



UNIVERSITY OF SARAJEVO

UNIVERSITY OF SALZBURG

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

**HOW HAVE EXISTING FOREIGN POLICIES DISCOURSES
AND FRAMEWORKS PLAYED OUT THROUGH VACCINE
DIPLOMACY AND COVID-19 HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS?**

-MASTER THESIS-

Candidate: Minja Čulić

Supervisors:

prof. dr. Nedžma Džananović Miraščija

prof. dr. Dženeta Karabegović

Number of index: 1127-POSIG/20

Sarajevo/Salzburg, December 2022

Table of content

Abbreviations.....	i
Abstract	ii
1.Introduction	1
2.Theory.....	3
2.1. Justification of relevance.....	3
3.Research design and methodological framework.....	5
3.1. Research objectives.....	7
3.1.1. General objective.....	7
3.1.2. Specific objectives.....	7
3.2. Scope of the research	7
3.3. Expectations.....	8
3.4. Literature review.....	10
4. Superpowers' vaccine diplomacy	22
4.1. Vaccine diplomacy as part of global health diplomacy.....	22
4.1.1. China.....	23
4.1.2. European Union	31
4.1.3. Russia.....	33
4.1.4. United States of America.....	39
4.2. Vaccine diplomacy in the context of COVID-19.....	43
4.3. Vaccine diplomacy in Western Balkans.....	44
4.3.1. Bosnia and Herzegovina	45
4.3.2. Montenegro.....	66
4.3.3. Serbia.....	74
5.Discussion	83
Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	83
Montenegro.....	85
Serbia	86
Comparative analysis.....	88
6.Conclusion.....	89
7.References	91
8.Appendix.....	124

“Sciences are never at war.”

- Edward Jenner (In his letter to the National Institute of France)

Abbreviations

BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina

CDC – Centre for Control of Diseases

COVID-19 – Coronavirus disease 2019 is a contagious disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS-CoV-2).

EMA – European Medicines Agency

EU – European Union

FBiH – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

GAVI - (formerly the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization) GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, was founded in 2000 to bring together public and private sectors and their UNICEF and WHO partners with the shared goal of creating equal access to vaccines in developing countries.

RS – Republika Srpska

USA – United States of America

WHO – World Health Organization

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Abstract

This master thesis examines how existing foreign policy discourses and frameworks played out through vaccine diplomacy and humanitarian relief efforts in the Western Balkans since countries of this geographic region applied different approaches in the vaccine procurement process. This thesis provides a comprehensive examination of Western Balkans' vaccine diplomacy, vaccine procurement, and (re)shaping political discourses. Previous studies have examined the case of Serbia as a “regional miracle” during the COVID-19 pandemic or focused on single case studies. The thesis also examines which foreign actors engaged in the Western Balkans geopolitical arena with vaccines as a primary tool for an increase of soft power and if that engagement was motivated by liberal or realist ideas.

1. Introduction

Vaccines, in general, represent one of humankind's greatest creations. In the last forty years, vaccines have shown remarkable ability to contain great plagues, eliminate diseases, and eradicate the effects of diseases such as smallpox and polio. However, in the modern, globalized world, vaccines represent not only a cure but also a tool of soft power that countries use to frame foreign policies and use as agents of conflict resolution.

Since the COVID-19 outbreak, China experienced a reputational rollercoaster, garnering international sympathy because of its vaccine distribution and accusations of fanning the pandemic by silencing early reports. The United States of America initially made many promises to low- and middle-income countries to provide vaccines. It failed to deliver promised amounts of jabs. The Indian Ministry of Health and Family welfare claimed that India exported almost 60 million jabs to 74 countries worldwide till march 2021 (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of India, 2021), while Russia had pledged to provide its vaccine globally. Shortly after the development of different vaccines, vaccine diplomacy transformed into a vaccine war in which Western countries prohibited entrance on their territory if the person was inoculated with Russian or Chinese vaccine. (Maričić, 2021)

This work is focused on the Western Balkans. I examine how different discourses and frameworks played out through vaccine diplomacy and COVID humanitarian relief in this region. Aside from that, the work explains how great powers viewed Western Balkans in terms of international relations and geopolitics. I demonstrate the interplay between international and regional politics through the way that vaccine diplomacy has played out in a comparative way between Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the second chapter, I present the theoretical background of the research and the justification of relevance from the political and social point of view, while the academic aspect of the research is presented in a separate section.

The third chapter provides a detailed insight into the design of the research itself, which includes the subject, problem, scope and goal of the research (where the general and specific goals are separated and clearly defined) as well as into the methodological framework of the research itself and limitations of work that set certain standards of the work itself. Aside from that, expectations

regarding findings and political discourses of the analysed countries are presented. In addition, in the third chapter, current and relevant literature related to the topics of vaccine diplomacy in the Western Balkans and the foreign policy discourses of the countries in the Western Balkans are presented. I examine how the discourses and actions of regional politicians in the context of 4 ideal-type attitudes of politicians (as defined by Vangeli) during COVID-19 regarding vaccine diplomacy, and which I bring in connection with major theories in international relations.

In the fourth chapter, first, a historical review of the origin and development of vaccine diplomacy is provided, as well as an insight into how vaccine diplomacy became a foreign policy tool for realizing and increasing the soft power of the state that provides aid through the development of technology and globalization. In addition, each of the world's superpowers - China, Russia, the European Union (as a community of states) and the United States of America are individually presented to gain insight into how these countries sought to achieve their nation-branding through vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic. After that part, there follows a part concerning vaccine diplomacy in the context of the Western Balkans, where the events are arranged chronologically, and the political situation in the three countries of the Western Balkans - Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina - is analysed. This part is of great importance, since it presents an overview of all the efforts of these three countries of the Western Balkans in the process of procuring vaccines and medical equipment, which is of great importance for understanding the overall situation regarding "vaccine diplomacy" in the Western Balkans. The individual, detailed presentation of countries is of exceptional importance for comparative analysis, and to the best of my knowledge it is also the first such academic work since previous works focused primarily on the case-study of Serbia with no or minimum effort to explain the situation in other countries

The final chapter discusses and explains why certain political actions took place, as well as the consequences that led to the creation of new or changes to existing political discourses and narratives in the states on Western Balkans. This concluding chapter also focuses on the potential of disaster policy in the region in the future and examines some lessons learned.

2. Theory

2.1. Justification of relevance

Although vaccine diplomacy was a powerful political tool in the past, this topic would potentially not be interesting in the period of the 19th or 20th century, when pandemics could still be curbed and kept under control in a particular geographical area. However, accelerated globalization and more accessible travel from one country to another, as well as unhindered and often uncontrolled traffic of people and goods in duty-free zones, have led to the current health crises spreading much faster than before, and they are much harder to control.

From the social point of view, this topic is vital because comparative analysis indicates which foreign policy approach of the states was the best in the new circumstances and provides an opportunity for other countries to apply the same or similar hybrid approach to pandemic prevention and spread. I believe that the forthcoming work provide benefits for decision-makers at the state or entity level and key officials at the subnational since the subnational levels have made their own decisions on existing measures to control the COVID-19 virus, depending on the number infected. Also, I believe that the proper implementation of ideas from existing work would greatly help and facilitate the work of health workers who were under the greatest pressure during the current pandemic.

From the political point of view, it is more than interesting to examine how COVID-19 pandemics and COVAX ineligibility to handle the vaccine distribution in a proper way, especially among low and middle developed countries, influenced on and potentially shifted political narratives and political discourses among political elites inside those countries.

While having gained considerable attention in academia, the media, and the political arena alike, the concept is still insufficiently elaborated in a number of its essential components and is in great need of further improvements.

Although many articles in popular press and journals were published regarding vaccine diplomacy, no study, to the best of my knowledge, focused exclusively on the Western Balkans region and empirically analysed the motivations, consequences, and outcomes of COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy.

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Due to all the above, I believe that the existing work significantly impacts both the social and scientific aspects, and since the topic is still relevant, its relevance and significance should not be questioned.

3. Research design and methodological framework

The methodological framework identifies the objectives and subject of the research, the scope of the research, and the methods applied in conducting the research. The methodological framework aims to guide the analysis of relevant documents and literature, as well as research related to the foreign policy of the Western Balkans' countries and vaccine policy in general.

The subject of this research is the foreign policy of the three Western Balkans countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia in the context of vaccine procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic, but also the foreign policy of the world's "superpowers" in light of the distribution of vaccines and medical assistance to other countries focusing on the Western Balkans. The study includes a comparative overview of the policies and approaches used by the Western Balkan countries during the COVID-19 pandemic to procure vaccines and medical equipment.

At the core of my analysis is a comparative policy and approach examination of the three countries of the Western Balkans regarding vaccine diplomacy and the provision of humanitarian aid to their inhabitants. In this way, it is possible to investigate which of the different approaches of the states was the most effective and whether the political discourses were based on real facts or had a propaganda character with the aim of increasing political popularity in the case of the Western Balkans, and soft power in case of world superpowers whose foreign policy based on vaccine diplomacy and humanitarian relief is thoroughly investigated. Aside from that, I am trying to investigate why Western Balkans countries had so many problems regarding vaccine procurement and if the situation could be improved if all the states had the same foreign policy approach or if countries acted as a group of countries on regional level with common foreign policy regarding “disaster diplomacy”.

When we talk about the methodological approach that I use in the paper, it should be emphasized, and a clear distinction should be made between the methodological and epistemological approaches to the work. When we talk about the methodological part of the research of the forthcoming master thesis, in my approach to this paper I am using the mixed research method. Since the master's thesis includes a qualitative method, which is primary in this paper and which includes analysis of existing content, analysis of articles and literature, desk review and interviews with some of the greatest experts in international cooperation, diplomacy, and decision-makers in various levels of government. On the other hand, the quantitative part of the paper is presented through descriptive

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

statistics of some of the most important aspects for this paper to present in a statistically relevant way the facts about the effectiveness of different forms of foreign policy discourses.

On the other hand, in terms of the epistemological part, it is important to emphasize that this paper could represent a synergy of different epistemological approaches to research, but the dominant emphasis is on realism as an epistemological approach, as I try to investigate how foreign policy of countries increases influence in the geostrategic extremely important region of the Western Balkans. However, in addition to realism, another epistemological approach to paperwork is a conventional-pragmatic epistemological approach to explore the maximization of the benefits that can be achieved through collaboration through vaccine diplomacy. When we talk about the subtype of the epistemological approach, the paper uses the empirical-positivist approach as a subtype of the realistic approach, since the paper is based on previous research and measurable data that can be verified.

To prepare the forthcoming paper, we used relevant academic literature of recent date and various relevant Internet sources that can contribute to the relevance of the work, as well as consultations with a mentor who was very important to me and helped keep my focus on the topic. Aside from that, I am presenting evidence gained through the use of mechanism for free access to information of public importance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (one document) and Serbia (two documents). I am also presenting some of the attitudes from professor Dragan Đukanović (Faculty of political sciences – University of Belgrade) and from professor and former Minister of foreign affairs of Montenegro (2016-2020) Srđan Darmanović (Faculty of political sciences – University of Montenegro) which I interviewed in process of writing of this master thesis.

The biggest limitation is the lack of knowledge of Macedonian and Albanian language, which is why in the case of Albania, Kosovo and Northern Macedonia I would be forced to analyse only articles in English, which could lead to a misperception of the real situation and facts as I could not analyse domestic media. Another significant problem is the collection of official information by official institutions in the Western Balkans. During this research, an official request for access to information was sent to the Ministry of Health of Serbia and the Ministry of Health of Montenegro, as well as the Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina to try to obtain data necessary for descriptive statistics and comparative analysis of foreign policies in terms of procurement of vaccines against COVID-19 and medical equipment that is an integral part of the fight against the

pandemic and its prevention. Also, I am fully aware that many media in the Western Balkans are influenced by certain political parties, which is why they often take subjective views, because of which I am trying to limit information from these media and use information from them solely for references, so I could put certain events in a specific time frame.

3.1. Research objectives

3.1.1. General objective

The overall general objective of the research is to identify the different forms of foreign policy and approaches used by the Western Balkans countries to provide vaccines and medical care to the population, as well as to offer recommendations for improving them to deal with future crises, taking into account relevant geopolitical criteria such as position of the state in international circles and geopolitical/geostrategic positioning in relation to world superpowers.

3.1.2. Specific objectives

Specific objectives of research are reflecting in following:

- Comparative analysis of foreign policies frameworks and approaches of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia
- Suggestions for improvements of foreign and crisis policies for potential future crises
- Analysis of results in terms of international cooperation with world superpowers
- Analysis of results achieved through regional cooperation with other Western Balkans countries

3.2. Scope of the research

When it comes to the scope of research, the focus will be on the mezzo level as the focus will be on the Western Balkans region, while vaccine diplomacy and country branding through foreign policy reflected in vaccine diplomacy will be reflected at the macro level, since it will involve world superpowers from different parts of the world. Although the European Union is not a state, but a community of several independent and sovereign states, it will still be included in the analysis since the European Union is most often identified as the primary bearer of equality, civil liberties and as the primary provider of humanitarian and economic relief in countries covered by this research.

3.3. Expectations

All Western Balkans countries opted in for Euro-Atlantic integration in the future, however, that process became much more fatiguing in the last fifteen years, and after the Thessaloniki agenda, almost no progress regarding integration into the EU was made by the Western Balkans countries.

According to the official document by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the main directions of the foreign policy will be reflected in cooperation with the European Union. At the same time, China and Russian Federation were seen exclusively as the guarantees of peace agreement with which bilateral relations should be improved on the bilateral level. However, during the COVID- 19 pandemic, except for Milorad Dodik, no politician in Bosnia and Herzegovina had the attitude of “active opportunity seeking” when it comes to medical assistance from these countries. However, due to pragmatism and political rationale, it should be expected that politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina engage in cooperation and political talks with the European Union, but also with China and Russia to procure as many vaccines as possible. It should not be surprising if the internal political discourses of politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina differ from the official foreign policy, especially regarding the political discourse of politicians in Republika Srpska. It should also be expected that political discourses in Republika Srpska will mirror the political discourses from Serbia due to the “brotherly relations” between the two actors.

After gaining independence from Serbia, Montenegro opted for Euro-Atlantic integration and that attitude was significantly strengthened in 2017 when Montenegro became part of the NATO alliance. Because of that, I expect Montenegro will try to utilize all the forces to procure as much medical equipment and vaccines from the European Union and the United States of America, a global superpower that heads the NATO alliance. So far, China was engaged in Montenegro only in infrastructural projects, while Russia should not be expected to engage in dynamic relations with any NATO member state. Political discourses in Montenegro will probably not vary since there are still pro-Russian parties in Montenegro, but they are marginal, and their influence should be neglected. Compared to Bosnia and Herzegovina, it should not be expected that political discourses in Montenegro will mirror the political discourses of any other country since their foreign policy goals are clear and they do not experience such significant interference in external but also internal policy as Bosnia and Herzegovina does.

When it comes to Serbia, it should be expected that Serbia will continue with its “multi-stool politics” balancing between eastern partners and the European Union since this approach represents the legacy of the Former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia which was one of the initiators of the non-alliance movement. Due to NATO bombings in 1999 and 2001, it should not be expected that Serbia will engage in dynamic relations with the United States, but it cannot be guaranteed due to the pragmatism of Serbian president Vučić. However, it should be expected that Serbia will discuss with China and Russia, with which it has more friendly relations than Bosnia and Herzegovina or Montenegro, which are recognized as strategic partners of Serbia. Serbia's political discourse should primarily focus on crisis management rather than opting for exclusive cooperation with any external actor, and it should not be expected that Serbia will copy any political discourse from other Western Balkans countries. Also, it should be expected that Serbia, a country with established soft power, will procure more vaccines than other countries from their traditionally friendly countries (China and Russia).

In general, it should be expected that Serbia had the most favourable position of all the Western Balkans countries when procuring vaccines and medical aid since they have more manoeuvring space and already established soft power that they can utilize. Aside from that, I expect that focus of all the Western Balkans countries will be primarily on crisis management rather than on certain actors in foreign policy, but I cannot neglect the option that such a situation could be changed over time and that foreign policy actors could be placed in a primary focus. European Union should be the leading partner to all three countries in medical and financial terms. However, besides the European Union, USA, Russia and China, we could also see the interference of other foreign geopolitical actors who have already established their soft power in the Western Balkans –Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

3.4. Literature review

It should be noted at the outset that the study at hand, by addressing its central research question, draws on a vast and highly interdisciplinary body of literature. The focal phenomenon of vaccine diplomacy in international relations and foreign policy discourses in the Western Balkans, thus, has been subject to extensive research.

Vaccine diplomacy was never so significant, as it is in the last 3 years, from the 1950s when Albert Sabin and Jonas Salk collaborated to create a polio vaccine to prevent further spread of polio across both sides of the „Iron curtain“. Sporadic attempts to eradicate certain tropical diseases had a regional impact across the African Continent, in Latin America, the Middle East and Southern and South-eastern Asia. (Hotez, "Vaccine diplomacy": historical perspectives and future directions., 2014) Hotez, renowned US paediatrician claimed in his several works that “vaccine diplomacy and its implementation on a proper way could be an important agent in process of conflict resolution, especially in frozen conflicts.” (Hotez, 2009) (Hotez, 2010) (Hotez, "Vaccine diplomacy": historical perspectives and future directions., 2014)

However, the global reputation of COVID-19 led to the significant interest of „great powers“, but also emerging countries, that saw the pandemic as a part of their foreign policy to repair their reputation in international relations or to increase their power in certain geopolitical regions. Among such great powers, we could classify Russia, China, the United States of America and India, which competed to project influence through donations or loans of their home-grown vaccines to countries that have less access to vaccines, but also to countries that such great powers find strategically important in terms of international relations. (Ting Lee, Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China’s COVID-19 soft power play, 2021)

Jaspreet Pannu and Michele Berry follow this argument and claim that „When vaccines were developed, world left the realm of scientific investigation and entered the realm of geopolitics.“ In their paper „The state inoculates: vaccines as soft power“ Berry and Pannu claims that „such behaviour is not precedent, since similar behaviour patterns could be seen in the past when vaccines have driven deep wedges into international agreements, especially when their benefits are perceived to be inequitable.“ Aside from this argument, Pannu and Berry argue that „Inequitable vaccine distribution, export controls and bans, backstage agreements and bad behaviour of high-income countries have left low-income and middle-income countries vulnerable to political coercion. Because of that, and the fact that low-income countries are usually left at the end of the queue of vaccine distribution, there is a high risk that suspicion regarding exploitative nature of

international agreements and background interests of humanitarian relief will arise.“ (Pannu & Barry, 2021)

Pannu and Berry connect foreign policy aspirations and vaccine diplomacy on cases of India, China and Russia and claim that „The inequity of global vaccine access has also turned vaccines into diplomatic bargaining chips, which China, India and Russia exploited to use access to their COVID-19 vaccines to „curry favour with friends and foes“.“ (Pannu & Barry, 2021)

Although this approach presents a great improvement in comparison to hard-power political coercion of smaller countries, we have to bear in mind that there is still huge disbalance between countries with nationalist political agendas, such as Russia, China and India, which have more significant knowledge and resources, and low income countries which are in words of Pannu and Berry „facing worsening pandemic and which are tired of waiting for COVID-19 vaccine doses.“ Another author who tried to examine relationship between vaccine diplomacy and soft power, on case study of Turkey, during COVID-19 pandemic was Birgül Demirtaş. Demirtaş argues that „The CoViD-19 pandemic has led to a resurgence of health diplomacy in international relations, especially when it comes to great powers and middle powers, which have provided different kinds of assistance to countries in need and utilized health diplomacy as an opportunity to construct, reconstruct or consolidate their role in regional and global politics.“ Demirtaş claims that „Turkey was no exception with its assertive and ambitious health diplomacy, of which the Balkans were central.“ What is interesting to emphasize is the fact that Demirtaş claims that Turkey was conducting significant efforts to gain soft power through vaccine diplomacy, although it was not ready to solve the problems in their own „backyard“. (Demirtaş, 2022)

Support to such statement reflects in the fact that during the apex of CoViD-19 pandemic nearly every day, almost 30,000 Turkish people were infected with the virus, along with more than 200 people losing their lives. (Worldometers.info, 2021) Simultaneously, Turkey had the sixth-highest number of cases in the world and was ranked 72nd out of 102 countries in its performance which was by far below the median. (Lowy Institute, 2022) Demirtaş claims that „The Balkans is a key region where Turkish decision-makers are trying to launch new initiatives and play facilitation roles. For historical, geographical and cultural reasons, the Balkans has grown as an important region on the Turkish foreign policy agenda.“ (Demirtaş, 2022)

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Some of the authors examined how “mask diplomacy” of small states as a phase that preceded “vaccine diplomacy phase” influenced on it and shift of political narratives towards and nation branding of some states. Bier and Arceneaux have investigated how Vietnam, as one of the possibly next „Asian Tigers“ used COVID-19 to change the country image in international relations and how Vietnamese production of medical equipment and government's reaction on outbreak of COVID-19 changed the country image. In their text „Vietnam's “underdog” public diplomacy in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic“, they claim that „Soft power focuses on fostering a favourable country image and likeability. Few areas of diplomatic goodwill connect more with the humanitarian nature of international citizenship than medical assistance.“ (Bier & Arceneaux, 2020) Throughout COVID-19 outbreak, Vietnam worked with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S.-based DuPont to expedite the production of 450,000 hazmat suits at a Hanoi facility. (U.S. Department for human and health services, 2020) Dozens of firms across Vietnam are making 5.72 million surgical masks and 40,000 N95 masks per day. (Reuters Staff, Reuters, 2020) Others such as Vingroup are retooling to manufacture ventilators with a 55,000-units-per-month goal. (Vu, 2020) Aside from that, in early February 2020, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister To Anh Dung facilitated the donation of medical supplies to Wuhan, China. (Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020) Vietnam has since shipped supplies to the United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Cambodia and Laos which resulted with praises of former US president Donald Trump, but also with higher media interests from international media organizations such as Reuters and The New York Times for Vietnamese foreign policy and economy. Such actions of Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and domestic media helped shift image of Vietnam through hashtag #VietNamLeavesNoOneBehind indicate Vietnamese pride and gratitude for government security actions. (Bier & Arceneaux, 2020) Vietnam used COVID-19 in order to change its image of a country which was synonym for war toward a more likeable image of country that is proud and which show eagerness to be recommended as a „serious player“ in international relations as The Atlantic predicted in their article back in 2019. (Tatarski, 2019)

Cuba, which in the past was seen as an isolated communist country, is now one of the favourite tourist destinations, but it has also become synonymous with good health care and educated doctors who throughout history have always been ready to intervene in crisis situations as after earthquake in Chile in 1960 and after Ebola outbreak in West Africa, but also during COVID-19 pandemic

outbreak. On the other hand, Vietnam used to be a country that was synonymous with the war destruction caused by the American invasion. However, lately, Vietnam is seen as a country that has huge potential for economic development, and many believe that this country will be the next "Asian Tiger". Although it would be too ambitious to say that Vietnam could threaten the regional hegemon in the field of soft power and public diplomacy - China, it should be noted that Vietnam took the opportunity to increase its soft power in foreign policy without affecting Chinese interests and in a way, it filled the gap created by the decline of China's soft power and image due to the concealment of evidence, human rights violations within its borders and the silencing of doctors who tried to report the COVID-19 virus. (Bier & Arceneaux, 2020)

Historic example of Cuba, just as recent example of Vietnam shows good practice of inclusion of health-care diplomacy as an integral part of foreign policy of one country and how participation in humanitarian aids during crises can help in process of change of country image.

The region of the Western Balkans is highly under researched when it comes to vaccine diplomacy and (re)shape of foreign policy discourses of Western Balkans countries. Just as is the case with vaccine diplomacy at the global level, most research is based on specific case-studies of countries that achieved extremely good or extremely bad results during the COVID-19 pandemic to investigate the causes of such events.

In the region of the Western Balkans, the most researched country in the field of "vaccine diplomacy" was Serbia, which during most of the pandemic was a kind of regional miracle, and in the later stages, a regional patron who helped other countries of the Western Balkans in the process of immunizing citizens. Even the world's most important scholars in the field of "vaccine diplomacy", such as Peter J. Hotez, did not analyse the Western Balkan region after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, and so far sporadic efforts to investigate the "case-study of Serbia" have appeared in academic works. Because of this situation, the other countries of the Western Balkans - Albania, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro - have been largely neglected, and so far under researched.

What makes it interesting to investigate this topic is the fact that of all the ruling parties in the Western Balkans, only one party in its statute has as a special foreign policy goal the strengthening of cooperation with Russia and China as external actors (Srpska Napredna Stranka, 2013), and that

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

is the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) led by Aleksandar Vučić, who has been balancing on two chairs for years regarding cooperation with the European Union's states and the European Union globally, but also with Russia and China, which is why he is often subject to criticism from the highest European officials.

The absolute cornerstone of my research is work by Anastas Vangeli, since it is, to the best of my knowledge, the only paper that made comprehensive research of Western Balkans countries' political discourses during the COVID-19 outbreak, but the limitation of his work is that he examined how political discourses toward China was (re)shaped, while other foreign policy actors, such as Russia, EU, USA or Turkey as country that have significant influence in the region, were neglected to the biggest extent.

Anastas Vangeli in his text "Western Balkans Discourses on and positioning towards China during the COVID-19 pandemic" states that "political discourses in the Western Balkans during the COVID-19 pandemic went through 3 phases." According to him, "In the early, initial phase, the entire focus of the public in the Western Balkans was directed towards the outbreak of the pandemic in China, whereby the perception of China was extremely negative". It is significant to point out the fact that, in addition to this phase, Anastas Vangeli separated two other phases, which in some cases merge into one, namely "Mask diplomacy" as the second phase, during which the great powers tried to provide, through geopolitical competition, what possible greater aid to the countries in the Western Balkans, and vaccine diplomacy as the third phase, during which the medical equipment that was in focus in the previous phase was replaced by vaccines that became the basic means of geopolitical competition. Vangeli's main goal was to explore how the discourses in the Western Balkans have been (re)shaped by the COVID-19 pandemic, and how this has affected the position of Western Balkan countries vis-a-vis China. (Vangeli, 2021)

Vangeli states that in the period from 2009 (after the economic crisis) to 2019, China grew into one of the most important external actors in the Western Balkans, and as a "Plan-B" partner of the countries in the region, which is why he focused on China as a foreign policy partner of countries in the Western Balkans. However, on the other hand, the countries of the Western Balkans are geostrategically very important for China, while they have been socialized in the 17+1 format of China's foreign policy and present a vital part in the flagship "Belt and Road initiative". He points out that "During the second phase of the pandemic, China was seen as an actor that can be

significant in terms of aid, but also as an actor that can bring additional issues, while during the third period of the pandemic, China was seen exclusively as a partner country that helps countries in the region in efforts to immunize the population against the COVID-19 virus.” Vangeli states that “During the COVID-19 pandemic, China became the only actor on the world level that did not face insecurities and problems regarding the spread of the pandemic on the domestic scene, which is why China could focus on its foreign policy and helping partners.” (Vangeli, 2021)

Vangeli brilliantly saw the fact that “the Western Balkan thinking on China is not solely an externally driven process. The dispositions, context and interests of local actors also determine the (re)positioning towards China. The discourses on and positions towards China are therefore the result of a complex dialogical process, which is informed through interactions between the various inputs – from China, from the West, and local ones. The fact why I consider Vangeli’s paper so important is the fact that he extricated four general ideal types of attitudes towards China in the pre-COVID-19 world:

(1) active opportunity seeking – Pro-active participation in China-led initiatives, platitudes to Chinese leadership, advertising of cooperation

(2) cautious opportunity utilization – Some participation in China-led initiatives, some cooperation, but without attracting too much attention

(3) active alarmism – Voice criticism on China, link domestic with global debates

(4) threat avoidance – Reduction of contact/interaction with China, but without making too much noise

Since these four types are ideal types of attitudes towards China, Vangeli claim that „in practice, there have been blurred lines between the different positions. Moreover, while some actors like Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić can be easily classified as active opportunity seekers, others, like Montenegro’s former President Milo Đukanović have transitioned from active opportunity seekers to active alarmism.“ Aside from these politicians, I would emphasize that discourses of main politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding these emphasized attitudes are completely opposite, so Milorad Dodik’s attitude toward China could be seen as active opportunity seeking,

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Dragan Čović's attitude could be classified as cautious opportunity utilization, while Bakir Izetbegović and Šefik Džaferović's attitude could be seen as „threat avoidance“. (Vangeli, 2021)

Vangeli claims that during the initial phase“ the discourse of Western Balkans countries towards China took a full swing towards the „threat perspective“, due to the theories that virus escaped from a lab in Wuhan and similar conspiracy theories, but emphasizes that in Serbia, where the population is most friendly towards China, conspiracy theories that concern China are less popular than in other countries in the region and vice versa“. Aside from that, Vangeli refers to Human Rights Watch report for 2020 and claims that „xenophobic sentiments in the Western Balkans were perhaps less widespread and less conducive to harassment and violence as the discourse in some Western European countries or the US with more sizeable Chinese communities, and emphasizes that prejudices have been primarily manifested on the level of the popular discourse, but not among elites.“ This could be very important regarding the discourse (re)shaping towards China, since the ruling elites and politically influenced media have the biggest influence on shift of narratives and discourses toward any internal or external actor. (Vangeli, 2021)

Aside from that, Vangeli argues that in initial phase, „Chinese efforts to fight outbreak of virus and their early response got praises from some of Western Balkans countries and their medical staff“, but also claims that „The overall picture was that the early stages of the pandemic did more damage than help China's standing in the region, because of which Chinese ambassadors in the region, as in a number of other places around the world, embarked on a charm offensive to present the Chinese point of view in order to try to shift the negative discourse towards China“. This led to efforts during second phase which reflected in fact that China profiled itself as the largest (and at some point the only) provider of protective and other medical equipment (i.e. respiratory masks, protective gear, testing kits), and pharmaceuticals. (Vangeli, 2021)

Dukovska claims that „The overall assessment of China's role as assistance provider in mitigating the pandemic during this stage had both elements of “opportunity” and “threat.” A popular trope in the West was that China was taking advantage of the pandemic to advance its foreign policy agenda. Liberal media and civil society organizations in the Western Balkans echoed Western narratives about alleged Chinese disinformation campaigns and alleged ulterior motives behind the “mask diplomacy“, reinforcing a “threat” perspective of China in the region.“ (Dukovska, 2020)

Bayer et al. claim that „The threat narrative did not catch on in the Western Balkans as it did in other parts of Europe, since China’s help arrived as the Western Balkan countries struggled to overcome their shortages, at a time when there were no alternative suppliers and the EU had introduced a ban on medical equipment exports. (Bayer, Deutsch, Hanke Vela, & Tamma, 2020)

Vangeli argues that “Although the threat narrative did not catch on as in other Western European countries, Western Balkans countries” attitudes varied between the dramatic and by now widely known “Brother Xi” speech by Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić in which he also shamed the EU for the lack of solidarity getting the widest coverage and provoking reactions in the world press. In the other countries, however, gratitude towards China was accompanied with much more caution. Leaders have seemed to avoid following in the footsteps of Vučić and instead opted for keeping the relationship with China outside of the spotlight, thanking China in a formal, unspectacular manner.” (Vangeli, 2021)

Tatalović claims that „Number of actors in Western Balkan societies were willing to cooperate with China, but, except for Vučić, they were unwilling to legitimize China as a game-changer in dealing with COVID-19. Interactions with insiders suggest that such an approach very much fits the spirit of the time: as both the US and the EU have sharpened their stance on China, by taking a “low profile” approach Western Balkan elites could avoid being targeted for selling out to China. Thus, for them, dealing with China during the COVID-19 pandemic posed the challenge of not weakening their own positions vis-a-vis Washington, Brussels, and other European capitals. “ (Tatalović, 2020)

At the very end, Vangeli argues that during the third phase „Most Western Balkan leaders had either rejected or avoided making decisions on vaccines coming from China. However, faced with limited opportunities, by mid-February, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia have all made pre-orders with Sinopharm, making the region a particularly important one for China’s healthcare diplomacy in general “. Although Vangeli's work presents the most comprehensive study regarding (re)shaping narratives and discourses of Western Balkans countries towards China during COVID-19 pandemic, the issues is that he solely focused on China, and his focus in Western Balkans was Serbia, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro were almost completely neglected from his research since he did not present if and how political narratives and discourses changed in these countries. However, we have to bear in mind the benefits of Vangeli's

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

research, since he has offered four general and ideal types of attitudes of countries towards China during the COVID-19 outbreak, which helps us to the great extent regarding positioning of countries in those clusters. (Vangeli, 2021)

Similar to Vangeli, Schmidt and Džihčić explored in their work “Vaccine diplomacy and enlargement fatigue: Why the EU must rethink its approach to the Western Balkans”, how Russia, China and United Arab Emirates as foreign actors on Western Balkans used the opportunity to increase their influence due to the newly made vulnerabilities caused by COVID-19 outbreak in the forementioned region. They claim that “in the European Union awareness is growing that although all the countries of in the region of Western Balkans decided to be part of Euro-Atlantic integrations, EU and the West are not the only available partners, because of which the vision of a free, democratic and truly European Balkans is no longer self-evident. (Schmidt & Džihčić, 2021)

Tzifakis and Prelec examined superpowers’ geopolitical competition in Western Balkans regarding “mask diplomacy” vaccine diplomacy and presented healthcare and medical aid as an instrument of soft power that is not necessarily employed to help those in greater need, since it is used to consolidate and expand influence over third countries”. Tzifakis and Prelec argue that “In the Western Balkans, although the EU has been the single largest health-assistance donor during the pandemic with assistance worth more than 3,3 billion Euros, the general impression in the Western Balkans is that the EU has reluctantly given too little and too late.” Authors argue that “EU actions demonstrated that Brussels has instinctively considered the region to fall outside of its area of main concern. EU assistance has arrived in response to appeals from Western Balkan leaders and following Chinese and Russian moves to win the “battle of narratives””. (Tzifakis & Prelec, 2021)

Tzifakis and Prelec referred to Gledić et al. whose public opinion survey conducted in Serbia in September/October 2020 showed that only half of the respondents believed that the EU helped their country during the pandemic, whereas eight and seven out of ten Serb people respectively appreciated positively the corresponding Chinese and Russian health assistance. (Gledić, Turcsányi, Šimalčik, Kironská, & Sedláková, 2020)

Tzifakis and Prelec examined Serbian tabloids articles regarding vaccination in order to examine if the medias could reshape the initially negative narrative of China regarding COVID-19. Similarly to Vangeli, Tzifakis and Prelec argue that “in second and third phase (defined by Vangeli), Beijing sought to improve its internationally tarnished image once it contained the spread of Covid-19

domestically. Crucially, it also perceived the pandemic as an opportunity to portray itself as a very efficient country in health management as well as an altruistic global leader in humanitarian assistance. Geopolitical games reflected in mask and vaccine diplomacy reflects in the fact that “China’s health diplomacy has targeted all Western Balkan countries except Kosovo, whose independence Beijing has not recognized with Serbia as a focal point in the Western Balkans.”

