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**STRUCTURAL INTEGRATION OF
MIGRANTS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS
FROM THE MAGHREB INTO FRENCH
SOCIETY**

-Master Thesis-

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Abbreviations

TeO	Trajectories and Origins
INSEE	National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
IOM	International Organization for Migration
WW1	First World War,
WW2	Second World War
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
CAI	Reception and Integration Contract
CESEDA	Code of Entry and Stay of Foreigners and Rights of Asylum
SUZ	Sensitive Urban Zones
HLM	Hierarchical Linear Modeling
CMU	Universal health cover
BEPC	General Certificate of Secondary Education

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1. Introduction

France has a long history of immigration. Mass immigration to France began as early as the middle of the 19th century as a result of labor shortages created by industrial growth. At the beginning of the 1930s, 2.7 million immigrants (6.6% of the total population) were living in France, which had the second largest number of immigrants after the USA. In the post-war years and during the economic upturn of the 1950s and 1960s, immigration was encouraged in order to assist France's economic reconstruction. This mainly (single) male (unqualified) labor migration reached its peak in the 1960–74 period. In 1974 the French government officially stopped immigration other than family reunification in response to the perceived increasing number of immigrants entering the country and to the growing economic crisis. In spite of incentives to return to their home countries, many immigrants remained in France and were joined by their families (Engler 2007). This immigration continued to rise and was henceforth female dominated. As family reunification was the most important channel of immigration, successive restrictive immigration policies failed to stop immigration flows. In 2010 the French metropolitan population (i.e., France without its overseas departments) consisted of 10.7% immigrants (5.4 million). Since immigration started a long time ago, the descendants of immigrants represent a significant share of the adult population: 10.5% in 2008. The composition of immigration flows and the immigrant population according to country of origin changed over time. After the Second World War, the majority of immigrants came from Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, and Portugal). Subsequently France received more and more immigrants from its former colonies in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Southeast Asia. From the middle of the 1950s the Maghrebis (i.e., those from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) and the Turkish formed the most significant groups of new immigrants. Migration from Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) took place later and over a short period (mid-1970s to mid-1980s). Immigration from other EU-27 countries and from Sub-Saharan Africa (Senegal, Mali) is more recent, and the latter is gaining in significance.

INED and INSEE joined forces to conduct a special survey on population diversity in France and the issue of discrimination. This extensive survey, entitled Trajectories and Origins (TeO), a survey on population diversity in France, was conducted in metropolitan France between September 2008 and February 2009 on a sample of 21,000 people. Respondents were immigrants, DOM native-borns (ie. persons born in one of the French overseas départements),

descendants of immigrants, descendants of DOM native-borns, or persons born in metropolitan France without immigrant or DOM-native-born parents. This survey fills a gap in statistical knowledge of these minority populations; although they have been the subject of surveys in recent years, no previous survey has had such a large sample or covered so many areas of social life. The Trajectories and Origins survey is intended to assess how far migratory origins (from other countries or from overseas France) are liable to affect living conditions and chances of access to the goods, services and rights that establish a person's place in society: housing, education, employment and promotion, public services and welfare provisions, health, nationality and citizenship, etc. The survey addresses respondents' social situations at the time of the survey and looks at their living conditions and experiences (Haas 2006).

1.1. Methodological framework

1.1.1. Research question

For my research work, I chose the structural integration of immigrants from the Maghreb countries into French society because this example is the most relevant and current as far as the integration policies of the European Union countries are concerned. A large increase of new immigrants to France in recent years and past few decades resulted in debate between local community and national authorities over the issues of migrants.

In France, it is generally accepted that Muslim immigrants are largely to blame for their integration into society. However, the role of the host country of immigrants is equally important in the integration process.

The success of the integration of migrants from the Maghreb countries is under great question, and the question also arises as to whether it is even possible to successfully integrate such a large number of immigrants into one country. The host country in this case must impose its law and culture on every immigrant and it is known that the culture and state laws of the people who come from the Maghreb countries are fundamentally different from the French.

Simultaneously, integration of immigrated ethnic minorities is a major concern across European immigration countries, many of which have experienced riots among second generation immigrant youth in marginalized housing areas, heated debates on the “integration failure”, and the rise of anti-immigrant right wing parties in elections over the past years. There is also recognition that ethnic discrimination affects immigrants’ chances to participate on equal terms.

1.1.2. Research methods and purposes of the study

Point of the thesis is to contribute the academic literature by studying the importance of the French integration policies relating to immigrants from the Maghreb, in particular the French assimilation policy and its role in the integration process of those immigrants. The primary aim of thesis is to analyse integration issues of all three generations of the migrants from Maghreb from responsibility of the host society's perspective and from immigrants perspective also. Although there is a significant amount of study investigating the question of integration problems of Maghreb migrants, not much attention has been paid to exploring issues of structural integration such as political measures, employment, family, housing, healthcare system, culture, education and language.

To study the research question, quantitative statistical data, two small case studies (Paris and Marseille local policies on immigrants) and comparative evaluations will be employed.

To determine the degree of integration of migrants – how they integrated into society, I will look at the political, social and economic indicators of integration that will help to observe the issues their integration. The role of these three indicators in the integration process will be studied by using quantitative statistical data taken from databases, analytical reports from the European Union, reports from certain non-governmental organizations, scholarly research articles, websites and online articles.

1.2. Hypothesis formulation

Having elaborated the research topic, the general hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

Successful integration of immigrants (in particular those belonging to the first generation) from the Maghreb countries into French society is questionable due to certain structural issues.

General hypothesis will be observed through seven factors of structural integration: political measures, employment, family, housing, healthcare system, culture and education.

Auxillary hypotheses :

- a) French government often denies the opportunity to represent themselves in government bodies.
- b) The employment rate of migrants is not the same like the native born French population. There is often a problem with a qualification mismatch of migrants.
- c) Endogamy between migrants is the most frequent.
- d) Immigrant communities in France experience poorer living conditions than non-migrant counterparts.
- e) Health services are equally accessible for both the immigrants and French natives. There are differences in healthcare system between the two generations of immigrants although second generation of immigrants have better healthcare system than the first generation.
- f) Muslim immigrants and their children's cultural integration into French society has not progressed quickly as the previous waves of immigrants. France accepted the culture of the Maghrebi immigrants.
- g) In France, education is at the same level and provides equal opportunities in compare between French children and children of the Maghreb immigrants. There is a difference between men and women immigrants in a level of opportunities for education.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Definition of migrants and immigration

A migrant is a person who makes a conscious choice to leave their country to seek a better life elsewhere. Before they decide to leave their country, migrants can seek information about their new home, study the language and explore employment opportunities. They can plan their travel, take their belongings with them and say goodbye to the important people in their lives. They are free to return home at any time if things don't work out as they had hoped, if they get homesick or if they wish to visit family members and friends left behind (SSI settlement services international 2020).

There are over two hundred million migrants in the world currently, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Almost 3% of the total number of citizens in the world have a migrant status. After the Second World War, number of immigrants is dramatically increasing, thanks to globalization and major changes in the African political map. Almost every African state gained independence in the Cold War period as a result of the end of the colonization period and changes in the political views. The reasons for this massive migration flow after the WW2 are economic and political mostly. The rebuilding of post-war European economy is the key reason of such a rapid increase in migrant income from the third world.

France became a leader hosting country for guest-workers by the late 1960s, due to lack of labour force as one of the consequences of the war. France needed efficient and cheaper work force in order to recover their economy and infrastructure quickly in order to keep pace with other European powers. As a result of this migrant incomes, 7% of the total population in France is consisted of non-French citizens.

The Maghreb states, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, became the main source of foreign labour force after the end of the French colonisation era in the 1960s. A fact that these three Maghreb states were under the French rule for couple of hundreds of years plays an essential role in making a link between the past and the present migrations flow in France.

From the host country citizens perspective, France in this case, is widely held notion that the Maghreb migrants themselves are mostly responsible for their poor integration into the French society. On the other side, from the perspective of the Maghreb migrants, French state

policies and French assimilationist model of integration have failed in providing them an equal chances in society.

The role of the host country, as part of the integration process, is very important indicator in my study. French integration process has focused on the integration of migrants' children rather than on that of the first generation of migrants themselves.“ (Heckmann 2003) School system, along with nationality legislation has been considered as the best instrument to promote universal French principles, and to integrate young people into the national culture. It is expected that, amongst other subjects, the French language, values, culture and the rights as well as duties of citizenship should be the key to a successful integration. Language knowledge, as part of colonial legacy, has been certainly an important integration process facilitator.


A particularly interesting question is thus whether the French state policies have been able to guarantee a successful integration of the migrant communities in France. Assimilation model of integration that is conducting by France at this moment is not sufficiently coherent with the two-way integration approach that is based on Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy adopted in the European Union in November 2004.

At the international level, there is no universally accepted definition of the term “migrant”. Migrants may remain in the home country or host country (“settlers”), move on to another country (“transit migrants”), or move back and forth between countries (“circular migrants” such as seasonal workers) (WHO 2020). When counting migrants and analysing the consequences of migration, who counts as a migrant is of crucial importance. Yet there is no consensus on a single definition of a ‘migrant’. Migrants might be defined by foreign birth, by foreign citizenship, or by their movement into a new country to stay temporarily (sometimes for as little as one month) or to settle for the long-term. While dictionary definitions distinguish ‘immigrants’ – people who are or intend to be settled in their new country – from ‘migrants’ who are temporarily resident, ‘immigrant’ and ‘migrant’ (as well as ‘foreigner’) are often used interchangeably in public debate and even among research specialists. In some scholarly and everyday usage, people who move internally within national boundaries are called migrants. No two definitions of migrant are equivalent, and their effects on our understanding of migration and its impact are significant (The Migration Observatory 2019).

2.2. What is migration?

Since the earliest times, humanity has been on the move. Some people move in search of work or economic opportunities, to join family, or to study. Others move to escape conflict, persecution, terrorism, or human rights violations. Still others move in response to the adverse effects of climate change, natural disasters, or other environmental factors.

Figure 1. International migrants at mid-year 2019



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). International Migrant Stock 2019 (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2019). See <https://bit.ly/Migration2019>. © IOM's GMDAC 2019.

(United Nations, Migration 2020)

Today, more people than ever live in a country other than the one in which they were born. In 2019, the number of migrants globally reached an estimated 272 million, 51 million more than in 2010. International migrants comprise 3.5 per cent of the global population. Compared to 2.8 per cent in 2000 and 2.3 per cent in 1980, the proportion of international migrants in the world population has also risen. While many individuals migrate out of choice, many others

migrate out of necessity. The number of globally forcibly displaced people topped 70 million for the first time in UNHCR's almost 70 year history at the end of 2018. This number includes almost 26 million refugees, 3.5 million asylum seekers, and over 41 million internally displaced persons (United Nations, Migration 2020).

2.3. Migrants from Africa in France

Migration in Africa have occurred since ancient times, but the 20th century migratory flows to Europe are a new phenomenon. After decolonization, the European economies needed cheap labor and African workers were attracted by the prospect of paying jobs. The 4 million foreigners in France comprise 7-8% of the population. Nearly 1/2 are of European origin, 1/3 are from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, and about 3.5%, or 150,000 persons, are from Africa south of the Sahara. The main African countries of origin are Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania. Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, Togo, and Cameroon are less well represented. The migration to Europe began after World War II with small groups of Malians and Senegalese who had learned to speak French through their contact with French colonists and were readily assimilated into the labor force, mainly as skilled workers. Beginning in the late 1950s, their numbers increased rapidly. Accords signed by France, Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania in 1960 and 1963 to regularize their influx were ignored by employers needing labor and by Africans entering on tourist visas to seek work. By the early 1970s there were about 50,000 Africans in France, over 80% of them male. At about the same time immigration came to be regarded as a serious social and political problem, where before it had been little noticed. The number of immigrants had increased, especially in some neighborhoods of large cities, but not as much as generally believed. A larger proportion of families made the immigrants more visible on the streets and in the schools. The world economic recession caused the migrants to be regarded as competitors for the few jobs available. Cultural differences between the French and the immigrants increased. On the whole, North Africans are more numerous and visible, but Malians and Senegalese have become numerous enough in some Parisian neighborhoods to be perceived as a threat. Some journalists and politicians have fanned existing tensions for ideologic and electoral reasons. After 1973, France adopted an increasingly restrictive immigration policy. In 1981, 130,000 illegal immigrants were given legal status, and family regrouping was facilitated, but otherwise there has been a progressive hardening of


immigration policy. An essential element of the situation is that most immigrants currently in France are there to stay. Temporary immigration has, for many of them, become permanent. Family groups are increasingly seen even among the Africans, whose situation is about as marginal as that of Portuguese or Spanish immigrants in the 1950s. A process of adaptation to French society by the immigrants and to the immigrants by French society is already underway for Africans (Fassin 1986: 19).

