



DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

**THE RISE OF AUTHORITARIANISM AND THREATS TO
DEMOCRACY IN THE MENA REGION**

-master thesis-

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ABSTRACT

One of the most important parts of politics represents an analysis of the political regime, including historical background, leaders of the state, domestic and foreign policy, as well as its influence on other parts of the state structures. Relying on the historical facts, and description of the current structure of the state, the research aims to show the main differences between authoritarian and democratic regimes and represent the functionality of political life under hybrid regimes. As the Arab Spring brought some changes in domestic policies, currently it is possible to notice that many states are “trapped” somewhere in between, the started path to democracy, although leaving authoritarianism representing a difficult mission. Political structures in Jordan and Turkey are rated as hybrid regimes and this research brought deeper analyses of these states, which aim is to present how their regimes and the way of political life can be considered as threats. The violence of human rights, limited freedoms, unfair elections, and biased media are just some of examples where hybrid regimes are currently frozen. The question is: would these states progress into full democracies, continue as authoritarian, or rather stay somewhere in between, as currently – known as hybrid regimes?

KEY WORDS: regime, authoritarianism, democracy, hybrid regime, MENA region

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

MENA – Middle East and North Africa

EU – European Union

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Looking from the above, international politics is analyzed through the relations between states, their bilateral and multilateral relations, diplomacy, wars, as well as their historical background. However, looking from the depth, foreign policy can be understood as a product of domestic policy towards specific international actor. The understanding of foreign policy is based on the regime, under which domestic policy is functioning and represents the path through which the domestic and foreign policy will be functioning. Per definition authoritarian regime represents a state in which dominated centralized power, maintained by political repression as well as the exclusion of the potential opponents. Authoritarianism is focused on acquired (already certain) political party, which aim is to represents and maintain its political power over people masses, as well as control them through specific ways.¹ An aim of this research is to briefly explain different political regimes (democracy and authoritarianism), as well as to show how many states are tending towards authoritarianism or are already stagnating in democracy development. The focus is on the MENA region, two states will be used as examples and for broader analysis (Republic of Turkey and Jordan), including their influence on other states in already specified region.

An aim of this research is to briefly explain political regimes, their similarities and differences and through examples and comparison, find reasons why state(s) are stagnating in the democratic development and are functioning under the authoritarian characteristics.

Analyzing political regimes can help us to deeply understand domestic and foreign policies of states, and their influence on other domestic policies i.e. how and why states are striving for authoritarianism, as well as what is a product of a combination of democratic and autocratic rules within one state. Such kind of analysis opens other questions in the field of history, trying to find causes for the creation of the regime as it is today. Relying on the historical facts, and analysis personalities of the political leaders, and their political parties, research is coming to the core of analysis – which will approve or refute two main hypotheses: democracy survival and explanation of reasons for the stagnation of democratization in chosen states.

¹ European Center for Populism Studies: *Authoritarianism*. More on the website: <https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/authoritarianism/>, retrieved on the 9th of November 2022.

Using comparative methods, qualitative analysis, available sources, and data, the research should lead us to useful conclusions in the field of domestic and foreign policies, partly answering questions related to the constructions of regimes, development of democracy, creation of hybrid regimes, and aspiration for authoritarianism. The research aims to show the benefits of both political regimes, their bad sides, virtues, and strengths. As there are a lot of political regimes that are functioning as democracies or as authoritarianism, their structure and development are different in every state. Does the rise of authoritarian regimes represent a threat to democratic development and why, opening many other questions in the field of domestic and foreign policies, their bilateral and multilateral relations, as well as international politics in general, economy, cooperation, and connection with other international actors? From the history, across the current functioning of regimes, to the predictions of the political future.

As the research will be based on a comparative and descriptive analysis, there will be used two states into consideration: Jordan and the Republic of Turkey. Jordan and Turkey are rated as *hybrid regimes* and as they belong to the MENA region, they represent suitable states that will serve us for the analysis of the regimes and the unique policies.² First, there will be presented a picture of the regimes in Jordan and Turkey, and how history influenced the creation of the regime as it is now (briefly), then we will try to find the causes/strategies that these two regimes are using to stop/slow down the development of pure democracy. In the end, conclude - whether and how these regimes represent a threat to the development of democracy in the MENA region.

² Mapped: The State of Global Democracy in 2022, more on the website: <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/mapped-the-state-of-global-democracy-2022/>, retrieved on the 17th of November, 2022

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

This chapter will bring insight into how the research should be implemented, including the hypothesis, the structure of the analyses, the design, as well as literature and data sources. There will be shortly presented the aim of the study, the methodology on which the research is based, including auxiliary hypotheses and the research design.

2.1 The Aim of the Study

Several aims should be reached in this research and they include analyses of the domestic and foreign policy, explanations and research of the regime's structures, as well as try to find reasons why some states are "deciding" to function under hybrid regimes and stagnating in the democratic development. For a detailed explanation, there is a need to start and relying on the historical background, representing which factors contributed to the creation of the political regime as it is today in chosen states, then the main part of the research will be based on the comparison and description of the regimes, their structures, political parties and the situation in the chosen states in general, which should lead a reader to the conclusion and help us answer questions like what keeps political leaders to stay at the level of hybrid regimes and are such regimes suitable for domestic and foreign policies? It will help us also to think broadly about threats to democracy and the desire for authoritarianism.