Contrary to Vangeli who focused exclusively on China, Tsifakis and Prelec presented Russia as another foreign actor “Who has viewed the pandemic as another playing field on which it can advance its predefined political priorities. Contrary to China, its health diplomacy concentrated only on a few countries considered crucial for its foreign policy” They claim that “In the Western Balkans, Russia followed the pattern of rewarding friends and ignoring the needs of all other countries. Moscow sent assistance to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), while it disregarded the problems (e.g. evacuation of citizens) of the two Western Balkan countries that have recently joined NATO, namely, Montenegro and North Macedonia, but also exploited any given opportunity to increase popular dissatisfaction with the West.”

Authors argue that Russia and China had certain “strategic advantage” regarding achievement of their goals through vaccine diplomacy which is a consequence of the fact that “while Western powers were absorbed with the management of the crisis in their own territories, China and Russia were able to respond to international calls for help from third countries. In addition, when the first Western-manufactured vaccines came out, developed countries rushed to procure the bulk of doses that would be produced in early 2021. Hence, the Chinese and Russian vaccines have been (at the time of the study’s writing) the only vaccines on offer in the market to inoculate people in the rest of the world. Authors argue that potentially most important fact is that “contrary to the EU and the United States, China and Russia have run very aggressive public diplomacy campaigns throughout the entire researched period that, on the one hand, promoted their health management and vaccine efficiency and inflated the importance of their external acts of generosity and, on the other, denigrated the West and its corresponding efforts to contain the pandemic, manufacture safe and efficient vaccines, and offer health assistance abroad.” Opposite to Vangeli, Tsifakis and Prelec present only two stages of COVID-19 outbreak in the world (first phase encompasses both outbreak period and mask diplomacy period, while second phase is reflected in vaccine diplomacy). What is important to emphasize is the fact that Tsifakis and Prelec present and that is that “Foreign policy

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

discourses of Western Balkans countries became more positive and favorable towards China after the “vaccine diplomacy phase” although countries mostly procured or purchased vaccines instead of getting donations from China”. When it comes to Russia, Tsifakis and Prelec claim that “Russia moved quickly to offer health assistance to the region, placing particular emphasis on giving support to Serbia. Although Moscow delivered moderate quantities of medical supplies amounting to little more than symbolical gestures, it received plenty of credit: in part, due to their efficient public diplomacy policies and, in part, due to the way certain regional leaderships (predominantly, Aleksandar Vucic and Milorad Dodik) and their supportive media reported or positioned themselves in relation to external health assistance.”. (Tsifakis & Prelec, 2021)

In her work “Vaccine diplomacy as a soft power tool for external powers in the Western Balkans”, Caterina Bonora argued that “Incomplete European integration status makes the region geopolitically important for external actors like China and Russia, which seek to gain influence on the European Borders.” Bonora analyzed “To which extent, due to weak or absent EU solidarity COVID-19 vaccines were used by state actors from within and without the Western Balkans as a soft power tool to increase their clout in the region.” However, interesting fact to emphasize which Bonora noted in his work is that “in the context of the Western Balkans, soft power is mostly associated with the attempts of non-EU external actors to gain clout in the region, whereas it is more rarely associated with the EU’s own efforts to shape domestic policies and institutions in the region in the framework of the highly institutionalized EU accession process.”. Similarly to previous authors, Bonora argues that “EU’s humanitarian and financial aid to Western Balkans was hesitant and late, because of which other non-EU external actors gained an opportunity to intervene, especially in Serbia, whose president Aleksandar Vučić openly criticized European solidarity after which he sent a public call for help to China”. Bonora concludes that “In comparison to the European Union, Russia and particularly China were swifter and, at least initially, more generous in their vaccine donations to the region, even if the Western Balkans are not direct neighbors for them. Especially in early 2021, the Western Balkan countries were left behind by a European Union who had already started a massive vaccination campaign for its own population, thereby conveying the message that the countries of the Western Balkans were, once again, only external partners and not really members of a tightly knit European community. This exclusive attitude has left space for more authoritarian powers like China and Russia to increase their soft power in the region by exploiting the highly emotional subject of vaccines.” (Bonora, 2022)

Isabelle Ioannides examined the influence of COVID-19 vaccines in terms of geopolitics in the Western Balkans, and similarly to previous authors claimed that “The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has given rise to geopolitical games linked to access to the Covid19 vaccines. The first impression may be that Russia and China have made strides in this area, especially in the Western Balkans. “ She argues that “the COVID-19 crisis has only accelerated geopolitical dynamics that were already in place before the pandemic. In the countries of the Western Balkans, in particular, China and Russia have been present in the past decade through major projects, investments and loans.” Although all the authors claim that “the hesitant and late medical and financial assistance from the European Union opened doors for other external actors in Western Balkans”, Ioannides defends EU to some extent and argues that “It would be wrong and misleading to claim that the European Union has been and is absent from the Western Balkans during these trying times. The EU has already mobilized funds amounting to €38 million for immediate support to the health sector in the Western Balkans and €70 million have been offered for the procurement of EU-approved vaccines.” (Ioannides, 2021)

Since official data from countries, European Commission and independent researches confirm these claims, we can conclude that the media, especially those medias under “fist of government” had immense influence on (re)shaping political discourses toward external political actors, just as (Tsifakis & Prelec, 2021), (Bonora, 2022) and (Ioannides, 2021) argue in their works.

Nikolaos Tzifakis, professor on department for political sciences on University of Peloponnese, examined as previous authors geopolitics of pandemic-related assistance to Western Balkans. Aside from China and Russia which were examined the most, professor Tzifakis examined the influence that Turkey had in these geopolitical games in Western Balkans as well. However, Tzifakis argues that “COVID-19 and mitigation of its effects have not brought any new external powers to Western Balkans. As previous authors, Tzifakis argues that “Brussels have failed to convey to the Western Balkans a message of genuine concern, while it has committed a series of policy errors including the serious mismanagement of vaccine delivery to the region. These mismanagement errors were used by regional leaders (Aleksandar Vučić and Milorad Dodik in case of China and Russia) and Edi Rama (in case of Turkey) to profile themselves as leaders who had the most significant importance regarding vaccine procurement in the region of Western Balkans. (Tzifakis, 2021)

4. Superpowers' vaccine diplomacy

4.1. Vaccine diplomacy as part of global health diplomacy

As Bier and Arceneaux claim “Vaccines are often used as instruments of soft power and nation branding because they can help foster a favourable country image and likeability, as few areas of diplomatic goodwill connect more with the humanitarian nature of international citizenship than medical assistance”. (Bier & Arceneaux, 2020) Such definition classifies vaccine diplomacy as soft power or power of co-optation, which Nye described as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (Nye J. , Public diplomacy and soft power, 2008)

However, Kickbusch, Silberschmidt and Buss classified medical diplomacy in a more general type of diplomacy named global health diplomacy. According to their understanding, global health diplomacy could be defined as an “established area of study driven by a growing realization that an increasing range of health issues and their broad political, social, and economic implications now transcend national boundaries and require action on the global forces that determine the health of citizens”. (Kickbusch, Silberschmidt, & Buss, 2007) Similarly, as Kickbusch et.al, British diplomat Robert Cooper in 2003 claimed in his book “The breaking of nations. Order and chaos in the 21st century.” that “in the past, it was enough for a nation to look after itself, while today it is no longer sufficient” (Cooper, 2003) Despite being defined through the core concepts of interdependence, cooperation and mutual benefit, the term global health diplomacy continues to convey different conceptual meanings.

Aside from vaccine diplomacy, Hotez identified vaccine science diplomacy as a subset of vaccine diplomacy. According to Hotez, “Vaccine science diplomacy, representing hybrid characteristics of global health diplomacy and science diplomacy, refers to “the joint development of life-saving vaccines and related technologies, with the major actors typically scientists. In some instances, the scientists may come from two or more nations that are ideologically opposed or nations actively engaged in hostile actions.” (Hotez, "Vaccine diplomacy": historical perspectives and future directions., 2014) Vaccine science diplomacy is especially important in cases where all other forms of dialogue are blocked, which is why this form of cooperation between states in such cases is the only form of cooperation between two, ideologically opposed states.

Such understanding of global health diplomacy, in general, proved to be true once again during the COVID-19 outbreak since common goals made countries collaborate although they have different political systems and agendas.

According to the data presented by Felix Richter (Richter, 2021), data specialist for “statista”, in 2021, more than 11,2 billion vaccines were produced around the world and in the upcoming part we will discuss about main global superpowers who have the biggest share in vaccine production.

China, the EU, Russia, and the United States are understood to be relevant global actors in today’s multipolar world. The sections below provide an overview of their vaccine diplomacy throughout the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic before delving into how the countries of the Western Balkans responded to this and utilized their own discourses in providing vaccines to their citizens.

4.1.1. China

To understand vaccine diplomacy that was implemented by China during COVID-19 outbreak, it is important to understand Chinese public diplomacy and how it changed during the years. As Li and Wong argue „The origins of modern-day Chinese public diplomacy can be traced to the 1950s. The Chinese classify public diplomacy based on political leadership. Under Mao Zedong, the country applied Civic Diplomacy in response to international isolation, focusing on official, semi-official, and civilian exchanges“. (Li & Wong, 2018) Chinese public diplomacy additionally changed since 2010, when Hu Jintao and his successor Xi Jinping started new campaign of public diplomacy with main goal to rebrand China and its role on a world stage. In 2013, Xi Jinping presented the idea of „Chinese Dream“ – idea associated with the wish for a better life for all people in China’s neighbouring countries and potential regional development prospects through the idea of “a community of shared future for mankind”. (people.com.cn, 2013) Just a year later, in 2014, Xi Jinping held a speech in national congress of Brazil, where he said that „The goal of public diplomacy is to communicate the China Dream to the international community by highlighting Chinese characteristics and striving for worldwide understanding and support. The focus is on “explaining China to the world”. (Jinping, 2014)

As Ting-Lee argues, „Although China’s public diplomacy has been influenced by American and European theories and models from the very beginning, the “China Model” of public diplomacy has evolved through distinct Chinese characteristics including emphases on ideological leadership,

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

cultural self-confidence, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, and the provision of public goods for the international community.“ (Ting Lee, Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China’s COVID-19 soft power play, 2021)

Because of that, Zhao (Zhao, 2019) and Yang (Yang, 2020) claim that „Chinese public diplomacy is unique“ which reflects in fact that „China’s model of public diplomacy is characterized by a centralization of power in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, and a management approach featuring cultural—rather than institutional—coordination“. In his text „The China model of public diplomacy and its future“, Zhao argues that „The power structure is based on a system of “party-led” diplomacy with the CCP’s Central Foreign Affairs Leading (Small) Group coordinating all diplomatic matters. This is different from the case in most countries, where foreign ministries are the most important state actors in public diplomacy.“ He claims that „although several other institutional and non-institutional actors such as ministries, academies, NGOs, oversea Chinese communities and friendship associations are included in diplomacy, they don’t have legal basis to act as the specialized agency for public diplomacy.“ (Zhao, 2019)

Lately, Chinese public diplomacy was strongly dominated by soft power play and cultural projection. According to Krasnyak, during pre-COVID era of Jintao and later Jinping, China was spending more than \$10 billion a year in a soft power push to focus on academic exchanges and promotion of language and culture. (Krasnyak, 2018)

In his text for „The Guardian“, Michael Safi argues that „China's vaccine diplomacy was not any different from their regular public diplomacy, as state-led engagement has dominated the production, marketing and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. Safi mentioned example of Serbia, since in Serbia, as one of the many recipients of China’s Sinopharm doses, China sent its ambassador to Serbia to the airport in a glitzy ceremony celebrating the arrival of the vaccine. In contrast, the U.S., the U.K., and other European states “preferred to let pharmaceutical companies take the spotlight, and largely allowed them to decide where vaccines go and in what quantities.” (Safi, 2021)

Chinese reputational rollercoaster resulted with fall from fifth place in global soft power index in 2020 to eight place in 2021. Even though the authorities addressed the crisis very effectively and China was one of only a few countries around the world to have got the epidemic under control

and to register positive GDP growth at the end of 2020. As Ting Lee noticed China's poorer performance was probably impacted by the global media coverage of COVID-19 cases in city of Wuhan, just as with understanding that Chinese officials made maximum effort to hide the evidence of virus outbreak from Wuhan laboratory. Although China fell in most of the areas that influence global soft power index, China, just as Russia saw improved scores in areas of education and science since both of these two authoritarian countries developed their own COVID-19 vaccines and distributed them throughout the world. (Ting Lee, Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China's COVID-19 soft power play, 2021)

However, to answer on this reputational decrease, China, as the world biggest manufacturer of vaccines (China manufactured 4 types of vaccines: Sinovac, Sinopharm, CanSino and AstraZeneca with share of 33% of all the manufactured vaccines around the world) used the situation where Chinese officials held virus under control domestically and exported around 62% of all the manufactured vaccines. (Lawler, 2021) However, as Song noticed "there were a lot of issues regarding verification of Chinese data of vaccine export." (Song, 2021)

Wu and Gelineau claim that "China's COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy was motivated in part by its determination to transform itself from an object of mistrust over its initial mishandling of the COVID-19 outbreak to a saviour as part of a broader strategy of reputational damage repair or an image makeover—both at home and in the world. This approach entails reframing its image as the country that accelerated the virus' spread through cover-ups to that of the magnanimous global power offering leadership at a time of international leadership disarray." (Wu & Gelineau, Chinese vaccines sweep much of the world, despite concerns, 2021)

Silver, Devlin and Huang in their paper „Unfavourable views of China reach historic highs in many countries” presented the fact that “Pew Centre survey of 14,276 adults in the 14 advanced countries (Belgium, Japan, Italy, Denmark, France, Australia, Germany, the U.K., the U.S., the Netherlands, Canada, Spain, Sweden, and South Korea) showed that China and the U.S. gathered unfavourable views at or near historic highs in the Canter's 12 years of polling on the issue“. Although China did a good job when it comes to handling the virus domestically, Silver et.al. claim that „China's poor handling of COVID-10 appeared to be central to its record unpopularity. A median of 61% of respondents across all 14 countries polled said China had done a bad job dealing with COVID-19, worse in every case than their own country and global bodies such as the WHO. China's COVID-

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

19 failure was also reflected in the way people in these countries perceived Chinese President Xi. A median of 78% had no confidence in Xi's ability "to do the right thing in world affairs" (Silver, Devlin, & Huang, 2020)

In their report for 2020, IPSOS presented data about nation branding based on Anholt-GfK index. As it was the case with global soft power index, in the latest Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index for 2020 China, whose reputation remained stable at 23rd place over the past four years, saw an overall rank decline of 12 positions from 23rd place last year to 35th place. China's ranking declined across multiple categories this year—particularly in Governance, People, Tourism, and Immigration Investment. (McGrath & Parkas, 2020)

However, since USA retrieved from international diplomacy under Trump's administration and prioritized inoculation of domestic population, China saw this as an opportunity to fulfil the vaccine diplomacy vacuum and in geopolitical terms. China presented itself as a country that tends to achieve a widespread of vaccines among low- and middle-income countries in order to achieve global population immunity. Such Chinese plan was boosted with the fact that wealthy nations have pre ordered and secured billions of doses before COVID-19 vaccines were even approved.

Ting Lee presented the fact that by the end of 2020, Canada ordered 338 million doses, enough to vaccinate its population four times over. The U.K. secured three times what it needed to inoculate its citizens. As of February 2021, 56% of COVID-19 vaccines have been purchased by high-income countries, who represent 16% of the global population. (Ting Lee, Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China's COVID-19 soft power play, 2021) As of February 2021, the UN have found out that 10 countries received around 80% of produced vaccines and described this as a "Catastrophic moral failure". (United Nations, United Nations, 2021)

These huge disparities and pricey western vaccines left low- and middle-income countries with limited choice when it comes to vaccines. Aside from that, western vaccine producers struggled to fulfil all the orders and China used that opportunity to gain political points in numerous countries around the world. Wu and Gelineau emphasized the example of Chile and claim that "when its vaccination program began in late December 2020, only 150,000 of the 10 million Pfizer doses ordered arrived. China swooped in offering four million Sinovac doses in late January helping the

South American country to reach the fifth highest vaccination rate per capita in the world by March 2020, according to Oxford University's vaccination tracker.“ (Wu & Gelineau, CP24, 2021)

As it was the case with Russia, China had no problems regarding explanation to domestic population why they exported vaccines even before they distributed them on domicile ground. On the other hand, Safi explained that in comparison to China, western democracies used vaccines in order to inoculate their domestic population and to supply multilateral vaccine mechanisms such as COVAX which led to development of phenomena of the „vaccine nationalism“. (Safi, 2021) However, as French president Emanuel Macron noticed that vaccine nationalism and vaccine rollout to rich countries led to acceleration of global inequality and paved the way for war on influence over vaccines in which Russia and China already implemented their tactics. (Doherty, Hurst, & Lyons, 2021) (Huang, Foreign Affairs, 2021)

Another advantage of China was the fact that their vaccines are based on inactivated virus, do have a factual edge or substance, and as such, they do not require cold storage infrastructure for distribution. Thus, as Hu (Hu, 2020) and McGregor (McGregor, 2020) emphasize “Chinese vaccines were particularly appealing to many developing countries, daunted by the challenges of importing and transporting the mRNA vaccines of Pfizer and Moderna that require sub-zero facilities.” The competitiveness of COVID-19 vaccines provides a space for vaccine diplomacy. Chinese State media emphasized how African and some Latin American states prefer Chinese inactivated vaccines, due to their competitive costs and easier logistics considering tropical heat, distance, and scarcity of ultra-cold freezers. (Hu, 2020) Similarly, in December 2020, Indonesian officials claimed that they cannot use Pfizer vaccine given the logistical challenges during their distribution which led to procurement of 4 million doses of Chinese Sinovac vaccine. (Byrne, 2021)

Even president Xi Jinping claimed several times that Chinese vaccines will be global public good and that they will represent Chinese contribution in process of ensuring vaccine accessibility and affordability in developing countries.“ (Wheaton, 2020) Aside from that, president Jinping emphasized that international vaccine distribution is part of Chinese vision of a „shared future for the people of the world to work as one“. Although Chinese actions could be understood as a manoeuvres of nation image repair, Beijing studiously rejected any connection between the export of its vaccines and its image. Speaking in Moscow in March 2020, China's foreign minister Wang

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Yi said that „it was hypocritical of critics to suggest China was scheming to conduct some kind of vaccine diplomacy.“ (Doherty, Hurst, & Lyons, 2021)

Although China made numerous bilateral deals with other countries when it comes to vaccine distribution, accusations regarding use of vaccines to gain influence made Chinese officials to look in a different way, Because of that, China joined COVAX system in October 2020 and promised to provide more than two billion doses of vaccines to the most vulnerable people and health workers, especially in developing and poor countries. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2020)

During their campaign of vaccine diplomacy, Chinese officials emphasized multiple times that Chinese vaccine diplomacy is based on altruistic and civic virtue values, it did not look like that since most of the vaccines were sold. Karaskova and Blablova noticed this and claimed that „China’s vaccine diplomacy adheres to a mixed model of business and politics, as doses are “used as a tool, to reinforce established relations and capitalize on new opportunities”. (Karaskova & Blablova, 2021)

Data compiled by Blablova and Karaskova shows that the main distribution method of Chinese vaccines were not donations but purchases of other countries. According to their data, number of purchased vaccines of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not known, Montenegro received donation of 30 000 Sinopharm vaccines, while Serbia purchased two million vaccines. (Karaskova & Blablova, 2021)

According to Ting Lee (2021), less than 2% of all the Chinese vaccines were in fact free, since out of 656 million doses distributed around the world, only 8,6 million doses (1,31%) were in fact free (distributed through donations). What is interesting to emphasize is the fact that according to data presented by Beaubien (Beaubien, npr.org, 2021) and Liu (Liu, 2020), Chinese vaccines were not cheaper in comparison to other vaccines and their price ranged from 18,50\$ to 72,50\$ depending from country to country and by period of procurement.

Chinese political business model was effective because China at the very beginning was ready to distribute free samples which led to bigger purchases as it was the case with Philippines and Iraq. Aside from that, Hu emphasizes the fact that Chinese officials did not target countries in which Western influence was stronger since China tend to avoid competition with Moderna and Pfizer

but pushed strong regional campaign which led that nine out of ten ASEAN countries (all except Vietnam) procure Chinese vaccines.

China's vaccine diplomacy is a continuation of its brand building since before the outbreak of COVID-19, as Fauci claims, „China had an active health diplomacy program in Africa aimed at “winning the hearts and minds of people in poor countries by exporting medical care, expertise and personnel to help those who need it most”“ (Fauci, 2007)

According to Chinese State Council Information Office, Chinese actions during COVID-19 present the continuation of previous health diplomacy effort that China conducted in Africa. During the 2014 Ebola epidemic, (Benabdallah, 2021) China mobilized domestic and international resources and carried out health diplomacy campaigns in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, and Ghana including sending medical supplies and personnel, and financial donations. In addition, China also engaged local communities through medical training, research exchanges, and cultural events. (KUNDOC, 2017) Chinese success was not only visible in Africa, but also in South America, where all the countries except Suriname and French Guiana decided to procure Chinese vaccines in order to try to fight back outbreak of COVID-19. Chinese efforts to export vaccines on this continent were severely eased after Brazil opted to start trial Sinovac inoculation in July 2020, which marked the earliest Chinese vaccine trial outside China. After success trial, Brazilian officials decided to start the domestic production of Sinovac vaccine. (Cohen, 2020)

China quickly became the main supplier for states such as Brazil, Turkey, Argentina, Mexico, Iran, Iraq and many others across the globe. In December 2020, Egypt became one of the first countries to officially recognize and implement the inoculation process with Sinopharm and at that point, it seemed that Chinese vaccines sweep the World despite concerns of Western governments. (Gelineau & Huizhong, 2021) Till March 2021, Beijing has distributed millions of free doses to almost 70 countries and commercially exported many more to 28 other countries. (Huang, Foreign Affairs, 2021)

Ting Lee claims that “The destinations of Chinese vaccines are consistent with Beijing's public diplomacy efforts including development aid and business activities since the mid-1990s that have focused on Asia, Africa, and Latin America—areas sometimes neglected or deliberately isolated,

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

because of their repressive regimes, by the U.S. and Europe.” (Ting Lee, Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China’s COVID-19 soft power play, 2021)

In April 2020, simultaneously with its vaccine diplomacy, China also worked on the distribution of masks, tests, and other supporting medical material, especially in countries that were part of the "New Health Silk Road" but also geostrategic important countries such as Serbia as their main ally in Western Balkans. In their work, Lancaster and Rubin argue that “China has done this with the goal of positioning itself as a global world leader in healthcare.” (Lancaster & Rubin, 2020) Huang also saw such Chinese geopolitical intentions, pointing out in his article that concerns were growing in the "Western world" about the possibility that Chinese vaccines would positively affect China's popularity in donor countries and their more positive geostrategic position towards China. (Huang, Foreign Affairs, 2021)

Such Chinese vaccine diplomacy actions led to positive image rebranding which is visible from analysis of social media where 69,7% of posts suggested mostly favourable nation brand for China, but also from analysis of media where sentiment analysis of the 57,866 texts showed mostly positive sentiments about China’s vaccine diplomacy with 71.3% of texts showing positive mentions. (Ting Lee, Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China’s COVID-19 soft power play, 2021)

As it was the case with Russian vaccine Sputnik-V, most of the EU countries have resisted to use of Chinese vaccines, while some eastern and south-eastern European countries such as Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Belarus, North Macedonia procured Chinese vaccines to start inoculation of their general population. (Ting Lee, Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China’s COVID-19 soft power play, 2021) In February 2021, Hungary became the first EU country that started inoculation of their general population with Chinese Sinopharm (Reuters Staff, Reuters, 2021) and shortly after sent letter of intent to produce Chinese vaccines (Reuters, Reuters, 2021) while Czech Republic followed their lead shortly after. (Lau, 2021)

Till today, official data regarding procurement of Chinese vaccines by Western Balkans countries vary, but according to all the pieces of information that I gathered, estimates are that Serbia purchased slightly less than two and a half million vaccines, Bosnia and Herzegovina purchased more than six hundred thousand vaccines (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina about five

hundred thousand vaccines and Republika Srpska about one hundred and thirty thousand vaccines), while Montenegro purchased two hundred thousand vaccines and got donation of thirty thousand more.

4.1.2. European Union

Since the beginning of the pandemic, the European Union, as a community of independent states, has exported more than two billion vaccines to 167 different countries, primarily to the countries of Asia and the Pacific, and then to Africa, North, Central and South America and Europe. (European Commission, Export of COVID-19 vaccines from the EU, 2022)

It is interesting to point out that although 11 vaccines (only 5 of those 11 in the EU (EUROPEAN VACCINATION INFORMATION PORTAL, 2022)) have been approved for emergency use listing (EUL) by the World Health Organization, no manufacturer is from any of the European Union countries. (World Health Organization, World Health Organization, 2022) However, in 7 countries of the European Union (Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden) vaccines produced by the EU have been produced under the license of one of the manufacturers whose vaccines are listed on the EUL. (World Health Organization, World Health Organization, n.d.)

At the very beginning of the pandemic, European Union officials as well as representatives of the Member States received a great deal of criticism at their own expense and at the expense of vaccine nationalism, as many felt that such behaviour was not in line with European Union values. increases inequality in the world between the rich "Western world" and developing countries. On May 6, 2021, the President of the European Commission - Ursula Von der Leyen said that by that time the European Union had exported more than 350 million vaccines, which was equivalent to China, which began exporting vaccines earlier. (Innovations in healthcare, 2021) However, official reports from the European Union's trade sector indicate that most vaccines were exported at the time to highly developed countries such as Japan, Canada, United States and the United Kingdom. (European Commission, Export of COVID-19 vaccines from the EU, 2022) (McCarthy, 2021) However, lower and middle income countries had a relatively small share in such distribution of vaccines. Such claims are evidenced by the fact, which Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi pointed out at the health summit in Rome: "More than 1.5 billion vaccines have been used in over 180 countries. of the world, of which only 0.3% was applied in poor countries while the share of rich

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

countries in the distribution of vaccines was more than 85%. “ (Governo Italiano Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2021)

Due to this situation, European officials at the summit of European leaders on May 25, 2021 in Brussels pointed out that the European Union will donate more than 100 million doses to poor countries by the end of 2021, primarily in Africa, Asia and Latin America. (Associated Press, 2021) In addition, the European Union provided €41,000,000.00 in assistance to the aforementioned regions, of which €31,000,000.00 (75.61%) was intended for the procurement of vaccines and medical equipment in these areas, while €10,000,000.00 was intended to be used by the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). (European Commission, European Commission, 2021)

The European Union soon began donating large contingents of vaccines, protective equipment, but also technical and logistical material to developing countries to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic and overcome any problems that may arise due to lack of technical transport equipment. and vaccine storage in a best possible way. In addition, the European Union, after the initial interruption in air traffic after the pandemic, fully opened its airspace for the transport of humanitarian aid and medical personnel. From May 2021 to February 2022, the European Union donated over 1,150 tons humanitarian aid in the 20 least developed countries in Africa and Asia. (European Commission, European Commission, n.d.)

The European Union donations also included the countries of the Western Balkans, which received about 70,000,000.00 Euros for vaccine procurement in December 2020 and 4.7 million vaccines from the European Union, while through the COVAX system they received almost 2.8 million vaccines, which makes a total of 7.5 million vaccines from the European Union. In addition, the European Union, in cooperation with the World Health Organization, has launched a project to raise readiness for vaccination and the purchase of technical equipment in the Western Balkans worth a total of \$7,000,000.00, but there is no specific information how that money was split among countries in the Western Balkans. (European Commission, European Commission, n.d.)

European Union delegations to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia throughout the pandemics were updating the official data regarding EU help to these countries. According to official data, Serbia received more than twenty-seven million euros from the EU to procure

vaccines, while the total amount of financial donations from EU to Serbia exceeded two hundred million euros. (European Union Delegation to Serbia, n.d.) Official data for Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that the EU and its member states donated more than million and three hundred thousand vaccines to Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Bosnia and Herzegovina through COVAX system received two hundred and thirty two thousand vaccines. (europa.ba, 2021) When it comes to Montenegro, this country received more than one hundred and thirteen million euros from the EU, while more than two hundred and forty thousand vaccines were donated to Montenegro as part of EU vaccine sharing mechanism. (eu.me, 2021)

4.1.3. Russia

When Russia developed a vaccine against COVID-19 it prioritized exporting it to dozens of other countries at the expense of its people. Russia very quickly announced that it was developing a vaccine against the coronavirus and the sheer speed at which Russian scientists have been able to develop this vaccine has raised a lot of questions in scientific communities across the world and there was deeply rooted scepticism regarding vaccines success given the disorganized state of Russian science. (Foltynova, 2021) (Stronski, 2021) By the middle of the year, Gamaleya research institute had announced a new, efficient Russian vaccine “Sputnik”. The vaccine is 91.4% effective according to the manufacturer (Sputnik Vaccine, 2020) and because of it, the vaccine got emergency clearance in dozens of countries around the world.

However, if we look at the history of Soviet vaccine science, such accomplishment is less of a surprise, since, in the aftermath of World War 1, the Soviet Union encountered a lot of diseases throughout its territory and succeeded to handle them in a way that was efficient only to some extent. As Andrew Kramer claims “Bubonic plague, which the Soviet Union encountered in the 1920s came as the ghost from the Middle Ages”. This made the Soviet Union begin more significant research and development of the vaccines and by the end of the decade, the Soviet Union became world leader when it comes to virology and vaccine development. (Kramer, The New York Times, 2020)

The gap between the Soviet Union and the USA in comparison to other countries became even larger coming out of World War 2 when the real concern at the end of the 1940s was Polio, both in the United States and in the Soviet Union. Shortly after the end of World War 2, in USA Polio was proclaimed as “Killer of the children” (Beaubien, npr.org, 2012) and spread rapidly across

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

both Soviet Union and the United States. By the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union was reporting more than 22000 Polio cases per year which were one-third of cases in the United States. (The New York Times, 2021)

According to Anda Baicus professor at Carol Davila University of Medicine and Pharmacy, first Polio vaccination efforts were conducted in the United States of America with killed, inactivated Polio virus, but the used batch of a Polio vaccine infected more than a hundred children in the USA and killed some of them. (Baicus, 2012) In a podcast with Sabrina Tavernice, Kramer claims that such a situation created a lot of scepticism toward vaccines among the US population who argued that other, more modern ways should be implemented when it comes to vaccine development. (The New York Times, 2021) Because of the bad attitude of the population toward existing vaccines, US scientists developed new vaccines that used weakened Polio virus. However, even this, new approach was problematic since that meant that children should receive live Polio virus and because of the previously conducted research, no one in the United States was ready to test new vaccines and run this experiment on the children. (Baicus, 2012)

In the late 1950s, at the apex of the Cold war, Soviet delegation, led by Soviet virologists and partners Mikhail Chumakov and Marina Voroshilova, flew to the United States and asked for a sample of this, newly developed vaccine to bring it back to the Soviet Union and test it in their country. (The New York Times, 2021) American scientists gave their approval, just as the State Department and FBI, but the US Ministry of defence claimed that this, the new vaccine could be used by Soviet scientists for the development of the biological weapon. Although the US Ministry of defence was against sharing a new vaccine, Chumakov and Voroshilova finally got approval and Chumakov brought back the sample of the newly developed US vaccine to the Soviet Union in his pocket. (The New York Times, 2021) (Rhodes, 2013) (Vargha, 2018) (Agol & Drozdov, 1993)

In Soviet medicine, there is a tradition that a new technique or new medicine should test it on themselves first, and after they have tested it in a laboratory back in the Soviet Union, Chumakov and Voroshilova decided that they will test these, newly developed Polio vaccines on their children. (The New York Times, 2021) However, Chumakov and Voroshilova didn't vaccinate their people, but served them a sugar cube with drops of liquid from the Polio vaccine, because of which they are considered as creators of oral Polio vaccine. (Baicus, 2012) Results were encouraging and

children have developed immunity to Polio which meant that the vaccine was effective. Shortly after the experiment with their children, Chumakov and Voroshilova shared their findings with senior officials in the Soviet government, who ordered testing of oral polio vaccines on orphans in Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were facing the Polio outbreak in this period). (Sabin, 1985) In 1959 Soviet Union started massive vaccination and in 1960, all the children between the ages of two months and 20 years old were completely vaccinated. (The New York Times, 2021) Till the outbreak of the COVID-19, this was the fastest mass vaccination campaign ever carried out.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia as the main successor of the powerful Soviet Union quickly became the main recipient of financial aid. The vast number of Russian scientists changed their jobs due to inflation, personal poverty and lack of resources in scientific institutes, but those who kept their jobs in Russian scientific institutes continued with the development of vaccines for different diseases. Some of them even announced that they have made progress in the development of a cure for AIDS, but more recently Russian scientists announced that they have invented the vaccine for mumps-measles, which structure is very similar to a vaccine for COVID-19, which was one of the main reasons why Russia invented COVID-19 vaccine so quickly. (The New York Times, 2021)

After Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, public perception of various countries across the world toward Russia became significantly more negative (Vice, 2017), Russian interference in US elections in 2016, Navalny and Skripal affair additionally worsened public opinion towards Russia, because of which Russia used various ways to regain their positive status in international politics, and the latest is vaccine diplomacy.