2.3.1. Three dimensions of integration

The basic definition of integration encompasses *three analytically distinct dimensions* in which people may (or may not) become an accepted part of society: (i) the legal-political, (ii) the socio-economic, and (iii) the cultural-religious. These dimensions correspond to the three main factors that interplay with immigration and integration processes: the state, the market, and the nation. Focusing on these dimensions instead of the ones mentioned earlier (e.g., acculturation, placement, interaction, and identification) allows us to shift the focal point from immigrants to their relationship with a host society. The question is not only what immigrants do, with whom do they interact, and how do they identify themselves, but as much whether they are accepted and how they are positioned in each of our three dimensions.

Residence and political rights and statuses are included in the *legal-political dimension*. The central issue is whether and to what degree immigrants are considered full members of the political community. The position of an immigrant or the “degree of integration” has two extreme poles. One of these is the position of the irregular immigrant who is not part of the host society in the legal-political sense, though perhaps being integrated in the other two dimensions. The other is the position of the immigrant who is (or has become) a national citizen. In between there is enormous variety, which has increased in recent decades as a consequence of attempts of European states to “regulate” international migration and the new statuses and rights stemming from the EU migration regime (among others, EU nationals versus third-country nationals or “TCNs”) (Penninx, Garcés-Mascareñas 2016: 13).

Figure 2. Three dimensions of integration



(Penninx, Garcés-Masareñas 2016: 13)

The *socio-economic* dimension refers back to the social and monetary role of residents, no matter their national citizenship. Within this size, the placement of immigrants may be analysed via by of means of searching at their get right of entry to and participation in domain names which might be vital for any resident. Do immigrants have same get right of entry to to institutional centers for locating work, housing, education, and fitness care? Do they use those centers? What is the final results of immigrants' participation in comparison to that of natives with the equal or similar qualifications? Since the needs and desires in those domain names are fairly universal (simple needs are largely independent of cultural factors), immigrants' and natives' access to and involvement in those regions can be compared. The results, even though they are unequal, provide useful feedback for policymakers. (Penninx, Garcés-Masareñas 2016: 15).

The *cultural-religious* dimension pertains to the domain of *perceptions and practices* of immigrants and the receiving society as well as their reciprocal reactions to difference and diversity. If newcomers see themselves as different and are perceived by the receiving society

as culturally or religiously different, they may aspire to acquire a recognized place in these respects. For their part, the receiving society may or may not accept cultural or religious diversity. Here again we find two extremes. At one extreme, immigrants may be forced to adapt and assimilate into mono-cultural and mono-religious societies. In pluralistic social structures, racial groups, traditions, and worldviews may be recognized on an equal footing. Between these two extremes again are many in-between positions, such as accepting certain forms of diversity in the private realm but not, or only partly, in the public real. (Penninx, Garcés-Masareñas 2016: 13).

2.3.2. Format and scope of the Framework

The framework includes the following sections (Coussey 2000: 13):

1. Legal Measures

Recommendations concerned with the legal status and rights of immigrants:

- residence rights;
- citizenship, nationality and political participation;
- anti-discrimination, equal opportunities and legal protection against racism, xenophobia and discrimination.

2. Employment

Action by private and public sector employers, and training organisations.

3. Housing

4. Health and other services

5. Culture, language and religion

Bringing together the work on community relations, and that of the Council for Cultural Co-operation.

6. Education

Drawing on the work of the Council for Cultural Co-operation.

7. Media

8. Government functions

Action relating to governments' own functions in providing services, employment resources, and in co-ordinating and stimulating action by other organisations.

9. Monitoring and evaluation

Qualitative and quantitative tools for evaluating progress. Recommendations from the reports of two studies about immigrant women and integration, and from a study of participation, have been incorporated into the relevant sections.

The proposals and recommendations contained in the framework are addressed to (Coussey 2000: 15):

- governments and decision-makers in public authorities at various levels, national, regional and local, as policy makers and legislators,
- governments and public authorities indirectly, in their roles in supporting, facilitating, stimulating and encouraging action by non-governmental organisations and agencies,
- non-governmental authorities such as employers, trade unions, the media and private landlords,
- government's own direct functions, as an employer; a provider of public services; and in enforcing legal instruments.

2.3.3. Models of European integrations

One of the most critical goals of public policy in host countries is integration. Integration policy, on the other hand, differs from country to country and is described as a set of policies and legal provisions aimed at improving the lives of immigrants in various areas. The differences are obviously conditioned by a number of factors; a country's past, a nation state's configuration, political systems and cultures, institutional traditions, and so forth – all of these can play a major role. Hammar divides integration policy into two types – direct and indirect. The first is made up of initiatives that are explicitly tailored to help immigrants; the second is made up of measures that extend to all but have a positive impact on immigrants. Generally

speaking, European integration policies follow one of three models: the assimilationist model, the model of differential or the multicultural model (Kaya 2002: 29).

The assimilationist model

This is often known, also, as the republican or universalist model. France is regarded as offering the best example – which is why most French sociologists call this model the French integration model. It is assimilationist, because it assumes that a common foundation is needed for social and national cohesion; it is also universalist, because it puts the emphasis, at least in theory, on individual rights and equality, which are regarded as the source of shared values which transcend all differences. In this model, as Brubaker puts it (1992), political incorporation and cultural assimilation are combined.

Its characteristics are the following:

- a) the nation is regarded as a territorial and political community. It is not determined by cultural or ethnic criteria. It is contract-based, and assimilating republican values suffices for the conclusion of a nationality contract with the host country's government (see naturalisation below);
- b) the institutions of the community or state, such as schools and the army, fulfil an assimilating function;
- c) naturalisation (acquisition of the country's nationality) is seen as a means to integration and accordingly encouraged. The formal criteria and conditions for acquiring nationality are relatively non-restrictive;
- d) regardless of their culture or ethnic origin, people join the nation as individual citizens, and not as members of an ethnic or cultural community;
- e) a shared, universal culture is the hallmark of the public sphere, and the latter is therefore closed to ethnic and cultural diversity.

The specific cultures and identities of individuals or groups are, however, tolerated in private life.

The model of differential

The host culture cannot assimilate immigrant cultures, according to this model. Other cultural and racial groups being absorbed into one country is undesirable because it would contradict the idea of a nation determined by ethnic and cultural criteria. In reality, the countries that are widely regarded as exemplifying this model (Germany, Switzerland, Austria) refuse to be

considered immigration countries. This makes it very hard for them to accept the presence of immigrants as permanent.

This model may be described as follows (Kaya 2002: 32):

- a) it is based on an ethnic and cultural conception of the nation;
- b) it is based exclusively on blood. Naturalisation is traditionally very restrictive, and nothing is done to facilitate or encourage it;
- c) integration is considered, above all, a social and economic matter. The main instrument of integration is the labour market, which is supposed to create conditions favourable to social integration;
- d) it is based on cultural particularism, and sees the community as an organic entity, defined by a specific culture and language. The preservation of immigrants' languages and cultures is considered only with a view to their reintegrating, if they go home. No effort is made to promote and build on their cultural diversity.

The multicultural model

In 1971, the Canadian government initiated a program that promoted a multicultural approach to integration. Since its main element is appreciation for the rich diversity that immigration, in particular, brings, the term gained popularity in Europe in the 1980s and is now commonly used. However, the term "multiculturalism" may refer to a variety of items. It can be purely descriptive, meaning that a particular community is culturally very diverse. Seen in those terms, Europe today has no culturally homogeneous societies; on the contrary, cultural diversity and multiple identity are the typical features of modern societies. However, the term may also refer to a method of handling various cultures and identities within a single community. In other words, it refers to a public policy that recognizes immigrant cultures in the public domain, especially in schools, and ensures that students are taught in their native tongue. Sweden is the only country in Europe that follows this model.

This model has three main characteristics (Kaya 2002: 34):

- a) it aims at inclusion. It recognises the principle of place of birth, and it also encourages naturalisation of immigrants by making conditions and formalities relatively straightforward;

- b) it uses special measures, also known as “positive discrimination” (see glossary) to promote the socio-economic integration and emancipation of ethnic and cultural minorities;
- c) it actively promotes immigrant languages and cultures. Children are taught (in) their native language at school.

3. History of Maghreb migration to France

With their long-standing traditions of immigration and emigration, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia lie at the heart of Euro-African migration systems. Since colonial times, Maghreb migration policies both reflect and shape regional political priorities.

Over the past two centuries, trade, slavery and colonization have created strong human ties across the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea. Today, the Maghreb is marked by high emigration to Europe and beyond, as well as varying levels of student, worker, and refugee immigration from Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. Although often analyzed together, there is no single Maghreb migration narrative: As this short regional profile shows, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have fundamentally different social-economic and political histories that have shaped migration patterns on the ground and the immigration, emigration and diaspora policies pursued by these three states over the past century (Natter 2020).

The significant political, social, and economic changes that have occurred in North Africa over the last few decades may be impossible to comprehend without considering the role of large-scale migration movements within, to, and particularly from this area. Bordering the rich international locations of the European Union (EU) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), North Africa has advanced into one of the world’s leading ‘labour frontiers’. Large-scale migration become now no longer handiest a reaction to a call for for labour in EU and the GCC international locations, however it has additionally essentially affected social and financial improvement in migrant sending regions (Haas 2007: 12).

Over 8 million migrants originating from North-African countries are currently believed to live abroad, among which 4.7 million in Europe and 2.4 million in Arab oil countries. The North African migration mechanism seems to have undergone a migration transformation in the last decade. The most salient features of this have been, besides sustained outmigration,

increasing immigration from sub-Saharan countries as well as the new role of North Africa as a transit zone for sub-Saharan and even Asian migrants who want to migrate to Europe (Haas 2007: 13).


Maghreb emigration evolved in three phases (Natter 2020):

1. In response to European countries' recruitment policies, as well as high unemployment in and emigration policies in Maghreb states, emigration to France, but also Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, exploded in the 1960s and 1970s. During that time, the so-called "guest worker" migration laid the groundwork for subsequent family and student migration.
2. From the mid-1970s until the early 1990s, Algerian emigration decreased after the government enacted an emigration stop in September 1973 (in place until 1985). Emigration from Morocco and Tunisia, on the other hand, has remained strong and has expanded—mostly to Spain and Italy, but also to Libya for Tunisians and North America for Moroccans—in response to tighter labor migration regulations in North-Western Europe and a high demand for migrant workers in Southern Europe.
3. Moroccan migration has risen exponentially since the 1990s, from about 30,000 emigrants a year in the mid-1990s to about 150,000 in the mid-2000s. Tunisian and Algerian emigration, on the other hand, have remained stable at about 40,000 and 20,000 emigrants each year, respectively. Interestingly, even during the civil war, Algerian emigration has remained limited (1991-2002). Over the same period, Maghreb emigration has partly shifted into irregularity as legal migration restrictions were introduced by European countries, but demand for migrant labor across Europe persisted. Maghreb emigration has also remained high throughout the 2008 economic crisis and the political developments in North Africa after 2011.

Migration within the Maghreb (Natter 2020) has generally been low because of the limited economic and political integration of the region, dominated by the Moroccan-Algerian conflict over the Western Sahara territories. Nonetheless, Algerians sought refuge in Morocco and Tunisia during the independence war (1954-1962) and the civil war in the 1990s, Moroccan workers in Tunisia, especially in the 1980s, and Tunisian workers in Libya since the 1970s, depending on geopolitical ties between the two countries. Figure 3 showcases these three periods.

Figure 3. Maghreb emigration in three phases

■ Annual emigration from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to eight major destinations, 1960 – 2010



Source: DEMIG 2015. Included are emigration flows to the following eight destinations: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States of America. These cover roughly 80 percent of Maghreb emigration (see Figure 3).
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 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2020, www.bpb.de



(Natter 2020)

3.1. Colonial and post-colonial migration

The pre-colonial population history of north Africa (Haas 2006:71) has been characterised by continually shifting patterns of human settlement. Nomadic or semi-nomadic (transhumance) groups travelled large distances with their herds between summer and winter pastures. Frequent conflicts between tribal groups over natural resources and the control over trade routes were associated with the regular uprooting, movement and resettlement of people. Other sedentary groups were nomadic or settled down elsewhere, while some nomadic groups settled down and became peasants. In all Maghreb countries, modernisation and colonial intrusion occurring in the middle 19th century has triggered processes of urbanisation and substantial migration.

However, only in the ‘French’ Maghreb colonialism was associated to substantial international movement, in contrast to Libya and Egypt.

With the outbreak of the First World War, more than a million North Africans, most of them Algerians, were recruited in the French army. The first Moroccans who migrated to France were from the Souss region in the south; they were recruited by the factories in Nantes in 1909.¹ During the First World War, more than 35,000 Moroccans worked in the French agricultural and mining sectors, while about 40,000 (recruited from the Middle Atlas and High Atlas areas), served in the French army (Haas 2006: 92). During the WW1, soldiers from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia participated in the French army to defend the country. These Maghrebian soldiers not only served in the army, but were also used as labour force on farms and in the arms industries in order to replace the French workers who were serving in the army and to reduce the labour shortage situation.

Thousands of North African migrants fought in the Second World War on the side of France. Many of these migrants took part in France's postwar reconstruction. During the postwar period, there were about 250,000 North African migrants in France - 220,000 Algerians, 20,000 Moroccans, and 5,000 Tunisians (Haas 2006: 92).

