspora. Here I need to highlight that her research focused only on the countries that were part of former Yugoslavia which includes Slovenia and Croatia but excludes Albania.

The first part of this chapter presents every country separately, the sequence of the countries is determined by alphabetic order. In the second part, I will present the results of Emigrant policy index calculation, compare them between the states and region with already existing research of Latin American and Caribbean region. Finally, the EMIX is compared with the remittances Western Balkan countries received in the year 2020.

3.1. Republic of Albania

The Republic of Albania is the only country in this research that was not a part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The advantage of not having a conflict on its territory since the Second World War has not stopped emigration from the country. As Nicola Mai and Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers argue (2003), Albanian migration is an exceptional case in many aspects:

1. Diasporas fundamental role in guaranteeing the economical survival of Albanian society
2. Diasporas overall magnitude in relation to the size of the Albanian population
3. Diasporas sudden and forceful emergence after years of internal mobility restrictions and isolationist politics

These different strong influences Albanian diaspora still has on its home-country, combined with country's systemized approach to diaspora issues makes Albania a good example of how diaspora and home-country can work together to achieve mutual goals. The data from Albanian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, points out that "out of total Albanian population of 3.8 million, 800,000 are living abroad, 500,000 in Greece, 200,000 in Italy, 50,000 in other European countries, and 50,000 elsewhere, mainly in North America; in other words, more than one in five of the current Albanian population now lives abroad" (Mai, Schwandner-Sievers 2003, 941). As Joniada Barjaba (2015, 1) claims, "the majority of the Albanian diaspora members are well-educated and overqualified." This is a significant contrast to the emigrant population of the other countries in this research where emigrants were mostly low educated workers with strongly developed skills set to work in building and housekeeping companies. Authors (Barjaba 2015, Mai, Schwandner-Sievers 2003) agree that Albanian diaspora in the United States, Europe and other countries has a key role in national affairs.

The Albanian migration can be described in three major phases (Barjaba 2015, 2):

1. Before 1944
2. Between 1945 and 1990
3. Mass emigration after 1990s

These three major phases of emigration are the ground for division of Albanian diaspora to Old and New. As Barjaba claims, the primary factors that encouraged migrations before the communist era (1944-1990) were political and economic. During the communist era the reasons were primarily political, while after the fell of Berlin Wall the factors have variated from economy to corruption and difficult living conditions in Albania (Barjaba 2015). Barjaba (2015, 3) points out that "the old diaspora is mainly settled in the United States, Canada, Latin America, Australia, a few countries in Western Europe, and some Eastern European countries, such as Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Turkey, Egypt, and Syria." On the other side, the new diaspora

can be defined as individuals who migrated after the communist regime in Albania (Barjaba 2015). These people mostly emigrated to Italy and Greece, but also Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Austria. Considering the high proportion of emigrants in the general Albanian population, remittances also have a good share in countries Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is estimated that remittances from Albanian diaspora are equal to 9,1% of country's GDP (Kondan 2020).

As it will be further discussed in this section, Albania recognised the potential of its diaspora and created policies to attract investments in the country (Ragazzi 2014). The funds received from diaspora are mostly used for private needs of the families that receive them which is in line with Yang (2011) theory of remittances. Putting Albania in the perspective of Gamlens's (2014, 2017, 2019a, 2019b) work here needs to be highlighted that the government uses two approaches: tapping and governing. Considering that diaspora's economic potential is recognized the goal of getting more remittances is clear, which goes in hand with the tapping perspective. Additionally, Albania also has a goal to have more control over its diaspora in the region, mainly in Kosovo*, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia and through it to gain extraterritorial influence.

The main government body determined for diaspora and diaspora policies is National Diaspora Agency. Until recently, Albania had Ministry of Diaspora that was dissolved in September 2021 by the government decret.² Additionally, there are Albanian Fund for Diaspora Development, Diaspora Coordination Council, State Committee on Diaspora and Subcommission on Diaspora Migration. Albania has the most government established institutions devoted for diaspora of all the countries in this research. These institutions are mentioned in the sub-title Administration.

3.1.1. Citizenship/Nationality

Albanian citizenship is regulated by Law on Citizenship (Ligj PËR SHITËSINË). According to Article 3 of the mentioned Law, dual and multiple citizenship is allowed for

² Retrieved from: <https://diaspora.gov.al/en/> (01.12.2021)

Albanian citizens (Ligj PËR SHTETËSINË 2020). There are no specific conditions or restrictions for the exercise of citizens' rights for people with dual or multiple citizenships. It is important to highlight that Article 6 of the Law on Citizenship proscribes Albanian nationals that live abroad are eligible for Albanian citizenship only until the third generation (Ligj PËR SHTETËSINË 2020). There are no restrictions when it comes to a country in which second citizenship is obtained. Albanian citizens that live abroad do not lose their citizenship if they have permanent residence abroad or get another foreign one (Ligj PËR SHTETËSINË 2020). Thus, Albania has one of the most liberal citizenship laws in Western Balkans which is a good starting point for keeping the ties with its diaspora.

3.1.2. Suffrage

Considering the previously mentioned citizenship laws, it is surprising that diaspora and citizens residing abroad on temporary basis are completely excluded from electoral process. When it comes to president elections, Albanian president is elected in the parliament. Therefore, there are no direct elections and considering that there are no representatives of Albanian diaspora in the parliament, it does not have any influence on the election outcome (OSCE 2007). As of 2021 and confirmed by Lirim Krasniqi from Germin (Organization of Albanian diaspora), through E-Mail, Albanian citizens that live and work abroad have no access to the ballots outside of the country. This is the same for both national legislature as well as national referendum. According to The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania, there are no specific restrictions when it comes to national legislature elections and voting is not compulsory (OSCE 2015).

Even though voting from abroad is not possible for Albanian diaspora, according to the Electoral Code, candidacy right for all citizens is allowed (OSCE 2015). This means that it is possible for diaspora member to be listed as one of the candidates for the membership in the parliament but the only way he could express his vote is to go back to Albania on the election's day. Registration is automatic for all citizens of Republic of Albania from the day they turn 18. The procedure is the same for both citizens that reside in Albania and people living and working abroad (OSCE 2015). Finally, as also mentioned by Mr. Krasniqi, there

are some developments inside of Albanian public sphere to spread voting outside of the country too and allow vast Albanian diaspora to express their voting rights. At the time of writing, no steps were taken to ensure it for the next elections.

3.1.3. Administration

Albania has 50 consular missions deployed around the world. These 50 missions are dispersed in 37 countries.³ Albania is a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as a candidate for membership in European Union. Albania holds memberships in various international organizations and has its representatives there. Embassies and consulates do not work during the weekends on regular basis and there are no mobile consulates.

In the last decade, Albanian government invested into digitalization of the country. These developments were spread also on diaspora. Country has a digital system named „E-Consulate (E-Konsullata)“ designed to make communication between emigration and home country easier. According to official website of Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, e-Consulate offers following services:⁴

1. Accurate contacts and coordinates of each Albanian representation in the world
2. Information on the political and health situation for each country
3. Frequently asked questions and answers based on the interest of the citizens
4. List of vaccines to be made on a country-by-country basis
5. Opportunity to report or communicate directly with the Directorate of Consular Affairs in the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs

Additionally, Albania created an online system for application for residence permit. Foreign citizens that want to work or reside in Albania can apply for their visa online and also see which documents are necessary for the successful application.⁵

³ Retrieved from: <http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en> (19.04.2021)

⁴ Retrieved from: <https://ambasadaime.gov.al/e-konsullata/> (03.12.2021)

⁵ Retrieved from: https://e-albania.al/eAlbaniaServices/UseService.aspx?service_code=9759 (03.12.2021)

According to the official website of Ministry of Foreign affairs, Albanian citizens abroad can get expert legal help in the embassies and consulates from the diplomatic personal. It is not specified what is the nature of this support and how much consuls can help.⁶

Finally, as mentioned before, Albania had a State Ministry for Diaspora until June 2021. Considering that the Ministry is dissolved, the main government administration body for emigrant policies is National Diaspora Agency. Having in mind Pedroza Palop-García hierarchical classification (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017), Albanian diaspora institution is rank 4 – directorate. As of 2021, the Executive Director of this institution is Sonila Hysi. Also, Albania established Albanian Fund for Diaspora Development, Diaspora Coordination Council, State Committee on Diaspora and Subcommission on Diaspora Migration. Considering that there is little to no information about these institutions on English I was not able to identify the specifics of their institutional design and hierarchy. Still, the practice of multiple organizations devoted to engagement with diaspora confirms that Albania has a strong interest to develop relationship between itself and its emigration.

3.1.4. Symbolic policies

Albania has developed symbolic policies meant to demonstrate its ties to and recognition of diaspora. According to the Law on Diaspora, there is a special annual reward that is to be given to a diaspora member. This reward is named “Albanian National Hero” and is to be rewarded to the Albanian national who contributed to improving the image of the Albania and Albanians in the world (Law for Diaspora 2018).

Additionally, Albania has National Diaspora Day celebrated every year on December 18 (Law for Diaspora 2018). The chosen date is in line with United Nations’ International Migrants Day that is celebrated every 18th of December. On this day multiple events are organized that promote Albanian culture and history not only to its diaspora but also all the people abroad interested about Albanian culture. According to National Diaspora Agency, national conferences that discuss diaspora influence on Albanian public sphere are to be organized

⁶ Retrieved from: <http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en> (03.12.2021)

every year. The last conference was organized in February 2021 during which topics in connection with ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and ways of fighting it were discussed.⁷

3.1.5. Economic policies

Article 15 of the Law for Diaspora defines the country's plan to attract remittances from its diaspora (Law for Diaspora 2018). The Albanian Diaspora Fund plays an important role in promoting investment in the country as well as charity donations to the socially endangered families. No information could be found about government measures that aim to develop bank transfer systems in the case of remittances. Officially, as Kondan (2020) claims, 9.1% of Albanian GDP is consisted of remittances. As for the all the Western Balkan countries this percentage is just a part of actual material remittances that come into country. Considering that remittances in Albania are mostly spent privately in the household we can assume that actual amount of remittances is significantly higher.

Having in mind that diaspora can impact economic development also by returning to country, Albanian government loosened the procedure for nostrification of diplomas obtained in foreign countries. According to official government publications, the process is regulated generally which means that same rules apply for all the countries in which the studying took place. The length of the process is proscribed to be no longer then 45 days from the moment of application and the service is also available online.⁸

3.1.6. Cultural and social policies

The language barrier stopped me to obtain more valuable data about Albania's cultural and social policies. On the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Albania it is

⁷ Retrieved from: <http://akd.gov.al/en/takimi-i-mjekesise-ne-diaspore-2/> (03.12.2021)

⁸ Retrieved from: https://e-albania.al/eAlbaniaServices/MAS/853/docs/Diplomas_ENG.pdf (03.12.2021)

stated that many events are organized abroad, by government actors and its diaspora to promote Albanian culture and history. The country funds schools of Albanian language abroad in collaboration with Albanian diaspora organizations.⁹ Most of the cultural activities abroad are closely connected to cultural-artistic societies in cities with high concentration of diaspora. These cultural-artistic societies promote Albanian national dance as well as ethnic clothes and songs. Another way of promotion that is not necessarily official and funded by the state is personal promotion from famous singers in United States and Europe. Namely, Albanian pop singers Bebe Rexha, Rita Ora, Dua Lipa and Ava Max proudly highlight their Albanian heritage giving value promotion of the country around the world.

3.1.7. Participation of diaspora in the country's institutions and their obligations

Articles 18-21 of the Law for Diaspora proscribe creation of Coordination Council of Diaspora (Law for Diaspora 2018). This council has following functions (Law for Diaspora, Article 18):

- a.) Identifies diaspora problems, proposes actions for their resolution, sets out guidelines for the drafting of the Strategy of Diaspora;
- b.) Adopts procedural rules for the fulfillment of its activity and the decision-making procedure

The council consist of 15 members who are representatives of the diaspora. The president of the Council is also a diaspora member and there are no government officials in it. (Law for Diaspora 2018) The meeting and activities of the Council can be attended by Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, representatives of cultural centres for diaspora and Albanian Radio Television, still it is not defined by Law what influence on the Council decisions they have. (Law for Diaspora 2018)

Article 20 of the mentioned Law defines eligibility criteria for the Council. In order to become member of the Council one must (Law for Diaspora, Article 20):

⁹ Retrieved from: <http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en> (03.12.2021)

- a.) Have high integrity and reputation in the community where they live in
- b.) Have the capacity to perform the duties of maintaining and strengthening the relations between the country of origin and the diaspora

When it comes to the obligations of Albanian citizens that reside abroad, here needs to be highlighted that army service in Albania is not mandatory. This is the same for the civil service and applies to all the citizens no matter where they are. There was no information obtained about the tax clarification of Albanian citizens abroad in home-country and to my knowledge there are no additional taxes for people living abroad.

3.2. Bosnia and Herzegovina

As all the countries of Western Balkan, except Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a federal entity inside of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Of all the researched countries in this thesis, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only federation. The country is consisted of two entities, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska and Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a multiethnic and multireligious state with three constitutive ethnic groups Bosniaks, Croatians and Serbians. Here I need to highlight that in the sense of this thesis no difference was made between two entities and included only the laws that are accepted on state level. Still, for the future research it would be interesting to see the different approaches Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska have towards their diaspora.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has dispersed and still growing diaspora community around the world. This development “emerged in the past, and is also a result of recent economic trends of labor movement toward countries in the European Union (EU)” (Karabegović, Hasić 2019). It is safe to assume that these demographic changes lead to the political ones which made the situation in the country more complicated. As Kadusic and Suljic (2018, 76) claim, “not only did forced migration cause demographic changes but it also gave rise to numerous political, social and economic issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Therefore, we can identify three migration phases of Bosnian population in the 20th and 21st century (Kadusic, Sulic 2018):

1. Labor force emigration from the former Yugoslavia caused by economic factors
2. Forced migration in the 1992-1995 caused by political circumstances
3. Post-war migration motivated by political and economic factors

The most dramatic period of emigration (and internal displacement) was during the conflict between 1992 and 1995. It is estimated that the war displaced total of 2.2 million people of which 1.2 million went abroad and 1 million were people displaced inside of the country (Kadusic, Sulic 2018). Even after the war the emigration levels are not getting lower which leads to estimate over 1.6 million Bosnians outside of the country (Kondan 2020). It is agreed that most of the emigrants of Bosnia and Herzegovina emigrate to Germany, Austria, Croatia and Slovenia (Kadusic, Sluic 2018; Cicic, Efendic, Husic-Mehmedovic, Emirhafizovic 2019) Although, it needs to be highlighted that „in the last few years, trend of emigration to Germany and Austria is noticeable, while the number of emigrations to Croatia and Serbia is getting lower” (Cicic et. al 2019). Additionally, Halilovich et al (2018) in their paper map the Bosnian diaspora and show the dispersion of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina around the world. Still, Karabegović and Hasić (2019) argue that „Bosnian diaspora today „cannot be considered a homogenous group; Ethnicity remains the central factor in studying behaviour of the Bosnian Diaspora“. These emigrations are mostly closely connected to the ethnicity of the emigrant. Still, the proportion of remittances in the countries BDP is over 10% (10,9%) which make diaspora one of the best investors in the country (Karabegović, Hasić 2019; Kondan 2020).