Just as other global powerhouses, such as the US, United Kingdom and China, Russia started the development of their domestic vaccines, which in May 2020 led to the television appearance of a Russian scientist who claimed that he has vaccinated himself with COVID-19 vaccine through animal experiments and the test still was not conducted. Russian tradition that reflects in the fact that inventors of newly published medicines test them on themselves (The New York Times, 2021) was fulfilled once again and was followed by several bold announcements before Russian vaccine and simultaneously first COVID-19 vaccine on the world Sputnik-V was announced by Russians in August 2020. (Beaumont & Harding, 2020)

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

The background of the idea of name “Sputnik-V” was reflecting the fact that vaccine presented a surprise to the Western world as it was the case with the launch of the Russian satellite “Sputnik” which indicated Russian supremacy in science during its glory days in the 1950s during the “Space race”, while “V” in name symbolizes victory over COVID-19. (Gohd, 2020)

Although there was a slot of scepticism regarding the Russian vaccine, especially because it did not pass the late-stage trials that were necessary to prove that the vaccine is efficient and safe for use. (Beaumont & Harding, 2020) Rather than scientific accomplishment, such a move was more propaganda manoeuvre by Vladimir Putin to show that Russia was once again a pioneer in the scientific area. After the presentation of the Sputnik-V vaccine, Vladimir Putin used it as a soft-power tool of influence and presented it as the vaccine for all humankind.

Additionally, Russia put vaccines on trials and results, which came by December 2020, indicated that vaccines are effective in 91.4% of cases which was equivalent to “Western world vaccines” that were previously tested before they were launched for mass vaccination. (Sputnik Vaccine, 2020)

The vacuum that was made, after Donald Trump imposed a ban on the export of US-produced vaccines, was fulfilled by China and Russia. At the end of January 2021, while the US ban on the export of vaccines was still in power, Russia offered European Union 100 million doses of Sputnik-V vaccines (Reuters, Reuters, 2021) (Kramer, The New York Times, 2021) and simultaneously made arrangements with other countries with the main goal to achieve geopolitical interests in certain regions and also reduce interests that could be achieved by EU and United States by their deployment of vaccines to third countries.

Russia also used this opportunity to export vaccines to some of the countries, which Andrew Kramer called “Bad Boys Club”, such as Cuba, Iran, Syria, countries in Northern Africa, Venezuela and Belarus which are loosely aligned with Russia and with which Russia would like to deepen their relationship. (The New York Times, 2021) Aside from these countries, Russia was exporting Sputnik-V vaccines to “swinging countries”¹ such as Slovakia (Radio free Europe radio Liberty, 2021) and Hungary (Thorpe, 2021), but also to Russian allies in Western Balkans such as Serbia

¹ Allusion on „swing states“ in USA which are very important during US presidential elections. In this context, swinging countries are swinging between Russia and Western world, but are highly important in geopolitical terms.

(Danas.rs, 2020) and Republika Srpska (Entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina with predominant Serb population) (Jakovljević, Anadolu Agency, 2021). Such manoeuvres by Russia had the main goal of flipping the narrative of its public image as a country that shares the vaccines for a common goal, and not as a country that violates human rights and basic freedoms among the domestic population.

One of the first countries with which Russia tried to make an arrangement was Brazil, as a strategically important ally of the United States who implemented diplomatic efforts to prevent this from happening because vaccines were seen as “agents of influence” used by Russians. (The New York Times, 2021) Initially, in April 2021 Brazilian government influenced by US diplomatic efforts rejected the import of Sputnik V (Andreoni & Pietsch, 2021). Less than two months later, Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency (ANVISA) approved Sputnik-V, since the healthcare system was collapsing under pressure (McGeever & Paraguassu, 2021), but shortly after, in July 2021, the contract with Russia regarding the import of vaccines was terminated (Reuters, Reuters.com, 2021).

In the meanwhile, EU countries such as Slovakia and Hungary approved the use of Sputnik-V among their population and signed a contract with Russian producers, although EMA did not approve the use of Sputnik-V in the EU (EMA, 2021). Simultaneously, certain regions in European countries such as Bavaria in Germany (Euronews, 2021) and Campania in Italy (Reuters Staff, Reuters, 2021) signed the deal to buy Sputnik-V and with that manoeuvre, Russian vaccine diplomacy not only created discord between EU countries regarding the topic of vaccines but also gained influence in the very heart of Europe. Similarly, in Latin America, certain polls show that the population of countries such as Mexico (Schmidt C. , 2022) and Argentina (TASS, 2021) prefer and trust more Sputnik-V than other vaccines. In certain countries such as Argentina, Serbia Sputnik-V is still producing, (Reuters, Reuters, 2021) and in Germany, Russian vaccines were produced, but are currently stopped as a part of sanctions directed toward Russia due to their recent invasion of Ukraine. (Reuters, Reuters, 2022)

These Russian manoeuvres had a positive impact on the public image of Russia around the world, and Russian diplomacy was quite effective politically and in terms of PR. Russia also sent small shipments of vaccines toward less developed countries such as Bolivia, which helped the country to gain a better public image, but also to gain geopolitical influence in such regions. In Bolivia, the

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

president of the country even came to the airport to host the aeroplane that delivered the Sputnik-V vaccines. (ANI, 2021) In San Marino, the complete population was vaccinated with Sputnik-V (EURACTIV, 2021) and such vaccination campaign had huge media coverage which led to huge political impact which could be viewed as the biggest benefit of the Russian vaccine diplomacy.

Aside from that, Russia was not seen only through the prism of targeted assassination of political opponents, invading other countries and suppression of human rights and basic freedoms, but also as a saviour that helps to rest of the world, and this presents the sphere of influence that Western world can hardly counter. These Russian actions could result in the fact that after the COVID-19 pandemic is over, Russia could have more allies than before the pandemic. However, the recent war in Ukraine will certainly have a negative impact on the Russian public image, which was significantly improved throughout the apex of COVID-19 pandemics.

By April 2021, Russia had produced more than 20 million doses of COVID-19 vaccine of those it has exported about 4 million doses (20% of a total number of manufactured vaccines) to foreign countries instead of using it to vaccinate the domestic population. Until April 2021, Russia has vaccinated just 5% of its population (in comparison the United States have vaccinated 27% of its population till the same period and the United States count more than double of the Russian population). (The New York Times, 2021) However, we should bear in mind that such a low percentage of the vaccinated population arises from the fact that there is still great reluctance toward vaccines, not only in Russia but in the whole world. (Rainsford, 2021)

Official data regarding Russian vaccines in Bosnia and Herzegovina are blurry and there is no official data that Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina purchased any Sputnik V vaccine, while Republika Srpska purchased more than four hundred thousand. (dnevni.ba, 2021) Serbia purchased more than two million doses of Sputnik V vaccine (RTS, N1, 2021), while Russia did not engage in cooperation regarding vaccines procurement with Montenegro as a member of NATO alliance.

4.1.4. United States of America

During COVID-19 outbreak, United States of America were probably the superpower that made least effort to try to implement vaccine diplomacy on international level. Such behaviour could be understood as a consequence of Donald Trump's ban on export of vaccines and orders that domestic population in United States should be inoculated first. (Deutsche Welle, 2020) However, it would be completely wrong to say that United States did not conduct any activities regarding vaccine diplomacy, but it should be emphasized that such activities were primarily oriented on regional level and collaboration with North American countries, just as countries of Latin America and Caribbean (LAC).

Simultaneously with the Russian publishment of the first COVID-19 vaccine, former American president Donald Trump, implemented a ban on exports of domestically produced vaccines and said that “American vaccines should be used first to vaccinate American citizens”, which made a vacuum in terms of the export of vaccines to third countries and the countries which used that vacuum were Russia and China which emerged as global saviours regarding vaccine distribution. Situation caused with Trump’s ban export led to the fact that United States, as second biggest producer of vaccines in the world (behind China), accounted for 27% of the world's coronavirus vaccine production, but 0% of the global supply beyond its own borders. (Lawler, 2021) However, that situation changed, and it changed dramatically since Joe Biden succeeded Donald Trump and started his campaign of giving loans and donations to other countries.

US main target during COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy were Central America, Latin America and Caribbean with which United States have strong diplomatic and cultural ties. Although Chinese officials claimed that Chinese vaccines are as efficient as Western, their words did not achieve huge echo since countries in the region of Latin and Central America and Caribbean prioritized US vaccines in comparison to those produced in China. Although approaches of countries in this region were different, United States made a huge step forward in process of increase of their influence when they promised that they will donate humanitarian relief worth 310 million dollars to El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala in April 2021. (Brizuela de Ávila, Marti, Insanally, & Trevisan, 2022) Because of these, targeted vaccine diplomacy efforts United States, through bilateral deals and through COVAX, have donated more than 16,8 million doses (State Department, 2022), while China donated “just” around 1,75 million doses to countries in Central America. (Bridge Consulting, n.d.)

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Brizuela de Avila argues that although US shipments of COVID-19 vaccines drew media attention, it was not even close to media attention that was given by media in Central and Latin America to shipments that were coming from China. Aside from that, Brizuela de Avila argues that type of vaccines (mRNA and vector vaccines had huge significance when it came to decision which country will procure Chinese and which will procure US produced vaccines). More developed countries with vaccine storage facilities predominantly opted in for US produced vaccines, while developing and poor countries primarily chose Chinese vaccines since they do not require ultra-cold freezers as it is the case with Pfizer, Moderna and Johnson&Johnson's vaccines. (Brizuela de Ávila, Marti, Insanally, & Trevisan, 2022)

Although Brazil was US main target in vaccine diplomacy campaign in South America because it was under a huge influence of China and Russia, US donated just three million doses of Johnson and Johnson to Brazil which was barely one percent of Brazil's 407 million doses that were previously distributed and which were predominantly procured commercially. (US Embassy and Consulates in Brazil, 2021) It is interesting to emphasize the fact that during mandate of Donald Trump, US officials asked Brazil's officials to stop purchasing Russian vaccines during corona apex but did not offer US vaccines in order to replace Sputnik-V, because of which donations to Brazil occurred during Joe Biden's administration.

However, it seems as Brazil as the US's „last bastion“ in South America was under biggest influence from China, whose Sinovac-CoronaVac was predominant during mass immunization campaign in this country. Aside from that, it seems as laboratory to laboratory collaboration between Brazil and China played more significant role in Brazil's orientation toward use of Chinese vaccines. (Queiroz, 2021)

Probably the most important country for United States was Mexico as moderately developed country with which United States share border. As Bosco Marti claims „Mexico initially sought help from the United States – its most important and reliable ally – to buy needed PPE equipment and N-95 masks. US support did not immediately materialize due to both countries' similar peaks in caseload. This created pockets of diplomatic opportunities for other countries including China. Since China had an earlier first wave of COVID-19 infections, it had “off-cycle” pandemic peaks that allowed it to provide vaccines and other supplies when Mexico needed them the most. US support eventually came, as Mexico was the first Latin American country to benefit from United

States vaccine donations. By September 2021, the United States had donated 10.9 million vaccine doses; in contrast, China sold vaccines via purchasing agreements.“ (Brizuela de Ávila, Marti, Insanally, & Trevisan, 2022)

In June 2021, United States president, Joe Biden, announced that United States of America will donate about 80 million doses (75% of their unused COVID-19 vaccines) around the world either through UN backed COVAX, or through bilateral deals. As Early recipient were named India (whose number of infected people reached peak in April and May 2021) and South Korea, alongside with less developed African and Asian countries. (Miller, 2021) It is interesting that United States also donated vaccines to Ukraine as their ally and partner, just as to Kosovo while other countries of Western Balkans remained completely neglected. At the same time, Joe Biden announced that USA will provide 60 million doses of AstraZeneca to other countries since AstraZeneca has yet to be authorized in USA. Aside from AstraZeneca, Joe Biden announced that USA will lift export ban on domestically produced vaccines such as Pfizer, Moderna and Johnson&Johnson. (Miller, 2021)

United States of America had extremely slow start in vaccine diplomacy campaign, even in regions where their soft power is unmatched as it is the case in South America. This slow start resulted with the fact that British AstraZeneca negotiated opening of production facilities in Mexico Argentina and Brazil, (Government of Mexico, 2021) Beijing has reached agreements for production of Sinovac with Brazil, Chile and Mexico, Moscow has reached agreements for production of Sputnik-V with Argentina (Merco Press, 2021), while countries such as Bolivia, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru have expressed interest in making the Russian shot. (Shuldiner, 2022) On the other hand, only Pfizer of all the US manufacturers, in August 2021, signed a tentative agreement with Brazilian government to start vaccine production in this Southern American country. (pfizer, 2021)

However, as Rajah, Leng and Lemahieu claim in their text, there is a huge problem regarding credibility gap of donated vaccines, since huge part of population in countries that receive medical equipment and vaccines consider that such donations present waste for country that is donating and the similar case was with vaccines donated by US that are considered to have short expiry date. (Rajah, Leng, & Lemahieu, 2022)

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Just as was the case with Russia and China, the United States undoubtedly had, in addition to the altruistic, personal political interests guided by the distribution of vaccines in countries around the world. However, based on the existing soft power and economic situation, but also on the ratio of sold and donated vaccines, one gets the impression that, with the exception of the initial ban on vaccine exports to other countries, the United States had the most altruistic approach of all world powers. This approach has somewhat improved the view of the United States, which was at an all-time low in a poll presented by Ting Lee (Ting Lee, Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China's COVID-19 soft power play, 2021), but also showed middle-income and less developed countries that they do not necessarily have to turn to cooperation with China and Russia that do not belong to the liberal, Western world.

The aforementioned historical minimum in terms of a positive opinion of the United States is likely the result of US officials' decisions to ban US-made vaccines until the domicile population is fully vaccinated, as well as the US veto on intellectual property rights. when it comes to vaccines. Although from an altruistic point of view this move is not a positive example, from a financial point of view it is very good because the United States has done an excellent job in terms of promotion and quality of vaccines, which cannot be said for China as the main competitor, since their Sinovac showed only 51% efficacy in tests in Brazil, which was more than insufficient, especially considering the new and upcoming variants of the virus. (Iancu, 2021)

As Kantor claims, what we have seen in United States is previously mentioned vaccine nationalism which was probably the most intense in United States at the very beginning of pandemic as nowhere else. Despite a slow start, United States of America have donated more than 275 million doses which is more than a quarter of all the vaccines that Joe Biden's administration has pledged to other, primarily low and moderately developed countries. (Krishna, 2021) Such donations made United States largest single country donor of any vaccine ever. (Kantor, 2021)

However, in a survey conducted by RAND institute, prior to rise of Omicron variant, two third of US citizens have expressed their opinion that United States should send extra doses to other countries and nearly 60 percent of those surveyed agreed that if the United States does not help to fight the spread of COVID-19 in other countries through vaccine or monetary support, it will put the United States at risk. (Grace-Carman & Chandra, 2021)

Aside from that, when we look into the data, it is very important to emphasize the fact presented by Nolte who claims that „Both European Union (62,6%) and the United States of America (51,2%) had higher export share than it was the case with China, who due to domestic demand, exported only 31.5% of its production. (predominantly through commercial deals to Latin America and not throughout the donations as it was the case with European Union and United States). (Nolte, 2022)

During the COVID-19 pandemics, there is not any evidence that the United States of America directly helped either Montenegro, Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina when it comes to vaccine donations and vaccine procurement. However, United States of America provided important financial aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina (startbih.ba, 2021) (FENA, N1, 2021), Serbia (UNDP, 2021) (BETA, 2020) and Montenegro (Ambasada SAD Crna Gora, 2020) in order to try to mitigate the consequences of COVID-19 pandemics. However, it is interesting to emphasize the fact that United States of America engaged in cooperation with Kosovo and donated more than one million vaccines through the COVAX partnership program. (US Department of State, n.d.)

4.2. Vaccine diplomacy in the context of COVID-19

As a worldwide pandemic emergency, COVID-19 has changed how countries project their power and impact. General wellbeing has ascended to the highest point of each policy agenda as people, social orders, and nation-state centre around a shared objective – to prevent the spread of disease and reduce, or at least hold a number of infected people. The new pandemic has required from countries to work together as never before to share information about the virus, its origins, ways the virus is transmitted, methods of transmission and treatment, but also how the virus itself can be stopped and how immunity can be improved.

However, not only do domestic countries seem to care about nation-branding among their population, other, stronger countries often interfere within their territory with the main goal to implement their nation branding through vaccine diplomacy that became one of the most important forms of soft power in international relations since 2019.

Before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccine diplomacy was viewed solely through the prism of an agent for the usually ad-hoc, temporary, conflict resolution. Yet today, vaccine diplomacy can be viewed as a tool of soft power that states use to brand and pursue their interests in international relations. Lee and Kim argues that “In this, Zeitgeist, health diplomacy, mask diplomacy, pandemic diplomacy, CoViD-19 diplomacy and coronavirus diplomacy have become

part of the terminology of the international relations literature” (Ting Lee & Kim, Nation branding in the COVID-19 era: South Korea’s pandemic public diplomacy, 2020). Similarly as Ting Lee and Kim, Tanisha Fazal analysed pandemics of the 21st century (SARS, H1N1, MERS, Ebola and CoViD-19) and found out that „instead of trying to foster global cooperation, states preferred to make use of bilateral and regional diplomacy.“ Fazal claims that „Pandemics create opportunities for states to pursue foreign policy goals that primarily serve their national interest rather than serving global health.“ (Fazal, 2020)

4.3. Vaccine diplomacy in Western Balkans

Western Balkans’ legacy of war, corruption, significant underdevelopment, political instability and suspended European integration since the summit of European leaders in Thessaloniki in 2003, have led to this geopolitically important region being the subject of interest of some of the world's greatest powers and becoming a kind of playground for "pandemic activism" of the great powers.

The United States have significant interests in the region due to close cooperation with Kosovo, but also due to the claims of countries such as Russia and China to strengthen their interest in this region. Authoritarian states such as Russia, which has significant political and economic interests in the Western Balkans and extremely close relations with Serbia and Republika Srpska, but also China, which sees the region as a geographically important region within the „One Belt One Road project, are seeking to strengthen their influence. in this region through significant infrastructure projects, but also incentives and trade with the Western Balkans. In addition to these actors, Turkey has become one of the main actors in the region with the aim of expanding its soft power, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandzak (part of Serbia), Kosovo and Albania. What all the countries of the Western Balkans have in common is the fact that they are all striving to successfully implement the process of European integration and to become full members of the European Union. Because of Euro-Atlantic integration, European Union also has significant interests in this region, which some of the European officials have pointed out several times in their speeches.

Due to all the aforementioned circumstances, all the mentioned political actors during the COVID-19 pandemic sought to provide medical or financial assistance to the countries of the Western Balkans as much as they could. Based on the donations made by these political actors during the COVID-19 pandemic, it can be clearly seen that some countries were in a privileged position compared to others, which speaks about the fact that in many cases „the mantle of necessary

humanitarian aid" indisputably hid the interest of political actors to increase their interest in this region.

However, for the purposes of analysing this master's thesis, it is important to point out that all three countries analysed in the paper had different approaches when it comes to the procurement of vaccines against COVID-19 virus, with Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina relying primarily on donations from other countries and waited for them to receive vaccines through the COVAX system, while Serbia, as a real political prodigy in the Western Balkans, took a much more pragmatic approach, ensuring the purchase of vaccines from all manufacturers, which significantly affected the outstanding results of Serbia during COVID-19 pandemic and in terms of process of immunization.

However, in general, region of Western Balkans was one of the hardest hit regions by CoViD-19, and according to the data provided by European Center for Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC), countries in this region were on the top spots when it comes to number of deaths caused by CoViD-19 per 1000 inhabitants.

4.3.1. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina, as one of the least developed countries in the Western Balkans, is often synonymous with corruption, nepotism, political instability and negative migration balance, which has been particularly emphasized since the end of the 1992-1995 civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the end of the civil war, Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly opted for Euro-Atlantic integration, but significant problems arise due to inconsistencies in foreign policy created by the three-member presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as each member of the presidency has the option of blocking the decision by invoking the "Vital National Interest" which must then be confirmed by the entity parliament or the National Assembly. In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains the only country in the Western Balkans to pursue its foreign policy without an officially adopted Foreign Affairs Law, to a significant extent. (Lingo-Demirović, 2022)

The complex political system, frequent overlaps of competencies, incompetence of politicians and national divisions have often led to problems in the past when it comes to the political and security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and nothing was different during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in times of pandemic were united as never before to combat the pandemic, which led to a huge number of ad-hoc rules on foreign policy,

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Bosnia and Herzegovina during the COVID-19 pandemic was using diplomatic mechanisms mainly to ensure vaccines by major foreign policy partners, which has largely led to harsh critics from the public, which believes that in this way Bosnia and Herzegovina is not embarking on the challenges of multilateral diplomacy, but "waiting for donations" from other countries.

At the state level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are 9 ministries, but the Ministry of Health is not one of them, but its responsibilities are taken over by the Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ministries of health, on the other hand, exist in both entities, while in the Brcko District there is a health sector as an integral part of the Government. In addition, each of the 10 cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has its own government and Ministry of health, and during the COVID-19 pandemic, each of the cantonal ministries of health could decide, depending on the number of cases, to tighten or relax the measures in comparison to the rest of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to mitigate the risks. In the Republika Srpska....

In the following sections, overview of COVID-19 pandemics are shown, but also the interplay of the multiple institutions and their overlapping which greatly affected vaccine procurement of the country. Section will be divided in two sub sections (divided by entities) to try to realize to which extent one entity performed better in comparison to the other one and vice-versa. Aside from that, implemented measures are shown and described to the details, just as efforts to minimize the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemics.

The first case of infection with the COVID-19 virus in Bosnia and Herzegovina was registered on March 5, 2020 by a man from Banja Luka (A.D., klix.ba, 2020), and the number of cases in the days after the first case skyrocketed to over 2,000 newly infected people a day. In order to prevent the collapse of the health system at all levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, crisis headquarters were formed at all levels of government shortly after the pandemic was declared in order to discuss about the risks and measures that the pandemic of the COVID-19 virus posed before all citizens, but also administrative bodies. The measures adopted by the crisis staffs were often criticised by the public, as a large number of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina felt that their human rights were being violated.

Since the competent state-level institutions, such as the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, said after the first case of the COVID-19 virus in Bosnia and Herzegovina that there

was no room for panic (FENA, klix.ba, 2020) (I.Č., klix.ba, 2020), only six days later the situation became alarming. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared a pandemic of the COVID-19 virus (D.Be., klix.ba, 2020), and due to the large number of newly infected, the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina decided to implement 9 orders to combat the COVID-19 virus (I.P., klix.ba, 2020), the Brcko District Government suspended classes in classrooms (FENA, klix.ba, 2020), and soon a similar approach was introduced by the Republika Srpska (Jakovljević, Anadolu Agency, 2020). Shortly afterwards, even stricter measures were introduced, public transport was suspended, free movement of persons under 18 and over 65 was banned, movement and assembly of citizens were restricted, masks and gloves became an integral part of public life, and the strictest measures were imposed soon after which reflected in a ban on leaving the place of residence and police hour between 8 pm and 5 am. In addition, the decision of the Council of Ministers closed the Sarajevo International Airport to traffic (BUKA, BUKA, 2020), foreign nationals were banned from entering the country, while domestic population was unable to enter the country without fulfilling additional conditions.

Depending on their ethnicity, members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina due to the inconsistent normative framework regarding foreign policy, often made different statements about which foreign policy actor contributes to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

According to the official data received through the response to the request for access to information, as of June 13, 2022. Bosnia and Herzegovina procured a total of 4,142,310 vaccines through all procurement mechanisms (donations, direct procurement of entities, EU4Health and COVAX), and it is not known how many vaccines were received by which entity or how many vaccines were procured from which manufacturer.

A total of 332,640 doses arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the COVAX mechanism, which represents a total of 8.03% of the total number of vaccines purchased. A total of 214,110 doses (5.17%) of the total number were received through the EU4Health mechanism, 1,237,380 doses or 28.97% of the total number were purchased through direct procurement of the entities, and the highest percentage of vaccines (56.93%), ie 2,358,180 doses arrived through donations from the European Union and other countries. In addition, through financial arrangements provided by the European Union for the purchase of vaccines and technical

equipment aimed at raising readiness for vaccination against the COVID-19 virus in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the state received 13,775,280.00 euros through the EU4Health program.




Table 1 - Overview of Bosnia and Herzegovina's vaccine procurement

Political discourses at the state level were significantly diversified and largely depended on party affiliation. However, as it was the case at the entity level, there was no significant number of political actors dealing with the issue, but primarily presidents of predominantly national, ruling parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina and high-ranking officials such as Council of Ministers Chairman Zoran Tegeltija, Minister of Civil Affairs Ankica Gudeljević and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bisera Turković. On lower levels of government (entity and cantonal level) political discourses were not related to party affiliation as it was case on state level, but this will be elaborated to the details in forthcoming sub-chapters (“Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” & “Republika Srpska”)

The COVID-19 pandemic in Bosnia and Herzegovina was characterized by unusual entity cooperation, but even this event did not pass without the propagation of national policies and direct insults from the presidents of the ruling parties directed to each other.

Shortly after the first case of the coronavirus appeared in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the number of those infected skyrocketed, and to prevent the health system from collapsing, all levels of

government began procuring vaccines and medical equipment as soon as possible. At that time, vaccines against the COVID-19 virus had not yet been produced, while medical care was being procured from suspicious sources. One of the biggest scandals during the COVID-19 virus pandemic was the procurement of medical respirators procured from Beijing by the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which allocated more than 10,500,000.00 KM (FENA, Klix.ba, 2020) for these purposes in order to provide 100 respirators for health centres throughout the cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is interesting to point out is the fact that during the procurement of this contingent of medical equipment, the importing company was the agricultural company "Silver Raspberry", which did not have the necessary documentation or accreditation for the import and sale of medical equipment. (R.D., Klix.ba, 2021)

Due to numerous irregularities that accompanied the procurement of the aforementioned respirators, the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in cooperation with the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), soon launched an investigation into the entire respirators procurement process and indicted those responsible for respirators. but no significant results have been achieved till today. Almost a year after the purchase of the previously mentioned respirators, the president of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Bakir Izetbegović, admitted "How the respirators are overpaid, but they still work, which is quite enough in the given circumstances". (Ad., 2021)

The first efforts to bring vaccines from world-famous manufacturers such as Pfizer, AstraZeneca and Moderna to Bosnia and Herzegovina were initiated by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zoran Tegeltija, who met with the entity prime ministers in November 2020 to discuss procurement of vaccines, but also on the potential introduction of new measures due to the unfavorable epidemiological situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Tegeltija said was "under control due to the implementation of long-term and predictable measures, which in comparison with the measures implemented by other countries, gave results in the long run. At the mentioned meeting, the entity prime ministers and Tegeltija (who is technically the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina) agreed on the procurement of vaccines for over 20% of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the deadline for procurement and delivery of 1,230,000 vaccines was April 2021. (M., 2020)

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Fear caused by the previous fiasco with the procurement of medical equipment, complex political system, incompetences and overlapping competencies have led to Bosnia and Herzegovina being among the last countries in Europe when it comes to the procurement of vaccines, emphasizing that Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the few countries that decided to cooperate exclusively with the COVAX system when procuring vaccines although European Union officials advised state representatives to start procuring vaccines directly (through negotiations with manufacturers) and not through intermediaries including the COVAX system. (Hambo, Klix.ba, 2020)

In early 2021, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Zoran Tegeltija said that Bosnia and Herzegovina is keeping pace with other countries when it comes to vaccine procurement, which proved to be a completely false claim, since mass immunization of the population began in April 2021, while in other European countries, as well as in some countries of the Western Balkans, that process began at the end of 2020. (D. Be., 2021) Shortly afterwards, on January 11, 2021, Tegeltija made another statement that proved to be more than incorrect, as he said that "At the end of January 2021, the first doses of vaccines will arrive from the mechanisms of the European Union and the COVAX system, emphasizing that "The given vaccines are the most difficult to transport and store, which is why institutions from both entities as well as the Brcko District would be involved in this process." (I.Č., Klix.ba, 2021)

What is interesting to point out is the fact that the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina blamed the leaders of the ruling parties for this failure, since in a survey conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which 4830 respondents participated, 28.72% of them pointed out that the leaders of the ruling parties are the biggest culprits for the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet started the vaccination process. The citizens saw the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the second biggest culprit with 21.79% of the vote, while Zoran Tegeltija was identified as the third biggest culprit as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Hambo, Klix.ba, 2021)

Due to public pressure and the slowness of the COVAX system, on January 21, 2021, representatives of all levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prime Ministers of the Entity Governments and Entity Ministers of Health and Social Welfare) met to discuss the launch of an initiative to procure vaccines against the COVID-19 virus. This position was eventually adopted,

which marked the beginning of negotiations with Pfizer, but also with Russian and Chinese manufacturers whose vaccines Sputnik V and Sinopharm proved to be equally effective in the fight against the COVID-19 virus, and whose vaccines were not part of international vaccine distribution system COVAX. (N.V., Klix.ba, 2021)

In early March 2021, Tegeltija pointed out that Bosnia and Herzegovina had negotiated the procurement of a vaccine contingent sufficient to vaccinate 40% of Bosnia and Herzegovina's population (R.D., Klix.ba, 2021) and that he did not feel guilty about delaying the delivery of vaccines. (I.Č., Klix.ba, 2021)

It is interesting to note that the Minister of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ankica Gudeljevic, pointed out that this Ministry is responsible only for coordinating the procurement of vaccines, while the governments of the entities and the Brcko District dictate work activities in the field of vaccine procurement. However, in early February 2021, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina pointed out that it had submitted an inquiry to Pfizer as well as the Chinese and Russian embassies in Bosnia and Herzegovina to request medical documentation on vaccines, but that the Ministry would not directly procure vaccines due to lack of budget funds. as well as due to the lack of constitutional competencies, but will act as an intermediary in the process of procuring vaccines. (FENA, Klix.ba, 2021)

It is interesting to note that the European Union, as one of the most important actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina's foreign policy, joined the process of procuring vaccines and providing humanitarian aid in mid-February, when the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina Johann Satler told that “The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina can expect greater engagement from the European Union in the near future in the fight against the COVID-19 virus.” (Gušić M. , 2021)

At the beginning of March 2021, the first significant contingent of 10,000 AstraZeneca vaccines donated by the Republic of Serbia arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the plane with the donated vaccines was welcomed at the Sarajevo International Airport by members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Milorad Dodik, Zeljko Komšić and Šefik. Džaferović. Previous donations from the Republic of Serbia were almost exclusively distributed among the entities, and this donation is the first significant donation that Bosnia and Herzegovina has received at the state level. (Midhat, 2021)

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

However, this activity could not pass without a scandal either, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bisera Turkovic pointed out that “The vaccines that came are of lower quality than those that Bosnia and Herzegovina really needs to get” (Beker, 2021), which caused a mass of comments on social networks. and the media, who used this opportunity to once again point out the incompetence of BiH politicians and to express their dissatisfaction with the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina is still almost exclusively dependent on donations from other countries.

Despite the fact that the vaccines came from Serbia at the beginning of March, and despite the fact that the leading Bosnian officials pointed out that the vaccination of the population will start in the first quarter of 2021, that did not happen. In the survey, which was conducted at the end of March 2021, and in which 474 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina participated, concern that immunization has not yet begun was expressed by as many as 87.55% of respondents, 4.85% of respondents had a neutral attitude, and 7.60% of respondents were not at all concerned by the fact that immunization of the population had not yet begun. (Sijamija, Analiziraj.ba, 2021)

Immunization of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina eventually began in April, a few months later than in other Western Balkan countries, and in the first two weeks of immunization only the most demographically vulnerable categories were vaccinated, as were workers in those sectors most exposed to the COVID-19 pandemic (Army, police, medical staff, civil protection and members of other emergency services).

One of the bravest statements since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic was made by the ruling man of the Democratic Action Party (SDA), Bakir Izetbegović, who said in early April that “He had provided 130,000 vaccines through personal efforts by Malaysia, China and Turkey, and that he expects more than a million more vaccines to arrive in three months through other mechanisms.” (SDA, 2021) Although this statement proved to be one of the most true statements made by a Bosnian politician during the COVID-19 pandemic, it should be noted that this is also one of the statements made at the latest regarding the procurement of vaccines. In addition, this statement shows to some extent the geopolitical discourse emphasized by the Bosniak people, namely cooperation with actors such as Turkey, which has significant geopolitical interests in the Western Balkans, as well as Malaysia, which in some of the most difficult moments in history of Bosnia and Herzegovina proved to be an extremely important partner.