The French imprint was particularly strong in Algeria, which was colonized again in 1830 and has since become an indispensable part of France. The French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco were founded in 1881 and 1912, respectively. During the First World War, labor recruitment in the Maghreb began, while a critical shortage of manpower in France prompted the active recruitment of tens of thousands of men for the army, enterprise, and mines. During the Second World War, labor shortages forced the recruitment of Maghrebi civilians and soldiers (Haas 2007: 19).

After WW2, migrants from the Maghreb region became one of the dominating manpower flow among foreign workers in France. Maghreb migration to France began mainly economic and labour migration. After the independence of three main emigration Maghreb countries: Algeria (1962), Tunisia (1952), Morocco (1952), the flow of migrants greatly increased. The following factors can be used to describe why the number of migrants is increasing. On the one hand, the economic impact of the war on the Maghreb region forced many workers to migrate to western Europe, and the region became a labor exporting country, similar to Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavian countries. On the other hand, France needed to rebuild its postwar economy; therefore it opened its border to migrants from former colonies in order to reconstruct the economy of the country by employing a cheap labour force for a short period.

3.2. The guest-worker boom (1963-1972)

In comparison to the decade following 1962, when the Maghreb countries were firmly incorporated into the Euro-Mediterranean migration scheme, post-colonial migration was minimal. During this time, the Maghreb countries saw a surge in labor migration to Europe. Morocco and, to a lesser degree, Tunisia, embraced a wider range of migration destinations outside of France. From the 1950s onwards, rapid postwar economic growth in northwest Europe produced growing unskilled labor shortages in industries like mining, housing construction, and agriculture. This resulted in an increase in “guest worker” emigration from poorer Mediterranean countries. Most were recruited in southern European countries until the early 1960s. When this migration stagnated, attention shifted towards south Mediterranean countries. Morocco and Tunisia signed formal agreements on the recruitment of “guest workers” with France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Migration boomed particularly from 1967, to peak in 1972 (Haas 2007:15).

The three North African countries concluded bilateral agreements concerning migrant rights and obligations with the main destination countries. As recruitment offices started to sign job contracts with potential migrants, migration to France and Belgium became more coordinated. In 1974, the number of North African migrants reached nearly 1.5 million. In 1973, the Moroccan migrant population in Europe alone totaled half a million. By the mid-1970s, the number of Moroccan migrants per year had climbed to 30,000 from 17,000 in the previous decade, according to the Ministry of Employment report for 1986 (Haas 2006: 89).

In 1972, the government of President Georges Pompidou issued two administrative memoranda, collectively known as the Marcellin Fontanet circulars, which put an end to the practice of “regularization” whereby undocumented workers came to France, found employment, and then obtained the necessary paperwork. Under the new regulations, potential immigrants were required to obtain the commitment of employment prior to their arrival in France or face expulsion. These decrees heralded the dominance of administrative control measures (European Commission 2016).

The shock of the 1973 Six-Day war, the Oil Crisis and the ensuing economic recession in Western Europe would dramatically reshape and expand the North African migration landscape. It signaled the end of the recruitment process for Maghrebi-European migration and the beginning of increasingly restrictive immigration policies adopted by European states, a pattern that would last until the present day. On the contrary, the events of 1973 signaled the start of major labor recruitment in Arab oil producing countries (Bommes, Fassmass, Sievers 2014: 38)

3.3. The 1991 Gulf War turning point

After a period dominated by relatively persistent labour migration from Egypt to the Gulf countries and Libya and family migration from the Maghreb, the North-African migration landscape witnessed fundamental transformations since the late 1980s. Again, a number of political upheavals (Gulf War, outbreak of Algerian civil war, UN embargo on Libya) occurring in 1991-2 played a major role in setting new migration trends and creating increasing interlinkages between north- and sub-African migration systems while solidifying north-Africa's position in the Euro-Mediterranean migration systems as both origin and transit zone.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, there have been dramatic changes in France's immigration control strategy, ranging from new visa regimes and restrictions on hiring foreign workers to more stringent labor market regulations. France's acceptance of the notion of a "threshold of tolerance" and the subsequent policy decisions based on it not only served as a justification for stricter immigration control, but also led to an increase in the number of detentions, expulsions, and police atrocities against foreigners.

The debate about wearing the hijab has gotten a lot of international coverage in recent years. Since 2004, when the government passed a law banning the wearing of visible religious symbols in public areas, there has been a ban. Wearing the burqa, according to members of Parliament ranging from communists to conservatives, is "contrary to the Republic's principles." Recently French President Nicholas Sarkozy made it clear that "the burqa is simply not welcome in France" and "it hurts the dignity of women and is unacceptable in French society." According to French government statistics, only an estimated 2,000 French Muslim women have chosen to wear the niqab (facial veil) in public. The government's decision to pass a new law banning full-face veils is seen as a response to the wave of Islamophobia sweeping Europe, but it has sparked controversy among those who claim the bill breaches the French constitution's cardinal values of liberty, equality, and fraternity (Haas 2006: 66).

In addition, one of the most significant goals of France's decolonization was to draw refugees from former North African colonies. Furthermore, despite the fact that the majority of the migrants were unskilled or low-skilled and undocumented, the French government allowed them to work in order to support the country's economic growth.. Therefore, the number of foreign workers between the 1950s and the 1970s increased from 4.9% to 7.7%, with most of them coming from the Maghreb region.

All these three major events: colonization, the First and the Second WW have had a strong influence on the status of the current Maghreb migration in France.

According to INSEE, today the number of Maghreb migrants constitutes two-third of the foreign migrant communities in France. Among European countries France is regarded as Europe's biggest Maghreb Muslim migrant community (Barou 2014: 650).

Within the French census, there has been no ambiguity between immigrants and foreigners since 1990. Today, legal surveys accurately differentiate between these two groups of immigrants: the first has kept their foreign citizenship, while the second arrived in France as foreigners and later gained French citizenship. In the 2008 census, the range of immigrants changed into 5,342,000, amongst whom 3,715,000 had been foreigners. Their children, if born in France, aren't taken into consideration immigrants. Under the 1889 regulation introducing *jus soli*, they routinely gain from French nationality whilst they arrive of age. As the French census does now no longer gather facts on ethnic foundation or religious beliefs, they emerge as statistically invisible (Barou 2014: 650).

3.4. Between assimilation and accommodation

Several waves of social crisis, on the other hand, counteracted periods of economic prosperity and the resulting social mobility. The most important was the Great Depression of the 1930s, which resulted in widespread unemployment and violent xenophobia among the French population, including the working class. This crisis, however, generated a political response in favor of migrant integration.

In 1936, the government of the Front Populaire created a Junior Ministry Office to deal with immigration. Although its existence was short-lived, it took some important measures in facilitating the acquisition of French citizenship. Nonetheless, discriminatory views dominated French immigration policy in the years leading up to WWII, and the integration process was turned into coercive assimilation. With the imminent arrival of refugees and the economic crisis, France implemented a national and ethnic quota policy focused on a list of "races and peoples" ranked according to their assimilation potential. The main theorist behind this new policy was Georges Mauco, a scholar who published a doctoral thesis in 1932 on the role of migrants in the French economy (Barou 2014: 655).

Up to the 1980s, there was no real political debate on integration in France. The government appointed a Secretary of State for migrant workers in 1975. His main role was to control and

reverse migration flows rather than to develop an integration policy; he was also responsible for housing issues and cultural matters. Indeed, in spite of the return allowances given by the French authorities under Raymond Barre’s government (1978–1981), very few families did return home. On the contrary, a more flexible immigration law enabled many workers with families still living in their home countries to bring them to France. In the 1980s and 1990s, the greatest number of arrivals were the wives and children of immigrants who had already settled in France. They accounted for roughly 60% of the 120,000 new immigrants enrolled per year on average (Barou 2014: 655).

Table 1. Origin of immigrants and descendants of immigrants

Country or birth region of immigrants and parents of descendants of immigrants	Immigrants (aged 18–60)			Descendants of immigrants (aged 18–50)		
	Numbers		Weighted percentages	Numbers		Weighted percentages
	Unweighted	Weighted numbers (thousands)		Unweighted	Weighted numbers (thousands)	
Algeria	889	481	13	1306	617	20
Morocco and Tunisia	1194	679	19	1122	474	15
Sahelian Africa	665	137	4	480	76	2
Guinean and Central Africa	736	238	7	333	52	2
Southeast Asia	774	116	3	573	82	3
Turkey	830	212	6	447	63	2
Portugal	847	414	12	933	418	14
Spain and Italy	485	216	6	1692	777	25
Other Eu countries	754	381	11	649	276	9
Other countries	1282	710	20	575	246	8
Total	8456	3583	100	8110	3080	100

(Barou 2014: 655)

In contrast to previous immigrant generations in France, this second generation of non-European immigrants, in general of Maghrebian origin and on the periphery of the labor

market since the 1980s, experienced a unique form of integration. Under the diachrony of the mixing phase, these were first socially incorporated, then assimilated, before finally identifying politically with France. The aforementioned second generation migrants, on the other hand, can be considered to have assimilated to French traditions and subculture while still being socially and politically marginalized. This discrepancy ends in frustration and fuels city unrest, like that withinside the suburbs of Lyon at the start of the migration. (Vasudevan, Ratana, Fulgham 2015: 110).

Though descendants of immigrants can be clearly distinguished according to whether they have one or two immigrant parents, consideration must also be given to the immigrant parent(s)' migration profile. All parents born outside of France are referred to as "immigrants" in this context; they may have immigrated at some stage in their lives, and a large proportion of these parents arrived as children accompanied by their own parents. They are in an intermediate role in this situation, which we have dubbed 'Generation 1.5,' since they were mainly socialized and educated in France. These people resemble immigrants' descendants rather than immigrants themselves. The survey offers details that can be used to track down the descendants of immigrants who arrived as children. We used the younger parent's age at the time of arrival because both parents are migrants.

Although just over 20% of immigrants' descendants have parents who grew up in France, this is much more common among mixed-parentage descendants. Mixed marriages are even more common among young immigrants, and even more so among the second generation. As a result, mixed-parentage descendants almost constitute a "third generation." This is true for almost half of the descendants of southern European immigrants, but not for the other groups. Again, this demonstrates how diverse the group of "immigrant descendants" is. Throughout the book, differences between groups represent their socio-demographic characteristics as much as their roots (Vasudevan, Ratana, Fulgham 2015: 111).

4. Structure integration

The peculiar situation of Maghreb immigrants in France highlights the complexities surrounding the research issue of French integration models. The children of first-generation Maghreb immigrants are known as beurs, who have developed themselves as a distinct part of society due to major cultural differences between generations of Maghreb immigrants. (Vasudevan, Ratana, Fulgham 2015: 109).

Both first and second generation Maghrebis from Northern Africa have cultural characteristics that set them apart from French culture, such as language, faith, and traditional traditions, making integration even more difficult.

When looking at the historical history of Maghreb immigrants in France, as well as the persistence of political, economic, and social challenges they face as they integrate into French society, it becomes clear that these barriers lead to increased marginalization and dissatisfaction, which can lead to radicalization and violence.

In order to reduce the number of radical immigrants, the French government is currently promoting a series of national and local policies aimed at improving the lives of Maghreb immigrants living in the banlieues, or suburbs, while also that the economic, social, and political disparities that exist between city and suburb society (Vasudevan, Ratana, Fulgham 2015: 109).

4.1. Political Measures

Immigrants in France face two challenges when negotiating French government regulations: they aren't given sufficient guidance from the authorities, and they are often denied the opportunity to represent themselves in government bodies. For example, current integration regulations in France stipulate that the jurisdiction of immigration legal guidelines for immigrants in France will last up to 5 years, implying that immigrants in France do not receive constant authorities guidance after the initial 5-12 month agreement. At the same time, Maghrebis are no longer routinely portrayed in France. In 2007, the National Assembly did now no longer consist of any Maghrebis amongst its members, even though a number of the Maghrebis had been French nationals society (Vasudevan, Ratana, Fulgham 2015: 110).

In certain cases, candidates in France attempted to appeal to an immigrant and multiethnic electorate, but the members chosen were unrelated to both the electorate and the ethnic group targeted. Finally, Maghrebis face reduced economic prospects and social dilemmas as a result of the government's lack of funding and immigrants' under-representation in government relations.

After the suspension of foreign worker recruitment in July 1974, the French integration policy can be traced back to that point. Stopping structured recruitment resulted in the stabilization of existing migrants in France, as well as the growth of family reunifications.

Legislative activity on immigration was intense during the 1980s, especially in the areas of entrance and stay of foreigners, the conditions of citizenship eligibility, and the fight against

discrimination. With the family reunifications and the stabilisation of immigrants in France, the policy perspective on foreign population in France changes progressively and integration appears more and more as an issue, even if indirectly.

The Interior Ministry puts forward two main tools in the field of the integration policy: the requirement of naturalization and the reception and integration contract.