2.2 Research questions

RQ1: Which are reasons why states are stagnating in the democracy development and continue functioning under *hybrid regime*?

RQ2: How choosing to functioning under authoritarian regime represents threats to democracy?

2.3. Research hypotheses

Main research hypothesis 1: Democracy hardly succeeds (stagnates) in countries where governments display the characteristics of an authoritarian regime.

Main research hypothesis 2: The reason for the stagnation of democratization is hidden in the government's specific mechanisms that they use for the purpose to strengthen authoritarian regimes.

Auxiliary hypotheses:

H1: When states display authoritarian characteristics in the organization of regimes, they reach a process of democratic stagnation and end up as hybrid regimes.

H2: The rise of authoritarian regimes will have a "authoritarian diffusion" in the international arena (MENA region).

H3: Inadequate way of developing democracy in all segments of politics, leads to a partial or complete turn to authoritarianism.

H4: Hybrid regimes have more advantages to becoming authoritarian regimes again, than finish their development into the high-performing democratic regimes.

2.4 Data collection and instruments

In order to be sure that the research is based on accurate data, it is important to focus on quality and reliable sources of information. The master thesis will be based on a comparative and descriptive analysis, including qualitative analysis, in a combination with case studies. Per definition, a case study represents "...an instance of a class of events [where] the term class of events refers to a phenomenon of scientific interest...that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory regarding causes of similarities or differences among instances (cases) of that class of events" (2005, p. 17)".³

Relying on the historical facts, then a description of the current structure of the regime, there is a need to represent facts and information from confidential sources. Useful information from the adequate literature, comparative method, and descriptive analysis should create a clear picture of domestic and foreign policies, causes, and consequences of the regime as it is today in Turkey and Jordan.

³ George AL, Bennett A. Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 2005.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This part will briefly give an insight into the theoretical description, and exactly representation of theories of international relations through the prism of domestic and foreign policies. The second part will include a review of previous analyzes and studies on the topic of authoritarian and democratic regimes, as well as descriptions of the domestic and foreign policies of Turkey and Jordan. The aim is to present key analyses, confidential and useful literature, and give an overview of it. Although the topic is quite extensive, the literature reviews will be divided (per chosen states and regimes) and in the main part and the final part, as a conclusion literature reviews would be intertwined.

3.1 International relation theories and foreign policy analysis

For a detailed explanation and representation of a chosen topic in the field of foreign policy, description through the prism of international relation theories means starting analysis from the above, which can help readers to understand politics in different ways.

International relation theories find its roots as a theoretical discipline, back in the early '90s, where is important to mention foundational texts by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. Using descriptions from the book written by Burchill, S. et al. (2013), it is possible to see how diversity of theories of international relations can help social analysts, scholars and readers to see and understand international relations, domestic and foreign policy, as well as diplomacy, in different ways. As there are numerous definitions, we would like to mark off: Theories explain the laws of international politics or recurrent patterns of national behavior (Waltz 1979), as it explains the main "task" and the core of the international relation theories. International theories can help us to create a picture of international actors, structures, institutions, as well as bilateral and multilateral relations, foreign policies and international arena. In the following, there will be explained several theories of international relations, in order to see and understand this work from different points of view.

- ❖ **Realism**, as the oldest theory of international relations, dominated during the Cold war, representing the conflictual and competitive side of the international relations. Presenting a realism means firstly made a distinction/separation between classical realism (R. Niebuhr, H. Morgenthau) and radical or extreme realism. What is common is that the main actor for realists are the state, which is concerned with security,

including their own/national interests and power.⁴ Realists are arguing that international politics is anarchic; sovereign states are main actors at the international arena and the national power and capabilities representing a key features. Realists are also focused on the egoistic passions and the evil in all political action (Morgenthau, 1946). Waltz, unlike Morgenthau, claimed that bipolarity is actually more stable than *multipolarity* (Donnelley, 2000).

- ❖ **Liberalism**, in comparison with realism, representing a more optimistic theory of international relation, because of their general faith in the pacifying effects of political liberty, including economic freedom and international association. Liberals are arguing that democratic regimes, which are economically cooperating, are less likely to initiate conflicts with other states (democratic peace theory), as well as that democratic states are more focused on international trade and investments, which means that their cooperation will contribute to peace. Such kind of cooperation between states, per liberalists, means that they will also use in consideration institutional engagement. (Rousseau, et al. 2009). Liberalistic theory is very often called idealist, although liberals are believing in human mind power, global peace and stability.