During his speech, Izetbegović stated false information that "In the letter, the Prime Minister of Malaysia shared with him information that Malaysia is donating 50,000 vaccines to Bosnia and Herzegovina, although only 0.4% of Malaysians have been vaccinated so far, while according to Izetbegović at that time in Bosnia and Herzegovina, between 1 and 2% of the population was vaccinated." However, the fact-checking site "Istinomjer" analysed this statement in detail and found evidence that this claim was diametrically opposed to the truth and that it served only as a populist tool for politicians. (Istinomjer, 2021)

However, when all the facts are considered, it seems as if in Bosnia and Herzegovina and during the COVID-19 pandemic, what happened many times before happened, and that is the transfer of blame from one authority to another, as well as incompetence and administrative hibernation, which led to Bosnia and Herzegovina being among the countries with the highest mortality rate in Europe.

It is interesting to point out the fact that many citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed that "One of the most important external partners of Bosnia and Herzegovina was Serbia which was the first to come to help and donate a number of vaccines, but also which enabled the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to come to Serbia to receive the vaccine against COVID-19, which differs significantly from the political discourse propagated by some of the most important political actors of the Bosniak people who see such actions as an exclusively geopolitical game aimed at increasing the role of Serbia in the Western Balkans. Such form of cooperation between states in the Western Balkans is uncommon, since many issues related to war remained unresolved till today.

Some of the leading politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina received their first vaccine in May 2021, after the vaccination process of vulnerable demographic groups, the chronically ill and workers in the sectors most exposed to the COVID-19 pandemic was completed. On that occasion, there were several scandals in which Bosnian politicians were directly involved, so some members of their families were in a privileged position when receiving the vaccine, while politicians continued to make claims that are completely opposed to the truth.

Bakir Izetbegović, for example, said that "Like other citizens, he waited in line for the vaccine, although there was a possibility to enter the VIP entrance and be vaccinated first" (Ovčina, 2021), which the Minister of Health in Sarajevo Canton Haris Vranić quickly denied, claiming that "The

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

VIP entrance does not exist and has never existed, which means that Izetbegović is lying." (Maslo, 2021) In addition, in order to relieve the pressure and dissatisfaction of the public that escalated due to numerous scandals that befell Bosnia and Herzegovina, Izetbegović pointed out that "Bosnia and Herzegovina, if we exclude the purchase of respirators and slowness in the procurement of vaccines, is better than average in the European Union when it comes to slowing down the spread of the infection and responding to economic problems resulting from the COVID-19 virus pandemic. "However, such claims were not substantiated by the facts, as at that time Bosnia and Herzegovina was second in the world in terms of deaths per 1,000,000 inhabitants behind Hungary (according to some sources, third behind Hungary and the Czech Republic), with the mortality rate of 4.5%, making Bosnia and Herzegovina first in Europe. To put this in perspective, we can point to the fact that the best result in the region was noted by Serbia - 0.96%, followed by Montenegro with 1.59%, Slovenia (1.73%), Albania (1.85%), Kosovo (2.10%), Croatia (2.25%) and Northern Macedonia (3.45%). (Halimić, 2021)

In addition, at the time Izetbegović made this claim, 5.76% of citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been vaccinated (this figure should be taken with a grain of salt due to the lack of a centralized database system at the country level) while the European average was 31.24% of vaccinated population. If we put this data in the perspective of the Western Balkans, it is easy to conclude that only Kosovo had a worse result than Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at that time had only 3% of vaccinated inhabitants, while Serbia had 37%, Croatia 30.95%, Montenegro 20.98%, Albania 17%, and Northern Macedonia 11%. (Hadžović, 2021)

The story about the procurement of vaccines in the coming months continued, however, since previously ordered contingents of vaccines had already arrived, activities regarding the procurement of vaccines were significantly reduced, but it should be noted that in July 2021 Bakir Izetbegović and the Chinese ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina - Ji Ping met and agreed to purchase another 500.000 vaccines from the Chinese manufacturer Sinopharm. (Srpskainfo, 2021) On July 19, a donation from the government of Azerbaijan with 40,000 AstraZeneca vaccines arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, it is not known how these vaccines were distributed among the entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (L.K., 2021), and on August 9, 2021, a plane with 500,000 doses of vaccines landed at Sarajevo Airport. AstraZeneca, which Bosnia and Herzegovina received as a donation from the Austrian government. (R.D., klix.ba, 2021)

When the pandemic began to subside and Bosnia and Herzegovina procured a sufficient number of vaccines, the rhetoric of vaccines was replaced by political rhetoric and propaganda at the national level, with the main actors being the leaders of the leading political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After Serbia donated another contingent of vaccines to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bakir Izetbegović stated that "Aleksandar Vučić should not send vaccines and grain to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but should stop persecuting the defenders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and stop providing a shelter to a large number of people who directly relate to war crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1992-1995 civil war." (Beta, 2021) Serbian member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Milorad Dodik stated on these allegations that "Izetbegović, if he was capable, would procure vaccines for the inhabitants of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and would not let tens of thousands of citizens from this entity to go to Serbia for vaccination, as was the case in early 2021." (BUKA, BUKA, 2021)

Since in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in almost all other countries of the world, during the COVID-19 pandemic, a large amount of inaccurate information about vaccines as well as about the side effects that vaccination can bring appeared, the competent institutions decided to launch the website "vakcine.ba" on which all conspiracy theories are presented, as well as the facts that refute these theories. This approach of the competent institutions is extremely commendable, since in this way, greater immunization of citizens is stimulated, which is of great importance in the given, pandemic circumstances.

Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine

Since the vaccination process started in Bosnia and Herzegovina among the last countries in the world (Gušić M. , 2021), this situation directly affected the entities that were under big problems due to the lack of vaccines. And while certain contingents of vaccines and medical aid came to the Republika Srpska at the very beginning of the pandemic, this was not the case with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, due to cantonal divisions and overlapping jurisdictions, got somewhat "lost" in the entire process of vaccine procurement. In March 2021, an ad-hoc team was formed in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose task was to procure vaccines for this entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to negotiate with intermediaries working on the vaccine procurement process. (BHRT, 2021)

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

What marked the beginning of the pandemic in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the "respirators" scandal, in which the agricultural company "Srebrna Malina" was in charge of procuring respirators from China, which turned out to be an unsatisfactory solution to the greatest extent, which is why the healthcare system of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was once again brought to the breaking point. Precisely for this reason, the process of procuring vaccines was significantly slower in order to avoid possible errors that appeared in the process of procuring medical respirators. (E.A., 2021)

Just as it was the case in the Republika Srpska and in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, during the COVID-19 pandemic, various restrictive measures were introduced with the aim of suppressing and slowing down the further spread of the COVID-19 virus. However, each canton could adopt separate measures that did not have to be harmonized with those measures adopted by the entity government. The measures were increased and decreased depending on the number of infected persons, all with the aim of relieving the health system as much as possible at the level of the entire entity, which was on several occasions under complete collapse due to a large number of infected persons. Restrictive measures at the entity level alternated until February 2022, when they were officially lifted after the number of infected people was reduced to a minimum. On that occasion, the wearing of masks in closed spaces was abolished, a vaccination certificate, a test or a certificate of recovery from the COVID-19 virus were no longer mandatory when entering bar and restaurant, and in addition, students in all educational institutions returned to live classes. (R.D., klix.ba, 2022)

A sort of trigger for the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to start procuring vaccines on its own, without relying on state institutions, was the statement of the director of the Institute for Public Health of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Davor Pehar, who pointed out that "The Institute for Public Health of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not sign the vaccine procurement contract because they do not have complete documentation." (D.Be., klix.ba, 2021) Nevertheless, although they decided on an individual vaccine procurement action, representatives of entity levels of government in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina called on higher levels of government to join them in the overall process. (S.H., 2021)

Although they knew months before, since European Union officials stated that "countries must negotiate directly with vaccine manufacturers", the ad-hoc team of the government of the

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina only scheduled a session on March 16, 2021, at which they negotiated with registered companies who procure vaccines. (N.V., klix.ba, 2021) Of the several offers that arrived at the address of the ad-hoc team, only one company met all the conditions for the procurement of vaccines (N.V., klix.ba, 2021), and that is the company "Medimpex" from Sarajevo (N.V., klix.ba, 2022), which undertook to deliver the first part (100.000 vaccines) of a total of 500,000 Russian vaccines in following three day. However, this development of the situation somewhat disappointed the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since they expected that they would have the opportunity to be vaccinated with the "AstraZeneca" vaccine, which was also in circulation for procurement by the Medimpex company, however, it was not chosen as one of the vaccines that will be procured. (Hambo, klix.ba, 2021)

One of the most active actors in the entire process of procuring vaccines for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the prime minister of this entity - Fadil Novalić. During the extraordinary session of the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was requested by the opposition parties, Novalić pointed out that "the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has signed a contract for the procurement of 500,000 doses of vaccines and that now we are just waiting for the signature of the Russian side, after which the procurement process will be officially started." However, what marked that session was Novalić's statement in which he said that "the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina could have procured vaccines against the COVID-19 virus as early as December 2020, but it did not want to act the state." (A.B., 2021)

This statement was highly condemned by the Bosnian public, who believed that the entity government should have procured doses of vaccines at all costs if possible, and not introduce more restrictive measures that greatly disrupted the normal life of citizens in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Herzegovina.

However, what is even more problematic is the fact that only a few days after signing the contract for the supply of vaccines, the Medimpex company, as the only company that had all the necessary documentation for the supply of vaccines, decided to terminate the contract with the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina due to political pressures that arose as a result of breaking the deadline for the procurement of Russian vaccines due to incomplete documentation of this company. (R.D., klix.ba, 2021)

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Just a day before the contract was terminated, a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Šefik Džaferović, stated that "Bosnia and Herzegovina is not lagging behind the countries in the region when it comes to the vaccination process." This statement was very wrong, however it followed the discourse previously set by Bakir Izetbegović as the president of the Democratic Action Party, from which Džaferović also comes. Nevertheless, Džaferović emphasized that he supports the efforts made by the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide vaccines for its citizens on its own initiative. (M.G., klix.ba, 2021)

The Federal Minister of Health, Vjekoslav Mandić, pointed out that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina believed in the COVAX system, and that the procurement of vaccines was much more difficult than originally expected (B.R., klix.ba, 2021), and the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed a new body on March 25, 2021, which was in charge for the procurement of vaccines. (D.Be, 2021) However, on the same day, 49,800 vaccines from Pfizer and AstraZeneca arrived at the international airport in Sarajevo through the COVAX system for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and they were also the first vaccines that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina received without being a donation from other countries. (M.G., klix.ba, 2021) However, out of that number of donated vaccines, Goražde, as one of the cities most affected by the COVID-19 virus in Bosnia and Herzegovina, received only 250 doses of vaccines, which is a devastating fact. (B.R., klix.ba, 2021) On March 27, 2021, the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina launched an investigation against Fadil Novalić and other high-ranking politicians in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for not procuring vaccines and endangering the lives of citizens, however, just as it is the case with the respirators affair, no significant actions were taken in solving the criminal case either. (S.M., 2021) At the end of March 2021, Fadil Novalić, as Prime Minister of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed a letter of intent to purchase 500,000 doses of the Chinese Sinopharm vaccine. (R.D., klix.ba, 2021) However, information leaked to the public almost at the same time that the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina insisted on purchasing the Russian vaccine, even though they did not have the necessary storage conditions for it, which once again stirred spirits in the domestic public. (R.D., klix.ba, 2021)

At the beginning of April 2021, the citizens of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina protested to show their dissatisfaction with the work of federal institutions and demanded the resignation of

the relevant politicians due to incompetence and corrupt activities. (Be, 2021) Previously unsuccessful attempts by the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the cantonal government, led to the situation that the cantonal governments and the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina embarked on a joint procurement of vaccines, and the Russian Sputnik V was identified as the primary vaccine for procurement. (G.M., klix.ba, 2021)

Although during the entire vaccine procurement process, "Russian" and "Chinese" vaccines were kept separate as a last possible solution, at the end of April 2021, information appeared in the media that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would start producing the Russian vaccine Sputnik V. (B.R., klix.ba, 2021) The start of the production did not start, but this information indicated that the representatives of political parties in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina were ready to follow the official discourse of the foreign policy of Bosnia, according to which Bosnia and Herzegovina will cooperate with all the countries in order to ensure its welfare, although Russia was often seen as a destabilising factor in Western Balkans, but also as a country which through vaccine diplomacy want to increase its influence in Western Balkans. (Popović, European Western Balkans, 2021)

By mid-May 2021, more than half a million vaccines against the COVID-19 virus had arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, (N.V., klix.ba, 2021) however, many of these vaccines were kept for revaccination of the population, which ultimately turned out to be a wrong decision, since a large number of vaccines failed due to expiry date both in federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Republika Srpska. (D.Be., klix.ba, 2021)

On May 21, 2021, the Director of the Public Health Institute of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Davor Pehar, resigned from his position, due to the enormous pressure placed on him, which was reflected in his role in the process of coordinating the procurement of vaccines in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Herzegovina. (G.M., klix.ba, 2021) Pehar was often seen in the media, along with the Prime Minister of the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fadil Novalić, as the main culprit for the failure of the MedImpex contract with the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the process of procuring 100,000 "Sputnik V" vaccines, which were supposed to be procured back in March. in 2021

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Although the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina had a completely different attitude regarding the culprits for the non-procurement of vaccines in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian politicians constantly saw the culprit for the non-arrival of vaccines in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the international system for the distribution of COVAX, which according to their claims is ongoing. The COVID-19 pandemic has favored rich countries, leaving less developed countries to fend for themselves with a pandemic they have never faced before. Such views were not only expressed by politicians at the state level, but also by politicians at non-entity levels, especially in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, unlike the Republic of Srpska, failed to procure vaccines directly from manufacturers in China and Russia. (B.R., klix.ba, 2021)

Nevertheless, at the end of May 2021, the Sarajevo Canton Government decided to independently start the procurement of vaccines from the manufacturer Gamaleya, which produces the Sputnik V vaccine. (B.R., klix.ba, 2021) Such actions met with the approval of the citizens, who believed that such measures should have been taken even earlier, however, this process remained in the shadow of the scandal according to which the representatives of the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina slowed down and blocked the process of procuring vaccines, since in the procurement process favoured Chinese Sinopharm vaccines. (D.Be., klix.ba, 2021) What is interesting to point out is that at the end of May 2020, the American army, with the help of the NATO alliance, and through the mediation of the Ministry of Health of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, donated a certain amount of medical equipment for hospitals in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such engagement of the United States of America in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Western Balkans in general was rarity, and that occasion remained largely unreported by the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Radio Slobodna Europa, 2020)

After his initial statement that "the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not want to procure vaccines because they did not want to play the role of the state" met with a barrage of criticism, Fadil Novalić made another statement at the beginning of June 2021 in which he pointed out that "Bosnia and Herzegovina she did not run for the procurement of vaccines in order not to be a guinea pig like Serbia and Israel". (M.G., klix.ba, 2021) At that moment, Serbia, Israel and Great Britain were the countries that had the best results in terms of the number of infected, as well as based on the number of deaths and the percentage of the vaccinated population.

Not long after this statement, after numerous promises to procure 1,000,000 doses of the Pfizer vaccine and 500,000 doses of the Russian vaccine, the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina tried to conclude a contract with the Chinese company Sinopharm, which was in charge of providing 500,000 doses of vaccines to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Based on the previous experience of procurement of medical equipment, the ruling structures in Sarajevo Canton led by the opposition party "Naša Stranka" decided to ask Fadil Novalić to submit the contract on the procurement of vaccines by the Chinese company Sinopharm, which led to new confusion about the incompetence between politicians on entity and cantonal level. (V.K., klix.ba, 2021) (FENA, klix.ba, 2021)

What is interesting to emphasize is the fact that Serbia at mid-June 2021 donated 5.000 AstraZeneca vaccines to Tuzla canton (N.V., klix.ba, 2021), but shortly after was criticized for cheating citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since according to member of parliamentary assembly - Šemsudin Mehmedović "Serbia used this crisis to develop the COVID-19 tourism and that costs of getting vaccinated in Serbia are much higher than the benefits." (M.G., klix.ba, 2021)

In July 2021, the contract on the procurement of vaccines by Sinopharma was finally signed (V.K., klix.ba, 2021), and soon after it finally came to light, and it became known that the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina paid 12,500,000 KM for 500,000 Chinese vaccines (N.V., klix.ba, 2021), and this contract also represented the first major direct procurement by the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since previous attempts were unsuccessful.

Although politicians at the state and entity levels often criticized the European Union and its mechanisms for the distribution of vaccines, in mid-July 2021 it was announced that almost 700,000 vaccines should arrive in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of September 2021 through systems COVAX, EU4Health and as a donation from the United States of America. (N.V., klix.ba, 2021)

On July 19, 2021, the news was announced that the Republika Srpska will donate a certain number of AstraZeneca vaccines to the Faculty of Medicine in Tuzla, the health center in Mostar and some local self-government units in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina where Serb returnees live. This form of inter-entity cooperation is extremely surprising, since such situations are rare.

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

However, at the moment when it was announced that the Republika Srpska would donate a certain number of vaccines to another entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina still did not have a single vaccine directly purchased, while the Republika Srpska had over 300,000 directly purchased vaccines. (G.M., klix.ba, 2021)

At the beginning of August 2021, a plane with 500,000 doses of the Sinopharm vaccine finally landed in Sarajevo, which represented the first vaccines directly purchased by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, almost 10 months after other countries received the first vaccines, and almost 3 months after the Republic Serbia acquired the first doses of vaccines. (D.Be., klix.ba, 2021) In this way, he partially eased the pressure that was "hanging over the heads" of politicians in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina both because of the previous scandals and because of the unsuccessful attempts to procure vaccines for this entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The first direct procurement of vaccines by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the positive balance of the number of newly infected people led to the fact that the story about the procurement of vaccines in Bosnia and Herzegovina was significantly reduced. In October 2021, another 60,000 doses of the Modern vaccine arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which also represents the first contingent of vaccines from this manufacturer, of which the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina received 40,000 doses, while the Republika Srpska received 20,000 doses. However, due to the lack of use of vaccines, at the end of October 2021, more than 200,000 vaccines produced by AstraZeneca and China's Sinopharm were destroyed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (G.Š., 2021) These data are extremely significant, since according to the report published at the end of October 2021 in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, only 22% of the adult population was vaccinated, which is an extremely low percentage taking into account the number of vaccines that had been purchased by the entity itself, as well and through donations and procurement of vaccines at the state level. (B.T., 2021)

Although the Republika Srpska was able to better approach the entire process of vaccine procurement due to a simpler administrative arrangement, since there was no overlapping of responsibilities between different levels of government, it should be recognized that the competent institutions in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina did a much better job when it comes to promoting immunization campaigns, as well as campaigns to inform citizens about the real effects of the vaccine in order to fight the conspiracy theories that have characterized the COVID-19

pandemic on a global level as best as possible. (Zavod Zdravstvenog Osiguranja Kantona Sarajevo, 2021) (Zavod za javno zdravstvo Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, n.d.) In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the end of 2021, the immunization campaign of the population started, which took place in large shopping centers, where you could get vaccinated without prior notice, which was otherwise necessary. (V.K., klix.ba, 2022)

Republika Srpska

As we have previously stated, the first recorded case of infection with the COVID-19 virus in BiH was declared in the Republika Srpska on March 5, 2020. Some of the main politicians from this entity, such as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zoran Tegeltija, pointed out that there is no room for panic, which is why the Republika Srpska has declared state of emergency on March 28, 2020 (17 days after that happened in FBiH). (I.P., 2020) The Serbian member of the Presidency, Milorad Dodik, pointed out that the impose of a state of emergency in this entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a justified measure, and he regularly used his appearances in public to promote his work and neglect the work of the opposition. (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020) In order to implement preventive measures, the Republic Headquarters for Emergency Situations is on March 21, 2020. declared a police hour in the entire Republika Srpska, which was in force from 8 pm to 5 am (Jakovljević, Anadolu Agency, 2020), and stricter measures were announced shortly after and were in power till the end of April when their gradual easing began. It is interesting to point out the fact that Milorad Dodik on April 30, 2020 pointed out that the epidemiological situation in Republika Srpska had worsened (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020), and only 12 days later, under pressure from the public and the electorate, as president of the ruling party in Republika Srpska - the Union of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), he pointed out that „This political party is for the suspension of state of emergency in Republika Srpska“ (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020). It should be noted that during the entire COVID-19 pandemic in Republika Srpska, only the Minister of Health, Alen Šeranić had, almost the only, public appearances besides Milorad Dodik, while the role of other entity politicians was marginal or non-existent.

What is also interesting to emphasize is the fact that the views of the citizens of Republika Srpska expressed in the poll presented in chapter 5 are almost identical to those expressed by entity political officials during the pandemic, but to which extent is that justified?

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

The first external actor that came to help to Republika Srpska was the Republic of Serbia after Milorad Dodik talked with the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, on March 31, 2020. Although, according to previous announcements, it was pointed out that Serbia will donate medical aid to the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina (D.Be., klix.ba, 2020), on April 1, 2020, Serbia exclusively donated 10 respirators, 30,000 epidemiological N95 masks, 2,000 protective suits, 200 goggles and 50,000 gloves to the Republika Srpska (I.P., klix.ba, 2020), and Milorad Dodik pointed out that "in this way Serbia has shown that it cares about the Republika Srpska" (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020). Shortly after the donation from Serbia, on April 9, 2020, three cargo planes with medical aid donated by Russia arrived in Republika Srpska (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020) (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020) (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020), while on April 16, a cargo plane with medical aid donated by Hungary also landed at the Banja Luka airport (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020). Although he said only 9 days earlier that "Republika Srpska needs donations from external actors, since Republika Srpska has lost more than 750,000,000 euros due to the COVID-19 virus pandemic" (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020), Milorad Dodik soon changed his political discourse and on April 18, he pointed out that "due to the lack of humanitarian and financial assistance from the European Union, he would never take anything from them again, because the European Union turned its back on Republika Srpska due to delays in releasing exports of medical materials and equipment." (A.D., klix.ba, 2020) However, this is not the first such case, since on March 19, Dodik called on European officials for their lack of interest in resolving the COVID-19 virus pandemic in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He pointed out that "the Republika Srpska was abandoned by the European Union, which is why the people of the Republika Srpska are looking in the direction of China, which previously provided a number of masks and disinfectants in order to suppress the further spread of the virus." (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020)

On April 20, 2020, the International Monetary Fund approved a "COVID loan" to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the amount of 330 million euros, of which the Republika Srpska received 38% while the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina received 62% (both entities donated 0.5% Brcko District with the aim of combating the COVID-19 virus pandemic) (I.P., klix.ba, 2020). A summit of EU heads of state was held in Zagreb on May 6, 2020, during which the recovery from the crisis was discussed, but it was once again emphasized that the European Union will continue to support the Western Balkan countries on their path to joining the European Union, but also in the process of recovering from the effects of the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. (Tuhina, 2020)

It is interesting to point out that on April 21, 2020, by the decision of the Emergency Situations Headquarters, the Republika Srpska decided to hand over the humanitarian aid donation of the Government of Slovenia to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is not such a frequent case of inter-entity cooperation, (Jakovljević, Anadolu Agency, 2020) and on April 22, 2020, the third contingent of humanitarian aid from the Republic of Serbia arrived in Republika Srpska (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020), after which a kind of rhetorical pause was made, during which measures were relaxed and tightened again in order to find an ideal solution, and political discourses were adjusted to ad-hoc potentials for collecting medical aid from different external actors.

Political appearances and the introduction of pro-Russian discourse began in the summer of 2020, or to be more specific on August 19, 2020, when Milorad Dodik pointed out that he was going to Russia to provide contingents of Russian vaccines (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020), which stirred spirits in European circles since many European officials were emphasizing during the Zagreb summit that „all Western Balkan countries must align their foreign policies with those of the European Union, and that authoritarian states such as China and Russia could increase their influence in the Western Balkans through donations of medical aid as a form of soft power.“ (Tuhina, 2020) During the 31st special session of the United Nations Assembly, Dodik pointed out that „only united, we can overcome the pandemic of the COVID-19 virus and that no one is safe until we are all safe.“ However, he used the opportunity to once again call out the European Union, since he stated that "Even the European Union succumbed to the challenge of the COVID-19 virus, which forced Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a country of limited resources, to seek the help of friends at the international level, although many did not like it." (SRNA, klix.ba, 2020)

At the beginning of 2021, while all countries in the region were procuring significant contingents of vaccines, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus the Republika Srpska, relied on a small number of vaccines promised by Russia and China. On January 20, 2021, Dodik pointed out that "Republika Srpska institutions are behaving responsibly, caring for their citizens and working on vaccines, and that 10,000 vaccines should arrive from Russia in the next 7 days." (SRNA, klix.ba, 2021) Only 2 days later, Dodik spoke with Chinese Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina and asked him to procure Chinese vaccines against the COVID-19 virus to Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as possible (R.D., klix.ba, 2021). However, it seems that Milorad Dodik's political discourse was not significantly bothered by the fact that Republika Srpska received only 1,000 of the promised 10,000

doses from Russia in early February, and the promise that Russia should deliver 200,000 doses of Sputnik-V vaccine to Republika Srpska by the end of February was not fulfilled too. At the beginning of March, out of the promised 200,000 vaccines for Republika Srpska, only 10% of the total amount arrived from Russia, but on that occasion Dodik did not express the slightest dissatisfaction with Russia's non-fulfilment, but continued to criticize the European Union for introducing COVID passports, since, according to his words „In this way, European Union discriminates residents of non-EU countries.“ (SRNA, klix.ba, 2021)

Although during the COVID-19 pandemic at short intervals, Milorad Dodik made diametrically opposed decisions, according to everything done and the level of commitment to obtain medical aid from external actors, Dodik was one of the most active figures on the political scene in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seems that Dodik was one of the few politicians who had a pragmatic approach throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina when it came to providing humanitarian aid and procuring vaccines, but forcing pro-Russian political discourse proved to be completely unjustified, as expectations regarding donations were large, however only a small part of them was fulfilled. According to official data from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina purchased 1,237,380 doses of vaccines through direct procurement, which makes a total of 29.87% of the total number of vaccines, however, there is no data on how many vaccines were purchased from which manufacturer neither the data on the distribution of vaccines across the entities.

In the following sub-chapter, I describe situation, preventive measures and provide overview of COVID-19 pandemics in Montenegro, as well as efforts implemented by the great world super-powers to try to mitigate the consequences and number of victims who died from COVID-19. Aside from that, shifts of narratives, primarily from President Milo Đukanović and Government of Montenegro are shown to try to understand the pragmatism and opportunism as main policy-drivers during time of the pandemics.

4.3.2. Montenegro

Similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro had significant problems in procuring vaccines. However, unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the administrative division of the state and the overlapping of responsibilities between different levels of government had the greatest negative impact during the entire process of vaccine procurement, in Montenegro, as a unitary state, this was not the case. Montenegro has a state-level Ministry of Health which, during the entire process

of vaccine procurement, acted as a coordinating body between the Government and producers, which is why the process of vaccine procurement, although slow, was never questioned. However, what represented the biggest problem for Montenegro was the division in power, whereby the government that was formed during the COVID-19 pandemic often did not have significant support from the national assembly, and the government's focus often changed from the COVID-19 virus pandemic to other internal topics that were current in Montenegro in those days, such as the law on the expropriation of the land of religious institutions, the request for autocephaly of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, and internal disagreements between the pro-Serbian and pro-Montenegrin populations, which often resulted in conflict. This section details this, contextualizing Montenegro's vaccine procurement within vaccine diplomacy and political discourses.

Although Montenegro successfully resisted the pandemic of the COVID-19 virus almost three months after the first recorded case of infection in Europe, on the sixteenth of March 2020, the first cases of infection were recorded in two female persons who had previously stayed in areas affected by the pandemic of the COVID-19 virus. However, even before the first cases of infection with the COVID-19 virus were registered, Montenegro took preventive measures to prevent and contain the spread of the infection as much as possible. (Živić, 2020)

Thus, already at the beginning of 2020, public gatherings, visits to hospitals and prisons were prohibited, classes were suspended, restaurants and cafes were closed, social distancing was introduced, and no more than 50 people could enter at the same time in all facilities, regardless of the area. In addition, cruise ships are prohibited from entering Montenegrin ports, international passenger traffic, regardless of the type of transport, was also temporarily suspended. (Živić, 2020) (senat.ne, 2020)

The new measures significantly disrupted the "normal life" of Montenegrin citizens, and political officials at the state level justified these measures as necessary to protect public health and maintain the general well-being of the population. During the outbreak of the pandemic in Montenegro, the National Coordinating Body (NCT) was appointed as well as the crisis headquarters, which represented established practice in all Balkan countries, and which adopted measures in accordance with the number of infected and the tendency of the pandemic to spread further. (senat.me, 2020)

Just as it was the case with other countries both in the Balkans and in Europe, but also in the world, shortly after the appearance of the infection among the population, Montenegro quickly reached a large number of infected people, and political officials in Montenegro constantly criticized the casual attitude of the young people (Redakcija Pobjede, pobjeda.me, 2020), as well as the "religious processions" that were organized throughout Montenegro as one of the reasons why the pandemic was not suppressed (Redakcija Pobjede, pobjeda.me, 2020), new, more restrictive measures were announced at the state level, and Minister of Health, Kenan Hrapović, pointed out that even the scenario of a complete lockdown still cannot be ruled out with 100% certainty, which Montenegro resisted for a long time in order to save the touristic season as much as possible. (J.B., 2020) The situation was particularly alarming in smaller towns, as well as in hard-to-reach mountainous areas of Montenegro, where residents refused to comply with the prescribed rules, but also due to difficulties in providing logistical assistance in a given places. (Redakcija Pobjede, pobjeda.me, 2020)

In October 2020, the Montenegrin Minister of Health, Kenan Hrapović, pointed out that „Montenegro submitted a request for the procurement of vaccines, and signed an agreement, which ensures the receipt of a guaranteed dose, without waiting for a subsequent application, of the vaccine against the corona virus, when it is produced.“ (Redakcija Pobjede, pobjeda.me, 2020) By signing this agreement, Montenegro joined the COVAX Mechanism for vaccines against COVID-19, which was initiated by the World Health Organization (WHO) with the aim of enabling procurement and fair distribution among the countries participating in this agreement. However, the COVAX mechanism, as a key part of the GAVI (Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization) initiative, guarantees enough vaccines to vaccinate only 20% of the entire population of the country that accesses the mechanism (Radio Kotor, 2020), and that for the most vulnerable groups, as well as workers who in their work may encounter patients with viruses or belong to the risk groups defined by the World Health Organization. (World Health Organization, World Health Organization, n.d.)

Just one month later, on November 13, the Vice President of the Government of Montenegro, Milutin Simović, resigned from the position of President of the National Coordinating Body (NCT), and his place was taken by the then Minister of Health, Kenan Hrapović, whose name

was already covered by a veil of affairs and embezzlement of money during the fight against COVID-19. (mina.news, 2020)

In mid-January 2021, the newly elected Minister of Health, Jelena Borovinić Bojović, pointed out „that the vaccination against the COVID-19 virus will begin at the end of January or the beginning of February 2021, with the Government of Montenegro negotiating with a large number of countries on a bilateral and multilateral level, but also international organizations in order to provide their citizens with a vaccine against the COVID-19 virus.“ (A.O., 2021) Also, at the same time, the plan of the Institute for Public Health of Montenegro was presented, which defined the risk groups that are presented as priority in the process of vaccination of citizens, and the epidemiologist in front of the Institute for Public Health, Dragan Laušević, pointed out that „there is no reason for concern in terms of equipment and technical capacities necessary for the transport and storage of vaccines whose arrival was predicted.“ These views were confirmed by the representative of the World Health Organization in Montenegro - Mina Brajović, who pointed out „that the National Strategy for Immunization has only one goal, and that is an unhindered and equally available vaccine for everyone in Montenegro.“ On this occasion, the newly elected Minister of Health pointed out that „vaccination will not be mandatory in Montenegro, but each of the citizens of Montenegro will have the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they will receive the vaccine against COVID-19 or not.“ (Omeragić, 2021)

On January 1th, 2021, during the press conference, the newly appointed Minister of Health of Montenegro - Jelena Borovinić Bojović made accusations against her predecessor - Kenan Hrapović, that „due to his omission there was a standstill in the negotiations on the procurement of vaccines, thereby endangering public health and that this case should be dealt with specially state prosecutor's office.“ (rtcg.me, 2021) On January 20th, the news was announced that the special state prosecutor's office had formed a case and started an investigation to determine whether there were any omissions by the former government that caused a delay in the procurement of vaccines against the corona virus. (AlJazeera, 2021)

Only two days later, Montenegro was offered the first aid in terms of vaccines, which was reflected in the donation of the Greek businessman, Petros Stasis, close to the regime of the former Montenegrin President Milo Đukanović. Petros Stasis, the owner of Adriatic Properties and Universal Capital Bank, initiated the donation of 10,000 Chinese Sinopharm vaccines to

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Montenegro (AlJazeera, 2021), and this case represents a kind of precedent in the Balkans, since usually authoritarian states like Russia, Turkey and China were the first to come to the aid of the Western Balkan states. Not long after that, Montenegro signed a bilateral agreement with China on the procurement of 150,000 vaccines from the Chinese manufacturer Sinopharm. (bankar.me, 2021) Shortly after, Montenegro received medical help from Hungary (Medicalcg.me, medicalcg.me, 2021) and France (Medicalcg.me, medicalcg.me, 2021) who opted in for collaboration with Montenegro in fight against COVID-19.