As mentioned before, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a federal state. This influences the possibility to fit the country in one of the theoretical categories defined by this research. Having in mind the political situation in the country, and how hard it is to make any agreements between three presidents, the fact that the importance of diaspora is recognized and represented in Foreign policy strategy (Karabegović, Hasić 2019) is encouraging. Therefore, Ragazzi’s (2014) theory that when country recognizes the potential of its diaspora it will create policies in order to attract material and non material remittances is applicable in this case. Finally, in connection to Gamlen’s (2014, 2017, 2019a, 2019b) work, we could say that Federal government follows tapping perspective when creating policies that have the aim to attract diaspora remittances. Still, for the future research it can be of value to see which approaches federal entities adopted, are they different and why.

The government body devoted to the diaspora is the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees (Ministarstvo za Ljudska Prava i Izbjeglice). As of 2021, Bosnia and Herzegovina does not

have a law on diaspora which make participation of its emigration in the countries institutions really limited. Eventhough this ministry takes most of the responsibilities in relationship with diaspora, it is argued that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of promotion, development and cooperation with Bosnian emigration (Karabegović, Hasić 2019)

3.2.1. Citizenship/Nationality

Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina is regulated by the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Zakon o državljanstvu Bosne i Hercegovine). When it comes to dual citizenship, in principle having more than one citizenship is very limited but not prohibited. Considering the law, dual citizenship is allowed when bilateral treaties are signed (Zakon o državljanstvu BiH, 2016). This means that citizens, aside from the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, can have only citizenships of following countries: Serbia, Croatia, and Sweden (Zakon o državljanstvu BiH, 2016). Still, there are no restrictions for the exercise of citizen rights for people with dual citizenships.

It needs to be highlighted that for dual citizenship only first and the second generation of emigrants are eligible (Zakon o državljanstvu BiH, 2016). This makes the citizenship laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina the most restrictive after the ones in Montenegro. The reasons behind this restrictive law are various but the political ones can be considered the most influential. Theoretically, relaxing the citizenship laws could lead to the application for dual citizenships of all the emigrants, especially from the neighboring countries. This could change the ethnic picture of the country and bring political changes that would disturb current (in)stability. The elections for the shared institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina are dominated by ethnic parties. Therefore, the country's census that should take place every ten years has a big influence on Bosnia and Herzegovina's day-to-day politics. Last (and first) census after the independence took place in 2013. As Cooley (2019) argues, the census process was more of a political campaign than usual statistical register. The aim of this campaign was to utilize the number of people expressing as one of the three constitutive nations and gain political advantage in the future elections. Finally, "some members of this campaign went further, suggesting that people should not opt out of identifying as Bosniak,

Serb or Croat and instead declare themselves to simply be 'Bosnians'" (Cooley 2019, 1066). Although, this idea was condemned from all three sides as it was seen as danger to the political positions of nationalist leaders. Considering high politicisation of the census it is assumed that every change in it influenced by people acquiring dual citizenship would be critical.

The first step towards reintegration of the diaspora of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the country would be relaxing the citizenship law. This process is long and exhausting which makes integration of countries diaspora into the institutions very limited and unlikely.

3.2.2. *Suffrage*

All the electoral rules of Bosnia and Hercegovina (except the referendum) are defined by the Electoral law of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Izborni zakon Bosne i Hercegovine). This makes the research on the elections in the country easier and more transparent.

The country has a tripartite Presidency, with citizens registered to vote in the Federation voting for two members (a Bosniak and a Bosnian Croat) and those registered in the Republika Srpska voting for Serbian Member of the Presidency. Non-residential citizens are enfranchised according to Article 1.5 of the Electoral Law, but there is an active registration for every election. Moreover, clean criminal records are a must (Izborni zakon 2016). According to Article 1.3 of already mentioned Law, voting is not compulsory (Izborni zakon 2016). When it comes to passive electoral right, candidacy for non-resident citizens is allowed and is subjected to universally applied restrictions (Izborni zakon 2016). As for the other Western Balkan countries where candidacy right for non-resident citizens is allowed, here needs to be said that this is the product of no explicit prohibition then the actual practice. Still, the lack of media and party support for a citizen that lives abroad would make the positive outcome of the elections improbable. One more specific restriction for the candidacy for the member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Hercegovina is that people who committed war crimes cannot be elected (which is not the case for lower positions in government). The right to run for the Presidency and electoral rules have been criticized widely due to unequal treatment of citizens who do not ascribe to being one of the three main ethnicities, and

multiple rulings in the European Court of Human Rights are waiting to be implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Raulston 2013).

The lower is called House of Representatives (Predstavnički Dom) and is elected during the general elections with rules similar to the Presidency. On the other side, the Upper house is called the House of People (Dom Naroda) and is elected through votes of the parliaments of both entities. Ten representatives in House of people are elected in the Parliament of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (five from Bosniak community, five from Croatian) and five are elected in the Parliament of Republika Srpska. Considering the diaspora, elections for the House of Representatives is more important because there it can have the influence through the votes. The rules and restrictions for passive electoral rights are the same as for presidential ones.

There are three voting methods available for non-resident citizens: in country voting, voting in the selected embassies and consulates and voting by mail. Voting by mail is regulated by the Law and Rulebook on Election process (Pravilnik o sprovođenju izbora u Bosni i Hercegovini).¹⁰ According to the Rulebook, voter that registers himself in before the elections gets the „Electoral package“ from the Central Elections Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the package are:

1. Form with personal data
2. Voting ballots and instructions how to vote
3. Return envelope with the adress of Commission
4. Envelope for the voting ballots which secures the integrity of secret voting

The return envelope should be sent back to Commission no later than the day of the elections and arrive no later then five days after the election day. For the residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, registration for the elections is automatic. On the other side, non-residence needs to actively register before every election to vote (Izborni zakon 2016). Finally, for the national referendum there is only in country voting available without the access to the ballot outside the country.¹¹

¹⁰ Retrieved from https://dijaspora.mhrr.gov.ba/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Pravilnik_o_provodjenju_izbora_u_BiH-bos.pdf (03.11.2021)

¹¹ Retrieved from: http://www.podaci.net/gBiH/propis/Zakon_o_referendumu/Z-rginic03v1042-1046.html (29.04.2021)

3.2.3. *Regulation of the political competition*

The regulation of the political competition is the least developed field of the researched regulations in this thesis for all the respective countries. There is no explicit regulation of party offices abroad, political campaigns or party membership. All of these regulations are subjected to the universal rules that apply in inland politics. This means that party membership for the citizens that live abroad is not forbidden. For party offices abroad and political campaigns to be successful not only inland regulations are needed but also bilateral cooperation and agreements with the countries in which the voting ballots should be available. This is long and exhausting process for which there is no political will as of 2021.

3.2.4. *Administration*

Bosnia and Hercegovina has 57 diplomatic missions around the world. These missions are dispersed in 45 countries which means that 13 countries and international organizations are covered on non-residential basis.¹² Consular services can be provided in-person only, online services are not established as of 2021. Diplomatic missions of Bosnia and Hercegovina do not work on weekends and there are no mobile consulates.

Considering the services that diplomatic missions can offer, according to the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Hercegovina, consuls can provide travel documents to Bosnian citizens, in case of incarceration provide support, and make sure that

¹² Retrieved from:

http://www.mvp.gov.ba/ambasade_konzulati_misije/ambasade_konzulati_i_stalne_misije_bih/Default.aspx
(30.04.2021)

incarcerated persons are treated well, in case of sickness help with finding the health service and give different advice and useful addresses.¹³

Official government institution for diaspora policies is Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees (Ministarstvo za ljudska prava i izbjeglice) and the current minister is Miloš Lučić. This puts Bosnia and Hercegovina in the Rank 1 of the Pedroza, Palop-García hierarchical structure (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017b).

3.2.5. *Symbolic policies*

Lack of the law on diaspora in Bosnia and Hercegovina makes every comprehensive analysis of the diaspora policies harder. This is especially true when it comes to the symbolic policies. In the case of Montenegro and Serbia, we will see how law on diaspora makes countries' approach towards its emigration better and easier to understand. Even though there is no diaspora law that would be a codified rulebook of state-diaspora relations, Bosnia and Hercegovina's diaspora policies are incorporated into the Policy on Cooperation with the Diaspora (Karabegović, Hasić 2019). Karabegović and Hasić (2019) argue that diaspora policy is the first foreign policy agreed by all three presidents of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Because of this it is important to mention it in this thesis.

The draft of the Law on Cooperation between Bosnia and Hercegovina and its diaspora was drafted but never adopted (Karabegović, Hasić 2019). This confirms that B&H values its emigration but has internal problems to agree on content of the law.

The Policy on Cooperation with diaspora was adopted in 2017 and its main objectives are (Karabegović, Hasić 2019):

1. Development of the legal system and institutional capacities
2. Providing support to diaspora and improvement of cooperation
3. Creating conditions for greater contribution of diaspora to the development of BiH

¹³ Retrieved from: http://www.mvp.gov.ba/konzularne_informacije/sta_konzul_moze_uciniti_za_vas/?id=233 (03.11.2021)

As it can be seen, these objectives are corresponding with the objectives of diaspora laws implemented in other WB countries. Finally, the most important foreign policy document adopted by the B&H Presidency that addresses diaspora matters Foreign Policy Strategy (Karabegović, Hasić 2019). This document enhanced diaspora policies and steer the way government should take in relationship with its diaspora. On the other hand, in difference to diaspora laws of the other countries, the Policy on Cooperation with diaspora does not create advisory council that would give emigration direct influence on the country politics. It also does not determine national diaspora day and does not establish national rewards for the achievements of diaspora. Still, as Karabegović and Hasić (2019) argue, having in mind that for long time there was no diaspora policy, then it was shaped as 'domestic matter' to become an integral part of foreign policy. These are important developments that should lead to creation and implementation of the Law on Diaspora.

As mentioned above, in Bosnia and Hercegovina there is no national diaspora day. Although here I need to mention few manifestations that are organized irregularly by some of the local governments. One of those manifestations is Days of Diaspora (Dani Dijaspore) that was organized in Živnice in 2020 and Kladanj in 2021.¹⁴ There is no reference of diaspora in the constitution even though citizens of Bosnia and Hercegovina have "the protection of the country when abroad." There are no symbolic territorial entities for diaspora. Additionally, Cacic et al (2019) identify the problem of lack of database on returnees to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹⁴ Retrieved from: <https://dijaspora.mhrr.gov.ba/> (03.11.2021)

3.3. Kosovo*¹⁵

As well as for the other WB6 countries, Kosovo* struggles to get a grip of actual number of its citizens living abroad. For Kosovo*, the problem is even harder to solve considering that its emigration blends in with other communities abroad based on nationality. Albanians from Kosovo* easily adapt to Albanian community abroad and express themselves as Albanians, while Serbian, and other minorities, will always put out their home-country when expressing their nationality. Still, authors agree that Kosovo “has been witness to more historically complex phases of migration; they were part of the large-scale Yugoslavian labor migration to Germany Switzerland and Austria during the early post World War II decades” (King, Vullentari 2009, 385). In contrast to Albania, during the Cold War, as part of socialist Yugoslavia, Kosovars had an opportunity to go abroad and create their communities that now form Kosovar diaspora. As King and Vullentari (2009, 388) claim, “for a variety of reasons, Albanian-speaking Kosovars leaving their home territory at this time either took on, or were allocated by the host society where they settled, a ‘secondary identity’ as Yugoslavs or Turks, not as Albanians or Kosovars”. This trend changed after the Kosovo war at the end of XX century. Here needs to be highlighted that of all the countries in the Western Balkan 6 only Kosovo* citizens need an entrance visa for EU countries. This influenced the possibility of migration severally even after the war. Still Kosovar diaspora is estimated at 315.000 Albanian Kosovars plus 100.000 Serbian and other ethnicities. Most of these emigrants live in Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Italy, with few communities in the USA, Croatia, France and Canada (King, Vullentari 2009).

Taking a step back to Gamlen (2014, 2017, 2019a) Kosovo*'s governments changed their approach towards their diaspora during the years before and after the conflict. Following the work from Maria Koinova (2018) we can conclude that before proclamation of independence

¹⁵ Of all the countries in Western Balkans Kosovo*'s status is the most controversial and contested. According to the constitution of Republic of Serbia, Kosovo and Metohija is integral part of the country. (Ustav Republike Srbije 2006) Still, since the civil war in 1999, Serbia does not have means of force on this territory and its administration is relocated for more than two decades. On the other hand, Kosovo declared independence on 17th of February 2008 completing the political and briefly military battle that lasted more than 20 years. At the moment of writing of this thesis, Kosovo* status remains contested with 97 out of 193 members of United Nations, 22 out of 27 European Union members, 26 out of 30 NATO members recognizing its independence. Kosovo*'s independence and status will not be further discussed in this thesis. Considering the number of Kosovar diaspora as well as the factual separation from Republic of Serbia's institutions, Kosovo* needed to be a part of this research.

in 2008. Kosovo*’s government was closer to embracing their diaspora. This was with a goal to encourage emigrants to lobby for Kosovo*’s independence while promoting their membership in the wider Kosovar community. After the proclamation of independence, the approach towards diaspora changed. Koinova (2018) argues that diaspora did not get the reward it deserved for the effort invested into recognition of Kosovo*’s independence. Diaspora communities did not get any influence in policy creation and was seen more as an investor than political subject. Therefore, in connection to Gamlen (2014, 2017, 2019a, 2019b) from that point onwards, Kosovo*’s government adopted tapping approach.

The institution designed to engage with diaspora is Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora. Even though in the previous years Kosovo* had an independent Ministry of Diaspora and Strategic Investment, after the elections that took place at the beginning of 2021, new prime minister Albin Kurti connected it with Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, Kosovar government tries to engage with its diaspora on multiple levels while supporting their efforts to promote its culture and advocate for Kosovo* interests in western countries. Kosovar diaspora is also an important wheel of Kosovo*’s economy considering that remittances that emigrants send back home are equal to 15.6% of national GDP (Kondan 2020). Even though highly contested, government recognised the potential in its diaspora and created policies to engage with their emigrants in a successful manner.

3.3.1. Citizenship/Nationality

Kosovo* citizenship is regulated by the Law on Citizenship of Kosovo (Zakon o Državljanstvu RK, 2008). Article 3 of the mentioned Law proscribes that Kosovar citizen can be citizen of one or more other countries (Zakon o Državljanstvu RK, 2008). There are no specific conditions or restrictions for the exercise of citizens’ rights for people with dual citizenship. Here needs to be highlighted that Kosovo* is the only of the researched countries that does not put a generational limit on eligibility for dual citizenship. Generally, dual citizenship is allowed without discrimination based on the country in which Kosovar citizen acquires new citizenship. Paragraph 2 of already mentioned Article 3 defines that “obtaining and keeping second citizenship does not result in losing the citizenship of Republic Kosovo”

(Zakon o Državljanstvu RK, 2008, Article 3). Still, losing Kosovar citizenship is possible in the certain conditions. These conditions are defined in Chapter 3, Article 24 of the Law on Citizenship of Kosovo. There is stated that responsible institution can bereave a person of Kosovar citizenship if it concludes that he or she has another citizenship and takes part in activities that endanger security of Kosovo*. These activities are (Zakon o Državljanstvu RK, 2008, Article 24):

1. When citizen deliberately joins an organization that has a goal of destroying constitutional rule of Republic of Kosovo
2. Citizen takes part in activities that aim at destroying constitutional rule of Republic of Kosovo
3. Citizen is a member of intelligence service or police forces of another country, but he did not get a consent from responsible institution, or it is not allowed by international agreement.