The first pillar of French integration policy is access to French citizenship. The second pillar of the French integration policy is the Reception and Integration Contract (CAI), reviewed by the Code of Entry and Stay of Foreigners and Rights of Asylum (CESEDA) of 2004, and compulsory since January 2007 society (Vasudevan, Ratana, Fulgham 2015: 110) .

As a result of the French state's color-blind approach, policies aimed at the Maghreb community are frequently framed as urban policies, labeled collectively as *Politiques de la Ville*, which are managed by the Ministry of Urban Affairs. In 1996, the French government labeled approximately 750 urban areas across the country as ZUS (Zones Urbaines Sensibles - Sensitive Urban Zones) (Dikeç 2006: 112).

ZUS areas are eligible for a number of special incentives provided by the government. For instance, tax and social security contribution exemptions are provided to companies that are located in ZUS areas and have a certain number of ZUS residents as employees. ZUS areas and other neighborhood-oriented policies form the backbone of the French government's socioeconomic policies towards the Maghreb community.

Paris

Within the Paris metropolitan area, policies against the Maghreb network were formed by administrative boundaries. Most of the Maghreb network in Paris does not reside within the city limits of Paris, but rather in a number of small suburban municipalities known as *banlieues*, which are located outside of the city. This shape has created problems for policy cooperation between the municipal governments of Paris, where many contributors of the network operate, and the nearby governments of the *banlieues*, where they live, in addition to perpetuating a sense of sophistication and race-based completely exclusion. As a result, the French government attempted to re-configure administrative devices within the Paris area in order to respond to the fact that the city and the *banlieues* function as a single city entity.

In 2007, President Nicolas Sarkozy unveiled the ambitious "Grand Paris" plan. The project included major policy changes, especially in the transportation sector. Despite the proximity of the *banlieues* to the center of Paris, public transportation options for residents of the *banlieues* are limited, amplifying a sense of isolation from the city. It is not unusual for

inhabitants of the banlieues to have never visited any of Paris' renowned cultural institutions, despite the fact that they are just a few miles away. By building many long subway lines, collectively known as the "Grand Paris Express," the "Grand Paris" project aims to eliminate spatial segregation. The new lines will reach into Paris's periphery far beyond the current system, which is heavily Paris-centric, allowing banlieue residents to travel between banlieues without having to enter Paris. "Grand Paris" also initially called for the suppression of the banlieue municipalities and their absorption into Paris, but this reorganization plan was withdrawn due to resistance from the leaders of the suburban municipalities and due to fears that a centralizing approach would limit opportunities for bottom-up initiatives in favor of uniform top-down policies. Instead, "Grand Paris" would be constituted as an intercommunalité, a structure that allows for greater administrative cooperation between different local governments while preserving their individual existence (Dikeç 2006: 115)..

Marseille

Marseille is the second largest metropolitan area in France. Because of its proximity to the area and its history as a Mediterranean commercial port, about a quarter of the city's population is of North African descent. Marseille serves as a useful counterpoint to Paris since it is a relatively good example of Maghreb group integration. The area was also largely unaffected by the 2005 urban riots. Marseille's success can be attributed to the fact that the city's Maghreb community sees itself as a positive stakeholder in the city, among other factors. Unlike Paris, there is no clear distinction between the city's core and its outskirts. Maghreb residents are not confined to the outskirts of the city, as the city's central neighborhood is also home to a visible community of Maghrebis.

In Marseille, government-built low-income housing units are no longer confined to the city's outskirts, but are instead scattered across the city. In addition, the town center contains a few city recreation areas, including beaches, that are common among both Maghreb and non-Maghreb youth. The reduction of geographical segregation serves as a tool for promoting social cohesion. Furthermore, neighborhood officers in Marseille have often conducted talks with network leaders representing Maghreb citizens, a process that scarcely differs from the national "republican" edition. This system is reflected by the town's Service de membres de la famille avec les communautés (Service for Community Relations), a division charged with dealing with members of the family both within the town and among identity-based totally groups, as well as within the groups themselves.

This department was the first of its kind in France when it was founded in 2001. Marseille Espérance, a leading group working under this agency, brings together the city's political and religious leaders. The leaders act as a force of unity, acting as mediators in community conflict as well as giving statements in favor of tolerance when racial tensions flare up nationally or locally. Efforts such as this contribute to assuring Maghreb residents that their interests are recognized and respected by the city, and act as a bulwark against ethnic segregation that is pervasive in other cities such as Paris (Dikeç 2006: 117).

4.2. Employment

Employment is an essential aspect of the integration process. It is not only migrants' primary source of income, but also contributes to their integration by supporting their access to adequate housing and facilitating their interaction with native-born residents.

In France, (OECD 2018) about one in ten people of working age is a migrant and the unemployment rate of migrants is twice that of native-born French people, amounting to 18.1% in 2015 (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2016b). According to INSEE data, in 2015, the unemployment rate of non-EU foreign (25%) was two and a half times higher than that of French citizens (10%) (INSEE Enquête Emploi). Recent OECD research has shed light on gaps on migrant access to the labour market (OECD, 2017b). The employment rate of recently arrived migrants is 25 percentage points lower than that of native-born. Only one out of three foreigners living in France for less than five years of working age is working.

Though work is an important aspect of economic integration, examining the types of jobs migrants actually get gives a more complete picture of their labor market participation. Overqualification, in particular, is a recurring problem for migrants in France. In 2012-2013, more than a fourth of employed foreign-born individuals with a tertiary education degree (about 27% of the total migrant population in France) were over-qualified in the country, against less than 20% for the native-born working population (OECD and EU, 2015). The over-qualification rates are lower in the region of Île-de France both for natives and migrants compared to the national average but remain higher for migrants, reaching 12% for foreign-born and 8% for natives. Self-employment is often used by migrants as a means of gaining access to the labor market. The international community in Paris is strongly ambitious. According to the Greffe du Tribunal de Commerce de Paris's 2016 Economic Atlas of Paris, 14 percent of companies founded in Paris are led by foreign citizens, and one out of every ten

companies is led by a non-EU foreigner.. The most represented countries are Algeria (2.7% of all companies in Paris) and China (2.1%) (OECD 2018).

Labour market strategies implemented by the city in Paris

Daily migrants, like the rest of the population, are entitled to unemployment care, job searching, and training programs offered by the 900 employment agencies known as "Pôle emploi" located across France. In addition, as a department and a region, Paris promotes the integration of the Parisian labor market. Migrants are users of these non-migrant targeted services, which include professional training and job hunting support services. Some Parisian initiatives include (OECD 2018):

- The Parisian Plan for Insertion through Work (Plan parisien de l’insertion par l’emploi 2020, hereafter referred as PPIE) targets a population that has lost contact for a considerable period with the job market such as the long-term unemployed among which migrants are among the main beneficiaries. The programme was initiated in July 2015 and adopted in June 2016, it aims at providing professional training and subsidised job opportunities to 1 100 long-term unemployed individuals living in Paris every year. Under the Paris Employment Training initiative Paris also provides tailored professional training and qualification services to 2 000 residents every year including migrants.
- The Parisian Pact to Fight Great Exclusion which underlines the city’s commitment to support innovative labour market integration solutions such as the “first hour” scheme, which enables homeless people to progressively re-enter the job market through hour-based work contracts or the “Lulu dans ma rue” project, which provides the unemployed population of Paris with self-employment opportunities to offer local services to neighbours
- Paris also supports specific initiatives for women regarding labour market integration and gender equality in the workplace. In 2016, spending in this area amounted to EUR 3 136 503 and were for example directed to non-profit organisations like ADAGE, which offers linguistic workshops and professional training to vulnerable women in the northern districts of Paris

A central question concerning the situation of immigrants and descendants of immigrants in a society is their labour force integration, and their position on the labour market in relationship to other groups. Do they enjoy the same employment opportunities? Are they paid the same wages to do the same jobs? Owing to a lack of data on individual origins, these factual issues were long ignored in France. As soon as databases began to contain questions about respondents' nationality and place of birth, a boom in research on these topics began to fill the knowledge gap (Meurs 2018: 82).

Among men in the mainstream population, the most common situation is full-time wage employment (67%). Part-time employment is rare (2%), and 10% are selfemployed. Non-employed men tend to be students (10%) or unemployed (8%). Very few individuals in this group (2%) are economically inactive (other than as students). Crude differences by origin with respect to the mainstream population are large. Table 2 illustrates the differences in the four situations (employed, unemployed, student, inactive) with respect to the mainstream population group. It demonstrates that full-time employment is significantly more common among immigrants and descendants of immigrants from Southern Europe than among non-Europeans, especially descendants of immigrants. What is the situation for non-European immigrants and their descendants if they are less likely to be employed?

Once again these statistics, uncorrected for structural effects, show that the employment deficit of these populations is the result not only of higher unemployment, but also of a higher proportion of individuals in education. This is particularly visible for the descendants of immigrants from Southeast Asia (+26 percentage points), Morocco and Tunisia (+11 percentage points), and sub-Saharan Africa (+9 percentage points). Among men, the proportion of inactive individuals in all groups is marginal (Meurs 2018: 84).

The pattern for women is quite similar, with a few particularities in specific origin groups. Among women in the mainstream population, 46% are employed fulltime, 20% part-time, 7% are self-employed, 9% unemployed, 10% in education, and 8% inactive. With respect to this reference group, non-European immigrant women are the least present on the labour market, either in full-time or part-time employment (the two types of employment are grouped together in the figure). The gender difference is no more than 6 percentage points among members of the mainstream population as well as immigrants and descendants from the DOMs or Europe, but among immigrants from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa it is between 25 and 30 points, and among Turkish immigrants it is nearly 50 points. These differences in employment are of the same order of magnitude among female descendants of

immigrants, although far fewer are inactive and a higher proportion are students (Meurs 2018: 95).

Table 2. Labour market situation of men, by origin (%)

	Employed			Other			Number
	Full-time employee	Non-full-time employee	Self-Employed	Unemployed	Student	Inactive	
Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrants and DOM native – borns							
Overseas <i>département</i> (DOM)	72	5	4	7	11	2	259
Algeria	65	3	7	16	6	2	327
Morocco and Tunisia	67	3	10	12	5	2	442
Sub-Saharan Africa	59	2	8	15	13	4	256
Southeast Asia	69	4	10	11	1	5	267
Turkey	58	2	21	13	3	3	389
Portugal	80	1	12	4	2	1	268
Spain and Italy	80	0	15	3	0	2	97
Other EU-27 countries	61	4	15	11	7	2	185
Other countries	58	7	11	10	11	2	692
Parents'/parents' country or <i>département</i> of birth, descendants of immigrants and of DOM native – borns							
Overseas <i>département</i> (DOM)	62	3	4	9	20	2	307
Algeria	55	3	7	19	13	4	582
Morocco and Tunisia	44	4	9	19	21	4	487
Sub-Saharan Africa	48	3	2	27	19	1	214
Southeast Asia	44	2	5	12	36	2	299
Turkey	45	5	10	19	20	2	213
Portugal	69	2	6	9	12	2	469
Spain and Italy	71	3	10	7	6	3	829
Other EU-27 countries	68	3	9	7	11	3	317
Other countries	50	2	8	7	33	1	456
Mainstream population	67	2	10	8	10	2	1522
Number	5399	263	820	965	1243	187	8877

(Meurs 2018: 84)

Table 3. Labour market situation of women, by origin (%)

	Employed			Other			Number
	Full-time employee	Non-full-time employee	Self-employed	Student	Unemployed	Inactive	
Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns							
Overseas <i>département</i> (DOM)	64	10	5	7	7	6	286
Algeria	30	15	3	6	18	28	346
Morocco and Tunisia	33	13	3	7	18	26	466
Sub-Saharan Africa	28	19	3	10	21	19	302
Southeast Asia	48	13	5	4	14	17	262
Turkey	20	10	4	7	15	46	338
Portugal	48	25	3	1	10	13	279
Spain and Italy	51	21	8	3	6	11	122
Other EU-27 countries	41	16	13	4	10	15	357
Other countries	36	13	6	12	15	18	978
Parents'/parent's country or <i>département</i> of birth, descendants of immigrants and of DOM nativeborns							
Overseas <i>département</i> (DOM)	55	7	3	22	9	5	343
Algeria	37	12	3	15	19	13	724
Morocco and Tunisia	35	9	4	27	14	10	635
Sub-Saharan Africa	35	11	1	36	12	4	266
Southeast Asia	42	8	7	34	7	2	274
Turkey	24	4	1	26	22	23	234
Portugal	54	15	5	15	5	6	464
Spain and Italy	53	18	5	7	8	10	863
Other EU-27 countries	45	16	8	12	8	11	332
Other countries	41	11	5	29	6	8	452
Mainstream population	46	20	7	10	9	8	1664
Number	4079	1540	478	1378	1176	1336	9987

(Meurs 2018: 84)

After taking into account all explanatory variables, no significant differences remained between European immigrant women and women in the mainstream population. Their

employment statuses do differ, however: daughters of European immigrants are more likely to be employed full time (+4 percentage points), and less likely to be employed part time (−2 percentage points, although this is only significant at the 5% level). In conclusion, after accounting for all potential labor market statuses, there are still many unexplained percentage points of excess unemployment among immigrants and descendants of immigrants from non-European countries compared to the general population for both men and women. Immigrant descendants are not more likely to attend college. Finally, female immigrants from non-European countries are much more likely to be inactive; the same is true of the daughters of non-European immigrants, but to a lesser degree (Meurs 2018: 110).