Although the political officials of the Montenegrin government, led by the Minister of Health Jelena Borovinić Bojović, announced that „the vaccination of the population in Montenegro would begin at the end of January or the beginning of February“, this did not happen, and Montenegro broke negative records at the European level in the given period. regarding the percentage of people infected with the COVID-19 virus, which in that period reached as much as 10%. (Milić, 2021) Minister Borovinić-Bojović pointed out at the beginning of February that „the vaccination will start in the middle of February, and that in the coming period a large number of vaccines are expected from China and Russia“. It is interesting to point out that at the same time as these events, despite the lack of vaccines against COVID-19, the Ministry of Health sent 10,000 vaccines donated by Petros Statis for additional testing, and some of the political officials even accused him of trying to achieve political influence in Montenegro. (Milić, 2021)

In the middle of February 2021, the embassy of the People's Republic of China in Montenegro announced that „Montenegro, following the principles of its foreign policy, had asked the People's Republic of China through a bilateral agreement for help in providing vaccines to vaccinate the population against the COVID-19 virus, and that China would , as a long-time friend and partner of Montenegro, to meet this request, and in the future to donate 30,000 vaccines to Montenegro.“ (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Montenegro, 2021)

On March 30, 2021, Montenegro received the first contingent of 24,000 AstraZeneca vaccines through the COVAX mechanism, and UNICEF was in charge of transporting the vaccines as an organization that annually supplies more than two billion vaccines for immunization against various diseases. (UNICEF Crna Gora, UNICEF Crna Gora, 2021) The second contingent of 24,000 AstraZeneca vaccines arrived in Montenegro through the COVAX mechanism on May 14, 2021, but a major problem was citizens' mistrust of the AstraZeneca vaccine's effectiveness, which

is why political officials, as well as officials of international organizations such as UNICEF and WHO had to encourage citizens regarding immunization with the AstraZeneca vaccine. (UNICEF Crna Gora, UNICEF Crna Gora, 2021)

In the first three months since the start of vaccination in Montenegro, this country exceeded the European average for middle-level countries (11%), as well as the average vaccination rate of citizens in the region (20%), since by May 14, 2021, 22% had been vaccinated population. However, these data should be taken with a grain of salt, since only 600,000 people live in Montenegro, which is far less than in other countries of the region. (UNICEF Crna Gora, UNICEF Crna Gora, 2021)

Negative trends in terms of the number of infected people, as well as in terms of the percentage of deaths from the corona virus, continued throughout 2021, and on July 21, 2021, due to the second wave of the COVID-19 virus, an epidemic of the COVID-19 virus was declared throughout the territory of Montenegro. and the measures that were in force were reduced and strengthened depending on the number of infected. (Z.K., 2020) A similar trend continued in 2022, since in July 2022 the mandatory wearing of masks was again introduced in public administration institutions, grocery stores, pharmacies and gas stations, all in order to mitigate the consequences of the COVID-19 virus as much as possible and thus saved the tourist season in Montenegro, which represents an extremely significant source of income for this small country in the Western Balkans. (Radio Slobodna Evropa, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2022) (D.C., 2022)

Through the portal www.euprava.me, we tried to get information from the Ministry of Health of Montenegro about „how many vaccines Montenegro received through bilateral agreements with other countries, how many they acquired directly from manufacturers, how many through donations, and how many through the COVAX mechanism as part of the global GAVI alliance.“ However, to date, no one from the Ministry of Health of Montenegro has responded to our request for free access to information.

As part of the research, I managed to get in touch with Professor Srđan Darmanović, professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Montenegro and former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government of Montenegro.

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

At the very beginning of our interview, Professor Darmanović pointed out that „the position of Montenegro in a geopolitical sense is significantly different from the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has destabilizing factors among its political elite, as well as Serbia, which, despite its clear commitment to the pro-European path and western integration, is still trying to sit on two chairs and closely cooperates with Eastern partners (primarily Russia and China).

“In contrast to the previously mentioned two states, Montenegro is a unitary state that clearly decided for the pro-European path back in 2006, when the National Assembly of Montenegro voted for the independence of this state from Serbia, which is why it is clear in whom Montenegro had the most confidence in the entire process of fighting against the COVID-19 pandemic, including procuring vaccines and necessary medical equipment.“

Professor Darmanović states that the biggest partner of Montenegro in the fight against the pandemic was the European Union, even after the change of government, which is latently pro-Russian, primarily thanks to church circles that have achieved great political power in Montenegro. “It was these (church) circles that tried to influence the creation of a new foreign policy alternative for Montenegro, directed towards eastern countries embodied in Russia and China, which only partially happened despite the promise of the newly formed ruling coalition that the foreign policy goals defined in 1997 and confirmed when Montenegro gained independence , in 2006 will not change.”

Darmanović pointed out that “Russia tried on several occasions during the COVID-19 pandemic to gain influence in Montenegro, but they did not succeed, while China's soft influence and political discourse was primarily reflected in the realisation of infrastructure projects, the most significant of which is the construction the Bar-Boljane highway, while during the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, China did not have a significant contribution in Montenegro, but primarily sought to protect its financial interests, which were reflected in the sale of vaccines to other countries.”

Another factor that is often unfairly neglected when analyzing political influences in the Western Balkans is Turkey, which closely cooperated with the minority Bosniak-Muslim community in Montenegro, however Turkey's efforts to help Montenegro were often sporadic and localized only to certain municipalities. which is why Turkey could also be written off as a more significant factor in terms of vaccine procurement and donations. At the very end, Professor Darmanović claimed

that “Regional cooperation in the area of the Western Balkans during the pandemic could have been significantly better than it was, and states that the main causes for this attitude are latent intolerance, mistrust and insecurity that has become entrenched in the region of the Western Balkans.”

However, on the other hand, Darmanović claims that „The establishment of green corridors and the liberal cooperation of the countries of the Western Balkans have shown to a certain extent that there is a desirable and favorable form of cooperation between the countries that gives a kind of semblance of regional cooperation and „normal relations“ between the countries of the Western Balkans“. He pointed out that „It would be good to achieve a kind of cohesion with regard to the foreign policy goals of the countries in the Western Balkans, since uniform discourses could significantly facilitate future cooperation between the countries.“

Now, almost three years after the start of the pandemic, it seems that these views of Professor Darmanović have a very good basis in the facts that are available to the public. Since the beginning of the pandemic, the European Union and its member states have donated over 116 million euros, and over 520,000 vaccines, which represents an amount that is significantly greater than the amount of donated doses of all other countries together.




Table 2 - Percentage of donated vaccines to Montenegro

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Aside from that, the fact that the negotiations with Russia on the purchase of the Russian vaccine Sputnik Light failed due to a delay in the process of procuring of vaccines did not contribute to the construction of the opposite discourse regarding vaccine diplomacy. (Radio Slobodna Evropa, vijesti.me, 2021)

In 2022, the Ministry of Health of Montenegro was taken over by Dado Šćekić, and Montenegro, with the help of foreign policy partners, continues to successfully fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

What is interesting to point out is the fact that, compared to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro started the process of procuring vaccines much earlier, which is why Montenegro paid much less money per vaccine dose than was the case with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Herzegovina, which paid even twice as much for certain doses of vaccines as Montenegro did. (Tanjug, ekspres.net, 2020) (SRNA, N1 Bosna i Hercegovina, 2021)

In the following chapter, I am depicting the situation in Serbia and trying to find evidence and reasons why Serbia became regional and global prodigy when it comes to vaccine procurement. Aside from that, president Vučić's official "active opportunity seeking" stances are to be investigated to try to realise if Serbia's efforts were driven by pragmatism or once again by geopolitical games.

4.3.3. Serbia

During the 2018 GLOBSEC Forum held in Bratislava, Aleksandar Vucic repeated Serbia's official stances regarding the country's foreign policy directions vis-a-vis the EU, Russia and China by noting that "Serbia is striving to become a full member of the European Union and that the ultimate goal of Serbia's foreign policy is the finalization of the Euro-Atlantic integration process, but that this does not mean that Serbia will not cooperate with other partners that are not members of the European Union." The "status quo" in terms of Serbia's foreign policy is quite often known to "stir up spirits" in Brussels, especially bearing in mind that Serbia has been a "military neutral" country since 2007 (Luković, 2019), which enables it to cooperate both with the European Union and with Russia and China. However, according to Professor Dragan Đukanović from the Department of Foreign Policy of Serbia at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, "the decision to declare military neutrality in relation to the existing military alliances does not in itself represent Serbia's real military neutrality, but to a much greater extent distancing itself from the NATO alliance

because of the activities that this alliance carried out in the territory of Serbia at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century."

Nevertheless, it was precisely this approach that enabled Serbia to have the most pragmatic approach of all the countries in the Western Balkans, which is why it entered the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic the most prepared and achieved the best results. The fact that most of the time, Serbia was the second country in Europe in terms of the number of acquired vaccines per 100 inhabitants, right behind Great Britain (Good, 2021), while it was seventh in the world. In order to understand how this happened and how a small country like Serbia managed to achieve such enviable results, it is necessary to understand the foreign policy of Serbia, which is significantly different from the foreign policy of Montenegro, but also to see the fact that Serbia is a unitary state, which helped it to a significant extent to achieve significantly better results than Bosnia and Herzegovina, where there was a significant overlap of competences between institutions at different levels of government, which is why we can say with certainty that Serbia was in a somewhat more favourable situation political position.

The Serbian government's pragmatism was primarily reflected in the adoption of a dispersive position in terms of foreign policy and the vaccine procurement process as part of the fight against the COVID-19 virus, where no foreign policy actor was predominant and in a privileged position as an exclusive partner in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, it seems as if geopolitical games were played in Serbia on this occasion, which were often disguised with the aim of maintaining the "status quo" in Serbian foreign policy, and were often reflected in the kissing of the flags of other countries, the reception of airplanes with vaccines along with the highest statesmen honors as well as other examples that might seem to the average citizen to be political everyday life even though they were not. However, what was seen by the Serbian authorities as a pragmatic approach, was seen by the Western media as a strengthening of the soft power of Russia and China in Serbia, but also in the Western Balkans in general. Although the Serbian authorities have repeatedly emphasized that "with regard to cooperation with China and Russia during the pandemic, it is about lives, not geopolitics", the highly respected newspaper POLITICO pointed out that "this kind of cooperation between Serbia and its eastern partners reminds the EU of strong competition in this region ." (Popović, European Western Balkans, 2021)

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

The first official case of infection with the COVID-19 virus was identified in a man from Subotica on March 6, 2020. At the same time, several people throughout Serbia were put under surveillance and quarantined with the aim of maximally preventing the further spread of the infection. (BBC News, 2020) During the identification of the first case of infection with the COVID-19 virus, the Serbian authorities, led by the Government, opened telephone numbers for emergency calls to people who think they have symptoms of a respiratory infection, as well as to people who have stayed in risk areas, in order to get information and be able to get information that is necessary with the aim of alleviating symptoms and preventing the further spread of the virus. In addition, the Ministry of Health of Serbia initiated the creation of the website ww.covid19.rs through which all residents of Serbia could obtain basic information about the virus, the current situation in Serbia, the tendency of its spread, as well as the number of infected, hospitalized and deceased persons as a result of the virus COVID-19, where it should be emphasized that the information published on the site was quite up-to-date, since it was updated twice a day. In addition, on this website, citizens were able to gain insight into the guide on self-assessment of symptoms, to contact the competent institutions via the telephone for emergencies, the "COVID telephone" was also opened, and the website also displayed the contact telephone numbers of all the COVID clinics in Serbia that also included mobile teams that tested people who suspected the presence of the COVID-19 virus in their bodies. (ww.covid19.rs)

What is important to point out is the fact that even before the first case was confirmed, Serbia acquired adequate doses of tests and medical equipment, which indicates that Serbia acted as a preventive precaution, seeing the tendency of the virus to spread on a global level. The Crisis Staff of the Republic of Serbia, headed by Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, was formed shortly after the first registered case, and in addition to the Prime Minister, it included twenty five most significant names in the field of healthcare in the Republic of Serbia (paragraf.rs, n.d.), such as Predrag Kon and Zlatibor Lončar, who represented this virus at the very beginning as a virus that appeared in another part of the world and that does not represent a significant danger, calling it "funny" and harmless, and this attitude soon proved to be wrong, which is why some of the members of the crisis headquarters were removed from the media space, and their place in the majority of cases was occupied by President Vučić who, as the Western media reported, "stole the show" with his performances during the COVID-19 pandemic. (Bechev, 2021)

Five days later, on March 11, 2020, the global pandemic of the COVID-19 virus was declared (Radio Slobodna Evropa, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2020), and on March 15, 2020, Serbia declared a state of emergency caused by the COVID-19 virus. (The Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2020) The first to come to Serbia's aid were the European Union with a humanitarian aid package of 94,000,000 euros, Norway with 5,000,000 euros and Switzerland with 470,000 euros. In addition to them, the People's Republic of China also provided Serbia with significant help, which delivered medical material, respirators, medicines, masks and gloves and six expert doctors from the People's Republic of China to Serbia in order to help Serbia fight the COVID-19 virus pandemic as easily as possible. On the twelfth of March, three days before the introduction of the state of emergency in Serbia, a United Arab Emirates' plane landed at the Belgrade airport with humanitarian aid, which was reflected in X-ray and ultrasound machines, scanners, magnetic resonance machines and other medical equipment necessary for the treatment of COVID-19 patients. It is interesting to point out that until the publication of this data, on March 26, 2020, Russia, as an important foreign policy partner of Serbia, did not advertise its donations or even spoke about potential help. In addition to the European Union, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) provided the most significant assistance to Serbia, which made 15 million euros available to Serbia for urgent needs from current programs and contracts, the United Nations Office for Project Services pointed out that 21 million euros will be transferred to Serbia from the European Integration Support Program, as well as that additional funds of 57.6 million euros, earmarked for projects that have not started, will be redirected to support the Serbian health system and overcoming the socioeconomic consequences of the crisis caused by the corona virus pandemic. (UNDP Srbija, 2020) In addition, on March 20, 2020, Sam Fabrici, head of the EU delegation in Serbia, and Jadranka Joksimović, Minister for European Integration under the Government of Serbia, signed an agreement providing 7.5 million euros in non-refundable aid from the European Union, of which one million is intended for delivery medical equipment to Serbia. (Glavonjić, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2020)

On March 26, a plane with medical equipment landed from China, which was partly a donation from China, and partly medical equipment purchased by Serbia and co-financed by the European Union, and five days earlier, on March 21, a Chinese plane landed in Serbia with six medical experts, as well as with additional medical equipment from China. (Radio Slobodna Evropa, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2020) Russia, as an important strategic partner of Serbia, became involved in

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

the entire process only on April 4th, delivering medical and technical equipment to Serbia, sending medical experts from the Russian Federation as well as disinfecting facilities, which was officially reported by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Belgrade. (Ivković, 2020)

At the end of March 2020, a political discourse about insufficient solidarity within the European Union appeared in some European countries (Juncos, 2021), and it further strengthened after the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, kissed the Chinese flag during the landing of a plane with medical workers and the necessary medical aid from Shanghai, which was seen in European circles as an additional distancing of Serbia from the European Union. (I.H., 2020) The quiet murmur of dissatisfaction that was heard in European circles due to such a move by President Vučić soon turned into an open protest, and the loudest were the members of the European Parliament, the COREPER organization, members of the European Commission, Carl Bildt as an extremely important high-ranking official in European circles, as well as Josep Borrell, who pointed out that China and Russia are using the situation caused by the pandemic to start a "battle of narratives" in the Western Balkans. (Smajić, 2020)

Since, like in other countries of the world, the number shortly after the first confirmed case exceeded all the expectations of the crisis headquarters, Serbia had to start a more intensive procurement of medical and technical equipment, medical tests for the presence of the COVID-19 virus, as well as protective equipment for medical personnel who was under the greatest pressure and by far the most exposed to work with infected persons. Just as it was the case with the procurement of vaccines from diversified sources, the same was the case with the medical equipment that came to Serbia from all foreign policy partners.

Shortly after the development of the COVID-19 vaccine, Serbia was among the first European countries to administer jabs made in China, alongside Russia's Sputnik V, Pfizer, AstraZeneca and Moderna. By mid April 2021, almost 43 doses had been given to every 100 people. (Hopkins, 2021) Sputnik V vaccine came to testing in Serbia on beginning of December 2020 (seemberija.info, 2020), just as Chinese Sinopharm, first Pfizer and Biontech vaccines arrived in Serbia on December 22, 2020 when Serbia got 4875 vaccines through COVAX system and that number represented less than a half of promised vaccines which should be used for inoculation of the medical workers, army and police officers, but Government of Serbia shifted initial plan and decided to inoculate

older population first. (Radio Slobodna Evropa, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2020) (AlJazeera Balkans, 2020)

What is important to emphasize that Serbia negotiated directly with vaccine producers too and did not rely exclusively on COVAX system, according to recommendations of World Health Organization. At the mid of January 2021, Serbia got million vaccines from Chinese manufacturer Sinopharm (M.G., klix.ba, 2021) and mass immunization started on January 19th, 2021. On this occasion, Aleksandar Vučić came out with strong populist rhetoric and claimed that this situation could be compared to “Titanic” where “the rich have tried to secure all the boats for themselves, and poor countries have been left to go down with the ship”. (Conley & Sarić, 2021)

Once again, main figure in Serbian politics, president Vučić stole the show and got Chinese jab in remote village in Serbia to show that he trusts to Chinese vaccine, but also to show that it will be available in every corner of the country. According to data of Serbian Government, till mid of March 2021, Serbia inoculated more than 1,3 million citizens, while 862 000 received second jab, simultaneously, other countries in Western Balkans struggled to procure vaccines for their citizens. (Glavonjić, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2021)

Due to vaccine-scepticism of Serbian population and the factor that more than 2,6 million vaccines were procured and only 2,2 million were used till mid-march (Vuksanović, cepa.org, 2021), Serbia “mimicked” China and started their own vaccination diplomacy in Balkans. (Dinić, 2021) They previously donated vaccines to Bosnia and Herzegovina (The Government of Republic of Serbia, 2021), Northern Macedonia (Reuters Stuff, 2021) (N1 Belgrade, 2021), Montenegro (Ralev, 2021) and Albania, and vaccinated Serbian population on north of Kosovo (Ničić, 2021) which Serbia views as its territory and according to some opinions “as final goal of Serbia’s vaccine diplomacy”. (Vuksanović, EU Observer, 2021)

Interesting fact to emphasize is also the fact that Serbian population was not only vaccine-sceptical, but also Euro-sceptical regarding their help, because of which most of the inoculated people in Serbia decided to take Chinese jab 936 813 till mid-March 2021, 129 578 people received Pfizer/Biontech jab, 111 553 people received Sputnik V, while 105 693 people opted for AstraZeneca’s vaccine. (Glavonjić, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2021) Aside from that, about 75% of respondents in a survey by the Belgrade Security Policy Center thought China helped Serbia the

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

most while just 3 percent thought it was the EU that did so. About 51 percent of respondents said that they were against joining the EU. (Petrov, 2021)

In late march and beginning of April, Serbia seized momentum and started campaign through which people from neighbouring countries could register through e platform to receive jab in Serbia. (Vuksanović, cepa.org, 2021) Such campaign was quickly called “COVID tourism” (Radio Slobodna Evropa, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2021), while some of the regional politicians claimed that Belgrade is giving old vaccines and that it is trying to make a profit out of pandemics on behalf of population of neighbouring countries. (M.G., klix.ba, 2021) However, through these actions and donations, Aleksandar Vučić collected regional sympathies, but also political points and placed Serbia as regional hegemon in terms of fight against COVID-19. (Mujanović, 2021)

Not only vaccines, but also medical equipment continued coming in Serbia from all the political partners, European Union provided medical aid through RescEU project (europa.rs, 2020), United Arab Emirates send new package of medical aid (Tanjug, Ekspres.net, 2021) and France joined shortly after. (Ambasada Francuske u Srbiji, 2021)

What is interesting is the fact Maglajlija noticed and that is that “vaccines in Serbia reflected Serbian foreign policy and political preferences of different highly ranked political officers. For example, minister for work and social questions Darija Kisić Tepavčević and prime minister – Ana Brnabić (both pro-European) received Pfizer/Biontech jab, Minister of internal affairs Aleksandar Vulin and president of national assembly, Ivica Dačić (both with strong pro-Russian attitudes) received Russian jab in front of TV cameras, while president Vučić emphasized that his choice is Chinese vaccine. (Maglajlija, 2021)

If we look at the example of the behaviour of the Republic of Serbia and its response to the crisis, the head of state, although not directly the executive, behaved in such a way that he participated with the government and the prime minister in the creation of crisis management. Thus, without entering into a further discussion related to the competences of the President of the Republic of Serbia, Serbia was the first in the Western Balkans to have the necessary medical equipment, later, vaccines, and helped other countries in the region and positioned itself as a regional leader in stability and response to the pandemic. As Sijamija claims “The example of the Republic of Serbia, with a very clearly regulated system of response to crises, contributed to the development of crisis

management, where foreign policy played a key role in the procurement of equipment, vaccines, and action in the international response system to the pandemic.” (Sijamija, ULOGA VANJSKE POLITIKE U BORBI PROTIV PANDEMIJE, 2021)

On May 20th, Torlak’s Sputnik V vaccines were approved by Russia which presented a huge leap toward provision of enough doses to other countries in region of Western Balkans which showed interest for Russia vaccine. (euractiv.rs, 2021), and in early June 2021, Belgrade based “Torlak” institute started manufacturing of Sputnik V vaccine after technology transfer from Moscow (xinhua, 2021). Three months later, Construction of the first Chinese vaccine factory in Europe began in Belgrade amid the fourth wave of the COVID-19 pandemic that ravages Serbia and its neighbouring countries. According to the claims of the Serbian President – Aleksandar Vučić, “this, new facility will provide 30 million COVID-19 doses starting from April 2022 with final aim to support Serbia and other countries in Western Balkans with supplies of Chinese developed Sinopharm vaccines.” (Embassy of the People Republic of China in Canada, 2021) Although all the western media saw these Chinese activities as an effort to increase their influence and soft power in region of Western Balkans, Serbian Minister of foreign affairs denied these claims and told that Chinese activities in Western Balkans are exclusively about saving lives, not geostrategy. (Zhang, 2021) However, in interview that I conducted with professor Dragan Đukanović from department for foreign policy of Serbia on Faculty of political sciences on University of Belgrade has opposite attitude and claims that “Chinese activities present geopolitical game with main effort to shift influence from exclusively infrastructural area to the area of political influence and economy in Serbia.” Aside from that, professor Đukanović claims that “Russia also tried to increase their influence not only in Serbia, but also in Republika Srpska as Serb-Majority part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they previously had exclusively interests in area of energetics, but slowly started gaining also influence in political and economical areas, because of which, in near future, we could potentially see the COVID-19 hidden agenda from Kremlin and Beijing”

Since the contracts signed by the Government of Serbia with vaccine manufacturers were quite shrouded in secrecy, and since it is extremely difficult to gather all the information about how many vaccines Serbia tried to get through donations and bilateral agreements with the countries, I used the mechanism of free access to information of public importance of Republic of Serbia and contacted the Ministry of Health of Serbia in order to search for the given information. On May

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

20th, they answered that they do not have the given information and that such information should be asked Institute for public health “Dr Milan Jovanović Batut”. On May 31st, I used the mechanism of free access to information of public importance of Republic of Serbia to contact the Institute for public health “Dr Milan Jovanović Batut” and ask for a given information, but once again they told me that they do not have a given information and that I should contact Government of Serbia as body that has the main part in process of vaccine procurement. Till today, no one from Government of Serbia sent a response to my e-mail.

Until today (September 2, 2022), according to the data of the Institute of Public Health of Serbia - "Dr. Milan Jovanović Batut", 2,286,511 cases have been registered in Serbia, 10,689,969 people have been tested, 16,695 people have died, and the total percentage of mortality in Serbia is 0.73%, which is below the world average of 1.08% (Source: Our world in data), whereby Serbia is by far the best in the Western Balkans region.

Since the very beginning of COVID-19 pandemics, Serbia acted as regional prodigy who had enough amounts of medical equipment and vaccines all the time, which present a huge anomaly, not only in Western Balkans, but also in world. The fact that Serbia kept often criticized “Status quo” in foreign policy this time bear fruits since Serbia casted a wider foreign political net, which helped her procure vaccines from all the foreign actors with which Serbia cooperates. Even director of World Health Organisation (which initiated the creation of COVAX) in Serbia – Marijan Ivanuša praised Serbia’s efforts to procure vaccines from different sources and claimed that Serbia would be in much worse position if it relied exclusively on support from COVAX. (RTS & FoNET, N1 Srbija, 2021)

5. Discussion

Initially, China and Russia were the main actors in Western Balkans' infrastructural and energetics sector but quickly became „strategic partners“ in vaccine diplomacy. Their efforts were primarily reflected through donations of medical equipment, vaccines, and knowledge transfer. When European Union saw „Western Balkans' Eastern partners' „tendencies, they quickly countered them to prevent the further spread of Russian and Chinese influence in the Western Balkans, which could result in further distancing from the European Union, and which could have as a final consequence destabilisation of the region of Western Balkans. European Union primarily helped through financial loans and donations, but according to the biggest number of experts, such help came late, which can be seen in the attitudes of the population in analysed countries which mainly see Russia and China as their biggest partners. What is interesting to emphasize is that, aside from small donation of vaccines to Kosovo and sporadic minor donations to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States of America had almost no influence in the region of Western Balkans when we speak about the fight against COVID-19 pandemics.

My analysis shows three different approaches and political discourses among analysed countries.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina had severe political problems, which mainly reflected overlapping jurisdiction throughout the vaccine procurement process, just as numerous scandals shattered civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the process of vaccine procurement, Bosnia and Herzegovina primarily depended on the COVAX system, and lower levels of government started procuring vaccines independently from COVAX in April 2021. Aside from that, Bosnia and Herzegovina, among the analysed countries, was the country that received the biggest number of donations from other countries, among which was also Serbia. Lack of Ministry of Health on the national level, corruption, incompetency of high political officers and dependence on the COVAX system led to the state that Bosnia and Herzegovina was among the worst performing countries in Europe when we speak about the fight against COVID-19. In Sarajevo Canton, at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, more people were dying than during the war siege of Sarajevo. During the pandemic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, inter-entity cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was strong as ever before; for a moment, people in Bosnia and Herzegovina had a phantasm of normality in this captured state.

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Political discourses from the highest-ranking politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina varied during the pandemic. Milorad Dodik initially had a similar standpoint to Aleksandar Vučić – reflected in active opportunity seeking - and started bilateral conversations with China and Russia, but also relied on the COVAX system with the attitude of cautious opportunity seeking. However, after Aleksandar Vučić criticized European Union for lack of solidarity, Milorad Dodik did the same and started an “active alarmism” campaign against the EU while publicly glorifying Russia and China as “strategic partners in hard times”. Although Milorad Dodik's focus initially was exclusively on crisis management in Republika Srpska, in the phase of vaccine diplomacy, a turnaround was made, and more attention was given to (re)shaping political discourses towards foreign actors. It is not only political discourse which was “mirrored” from Serbia to Republika Srpska but also preventive measures and media campaigns which had the primary goal of glorifying Russia and China’s help, although the European Union made the biggest effort to mitigate consequences influenced by COVID-19 pandemics.

In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation was probably even more alarming due to the overlapping of political jurisdictions among cantons and entity, because of which, in April 2021, lower levels of government started their vaccine procurement campaigns. Yet, in comparison to Republika Srpska, attitudes towards China and Russia were completely different during the initial period of the vaccine diplomacy phase. Bosniak member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Šefik Džaferović, and Croat member of the Presidency – Željko Komšić (as highest ranked politicians in FBiH) seemed like they don’t want to antagonize their relationship to official Brussels, because of which they took “cautious opportunity seeking” attitude and did not want to get involved in any dynamic relationship to China and Russia. However, after the bust of the COVAX system, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, led by entity prime minister – Fadil Novalić- started their vaccine procurement from Russia shortly after busted, and after that, from China, which proved to be a good solution. In this case, we can see the transfer from “cautious opportunity seeking” to “active opportunity seeking”, which finally ended with a “threat avoidance” attitude and, unlike Serbia and, to some extent, Republika Srpska, formal thanks to China. It is also interesting to point out that specific campaigns, such as the disinfection University Clinical Hospital in Mostar, initiated by Dragan Čović, were conducted without the official permission of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which must approve foreign missions on the soil of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although Bosniak Ministers blocked this campaign, we must

emphasize this case as an “active opportunity seeking” even on the lowest authority levels. Aside from the cooperation with the EU, Russia and China, some of the Bosnian politicians (primarily politicians from the Party of Democratic Action – SDA) also cooperated with Turkey as a traditional Bosnian ally to try to procure vaccines which ultimately succeeded.

It is also crucial to emphasize that when I made the comparison between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, there were not so many media campaigns and articles which had the goal of glorifying certain foreign political actors or starting “witch-hunting campaigns” towards other foreign actors, which did not provide significant help to Bosnia and Herzegovina. To this date, the most effective support in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in both medical and financial terms, was received from the European Union. However, the general impression among the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina (especially in Republika Srpska with a more intense pro-Russian attitude) is that aid from the European Union came way too late and that European Union was reluctant to help countries in Western Balkans in general, since they are not formally part of the European Union

Montenegro

After gaining independence from Serbia, Montenegro opted for Euro-Atlantic integration with the primary goal of becoming a member state in the European Union and that attitude is strengthened even more after Montenegro joined the NATO alliance in 2017. The former prime minister of Montenegro, Zdravko Krivokapić, signed a memorandum to join the COVAX mechanism, but Montenegro started bearing fruits from COVAX months later, and the number of requests for vaccines significantly outpaced the number of procured vaccines because of which Montenegro had to contact China and ask it for help to start mass inoculation of their population.

Russia completely neglected Montenegrin appeals for help procurement since Montenegro is a member of the NATO alliance, but what is surprising is that US efforts to fight COVID-19 in Montenegro as a member of the NATO alliance were minor too. This reflects that the United States of America provided humanitarian aid to Montenegro only during the “Mask diplomacy” phase with a symbolic amount of assistance. Throughout the pandemics and procuring processes, European Union was inevitably the leading strategic partner to Montenegro in both financial and humanitarian aid, and this is not surprising since, as professor Darmanović claim, „Montenegro opted for this discourse long ago.“ Besides European Union, Montenegro received numerous donations through bilateral agreements with other countries, but till today, I didn't receive an

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

official response from the Ministry of Health of Montenegro regarding the exact number of vaccines procured through donations.

Montenegro, similarly to Northern Macedonia, did not have so much manoeuvring space as Serbia did since it had to respect the regulations posed by the NATO alliance; however, after European Union neglected Montenegro in the process of vaccine procurement during the initial phase of “vaccine diplomacy” and after sporadic donations from NATO member states, Montenegro opted to ask Chinese ambassador in Montenegro for Help and China publicly responded by providing aid to this small Western Balkans country. As was the case with Northern Macedonia, led by the government of pro-European Zoran Zaev, Montenegro transformed their attitude from “cautious opportunity seeking” to “active opportunity seeking” with the final phase of “threat avoidance” in order not to antagonize their relationship with European Union, but also with other states in NATO alliance.

Although the media in Montenegro were critical towards the European Union during the initial phase of “vaccine diplomacy”, Montenegro continues its Euro-Atlantic integration way which is additionally paved with the European Union being the “saviour” of Montenegro in both medical and financial ways. However, the case of Montenegro showed both European Union and NATO alliance that there are also other external actors who seek their chance to become influential competitors in the Western Balkans region and will utilize any opportunity to increase their soft power.

Serbia

In comparison to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro, Serbia cooperated with both Eastern and Western partners to secure a vaccine supplies, which represents the continuation of cooperation and political neutrality as factors taken from the political tradition and foreign policy established in the former Yugoslavia during the reign of Josip Broz Tito. Serbia took the most pragmatic attitude of all the countries in the Western Balkans, which resulted in the fact that Serbia had excellent results regarding the procurement of medical aid and vaccines, but also concerning inoculation not on a regional but global level. As I have stated, this “Balkan anomaly” presents the Serbian “status quo” legacy in terms of foreign policy and constant balance between east and west. Centralized government, coordination between the legislative and the executive branch of government, awareness of risks and preparations which were undertaken even before the first case

was registered in Serbia, led to the fact that six months after the development of vaccines, “vaccine diplomacy narrative” on Western Balkans shifted from Russia and China to Serbia which “mimicked” China and implemented their vaccine diplomacy in Western Balkans, placing itself as a regional hegemon in terms of soft power and readiness to help neighbouring countries in times of crisis. The case of Serbia would be interesting for further analysis and study, but when all the data become public and transparent. Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić, at the very beginning of the “mask diplomacy phase”, positioned himself as a great friend of both Russia and China, signed the accession to COVAX mechanism, and worked on bilateral agreements with companies that produce vaccines. Although some people might think that such “active opportunity seeking” is something new in Serbian foreign policy, that would be a huge mistake since Aleksandar Vučić claimed on several occasions that the primary goal of Serbia is accession to the European Union, which does not exclusively mean that Serbia will not cooperate with other foreign actors such as China and Russia. An interesting fact is that during the writing of the master thesis, I researched statutes of the leading political parties in the Western Balkans, and only the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska Napredna Stranka – SNS) led by Aleksandar Vučić has in their statute specifically emphasized the goal of further cooperation and strengthening of partnerships with China and Russia.