In conclusion, it is possible to affirm that Kosovo* has a dynamic solution for citizens that have or want to have dual citizenship. Even though in some of the Articles, like Article 3, Kosovar citizenship law is very liberal, in the other, like Article 24, it shows that some restrictions needed to be applied.

3.3.2. Suffrage

Elections in Kosovo are regulated by different set of laws in accordance to the constitution. These laws are, the Law on President of Republic Kosovo and The Law on general elections in Republic Kosovo. When it comes to diaspora voting from abroad, important is to mention that it is regulated by Electoral Rule – Voting outside of Kosovo. First, it is vital to highlight that as in case of Albania, there are no elections for Kosovar president. The president is elected in the parliament by the MPs. Still, there are some restrictions when it comes to who can be a candidate for presidency. Article 3 of the Law on President of Republic Kosovo proscribes that for president of Kosovo* only citizens that are older then 35 and were permanently residing in Kosovo* for minimum of 10 years can candidate (Zakon o predsedniku 2008). This is a similar solution as in Montenegro and North Macedonia but here

the Law does not define do these 10 years need to be consecutive or not. This leaves a possibility of diaspora member being elected for president if he or she lived in Kosovo* for at least one decade but remains highly unlikely considering that the votes come from the parliament with no diaspora members.

On the other side, when it comes to national legislature all non-residential citizens are enfranchised (Zakon o Opštini izborima RK, 2008). Articles 5 and 6 of the Law on General Elections in Kosovo defines the conditions and restrictions potential voters come across. Similar to how it is in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the restrictions are imposed for the persons who (Zakon o Opštini izborima RK 2008):

1. Currently serves a sentence judged by International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
2. Is under the investigation of the Tribunal and did not appear in front of it when requested
3. Is registered as mentally disadvantaged by lawful decision of the court.

First two restrictions are closely connected to the crimes committed during the war, these restrictions we saw in Bosnia and Hercegovina too. What makes Kosovo*'s Law unique is the restriction of voting for mentally disabled persons, a form of discrimination that spreads on both in country citizens and ones abroad. Voting on the elections is not compulsory according to the Law (Zakon o Opštini izborima RK 2008). No information about national referendum and the regulations connected to it could be found online.

Considering the voting methods available to diaspora, expressing their vote is possible only in two ways: in country or by post. Kosovo* does not organize its elections in the embassies and consulates around the world but voting by post is defined by the Electoral Rule – Voting outside of Kosovo (Izborna pravilo 2013). According to the Rule, a citizen that want to vote from abroad, needs to register himself on the website of national electoral commission. On the address he or she registers online, a voter gets the ballot with the instructions how to vote and also an envelope in which the ballot should be sent back to Kosovo*. The envelope should be left in the determined post boxes and arrive to the electoral commission no later then 24 hours before the elections (Izborna pravilo 2013). Still voting from abroad is contested and hard. According to organization of Albanian diaspora Germin (2020), several obstacles to Kosovar diaspora expressing their votes can be defined:

1. Lack of national ID for people living abroad

2. Lack of knowledge about electoral rights and complicated registration procedure
3. Short deadlines for registration
4. Frivolous approach to diaspora voting and diaspora questions by Kosovar political actors

Considering that diaspora is included in electoral process in Kosovo*, it is surprising that no regulation of political competition abroad could be found. As in other western Balkan countries this leaves a lot of space for parties to break the electoral rules in order to gather votes and needs to be addressed in order to have fair elections on all levels.

3.3.3. Administration

Kosovo* has 61 consular missions deployed around the world. These missions are in 32 different countries. Most of the embassies also have a consular unit but there are also general consulates in the countries in which there are significant Kosovar diaspora (Germany, Austria, Italy).¹⁶ There are no consular services available online and embassies and consulates do not work during weekends on regular basis.

The main government body for emigrant policies is Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora. As stated before, Kosovo* had a separate Ministry of Diaspora and Strategic Investment that was dissolved and joined with Ministry of Foreign affairs in the first quarter of 2021 after establishing of second government of Albin Kurti. As of 2021, minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora is Donika Gërvalla-Schwarz.

3.3.4. Symbolic policies

¹⁶ Retrieved from: <https://mfa-ks.net/sr/misionet/493/ambasadat-e-republiks-s-kosovs/493> (06.12.2021)

Symbolic policies as well as the levels of engagement of Kosovo* government with its diaspora is regulated by the Law on Diaspora and Migration. (Zakon o Dijaspori i Migraciji 2012) As discussed before, Kosovar diaspora is a strong support of Kosovo*'s independence and its activity in their respective host country is recognised by the government. According to the Law, National Diaspora Day of Kosovo* is 2nd of August. On this day, it is proscribed by the Law, that government will organize multiple events to honour its emigration (Zakon o Dijaspori i Migraciji 2012). Law on Diaspora and Migration also regulates a national reward for the best Migration Group or Migrant (Zakon o Dijaspori i Migraciji 2012). The criteria and the selection process are not defined by this Law and no further information could be found. Finally, no information about national diaspora conference could be found on internet and Kosovo* representatives left several e-Mail requests for information unanswered.

3.3.5. Economic policies

Article 12 of already mentioned Law on Diaspora and Migration defines the economic relation between Kosovar government and its diaspora. In the Law it is stated that (Zakon o Dijaspori i Migraciji 2012):

1. Ministry will devote special attention to strengthen economical ties, cooperation in fields of science and new technology development between diaspora and migration and Kosovo* institutions, through economic cooperation and different economic policies.
2. Ministry supports cooperation of Kosovar scientists, members of Kosovo* diaspora and migration that live abroad and strengthens cooperation in research institutional projects.

Even though, Kosovo* is the only of the cases researched in this thesis that has economic relations with its diaspora defined by Law, few information could be found on how this Law is being implemented and practiced. The only valuable information that I was able to obtain is about the recognition of the diplomas gained abroad. According to Administrative Instruction that can be found on the website of Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technological innovation, recognition of diplomas obtained abroad is regulated on general basis for all the

countries the same (Administrative Instruction). No information about actual projects devoted to diaspora, as well as the diaspora taxing policies could be found.

3.3.6. Cultural and social policies

As a way of promoting its culture as well as independence, Kosovo* invested into creating policies that support opening Kosovo cultural centres abroad. Articles 5, 9 and 10 of Law on Diaspora and Migration defines the relationship between Kosovar institutions and cultural centres. Kosovo* provides support in learning both official languages (Albanian and Serbian) as well as formation of diaspora organizations that have promoting Kosovar culture and history as their goal (Zakon o Dijaspori i Migraciji 2012). Finally, the Law proscribes creation of Cultural centre for Diaspora and Migration, an organization with following responsibilities (Zakon o Dijaspori i Migraciji 2012):

1. Promotion of general knowledge about Kosovo
2. Support and develop knowledge about languages, culture, and cultural heritage of Kosovo
3. Support scientific, technical, sport and economic cooperation between Kosovo* and emigration

Generally, as for the economic policies, the Law gives a good and transparent definition of Kosovo* engagement with its diaspora through cultural promotion. Still, no information could be found about the actual implementation of the legal constructions. The transparency of these programs and projects should be provided to have a good picture of the Kosovo*'s diaspora policies.

3.3.7. Participation of diaspora in Kosovo institutions and their obligations

As in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovar diaspora does not participate in the Kosovo* institutions in any way. No information could be found about advisory bodies or potential places in parliament reserved for diaspora. Still, Kosovar diaspora is a main engine of contested country's promotion in international sphere. Jusufi and Ukaj (2020) argue that considering the economic and development influence Kosovo* diaspora has it should have more influence on political decisions.

As of 2021, Kosovo* does not have formed military forces. No information about additional taxes for emigrants could be found.

3.4. Montenegro

As for the other ex-Yugoslavian countries, the migration waves are closely connected to two periods of the twentieth XX century. The first wave, during the 1960s, was the response to government programs of sending workers abroad as well as slow growth of the economy especially in less developed areas of socialist Yugoslavia. Second wave is linked with war in Yugoslavia and even though there were no military actions on the territory of Montenegro people decided to emigrate (Rajović 2011).

When it comes to the exact number of Montenegrin emigrants, as for the other countries in this research, there is no precise data. According to statistics from 1991, most of the Montenegrin emigrants live in (Rajovic 2011): United States 44.9%, Germany 20.0% and Switzerland 7.9%. Here needs to be highlighted that in the time of this census, Montenegro was still in the state union with Serbia and therefore there are no exact data how many Montenegrins are in this country. Still, according to the census of 2003, more than 50 thousand citizens of Montenegro live abroad, which is around 9% of the total population of Montenegro (Rajovic 2011). As the data provided by Kondan (2020) claim, remittances inflows are equal to 25% of the national GDP of Montenegro. This puts Montenegro at the highest position considering the share of remittances in the country's GDP. (Kondan 2020)

Most of these remittances are sent from emigrants that live and work in Serbia, Germany, Austria and other Western countries.

Putting this information in the established theories is not an easy task. In the case of Montenegro, the relationship with its diaspora is dependent on the nationality. Therefore, for people who identify themselves as Montenegrin we could say that the government tries to adopt embracing as well as tapping perspective (Gamlen 2014, 2019a, 2019b). On the other hand, for other national identities are emigrants from Montenegro the relationship would be only through economic benefits of the remittances (tapping). This confirms Cohen (2015) theory that the governments can adopt different approaches towards different groups of its diaspora, namely accepting and promoting the 'good' diaspora while disregarding and in ways discriminating of the 'neglected' emigration.

The governmental body devoted to diaspora policies and cooperation with emigrants is Directorate for Montenegrin Diaspora (Uprava za dijasporu Crne Gore). Montenegro has the most restricted citizenships laws of all the countries in this research with interesting institutional solutions and efforts to promote membership in the Montenegrin nation.

3.4.1. Citizenship/Nationality

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Montenegro has the most restrictive law on citizenship. Citizenship is regulated by the Law on Montenegrin Citizenship (Zakon o crnogorskom državljanstvu). According to Article 8 of this law, in order to get the Montenegrin citizenship, person needs to hand in the renunciation of all other citizenships he or she has (Zakon o crnogorskom državljanstvu 2019). This means that dual, and multiple citizenship is forbidden for people who would like to get Montenegrin one. Article 10 of the same law leaves the possibility of the decedents of Montenegrin citizens from abroad until the third generation to get the citizenship. Still, that person would need to go through the process of getting the citizenship and renounce all the others (Zakon o crnogorskom državljanstvu 2019).

Another fact that sets Montenegro apart from the other countries in this research is the possibility of loss of the citizenship by law. In other countries of Western Balkans the citizenship can be retrieved on the request of the citizen. On the other side according to

Article 19 of the law there are three ways to lose Montenegrin citizenship (Zakon o crnogorskom državljanstvu 2019):

- On the request of the citizen
- On the force of law
- According to international contracts

In the Article 24, the Law also defines the reasons why someone can be divested of Montenegrin citizenship (Zakon o crnogorskom državljanstvu 2019):

- In the case of voluntary acceptance of the citizenship of another state
- If he or she got the citizenship through the fraud
- If he or she got citizenship because of conformation from another state that he will be deleted from the citizenship of that state in proscribed time, but at the end that does not happen
- If he or she is rightfully sentenced for crime against humanity
- In the case of terrorist activity
- In the case of voluntary service in the army of another country
- If his behaviour damages vital interests of Montenegro

Montenegro thus has a rigorous citizenship law that makes dual citizenship almost impossible. The reasons behind this law are various of political and cultural nature. These reasons will not be researched as a part of this thesis but would be an interesting topic to handle in the future research. The current law was part of the pre-electoral discussion in 2020 and new government promised changes, still, as of November 2021 the law was not discussed in the parliament.

3.4.2. Suffrage

Elections, voting and candidacy rights in Montenegro are regulated through different laws, usually specified to the institutions that is getting elected. Therefore, Montenegro has Law on Elections of the President of Montenegro (Zakon o izboru predsjednika Crne Gore) and the

Law on the Election of Representatives and Members of Parliament (Zakon o izboru odbornika i poslanika).

Montenegro generally does not apply voting from abroad and this is also the case for the elections of the president of Montenegro. According to the Article 88 of the Law on the Elections of Representatives and Members of Parliament, “voters that reside abroad vote on the ballot place in the area of last residence on the territory of Montenegro, before going abroad” (Zakon o izboru odbornika i poslanika 2020). Because of this, there is in country voting only, with no access to a ballot outside of the country. To be able to vote, person needs to have valid residence in the country. According to Article 2 of the presidential law, voting is not compulsory (Zakon o izboru predsjednika CG 2020). On the other side, passive electoral right for the presidential elections is also restricted. The non-residents have no right to candidate. According to Article 2 of the Law on Election of the President of Montenegro, “candidacy right has citizen of Montenegro, that has more than 18 years of life and has residency in Montenegro at least 10 years in the last 15 years before the election day” (Zakon o izboru predsjednika CG 2020). With this restriction, Montenegro remains the only country with such a law which makes impossible for the emigrants to get elected. Still, as mentioned in the chapters about other researched countries the question remains how successful this campaign would be even if not prohibited by the law.

The rules prescribed by law are similar for the national parliament elections too with less restrictions when it comes to candidacy right. According to Article 88 of previously mentioned Law on Election of Representatives and Members of Parliament, there is no access to a ballot outside of the country (Zakon o izboru odbornika i poslanika CG 2020). This means that country’s diaspora is completely cut out of the electoral process and its votes are not counted. The only way for the citizens of Montenegro that live abroad to exercise their right to vote is to have a residence in the country and come back for the elections. This leaves, according to different sources, almost half a million people without the opportunity to vote, which is certainly a problem that needs addressing in the Montenegrin law.¹⁷ On the other side, the law does not prohibit candidacy of non-residents for the position in the parliament. All the citizens, no matter if they are residents or not, are eligible for candidacy and are subjected to the universally applied restrictions (Zakon o izboru odbornika i poslanika CG

¹⁷ Retrieved from: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-dijaspora-parlamentarni-izbori/30803832.html> (05.11.2021)

2020). Still, considering that there is no possibility to vote from abroad, scenario in which a person from abroad will be on the list and elected to the parliament is not probable. Finally, voting is not compulsory (Zakon o izboru odbornika i poslanika CG 2020).

Considering everything written above it is easy to conclude that the only voting method available for non-resident citizens is to vote in country, according to their last residence in Montenegro. Because of voting being available in country only, all the citizens of Montenegro are registered automatically in the voters list. As mentioned before, the law prescribes that when a person comes of age 18 it will be automatically subscribed for the elections in the municipality of the residence or in the case of emigration, in the municipality of the last residence in Montenegro (Zakon o izboru odbornika i poslanika CG 2020).