Even when all possible labor market statuses are taken into account, the TeO data show that there are many percentage points of unexplained excess unemployment among immigrants and descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb compared to the mainstream population, both for women and men. The respondents' perceptions of discrimination in the job market are consistent with "objective" data: the more appealing a respondent's profile is to a potential employer, the more favorably they react to questions about discrimination. This difficulty in finding work is compounded by a pay penalty. Where the average hourly wages of immigrants and descendants of immigrants are lower than those of members of the mainstream population, it is partly due to differences in individual characteristics (education, experience), and partly to segregation into jobs with lower pay. In this sense, wage discrimination in the strict sense (wage gaps with all other things being equal) can be seen as a second-order problem with respect to inequalities and discrimination in access to employment and career development. Nevertheless, for non-European immigrant men, there is still a substantial unexplained wage gap, on the order of 5–7%, even after controlling for all observable characteristics. To extend our analysis (Meurs 2018: 110), we calculated the gap between individuals' actual wages and the wages that they "should" receive if they were treated in the same way as employees from the mainstream population. We found a strong correlation between this indicator and individual feelings of injustice in promotion and dismissal. This unexplained gap thus most likely reflects discriminatory treatment in the workplace (Meurs 2018: 110).

4.3. Family

Whether individuals define themselves through family depends mainly on their family situation. Persons who live with a partner are 1.7 times more likely to choose this identification than those who live alone, and persons with children are 7.5 times more likely to do so. Interest in family is strongly gendered: all other things being equal, women cited this category 1.5 times more than men. Few other factors contribute to the formation of a family-centered identity. Adult immigrants are much less likely to mention family as a reason for their arrival. This is due to rivalry with other more active descriptors, most notably origin; non-recognition of one's Frenchness or being questioned about one's origins greatly reduces family mentions.

Unions between partners with the same origin are the most frequent. They can be divided into four sub-groups (Simon, Tiberj 2018: 278):

- persons who arrived as adults already in a union. This is the principal group. It represents 31% of immigrants (a higher proportion of women than men. These are often first unions, formed at a relatively early age through direct marriage (84%), with a partner from the same country, often with few or no educational qualifications and met through the family network.

The three other groups are roughly the same size, each representing around one in ten immigrants.

- persons who met their partner abroad after migrating to France. This group makes up only 8% of immigrants, predominantly men from the Sahel, Morocco, and Tunisia. These men came in the large of labour migration waves, and are older than the men in the other categories. In 86% of cases, the union was a direct marriage, but it was most often a second marriage. The spouses generally met through the family network. The spouses of this group of respondents are generally from the same origin, and social homogamy is strong: in three quarters of cases, these immigrants' spouses have a similar level of education, often low

- persons who met their partner in France after migration. This group, consisting of immigrants who arrived in France as adults, makes up 13% of all immigrants. Half of the people in this much more heterogeneous group married directly, while a quarter are in a non-marital union. In cases where the respondent is in a first union, migration delayed the beginning of cohabitation, but in a quarter of cases, the union is a second union. In two thirds of cases, these individuals met their partner in France through friends or in a public place.

These couples consist of persons with a common origin, and in 17% of cases, the partner is a descendant of immigrants. SubSaharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and, to a lesser extent, Portugal are the principal regions of origin of migrants in this group. Among those from subSaharan Africa, there are as many women from Guinean and Central Africa in this category as men, whereas women from Sahelian Africa are far less frequently in this group than their male counterparts.

– persons who came to France as children and who have a partner of the same origin. This group makes up around 10% of immigrants. In 83% of cases their partner is also an immigrant or the descendant of immigrants of the same origin. These practically all first unions formed early through a direct marriage. The spouses often met abroad (in 6 out of every 10 cases). In these cases the parents' influence on the choice of partner remains relatively strong. In this group educational homogamy is low, as one of the partners attended school in France and the other in the country of origin, and the meeting took place in the family environment, rather than in the individual's broader social environment. The immigrants most frequently in this situation are those from Turkey (nearly 22%), southern Europe (12-16%) and, to a lesser extent, the Maghreb (11-15%). They are considerably younger than those in other groups.

Being French or Looking French?

National belonging (Simon, Tiberj 2018: 281) is formed not only on the basis of attachment and affiliation that develop over the life course, but also in relation to other people's perception of one's identity. This far, we have analysed indicators expressing the sense of national belonging as reported by the respondents, but the survey also asked a more original question on the way respondents interpret people's perception of their "Frenchness". It is not uncommon to find some dissonance between personal self-representation – "I feel French" – and the perception of others – "but I'm not seen that way".

Around half of immigrants with French citizenship believe they are not seen as French (denial of Frenchness), and a quarter of immigrant parents' descendants believe the same. Having a mixed couple as parents greatly reduces the impact of this: Compared to 36% of descendants of two immigrant parents, 11% of descendants of mixed couples believe they are not seen as French. The sense of denial of Frenchness clearly follows a "line of visibility" or "colour line", affecting immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and their descendants the most, followed by immigrants and descendants from the Maghreb, Turkey, and Southeast Asia. Immigrants from Europe stand apart in this respect, and consider themselves to be fully accepted in the

national community – or invisible. This is even truer for their descendants. Clearly, “Frenchness” is not ascribed on the basis of nationality or cultural codes, such as spoken language, but on a narrow vision of those who “look French”.

Pailhe 2015, has investigated transformations in partnership formation, i.e., the timing and type of first union across generations of immigrants pertaining to the main origin groups in France. It has analyzed men and women separately, using data from the Trajectories and Origin survey. It addressed how the socialization vs. assimilation hypothesis shapes immigrants and their descendants’ first partnership formation patterns, analyzing the interplay of cultural and structural factors by focusing on religiosity, education, and access to employment. In line with our first hypothesis, we find there are significant differences in partnership trajectories between the first and the second generations. First of all, both male and female second-generation immigrants form their first union later than the first generation. The adaptation process of partnership patterns over generations also manifests with lower levels of direct marriage over generations, while the level of informal cohabitation increases. The development of pre-marital cohabitation over generations of immigration is a sign of more gradual entry into a union and an alternative way of living: descendants of immigrants have more choices than their parents regarding lifestyle and personal arrangements, and they have more freedom to plan their own lives. It also signals a weakening of traditional family behaviors, in particular regarding changes in the conception of pre-marital sex.

For immigrants from the Maghreb and, to a lesser degree, their descendants, marriage remains a significant institution. Maghrebis, on the other hand, have a faster rate of transition between the first and second generations than Turks. As a result, there is a higher convergence for the earliest immigration flows for those of Muslim descent. To qualify our earlier assumptions, some groups whose sending country's marital norms are drastically different from French standards are also undergoing a phase of convergence toward French behaviors. Immigrant children from Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa delay union creation and have a low probability of marrying directly.

New migrants are allowed to live in France in particular as own circle of relatives migrants (72 %). The different essential motives are admission as a refugee (13 %) and hard work migration (9 %). Men and women do now no longer come for the identical motives in France. Although the bulk of men has migrated withinside the context of own circle of relatives migration, women are greater extensively admitted for the identical reason. Thus women are

much less frequently admitted in France than men as hard work migrants and, to a lesser extent, they're additionally a much less frequent refugees. All new migrants and own circle of relatives migrants have a totally comparable age structure. These populations are pretty young : greater than 4 out of ten human beings among 18 and 30 years old. Among own circle of relatives migrants, women are more youthful than men. Generally, women additionally arrived in France a touch more youthful than the men. Newcomers who have acquired a primary house allow withinside the identical year, did now no longer arrive in France on the identical time because of administrative procedures. Family migrants are migrants for which the stairs are the fastest : 60 % them are in France for much less than years towards 48 % for all new migrants (Amiel, Jourdan 2013).

Women, on the other hand, are admitted to France for a shorter period of time than men for the same reason. Family migrants are more likely to come from the Maghreb (especially men) than from Sub-Saharan Africa or Asia, when compared to all new migrants. The following section of the research focuses on new migrants who have come as a result of family migration. It is adamant about gender problems, including women's integration.

Table 4: Socio-demographic characteristics in 2010; All new migrants and family migrants

	ALL	Family migration		
		All	Men	Women
Age (in 2010)				
18 to 29 y.o.	44	46	36	54
30 to 39 y.o.	38	37	47	31
40 to 49 y.o.	13	12	14	11
50 y.o. and more	5	4	4	4
Age at arrival in France				
0 to 17 y.o.	9	6	8	5
18 to 29 y.o.	55	57	53	61
30 to 39 y.o.	26	27	32	24
40 to 49 y.o.	7	7	6	7
50 y.o. and more	3	2	2	3
Duration of presence in France in 2010				
Less than 2 years	48	60	50	67
From 2 to 4 years	16	12	11	12
From 5 to 9 years	25	22	29	17
More than 10 years	10	7	11	4
Citizenship				
Maghreb	36	46	51	42
Subsaharian Africa	25	21	21	21
Other Africa	8	6	7	6
Asia	20	16	13	18
Europe (and CIS)	6	5	3	7
America and Oceania	6	6	5	6

(Amiel, Jourdan 2013)

Between the time of migration and 2010, the participation rate in labor market for men has increased significantly from 72 % to 90 % while the rate for women remained stable (about one in two women is active). However, due to migration, this stability masks fluctuations in activity and inactivity. After migration, around two out of every ten new migrant women (especially housewives) become inactive. In comparison, the same proportion of people shift from being idle (mostly students, but also housewives) to being active. Meanwhile, the employment rate of women collapsed, losing 20 points of percentage at 44 % and the unemployment rate increased significantly (from 10 % to 53%). Thus, migration appears as a break in the new migrant women path of activity (Amiel, Jourdan 2013).

4.4. Housing

After the Algerian war for independence, an influx of Algerians came to France looking for jobs and a new future. Approximately four million Maghrebins live in France today, constituting a significant minority of around 8% of the population. Many French citizens fear the Maghreb's heavy immigrant presence, and these people are often forced to live in the slums of major cities like Paris or Lyon by circumstance. To combat this, the Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians who immigrated to this area have created a subculture of their own among the French culture. Although they have been economically repressed, they have created a sort of intellectual and cultural revival, especially among the young generation. As one author said, “Algeria had become a part of the daily history of France and she spoke there also in French”. Today’s French youth enjoy music imported from Algeria, and women who were not free to express themselves in Algeria find themselves liberated in France (Tarwater 2015).

Immigrant communities in France experience poorer living conditions than the rest of French society. In 1988, over 25% of non-French residents in France reported having no inside toilet and no bath or shower; 19% did not have hot water (Taïeb, 1998). These conditions are still described by some first generation immigrants (Killian, 2006). In the 1960s and 70s many migrant workers were living in shantytowns called bidonvilles that were built on the outskirts of large cities like Paris and Lyon because there was not enough existing housing to accommodate them. To help with this housing crisis the state built low-income housing called

habitation à loyer modéré (HLM) in these areas, in what are called the banlieues. The HLMs are large concrete apartment complexes that are comparable to housing projects in the US. They are notorious for being run-down and dangerous: between 2005 and 2009 there were 48 deaths from three separate fires in HLMs that were attributed to their poor condition (Killian 2006).

To quell the feeling of rebellion, the French authorities realized that building homes, especially for singles, would drastically improve the wretched living conditions of Algerian workers in France. Despite this, the number of supporters of Algerian independence continued to rise.

Due to a shortage of accommodation and a lack of "evolution," these Algerian families who immigrated to France were denied access to low-income housing (HLM). Banks provided special loans to create low-rent housing that these families could afford with their income in response to such a situation. The French authorities thus hoped that they could use the improvement of the status of Algerian immigrants in France as a bargain chip in future negotiations with the F.L.N., and to secure the future status of Europeans living in Algeria. Algerian workers had become indispensable to the French economy in sectors such as public work, steel, and textiles. The Evian Agreements guaranteed the Blackfoot—referring to the European settlers because of the color of their boots at the beginning of the colonization of Algeria, their civil rights, religion, language and property in Algeria; whereas the Algerian workers on French territory were guaranteed the same rights as French citizens, apart from political rights. The agreement's centerpiece was the free movement of refugees between the two nations. In reality, through a series of "special" agreements, the concept of free movement, which was one of the levers of French policy in Africa, was expanded to all African countries (Maillard 2010: 14)

During the 1960s and 1970s, the availability of public housing in France grew significantly. Since 1968, public housing has likely affected the evolution of segregation by relocating people living in cities to communities where housing projects were located. Its influence on non-European immigrants is potentially particularly large as rates of participation in public housing by these groups increased tremendously. The year 1968 is an interesting benchmark as the stock of public housing units was considerably lower at that time. Unlike today, the participation rate of immigrants in public housing was probably negligible, as their access was severely restricted before the 1970s. Verdugo et al. study has shown that in 1968, only 5.5% of foreign workers in the Paris urban area lived in public housing versus 15.3% of natives.