Due to all said above, it is not surprising that Aleksandar Vučić turned to Russia and China to ask for help after he saw that the European Union marginalized countries of the Western Balkans. With the assistance of the regime-friendly media in Serbia, Vučić succeeded in glorifying the donations from China and Russia, but also other countries which donated rather symbolic amounts of vaccines to Serbia. Tsifakis and Prelec presented their finding of how Serbian tabloids (re)shaped political narratives among the general population and claimed that “Contrary to Russia and China who are presented as “saviours”, the European Union was almost always painted in a bad light. Aside from that, they claim that “the way European countries are described and addressed is, however, multi-layered. While the EU is always painted in a bad light, certain European countries and leaders receive better treatment. It should be no surprise that the UK and – to a lesser degree – Scandinavian countries, Turkey and Hungary are discussed in a mostly positive light, as they are all either perceived to be sitting outside of the EU (especially Brexit England) or are undermining it from within (Hungary). Interestingly, French President Emmanuel Macron receives the most favourable treatment from Informer among EU leaders. On the other hand, the Biden

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

administration in the U.S. is painted in a decidedly bad light (calling vaccination in the U.S. a “dark failure”).” (Tsifakis & Prelec, 2021)

Comparative analysis

Although European Union and western democracies could learn a lot from “vaccine diplomacy lessons” lectured by China and Russia, we must bear in mind that European Union was the leading strategic partner to all three countries throughout the pandemics of COVID-19. Although there is no substantial evidence that either Authoritarian or democratic regimes are more likely to help other countries in times of crisis, the humanitarian and financial aid that the EU provided was multiple times bigger than all the aid provided by Russia and China. However, the subjective feeling is that assistance from European Union came a bit late, because of which Sino-Russian propaganda gets rooted in Balkan society, because of which these two countries are predominantly seen as leading partners of countries in “Western Balkans” in times of lack of solidarity.

In order to put the failure of Bosnia and Herzegovina's and Montenegro's foreign policy in perspective, suffice it to say that at the end of January 2021, these two countries still had 0 vaccines procured, while for comparison, Serbia has already procured 300,000 vaccines, Croatia 70,000 and Slovenia 55,000 vaccines. (Hambo, Klix.ba, 2021)

Overreliance on the European Union proved to be an issue, not only in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro but also in the examples of Albania, Northern Macedonia and Kosovo (Except the Serb-majority northern part). On the other hand, Serbia cast a wider net and used “multi-stool politics” to procure as many vaccines as possible. Such an “active opportunity seeking” attitude led to the fact that at the beginning of March 2021, Serbia was the second country in Europe (after the UK) in terms of vaccinated people per capita, while in comparison, much richer, stable European democracies such as Belgium and Germany simultaneously had 2,9%. As the biggest donor of medical aid and vaccines (till today, according to the official EU data), Austria had 0% of the fully vaccinated population in a given moment.

6. Conclusion

Throughout the duration of the pandemic, the Western Balkans region was one of the world's largest hotspots in terms of the number of infected people, as well as in terms of the number of deaths. However, when it comes to "vaccine diplomacy" and "mask diplomacy", it seems as if the European Union has put the Western Balkan region on the margins of its foreign policy to a significant extent, since this region has been standing in the same place for almost twenty years regarding the process of European integration. This momentum was used by other actors who were already present in the Western Balkans to strengthen their soft power in the countries of this region as much as possible.

Russia and China, which helped significantly less to the countries in the Western Balkans, using their public diplomacy, but also supported by the media, primarily in Serbia and the Republika Srpska, received much more gratitude compared to the European Union, which donated a significantly larger number of vaccines, but also enormous financial aid which, however, according to the estimates of many analysts, but also according to the views of the inhabitants of the countries in the Western Balkans, arrived quite late. A significant role in building such a perception among the domestic population was also played by the media (primarily those of the regime), which supported the campaigns of Russia and China, at the same time degrading the efforts of the European Union, and presenting a large number of cases in the countries of Western Europe and the United States of America as a "historical failure " which Serbia avoided thanks to proactive action and cooperation with "eastern partners".

Analysing the political discourses of the countries in the Western Balkans, we can conclude that the most pragmatic, proactive approach was taken by Serbia and Republika Srpska, which, like other actors in the Western Balkans, did not rely exclusively on the COVAX system for distributing vaccines, but also tried to achieve cooperation with the Chinese and Russian producers, but also to enter direct bilateral negotiations with vaccine producers. Their "active opportunity seeking" proved to be extremely good, and it was in Serbia and Republika Srpska that the first vaccination campaigns were started, looking at the entire region of the Western Balkans. However, this approach was much more pronounced in Serbia than in the Republika Srpska, so Serbia managed to grow from a passive to an active actor in the Western Balkans.

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

In the case of Serbia, the internal political discourses expressed in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic also mirrored external discourses, whereby pro-Russian ministers Ivica Dačić and Aleksandar Vulin received Russian vaccines, Aleksandar Vučić received the Chinese "Sinopharm" vaccine out of gratitude to China, while Prime Minister Ana Brnabić and the newly appointed Minister of Labour, Employment, Veterans and Social Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, who are pro-European oriented, received the Pfizer vaccine, thus depicting Serbia's internal discourses.

In other countries in the Western Balkans, this was not the case, so the external political discourses at the same time reflected the internal political discourses of the resident population.

In addition, the general impression is that all countries were initially exclusively focused on crisis management to mitigate the consequences as much as possible, while only in the later periods of the "mask diplomacy phase" and "vaccine diplomacy phase" the emphasis began to be placed on political discourses aimed at according to certain political actors on the world geopolitical scene.

What is extremely important to point out is the fact that all the countries we analysed had different approaches in the process of procuring vaccines and protective equipment, with Serbia's approach proving to be the most correct. Nevertheless, one gets the impression that regional cooperation during the pandemic was at a level that was higher than ever before, which is why in the future one should think about creating a regional policy regarding "disaster diplomacy" and "crisis management" in order to of repeated similar situations could act proactively at the regional level, whereby no country would be significantly behind others, as was the case during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Despite the fact that the paper does not exclusively support any major political theory, but in a peculiar way supports all three, it should be emphasized that this paper does not have overarching theoretical relevance for any exclusive literature, but could have significant relevance for policymakers, since they are able to understand how to act when a pandemic is officially proclaimed, how to handle crisis management and how to engage in "disaster diplomacy" in a proper way.

7. References

- A.B. (2021, March 18). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Novalić: Da smo htjeli glumiti državu mi bismo vakcine nabavili u decembru: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/novalic-da-smo-htjeli-glumiti-drzavu-mi-bismo-vaccine-nabavili-u-decembru/210318082>
- A.D. (2020, March 5). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Prvi slučaj koronavirusa u BiH zabilježen u Banjoj Luci: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/prvi-slucaj-koronavirusa-u-bih-zabiljezen-u-banjoj-luci/200305012>
- A.D. (2020, April 18). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Dodik poslao oštru poruku EU: Da mogu, nikada više ništa ne bih uzeo od njih: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-poslao-ostru-poruku-eu-da-mogu-nikada-vise-nista-ne-bih-uzeo-od-njih/200418095>
- A.O. (2021, January 15). *cdm.me*. Retrieved from Crna Gora ima dogovor sa svim proizvođačima vakcina protiv COVID, vakcinacija neće biti obavezna, prve doze stižu krajem januara ili početkom februara...: <https://www.cdm.me/drustvo/crna-gora-ima-dogovor-sa-svim-proizvodacima-vaccina-protiv-covid-vakcinacija-nece-bit-obavezna-prve-doze-stizu-krajem-januara-ili-pocetkom-februara/>
- Ad., A. (2021, May 8). *Dnevni Avaz*. Retrieved from Izetbegović iz vreće zlata o "malina" respiratorima: Preplaćeni su, ali rade!?: <https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/650317/izetbegovic-iz-vrece-zlata-o-malina-respiratorima-preplaceni-su-ali-rade>
- Agol, V. I., & Drozdov, S. (1993, December 21). *national library of medicine - National center for biotechnology information*. Retrieved from Russian contribution to OPV: <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/8024746/>
- AlJazeera. (2021, January 22). *AlJazeera*. Retrieved from Crnoj Gori donacija od deset hiljada vakcina protiv korona virusa: <https://balkans.aljazeera.net/news/balkan/2021/1/22/crnoj-gori-donacija-od-deset-hiljada-vaccina-protiv-korona-virusa>
- AlJazeera Balkans. (2020, December 22). *AlJazeera Balkans*. Retrieved from Lučić: Vakcinacija u Srbiji prvo za starije građane: https://balkans.aljazeera.net/videos/2020/12/22/lucic-vaccinacija-u-srbiji-prvo-za-starije-gradane?fbclid=IwAR0eoJHClsci-_vOGwHtj2tpOY8BImCylMjqzncYKc4cUETKPzXZNUN7QI
- Ambasada Francuske u Srbiji. (2021, January 20). *Ambasada Francuske u Srbiji*. Retrieved from Francuska donacija medicinske opreme Srbiji: <https://rs.ambafrance.org/Predata-je-francuska-donacija-medicinske-opreme-Srbiji-20-januara-2021>
- Ambasada SAD Crna Gora. (2020, April 17). *Ambasada SAD Crna Gora*. Retrieved from Sjedinjene Američke Države obezbijedile pomoć Crnoj Gori za borbu protiv COVID-19: <https://me.usembassy.gov/me/sjedinjene-americke-drzave-obezbijedile-pomoc-crnoj-gori-za-borbu-protiv-covid-19/>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Andreoni, M., & Pietsch, B. (2021, April 26). *The New York Times*. Retrieved from Brazil's health authority rejects importing Russia's Sputnik V vaccine.:
<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/26/world/covid-vaccine-brazil-russia-sputnik.html>

Anholt, S. (1996). Making a brand travel. *Journal of Brand Management*, III(6), pp. 357-364.

Anholt, S. (2007). *Competitive identity: The new brand management for nations, cities, regions*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Anholt, S. (2011). Competitive identity. In N. Morgan, A. Pritchard, & R. Pride, *Destination Brands* (p. 21). Oxford, United Kingdom: Elsevier.

ANI. (2021, October 22). *aninews.in*. Retrieved from Bolivians choose Sputnik V over other COVID-19 vaccines: <https://www.aninews.in/news/world/others/bolivians-choose-sputnik-v-over-other-covid-19-vaccines20211022191446/>

Associated Press. (2021, May 25). *Associated Press*. Retrieved from EU će do kraja godine donirati 100 miliona doza vakcina protiv COVID-19: <https://www.aa.com.tr/ba/svijet/eu-%C4%87e-do-kraja-godine-donirati-100-miliona-doza-vakcina-protiv-covid-19/2253790>

B.R. (2021, March 25). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Federalni ministar zdravstva: Trudili smo se da nabavimo vakcine, ali teško ide: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/federalni-ministar-zdravstva-trudili-smo-se-da-nabavimo-vakcine-ali-tesko-ide/210325027>

B.R. (2021, March 26). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Najviše Pfizerovih i AstraZenecinih vakcina dobit će Sarajevo i Tuzla, za Goražde tek 250 doza: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/najvise-pfizerovih-i-astrazenecinih-vakcina-dobit-ce-sarajevo-i-tuzla-za-gorazde-tek-250-doza/210326086>

B.R. (2021, April 27). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Federacija BiH namjerava proizvoditi rusku vakcinu u Bosni i Hercegovini: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/federacija-bih-namjerava-proizvoditi-rusku-vakcinu-u-bosni-i-hercegovini/210427050>

B.R. (2021, May 22). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Federalna i državna vlast neuspjeh u direktnoj nabavci vakcina kriju iza COVAX-a i EU: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/federalna-i-drzavna-vlast-neuspjeh-u-direktnoj-nabavci-vakcina-kriju-iza-covax-a-i-eu/210521041>

B.R. (2021, May 28). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Skupština jednoglasno dala saglasnost, Kanton Sarajevo će kupiti 200.000 ruskih vakcina: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/skupstina-jednoglasno-dala-saglasnost-kanton-sarajevo-ce-kupiti-200-000-ruskih-vakcina/210528024>

B.T. (2021, October 27). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from U Federaciji BiH 22 posto građana potpuno vakcinisano: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/u-federaciji-bih-22-posto-gradjana-potpuno-vakcinisano/211027119>

Baicus, A. (2012, August 12). *PMC - US National Library of Medicine National Institutes of Health*. Retrieved from History of polio vaccination:

University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Political science
Master Thesis

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3782271/#:~:text=The%20first%20inactivated%20polio%20vaccine,the%20United%20States%5B13%5D>.

bankar.me. (2021, January 26). *bankar.me*. Retrieved from 150 hiljada vakcina stiže u Crnu Goru:
<https://www.bankar.me/2021/01/26/150-hiljada-vakcina-stize-u-crnu-goru/>

Baumann, P., & Cramer, G. (2017, January-June). Power, Soft or Deep? An Attempt at Constructive Criticism. *Las Torres de Lucca: International Journal of Political Philosophy*, pp. 177-214.

Bayer, L., Deutsch, J., Hanke Vela, J., & Tamma, P. (2020, March 15). *Politico*. Retrieved from EU moves to limit exports of medical equipment outside the bloc:
<https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-eu-limit-exports-medical-equipment/>

BBC News. (2020, March 6). *BBC News*. Retrieved from Korona virus: Potvrđen prvi slučaj u Srbiji, još dvoje obolelih u Severnoj Makedoniji: <https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/svet-51766172>

Be, D. (2021, April 6). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Stotine građana Sarajeva poručilo vlastima: Nesposobni ste, odlazite!: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/stotine-gradjana-sarajeva-porucilo-vlastima-nesposobni-ste-odlazite/210406073>

Beaubien, J. (2012, October 15). *npr.org*. Retrieved from Wiping Out Polio: How The U.S. Snuffed Out A Killer: <https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2012/10/16/162670836/wiping-out-polio-how-the-u-s-snuffed-out-a-killer>

Beaubien, J. (2021, February 19). *npr.org*. Retrieved from Price Check: Nations Pay Wildly Different Prices For Vaccines: <https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/02/19/969529969/price-check-nations-pay-wildly-different-prices-for-vaccines?t=1652831996156>

Beaumont, P., & Harding, L. (2020, August 11). *The Guardian*. Retrieved from Russia approves Sputnik V Covid vaccine despite testing safety concerns:
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/11/russia-approves-coronavirus-vaccine-despite-testing-safety-concerns-vladimir-putin>

Bechev, D. (2021, June 30). *Atlantic Council*. Retrieved from How Aleksandar Vučić stole the vaccine-diplomacy show: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-aleksandar-vucic-stole-the-vaccine-diplomacy-show/>

Beker, M. (2021, March 17). *N1*. Retrieved from Turković o izjavama u vezi doniranih vakcina iz Srbije: Nikakva loša namjera: <https://ba.n1info.com/vijesti/turkovic-o-izjavama-u-vezi-doniranih-vakcina-iz-srbije-nikakva-losa-namjera/>

Benabdallah, L. (2021, March 5). *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from Don't believe the hype about China's 'vaccine diplomacy' in Africa:
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/05/dont-believe-hype-about-chinas-vaccine-diplomacy-africa/>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Berridge, G., & James, A. (2001). *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*. New York, New York, United States of America: Palgrave. Retrieved August 18, 2021

BETA. (2020, April 17). *N1 Srbija*. Retrieved from SAD izdvojile 1,2 miliona dolara za pomoć Srbiji: <https://rs.n1info.com/vesti/a590122-sad-pomazu-srbiji-u-borbi-protiv-koronavirusa/>

Beta. (2021, September 17). *Danas.rs*. Retrieved from Izetbegović: Vučić nam ne treba slati vakcine i žito, neka prestanu sa progonom branilaca BiH: <https://www.danas.rs/vesti/drustvo/izetbegovic-vucic-nam-ne-treba-slani-vakcine-i-zito-neka-prestanu-sa-progonom-branilaca-bih/>

BHRT. (2021, March 8). *BHRT*. Retrieved from Vlada FBiH: Formiran ad hoc tim za nabavku 400.000 vakcina: <https://bhrt.ba/vlada-fbih-formiran-ad-hoc-tim-za-nabavku-vakcina/>

Bier, L. M., & Arceneaux, P. C. (2020, April 23). *USC Center on Public Diplomacy*. Retrieved from VIETNAM'S "UNDERDOG" PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE ERA OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/vietnam%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cunderdog%E2%80%9D-public-diplomacy-era-covid-19-pandemic>

Bollyky, T. J. (2021, March 27). *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from Democracies Keep Vaccines for Themselves: <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/rich-countries-give-money-keep-vaccines-themselves/618437/>

Bonora, C. (2022). Vaccine diplomacy as a soft power tool for external powers in the Western Balkans. In C. Bonora, M. Kruse, S. Meyerhuber, A. Quaas, S. Ritter, & F. Tils, *Sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektiven auf die Corona-Pandemie* (pp. 160-177). Bremen: Institut für Politikwissenschaft (IPW) Bremen.

Bourne, P. G. (1978, March-April). A partnership for international health care. *Public health reports*, pp. 114-123.

Bridge Consulting. (n.d.). *Bridge Consulting*. Retrieved from China COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker: <https://bridgebeijing.com/our-publications/our-publications-1/china-covid-19-vaccines-tracker/>

Brizuela de Ávila, M. E., Marti, B., Insanally, R., & Trevisan, C. (2022, February 23). *Atlantic Council*. Retrieved from US-China vaccine diplomacy: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/us-china-vaccine-diplomacy-lessons-from-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/>

Bugajski, J. (2019, October). *Oxford Bibliographies*. doi:DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0094

BUKA. (2020, March 30). *BUKA*. Retrieved from Međunarodni aerodrom Sarajevo od jutros privremeno zatvoren za putnički promet: <https://6yka.com/novosti/medunarodni-aerodrom-sarajevo-od-jutros-privremeno-zatvoren-za-putnicki-promet>

University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Political science
Master Thesis

BUKA. (2021, September 18). *BUKA*. Retrieved from Dodik: Zašto Izetbegović Bošnjacima nije obezbijedio vakcine, nego je to uradio Vučić: <https://6yka.com/novosti/dodik-zasto-izetbegovic-bosnjacima-nije-obezbijedio-vakcine-nego-je-to-uradio-vucic>

Byrne, J. (2021, January 11). *Biopharma-reporter*. Retrieved from <https://www.biopharma-reporter.com/Article/2021/01/11/Indonesia-green-lights-China-s-Sinovac-COVID-19-vaccine>: <https://www.biopharma-reporter.com/Article/2021/01/11/Indonesia-green-lights-China-s-Sinovac-COVID-19-vaccine>

Caarr, E. (1939). *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: Reissued with New Introduction*. New York, New York, United States of America: Springer Nature.

Campbell, D. (1998). *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States of America : University of Minnesota Press.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2021, March 4). *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*. Retrieved from Clinical Questions about COVID-19: Questions and Answers: <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/faq.html>

Cohen, J. (2020). With global push for COVID-19 vaccines, China aims to win friends and cut deals. *Science magazine*.

Conley, H. A., & Sarić, D. (2021, March 24). *Center for strategic and international studies*. Retrieved from Serbia's Vaccine Influence in the Balkans: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/serbias-vaccine-influence-balkans>

Cooper, R. (2003). *The breaking of nations. Order and chaos in the 21st century*. Boston, United Kingdom: Atlantic Monthly Press.

D. Be. (2021, January 4). *Klix.ba*. Retrieved from Tegeltija tvrdi da BiH ide ukorak s EU u nabavci vakcina, iako je tamo već počela imunizacija: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/tegeltija-tvr-di-da-bih-ide-ukorak-s-eu-u-nabavci-vakcina-iako-je-tamo-vec-pocela-imunizacija/210104011>

D.b. (n.d.).

D.Be. (2021, March 25). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Vlada FBiH formira novo tijelo za nabavku vakcina nakon posljednjeg fijaska: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/vlada-fbih-formira-novo-tijelo-za-nabavku-vakcina-nakon-posljednjeg-fijaska/210325093>

D.Be. (2020, March 11). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Svjetska zdravstvena organizacija proglasila koronavirus globalnom pandemijom: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/svijet/svjetska-zdravstvena-organizacija-proglasila-koronavirus-globalnom-pandemijom/200311193>

D.Be. (2020, March 23). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Vučić nakon sastanka s Dodikom obećao pomoć cijeloj BiH: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/regija/vucic-nakon-sastanka-s-dodikom-obecao-pomoc-cijeloj-bih/200323134>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

- D.Be. (2021, March 13). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Zavod za javno zdravstvo FBiH: Nismo potpisali ugovor za vakcine jer nemamo potpunu dokumentaciju: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/zavod-za-javno-zdravstvo-fbih-nismo-potpisali-ugovor-za-vakcine-ger-nemamo-potpunu-dokumentaciju/210313056>
- D.Be. (2021, June 9). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Da li Vlada FBiH namjerno koči kupovinu ruskih vakcina za Kanton Sarajevo i favorizuje kineske?: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/da-li-vlada-fbih-namjerno-koci-kupovinu-ruskih-vakcina-za-kanton-sarajevo-i-favorizuje-kineske/210609114>
- D.Be. (2021, September 3). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from U FBiH ističe rok za 340 hiljada vakcina, u RS-u već propalo 55 hiljada: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/u-fbih-istice-rok-za-340-hiljada-vakcina-u-rs-u-vec-propalo-55-hiljada/210903025>
- D.Be. (2021, August 6). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from U Sarajevo sletio avion s pola miliona vakcina za potrebe Federacije BiH: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/u-sarajevo-sletio-avion-s-pola-miliona-vakcina-za-potrebe-federacije-bih/210806063>
- D.C. (2022, July 28). *vijesti.me*. Retrieved from Predloženo da aktuelne epidemiološke mjere protiv koronavirusa ostanu i narednih 14 dana: <https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/drustvo/615255/predlozeno-da-aktuelne-epidemioloske-mjere-protiv-koronavirusa-ostanu-i-narednih-14-dana>
- Daagi, Z. (2005). Orta dog̃ u perspektifinden Tu`rkiye'nin avrupa entegrasyonu: O` tekiles_tirme. *Demokrasi Platformu*, pp. 97-113.
- Danas.rs*. (2020, August 13). Retrieved from FT: Srbija među zainteresovanima za nabavku ruske vakcine protiv korone: <https://www.danas.rs/vesti/drustvo/ft-srbija-medju-zainteresovanima-za-nabavku-ruske-vakcine-protiv-korone/>
- Demirtaş, B. (2022, February 8). Reconstruction of the 'regional power' role during the pandemic: Turkey's COVID-19 diplomacy towards the Balkans. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, pp. 25-43.
- Deutsche Welle. (2020, December 8). *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved from Coronavirus digest: Trump orders priority vaccine access for US: <https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-digest-trump-orders-priority-vaccine-access-for-us/a-55859711>
- Dinić, L. (2021, April 8). *China US Focus*. Retrieved from Serbia Mimics China's 'Vaccine Diplomacy' in the Balkans: <https://www.chinausfocus.com/society-culture/serbia-mimics-chinas-vaccine-diplomacy-in-the-balkans>
- dnevni.ba. (2021, May 18). *dnevni.ba*. Retrieved from Zašto je Republika Srpska kineske vakcine platila duplo skuplje nego Srbija?: <https://dnevni.ba/vijesti-bih/bih/zasto-je-republika-srpska-kineske-vakcine-platila-duplo-skuplje-nego-srbija/>

University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Political science
Master Thesis

Doherty, B., Hurst, D., & Lyons, K. (2021, March 27). *The Guardian*. Retrieved from Coercion or altruism: is China using its Covid vaccines to wield global power?: <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/mar/28/coercion-or-altruism-is-china-using-its-covid-vaccines-to-wield-global-power>

Dukovska, J. (2020, April 14). *vistinomer.mk*. Retrieved from Маска-дипломатијата на Кина како глобална ПР-стратегија: <https://vistinomer.mk/maska-diplomati%D1%98ata-na-kina-kako-globalna-pr-strategi%D1%98a/>

E.A. (2021, March 23). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Pacijenti u Goraždu leže po hodnicima bolnice, traži se pomoć sa svih strana: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/pacijenti-u-gorazdu-leze-po-hodnicima-bolnice-trazi-se-pomoc-sa-svih-strana/210323107>

EMA. (2021, March 4). *EMA*. Retrieved from EMA starts rolling review of the Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine: <https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/news/ema-starts-rolling-review-sputnik-v-covid-19-vaccine>

Embassy of the People Republic of China in Canada. (2021, September 15). *Embassy of the People Republic of China in Canada*. Retrieved from Construction of first Chinese COVID-19 vaccine factory in Europe starts -- Solid step towards "public good" commitment: http://ca.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgxw/202109/t20210915_10316264.htm

Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Montenegro. (2021, February 18). *Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Montenegro*. Retrieved from Kina donira Crnoj Gori 30000 doza vakcine protiv COVID-19: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceme/mon/sghd_1/t1854807.htm

eu.me. (2021, April 12). *eu.me*. Retrieved from EU solidarnost od preko 110 miliona i to nije sve: <https://www.eu.me/eu-solidarnost-od-preko-110-miliona-i-to-nije-sve/>

EURACTIV. (2021, February 24). *EURACTIV*. Retrieved from San Marino turns to Russia's Sputnik V coronavirus vaccine: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/san-marino-turns-to-russias-sputnik-v-coronavirus-vaccine/>

euractiv.rs. (2021, May 20). *EURactiv*. Retrieved from Belgrade's Torlak Institute's Sputnik vaccine approved in Russia: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/belgrades-torlak-institutes-sputnik-vaccine-approved-in-russia/

Euronews. (2021, April 7). *Euronews.com*. Retrieved from Bavaria signs 'preliminary contract' for 2.5 million doses of Russia's Sputnik V vaccine: <https://www.euronews.com/2021/04/07/bavaria-has-negotiated-preliminary-contract-for-2-5-million-doses-of-russia-s-sputnik-v-vaccine>

europa.ba. (2021, August 25). *europa.ba*. Retrieved from Final batch of EU-funded Pfizer/BioNTech vaccines arrives in Sarajevo, bringing total number of vaccines donated by EU and its member states to BiH to 1,302,110: <http://europa.ba/?p=73087>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

europa.rs. (2020, July 7). *europa.rs*. Retrieved from Prva isporuka nove EU RescEU zalihe medicinske opreme u Srbiju – 10.000 visokokvalitetnih maski: <https://europa.rs/prva-isporka-nove-eu-resceu-zalihe-medicinske-opreme-u-srbiju-10-000-visokokvalitetnih-maski/#>

European Cluster Collaboration Platform. (n.d.). *European Cluster Collaboration Platform*. Retrieved from EU Neighbourhood initiative in the Western Balkans: <https://clustercollaboration.eu/international-cooperation/western-balkans>

European Commission. (2018, February 6.). *A CREDIBLE AND ENHANCED ENLARGEMENT PERSPECTIVE FOR EU ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WESTERN BALKANS*. Brussels: European Commission. Retrieved from https://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Balkans_BorchureA5_V7-HD-CR_PRINT_DEF-1.pdf

European Commission. (2021, August 20). *European Commission*. Retrieved from Coronavirus: EU makes available additional humanitarian funding of €41 million to fight the pandemic: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/ip_21_4281

European Commission. (2022). *Export of COVID-19 vaccines from the EU*. Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission. (n.d.). *European Commission*. Retrieved from EU humanitarian efforts take off during the pandemic: https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20220517115547/https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/recovery-plan-europe/recovery-coronavirus-success-stories/global-response/eu-humanitarian-efforts-take-off-during-pandemic_en

European Commission. (n.d.). *European Commission*. Retrieved from Bosnia and Herzegovina on its European path: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/system/files/2022-04/factograph_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf

European Union Delegation to Serbia. (n.d.). *Delegacija Evropske Unije u Republici Srbiji*. Retrieved from <https://www.euzatebe.rs/rs/covid>

European Universities on Professionalization on Humanitarian Action (EUPRHA). (n.d.). *The State of Art of Humanitarian Action A Quick Guide on the current situation of Humanitarian Relief, its Origins, Stakeholders and Future*. European Universities on Professionalization on Humanitarian Action (EUPRHA). Retrieved from <https://web.archive.org/web/20170215111127/http://euhap.eu/upload/2014/09/the-state-of-art-of-humanitarian-action-2013.pdf>

EUROPEAN VACCINATION INFORMATION PORTAL. (2022, April 28). *EUROPEAN VACCINATION INFORMATION PORTAL*. Retrieved from COVID-19 vaccines: <https://vaccination-info.eu/en/covid-19/covid-19-vaccines>

University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Political science
Master Thesis

eurostat. (2003, July). *GESIS*. Retrieved from Eurobarometer 59.1 (Mar-Apr 2003):
https://search.gesis.org/research_data/ZA3904?doi=10.4232/1.10955

Fan, Y. (2006, January 1). Branding the nation: What is being branded? *Journal of Vacation Marketing*, 1(12), pp. 5-14. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1177/1356766706056633>

Fan, Y. (2010). Branding the nation: Towards a better understanding. *Place branding and public diplomacy*, 11(6), pp. 97-103. doi:doi: 10.1057/pb.2010.16.

Fauci, A. S. (2007). Lasker Public Service Award. The expanding global health agenda: a welcome development. *Nature Medicine*, pp. 1169-1171.

Fazal, T. M. (2020, September 16). Health Diplomacy in Pandemical Times. *International organization*, pp. 78-97.

FENA. (2020, March 11). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Obustava nastave u Brčkom zbog koronavirusa:
<https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/obustava-nastave-u-brckom-zbog-koronavirusa/200311177>

FENA. (2020, March 9). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Ministar zdravstva ZDK: Zaražena žena ima blaže simptome, očekivali smo da će virus stići u Zenicu: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ministar-zdravstva-zdk-zarazena-zena-ima-blaze-simptome-ocekivali-smo-da-ce-virus-stici-u-zenicu/200309194>

FENA. (2020, April 25). *Klix.ba*. Retrieved from Iz Pekinga stiglo 80 respiratora koje je kupila Vlada FBiH, očekuje se još 20: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/iz-pekingsa-stiglo-80-respiratora-koje-je-kupila-vlada-fbih-ocekuje-se-jos-20/200425084>

FENA. (2021, June 11). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Ured Fadila Novalića: Neka Vlada KS nabavi vakcine, a Vlada FBiH će ih platiti: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ured-fadila-novalica-neka-vlada-ks-nabavi-vakcine-a-vlada-fbih-ce-ih-platiti/210611110>

FENA. (2021, January 27). *Klix.ba*. Retrieved from Ministarstvo civilnih poslova BiH prosljedilo zahtjeve za vakcine Pfizeru i ambasadama: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ministarstvo-civilnih-poslova-bih-prosljedilo-zahtjeve-za-vakcine-pfizeru-i-ambasadama/210127080>

FENA. (2021, November 8). *N1*. Retrieved from SAD daje dodatnih 1,8 milona dolara pomoći BiH za borbu protiv COVID-19: <https://ba.n1info.com/vijesti/sad-daje-dodatnih-18-milona-dolara-pomoci-bih-za-borbu-protiv-covid-19/>

Ferguson, N. (2003, January/February). Power. *Foreign Policy*, p. 21.

Folarin, S. (2017, December 20). *e-international relations*. Retrieved August 26, 2021, from Student Feature – Foreign Policy: <https://www.e-ir.info/2017/12/20/student-feature-foreign-policy/>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Foltynova, K. (2021, March 4). *Radio Free Europe Raadio Liberty*. Retrieved from Sputnik V: The Story Of Russia's Controversial COVID-19 Vaccine: <https://www.rferl.org/a/sputnik-v-vaccine/31133608.html>

Freeman, C. W. (2020, December 14). *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Retrieved August 18, 2021, from Diplomacy: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomacy>

G.M. (2021, April 15). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Vlade Federacije BiH i Kantona Sarajevo zajedno idu u nabavku ruskih vakcina: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/vlade-federacije-bih-i-kantona-sarajevo-zajedno-idu-u-nabavku-ruskih-vakcina/210415083>

G.M. (2021, April 21). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Davor Pehar podnio ostavku na poziciju direktora Zavoda za javno zdravstvo FBiH: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/davor-pehar-podnio-ostavku-na-poziciju-direktora-zavoda-za-javno-zdravstvo-fbih/210521077>

G.M. (2021, July 19). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Republika Srpska će donirati vakcine Federaciji BiH: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/republika-srpska-ce-donirati-vakcine-federaciji-bih/210719158>

G.Š. (2021, October 21). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from U BiH sutra prvi put stižu Modernine vakcine, ali će zato propasti više od 200.000 AstraZeneca: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/u-bih-sutra-prvi-put-stizu-modernine-vakcine-ali-ce-zato-propasti-vise-od-200-000-astrazenece/211021152>

Gelb, L. H. (2009). *Power rules: how common sense can rescue American foreign policy*. New York, New York, United States of America: Harper Collins Publishing.

Gelineau, K., & Huizhong, W. (2021, March 2). *Associated Press*. Retrieved January 28, 2022, from Chinese vaccines sweep much of the world, despite concerns: <https://apnews.com/article/china-vaccines-worldwide-0382aefa52c75b834fbaf6d869808f51>

Glavonjić, Z. (2020, March 26). *Radio Slobodna Evropa*. Retrieved from Ko je koliko pomogao Srbiji tokom pandemije: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ko-je-koliko-pomogao-srbiji/30511328.html>

Glavonjić, Z. (2021, March 22). *Radio Slobodna Evropa*. Retrieved from Kineska vakcina dominantna u Srbiji: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/kineska-vakcina-dominantna-u-srbiji/31163198.html>

Gledić, J., Turcsányi, R. Q., Šimalčik, M., Kironská, K., & Sedláková, R. (2020). *Serbian public opinion on China in the age of COVID-19 - An unyielding alliance?* Bratislava: Central European Institute of Asian Studies.

Global Humanitarian Assistance. (n.d.). *Global Humanitarian Assistance*,. Retrieved from Defining humanitarian assistance: <https://web.archive.org/web/20171102215158/http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/defining-humanitarian-aid>

University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Political science
Master Thesis

Gohd, C. (2020, August 11). *space.com*. Retrieved from Russia names its 1st COVID-19 vaccine 'Sputnik V' after space race triumph: <https://www.space.com/russia-names-coronavirus-vaccine-sputnik-v.html>

Goldsmith, B. E., & Horiuchi, Y. (2012). In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for US Foreign Policy? *World Politics*, pp. 555-585.