3.4.3. Administration

Having in mind that there are no elections abroad the chapter of regulation of the political competition abroad will be skipped. Montenegro has 38 consular missions deployed as of 2021.¹⁸ These 38 missions are dispersed across 28 countries. Montenegro is, as Albania and North Macedonia, member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and has its diplomatic mission in the organization. There are no online consulate services and consulates do not work on weekends. Here needs to be mentioned one online program that government invented to collect valid data on number of its diaspora from abroad. This program could be understood as online consular service because it resembles signing into the base of the Montenegrin emigrants.¹⁹ Montenegrin nationals can sign themselves into the online database, the form is easy to understand and requires only the necessary data. This is the positive solution from Montenegrin officials which will help them to have actual picture about the demography of their diaspora. Apart from the legal help of the incarcerated citizens in the case of discrimination, there are no unordinary services that Montenegrin consulates provide.

¹⁸ Retrieved from: https://usdi.gov.me/Korisne_informacije (05.11.2021)

¹⁹ Retrieved from: <http://www.evidencija.dijaspora.mvpei.gov.me/> (05.11.2021)

The official government administration body for emigrant policies is the Directorate for cooperation with diaspora – emigrants. Considering the institutions rank as it can be seen from the name, this institution is a directorate and therefore has Rank 4 in the Pedroza, Palop-García (2017b) hierarchical structure. Acting director of the Directorate as of 2021 is Seid Hadžić.

3.4.4. Symbolic policies

Montenegro's relevant law to the diaspora population is the Law on cooperation of Montenegro with diaspora – emigrants (Zakon o saradnji Crne Gore sa dijasporom - emigrantima 2018). According to Article 39 of the mentioned Law, “to strengthen the connection with diaspora – emigrants, as a rule once a year, manifestation “Days of diaspora – emigrants” are to be held; Date and program of the manifestation is to be decided by the Ministry” (Zakon o saradnji Crne Gore sa dijasporom - emigrantima 2018). The national diaspora day is not determined as in the case of Republic of Serbia, but it is important that it is prescribed by law that once in a year diaspora has the day devoted to its influence on Montenegrin culture.

Another important product of the law that was not found in other researched countries is Emigrant card (Iseljenička knjižica). This Emigrant Card, as well as its look and function is also described in Articles 36-39. The Emigrant Card is „public identification document that, during the residence in Montenegro, can be used in cases of presentation and identification as a member of diaspora – emigration and cannot be used in other cases”. (Zakon o saradnji Crne Gore sa dijasporom - emigrantima 2018) The Card is issued on the request of the diaspora member and is valid for 20 years. This is another positive creation of the Montenegrin government to try to re-integrate the emigration into the country. The main advantage of the holder of Emigrant Card are the tax reliefs in cases of investment and other activities in economy, and especially „for activities that are valuable for the interests of Montenegro” (Zakon o saradnji Crne Gore sa dijasporom - emigrantima 2018).

Apart from national diaspora day and Emigrant Card, the Law on cooperation of Montenegro with diaspora – emigrants regulates the national rewards devoted for valuable members of the

diaspora. These rewards are handed during the days of diaspora – emigrants by the minister of foreign affairs. The laureates are nominated by the Directorate and selected by the Ministry. The awards are to be given for (Zakon o saradnji Crne Gore sa dijasporom - emigrantima 2018):

- Preservation of national identity and membership of Montenegro
- Contribution in culture
- Contribution in science
- Contribution in diplomacy and promotion of Montenegro
- Contribution to business partnership with Montenegro
- Good deeds
- Contribution in sport

The Law on cooperation with diaspora – emigrants is well written law that gives transparent overlook on countries strategy as well as programs devoted to diaspora and is crucial part of understanding the diaspora policy of Montenegro.

3.4.5. Economic policies

The data for this chapter was collected from the official website of the Directorate for cooperation with diaspora – emigrants and the Law on cooperation of Montenegro with diaspora – emigrants. According to the website of the Directorate, government of Montenegro is devoted to attracting remittances from its citizens abroad and to help them invest in the country.²⁰ One of the ways government does that is certainly described in the Law in the part that concerns Emigrant Cards (Zakon o saradnji Crne Gore sa dijasporom - emigrantima 2018). Considering that the level of remittances that come into Montenegro is equal to 25% of the national GDP we can say that Montenegrin diaspora is open to sending money back to the country. As I could not find information about any program on re-directing remittances to the public funds, the remittances are most likely spent privately for the household.

²⁰ Retrieved from: <https://usdi.gov.me/naslovna> (05.11.2021)

Academic titles earned by Montenegrin citizens abroad are accepted in the country. According to the official website of the Directorate, the accreditation is regulated on bilateral basis with countries Montenegrin students go to. There is no shortest period for the process prescribed by law, but the process cannot last longer than 30 days after the request for recognition is submitted.²¹ There was no information about the programs that have a goal to return diaspora back to the country, although here I would like to mention program devoted to the scientists of Montenegro inland and abroad. The program called Scientific Network (Naučna Mreža) is created to connect the scientist from Montenegro and abroad and create circulation of knowledge that would be beneficial for both sides.²²

3.4.6. Cultural and social policies

There was no information about cultural centres of Montenegro abroad. Even though it is prescribed by Law on cooperation with diaspora – emigrants that cultural promotion of Montenegro will be supported, available information suggests that diaspora communities abroad are left to create their organizations. The list of the organizations of Montenegrin diaspora is provided by the Directorate and can be accessed online. From introspection of the list it can be concluded that Montenegro has active diaspora that create cultural-artistic societies all around the world.²³ Similar to Republic of Serbia, Montenegro also works on promoting the language to its diaspora and their descendants born outside of the country. Having this on mind, learning of Montenegrin language is provided online by the Directorate.²⁴

Montenegrin citizens also retain their social and health advantages when abroad according to international bilateral contracts. The exercise of these advantages remains unclear considering that there is no general regulation but bilateral contracts.²⁵

²¹ Retrieved from: https://usdi.gov.me/Korisne_informacije/Nostrifikacija_diploma (05.11.2021)

²² Retrieved from: <https://naucnamreza.me/> (05.11.2021)

²³ Retrieved from: https://usdi.gov.me/adresar_organizacija (05.11.2021)

²⁴ Retrieved from: <https://crnogorskijezik.me/> (04.11.2021)

²⁵ Retrieved from: https://usdi.gov.me/Korisne_informacije/Penzijsko-invalidsko_osiguranje (05.11.2021)

3.4.7. Participation of diaspora in the country's institutions and their obligations

The Law on cooperation with diaspora – emigrants also regulates creation, composition, structure and work of Council for cooperation with diaspora – emigrants (Savjet za saradnju sa dijasporom – iseljenicima). Functions of the Council according to the Law are (Zakon o saradnji Crne Gore sa dijasporom - emigrantima 2018):

- Deliberates accomplishment of strategies and laws devoted to diaspora – emigrants
- Initiates activities that concern preservation of language, culture and tradition of diaspora – emigrants
- Gives opinion on questions in connection with diaspora – emigrants

This Council is similar institutional solution for advisory body as Parliament of Diaspora in Republic of Serbia. The Council is composed of diaspora members from different countries of the world as well as representatives of institutions of Montenegro. The president from the Council is voted from its members and it is not prescribed by Law if he or she should be from the government or a member of diaspora. Mandate of the Council lasts four years and one person can be member of the Council only two times. Council has one president and for vice-presidents (Zakon o saradnji Crne Gore sa dijasporom - emigrantima 2018).

When it comes to the obligations of the members of diaspora who are citizens of Montenegro, there is no mandatory army service. Still, as mentioned above, it needs to be highlighted that doing an army service in another country is prohibited by Law and could lead to the permanent loss of the citizenship (Zakon o crnogorskom državljanstvu 2020). The information about tax reporting for the members of diaspora is not found and as far as this research goes, there are no special taxes for citizens living abroad.

3.5. Republic North Macedonia

Republic of North Macedonia with its approximately 1.8 million inhabitants is estimated to have more people identifying themselves as Macedonians outside of the country than inside of its borders. As Damjanovski (2008, 236) claims, “emigration from Macedonia has been a process that has its roots as early as the 19th century, thus making Macedonia a traditional migration habitat. As most of the other countries in this research, North Macedonia too has internal problems that are rooted to the 90s and break-up of Yugoslavia. It is argued that “despite the establishment of the Republic in 1991 as a result of break-up of federal Yugoslavia, the state’s constitutional make-up is still an object of discussion, particularly in view of the population’s multi-ethnic character” (Balalovska 2012, 612).

In difference to the other countries of Western Balkans, Macedonian diaspora emigrated in four waves. As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, Macedonians emigrated during the sixties as a consequence of bad economic situation in the federal Yugoslavia, also in the nineties after the independence and in 2000s as a consequence of economic instability and political tensions between two biggest communities: Macedonian and Albanian (Damjanovski 2008). The wave that can be identified as different to the others is the first one, it is argued that “the period preceding the Second World War is marked by several events and factors, such as the Balkan wars and the First World War, which resulted in overseas migratory flows to the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand” (Damjanovski 2008, 236).

Macedonian national identity, its church, territory and even the name is contested by the neighbouring countries. Bulgaria argues their identity, Serbian orthodox church argues the independence of Macedonian church, Albania has open and hidden territorial pretensions and Greece contests country’s name and history.²⁶ With the last – Greece, Macedonian government signed Agreement in Prespa in 2018 finally solving one of the biggest problems on countries road to NATO and European Union.²⁷ The main result of the long negotiations between Greeks and Macedonians was the change of the Macedonian constitution and the name. Since 12. February 2019, country’s official name is Republic of North Macedonia.

²⁶ Retrieved from: <https://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/11/region/4421638/makedonija-bugarska-istorija-spor-goce-delcev.html> (20.10.2021)

²⁷ Retrieved from: <https://www.ekathimerini.com/resources/article-files/aggliko-1.pdf> (20.10.2021)

The main diaspora institution in North Macedonia is Agency for Emigration (Агенција за иселеништво). Still, the level of remittances as of 2020 is quite low compared to the other Western Balkan countries. Of all the researched countries, North Macedonia has the lowest share of remittances in countries GDP – just 2,5% (Kondan 2020). The country's electoral system is what sets North Macedonia apart from the other countries in this research. Macedonian government addressed diaspora in a sense that it created three electoral units devoted just for diaspora with three members of parliament that can be elected to represent interests of Macedonian diaspora (Aziri 2013).

3.5.1. Citizenship/Nationality

The citizenship of Republic of North Macedonia is regulated by the Law on Citizenship of Republic Macedonia (Закон за државјанството на Република Македонија). Article 2 of the mentioned law regulates that citizen of Republic of Macedonia can have other citizenships, it also proclaims that if person has two (or more) citizenships, when on territory of North Macedonia he or she will be considered a Macedonian citizen, if not regulated different by bilateral contracts (Закон за државјанството на Република Македонија 2016). Still, the number of generations that are eligible for the Macedonian citizenship after emigration is quite low. According to Article 8 of the same law, emigrant from Republic of Macedonia, as well as his child can have Macedonian citizenship (Закон за државјанството на Република Македонија 2016). All the other generations are considered as foreigners and will need to go through the whole process of getting the citizenship. This solution written in law limits the connection that Macedonian emigrants can have with it's home country.

Considering Article 2 and general eligibility for dual and multiple citizenships, there is no loss of citizenship if permanent residence abroad, as well as in the case of acquisition of foreign citizenship (Закон за државјанството на Република Македонија 2016). We can say that Macedonia has one of the most liberal citizenship laws in the region with the mark that the eligibility for the citizenship of future generations could be prolonged.

3.5.2. Suffrage

Electoral laws as well as the rules of election and eligibility to vote and be voted in North Macedonia are regulated by the Election Rulebook (Изборен законик). Article 6 of the mentioned law proscribes that all citizens (residential and non-residential) are enfranchised to vote on presidential elections (Изборен законик 2009). There are no specific restrictions and Article 3 forbids any pressure on citizens to vote (Изборен законик 2009). What needs to be highlighted, as mentioned before, is that on presidential and parliamentary elections there are electoral units devoted to diaspora only. In the case of presidential elections, all diaspora votes are counted as one electoral unit (Изборен законик 2009). Still, when it comes to candidacy right for presidential elections, the Constitution prescribes some restrictions. In the conditions for candidacy on presidential elections it is noted that, as in case of Montenegro, candidate needs to live in North Macedonia for at least ten years in the last fifteen.²⁸

The already mentioned Rulebook also regulates the elections for national legislature. In the same Article 6, law prescribes that all non-residential citizens are enfranchised (Изборен законик 2009). There are no specific restrictions for casting a vote and according to Article 3, voting is not compulsory (Изборен законик 2009). As mentioned above, North Macedonia is specific because it has representatives from diaspora in the parliament. In the Election Rulebook, it is defined that all of diaspora votes are counted as one electoral unit. (Изборен законик 2009) Considering the passive electoral right for national parliament, candidacy right is spread on non-resident citizens without special restrictions. The candidates from Macedonian diaspora are subjected to universally applied restrictions (Изборен законик 2009).

Having in mind that Macedonian diaspora's votes are counted as one separate electoral unit, Article 107 of Election Rulebook regulates voting methods available for non-resident citizens. The Rulebook prescribes that Macedonian diaspora can vote in country or in all the embassies or consulates of Republic of North Macedonia (Изборен законик 2009). Other methods like proxy voting, ad hoc voting stations or voting by mail are not regulated by this law. This could be an area in which Macedonian government could introduce few upgrades to promote turnout of its diaspora. The registration for the franchise is automatic for the residents of

²⁸ Retrieved from: <https://www.sobranie.mk/content/Odluki%20USTAV/UstavSRSM.pdf> (30.04.2021)

North Macedonia, while on the other side, non-resident citizens need to actively register themselves to vote in the elections (Изборен законик 2009).

3.5.3. Regulation of political competition

Having in mind that Macedonian diaspora has a representatives in the national parliament, one could expect that the political competition abroad is regulated by the law. This is not the case. Even though Electoral Law regulates political competition in Articles 70-85 (Изборен законик 2009), participation abroad is not mentioned. This lack of regulation allows political actors from different parties to act abroad, among diaspora, in the ways that could be against the law in the home country. This problem should be addressed by Macedonian representatives in order to have fair elections outside of the country. It is interesting to mention that diplomatic missions in which the elections will take place are pre-decided and regulated by the law. In Article 113 of mentioned Law there is a list of embassies and consulates in which elections are to be prepared and organized (Изборен законик 2009).

Another fact that separates North Macedonia from other countries in this research is the existence of the coherent and world-wide-spread organization of Macedonian diaspora. This organization is named United Macedonian Diaspora (UMD) and has its offices across the globe. As main organization of all the emigrants, UMD advocates for the interests of North Macedonia in United States of America, Canada, Australia, Germany and other global powers. They take action and often critique government for discrimination of diaspora while pointing to the regulations that should be changed. The most of the former parliament members from diaspora are also members of UMD. Even though, it is described as charity organization, UMD has mild political influence on North Macedonia.²⁹

²⁹ Retrieved from: <https://umdiaspora.org/> (25.09.2021)

3.5.4. Administration

North Macedonia has 60 consular missions deployed by the state around the world. These 60 missions are dispersed in 42 countries. As Montenegro and Albania, North Macedonia is a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and has its representatives in European Union, United Nations and other international organizations.