Originally, public housing structures were unrelated to immigrants' needs, and is the reason immigrants' fairly decrease participation costs in public housing throughout the Nineteen Sixties and Seventies. Housing laws for immigrants focused on unmarried male migrants until the 1970s, when they were forced to live in communal dormitories known as "lobby Sonacotra," rendering reunification of families impossible. Until the center of the Seventies, the countrywide government taken into consideration the immigration of Africans and Maghrebis to be temporary, and the authorities explicitly attempted to deter reunification of those immigrants' families. Therefore, immigrants' get right of entry to to housing initiatives turned into critically restricted. As a result, many immigrants lived in slums at the outskirts of French city areas. After 1970, the authorities determined to cast off immigrant slums, and the get right of entry to of immigrants to public housing turned into regularly unrestricted throughout the Seventies as own circle of relatives reunification immigration have become easier (Verdugo 2011: 16).

Table 5. Proportion of Immigrant Households Living in Public Housing 1982-1999.

Table 1 : Proportion of Immigrant Households Living in Public Housing 1982-1999				Linear Regression Adjusted Participation Rates (with respect to natives) Includes Municipalities Fixed Effect	
Participation Rates	1982	1990	1999		
Immigrants	23.7	27.3	32.8		
Natives	17.9	18.7	19.7		
Europe	18.1	19.3	19.7		
<i>Spain</i>	22.0	22.8	22.8	1.6	5.3
<i>Portugal</i>	25.2	26.6	25.1	-4.1	-5.9
<i>Italy</i>	14.2	14.4	14.5	-6.1	-4.2
Africa	26.4	32.3	43.5		
Maghreb	34.2	42.6	47.9		
<i>Algeria</i>	35.2	43.4	50.4	26.4	21.4
<i>Morocco</i>	37.6	42.8	49.2	24.4	20.4
<i>Tunisia</i>	27.3	37.8	39.1	15.9	13.6
Asia	25.9	27.1	31.7		
<i>Turkey</i>	31.2	31.4	46.4	17.6	13.1
<i>Vietnam</i>	29.4	32.1	32.0	12.5	7.3
<i>Other nationalities</i>	17.3	19.6	20.1		

(Fougere, Kramarz, Rathelot, Safi 2011: 9)

Different data sources can be used to identify migrants in France. The most important source is the general Population Census, which was last conducted in 1999 for the whole population. Other notable surveys include the Labor Force Surveys (Enquêtes sur l'emploi), which were

conducted annually until 2002 and quarterly since 2003 by the Paris-based Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) (Fougere, Kramarz, Rathelot, Safi 2011: 9).

Study show that, in general, migrants live more frequently in social housing than French natives, other observables being equal. In particular, this probability is higher for migrants from Turkey, Morocco, Southeast Asia, Algeria, Tunisia and Sub-Saharan Africa (in descending order). It is generally lower for migrants who have gained French citizenship (excepted for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa). Study (Fougere, Kramarz, Rathelot, Safi 2011: 11) find also that migrants are less likely to live in a HLM (habitations à loyer modéré, dwelling with a moderate rent) than natives in large cities. When the fraction of inhabitants living in a HLM is large in the city, migrants are less likely than 18 natives to live in a HLM. Moreover, migrants are in general more likely to live in a HLM when the fraction of natives is large in the city. On the whole, in cities with many HLMs and many migrants (irrespective of the origin), migrants are less likely to inhabit a social housing. Put differently, migrants of all origins live less often in a HLM when the city has plenty of social housing and when the fraction of natives is high.

In France, public and private entities may build and/or operate social housing. It covers a broad variety of dwellings, such as communal houses, individual apartments in a block of privately owned flats, and private housing estates. Furthermore, social housing can be leased (as is the case with the vast majority of social housing residents) or purchased. However, census information concerning social housing does not capture this variety of situations. In the 1982 French census, information regarding social housing reflects the nature of the building in which the household resides, while in the 1990 and 1999 censuses, the information reflects the nature of the individual apartment occupied by the interviewee or the building in which he or she resides. In order to be able to compare the three censuses, we thus define the dependent variable as being an housing unit within a HLM building. For some censuses, we know whether the social housing unit is rented or owned, but here again, we do not distinguish between these two occupancy statuses for comparability concerns.

Housing projects are found in all cities but their supply varies widely across localities: the percentage of housing units in the social rented sector can change from 7% in Nice to 44% in Reims for example and is about 20% in 1999 on average. During the time period I consider, the number of social housing units increased from 1.4 millions in 1968 to 3.4 millions in 1999. Most housing units were constructed between 1958 and 1978 after a huge construction plan was launched by the government. This period of construction was particularly intense: I

estimate that the total social housing stock was multiplied by two between 1968 and 1982 (Boeri, Phillipis, Patacchini, Pellizzari 2013).

Constructions were roughly random across cities throughout the time, or at least unrelated or negatively linked to the share of immigrants across cities or other measurable city characteristics, which is an interesting feature of the development plan. Therefore, these exogenous changes in the supply of social housing within cities and across cities can be exploited to identify the effect of social housing on the incentives to locate in the city (Boeri, Phillipis, Patacchini, Pellizzari 2013).

4.5. Healthcare system

In comparison to other countrywide health-care systems, the French health-care system is generally thought to be extremely friendly. However, the implications bring with them some flaws, especially in terms of unequal access to treatment. This is true both in terms of system access and later healthcare strategies within the various pleasantness and pertinence of the clinical actions performed. When it comes to getting access to first-rate services, the individuals who have the most challenges are those who are the most economically disadvantaged. This is due to the fact they're much less able to paying the quantities notable after social protection cover. The end result is usually a failure to take in treatment, which worries multiple in 3 in a few classes of the population. Migrants constitute this type of classes.

Over 20% of migrants do now no longer own optional health insurance, in comparison to approximately 5% of the overall population. A difference is made among migrants who're in a everyday situation (documented) withinside the us of a and people who are now no longer (undocumented migrants). The former can declare common regulation benefits, while the latter are handiest eligible for a particular gain referred to as State Medical Assistance - Aide Médicale de l'Etat (Andre, Azzedine 2016: 4).

State Medical Assistance is a social benefit created at the same time as universal health cover – couverture maladie universelle (CMU) – and which came into force in early 2000 to help combat exclusion. It is about foreign nationals who are living in a precarious situation in France and are facing financial difficulties. Beneficiaries must have been on the national

territory for more than three months and have an annual income of less than 8,645 euros to qualify for this assistance. The limit for a pair is 12,967 euros. Several supporting documents are required to prove the identity of the applicant, an address of domiciliation and over three months' presence in France. Dependent people can also benefit from State Medical Assistance (i.e. partners and children). Children under 18 can claim the allowance if their parents are in France in an irregular situation and not eligible for the allowance.

Another measure existed prior to State Medical Assistance, a local medical assistance. This benefit aimed to provide social protection for all people living in poverty and insecure conditions (Andre, Azzedine 2016: 6).

Currently, State Medical Assistance covers all medical treatment resulting from illness or childbirth within tariffs determined by the Social Security. Fees are not paid out in advance. All healthcare professionals are obliged to accept State Medical Assistance beneficiaries. The entitlement lasts for one year and can be renewed. For undocumented migrants who cannot meet the residency requirements to receive State Medical Assistance, an overriding measure exists to cover emergency treatment, defined as care "that may be life-threatening or would result in a significant, long-term alteration of the person's or unborn child's health status." Treatment to avoid the propagation of disease (e.g. tuberculosis) is also concerned.

How much does State Medical Assistance cost?

In 2014, (Andre, Azzedine 2016: 8) expenditure relating to State Medical Assistance totalled 831 million euro for the all undocumented migrants. This represented 0.49 % of expenditure on social welfare devoted to covering the consumption of medical goods and services. The average annual expenditure per beneficiary came to 2,823 euro. This average figure hides significant disparities, since statistic analyses show that 75 % of beneficiaries incur expenses below 1,000 euro and 3 % above 10,000 euro. Although average expenditure per person has been relatively stable over the last few years (it was 2,846 euro in 2007), we observe a clear increase in overall expenditure, from 661 million euro in 2010 to 831 million in 2014, or an increase of 26 %. As we shall see, this increase is mostly due to a rise in the number of beneficiaries. Note also that, since its creation, the budget devoted to State Medical Assistance has been consistently underestimated compared to actual needs. In terms of the organization of expenditure, hospitalization costs represent 70 % of the overall amount, compared to less than 50 % for those insured under the social security system. This observation can be related to the progression of emergency care, generally requiring a hospital stay, which went up 38 % from 2010 to 2014.

Health status

In 2007, immigrants' health status emerges as a major theme during the Portuguese presidency of the European Council (European Union JO, 2007) that was furthermore accompanied by the project 'Assisting Migrants and Communities: Analysis of Social Determinants of Health and Health Inequalities', aimed at increasing exchanges on immigrants' health and use of healthcare services (Berchet, Jusot 2012).

Despite these various initiatives, awareness of immigrants' health status in France remains restricted, owing to the majority of national health surveys lacking information on nationality and country of birth. Nevertheless, some studies show that the immigrant populations' health status and healthcare use are fundamentally different to those of the native population, due to self-selection phenomena related to migration, the economic situation of immigrants in the host country, the loss of social connections, informational barriers or discriminating attitudes from the healthcare sector.

An analysis (Berchet, Jusot 2012) of causes of death between 1979 and 1991 showed that, forequivalent age, the life expectancy of an immigrant Moroccan male was higher than that of a native French male. These results are consistent with other studies revealing the better health status of foreigners. After controlling for age, foreigners have a better longevity than the population as a whole but also a lower incidence of invalidity. Self-reported morbidity rates in Moroccan immigrant households also appear particularly low before and after controlling for age, occupation and social category. Self-reported illness is respectively 16% and 33% lower than among women and men in French households. This lower morbidity rate appears more marked among men in terms of cancers and cardiovascular diseases but the situation is more contrasted among women that present a lower morbidity rate for endocrinal and perinatal diseases.

Differences in health status between the two generations of migrants

Results of the successive ESPS survey editions conducted in 2006 and 2008 verify the immigrant poorer perceived health status. Although the distinction between first and second generation immigrants is rarely considered in empirical literature, it becomes important when the acculturation or assimilation scheme is considered. This suggests that adopting the host

country's cultural traditions causes second-generation immigrants' wellbeing to converge with that of the local population. Therefore, after controlling for age, first generation immigrants have a markedly poorer perceived health popularity, substantially the various North African populace and women. On the opposite hand, perceived health status amongst first and second generation immigrants from southern Europe does now no longer range from that of the French population. (Berchet, Jusot 2012).

Men

A very high risk of mortality by thyroid diseases was observed in migrants from Algeria (and eastern Europe), which could be related to low iodine intake during the years they lived in their country of origin. Apart from that, an under-mortality was observed in Mediterranean men for nearly all causes of death that may be related to nutrition, such as endocrine, metabolic and cardiovascular diseases, as well as digestive cancers. Migrants originating from Italy and North Africa presented a lower mortality from colorectal cancers, and Moroccans and Portuguese were well protected from digestive and cardiovascular diseases. Consistent with the lower consumption of alcohol by migrants from North Africa, their mortality from hepatic cirrhosis was also low. In addition, despite a tobacco intake at least as high as that of French men of the same socio-economic level, migrants from North African countries had a lower mortality from smoking-related cancers. Overall, these findings indicate that, in addition to the beneficial migrant influence, environmental and lifestyle factors, such as traditional eating patterns followed by men from southern Europe and North Africa, could protect them from chronic diseases. (Darmon, Khlat 2001: 169).

Women

North African women do not present the same health advantage as men. Various factors may explain this difference. First, most of the migrant women did not arrive in France as workers, and therefore they were not submitted to the positive selection linked to the working immigration. Second, North African women are more often non-working than are local-born women of similar socio-economic status, and are therefore less likely than men to have regular medical check ups. Third, North African women are more frequently obese than French women of the same age and social background. Obesity prevalence varies by ethnicity in most developed countries, including France, and there is an inverse association between obesity and socioeconomic status in women, but not in men. On the one hand, women of all races have a higher prevalence of obesity than men due to a variety of physiological mechanisms that lead to females' increased fat accumulation. On the other hand, it appears

that several ethnic groups in industrialized countries are more prone to obesity: this may be due to a genetic predisposition which only becomes apparent once the individuals are suddenly exposed to a more affluent lifestyle. Consequently, the risk is particularly high in women from ethnic minorities living in industrialized countries (Darmon, Khlat 2001: 172).