Good Humanitarian Donorship. (2018, January 30). *Good Humanitarian Donorship*. Retrieved from 23 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship: <https://web.archive.org/web/20180130010945/https://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/principles-good-practice-of-ghd/principles-good-practice-ghd.html>

Good, R. (2021, January 27). *Euronews*. Retrieved from Serbia has second fastest COVID-19 vaccine rollout in Europe thanks to China : <https://www.euronews.com/2021/01/27/serbia-has-second-fastest-covid-19-vaccine-rollout-in-europe-thanks-to-china>

Government of Mexico. (2021, May 25). *Gobierno de Mexico*. Retrieved from The Government of Mexico announces that the AstraZeneca vaccine produced by Mexico and Argentina is now available: <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/the-government-of-mexico-announces-that-the-astrazeneca-vaccine-produced-by-mexico-and-argentina-is-now-available>

Governo Italiano Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. (2021, May 21). *Governo Italiano Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri*. Retrieved from Pm Draghi's opening address to the Global Health Summit: <https://www.governo.it/node/17046>

Grace-Carman, K., & Chandra, A. (2021, December 9). *The RAND Blog*. Retrieved from American Attitudes About Vaccine Globalism: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/12/american-attitudes-about-vaccine-globalism.html>

Gušić, M. (2021, March 14). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from U svijetu se dnevno vakicniše 9,14 miliona ljudi, proces započeo u 121 zemlji: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/u-svijetu-se-dnevno-vakicnise-9-14-miliona-ljudi-proces-zapocao-u-121-zemlji/210314021>

Gušić, M. (2021, February 11). *Klix.ba*. Retrieved from Johann Sattler za Klix.ba: Očekujte veći angažman Evropske unije u BiH: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/johann-sattler-za-klix-ba-ocekujte-veci-angazman-evropske-unije-u-bih/210211136>

Hadžović, D. (2021, June 1). *Dnevni Avaz*. Retrieved from Bakire, gdje su vakcine?: <https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/655733/bakire-gdje-su-vakcine>

Halimić, E. (2021, May 27). *Dnevni Avaz*. Retrieved from Izetbegović drsko obmanjuje javnost: Podaci svjetskih univerziteta kažu da je BiH druga u svijetu po smrtnosti od koronavirusa: <https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/654523/izetbegovic-drsko-obmanjuje-javnost-podaci-svjetskih-univerziteta-kazu-da-je-bih-druga-u-svijetu-po-smrtnosti-od-koronavirusa>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Hall, T. (2010). An Unclear Attraction: A Critical Examination of Soft Power as an Analytical Category . *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, pp. 189-211.

Hambo, S. (2020, December 24). *Klix.ba*. Retrieved from Respiratori su nas opekli, pa će vakcine protiv korone BiH nabaviti posljednja: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/respiratori-su-nas-opekli-pa-ce-vakcine-protiv-korone-bih-nabaviti-posljednja/201224077>

Hambo, S. (2021, March 17). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Kako smo se nadali "zapadnim", a završili na ruskim vakcinama: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/kako-smo-se-nadali-zapadnim-a-završili-na-ruskim-vakcinama/210317052>

Hambo, S. (2021, January 26). *Klix.ba*. Retrieved from Zašto je BiH idealna zemlja za "državne uhljebe": Vakcina nemamo, a niko nije kriv: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/zasto-je-bih-idealna-zemlja-za-drzavne-uhljebe-vakcina-nemamo-a-niko-nije-kriv/210126094>

Harrison, C. (2022, March 28). *AS/COA*. Retrieved from Tracker: U.S. Vaccine Donations to Latin America: <https://www.as-coa.org/articles/tracker-us-vaccine-donations-latin-america>

Harvard Business School. (2016.). *The Benefits of Soft Power*. Retrieved Januar 16., 2019., from <https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/the-benefits-of-soft-power>

Hill, C. (2002). *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*. Houndmills, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hill, C. (2003). *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*. Houndmills, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hopkins, V. (2021, April 13). *Financial Times*. Retrieved from Bounty of Serbian vaccine diplomacy shames the EU: <https://www.ft.com/content/81fc28aa-04a9-4108-a69b-80dc93a9e985>

Hotez, P. J. (2009, November 19). *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from Vaccine Diplomacy: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/19/vaccine-diplomacy/>

Hotez, P. J. (2010). Peace through vaccine diplomacy. *Science*, p. 1301.

Hotez, P. J. (2014, June). "Vaccine diplomacy": historical perspectives and future directions. *PLoS Negl Trop Dis*.

Hu, Y. (2020, December 1). *Global Times*. Retrieved from China's vaccines better suit Africa, LatAm due to 'lower costs, easier logistics': <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1208668.shtml>

Huang, Y. (2021, March 11). *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from Beijing Hasn't Won the Soft-Power Stakes, but It Has an Early Lead: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-03-11/vaccine-diplomacy-paying-china>

Huang, Y. (2021, March 11). *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from Vaccine Diplomacy Is Paying Off for China: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-03-11/vaccine-diplomacy-paying-china>

- I.Č. (2020, March 5). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Vijeće ministara o koronavirusu u BiH: Nema mjesta za paniku: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/vijece-ministara-o-koronavirusu-u-bih-nema-mjesta-za-paniku/200305155>
- I.Č. (2021, January 11). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Tegeltija: Krajem januara stižu nam vakcine koje je najteže transportovati i skladištiti: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/tegeltija-krajem-januara-stizu-nam-vakcine-koje-je-najteze-transportovati-i-skladistiti/210111071>
- I.Č. (2021, February 3). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Zoran Tegeltija: Ne osjećam se odgovornim zbog kašnjenja vakcina: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/zoran-tegeltija-ne-osjecam-se-odgovornim-zbog-kasnjenja-vakcina/210203138>
- I.H. (2020, April 3). *Direktno.hr*. Retrieved from Vučić poljubio je kinesku zastavu i obećao slušati diplomaciju kako bi izbjegli 'katastrofalan talijanski scenarij': <https://direktno.hr/eu-i-svijet/vucic-poljubio-kinesku-zastavu-i-obecao-slusati-diplomaciju-kako-bi-izbjegli-katastrofalan-talijansk-189142/>
- I.P. (2020, March 11). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Devet naredbi Kriznog štaba FBiH: Zatvorite škole, ne idite u inozemstvo i poštuju izolaciju: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/devet-naredbi-kriznog-staba-fbih-zatvorite-skole-ne-idite-u-inozemstvo-i-postujte-izolaciju/200311144>
- I.P. (2020, April 1). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from U Banju Luku iz Srbije stiglo 10 respiratora i hiljade maski, rukavica i odijela: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/u-banju-luku-iz-srbije-stiglo-10-respiratora-i-hiljade-maski-rukavica-i-odijela/200401002>
- I.P. (2020, April 20). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from MMF odobrio korona-kredit za BiH od 330 miliona eura: <https://www.klix.ba/biznis/finansije/mmf-odobrio-korona-kredit-za-bih-od-330-miliona-eura/200420160>
- I.P.: (2020, March 28). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Republika Srpska proglasila vanredno stanje zbog koronavirusa: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/republika-srpska-proglasila-vanredno-stanje-zbog-koronavirusa/200328064>
- Iancu, A. (2021, November 17). *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. Retrieved from The Shot Heard around the World: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/shot-heard-around-world>
- Ilgén, T. L. (2006.). *Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations* (1. ed.). Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Innovations in healthcare. (2021, July 9). *Innovations in healthcare*. Retrieved from TAKING A CLOSER LOOK AT VACCINE EXPORTS: <https://www.innovationsinhealthcare.org/taking-a-closer-look-at-vaccine-exports/>
- Ioannides, I. (2021). *The European Union and the geopolitics of Covid19 vaccines in the Western Balkans*. Athens: ELIAMEP.

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

- Islam, A. M., Abdullah, B., & Jeyasakthy, S. (2020, December 5). Prevalence of Olfactory Dysfunction in Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): A Meta-analysis of 27,492 Patients. *The Laryngoscope*, pp. 1-14. Retrieved August 18, 2021, from <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7753439/>
- Islam, A. M., Alam, S. S., Kundu, S., Kamal, M. A., & Cavestro, C. (2020, November 27). Prevalence of Headache in Patients With Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of 14,275 Patients. *Frontiers in Neurology*(11), pp. 1-9. Retrieved August 18, 2021, from <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7728918/>
- Islam, A. M., Kundu, S., Alam, S. S., Hossan, T., Hassan, R., & Kamal, M. A. (2021, April 6). Prevalence and characteristics of fever in adult and paediatric patients with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19): A systematic review and meta-analysis of 17515 patients. *Plos One*, 16(4), pp. 1-21. Retrieved August 18, 2021, from <https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0249788>
- Istinomjer. (2021, April 26). *Dnevni Avaz*. Retrieved from Istinomjer analizirao izjavu Bakira Izetbegovića: Je li BiH vakcinisala više ljudi od Malezije: <https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/647372/istinomjer-analizirao-izjavu-bakira-izetbegovica-je-li-bih-vakcinisala-vise-ljudi-od-malezije>
- Ivković, A. (2020, May 1). *European Western Balkans*. Retrieved from Kina, EU, Rusija: Ko je koliko pomogao Srbiji tokom pandemije?: <https://europeanwesternbalkans.rs/kina-eu-rusija-ko-je-koliko-pomogao-srbiji-tokom-pandemije/>
- J.B. (2020, November 17). *pobjeda.me*. Retrieved from Hrapović: Potpuno zaključavanje nije bačeno s dnevnog reda: <https://www.pobjeda.me/clanak/hrapovic-potpuno-zakljucavanje-nije-baceno-s-dnevnog-reda>
- Jaffe, E., & Nebenzahl, I. (2001). *National Image and Competitive Advantage: The Theory and Practice of Country-of-Origin Effect*. Frederiksberg: Copenhagen Business School Press.
- Jakovljević, G. (2020, April 21). *Anadolu Agency*. Retrieved from BiH: Štab za vanredne situacije RS raspodijelio donacije Malezije, Turske i Slovenije: <https://www.aa.com.tr/ba/balkan/bih-%C5%A1tab-za-vanredne-situacije-rs-raspodijelio-donacije-malezije-turske-i-slovenije/1813339>
- Jakovljević, G. (2020, March 21). *Anadolu Agency*. Retrieved from Višković: Zabranjeno kretanje starijim od 65 godina u RS-u: <https://www.aa.com.tr/ba/balkan/vi%C5%A1kovi%C4%87-zabranjeno-kretanje-starijim-od-65-godina-u-rs-u/1774244>
- Jakovljević, G. (2021, April 26). *Anadolu Agency*. Retrieved from BiH: U RS stiglo 25.000 doza ruskih vakcina Sputnik V: <https://www.aa.com.tr/ba/korona-virus/bih-u-rs-stiglo-25000-doza-ruskih-vakcina-sputnik-v/2221128>
- Jinping, X. (2014, July 17). Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech at National Congress of Brazil-Carry Forward Traditional Friendship and Jointly Open up New Chapter of Cooperation. Retrieved from

University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Political science
Master Thesis

- Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech at National Congress of Brazil-Carry Forward Traditional Friendship and Jointly Open up New Chapter of Cooperation:
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/lmzms_664952/gjlb_664956/3473_665008/3475_665012/201407/t20140721_594796.html
- Juncos, A. E. (2021, July 8). *Carnegie Europe*. Retrieved from Vaccine Geopolitics and the EU's Ailing Credibility in the Western Balkans: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/07/08/vaccine-geopolitics-and-eu-s-ailing-credibility-in-western-balkans-pub-84900>
- Kahraman, E. (2017). A methodological approach to nation branding. In J. Simons, *The Routledge handbook of soft power* (pp. 93-103). London: Routledge.
- Kantor, D. (2021, November 15). *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*. Retrieved from The case for U.S. vaccine diplomacy in Latin America: <https://dc.fes.de/news-list/e/the-case-for-us-vaccine-diplomacy-in-latin-america>
- Karaskova, I., & Blablova, V. (2021, March 24). *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from The Logic of China's Vaccine Diplomacy: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-logic-of-chinas-vaccine-diplomacy/>
- Kelly, P. (2003, July 26). Power Pact. *The Australian*.
- Kickbusch, I., Silberschmidt, G., & Buss, P. (2007, March). Global health diplomacy: the need for new perspectives, strategic approaches and skills in global health. *Bull World Health Organisation*, pp. 230-232.
- Kramer, A. (2020, April 15). *The New York Times*. Retrieved from How Bubonic Plague Has Helped Russia Fight the Coronavirus: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/15/world/europe/coronavirus-plague-russia-soviet-union.html>
- Kramer, A. (2021, February 19). *The New York Times*. Retrieved from Russia Is Offering to Export Hundreds of Millions of Vaccine Doses. Can It Deliver?: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/world/europe/russia-coronavirus-vaccine-soft-power.html?searchResultPosition=13?smid=pc-thedaily>
- Krasnyak, O. (2018, December 13). *USC Center on Public Diplomacy*. Retrieved from NATIONAL STYLES IN SCIENCE DIPLOMACY: CHINA: <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/national-styles-science-diplomacy-china>
- Krishna, K. B. (2021, December 28). *The RAND Blog*. Retrieved from America Can Still Deliver on Global Vaccine Diplomacy: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/12/america-can-still-deliver-on-global-vaccine-diplomacy.html>
- KUNDOC. (2017). Retrieved from CHINA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMATIC NETWORKS ON THE EBOLA ISSUE IN WEST AFRICA: ISSUES MANAGEMENT IN A NETWORK SOCIETY: <https://coek.info/pdf-chinas-public-diplomatic-networks-on-the-ebola-issue-in-west-africa-issues-manag.html>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

L.K. (2021, July 19). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Na sarajevski aerodrom stiglo 40.000 doza AstraZeneca iz Azerbejdžana: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/na-sarajevski-aerodrom-stiglo-40-000-doza-astrazenece-iz-azerbejdzana/210719136>

Lancaster, K., & Rubin, M. (2020, April 30). *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from Assessing the Early Response to Beijing's Pandemic Diplomacy: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/assessing-early-response-beijings-pandemic-diplomacy>

Lau, S. (2021, March 9). *Politico*. Retrieved from Czech Republic to get Chinese vaccines: <https://www.politico.eu/article/czech-republic-will-get-chinese-vaccines/>

Lawler, D. (2021, March 17). *axios.com*. Retrieved from Biden's next challenge: Vaccine diplomacy: <https://www.axios.com/2021/03/22/us-coronavirus-vaccine-diplomacy-china-exports>

Layne, C. (2010). The unbearable lightness of soft power. In I. Parmar, & M. Cox, *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (pp. 62,71). London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Lee, G. (2009). A Theory of So Power and Korea So Power Strategy. *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, pp. 205-218.

Leira, H. (2019). The Emergence of Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, pp. 187-198. Retrieved August 26, 2021, from <https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/63/1/187/5307236>

Li, H. Y., & Wong, S. (2018). The evolution of Chinese public diplomacy and the rise of think tanks. *Place Brand Public Diplomacy*, 36-46.

Lingo-Demirović, M. (2022, November 10). *UNA*. Retrieved from BiH je jedina zemlja u regionu koja nema Zakon o vanjskim poslovima!: <https://unaworld.com/ba/vijesti/politika/bih-je-jedina-zemlja-u-regionu-koja-nema-zakon-o-vanjskim-poslovima>

Liu, A. (2020, August 18). *Fierce Pharma*. Retrieved from Sinopharm chief says COVID-19 vaccine will cost less than \$145 for 2-dose regimen: <https://www.fiercepharma.com/vaccines/china-sinopharm-chief-narrows-down-covid-19-vaccine-price-to-within-145-for-2-dose-regimen>

Lowy Institute. (2022, June 12). *Low Institute*. Retrieved from Covid Performance Index deconstructing pandemic responses: <https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/covid-performance/#overview>

Luković, D. (2019, July 10). *Council for strategic policy*. Retrieved from Vojna neutralnost Srbije: <https://cfsp.rs/2019/10/07/vojna-neutralnost-srbije/>

M., E. (2020, November 27). *Klix.ba*. Retrieved from Tegeltija nakon sastanka u Doboju: Nema novih mjera, nabavljamo vakcine za 20 posto stanovništva: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/tegeltija-nakon-sastanka-u-doboju-nema-novih-mjera-nabavljamo-vakcine-za-20-posto-stanovnistva/201127104>

- M.G. (2021, March 22). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Džaferović: Bosna i Hercegovina u vakcinaciji ne zaostaje za zemljama regiona: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dzaferovic-bosna-i-hercegovina-u-vakcinaciji-ne-zaostaje-za-zemljama-regiona/210322158>
- M.G. (2021, March 25). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Važan dan za BiH u borbi protiv pandemije: Dobili smo prve vakcine koje nisu donirane: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/vazan-dan-za-bih-u-borbi-protiv-pandemije-dobili-smo-prve-vakcine-koje-nisu-donirane/210325163>
- M.G. (2021, June 4). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Novalić: Nismo potrčali za vakcinama da ne budemo pokusni kunići kao Srbija i Izrael: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/novalic-nismo-potrčali-za-vakcinama-da-ne-budemo-pokusni-kunici-kao-srbija-i-izrael/210604169>
- M.G. (2021, June 4). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Novalić: Nismo potrčali za vakcinama da ne budemo pokusni kunići kao Srbija i Izrael: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/novalic-nismo-potrčali-za-vakcinama-da-ne-budemo-pokusni-kunici-kao-srbija-i-izrael/210604169>
- M.G. (2021, June 17). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Mehmedović: Srbija vakcinacijom vara građane BiH, odlazak u Beograd je skup: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/mehmedovic-srbija-vakcinacijom-vara-gradjane-bih-odlazak-u-beograd-je-skup/210617079>
- M.G. (2021, January 15). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from U Srbiju sutra stiže milion doza vakcina protiv koronavirusa kompanije Sinopharm: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/regija/u-srbiju-sutra-stize-milion-doza-vakcina-protiv-koronavirusa-kompanije-sinopharm/210115171>
- M.G. (2021, June 17). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Mehmedović: Srbija vakcinacijom vara građane BiH, odlazak u Beograd je skup: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/mehmedovic-srbija-vakcinacijom-vara-gradjane-bih-odlazak-u-beograd-je-skup/210617079>
- Maglajlija, V. (2021, January 24). *Allazeera Balkans*. Retrieved from 'Diplomatija vakcina' – odraz vanjske politike Srbije: <https://balkans.aljazeera.net teme/2021/1/24/diplomatija-vakcina-odraz-vanjske-politike-srbije-i-naklonost-kini>
- Maričić, S. (2021, February 8). *bbc.com*. Retrieved from Korona virus, vakcine i putovanja: Da li će sa ruskom i kineskom vakcinom biti moguć ulazak u Evropsku uniju: <https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/srbija-55925644>
- Maslo, E. (2021, May 26). *Dnevni Avaz*. Retrieved from Ministar Vranić: Ne postoji VIP ulaz, Bakir laže: <https://avaz.ba/kantoni/sarajevo/654290/ministar-vranic-ne-postoji-vip-ulaz-bakir-laze>
- Mayer, A. J. (1970). *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy 1917–1918*. New York: New York Vintage Books.
- McCarthy, N. (2021, April 7). *Statista*. Retrieved from Where The EU Exports Its Covid-19 Vaccines To: <https://www.statista.com/chart/24458/eu-covid-19-vaccine-exports/>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

- McGeever, J., & Paraguassu, L. (2021, June 5). *Reuters*. Retrieved from Brazil's Anvisa approves Russian Sputnik V vaccine, with conditions: <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-health-regulator-technical-staff-recommend-conditions-any-approval-2021-06-04/>
- McGrath, J., & Parkas, U. (2020). *Germany Retains Top "Nation Brand" Ranking, US and China Experience Significant Decline*. New York: IPSOS.
- McGregor, G. (2020, December 5). *The Fortune*. Retrieved from How China's COVID-19 vaccines could fill the gaps left by Pfizer, Moderna, AstraZeneca: <https://fortune.com/2020/12/05/china-covid-19-vaccines-approval-sinovac-sinopharm/>
- Medicalcg.me. (2021, March 12). *medicalcg.me*. Retrieved from 12. mart – Mađarska donirala više od 10 hiljada PCR testova: <https://medicalcg.me/12-mart-madjarska-donirala-vise-od-10-hiljada-pcr-testova/>
- Medicalcg.me. (2021, March 16). *medicalcg.me*. Retrieved from 16. mart – Francuska spremna da pomogne crnogorskom zdravstvenom sistemu: <https://medicalcg.me/16-mart-francuska-spremna-da-pomogne-crnogorskom-zdravstvenom-sistemu/>
- Melissen, J. (2005). *The new public diplomacy – Soft power in international relations*. Houndmills, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Merco Press. (2021, June 4). *Merco Press*. Retrieved from Argentina to launch local production of Sputnik V vaccine, but subject to availability of active ingredient: <https://en.mercopress.com/2021/06/04/argentina-to-launch-local-production-of-sputnik-v-vaccine-but-subject-to-availability-of-active-ingredient>
- Midhat. (2021, March 1). *Magazinplus.eu*. Retrieved from Dodik, Komšić i Džaferović dočekuju Vučića na aerodromu: <https://magazinplus.eu/dodik-komsic-i-dzaferovic-docekuju-vucica-na-aerodromu/>
- Milić, P. (2021, February 3). *Voice of America*. Retrieved from U Crnoj Gori još bez vakcinacije protiv koronavirusa: <https://www.glasamerike.net/a/crna-gora-koronavirus-vakcinacija-ka%C5%A1njenje/5763877.html>
- Miller, Z. (2021, June 4). *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from Biden Announces International COVID-19 Vaccine Sharing Plan: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/biden-announces-international-covid-19-vaccine-sharing-plan/>
- mina.news. (2020, November 13). *mina.news*. Retrieved from Simović podnio ostavku, Hrapović na čelu NKT: <https://mina.news/vijesti-iz-crne-gore/simovic-podnio-ostavku-hrapovic-na-celu-nkt/>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2020, October 9). *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*. Retrieved from Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying's remarks on China joining COVAX: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1822631.htm

Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of India. (2021, March 23).

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1706942>. Retrieved from Export of Vaccine to other Nations: <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1706942>

Morgenthau, H. J., Thompson, K. W., & Clinton, D. W. (1985.). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*. New York, New York, United States of America: McGraw-Hill.

Mujanović, J. (2021, April 1). *BIRN*. Retrieved from Serbia's Vaccine Diplomacy isn't as Benign as it Looks: <https://balkaninsight.com/2021/04/01/serbias-vaccine-diplomacy-isnt-as-benign-as-it-looks/>

Myers, S. L. (2004, November 14). *Putin Uses Soft Power to Restore the Russian Empire*. Retrieved from The New York Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/weekinreview/putin-uses-soft-power-to-restore-the-russian-empire.html>

N.V. (2021, March 16). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Počela sjednica Vlade FBiH o pregovorima sa veledrogerijama koje nabavljaju vakcine: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/pocela-sjednica-vlade-fbih-o-pregovorima-sa-veledrogerijama-koje-nabavljaju-vakcine/210316155>

N.V. (2021, March 16). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Ad hoc tim zasjeda o ponudama za nabavku vakcina, samo jedna kompanija ispunjava sve traženo: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ad-hoc-tim-zasjeda-o-ponudama-za-nabavku-vakcina-samo-jedna-kompanija-ispunjava-sve-trazeno/210316114>

N.V. (2021, May 16). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from U BiH do sada stiglo 520.780 vakcina protiv koronavirusa, veliki broj doza se čuva za revakcinaciju: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/u-bih-do-sada-stiglo-520-780-vakcina-protiv-koronavirusa-veliki-broj-doza-se-cuva-za-revakcinaciju/210512065>

N.V. (2021, July 2). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Vlada Federacije BiH kineske vakcine platila 12,5 miliona KM, prve doze u narednih 10 dana: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/vlada-federacije-bih-kineske-vakcine-platila-12-5-miliona-km-prve-doze-u-narednih-10-dana/210702090>

N.V. (2021, June 12). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Srbija donirala 5.000 doza AstraZeneca vakcina Tuzlanskom kantonu: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/srbija-donirala-5-000-doza-astrazeneca-vakcina-tuzlanskom-kantonu/210612034>

N.V. (2021, July 12). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Skoro 700.000 Pfizer vakcina bi u Bosnu i Hercegovinu trebalo stići do kraja septembra: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/skoro-700-000-pfizer-vakcina-bi-u-bosnu-i-hercegovinu-trebalo-stici-do-kraja-septembra/210712139>

N.V. (2021, January 21). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Bosna i Hercegovina ipak kreće u direktnu nabavku Pfizerove, ruske i kineske vakcine: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bosna-i-hercegovina-ipak-krece-u-direktnu-nabavku-pfizerove-ruske-i-kineske-vakcine/210121042>

N.V. (2022, March 16). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Kompanija Medimpex će za Federaciju BiH nabaviti 500.000 ruskih vakcina, prve doze za tri dana: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/kompanija-medimpex-ce-za-federaciju-bih-nabaviti-500-000-ruskih-vakcina-prve-doze-za-tri-dana/210316159>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

- N1 Belgrade. (2021, April 1). *N1*. Retrieved from Skopje: Serbia donates 40,000 vaccines to North Macedonia: <https://rs.n1info.com/english/news/skopje-serbia-donates-40000-vaccines-to-north-macedonia/>
- Ničić, B. (2021, November 5). *Voice of America*. Retrieved from Na Kosovu skoro 1,6 miliona vakcinisanih, veće interesovanje mladih: <https://www.glasamerike.net/a/kosovo-skoro-1-6-miliona-vakcinisanih-ve%C4%87e-interesovanje-mladih/6301624.html>
- Noe, N. (2020, November 20). *EU Ideas*. Retrieved from Vaccine diplomacy—the best first move for the Biden administration to reset relationships: <https://euideas.eui.eu/2020/11/20/vaccine-diplomacy-the-best-first-move-for-the-biden-administration-to-reset-relationships/>
- Nolte, D. (2022, February 1). *German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)*. Retrieved from RELATIVIZING THE SUCCESS OF CHINA'S "VACCINE DIPLOMACY": <https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/relativizing-success-chinas-vaccine-diplomacy>
- Nye Jr., J. S. (2004.). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (1. ed.). New York: Public Affairs.
- Nye, J. (1990). Soft power. *Foreign policy*, pp. 153-171. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148580>
- Nye, J. (2004). Soft Power and American Foreign Policy. *Political Science Quarterly*, pp. 255-270. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20202345?seq=1>
- Nye, J. (2008). Public diplomacy and soft power. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, pp. 94-109.
- Nye, J. S. (2008, March). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, pp. 94-109. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25097996>
- Nye, J. S. (2010). Responding to My Critics and Concluding Thought. In I. C. Parmar, *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
- Nye, J. S. (2013). Hard, soft, and smart power. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur, *The Oxford handbook of modern diplomacy*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Oguzlu, T. (2003, March 9). Soft power in Turkish foreign policy. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, pp. 81-97. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710601142518>
- Ohnesorge, H. W. (2020). *Soft power - The forces of attraction in international relations*. New York, New York, United States of America: Springer.
- Olins, W. (1999). *Trading Identities; Why Countries and Companies Are Taking on Each Other's Roles*. London, United Kingdom: Foreign Policy Centre.
- Oloruntoba, R., & Gray, R. (2006). Humanitarian aid: an agile supply chain? *Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, 2(11), pp. 115-120.

University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Political science
Master Thesis

Omeragić, A. (2021, January 15). *Anadolu Agency*. Retrieved from Crna Gora: Vakcinacija protiv koronavirusa počinje krajem januara ili početkom februara: <https://www.aa.com.tr/ba/korona-virus/crna-gora-vakcinacija-protiv-koronavirusa-po%C4%8Dinje-krajem-januara-ili-po%C4%8Detkom-februara-/2111389#>

Oran, D. P., & Topol, E. J. (2021, January 22). The Proportion of SARS-CoV-2 Infections That Are Asymptomatic. *Annals of internal medicine*, pp. 1-9. Retrieved August 18, 2021, from <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7839426/>

Ovčina, A. (2021, May 26). *Dnevni Avaz*. Retrieved from Izetbegović se vakcinisao Pfizerom: Ništa ne boli, postojala je mogućnost da uđem na VIP ulaz: <https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/654272/izetbegovic-se-vakcinisao-pfizerom-nista-ne-boli-postojala-je-mogucnost-da-udem-na-vip-ulaz2>

Page, J., Hinshaw, D., & McKay, B. (2021, February 26). *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved August 18, 2021, from In Hunt for Covid-19 Origin, Patient Zero Points to Second Wuhan Market: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-hunt-for-covid-19-origin-patient-zero-points-to-second-wuhan-market-11614335404>

Pannu, J., & Barry, M. (2021, June 1). The state inoculates: vaccines as soft power. *The Lancet Global Health - Comment*, VI(9), pp. 744-745. doi:[https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X\(21\)00091-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(21)00091-7)

paragraf.rs. (n.d.). Retrieved from ODLUKA O OBRAZOVANJU KRIZNOG ŠTABA ZA SUZBIJANJE ZARAZNE BOLESTI COVID-19: <https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/odluka-o-obrazovanju-kriznog-staba-za-suzbijanje-zarazne-bolesti-covid-19.html>

Patakh, A. (2016). Assessment of Soft Power Strategies: Towards an Aggregative Analytical Model for Country-Focused Case Study Research. *Croatian International Relations Review*, pp. 85-112.