There are no online consular services and diplomatic missions do not work on weekends on a regular basis. What needs to be mentioned here is a special service that Macedonian citizens can get in the specific diplomatic missions. This service is a certificate of title that can be issued in diplomatic missions in United States of America, Canada, Austria and Serbia. The certificate of title is a document that proves the ownership of a person on a land parcel, apartment, house, or other real estate.³⁰

Government administration body designed for North Macedonia's emigrant policies is vice-ministry. This corresponds with 2nd rank in hierarchical structure proposed by Pedroza-Palop García (2017) paper. Vice-Minister in charge of diaspora policies as of 2021 is Edmond Ademi.

3.5.5. Symbolic policies

As in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, absence of coherent Law on Diaspora makes gathering all of the information needed for this research impossible. Official institutions of North Macedonia left requests for expert interviews as well as simple filling up of questionnaire unanswered. This strongly influenced possibility of full research on North Macedonian diaspora policies. As a consequence, no further data was gathered.

³⁰ Retrieved from: <https://mfa.gov.mk/mk/page/449/imotni-listovi> (25.09.2021)

3.6. Republic of Serbia

Considering its territory and population Serbia is the biggest country of the Western Balkan region. As legal heir of Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia as well as Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and at the end the union of Serbia and Montenegro country went through several regime changes and turbulent period from 1989 until 2006. This influenced country's population pace of emigration, even though workers emigration in the western European countries started much earlier in the 60s and 70s.

Determining the actual number of Serbian diasporans, as well as for the whole region, is a hard task. The mixture of legal and illegal as well as temporary and permanent migration makes it hard for both Serbia as home country as well as for the host countries to create an accurate statistic database. Therefore, as Panev and Predojević-Despić (2012, 37) claim, for Serbia, "as country with long tradition of emigration, specific economy, but also political context, high number of its citizens abroad, as well as heterogenous space and differential structure of international migrants, we cannot say that it has good statistical base." Having in mind that remittances construct 8,1% share of national GDP, there is a vast space of improvement (Kondan 2020).

The main government institution for diaspora is Directorate for Cooperation with Diaspora and Serbians in the region (Управа за Сарадњу са Дијаспором и Србима у Региону). What sets Serbia apart from the other countries from this region is the existence of the Parliament of Diaspora and Serbians in the region (Скупштина Дијаспоре и Срба у Региону); a consultative body that works close with the Directorate.

In connection to already established literature, "Serbia's Office for Cooperation with Diaspora and Serbs in the Region aims to assist the preservation and development of the spiritual, national, and cultural identity of the Serbian people outside the Republic of Serbia" (Gamlen et al. 2017, 498). This would be the reason for creation of this institution from the embracing perspective. This is in close connection with countries' government position on the left-right scale. Considering this, we could conclude that Serbian government created such an institution to spread extra-territorial nationalism. Gamlen and his co-authors highlight that home countries "with governments holding more right-wing, nationalist orientations are more likely to create diaspora institutions" (Gamlen et al. 2017, 498). Even though it's arguable if current Serbian government is nationalist or catch-all populist, it is hardly possible that

country with such high level of remittances created its government institutions solely because of spread of nationalism. Finally, Garding (2018) argues that that diaspora institutions in Serbia since the 1990s were clipped of their wings and did not have positive influence on the relationship between the country and its emigration.

3.6.1. Citizenship/Nationality

Citizenship of Republic of Serbia is regulated with Law on Citizenship of Republic of Serbia (Закон о држављанству Републике Србије). The law says that dual or multiple nationality is allowed without the limit of possible citizenships. There are no specific conditions and restrictions for exercising the citizen rights for people who have two or more citizenships. In the case that a person has two or more citizenships when on territory of Republic of Serbia, he/she will be considered a Serbian citizen (Закон о држављанству Републике Србије 2018-70).

Having in mind that there are no legal obstacles to acquire two or more citizenship the loss of Serbian citizenship is not connected to having more than one. Termination of Serbian citizenship is possible in two ways: renunciation and discharge. Renunciation is possible only for the Serbian citizens who have another foreign citizenship and are not older than 25, the process is easy and fast considering that the termination begins from the moment person provide the state with the signed renunciation letter. On the other side, dischargement from Serbian citizenship is long and complicated process with multiple conditions that need to be fulfilled such as regulated army obligations, clear criminal record, and conformation that the person will be accepted into another citizenship (Закон о држављанству Републике Србије 2018-70).

3.6.2. *Suffrage*

The voting rights as well as the participation in electoral race in Serbia are regulated with several laws mainly defined by the institutional body that is getting elected. The laws that consider this matter are: The Law on Election of Members of Parliament (Закон о Избору Народних Посланика), The Law on Election of President of the Republic (Закон о Избору Председника Републике), The Law on the Local Elections (Закон о Локалним Изборима) and The Law on the Referendum and National initiative (Закон о Референдуму и Националној иницијативи).

When it comes to presidential elections all non-residential citizens are enfranchised. This means that all of them are eligible to vote (Закон о Избору Председника Републике 2009, Ћлан 2). There are no specific restrictions for the diaspora and voting is not compulsory (Закон о Избору Председника Републике 2009, Ћлан 2, 3). On the other side, passive electoral rights for presidential elections are identical for non-residents and residents of the country. Theoretically, non-resident citizens can candidate themselves for presidential elections and are subjected to universally applied restrictions (Закон о Избору Председника Републике 2009, Ћлан 2, 11). In practice, it needs to be said that the electoral success for the diaspora candidate is not probable. The lack of access to the media as well as lack of political network and representation of diaspora makes this race unwinnable for the candidate outside of Republic of Serbia.

The elections for national legislature, in Serbian case – Parliament, are regulated by the Law on elections of Members of Parliament. The difference between presidential and national legislature elections, when it comes to diaspora voters, is that only selected categories of non-residents are eligible to vote on the national legislature elections. This means that “the right to elect and be elected for member of a parliament have every full of age working capable citizen of Republic of Serbia with residency in Republic of Serbia” (Закон о Избору Народних Посланика 2020-3, Ћлан 10). The official percentage of diaspora that has residency in Republic of Serbia is not familiar to the author of this thesis, but considering that the laws of Republic of Serbia make a difference between residency and habitat where residency is adress in Serbia and habitat adress in foreign country, we could assume that majority of diaspora has the right to vote and be voted for the parliament. As for the

presidential elections, voting on the national legislature elections is not compulsory (Закон о Избору Народних Посланика 2020-3, Član 2).

National referendum and the right to vote on it is regulated by the Law on Referendum and National initiative. Considering the new Law on Referendum and National initiative that was signed by President Aleksandar Vučić on 25th of November 2021, diaspora problems are addressed better than before. In article 4 of this Law, it is claimed that “the right to vote on the referendum has a citizen which, in accordance with the regulations of elections, have right and residency on the territory for which the referendum is called, and they are written in the voters pool.”³¹ The law continues with a short, but important clarification: “if the referendum that is called for the territory of local self government or part of its territory is deciding about rights and obligations of citizens – owners of real estate while the residency outside of that territory, the right to vote have also those citizens, which have the right to vote in accordance to voting regulations.”³² This is important for the citizens abroad because it gives them the right to decide if the eventual result of the referendum will influence their private possession. The voting is not compulsory (Закон о референдуму 2021). This law was approved by the Venetian commission on 24.09.2021.³³

Considering the voting methods available for non-resident citizens apart from in-country voting, citizens abroad have possibility to vote in the selected embassies or consulates as well as in other ad hoc voting stations (Закон о Избору Народних Посланика 2020-3). Embassies and consulates, in which the elections are held, are decided mainly on the number of diaspora members that live in the area under the jurisdiction of the diplomatic representative. Other ad hoc voting stations include registered cultural centres abroad and schools of Serbian language. The system of registration for the elections is different for residents and non-residents. For residents this process is automatic. When a person comes of age, in Serbia on the day of 18th birthday, he is automatically registered in the voters’ pool if he has the residency in the Republic of Serbia. Citizens are assigned to the specific electoral office and receive their ballot by mail (Закон о Избору Народних Посланика 2020). On the other side for the people living abroad the process is active – they need to register themselves by the diplomatic representative responsible for the territory where they are. This means that

³¹ Retrieved from : (<https://www.paragraf.rs/dnevne-vesti/120721/120721-vest10.html>) 29.10.2021

³² Retrieved from : (<https://www.paragraf.rs/dnevne-vesti/120721/120721-vest10.html>) 29.10.2021

³³ Retrieved from (<https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/srbija-venecijanska-komisija-referendum-/31476760.html>) 29.10.2021

person will change the place of voting, after requesting it to electoral commission (Закон о Избору Народних Посланика 2020). Even though this process does not take long it is time consuming for an emigrant to go to the embassy or consulate, submit all the requested documents and then wait for the answer from the electoral commission. This is certainly a policy that would need to be adjusted during the next legal reform. For now, the rule of active registration for the elections for non-residents is mandatory for presidential and parliamentary elections.

3.6.3. Regulation of the political competition

Political competition during the electoral process is not addressed at all in the countries' laws and electoral regulations in the Western Balkan. Party offices abroad, political campaigns abroad as well as party membership of non-residents, is not clearly addressed by the law. This means that in Serbia there is a lot of space for the corruption and the semi-legal activities, especially when it comes to political campaigns abroad. Good regulation of the electoral process abroad requires long negotiations not only between political actors in the country but also with the authorities of the host country. This process would be too long and exhausting for policy makers in the country to act and therefore leave the regulations as they are. Policy changes are recommended to democratize electoral process not only in Serbia but also abroad. Still, here needs to be said that of around 1.7 million people that are eligible to vote from abroad, only 6000 people voted on the parliamentary elections in 2016 (Pujkilovic 2020). In the current political situation in Serbia, this number of voters cannot influence the outcome of the elections in anyway and is significantly lower than number of people eligible to vote. The reasons behind this voter turnout are various from great distance between the place of living and voting boot to general disinterest and abstinence (Pujkilovic 2020). Addressing this problem would certainly make policy creators to have a better look into the current regulations of voting abroad.

3.6.4. Administration

Republic of Serbia has 102 different consular missions deployed as of year 2021.³⁴ These 102 missions are dispersed across all the continents in 70 world states. Considering the online services that these consular missions offer here I need to highlight that even though country is working on the digitalization since the first mandate of current prime minister Ana Brnabić, diaspora and consular services still do not offer many services in the digital service eUprava. The only consular service that can be accessed online is to make a request for working permit on the specialised website – eConsulate.³⁵ This is certainly a good step forward to make these services more accessible and easier to handle, but country should keep upgrading it and provide more system solutions. On the regular basis consulates do not work on weekends, only in the urgent cases usually involving providing papers for transport of deceased people back to home country for funeral. As it was presented to me by Consul General Stanković, in the special cases expert jurisdictional help can be offered to the citizens asking for it. Unfortunately, this is mostly connected with the incarcerated citizens usually making claims of mistreatment in foreign prisons. There are also no mobile consulates.

The official government administration body for emigrant policies is already mentioned Directorate for Cooperation with Diaspora and Serbians in the Region. Considering the institutions rank as it can be seen from the name, this institution is a directorate and therefore has Rank 4 in the Pedroza, Palop-García (2017b) hierarchical structure. The director of this institution as of 2021 is Arno Gouillon, French-Serbian activist, and humanitarian.

3.6.5. Symbolic policies

Republic of Serbia has national day devoted to emigrants as of 2021. The national Diaspora Day is celebrated on 28th of June every year (Закон о дијасопри 2009). Additionally, it needs to be mentioned the introduction of the new holyday that was celebrated this year for

³⁴ Retrieved from: <https://www.mfa.gov.rs/> (02.11.2021)

³⁵ Retrieved from: <https://econsulate.gov.rs/> (01.12.2021)

the first time. The day of Serbian unity, freedom and national flag was celebrated on 15th of September and included manifestations in the areas where Serbians live, inside or outside of the country. In the Constitution of Republic of Serbia, no reference about diaspora could be found. Still, it needs to be mentioned that the Constitution says that Serbia should “protect the interests of its citizens abroad” (Устав Републике Србије 2006). There is also no symbolic territorial entity.

Another important change that happened in 2021 considering the diaspora policies is the re-introduction of the national awards for the valuable citizens abroad. After 10 years, Republic of Serbia will award its citizens abroad for various achievements in charity, politics, and science. Some of the awards are: Мајка Србија, Slobodan Jovanović, Nikola Tesla, Dositej Obradović and Vuk Karadžić (Закон о дијасопри 2009).

3.6.6. Economic policies

The data for the chapter about economic policies created for diaspora of Republic of Serbia as well as the next chapters was collected through the questionnaire answered by Consul General Svetlana Stanković and the colleagues from the General Consulate of Republic of Serbia in Salzburg. Questionnaire on Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian (BCS) as well as its English version can be found in appendix.

As claimed by my sources, Government of Serbia created policies and programmes aimed towards gathering the remittances from the citizens abroad. Still, the policies aimed at upgrading the system of money transfers in the case of remittances are lacking. As of 2021 there are no additional taxes on the remittances from the abroad apart from the usual bank taxes. Remittances are usually spent privately.

For the investments as well as for the other similar diaspora policies, Government of Republic of Serbia with the help of Prime Minister Brnabić created the program called Таčka повратка. As written on their web page, Таčka повратка is “support for the returnees (diaspora) that plan

to return to the country, business, or scientific and personal career.”³⁶ In the case of the investment, Tačka povratka is the first point of information that “supports initiatives to present Serbia as the destination for potential investment from diaspora and returnees through offering relevant information about opportunities as well as connection interested persons and organizations with local partners.”³⁷ This organization also works on the promotion of the return to the country, as well as on the brain circulation.

3.6.7. Cultural and social policies

Serbia has cultural centres all around the world. Cultural centres are present mostly in the areas where there is an established Serbian community. The most of these centres can be found in Germany, Austria, United States of America, and Australia. Consular missions of the country help the work of these cultural centres and take part in the promotion of the Serbian culture. Programs that are established abroad, claimed by my sources are Schools of Serbian language, cultural-artistic societies and cultural centres. When it comes to social policies, emigrants from Republic of Serbia can keep their retirement and health benefits after the emigration. This is usually regulated on the bilateral basis with the countries of emigration.

3.6.8. Participation of diaspora in the country's institutions and their obligations

Participation of the diaspora in the institutions of Republic of Serbia is limited. According to the personal of General Consulate there were no advisory bodies created by the Government for the diaspora. During my research, as mentioned before, I found the Parliament of Diaspora and Serbians in the Region, an advisory body that works close with Directorate for Cooperation with Diaspora and Serbians in the Region. Unfortunately, the information about

³⁶ Retrieved from: <https://tackapovratka.rs/o-nama/> on 02.11.2021

³⁷ Retrieved from: <https://tackapovratka.rs/o-nama/> on 02.11.2021

this body is very limited and I could not find any activity after 2013. Considering that this Parliament was created through the law for the diaspora it is safe to assume that the reason behind inactivity can be linked to the lack of interest in Serbian community abroad to take initiative in this advisory process.³⁸ According to the Law on diaspora and Serbians in the region, in the work of Parliament are included: Prime Minister, Minister for Diaspora (after 2014, director), Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Internal affairs as well as the other representatives from the state and culture, as the guest of honour President of the Republic (Закон о дијасопри 2009). There is total of 45 delegates in the Parliament and apart from the government officials there are delegates from every region of the world where Serbians are living. The mandate of the delegates lasts for four years (Закон о дијасопри 2009).