Children

North American studies have shown that the risks of both obesity and nutrient deficiencies, especially iron deficiency, are higher in pre-school children at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum. Therefore, it can be argued that the nutritional risks observed in migrant children living in France, namely nutrient deficiencies and obesity, are only related to the low social status of their parents. However, other factors, more specific to their position as migrants also need to be looked at. Higher risks for vitamin D deficiency in migrant children might be related to insufficient sun exposure linked to cultural habits and a low rate of endogenous synthesis when the skin is highly pigmented. Iron deficiency can be clarified in part by intestinal dysfunction caused by infections, alactasia, gluten sensitivity, or lead poisoning, which may be more common or undiagnosed in migrant children. Furthermore, weaning foods are introduced later in migrant children, and weaning diets can have a high phytate-to-iron molar ratio, potentially causing iron deficiency. More importantly, cultural and language barriers might limit access to dietary information. Because they do not strictly follow the mandatory preventive care of their children, migrant families would have less access to preventive dietary advice for children, such as fluoride supplementation and the use of iron and vitamin D fortified milk formula. Lastly, the accelerated dietary transition observed in this young population might be involved in the high frequency of obesity observed in North African children (Darmon, Khlat 2001: 169).

4.6. Culture

Like most immigrants in industrialized countries, the Muslims who came to France during the second half of the twentieth century have endured lasting economic and social hardships. They first had low-level jobs, predominantly in the industrial sector, when they arrived in the 1960s and early 1970s. Their situation became more difficult as the abundant, stable jobs of the postwar boom disappeared in the economic downturn of the 1970s and 1980s. That helps explain why the economic and social indicators for this population have been so unfavorable.

Immigrants have faced higher unemployment rates than the rest of the population, as well as a higher rate of workplace injuries, housing issues, such as being segregated in massive, high-density housing projects on the outskirts of major cities that were gradually abandoned by native French families, educational issues, and high levels of crime and unrest (Adida, Laitin, Valfort 2014: 1044).

Table 6. Population of Muslims in France

<i>City</i>	<i>number of Muslims</i>	<i>Total city population</i>	<i>percent of local population</i>
Paris	1,700,000	11,000,000	10 – 15
Marseille	200,000	800,000	25
Lille	200,000	4,000,000	5
Lyon	150,000	1,200,000	8 – 12

(Adida, Laitin, Valfort 2014: 1044)

Those problems have been reinforced by the economic situation in France, especially the stagnant job market, and they failed to improve in the 1990s. Meanwhile negative stereotypes and racism have continued to take their toll. While Muslim immigrants and their children's integration into French society and overall situation has not progressed as quickly as previous waves of immigrants, significant, if largely unseen, progress is being made. Statistical metrics may be used to measure this very puzzling condition.

The unemployment rate of populations of immigrant origin is generally twice the rate of the overall population, and that rate is even higher among youth of North African origin. In 1999, foreigners represented 8.6 percent of the working population but made up 15 percent of the unemployed; moreover, while 22 percent of all immigrants were unemployed, only 13 percent of the French workforce was. Foreign women were even more adversely affected—their unemployment rate was 25 percent.

Today, France is home to the largest Muslim population in Europe, a number estimated to be around 4.7 million. The majority of this number is made up of immigrants and their successive generations originating in former French colonies in North and Sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey, although they are predominately from the Maghreb (https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/integratingislam_chapter.pdf).

The availability of Arabic language courses in the education system and its status in France is unstable. The Ministry of Culture recognized both Berber and the North African dialect of Arabic as a language of France in 1999; however, they failed to recognize that there are different dialects in each of the countries of the Maghreb. In the same year, dialectal Arabic was eliminated from the list of languages a student could take as an optional test on the baccalaureate. Berber, on the other hand, has been an available option for oral examination since the 1970s, and since 1995 it has been an available option for written examination.

There are opportunities for children to learn Arabic through the program Enseignement des Langues et Cultures d'Origine (ELCO). These language courses are primarily targeted toward immigrants of Maghrebi or Turkish descent and are available free of charge after school. Because ELCO courses are funded by the government of the country of origin, not the French state, only the official state language is offered. For the Maghrebi governments this means Standard Arabic, not the dialectal variety spoken in the homes of these children. Although the purpose of these classes is to allow children to connect with their roots, they are teaching them a language that is somewhat foreign to them (Adida, Laitin, Valfort 2014: 1044).

The religion of the Maghreb is almost entirely Islam. In Morocco, over 98% of the population is Muslim. The current task is to identify the attitudes of the grown children of first-generation Maghreb immigrants toward language, but also toward religion, in order to investigate the interplay between the two. To do so, it is important to understand how Islam is practiced in France. Although the focal point is on the second one era, it's miles vital to check how faith is and has been practiced over the past couple of a long time via way of means of the primary era as well. Responses of first generation North African women can not be generalized to the male population, or to the North African diaspora in trendy due to the fact the pattern length become too small; however, their interviews do provide a few perception into the modern-day studies and perspectives of immigrants from the Maghreb. It is vital to word that the majority of those individuals have been especially knowledgeable which might also additionally have an impact on their perspectives on religion (Adida, Laitin, Valfort 2014: 1044).

France's religious landscape has changed dramatically, with the country's ongoing secularisation and the advent of Islam as a minority religion alongside Protestantism, Judaism, and Buddhism. Nearly 45 percent of the population in metropolitan France between the ages of 18 and 50 pretend to be agnostic or atheist. This distance from religion is observed mainly in the mainstream population and among descendants of mixed parentage. More than

three quarters of immigrants and their descendants reported having a religion. The religious detachment of Spanish and Italian immigrant.

Table 7. Proportion of French nationals among immigrants by origin, sex and age at arrival (%)

Immigrants' country of birth	Overall	Males	Females	Arrived after age 16
Algeria	45	47	43	35
Morocco and Tunisia	47	48	46	39
Sahelian Africa	29	30	29	26
West and Central Africa	43	45	42	37
Southeast Asia	81	83	78	72
Turkey	31	30	32	21
Portugal	28	22	35	12
Spain and Italy	51	48	54	15
Other EU-27 countries	26	21	29	19
Other countries	45	46	44	37
All immigrants	41	41	41	32

(Simon, Tiberj 2010).

While Catholicism is still the principal religion in France with 11.5 million people aged 18-50 reporting being Catholic (43% of the population), Muslims now form the largest minority religion with 2.1 million followers – a long way from certain estimates put forward during the recent public debate. There are fewer than 500,000 Protestants, 150,000 Buddhists and 125,000 Jews. Respondents in the mainstream population who reported having a religion were almost exclusively Catholic, with minority religions representing less than 5%.

Catholics, on the other hand, were in the minority among the refugees and their descendants, where Islam reigned supreme. Mixed-parentage descendants were mostly Catholic, indicating the proportion of Southern European immigrants in this population (Simon, Tiberj 2010).

Table 8. Importance of religion by sex and origin (%)

	Males	Females	Overall	Unweighted numbers
Country or <i>département</i> of birth of im migrants and DO M native-borns				
DOM	50	63	58	410
Algeria	72	82	77	565
Morocco and Tunisia	72	82	77	817
Sahelian Africa	77	89	84	507
West and Central Africa	76	78	77	548
Southeast Asia	50	59	55	343
Turkey	67	79	73	634
Portugal	38	51	45	431
Spain and Italy	29	30	30	144
Other EU-27 countries	33	41	38	364
Other countries	61	66	64	774
All immigrants	62	70	66	5,127
Country or <i>département</i> of birth of th e parents of descen dants of immigra nts and DOM native- borns				
DOM	43	49	46	414
Algeria	71	75	73	825
Morocco and Tunisia	71	81	77	864
Sahelian Africa	90	85	88	392
West and Central Africa	67	61	64	242
Southeast Asia	49	45	47	251
Turkey	71	76	73	390
Portugal	30	44	37	617
Spain and Italy	24	27	26	868
Other EU-27 countries	22	31	26	372
Other countries	51	53	52	333
All descendants of immigrants	49	57	53	5,324
Mainstream population	20	27	24	1,635
All metropolitan population	31	38	34	12,910

(Simon, Tiberj 2010)

4.7. Education

Like their native French counterparts, only a small minority of young foreign-born adults aged 18–24 are still in the education system. Among these families, the share of young men in higher education is the same as the share among young French men (45.1 and 44.8 per cent,

respectively). The corresponding difference is greater between young foreign-born women and young French women (43.1 and 49.5 per cent, respectively).

Table 9. Young Foreign-born Aged 18–24 in Education, France 1999

	<i>Young men</i>		<i>Young women</i>	
	<i>In any education</i>	<i>In tertiary education</i>	<i>In any education</i>	<i>In tertiary education</i>
Natives	44.8	56.6	49.5	65.8
Foreign-born	45.1	50.0	43.1	56.9
Europe	44.1	64.1	47.4	78.5
South of Europe	24.0	60.9	29.5	85.2
Other EU-15	54.6	70.0	56.1	79.1
Other Europe	70.2	62.1	63.4	72.8
Africa	47.1	45.9	43.3	46.9
Algeria	38.7	43.8	40.6	50.3
Morocco	42.3	48.4	40.6	45.8
Tunisia	51.7	55.3	36.3	71.1
Other Africa	60.4	43.5	51.2	42.5
Asia	39.7	55.7	35.1	54.7
Turkey	26.0	37.6	15.4	9.8
South East Asia	24.3	72.2	57.1	61.3
Other Asia	55.6	58.9	51.2	71.5
Other	51.2	32.9	54.1	47.6

(Kirszbaum, Brinbaum, Simon 2009:7)

The differences between those who go on to higher education (whether academic or vocational) and those who go straight into professional or technical branches, which are typically seen as less prestigious, are greater among young people still in the educational system. Some 56.6 per cent of young native French men and 65.8 per cent of native French young women go to university after reaching age 18 compared with 50 per cent of young foreign-born men and 56.9 per cent of young foreign-born women (Kirszbaum, Brinbaum, Simon 2009:7).

In practice, the status of the children of immigrants as students depends on whether they are French or foreign nationals, whether they are speakers of French or of another language and whether they or their parents are asylum seekers, beneficiaries of family reunification, holders of long-term work permits, and so on. Candidates are typically sorted by education services

based on their age, official residence status, linguistic proficiency, and other factors. The registered or undocumented status of students is not an issue in the national education system before they reach the age of legal majority, according to a 2002 ministerial circular.

Nonetheless, comments by national education authorities suggest that undocumented status is a barrier to rapid access to schooling if there are no places available and that, even if there is no shortage of places, the type of schooling offered to these students may often be inappropriate. For many of these students, the educational system has been compared to an obstacle course. Some regional education authorities (académies) have responded to the recent rise in the number of these students by opening new facilities, notably middle schools. Some of the new arrivals are assigned to special transitional classes, which, in 2001, included 475 introductory classes and 329 integrated remedial classes at the primary level and 627 admission classes at the secondary level. Evaluations that take into account not only French proficiency, but also educational achievement, experience-based skills, and student preferences are used to decide if a student requires special classes. If special education is required, the student is placed in one of two types of classes: small group special classes or regular special classes. If their language skills improve, the students progress. Many commentators draw attention to the marginal status of special classes within schools and the lack of interest among some members of the teaching profession more generally in the educational problems of newly arrived students (Kirszbaum, Brinbaum, Simon 2009:7).

Many children of immigrants left the education system with none qualifications (13% as compared to 8% for the mainstream population). This fee varies extensively in step with the parents' birth country. It is mainly excessive (27%) for descendants of immigrants from Turkey, and particularly decrease however nonetheless excessive for descendants of immigrants from North Africa and subSaharan Africa (18% for the ones of Algerian descent, 15% for Moroccan and Tunisian and 16% for West and Central African). Next come descendants of immigrants from Portugal (11%) and Southeast Asia, accompanied through the ones from Italy and Spain, with figures near the mainstream population. Regardless of origin, a few immigrants' youngsters depart faculty with simplest decrease secondary (BEPC) qualifications (5-11%) (Mogueru, Brinbau, Primon 2010).

Table 10. Educational track after lower secondary school of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns aged 18-35 by origin and sex

<i>Département</i> or country of birth of parents		Gene ral track s	Technolo gical tracks	Vocation al tracks (in a <i>lycée</i>)	Apprenticesh ip*	No further schooli ng	Tot al	Unweight ed numbers
DOM	Males	33	16	43	6	2	100	248
	Females	53	16	28	1	2	100	250
Algeria	Males	32	16	40	4	9	100	370
	Females	41	16	36	2	5	100	429
Morocco and Tunisia	Males	35.5	20	34	6.5	4	100	394
	Females	51	14	31	1	3	100	497
Sahelian Africa	Males	28	16	47	3	6	100	169
	Females	35	21	41	2	1	100	230
West and Central Africa	Males	40	15.5	42	2	0	100	113
	Females	53	20	24	0	3	100	128
Southeast Asia	Males	57	13.5	25	4	0	100	266
	Females	65	11	22	2	1	100	243
Turkey	Males	28	17	42	9	4	100	189
	Females	27	13	48	1	11	100	218
Portugal	Males	24	18	43	13.6	2	100	350
	Females	46	15	32		1	100	314
Spain and Italy	Males	36	21	30	10.4	3	100	348
	Females	49	13	31		3	100	353
Other EU- 27 countries	Males	61	17	16	4	2	100	131
	Females	65	12	19	0	5	100	141
Other countries	Males	44	20	32	3	1	100	229
	Females	73	8	15	2	2	100	168
All descendan ts of immigrant s	Males	36	18	35	7	4	100	2,559
	Females	50	14	31	2	3	100	2,721
Mainstrea m population	Males	40	14	31	12.5	3	100	726
	Females	46	14	31		3	100	739
All metropolit an population	Males	39	15	32	11.5	3	100	3,897
	Females	48	14	31		3	100	4,085

(Mogueru, Brinbau, Primon 2010).