Pells, R. (1997). *Not like us*. New York: Basic Books.

people.com.cn. (2013, October 25). Retrieved from 习近平在周边外交工作座谈会上发表重要讲话: <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1025/c1024-23332318.html>

Peruvemba, J. (2018, May 31). *Development and cooperation*. Retrieved from Why the nexus is dangerous: <https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/expert-warns-against-coupling-humanitarian-aid-other-development-goals>

Petrov, A. (2021, March 17). *AlJazeera Balkans*. Retrieved from Serbia's vaccine diplomacy in China's shadow: <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/3/17/serbias-vaccine-diplomacy-in-chinas-shadow>

pfizer. (2021, August 26). *Pfizer.com*. Retrieved from Pfizer and BioNTech Announce Collaboration With Brazil's Eurofarma to Manufacture COVID-19 Vaccine Doses for Latin America: <https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer-and-biontech-announce-collaboration-brazils>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

- Popović, S. (2021, February 12). *European Western Balkans*. Retrieved from Hoće li nabavka vakcina ojačati uticaj Rusije i Kine u Srbiji?: <https://europeanwesternbalkans.rs/hoce-li-nabavka-vakcina-ojacati-uticaj-rusije-i-kine-u-srbiji/>
- Popović, S. (2021, February 12). *European Western Balkans*. Retrieved from Hoće li nabavka vakcina ojačati uticaj Rusije i Kine u Srbiji?: <https://europeanwesternbalkans.rs/hoce-li-nabavka-vakcina-ojacati-uticaj-rusije-i-kine-u-srbiji/>
- Queiroz, S. (2021, February 6). *Reuters*. Retrieved from Brazil gets first active ingredients for AstraZeneca vaccine from China: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-brazil/brazil-gets-first-active-ingredients-for-astrazeneca-vaccine-from-china-idUSKBN2A60S7>
- Quelch, J., & Jocz, K. (2005). Positioning the nation state. *Place branding, 1*(3), pp. 229–237.
- R.D. (2021, 1 22). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Dodik zamolio kineskog ambasadora da BiH što prije dobije vakcinu protiv korone: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-zamolio-kineskog-ambasadora-da-bih-sto-prije-dobije-vakcinu-protiv-korone/210122108>
- R.D. (2021, March 24). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Objavljujemo pismo u kojem Medimpex navodi razloge zbog kojih odustaje od nabavke vakcina: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/objavljujemo-pismo-u-kojem-medimpex-navodi-razloge-zbog-kojih-odustaje-od-nabavke-vakcina/210324117>
- R.D. (2021, March 29). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Novalić potpisao pismo namjere za kupovinu 500 hiljada doza kineskog Sinopharma: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/novalic-potpisao-pismo-namjere-za-kupovinu-500-hiljada-doza-kineskog-sinopharma/210329110>
- R.D. (2021, March 30). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from FBiH insistirala na nabavci ruske vakcine, a nema potrebne uslove za skladištenje: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/fbih-insistirala-na-nabavci-ruske-vakcine-a-nema-potrebne-uslove-za-skladistenje/210330030>
- R.D. (2021, August 4). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Pola miliona vakcina AstraZenece stiže 9. augusta u BiH: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/pola-miliona-vakcina-astrazenece-stize-9-augusta-u-bih/210804124>
- R.D. (2021, February 3). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Tegeltija: BiH je ispregovarala i platila vakcine za 40 posto stanovništva: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/tegeltija-bih-je-ispregovarala-i-platila-vakcine-za-40-posto-stanovnistva/210203070>
- R.D. (2021, April 27). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Poljoprivredno gazdinstvo "Srebrena malina" je uvoznik kineskih respiratora u FBiH: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/poljoprivredno-gazdinstvo-srebrena-malina-je-uvoznik-kineskih-respiratora-u-fbih/200427095>
- R.D. (2022, February 24). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Nošenje maski u FBiH u zatvorenim prostorima više nije obaveza: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/nosenje-maski-u-fbih-u-zatvorenim-prostorima-vise-nije-obaveza/220224063>

University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Political science
Master Thesis

Radio free Europe radio Liberty. (2021, June 7). *Radio free Europe radio Liberty*. Retrieved from Slovakia Becomes Second EU Member To Use Russia's Sputnik Vaccine: <https://www.rferl.org/a/slovakia-russia-sputnik-covid/31294601.html>

Radio Kotor. (2020, December 24). *Radio Kotor*. Retrieved from PROCEDURA NABAVKE VAKCINA PROTIV COVID-19 OBOLJENJA: <https://radiokotor.info/clanak/drustvo/procedura-nabavke-vakcina-protiv-covid-19-oboljenja/0>

Radio Slobodna Europa. (2020, May 26). *Radio Slobodna Europa*. Retrieved from Američka vojska i NATO u BiH: Donacija medicinske opreme za bolnice: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/30635655.html>

Radio Slobodna Evropa. (2020, March 11). *Radio Slobodna Evropa*. Retrieved from Proglašena pandemija korona virusa u svetu: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/30482379.html>

Radio Slobodna Evropa. (2020, March 21). *Radio Slobodna Evropa*. Retrieved from Avion sa lekarima i pomoći iz Kine sleteo u Beograd: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/30501473.html>

Radio Slobodna Evropa. (2020, December 22). *Radio Slobodna Evropa*. Retrieved from U Srbiji naredne nedelje vakcinisanje pristiglim Pfizer vakcinama: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/31013283.html>

Radio Slobodna Evropa. (2021, October 12). *Radio Slobodna Evropa*. Retrieved from Ruski COVID turizam: U Srbiju po zapadne vakcine: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/srbija-koronavirus-rusi-vakcina/31504017.html>

Radio Slobodna Evropa. (2021, October 5). *vijesti.me*. Retrieved from Crna Gora i vakcina Sputnjik V – neispunjena očekivanja: <https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/drustvo/569516/crna-gora-i-vakcina-sputnjik-v-neispunjena-ocekivanja>

Radio Slobodna Evropa. (2022, July 29). *Radio Slobodna Evropa*. Retrieved from U Crnoj Gori ponovo obavezne maske, raste broj zaraženih od COVID-19: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-ponovo-obavezne-maske-protiv-kovida/31965293.html>

Rainsford, S. (2021, March 3). *BBC News*. Retrieved from Why many in Russia are reluctant to have Sputnik vaccine: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56250456>

Rajah, R., Leng, A., & Lemahieu, H. (2022, March 1). *Lowy Institute*. Retrieved from TOWARDS A BETTER VACCINE DIPLOMACY: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/vaccine-diplomacy-asia>

Ralev, R. (2021, February 18). *SeeNews*. Retrieved from Montenegro receives 2,000 doses of Sputnik V vaccine from Serbia: <https://seenews.com/news/montenegro-receives-2000-doses-of-sputnik-v-vaccine-from-serbia-731699>

Redakcija Pobjede. (2020, August 3). *pobjeda.me*. Retrieved from Hrapović: Situacija u Pljevljima se smiruje: <https://www.pobjeda.me/clanak/hrapovic-situacija-u-pljevljima-se-smiruje>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Redakcija Pobjede. (2020, October 9). *pobjeda.me*. Retrieved from Crna Gora će imati vakcinu protiv kovida kad bude dostupna, cijena po dozi 8.84 eura: <https://www.pobjeda.me/clanak/crna-gora-ce-imati-vakcinu-protiv-kovida-kad-bude-dostupna-cijena-po-dozi-884-eura>

Redakcija Pobjede. (2020, July 3). *pobjeda.me*. Retrieved from Nikšićki ljekari odgovorili Hrapoviću: Učešćem na litijama nije ugroženo zdravlje: <https://www.pobjeda.me/clanak/niksicki-ljekari-odgovorili-hrapovicu-ucescem-na-litijama-nije-ugrozeno-zdravlje>

Redakcija Pobjede. (2020, July 24). *pobjeda.me*. Retrieved from Hrapović: Spremni smo i na mnogo gore scenarije, brine ležerniji odnos mladih: <https://www.pobjeda.me/clanak/hrapovic-spremni-smo-i-na-mnogo-gore-scenarije>

Reuters. (2021, January 29). *Reuters*. Retrieved from Russia's RDIF says it could ship 100 mln doses of vaccine to EU in Q2: <https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/russias-rdif-says-it-could-ship-100-mln-doses-vaccine-eu-q2-2021-01-29/>

Reuters. (2021, June 4). *Reuters*. Retrieved from Serbia and Argentina start producing Russia's Sputnik V vaccine: <https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/serbia-argentina-start-producing-russias-sputnik-v-vaccine-2021-06-04/>

Reuters. (2021, September 10). *Reuters*. Retrieved from Hungary signs letter of intent to produce Chinese Sinopharm shots: <https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/hungary-signs-letter-intent-produce-chinese-sinopharm-shots-2021-09-10/>

Reuters. (2021, July 29). *Reuters.com*. Retrieved from Brazil to cancel contract for Russian COVID-19 vaccine, minister says: <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-cancel-contract-russian-covid-19-vaccine-minister-says-2021-07-29/>

Reuters. (2022, February 23). *Reuters*. Retrieved from Bavaria freezes Sputnik V production in Germany citing sanctions against Russia: <https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/bavaria-freezes-sputnik-v-production-germany-citing-sanctions-against-russia-2022-02-23/>

Reuters Staff. (2020, April 9). *Reuters*. Retrieved from Vietnam can produce 5.72 mln surgical masks a day -government statement: <https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-vietnam/vietnam-can-produce-572-mln-surgical-masks-a-day-government-statement-idUSL3N2BX306>

Reuters Staff. (2021, March 26). *Reuters*. Retrieved from Italy's Campania region signs deal to buy Russia's Sputnik V vaccine: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-italy-sputnik-idUSKBN2BI2I6>

Reuters Staff. (2021, March 22). *Reuters*. Retrieved from Hungary approves new Chinese vaccine, and CoviShield for emergency use: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-hungary-vaccines-idUSKBN2BE1I4>

University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Political science
Master Thesis

Reuters Stuff. (2021, February 14). *Reuters*. Retrieved from Serbia donates thousands of doses of Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine to North Macedonia: <https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-nmacedonia-serbia-idUSL1N2KK06U>

Rhodes, J. (2013). *The end of plagues : the global battle against infectious disease*. New York City, New York, United States of America: Palgrave Macmillan.

Richter, F. (2021, December 17). *Statista*. Retrieved from Covid-19 Vaccines: From Zero to 11.2 Billion in a Year: <https://www.statista.com/chart/26420/global-covid-19-vaccine-production/>

Ripley, C. (2017, June 28). *Oxford Research Encyclopedia*. Retrieved from Discourse in Foreign Policy: <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-411>

Robin. (2011, November 28). *Public Diplomacy, Networks and Influence*. Retrieved from EH Carr and the Realist Theory of Propaganda: <https://pdnetworks.wordpress.com/tag/power-over-opinion/>

rtcg.me. (2021, January 20). *rtcg.me*. Retrieved from Kašnjenjem vakcina trebalo bi da se bavi SDT: <https://rtcg.me/vijesti/drustvo/307131/kasnjenjem-vakcina-trebalo-bi-da-se-bavi-sdt.html>

RTS. (2021, January 6). *N1*. Retrieved from Dva miliona doza ruske vakcine za Srbiju: <https://rs.n1info.com/vesti/dva-miliona-doza-ruske-vakcine-za-srbiju/>

RTS, & FoNET. (2021, May 12). *N1 Srbija*. Retrieved from Ivanuša: Srbija pokazala kako masovna vakcinacija može da utiče na tok epidemije: <https://rs.n1info.com/vesti/ivanusa-srbija-pokazala-kako-masovna-vakcinacija-moze-da-utice-na-tok-epidemije/>

S.H. (2021, March 16). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Konaković, Kojović i Nikšić hitno zasjedali: Pozivamo više nivoa vlasti da nam se pridruže: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/konakovic-kojovic-i-niksic-hitno-zasjedali-pozivamo-vise-nivoa-vlasti-da-nam-se-pridruze/210316072>

S.M. (2021, March 2021). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Tužilaštvo BiH formiralo predmet u vezi nenabavke vakcina i ugrožavanja života građana: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/tuzilastvo-bih-formiralo-predmet-u-vezi-nenabavke-vakcina-i-ugrozavanja-zivota-gradjana/210327036>

Sabin, A. B. (1985, March 3). Oral Poliovirus Vaccine: History of Its Development and Use and Current Challenge to Eliminate Poliomyelitis from the World. *The Journal of Infectious Diseases*, pp. 420-436.

Safi, M. (2021, February 19). *The Guardian*. Retrieved from Vaccine diplomacy: west falling behind in race for influence: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/19/coronavirus-vaccine-diplomacy-west-falling-behind-russia-china-race-influence>

Saunders, R. (2004). Natsional'nost': kiberrusskii. *Rossiya v global'noi politike* 4.

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Schmidt, C. (2022, February 24). *NPR*. Retrieved from Looks like non-mRNA vaccines can be as good as Pfizer and Moderna in certain scenarios:

<https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/02/24/1082529219/looks-like-non-mrna-vaccines-can-be-as-good-as-pfizer-and-moderna-in-certain-sce>

Schmidt, P., & Džihic, V. (2021, April 28). *London school of Economics and Political science*. Retrieved from Vaccine diplomacy and enlargement fatigue: Why the EU must rethink its approach to the Western Balkans: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/04/28/vaccine-diplomacy-and-enlargement-fatigue-why-the-eu-must-rethink-its-approach-to-the-western-balkans/>

SDA. (2021, April 8). *SDA.ba*. Retrieved from Izetbegović: Imat ćemo milion vakcina u naredna dva do tri mjeseca: <https://www.sda.ba/vijest/video-izetbegovic-imat-ceso-milion-vakcina-u-naredna-dva-do-tri-mjeseca/1260>

semberija.info. (2020, November 30). *semberija.info*. Retrieved from Do kraja sedmice u Srbiju stiže prva tura vakcine Sputnik pet: <https://www.semberija.info/lat/news/novosti/-/12017.do-kraja-sedmice-u-srbiju-stize-prva-tura-vakcine-sputnjik-pet.html>

senat.me. (2020, March 26). *senat.me*. Retrieved from Coronainfocg # – Formiran Krizni Medicinski Štab: <https://senat.me/me/coronainfocg-formiran-krizni-medicinski-stab/>

senat.me. (2020, March 25). *senat.me*. Retrieved from Obustava Putničkog Međunarodnih Saobraćaja: Nove Mjere NKT: <https://senat.me/me/obustava-putnickog-medunarodnih-saobracaja-nove-mjere-nkt/>

Shakeel, S. I., Brown, M., Sethi, S., & Mackey, T. K. (2019, January 17). Achieving the end game: employing "vaccine diplomacy" to eradicate polio in Pakistan. *BMC Public Health*. doi:10.1186/s12889-019-6393-1

Shuldiner, H. (2022, January 21). *Wilson Center*. Retrieved from 'Vaccine Diplomacy,' the Final Frontier: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/vaccine-diplomacy-final-frontier>

Sijamija, M. (2021, April 4). *Analiziraj.ba*. Retrieved from Imunizacija stanovništva BiH još nije započela – građani zabrinuti: <https://analiziraj.ba/imunizacija-stanovnistva-bih-jos-nije-zapocela-gradani-zabrinuti/>

Sijamija, M. (2021). *ULOGA VANJSKE POLITIKE U BORBI PROTIV PANDEMIJE*. Sarajevo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved from <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sarajevo/18764.pdf>

Silver, L., Devlin, K., & Huang, C. (2020, October 6). *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved from Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/>

Smajić, Z. (2020, April 23). *AlJazeera Balkans*. Retrieved from Činjenice o donacijama Srbiji: <https://balkans.aljazeera.net/opinions/2020/4/23/cinjenice-o-donacijama-srbiji>

Snow, N., & Taylor, P. M. (2009). *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. New York, New York, United States of America: Routledge.

Solomon, T. (2014). The Affective Underpinnings of Soft Power. *European Journal of International Relations*, pp. 720-741.

Song, W. (2021, October 10). *BBC*. Retrieved from Covid-19 vaccines: Has China made more than other countries combined?: <https://www.bbc.com/news/58808889>

Sputnik Vaccine. (2020, November 24). *sputnikvaccine.com*. Retrieved from SECOND INTERIM ANALYSIS OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA SHOWED A 91.4% EFFICACY FOR THE SPUTNIK V VACCINE ON DAY 28 AFTER THE FIRST DOSE; VACCINE EFFICACY IS OVER 95% 42 DAYS AFTER THE FIRST DOSE: <https://sputnikvaccine.com/newsroom/pressreleases/second-interim-analysis-of-clinical-trial-data-showed-a-91-4-efficacy-for-the-sputnik-v-vaccine-on-d/>

SRNA. (2020, May 15). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Dodik: Vanredno stanje bilo opravdana mjera, opozicija nije ništa radila: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-vanredno-stanje-bilo-opravdana-mjera-opozicija-nije-nista-radila/200515179>

SRNA. (2020, April 30). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Dodik: Pogoršana epidemiološka situacija u RS-u, strpimo se 10 dana: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-pogorsana-epidemioloska-situacija-u-rs-u-strpimo-se-10-dana/200430136>

SRNA. (2020, May 12). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from SNSD zatražio ukidanje vanrednog stanja u Republici Srpskoj: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/snsd-zatrazio-ukidanje-vanrednog-stanja-u-republici-srpskoj/200512083>

SRNA. (2020, March 31). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Dodik o medicinskoj pomoći: Poruka Srbije je da brine o Republici Srpskoj: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-o-medicinskoj-pomoci-poruka-srbije-je-da-brine-o-republici-srpskoj/200331216>

SRNA. (2020, April 9). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Prvi dio medicinske opreme iz Rusije stigao na banjalučki aerodrom: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/prvi-dio-medicinske-opreme-iz-rusije-stigao-na-banjalucki-aerodrom/200409187>

SRNA. (2020, April 9). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Na banjalučki aerodrom stigao i drugi avion ruske pomoći: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/na-banjalucki-aerodrom-stigao-i-drugi-avion-ruske-pomoci/200409225>

SRNA. (2020, April 9). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from U Banju Luku stigao i treći avion ruske pomoći: RS dobila respiratore i medicinsku opremu: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/u-banju-luku-stigao-i-treci-avion-ruske-pomoci-rs-dobila-respiratore-i-medicinsku-opremu/200409232>

SRNA. (2020, April 16). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Na banjalučki aerodrom sletio avion sa mađarskom pomoći: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/na-banjalucki-aerodrom-sletio-avion-sa-madjarskom-pomoci/200416165>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

- SRNA. (2020, April 9). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Dodik: RS je zbog koronavirusa već pretrpjela gubitke od 750 miliona KM: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-rs-je-zbog-koronavirusa-vec-pretrpjela-gubitke-od-750-miliona-km/200409185>
- SRNA. (2020, March 19). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Dodik se zahvalio Xi Jinpingu: Ostavljeni od Evrope, gledamo u Vas: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-se-zahvalio-xi-jinpingu-ostavljeni-od-evrope-gledamo-u-vas/200319048>
- SRNA. (2020, April 22). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from U RS iz Srbije stiglo deset respiratora i 5.000 testova za koronavirus: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/u-rs-iz-srbije-stiglo-deset-respiratora-i-5-000-testova-za-koronavirus/200422205>
- SRNA. (2020, August 19). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Dodik: Nabavku ruske vakcine završit ću najesen, niko neće biti natjeran da je primi: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-nabavku-ruske-vakcine-završit-cu-najesen-niko-neće-bit-natjeran-da-je-primi/200819086>
- SRNA. (2020, December 3). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Dodik ponovo govorio u UN-u, ovaj put o borbi protiv korone i potrebi za jedinstvom: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-ponovo-govorio-u-un-u-ovaj-put-o-borbi-protiv-korone-i-potrebi-za-jedinstvom/201203129>
- SRNA. (2021, January 20). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Dodik: Sljedeće sedmice dolazi 10 hiljada vakcina iz Rusije: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-sljedece-sedmice-dolazi-10-hiljada-vakcina-iz-rusije/210120116>
- SRNA. (2021, march 14). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Dodik o Covid pasošima: Dodatna diskriminacija stanovnika Evrope: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-o-covid-pasosima-dodatna-diskriminacija-stanovnika-evrope/210314082>
- SRNA. (2021, August 1). *N1 Bosna i Hercegovina*. Retrieved from Pfizer i Moderna podigle cijene vakcina protiv koronavirusa: <https://ba.n1info.com/svijet/pfizer-i-moderna-podigle-cijene-vakcina-protiv-koronavirusa/?fbclid=IwAR3NRIQkVPYDPosiLm4-0efZ2kgoRGg37U0tGjc2CAQjFKXVUcclxkkOQvA>
- Srpska Napredna Stranka. (2013, January 19). *Srpska Napredna Stranka*. Retrieved from СТАТУТ ЧЛЧ СРПСКЕ НАПРЕДНЕ СТРАНКЕ: <https://www.sns.org.rs/o-nama/statut-srpske-napredne-stranke>
- Srpskainfo. (2021, July 22). *Srpskainfo*. Retrieved from Očekuje se i pola miliona Sinofarm vakcina u avgustu: Izetbegović i kineski ambasador razgovarali o zatvaranju OHR u BiH: <https://srpskainfo.com/ocekuje-se-i-pola-miliona-sinofarm-vakcina-u-avgustu-izetbegovic-i-kineski-ambasador-razgovarali-i-zatvaranju-ohr-u-bih/>
- startbih.ba. (2021, October 18). *startbih.ba*. Retrieved from Sjedinjene Američke Države osigurale dodatnih 750.000 dolara WHO za pomoć borbi protiv COVID-19 u Bosni i Hercegovini: <https://startbih.ba/clanak/sjedinjene-americke-drzave-osigurale-dodatnih-750000-dolara-who-za-pomoc-borbi-protiv-covid-19-u-bosni-i-hercegovini/167092>

University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Political science
Master Thesis

State Department. (2022, January 6). *State Department*. Retrieved from COVID-19 Vaccine Donations: https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/%22%20%5C%20%22map_western/

Stronski, P. (2021, November 15). *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved from What Went Wrong With Russia's Sputnik V Vaccine Rollout?: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/15/what-went-wrong-with-russia-s-sputnik-v-vaccine-rollout-pub-85783>

Tanjug. (2020, October 9). *ekspres.net*. Retrieved from BEZ ČEKANJA I APLICIRANJA: Crna Gora rezervisala vakcinu protiv korone: <https://www.ekspres.net/vesti/bez-cekanja-i-apliciranja-crna-gora-rezervisala-vakcinu-protiv-korone>

Tanjug. (2021, March 12). *Ekspres.net*. Retrieved from U Srbiju stigla medicinska oprema iz UAE: <https://www.ekspres.net/vesti/u-srbiju-stigla-medicinska-oprema-iz-uae>

TASS. (2021, January 28). *TASS.com*. Retrieved from Argentine leader prefers Russian Sputnik V to other COVID-19 vaccines: <https://tass.com/world/1394825>

Tatalović, Ž. (2020, April 24). *N1 Srbija*. Retrieved from Ljutnja prema EU brzo prošla predsednika, sada zahvaljuje na solidarnosti: <https://rs.n1info.com/vesti/a592669-ljutnja-prema-eu-brzo-pros-la-predsednika-sada-zahvaljuje-na-solidarnosti/>

Tatarski, M. (2019, February 28). *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from Vietnam Won the Trump-Kim Summit: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/02/vietnam-won-trump-kim-summit/583834/>

The Government of Republic of Serbia. (2021, March 2). *The Government of Republic of Serbia*. Retrieved from Serbia donates 5,000 AstraZeneca vaccines to Bosnia and Herzegovina: <https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/168699/serbia-donates-5000-astrazeneca-vaccines-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina.php>

The Government of the Republic of Serbia. (2020, March 15). *The Government of the Republic of Serbia*. Retrieved from Proglašeno vanredno stanje na teritoriji čitave Srbije: <https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/451323/proglaseno-vanredno-stanje-na-teritoriji-citave-srbije.php>

The New York Times. (2021, April 26). *The Daily - Why Russia Is Exporting So Much Vaccine*. New York, New York, United States of America. Retrieved February 26, 2022., from <https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcY5zaW1wbGVjYXN0LmNvbS81NG5BR2NJbA/episode/YTQ0MGJiNTctZjdkNy00OTNhLWExN2ItMzhkY2I3N2E5YzRh?sa=X&ved=0CAgQuIEEahcKEwjwuPOhrp32AhUAAAAAHQAAAAQLA>

Thorpe, N. (2021, January 21). *BBC News*. Retrieved from Coronavirus: Hungary first in EU to approve Russian vaccine: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55747623>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

Ting Lee, S. (2021, July 6). Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China's COVID-19 soft power play. *Place Brand Public Diplomacy*, pp. 1-15.

Ting Lee, S., & Kim, H. S. (2020, October 15). Nation branding in the COVID-19 era: South Korea's pandemic public diplomacy. *Place Brand Public Diplomacy*.
doi:<https://doi.org/10.1057%2Fs41254-020-00189-w>

Tsifakis, N., & Prelec, T. (2021). From mask to vaccine diplomacy: geopolitical competition in the Western Balkans. In G. Fruscione, *THE PANDEMIC IN THE BALKANS Geopolitics and Democracy at Stake* (pp. 12-34). Milan, Italy: Ledizioni LediPublishing. Retrieved from
<https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e945b068-10db-4c69-87bd-7cad5229df4f>

Tsygankov, A. P. (2006, November 28). If not by tanks, then by banks? The role of soft power in Putin's foreign policy. *Europe-Asia Studies*, pp. 1079-1099.

Tuhina, G. (2020, May 6). *Radio Slobodna Evropa*. Retrieved from Samit u Zagrebu: Podrška EU Zapadnom Balkanu na putu ka pridruživanju: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/samit-eu-zapadni-balkan-zagreb-/30595890.html>

Tzifakis, N. (2021). The Geopolitics of Pandemic-related Assistance to the Western Balkans. *MEDITERRANEAN YEARBOOK*, pp. 177-180.

U.S. Department for human and health services. (2020, April 8). *U.S. Department for human and health services*. Retrieved from HHS to Provide Millions of TYVEK Protective Suits for U.S. Healthcare Workers:
<https://public3.pagefreezer.com/browse/HHS%20%E2%80%93%93%C2%A0About%20News/20-01-2021T12:29/https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/04/08/hhs-provide-millions-tyvek-protective-suits-us-healthcare-workers.html>

UNDP. (2021, August 26). *UNDP.org*. Retrieved from Sjedinjene države donirale još pet ambulantnih vozila za zdravstvene ustanove u Srbiji: <https://www.undp.org/sr/serbia/news/sjedinjene-dr%C5%BEave-donirale-jo%C5%A1-pet-ambulantnih-vozila-za-zdravstvene-ustanove-u-srbiji>

UNDP Srbija. (2020, March 27). *UNDP Srbija*. Retrieved from Uz podršku EU i UNDP-a hitno potrebna medicinska oprema stigla u Srbiju: <https://www.undp.org/sr/serbia/news/uz-podr%C5%A1ku-eu-i-undp-hitno-potrebna-medicinska-oprema-stigla-u-srbiju>

UNICEF Crna Gora. (2021, March 30). *UNICEF Crna Gora*. Retrieved from COVAX isporučio 24,000 doza vakcine Astra Zeneka Crnoj Gori: <https://www.unicef.org/montenegro/price/covax-isporu%C4%8Dio-24000-doza-vakcine-astra-zeneka-crnoj-gori>

UNICEF Crna Gora. (2021, May 14). *UNICEF Crna Gora*. Retrieved from U Crnu Goru stigao drugi kontigent vakcina preko COVAX mehanizma: <https://www.unicef.org/montenegro/price/u-crnu-goru-stigao-drugi-kontigent-vakcina-preko-covax-mehanizma>

University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Political science
Master Thesis

United Nations. (2021, March 11). *United Nations*. Retrieved from UN launches 'Only Together' campaign to support global vaccine equity call : <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1087072>

United Nations. (n.d.). *United Nations*. Retrieved from Deliver Humanitarian Aid: <https://www.un.org/en/our-work/deliver-humanitarian-aid>

US Department of State. (n.d.). *US Department of State*,. Retrieved from Kosovo: <https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/kosovo/>

US Embassy and Consulates in Brazil. (2021, June 25). *US Embassy and Consulates in Brazil*. Retrieved from The United States Donates 3 Million Doses of Johnson & Johnson Vaccine to Brazil: <https://br.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-donates-3-million-doses-of-johnson-johnson-vaccine-to-brazil/>

V.K. (2021, June 10). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Naša stranka: Neka Novalić objavi ugovor s Kinezima i kaže ko je uvoznik: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/nasa-stranka-neka-novalic-objavi-ugovor-s-kinezima-i-kaze-ko-je-uvoznik/210610149>

V.K. (2021, July 1). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Vlada FBiH potvrdila: S Kinezima smo zaključili ugovor o kupovini 500.000 Sinopharm vakcina: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/vlada-fbih-potvrdila-s-kinezima-smo-zakljucili-ugovor-o-kupovini-500-000-sinopharm-vakcina/210701051>

V.K. (2022, January 4). *klix.ba*. Retrieved from Građani Kantona Sarajevo se ovog vikenda mogu vakcinisati u SCC-u: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/gradjani-kantona-sarajevo-se-ovog-vikenda-mogu-vakcinisati-u-scc-u/220104135>

Vangeli, A. (2021). *Western Balkan Discourses On and Positioning Towards China During the COVID-19 Pandemic*. Prague: Prague Security Studies Institute.

Vargha, D. (2018). Sabin Saves the Day. In D. Vargha, *Polio across the iron curtain* (pp. 147-179). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/polio-across-the-iron-curtain/sabin-saves-the-day/8198A8518BF08D25A1F187A89B96D47E>

Vice, M. (2017, August 16). *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved from Publics Worldwide Unfavorable Toward Putin, Russia: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/08/16/publics-worldwide-unfavorable-toward-putin-russia/>

Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2020, February 9). *Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs*,. Retrieved from Vietnam hands over medical equipment to China for nCoV combat: <https://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns200211081448>

Vu, K. (2020, April 3). *Reuters*. Retrieved from UPDATE 2-Vietnam's Vingroup says to produce ventilators in COVID-19 fight: <https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-vietnam-vingroup/update-1-vietnams-vingroup-says-to-produce-ventilators-in-covid-19-fight-idUSL4N2BR2ON>

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022

- Vuksanović, V. (2021, April 16). *cepa.org*. Retrieved from In the Balkans, Serbia Has Its Own Vaccine Diplomacy: <https://cepa.org/in-the-balkans-serbia-has-its-own-vaccine-diplomacy/>
- Vuksanović, V. (2021, September 10). *EU Observer*. Retrieved from Kosovo: the goal of Serbia's global 'vaccine diplomacy': <https://euobserver.com/opinion/152849>
- Vuving, A. L. (2009). HOW SOFT POWER WORKS. *American Political Science Association annual meeting*, (pp. 1-20). Toronto.
- Waagleitner, R. (1994). *Coca colonization and the cold war*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Wheaton, S. (2020, May 18). *politico*. Retrieved from Chinese vaccine would be 'global public good,' Xi says: <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/18/chinese-vaccine-would-be-global-public-good-xi-says-265039>
- World Health Organization (WHO). (2021, August 17). *World Health Organization*. Retrieved August 18, 2021, from Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic: <https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019>
- World Health Organization (WHO). (n.d.). *World Health Organization*. Retrieved August 18, 2021, from Coronavirus: https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1
- World Health Organization. (2022, June 2). *World Health Organization*. Retrieved from 11 Vaccines Granted Emergency Use Listing (EUL) by WHO: <https://covid19.trackvaccines.org/agency/who/>
- World Health Organization. (n.d.). *World Health Organization*. Retrieved from List of vaccine producing countries with functional NRAs: <https://www.who.int/initiatives/who-listed-authority-reg-authorities/list-of-vaccine-prod-countries>
- World Health Organization. (n.d.). *World Health Organization*. Retrieved from COVID-19: vulnerable and high risk groups: <https://www.who.int/westernpacific/emergencies/covid-19/information/high-risk-groups>
- Worldometers.info. (2021, October 17.). *Worldometers.info*. Retrieved from COVID-19 CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC: <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/#countries>
- Wu, H., & Gelineau, K. (2021). Chinese vaccines sweep much of the world, despite concerns. *The Diplomat*.
- Wu, H., & Gelineau, K. (2021, March 2). *CP24*. Retrieved from China ships millions of COVID-19 vaccines to poor nations abroad; denies 'vaccine diplomacy': <https://www.cp24.com/world/china-ships-millions-of-covid-19-vaccines-to-poor-nations-abroad-denies-vaccine-diplomacy-1.5329782>
- xinhua. (2021, June 5). *Xinhua Net*. Retrieved from Serbia officially starts to produce Russia's COVID-19 vaccine: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-06/05/c_139989827.htm

University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Political science
Master Thesis

Yang, Y. (2020, March 22). Looking inward: How does Chinese public diplomacy work at home? *he British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, pp. 369-385.

Z.K. (2020, July 21). *tportal.hr*. Retrieved from Crna Gora proglasila epidemiju koronavirusa na cijelom teritoriju: <https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/crna-gora-proglasila-epidemiju-koronavirusa-na-cijelom-teritoriju-20200721>

Zahrn, G., & Ramos, L. (2010). From Hegemony to Soft Power: Implications of a Conceptual Change. *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, pp. 12-31.

Zavod za javno zdravstvo Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine. (n.d.). *Zavod za javno zdravstvo Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine*. Retrieved from Informacije o cjepivu: <https://www.zzjzfbih.ba/informacije-o-cjepivu/>

Zavod Zdravstvenog Osiguranja Kantona Sarajevo. (2021, May 25). *Zavod Zdravstvenog Osiguranja Kantona Sarajevo*. Retrieved from Edukativni tekst, pitanja i odgovori i linkovi na brošure koje je izradio Zavod za javno zdravstvo Kantona Sarajevo: <https://www.kzzosa.ba/Publication/Read/edukativni-materijal-u-svrhu-promocije-covid-19-vakcinacije>

Zhang, R. (2021, May 31). *South China Morning Post*. Retrieved from Coronavirus: Serbia backs China against 'vaccine diplomacy' critics: <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3135511/coronavirus-serbia-backs-china-against-vaccine-diplomacy>

Zhao, K. (2019, April). The China Model of Public Diplomacy and its Future. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, pp. 169-181.

Živić, P. (2020, March 16). *BBC News*. Retrieved from Korona virus: Prvi zaraženi registrovani u Crnoj Gori: <https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/balkan-51915803>



Република Србија
МИНИСТАРСТВО ЗДРАВЉА
Број: 500-01-523/2022-16
20.05.2022. године
Београд

МИЉА ЧУЛИЋ

ministks@gmail.com

На основу Закона о слободном приступу информацијама од јавног значаја („Службени гласник РС“, бр. 120/04, 54/07, 104/09 и 36/10) и Вашег захтева којим сте доставили захтев који се односи на број вакцина против COVID-19 вируса које је Република Србија набавила како куповином, тако и кроз донације других држава од почетка пандемије до дана одговора на Захтев, обавештавамо Вас о следећем:

Сходно закону, све податке од јавно здравственог значаја прикупља, обједињује, анализира и тумачи завод за јавно здравље основан за територију Републике Србије. Наиме, чланом 101. став 4. тачке 2. и 12. Закона о здравственој заштити („Службени гласник РС“ бр. 25/19) предвиђено је да Завод за јавно здравље основан за територију Републике Србије прати и анализира здравствене проблеме и ризике по здравље становништва, као и да спроводи и координира активности јавног здравља у кризним и ванредним ситуацијама, у складу са законом, а чланом 7. став 8. Закон о заштити становништва од заразних болести („Службени гласник РС“ бр. 15/16, 68/20, 136/20) прописано је да Завод за јавно здравље основан за територију Републике Србије обједињује, анализира и тумачи податке добијене епидемиолошким надзором на територији Републике Србије.

Сходно наведеном упућујемо Вас да се за добијање тражених информација обратите Институту за јавно здравље Србије „Др Милан Јовановић Батут“.

С поштовањем,



Image 1 - Answer of Ministry of Health of Serbia on my request for free access to information of public importance

Minja Čulić
1127-POSIG/20
Sarajevo 2022



ИНСТИТУТ ЗА ЈАВНО ЗДРАВЉЕ СРБИЈЕ
„Др Милан Јовановић Батут“
Др Суботица 5, 11000 Београд, Србија
<http://www.batut.org.rs>

Телефон централа: 011-2684-566
Број рачуна: 840-624661-38

Факс: 011-2685-735
Матични број: 07036027

Електронски пошта: kabinet@batut.org.rs
ПИБ: 102006930

Миња Чулић
Стојана Јанковића бр. 5
70260 Мркоњић Град

09 JUN 2022
бр 2042/1

ПРЕДМЕТ: Поступање по Захтеву за слободан приступ информацијама од јавног значаја (ваш деп. бр. 2942/1 од 31.05.2022. године)

Поштовани г. Чулић,

У складу са Законом о слободном приступу информацијама од јавног значаја („Сл. гласник РС“, бр. 120/04, 54/07, 104/09, 36/10 и 105/21) обавештавамо Вас:

Податке о количинама купљених вакцина и од ког произвођача од стране Републике Србије као и податке о количинама дозирањих вакцина и од ког произвођача Републици Србији Институт за јавно здравље Србије „Др Милан Јовановић Батут“ не поседује с обзиром да тражене податке не прокупиља. У складу са наведеним, препоручујемо да се за тражене информације обратите добављачима вакцина, односно Влади Републике Србије на адресу: ул. Неманова бр. 11, 11000 Београд, Република Србија, емаил: kontakt@gov.rs.

У складу са чланом 19. Закона о слободном приступу информацијама од јавног значаја („Сл. гласник РС“, бр. 120/04, 54/07, 104/09, 36/10 и 105/21) Ваш захтев ће бити прослеђен Поверенику за информације од јавног значаја и заштити података о личности.

В.Д. ДИРЕКТОРА ИНСТИТУТА


Док. др Верика Јовановић

Image 2 - Answer of the institute for the Public Health of Serbia "Dr. Milan Jovanović Batut" on my request for free access to information of public importance