According to the diplomats from Consulate General in Salzburg, there are no special obligations for the citizens of Republic of Serbia that are living abroad. As of 2021, there is no mandatory army or civil service. Although, male citizens are obliged to register themselves in the army register when they turn 18. Also, there are no special taxes for the emigrants. Here I need to highlight that at the moment there is an ongoing discussion in Serbia for the return of the mandatory army service. As well, during the spring of 2021 it could be read about the introduction of the taxes for diaspora, but without the official proposition or conformation.

3.7. Emigrant policies index – Western Balkan 6

With the help of EMIX codebook provided by professor Palop-García (2017) and the data I collected throughout the research I was able to calculate emigrant policies index scores for the countries of Western Balkan 6. Methods of data collection as well as of data processing are explained in the methodology section of this paper.

Figure 1 consists of the preliminary results and scores those countries achieved. As mentioned in the methodology section, Emigrant Policy Index is calculated by the equation that includes diaspora policies on one side and diaspora administration on the other. In Figure 1 I present all three scores, namely, diaspora policies, administration and finally EMIX score. This is to

³⁸ Retrieved from: <https://www.dijaspora.gov.rs/skupstina-dijaspora-i-srba-u-regionu/> (02.11.2021)

show to readers how WB6 countries differ in these fields and how both policies that country has aimed towards diaspora, as well as institutions designed to administer these policies, influence the final score.




Figure 1 - Emigrant Policies Index - Western Balkan 6

As mentioned in the methodology section, the data for calculating EMIX in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia were insufficient and therefore they should be considered with caution. Still, considering that the data is lacking in the areas that do not have high influence on the equation (cultural, social, economic policies and institutional participation) I have decided to include the results into the final analysis.

The highest EMIX score was detected in Serbia (0,522) and Kosovo*(0,519) and the lowest in Montenegro (0,34). In between with scores ranging from 0,40 to 0,45 were North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania.

When it comes to Republic of Albania, emigrant policies score is 0,45 which places the country on the third place in the region behind Serbia and Kosovo*. Albania scored relatively high in the policies part being second with 0,54. This is mostly because of the high scores in the areas of citizenship rights as well as economic, social, and symbolic policies country has in relation with it’s diaspora. Inclusion of diaspora in country’s institutions through Council of Diaspora is also policy that influenced the policies score and consequently final EMIX. On the other side Albania, as well as the other countries that have directorate as official

government diaspora institution, scored low in the administration scale. With 0,24 as result in this category, Albania has second lowest graded administration in the region. This is not only due to type of diaspora institution that has the highest influence on the administration score, but also because of country's low number of official representatives around the world. In the region of Western Balkan 6, Albania has the second lowest number of embassies consulates and missions (50) deployed in 37 countries. In general, compared with the rest of the region Albania is in the middle with some good solutions like already mentioned Council, as well as strong economic and social policies that show diaspora that they are respected and welcome by the home country. Still, there is a lot of space for improvement, namely in the part of administration and voting rights of Albanian citizens. More details are discussed in the next chapter.

Even though I was biased by the insufficient data, I was able to do the final calculation and draw some conclusions about the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards its diaspora. With the score of 0,43, Bosnia and Herzegovina position itself right behind Albania and on the fourth place in the region when it comes to EMIX. Even though this should be considered with caution, it is important that the highest influence on the result had the fact that the country has ministry devoted to diaspora policies on federal level. Considering highly restricted citizenship law as well as zero representation of diaspora in country's institutions, Bosnia and Herzegovina scored the lowest in policy sector with 0,32 on 0 to 1 scale. Here needs to be highlighted that lack of information about cultural, symbolic, and economy policies of the country had an influence on the final result. Still, the biggest reason of this low score is the impossibility of acquiring dual citizenship (except in already mentioned cases) and possibility to lose citizenship. It needs to be highlighted that, in difference to Montenegro, there are no restrictions when it comes to loss of the citizenship. Citizens do not lose their citizenship of Bosnia and Hercegovina because of permanent residence abroad nor acquisition of foreign citizenship (Zakon o državljanstvu BiH, 2016). This leaves the space for citizens that acquire the citizenships of the countries that do not require renunciations of current citizenships to keep the Bosnian one. Contrary to this, Bosnia and Herzegovina shares the first place in the region with Kosovo* when it comes to administration with final score being 0,69. As already mentioned, this is because country has a Ministry devoted to diaspora, but not only that, Bosnia and Herzegovina has 57 diplomatic missions deployed in 45 countries which puts her first behind Serbia when it comes to consular dispersion. Together with the other consular services that country provides for its citizens, Bosnia and Herzegovina is an example for the

rest of the region how to administer diaspora policies. Finally, considering that EMIX is a combination of administration (institutions) as well as policies devoted to diaspora, we can conclude that there is a lot of space for the improvement in country's relationship with its emigration.

As mentioned in the previous chapter about Kosovo*, Kosovar officials have always respected and thanked their diaspora for the influence they had on the battle for independence. This can also be seen in the EMIX score while Kosovo* achieved 0,51 on Pedroza, Palop-García (2017) scale. This result is second in the region, right behind Serbia. As in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, administration of diaspora policies (institutions) had high influence on the final score considering that Kosovo* has ministry devoted to its emigration. Still, the policies score was also decent with 0,44, putting Kosovo on the third place in the region behind Serbia and Albania. Good policy score is a consequence of liberal citizenship law in terms of possibility of multiple citizenship. Still, danger of losing the citizenship in the certain cases influenced the final score. Not only citizenship contributed to the policies score Kosovo* achieved. The Law on Diaspora and Migration also defined symbolic and economic measures and policies that affect diaspora which helped achieving higher result. On the other hand, as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo* scored highest in the region when it comes to administration of diaspora policies (0,69). This is mostly because of the existence of ministry devoted to diaspora but it is important to highlight that even though Kosovo* got its contested independence in 2008, it has well distributed diplomatic missions in 32 countries in the world. As second-highest ranked in the region, Kosovo* is a good example how to administer diaspora policies as well as create ones that will attract diaspora to invest back home.

Considering highly restrictive citizenship law, as well as low inclusion of diaspora in country's institutions and low number of diplomatic missions, it is not surprising that Montenegro EMIX score is the lowest in this research – 0,34. In the chapter about Montenegro it was discussed about possible political reasons behind this low result. Still, country scored relatively well when it comes to diaspora policies. With 0,39 Montenegro is on third place in the region in diaspora polices score. This result is not that encouraging mostly because of already mentioned citizenship laws. On the other side, voting rights of the Montenegrin citizens are also highly restricted and there is no possibility for them to excess their vote in the elections except if they do not find themself in the country at that moment. Having in mind that country has diplomatic missions in just 28 countries in the world, as well as low rank of diaspora institution the administration of diaspora policies is the lowest in

Montenegro. There is a lot of space for the improvement of country-diaspora relationship in the case of Montenegro, but for that there needs to be also a political will.

North Macedonia was the second country in this research with incomplete data regarding the calculation of EMIX scores. Still, as in case of Bosnia and Herzegovina there was enough data to make an estimation of the values of EMIX scores for this country. In this research, North Macedonia scored second lowest after Montenegro with 0,40 on 0 to 1 scale. Even though North Macedonia is the only country in which diaspora is represented in the parliament it scored the second lowest in the policies field with just 0,34. This is mostly because of lack of law that would define diaspora strategy and policies better. The problem for North Macedonia is also lack of symbolic and cultural policies aimed at fostering the sense of belonging to the country. Considering that diaspora institution in North Macedonia is vice-ministry, that, and relatively good dispersion of diplomatic missions the result for North Macedonia remains the most surprising in this research. Finally, when it comes to administration of diaspora policies, North Macedonia scored third with 0,55 on 0 to 1 scale.

With 0,52 EMIX score, Republic of Serbia is the country with the most advanced diaspora policies in the region of Western Balkan. High level of inclusion of diaspora in the country's institutions, as well as the orientation to attract emigration through cultural, symbolic and economic policies placed Serbia on the highest spot in this research. With the policies score 0,60, Serbia has better inclusion of its emigration then the other countries in this research. This is due to liberal citizenship laws, and efforts to enable diaspora vote in all the elections country holds. As in the case of Albania, Serbia has Parliament of Diaspora and Serbians in the Region, a governmental body designed to include emigration in the decision-making process. This way, diaspora 'voice' is heard by the country's officials when new policies are to be introduced. Circular migration and diaspora return projects resembled through 'Tačka povratka' are good example of spreading word about the opportunities that await home. In this way country gathers valuable knowledge and human capital that helps its development. On the other side, mainly influenced by the fact that Serbia does not have ministry for diaspora, administration score is low – just 0,32. Number of diplomatic missions dispersed in 70 countries rose the final score but there is still a lot to be done in this area.

After concluding the research few take-aways need to be noted. Primarily, the EMIX was created for the Latin American and Caribbean region and included variables that are specific for this part of the world. Namely, these are regulation of political competition abroad and existence of symbolic entities created for diaspora. None of the countries included in this

research regulated political competition in abroad and none of them created symbolic entity just for diaspora. On the other hand, in Western Balkan region more emphasis should be given on the current citizenship policies as well as for the representation of diaspora in country's parliament. For example, the fact that in North Macedonian parliament there is a spot for diaspora could not be accounted with this index. Still, as mentioned above, the influence that rank of diaspora institution has on the final value of EMIX, especially in administrative sub-component is arguably too high. Therefore, considering that Serbia has Directorate for Cooperation with Diaspora and Serbians in the region, the administration score was significantly lower than in case of Kosovo*. Having on mind that Serbia has three times more diplomatic missions abroad it is questionable if diaspora gets better service even though Kosovo* has a shared ministry for it.

3.7.1. Emigrant Policies Index – Comparison with previous research

In section 2.2.3. I presented the Emigrant Policies Index, it's background as well as the theory development by Lucy Pedroza and Pau Palop-García. Having in mind that previous research was done in a region geographically distant to the one that is subject of this thesis I need to present scientific justification of this comparison. The strongest connection between these two regions is that they are seen as 'exporters' of workforce. Qualified workers are leaving their home countries in search for better opportunities in developed countries abroad. Here needs to be highlighted that the emigration from Latin America and Caribbean region is mainly directed to United States and Canada (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017) while in case of Western Balkan this is mainly to developed western European countries like Germany, Austria, and Italy (Kondan 2020). Further connection can be found in the fact that countries from both regions are highly dependent on remittances diaspora sends back to the country (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, Kondan 2020). Finally, it is of value for science to check how does the respected index work in other regions of the world to prove its universality. The data from Pedroza, Palop-García (2017) paper about Latin American and Caribbean region can be found in Appendix III

Following the work of Pedroza and Palop-García (2017) I was able to do the regional average of policy and administration subcomponents of EMIX. Pedroza and Palop-García showed the results for the Latin American and Caribbean region in their paper *Diaspora policies in comparison: An application of the Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) for the Latin American and Caribbean region* (2017). On this track, the results are presented for the region of Western Balkan. Here needs to be highlighted that my dataset is significantly smaller – but the WB6 are nonetheless considered a region as noted in previous sections. Considering the lack of data for North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the areas of economic and symbolic policies I will not include them in this discussion.




Figure 2a - Average Policy subcomponents (WB6)

Figure 2b – Average Administration (WB6)

As shown in Figure 2a the highest average score is registered in citizenship rights (CIT=0,87). This is mostly because all the countries included in this research except Montenegro and partly Bosnia and Herzegovina allow dual citizenship. Compared to the previous research of Pedroza and Palop-García (2017), Western Balkan countries score better than in Latin America and Caribbean region where citizenship also scored high (0,79) for the same reasons. Second highest score was achieved in social policies (SOC=0,83), here it is important to highlight that all the countries in my research adopted the same laws when it comes to the right of keeping the health insurance and retirement benefits. This is one of the most positive outcomes and significantly higher than in the already mentioned LAC region (0,48). Another

positive result was achieved in suffrage (SUFF=0,40). Even though this result is below 0,5 it is significantly higher than in the Pedroza, Palop-García research where an average for Latin American and Caribbean countries was 0,22 (Pedroza, Palop García 2017). This means that Western Balkan countries included their diaspora into voting process much more than countries in LAC. The reasons behind this present a good ground for the future research of this topic. On the other side, WB6 countries scored remarkably low in institutional participation (INST=0,09). This is on the similar level as in Latin America (0,1) as countries in both regions lack better inclusion of emigrants into countries institutions (Pedroza, Palop García 2017).

Finally, Figure 2b gives us a look into administration subcomponent. Western Balkan region scores relatively low when it comes to administration abroad (AEX=0,26). This means that there is a lot of space for improvement in the services that are available for the emigrants abroad. In comparison to Latin American and Caribbean countries (0,35), WB6 scored even lower. On the other side, average score for the administration at home (AHO=0,58) is significantly higher considering that few of the countries included in this research have ministries for diaspora, and the smaller number of cases. Considering the influence that having a ministry for diaspora has on the administration result, the score in LAC was significantly lower (0,28) (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017).

In conclusion, I have inserted the results from respected authors in this thesis as Latin American and Caribbean region remains the only other region where EMIX was applied. The conclusions for these two distant regions can be drawn, namely, that countries tend to loosen their citizenship laws and allow their nationals to keep social and health services even when abroad. Still, when it comes to the institutional integration of emigration both regions fail to do it right. Considering that, to my knowledge, Latin American and Western Balkan regions are the only ones on which EMIX was applied, I invite scholars from the other parts of the world to try applying this index to create the comprehensive picture about diaspora policies in the world and identify the main struggles and obstacles to better integration of diaspora in home country's institutions.

3.7.2. *Diaspora policies and remittances*

Having in mind previous research it is important to mention the amounts of remittances that these countries received in 2020. Figure 3 shows the World Bank's estimation on these amounts.




Figure 3 - Personal remittances received in 2020 Source: World Bank

Before I proceed, here needs to be highlighted that the values are expressed in US dollars. It is important to have on mind that the population of these countries differs significantly from 7,5 million in Serbia to just over 650 thousand in Montenegro (World Bank). This can be one off the explanations for big differences between absolute numbers of remittances received in Serbia and Montenegro.

In order to control for the differences in the population I decided to divide amount of remittances with the estimated number of emigrants in each country. In this way I got the rough number of US\$ pro emigrant. Figure 4 shows the comparison between countries.