In vocational education (other than apprentice training centres) boys are always over-represented compared to girls, particularly among descendants of DOM nativeborns and of immigrants from West and Central Africa. For example, only 24% of daughters of immigrants from West or Central Africa were in vocational secondary streams compared to 42% of sons. The reverse trend applies to children of parents from Turkey: 48% of the girls but 42% of the boys. Traditionally, boys whose parents came from Portugal have more often opted for apprenticeships, with rates comparable to the mainstream population (Mogueru, Brinbau, Primon 2010).

4.7.1. Language as a key to integration

The acquisition of the national language as the immigrants' second language is influenced by a range of factors. These include conditions in the country of origin and immigration country, the existence and structure of an ethnic community and – in particular – individual and family living conditions and the specific circumstances of migration. Age at migration and the duration of stay in the country of migration are particularly significant factors; the parents' age at migration and language skills also play an important role in the case of immigrant children. A higher level of education of immigrants or their parents constitutes a clear advantage when it comes to second language acquisition. As opposed to this, significant linguistic distance between the first language and the language to be acquired, a high level of global usability of the first language (in particular English) and presumably strong socio-cultural distances (xenophobia) between the immigrant group and the majority society can inhibit the second language acquisition by immigrants.

School achievement is directly and indirectly related to language proficiency and this means that command of the national language and language of instruction is of vital importance regardless of the impact of other factors on the educational opportunities of migrant children, such as school choice, family circumstances and direct or indirect discrimination in the education system. The conditions that positively influence school performance in language-related subjects are usually the same as those that favor the acquisition of a second language, ie low age at the time of migration and a higher educational level of parents. At the same

time, school performance of children and adolescents is particularly affected when learning takes place in schools and classrooms with a high proportion of students who don't speak the national language. Additional competences in the mother tongue have no noticeable influence on school performance, and empirical studies have yet to confirm that bilingual teaching has a particular influence on national language acquisition and advanced schooling (Esser 2006).

In addition to the key elements of educational degree and professional experience, extensive language skills in the native language are critical for immigrants' integration into the labor market. A lack of language skills certainly decreases their prospects of getting job and advancing in their careers, as well as resulting in considerable pay losses. The more communication and coordination an activity requires, and especially if the immigrants' mother tongue has a low use value on the global labor market, this is all the more relevant. Anyone who does not have a thorough understanding of the national language will be unable to put their valuable work experience and knowledge to full use. The conditions that promote labor market integration, on the other hand, such as a high level of education and proficiency in the native language, reinforce each other. Employers that are afraid of additional transaction costs due to accents, or who underestimate candidates' professional competence and refuse to hire immigrants "as a preventive step," can all contribute to immigrants' professional status deteriorating. They may subsequently choose not to apply for jobs in the host society's labor market, especially if ethnic niche economies offer alternatives. Because of their ("exclusive") integration into intra-ethnic networks and a lack of language abilities, individuals may be shut out of information and relationships that could lead to job prospects.

The diversity of linguistic practices in France is reflected in the survival of regional languages and patois as well as in the variety of foreign languages spoken by migrants and their descendants. The transmission of languages is therefore an important issue in intergenerational relations. For migrants, learning the mainstream language is a key factor for integration, whether for access to the labour market and services or for integrating into new social networks (Esser 2006).

Not surprisingly, immigrants had a more fluent command of French as a whole (oral and written) at the time of the survey than when they arrived in France.

The fact of coming from a French-speaking country has a direct impact on the level of knowledge of the language on arrival. Thus very few immigrants from Portugal (3%), Turkey (3%), Italy and Spain (8%) and Southeast Asia (9%) said they were proficient in French on arrival in France. Because African countries formerly under French administration have retained the use of French, many immigrants from Africa had a very good command of the language when they arrived: West and Central Africa 77%, Sahelian Africa 53% and North Africa 44%. European migrants other than South Europeans are in an intermediate position: quite a high proportion, especially among women (36%), had a command of French before they arrived.

Table 11. Percentage of immigrants with a good or very good level of French at their arrival in metropolitan France and at the time of the survey

Country of birth	Men			Women		
	Good or very good reported level...			Good or very good reported level...		
	at arrival in France	at time of survey	Unweighted numbers	at arrival in France	at time of survey	Unweighted numbers
Algeria	52	84	330	44	72	395
Morocco and Tunisia	47	77	536	36	64	532
Sahelian Africa	58	73	293	48	58	310
West and Central Africa	82	95	254	73	90	368
Southeast Asia	11	72	347	8	50	336
Turkey	4	38	403	3	37	355
Portugal	3	50	354	4	54	347
Spain and Italy	5	78	168	12	75	180
Other EU-27 countries	21	63	216	36	78	404
Other countries	24	65	513	25	65	654
All immigrants	31	69	3,414	31	66	3,881

Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Although men and women still differed in fluency at the time of the survey, women from North and sub-Saharan Africa had made progress in written French as often as the men, and more often in spoken French. Women's progress in spoken French is largely to be explained by the need to practise French not only in their neighbourhood and with the administration, but also with teachers and the parents of their children's classmates – in short, in their role as mediators. Once the women have learned French outside the home, French is more often used in the family setting as the children grow up.

The rates of multilingualism among immigrants' descendants show the extent to which foreign languages are maintained in the family setting. The linguistic inheritance of descendants with two immigrant parents is markedly different from that of descendants of mixed couples.

More than half of descendants with at least one immigrant parent reported that one or both of their parents talked to them in a foreign language when they were children. With the notable exception of descendants of immigrants from West and Central Africa, who were raised solely in French, this proportion is above three-quarters for descendants with two immigrant parents. Only approximately one in five descendants of immigrants from Italy, Spain, Morocco, Portugal, Sub-Saharan Africa, or Tunisia reported exclusively speaking a foreign language, as did a third of those whose parents immigrated from Southeast Asia or Turkey. These parents spoke to their children in their native tongue, which was the language of their region of origin.

Their age on arrival in France and their level of knowledge of French undeniably play a part in the maintenance of foreign languages.

In these families as in others, the use of French becomes gradually more habitual, both because the children are using it to address each other and their parents, and because one or both parents are becoming more fluent in the language. The data do not tell us how the different languages alternate in different conversational contexts between parents and children.⁽⁵⁾ However, respondents who had said they had received two languages were asked to say which was the most used in the family. Between 40% and two-thirds of descendants who were multilingual in childhood said it was the language other than French that was most used. The highest proportions in this regard are for descendants of parents from Turkey (69%) and Southeast Asia.

Table 12. Languages spoken by parents to descendants of immigrants (%)

Country of birth of both parents of descendants of immigrants	Languages used by parents			Unweighted numbers
	French only	One or more other languages only	Combination French/ other language	
Algeria	17	11	72	883
Algeria – France	73	1	26	426
Morocco and Tunisia	11	19	70	830
Morocco and Tunisia – France	73	1	26	293
Sahelian Africa	15	20	65	386
Sahelian Africa - France	60	1	39	95
West and Central Africa	72	2	26	211
West and Central Africa - France	88	0	12	123
Southeast Asia	11	30	59	371
Southeast Asia – France	70	2	28	202
Turkey	27	33	40	448
Portugal	14	19	67	633
Portugal – France	79	1	20	302
Spain and Italy	26	19	55	596
Spain and Italy - France	73	0	27	1,110
Other EU-27 countries – France	62	2	36	673
Other countries	22	20	58	237
Other countries - France	67	0	33	342
All descendants of immigrants	46	9	45	8,161
Mainstream population	87	1	12	3,020
All metropolitan population	73	9	18	21,761

Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Multilingualism in children encompasses a wide range of contexts, ranging from solely oral use in the home to command of a written language acquired through schools or diverse media. The level of command stated at the time of the survey for people who learn a foreign language from their family differs depending on the main foreign language received and whether or not the parents are a mixed relationship. Thus, 68 percent of descendants of two Algerian immigrant parents who learnt Arabic at home say they can speak it well and 15% can write it,

while 57 percent of those who learned Berber say they can speak it well but only 5% can write it (Berber classes are not widely available).

Regular travels to the parents' home country assist immigrants' offspring in learning their parents' native tongue. Those with two Portuguese immigrant parents who learnt the language in the household speak it fluently, and 60% can also write in it. Those with two Turkish parents who acquired the language at home speak it fluently, and 81 percent can write it. Access to classes aids in the acquisition of written language proficiency; around half of these two groups had taken classes. Descendants of two parents from sub-Saharan Africa or from Southeast Asia who received a foreign language language or dialect at home report similar levels of command of that language: in both cases 54% say they speak the language well and a quarter (25% and 27% respectively) say they understand it but have difficulty speaking it (Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008).

5. The 2005 French riots

The 2005 French riots took place in the suburbs of Paris and other French towns over a three-week period in October and November 2005. During these disturbances, youth were involved in violent attacks.

Triggering event of these riots began on 27 October 2005 at the construction site in Paris suburb Clichy-sous-Bois. Police came to investigate a break-in at this construction site when three adolescents who were pursued by the police started running and hide in a power substation. Other adolescents were held for questioning at the police station when the blackout occurred at the station and in nearby areas. According to police this blackout was caused by the electrocution of two boys, Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré. Muhittin Altun, the third boy who were hiding in power substation suffered electric shock injury, but he survived. According to Altun, group of his friends started running when they saw the police patrol. Boys were scared of police repression and they tried to avoid lengthy questioning and custody.

French president at that time, Jacques Chirac proclaimed a national state of emergency on 8 November. The day after, Sarkozy ordered a deportation of 120 foreigners convicted of involvement in riots despite some of them having residency visa. The far-right French

politicians agreed and stated that naturalized French rioters should have their citizenship revoked. The French government at the moment of protests and in the following years attempted to link the rioting to Muslim separatism and illegal immigrants.

„Deaths of the two boys sparked nearly three weeks of rioting in 274 towns throughout the Paris region. The rioters, mostly unemployed teenagers from destitute suburban housing projects (the cités HLM) caused over €200 million in damage as they torched nearly 9000 cars and dozens of buildings, daycare centers, and schools. The French police arrested close to 2900 rioters; 126 police and firefighters were injured, and there was one fatality – a bystander who died after being struck by a hooded youth.“
(<https://items.ssrc.org/category/riots-in-france/>)

6. Concluding Remarks

At the EU level, integration is a top political priority, and the General Directorate of Legal and Internal Affairs has defined the Common basic principles of integration, where integration -- in accordance with the apparent mainstreaming of this perspective throughout Europe -- is described as “a dynamic two-way process” characterized by mutual adaptation between immigrants and the majority population. Employment, knowledge of the receiving country’s language and culture, equal access to goods and services, and political participation are highlighted as central areas when integration policies are formulated within the EU (Hellgren 2015: 10).

The increase in the number of migrants from the Maghreb region is causing social problems between migrants and local residents. In the last couple of decades, as the number of immigrants from Maghreb rises, integration issues have become the focus of greater attention in French state. In the meantime, fundamental rights, anti-racism, non-discrimination and providing an equal opportunities and rights for everybody, became the main integration issues of Maghreb migrants.

However, France's success in integrating large numbers of migrants into its society can serve as an example to other European Union countries in a similar situation.

„In France, there is a tradition of a so-called „assimilation“ policy with regards to foreign migrants. French integration process has focused on the integration of migrants' children rather than on that of the first generation of migrants themselves.“ (Heckmann 2003) This state clearly points out intentions of the French authorities and laws, but in the practice, this policy is very difficult to impose successfully as France has more social problems with Magribi immigrants and their children from the beginning till today than any other country in the world.

The thesis analysed a process of structural integration of Maghrebi immigrants into French society. I observed structural integration through seven main factors : political measures, employment, family, housing, healthcare system, culture and education.

After studying the research question, using quantitative statistical data, small case studies, comparative evaluations and main factors of structural integration mentiod above, I came to the following conclusions :

Immigrants from the Maghreb countries integrated successfully into French society since the beginning of mass immigration to France till today, despite some issues in certain matters.

The immigrants aren't given a sufficient guidance from the authorities, and they are often denied the opportunity to represent themselves in government bodies.

After taking into account all explanatory variables, there is no significant differences between the French native and immigrants from the Maghreb when it comes to employment.

Immigrant communities in France (especially those living in ghettos) experienced poorer living conditions than the rest of French society. However, the French government is making efforts to provide better living conditions for the Maghrebis.

Healthcare system in France today is equally friendly for both French natives and immigrants. First generation of immigrants had a markedly poorer perceived healthcare status than the second generation.

In France, education is at the same level and provides equal opportunities in compare between French children and children of the Maghreb immigrants.

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