Figure 4 - Remittances WB6 Sources: MPI³⁹, World Bank, Own Creation

Finally, conclusions can be drawn. Even though high differences in the population, Montenegro surprisingly emerges as a country that gets the most remittances (around 4,500 USD pro emigrant). Having in mind that country scored the lowest on the EMIX this result makes my argument questionable. Still, when we compare Serbia and Kosovo* who scored highest in the Emigrant Policy Index with the rest of the countries in Western Balkans, we can see that there are some significant differences. Namely, Serbia and Kosovo* scored 0,52 and 0,51 on EMIX and they get roughly 4000 and 2500 US dollars pro emigrant. These amounts are significantly higher than in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina (around 1000 USD pro emigrant). Finally, the lowest amount of remittances is received in North Macedonia where the amount of US dollars pro emigrant is a bit higher than 500. For the reference, North Macedonia had the lowest EMIX score after Montenegro with 0,40 so the results align with the pre-research expectations.

In conclusion, except for Montenegro, the results for the other five countries when it comes to the comparison between diaspora policies score and remittances pro emigrant are aligning with previous expectations. Still, better statistical model of comparison between these results is needed to prove the correlation between these values. Going back to Azarian (2011) in order to address the flaws of comparison method, here I would recommend another research which will compare levels of assimilation of diaspora in the host countries with the

³⁹ Migration Policy Institute, Retrieved from: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/total-immigrant-and-emigrant-populations-country> 25.01.2022

remittances. On the other side, EMIX scores could be compared with the number of people that decided to return home in 2020. Both of these research would be of value for the science and understating how home country can influence its diaspora behaviour. Authors are invited to dig deeper and find the reasons behind this unexpected result when it comes to Montenegro. This is important because the implications from future research could help the other Western Balkan countries improve their policies and consequently receive more remittances. In the next section I will present policy recommendations for all the countries included in this research. This is with a goal to fill the gap between science and practice with specific solutions for the problems identified by this research.

4. Policy Recommendations

After completing the analysis and comparison of the results it is important to summarize the relevance of this research. I argue that this thesis is scientifically relevant in three ways. First, this is the first comprehensive comparative indexing of diaspora policies in Western Balkan region. By gathering the data and transferring it into quantitative index I created a ground for future comparisons of diaspora policies in this region. Second, I have tested already existing theories and applied them to the Western Balkan countries. This is important for generalisability of these theories and their scientific significance. Finally, by putting diaspora policies in regional perspective I created starting positions for regional approach to this topic and regional knowledge exchange.

Considering research presented in this thesis and everything written above, I would like to elaborate on policy recommendations. First, I present general recommendations applicable to all of the countries included in this research. Secondly, I go in depth and recommend certain policies on state-by-state basis. Finally, I take a step back again and show good practices of other European countries in their relationship with diaspora.

General policy recommendations for the countries of Western Balkan 6 are defined as following:

1. **Creating, and development of existing Laws on Diaspora** – Countries that do not have Law on diaspora are recommended to develop and implement one. This is the

most accommodating way of creating diaspora policies and serves as lead to government institutions how to approach diaspora.

2. **Create new and update existing online consular services** – Digitalization is important process that should include all government institutions. Providing consular services online saves time and resources of both consular officials and diaspora members in need of them.
3. **Create remittances funds for public spending** – By creating governmental fund for receiving remittances that will be used as direct investment in certain areas of social benefits and public infrastructure (e.g. hospitals), government would attract its diaspora to also invest money directly to the state and transparently see on what is that money spent.
4. **Stimulate sense of belonging through cultural manifestation abroad** – Organization of cultural manifestations abroad, as detected in this research, is almost always on diaspora communities abroad. Diaspora institutions should engage more with these communities and support organization of these events. Attendance of high government officials on those manifestation can be beneficial for both politicians who would get good PR and also diaspora who would have a chance to talk about their problems with country representatives.

Going back to policy recommendations for single countries, when it comes to Republic of Albania the main problem identified by this research was in electoral process. As mentioned above, Albanian diaspora has no influence on the election outcome. Including diaspora into electoral process is an important task that stands in front of Albanian officials. This could be solved in multiple ways, like in neighbouring Kosovo* the solution can be found in voting by mail. This does not take vast resources and is possible to be organized. Another opportunity is naturally in organization of voting posts in foreign countries. Most of the world's countries use this method as a main method of gathering diaspora votes. Finally, other methods of voting mentioned in this research could be of use to Albania if there is a political will to include diaspora in electoral process. Another problem identified by this research is untransparent economic policy connected with diaspora. Certainly, Albania has economic policies aimed at its emigration but no data about it could be found. Transparent economic politics can result with better recommendations when it comes to usage of the funds devoted to development of state – diaspora relations.

Several problems were identified in Bosnia and Herzegovina when it comes to government diaspora relations. Citizenship rights are quite restricted unless the second citizenship is Serbian, Croatian, or Swedish. Following the example of other countries in the Western Balkans (except Montenegro), Bosnia and Herzegovina can change the citizenship laws in order to include its diaspora that is in the other countries. This would include mainly diaspora from Western Europe and United States. Considering sensitive political situation general regulation of dual citizenship should not happen immediately but step-by-step process is recommended. Finally, as we saw in this thesis, countries that have diaspora laws have much higher diaspora indexes. Creating a comprehensive diaspora law would be beneficial for both the country as well as its diaspora and could consequently lead to better relationship between the two. As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina could expect higher remittances if the law would be written well and supported by suitable policies.

Kosovo* scored second highest in this research, therefore compared to other WB6 countries not many urgent problems could be identified. As for all the other countries, regulation of political competition abroad stays the least developed field. As for the voting methods, voting by post is a positive solution by government officials. Still, other methods should be included, namely voting in the diplomatic missions abroad. This would be beneficial considering that the number of people voting would rise having in mind the complexity of Voting by mail. Even though, Kosovo* has diaspora law, diaspora participation in government institutions is highly restricted. Creating the Council of Diaspora similar to the one in Albania would close this gap and let emigration influence the political processes.

During the pre-election campaign of parliamentary elections 2020 in Montenegro, the current government officials promised the change of citizenship laws. Until now no new laws were introduced. This leaves Montenegro with the most restrictive citizenship laws in Western Balkans. Having in mind the specific political context in which Montenegro finds itself the improvements could be found in the current citizenship laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in a step-by-step introduction of different bilateral agreements between the governments. This would be beneficial both for the diaspora but also for the people that live in Montenegro for more than a decade but are not able to fulfil their citizenship rights. Diaspora is also discriminated of its voting rights. Namely, as in Albania, Montenegro does not enable voting outside of the country. The same recommendation as for Albania would be to introduce at least the Voting by mail. Spreading the consular network is also something in

which Montenegro government should invest the funds into, in order to take the grasp of more communities abroad.

When it comes to North Macedonia as in Bosnia and Herzegovina the biggest problem seems to be the lack of diaspora law that will systematize country's relationship with its emigration. As recommended above, Albanian law on diaspora is certainly something to start from and off all the countries in this research North Macedonia is in need of this law the most having in mind that diaspora is one electoral unit in parliamentary elections.

Finally, even though Republic of Serbia scored the highest on emigrant policies index, it is important to highlight that there is still room for improvement. Namely, considering that voting is organized only in selected embassies and consulates abroad, other methods should be prepared for people who live too far from these diplomatic missions. This could be done as it is done Kosovo*, which would imply providing voting by mail. This way the votes of people who do not live in cities where voting is organized can be acknowledged.

As identified by this research, the whole region of Western Balkans is struggling with regulation of political competition abroad, as well as with lack of consular services that can be done online. One country that is a pioneer regarding good online consular services that are provided to its citizens is Italy. Not only that country moved most of its services online but it also provides a wider spectrum of general consular services than countries in this research. As in diplomatic missions of WB6, Italian missions provide assistance to detainees as well as repatriation of corpses from abroad. On top of that, following services are available:⁴⁰

1. Economic assistance
2. Indirect assistance through charities
3. Health care
4. Help with document theft or loss
5. Assistance in finding compatriots
6. Assistance with permanent return to Italy

The country created an internet service called FastIt (Farnesina Servizi Telematici per Italiani all'Estero), which is a general system which provides different service. As mentioned in this research, Albania and Serbia have created similar system but it is, for now, only determined to

⁴⁰ Retrieved from: https://serviziconsolari.esteri.it/ScoFE/static/assistenza_connazionali.sco (01.02.2022)

eventual visa requests and work permits for foreigners. The transparency of FastIt as well as different services provided by the system makes emigration much easier to Italian citizens abroad, therefore developing similar system in countries of Western Balkan would have positive impact on both emigration and the country's officials abroad. This would be an improvement because people would not need to reach the diplomatic missions that are often more than hundred kilometres distant, but it would also loose the officials' workload. One of the services provided on FastIt is also A.I.R.E. (Anagrafe Italiani Residenti all'Estero). This is the registry of Italian residents abroad, established in 1988 and contains the data of Italian citizens residing abroad for a period of more than twelve months. This system is managed by the municipalities based on data and information from consular representations abroad.⁴¹ Montenegro is the only country mentioned in this research which has something similar to this system. In the case of Montenegro this was just a registry of Montenegrins abroad, but in Italian case also provides (Ministero degli Affari Esteri, n.d.):

1. The possibility to vote for political elections and referendums by correspondence in the country of residence, and for the election of Italian representatives to the European Parliament in the seats established by the diplomatic-consular network in the countries belonging to the European union
2. The possibility of obtaining the issue or renewal of identity and travel documents, as well as certificates
3. The possibility of renewing your driving licence

Creating a system similar to this one should be beneficial for countries of WB6 for two reasons. First, as identified in the analysis part, all the countries struggle with the exact data on number of emigrants they have. With the usage of this system, this problem would be solved considering that countries would not have to work with estimations anymore but have the exact numbers. Second, the services provided by this system would help emigrants do some of the official documents (for which they would need to go back to the home country) online. This would save the costs of travel, but also fasten up the process considering that workers would be able to renew their documents only during their holydays.

Another positive example of diaspora policies development in Europe is Moldova. It is claimed that "the country's Constitution (1994), a number of laws and legal acts defined the

⁴¹ Retrieved from: https://www.esteri.it/it/servizi-consolari-e-visti/italiani-all-estero/aire_0/ (01.02.2022)

main approaches of Moldova emigration, corresponding to international legal norms and democratic principles” (Mosneaga 2012, 2). This is because diaspora regulation in Moldova is well developed basis of legal documents, namely, one presidential decree, seven regulations and one governmental institution (Mosneaga 2012). Moldavian authorities strive towards their emigrant communities while providing conditions for small business development in the country. In this way they are gaining intellectual potential for modernization and socio-economic development of the country (Mosneaga 2012). As WB6 countries have similar goals in their diaspora engagement the example from Moldova should be followed.

When it comes to political competition abroad multiple authors research results showed that parties who invest into electoral campaign abroad have significantly higher percentage of votes in electoral districts abroad. This is seen in the case of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgaria, Turkish Justice and Development Party (Rashkova 2020), as well as in cases of the Green Party of New Zealand and democratic-liberal parties in Romania (Umpierrez de Reguero, Dandoy 2021). The examples of these parties confirm that the initiative should first come from the political parties inland to expand their campaign to communities abroad. As a product of this comes the regulation. In the case of WB6 non of the parties have shown an official initiative to spread their campaign abroad. This is mostly because of higher costs of this project in already limited campaigning budgets. Finally, what country can do to include the emigration more into the political process is to encourage political parties to spread their campaign abroad. This could be done with establishment of the budget for campaigning abroad.

To maximize remittance inflows good example can be found in the Philippines. Philippines has over 2,5 million of its citizens in emigration. The remittances gained from this vast diaspora, government created “incentives, including tax breaks and privileged investment options for overseas residents, while facilitating the transfer funds” (Newman 2004, 9). None of these initiatives were not registered in Western Balkans. Creating policies that would make these transfers easier but would be beneficial for the country too as it will reduce unofficial remittances flow and make the data more confident. Finally, Philippine government also “provides services that are intended to promote continued ties with the homeland, including overseas tours of Philippine entertainers, schools in areas with high concentrations of Filipino migrants, and psychological counselling services that emphasize maintenance of Filipino values” (Newman 2004, 10). Some of these solutions were also adopted by Albania, Kosovo and Serbia but even in these countries there is still room for improvement.

5. Conclusion

In this thesis I tried to prove the link between diaspora policies and remittances these emigrants send back to the countries of Western Balkan 6. Bearing in mind the results presented in the analysis part, the outcome of this research was as expected in my argument for five out of six countries. Montenegro remains the most interesting and surprising result of this research, due to the fact that it is the country with the lowest Emigrant policies index but has the biggest amount of remittances pro emigrant. The reasons behind this should be investigated in the future research. When it comes to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, North Macedonia and Serbia the results align with pre-defined predictions. The remittances are higher in the countries that invested more policies into reaching towards their diaspora.

When it comes to theoretical contribution of my research, I need to highlight that I tried to test theories of the other authors on this topic. Theories were implemented and tested on the region of Western Balkan. Mainly, I proved that the more diaspora policies created by governments higher will be remittances from abroad. This theory could be tested in other regions of the world in order to achieve scientific universality.

To take a step back and put my research in the scope of already existing literature mentioned in the chapter about theoretical background it needs to be highlighted that the countries in this research showed different traits and confirmed most of the theories. As Gamlen (2014, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c) claimed the relationship between diaspora and home countries in the last three decades is seen as good and always growing. The theory about almost heroic representation of diaspora in the public sphere was confirmed in all the countries included in this research. With more or less initiatives, we saw that non of WB6 governments have animosity towards its diaspora and all are well aware that emigration is a good investor and not an enemy. Another important implication of Gamlen (2014) work that countries around the world strive towards institutionalization of diaspora and diaspora policies was confirmed by this research. All the countries of Western Balkan 6 have at least one type of diaspora institution. The level and importance of the institution differs from country to country. The type of the institution (directorate, vice ministry or ministry) in the region is more of a product of day-to-day politics and government-creating negotiations than systematized diaspora engagement

program. This needs to be solved by the governments to get continuous relationship with the emigration.

On the other side, the reasons behind creation of diaspora policies and institutions defined by Gamlen (2014, 2017, 2019a, 2019b) differ from country to country. I need to highlight here that it is hard to put a country into only one perspective (tapping, embracing, or governing). In the sense of Gamlen's definitions the goal of all the countries in this research could be defined as tapping diaspora. The remittances (primarily material) remain the main reason behind reach out to diaspora for all Western Balkan countries. Having in mind the embracing perspective defined by Gamlen none of the countries included in this research can really fit there. The traces of embracing diaspora as goal of policy creation could only be seen in Serbia, namely through the project Tačka povratka. The other countries did not show any serious initiative to support diaspora return. Finally, when it comes to more governance as a goal of diaspora engagement, Serbia remains the only country with clear intention of controlling some of its diaspora. This is seen both through policies developed by the country but as well as in the name of the diaspora institution – Directorate for Diaspora and Serbians in the region. Therefore, it needs to be concluded that Serbia also separates its diaspora to the ones that live in Western developed countries (e.g. Germany, Austria, United States) and the people that are living in the neighbouring countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Croatia). For the first group of emigrants tapping perspective is the main goal behind this diaspora policy and institution development, for the second Serbia clearly wants to spread its influence outside of its borders.

Considering Ragazzi (2014) theory of extending right to vote and be voted as an emigrant the results of this research show the differences between countries. In the case of Albania and Montenegro voting outside of the country is not possible therefore citizens that live abroad remain discriminated on their voting rights. When it comes to the right to be voted, this right shown to be restricted in North Macedonia and Montenegro. This leaves only Kosovo* and Serbia as the cases that confirm Ragazzi's observations. As mentioned above, the reasons behind these restrictions are different and have different background, authors are invited to go deeper on this and point out why countries decide to restrict diaspora's right to vote.

Going back to the areas of interest countries exploit in relationship with diaspora, and as defined by Klekowski (2019), the results of this research show that only Serbia can be defined as Transnational state considering that it reaches towards its diaspora both economically and politically. All the other countries fit in the definition of strategic or selective states

considering that they either reach their diaspora through economy (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo*) or politically (North Macedonia – through diaspora electoral unit). On the other side, when it comes to theories of remittances and their spending, Newman (2004) research about the private spending of diaspora remittances was confirmed in all the countries included in this thesis. No systematized spending of remittances was registered in any of WB countries. Leaning on Newman (2004), lack of plan does not mean less remittances or more inequality but less development. It be assumed that all countries in this region use foreign direct investments for their development and remittances are used privately as an addition to household income. Was this planned separation or just product of the practice remains unclear.

Based on Mirilović (2016) and Kulakevich (2021) research about the rule of law and diaspora, the research I conducted can be a good base for the future research on this topic. The EMIX score developed for these countries can be used in qualitative research and compared to different other indexes that show the level of development of rule of law in the country (e.g. Freedom house index).

Finally, in this thesis I tried to fill the gap between remittances countries of Western Balkan receive and actual research done on the topic so far. The percentage of gross domestic products that monetary remittances fill remains unclear because of unreliable datasets as product of sending remittances through official and unofficial channels. Still, when looking at estimates only (Kondan 2020, World Bank) it can be concluded that it is in interest of the governments to develop their relationship with diaspora and attract more of these monetary transfers.

Calculation of Emigrant policy index (EMIX) developed by Pedroza and Palop-Gacía (2017, 2017b, 2021) was an interesting process with few difficulties connected with data accessibility and official's responsiveness. Still, I was able to do the whole research for four and partially for two out of six countries. Empirical data I presented in this thesis can contribute to the comparison of diaspora policies in Western Balkans. This can be used by both, scholars, and policy creators to compare their achievements and register areas that need to be improved. Having in mind that EMIX scores are already calculated for Latin American and Caribbean region, and with addition of Western Balkan 6, authors are invited to apply this index on the other regions of the world so that at the end we could have a dataset consisted of all the countries in the world.

In conclusion, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia are all more or less engaged with their vast emigration. As a region in development, Western Balkan is fertile ground for the investment both from foreign companies and it's diaspora. It is to be seen how these countries will benefit from their approach and how will this approach change in the always changing world of politics.

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6.1. Useful websites:

- <http://akd.gov.al/en/takimi-i-mjekesise-ne-diaspore-2/>
- <http://www.evidencija.dijaspora.mvpei.gov.me/>
- <http://www.mvp.gov.ba/>
- <http://www.podaci.net/>
- <http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en>
- <http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en>
- <https://ambasadaime.gov.al/e-konsullata/>
- <https://crnogorskijezik.me/>
- <https://diaspora.gov.al>
- <https://dijaspora.mhrr.gov.ba/>
- <https://e-albania.al/>
- <https://mfa.gov.mk/mk/page/449/imotni-listovi>
- <https://mfa-ks.net/>
- <https://naucnamreza.me/>
- <https://umdiaspora.org/>
- https://usdi.gov.me/Korisne_informacije
- <https://worldpopulationreview.com/>
- <https://www.paragraf.rs/>
- <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/>

- <https://www.sobranie.mk/content/Odluki%20USTAV/UstavSRSM.pdf>
- <https://www.mfa.gov.rs/>
- <https://econsulate.gov.rs/>
- <https://tackapovratka.rs/>
- <https://www.dijaspora.gov.rs/>
- <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/>
- <https://serviziconsolari.esteri.it/>
- <https://www.esteri.it/>

7. Appendix

Appendix I:

1. Table 1: EMIX Framework

Comp.	Subcomp.	Attributes	Items	Modality	Measurement level	Notes
Policy				0 to 1	Interval	
	Citizenship			0 to 1	Interval	
			Citizenship for nationals by birth	0 to 1	Interval	The indicators of citizenship follow the EUDO Citizenship Law indicators.
			Loss of nationality	0 to 1	Interval	
			Citizen Rights	0 to 1	Interval	
			Citizenship for nationals by naturalization	0 to 1	Interval	
			Loss of nationality	0 to 1	Interval	
			Citizen Rights	0 to 1	Interval	
	Suffrage			0 to 1	Interval	Scores are calculated as a percentage of the rights that can be extended.
			Active electoral rights	0 to 1	Interval	
			Presidential elections	0 to 1	Interval	
			Legislative (Lower House)	0 to 1	Interval	
			Legislative (Upper House)	0 to 1	Interval	
			Passive electoral rights	0 to 1	Interval	
			Presidential elections	0 to 1	Interval	
			Legislative (Lower House)	0 to 1	Interval	
			Legislative (Upper House)	0 to 1	Interval	
			Registration for the franchise	Easier than for residents, same procedure, more complex than for residents	Ordinal	
	Political Competition			0 to 1	Interval	
			Political offices abroad	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Political campaigns abroad	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Emigrant membership to SO parties	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Institutional Participation			0 to 1	Interval	The indicators of institutional participation follow the ones proposed by MIPEX for migrant advisory boards in the states of reception.
			At the national level	0 to 1	Interval	
			Structural consultation	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Composition of advisory body	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Chair of consultative body	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Right to get a response	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Right of initiative	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			At the consular level	0 to 1	Interval	
			Structural consultation	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Composition of advisory body	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Chair of consultative body	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Right to get a response	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Right of initiative	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Economic policies			0 to 1	Interval	
			Remittances	0 to 1	Interval	
			Program to foster remittances	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Improvement of banking channels	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Fee controls for remittances	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Remittances for co-development	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Investment programs	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Return programs	0 to 1	Interval	
			Recognition of academic qualifications obtained abroad	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Communication campaigns to foster return	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Tax exemption to bring in household goods	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Integration programs for returnees	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Brain-gain programs	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Brain circulation networks	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Obligations			0 to 1	Interval	For the military and social service, we will register if they exist for the resident population; next, we analyze whether the obligations apply for residents and non-residents equally or whether there are differences based on the place of residence.
			Military service	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Social service	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Declare taxes in SO	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Special tax for emigrants	Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Cultural institutes abroad	0 to 1	Interval	
	Cultural			Yes/No	Ordinal	
			Promotion offices in consulates	Yes/No	Ordinal	

	Cultural programs	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Exit and transit policies	0 to 1	Interval	
	Information campaigns about right and duties	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Information campaign to foster safe transit	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Social policies	0 to 1	Interval	
	Retirement benefits after emigration	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Healthcare	0 to 1	Interval	
	Targeted services for emigrants	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Bilateral agreements with other countries	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Education programs for emigrants	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Symbolic policies	0 to 1	Interval	
	Awards	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Communication campaigns	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Emigrant conferences	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	National day devoted to the emigrants	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Explicit reference in the constitution	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Creation of a new symbolic territorial entity	Yes/No	Ordinal	
ADM		0 to 1	Interval	
	Home administration	No, Directorate,	Ordinal	
	External Administration	Viceministry, Ministry	0 to 1	Interval
	Consular network		0 to 1	Interval
	Size		0 to 1	Interval
	Dispersion		0 to 1	Interval
	Consular services		0 to 1	Interval
	Online services	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Weekends	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Mobile consulates	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Consular functions		0 to 1	Interval
	Legal services	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Financial services	Yes/No	Ordinal	
	Psychological consultancy	Yes/No	Ordinal	

Table 1 - EMIX Framework - (Pedroza, Palop-García 2017, 169-170)

Appendix II:

2. Questionary used for the interview with Consul General of Republic of Serbia in Salzburg, Austria – Svetlana Lala Stankovic, May 2021

Pred Vama se nalazi upitnik namenjen prikupljanju podataka za izradu Master teze „Diaspora Policies and Remittances – Case of Western Balkan 6”. S obzirom da se odgovori na ovaj upitnik kodiraju radi kvantitativnog prikaza politike Srbije namenjene dijaspori, većina pitanja treba biti odgovorena sa DA ili NE.

Svi podaci prikupljeni uz pomoć ovog upitnika biće propisno navedeni i citirani u završnom radu. Autor rada ni na koji način neće izmeniti ili zloupotrebiti prikupljene informacije.

Hvala na saradnji,

Milan Ristić

Ekonomске politike:

Dotacije iz inostranstva od strane građanja Srbije:

1. Da li postoje programi Vlade Republike Srbije namenjeni privlačenju dotacija od strane građana koji žive i rade u inostranstvu? **DA**

(na pitanja ispod odgovarati samo u slučaju da je odgovor na prvo pitanje DA)

2. Da li postoje mere Vlade namenjene unapređivanju sistema bankovnih transfera u slučaju dotacija? Koje mere su u pitanju? **NE**
3. Da li postoje dodatni porezi na dotacije iz inostranstva? **NE**
4. Na koje načine se troše direktne donacije građana iz inostranstva?
 - a.) **Privatno**
 - b.) Dotacije su usmerene u razvojni fond

Investicije:

1. Da li postoje vladini programi namenjeni privlačenju direktnih investicija od strane dijaspore? **DA**

Politike za ohrabrivanje povratka u Srbiju:

1. Da li su akademska zvanja stečena u inostranstvu prihvaćena u Srbiji ? **DA**

(na pitanja br. 1.1-3. odgovarati samo u slučaju da je odgovor na prvo pitanje DA)

- 1.1. Kako je akreditacija regulisana? (Generalno ili na bilateralnoj bazi sa državama iz kojih akademci dolaze?)
 - a.) Generalno (za sve države po istom principu)
 - b.) **Na bilateralnoj osnovi**

1.2. Koji je najkraći mogući rok za priznavanje zvanja stečenih u inostranstvu? a.)

6 meseci ili manje

b.) Između 6 meseci i godinu dana

c.) Više od godinu dana

d.) **Ne postoji najkraći rok**

1.3. Koji je najduži mogući rok za priznavanje zvanja stečenih u inostranstvu?

a.) 6 meseci ili manje

b.) Između 6 meseci i godinu dana

c.) Više od godinu dana

d.) **Ne postoji najduži rok**

2. Da li postoje aktivni programi koji imaju za cilj povratak emigranata u Srbiju? **DA**

3. Da li su građani koji donose kućni nameštaj iz inostranstva izuzeti od poreza? **NE**

4. Da li postoje programi za re-integraciju emigranata u društvo Srbije? **DA**

5. Da li postoji organizovana mreža cirkulacije mozgovna namenjena razmeni znanja između emigranata i profesionalaca u Srbiji? **DA**

Kulturne politike:

1. Ima li Srbija kulturne centre u inostranstvu? **DA**

2. Da li diplomatska predstavništva Srbije učestvuju u promociji kulture Srbije? **DA**

3. Koji kulturni programi u inostranstvu postoje? **Škole srpskog jezika, kulturnoumetnička udruženja, kulturni centri**

Socijalne politike:

1. Da li je moguće održati penziona i zdravstvene benefite nakon emigracije u drugu zemlju? **DA**
2. Da li postoje edukativni programi namenjeni emigraciji koji se sprovode kroz mrežu diplomatskih predstavništava Srbije? **DA**

Simbolične politike:

1. Da li postoje nagrade Srbije koje se dodeljuju članovima njene dijaspore? **NE**
2. Da li su kreirane određene kampanje kako bi se pospešio osećaj pripadnosti Srbiji? **DA**
3. Da li se organizuju konferencije na nacionalnom nivou koje razmatraju uticaj emigracije na dešavanja u Srbiji? **NE**

Administracija politika namenjenih dijaspori:

1. Koje od sledećih usluga su dostupne u konzularnim predstavništvima Srbije?
 - a.) Ekspertska pravna pomoć
 - b.) Finansijsko savetovanje
 - c.) Psihološko savetovanje
 - d.) Zdravstvene usluge

Učešće dijaspore u institucijama Srbije:

Savetodavno telo na nivou države:

1. Da li postoje savetodavna tela dizajnirana isključivo za dijasporu ? **NE**

(na sledeća pitanja odgovarati samo ako je odgovor DA)

2. Da li je savetodavno telo deo sistema ili ad hoc?

3. Ko čini savetodavno telo?
 - a.) Samo predstavnici dijaspore
 - b.) Telo čine predstavnici dijaspore i predstavnici Vlade (ime države)
 - c.) Samo predstavnici Vlade
4. Ko je predsednik savetodavnog tela?
 - a.) Predstavnik dijaspore
 - b.) Predstavnik Vlade (ime države)
5. Da li savetodavno telo ima mogućnost predlaganja politika namenjenih dijaspori?
(DA/NE)
6. Da li je odgovor Vlade na savete savetodavnog tela obavezan? (DA/NE)

Savetodavno telo na nivou diplomatskog predstavništva:

7. Da li postoje savetodavna tela dizajnirana isključivo za dijasporu ? **NE**
(na sledeća pitanja odgovarati samo ako je odgovor DA)
8. Da li je savetodavno telo deo sistema ili ad hoc?
9. Ko čini savetodavno telo?
 - d.) Samo predstavnici dijaspore
 - e.) Telo čine predstavnici dijaspore i predstavnici Vlade (ime države)
 - f.) Samo predstavnici Vlade
10. Ko je predsednik savetodavnog tela?
 - c.) Predstavnik dijaspore
 - d.) Predstavnik Vlade (ime države)
11. Da li savetodavno telo ima mogućnost predlaganja politika namenjenih dijaspori?
(DA/NE)
12. Da li je odgovor Vlade na savete savetodavnog tela obavezan? (DA/NE)

Dužnosti građana Srbije:

1. Da li je služenje vojnog roka obavezno za državljane koji žive u inostranstvu? **NE**
(samo obavezna registracija)
2. Da li je služenje u civilnoj službi obavezno za državljane koji žive u inostranstvu?
NE
3. Da li su građani koji žive u inostranstvu obavezni da prijave porez u Srbiji? **NE**
4. Da li postoje specijalni porezi za građane koji žive u inostranstvu? **NE**

Izlazne i tranzitne politike Srbije:

1. Da li postoje određene restrikcije za državljane koji žele da se presele u inostranstvo?
NE
2. Da li su kreirani programi za informaciju građana koji žele da napuste (ime države) o njihovim pravima i obavezama? **NE**
3. Da li su kreirani programi koji obehhrabljuju emigraciju? **NE**
4. Da li postoje programi koji promovišu bezbedan prevoz do zemlje u kojoj bi građani hteli da žive? **NE**

Appendix III:

3. Emigrant policies Index data from Latin American and Caribbean region – Lucy Pedroza, Pau Palop-García (2017)




Figure 5 - EMIX data LAC region - Source: Pedroza, Palop-García (2017), *Diaspora policies in comparison: An application of the Emigrant policies Index (EMIX) in Latin American and Caribbean region*, p 173