- ❖ **Constructivism**, as a theory of international relations, is focused on the importance of norms, values and structures. Constructivism is often associated after the end of the cold War, arguing that the social world is of our making (Onuf, 1989). Per constructivists' view, actors, through their actions and interactions, are shaping and reshaping the nature of international relations.⁵ Constructivists are arguing that agency (the ability of someone to act) and structure (international system) are mutually constituted and that structures influence agency and that agency influences structures. For constructivists, state is not the most important actor in the international relations, however, international institutions and other non-state actors are of the great importance (i.e. lobbying or acts of persuasion).⁶

⁴ *Political Realism in International Relations*, more on the website: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/>, retrieved on the 19th of November, 2022

⁵ *Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory*, more on the website: <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/23/introducing-constructivism-in-international-relations-theory/>, retrieved on the 19th of November, 2022

⁶ *Key theories of international relations*, more on the website: <https://online.norwich.edu/academic-programs/resources/key-theories-of-international-relations>, retrieved on the 19th of November, 2022

3.2 *Democracy, as unique and long path*

At the very beginning it is important to mention that observers of democratization have divided definitions of democracy per several branches: constitutional, substantive, procedural and process-oriented. A constitutional approach is focused on laws, which means that through history there are different regimes such as constitutional monarchies, presidential systems, parliament-centered arrangements, as well as federal and unitary structures. Substantive approaches is more focused on the way of living, conditions for life, including social equality, security, freedom etc. Procedural field include analysis of elections, leaders, governmental stuff and policies. Process-oriented approaches identify some minimum set of processes that must be in motion for a situation to qualify as democratic (Tilly, 2007). All types of approaches are important, because they can help us to analyze and understand differences in democratic regimes, how states are more or less democratic. The analysis in the book named *Democracy* (Tilly, 2007) opened interesting question for thinking regarding democracy ratings, which explains that all jurisdiction is rated for their citizens (freedom, elections, way of living etc.), on the other side what about tourists, transnational corporations, members of underground economy? How a democracy is applicable and rated for them? Also, rating a democracy means deeper analysis, e.g. competitive elections are giving citizens a choice for a voice, on the other side so do lobbying, petitioning, referenda and opinion polling. Throughout history, the vast majority of regimes have been undemocratic, because democratic regimes are rare and pretty much recent creations. As there are numerous descriptions and divisions in democracy, Tilly (Tilly, 2007) separated it on four fields:

- ❖ **High-capacity undemocratic:** little public voice except elicited by state & extensive involvement of state security forces in any public policy
- ❖ **Low-capacity undemocratic:** ethnic blocs, religious mobilization, frequent violent struggle including civil wars
- ❖ **High-capacity democratic:** frequent social movements, interest groups, political party mobilizations
- ❖ **Low-capacity democratic:** less effective state monitoring, higher involvement of semi-legal and illegal actors in public politics.

Previously mentioned descriptions of democracies are not the only classification. In the following part, I will provide the basic descriptions of protective, pluralist, participatory and deliberative democracies. At the end of the research, we will be able to connect all of the

democratic descriptions and “decide” to which of mentioned descriptions Turkey and Jordan’s regimes are belonging to.

- ❖ Protective democracy: focus is on defending the rights of citizens from an intrusive state and other citizens (MacPherson, 1977); protective democrats envision a limited role of government; they emphasize the need to limit government intervention in the economy and view the right to private property as human rights; the role of government is to secure life, liberty and property from tyranny of local majorities (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019)
- ❖ Pluralist democracy: the main, starting point represent the voting process; pluralist democracy focuses on the role played by the myriad groups that mediate between voters and elected leaders and sustain a continued political presence between elections; for cultural cleavages (class, race, ethnicity, religion, business associations) the government must allow to join together to pursue their shared interests. In comparison with participatory and deliberative democracy, pluralists’ democracy does not require an active citizens’ engagement in politics and the power is dispersed within society (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019)
- ❖ Participatory democracy: citizens’ engagement in public life who are cooperating in community activities in an aim to achieve collective goals; community development represents a key for safeguarding and strengthening democracy; this include strong civil societies, education, information and knowledge circulation
- ❖ Deliberative democracy: represents a form of democracy in which decisions are made by discussion among free and equal citizens (Elster, 1998); it rejects conceptions of democracy that base politics on power/interest group bargaining or the way that decisions are made, like as it is voting process; in contrast with participatory democracy, deliberative democracy has less intellectual emphasis – citizens are involved in community projects, but they do not necessarily have to engage with the specific political decisions

What will be the focus in our research is referring on the term *de-democratization*. As the formation of the Weimar Republic in the German Empire’s ruins after the WWI introduced kind of a democracy, the Hitler’s period showed how the state was brutally back into de-

democratization. There will be explained the processes of de-democratization in Turkey and Jordan. Actually, our task is to approve or deny that statement, are these two countries returning to authoritarianism structures? Democracy, however, today is more understood and followed as an aspiration, an ideology, a political idea, although it is not a one specific, clear idea that can be applied. Interestingly, democracy is unique for every state and it is distinguished through history, which led us to have different types of democracies, such as: weak, strong, hybrid, incomplete etc.

3.3 *Polyarchy*

The term *polyarchy* was coined by Robert A. Dahl, which intended to describe a form of government in which power is invested in multiple people and it is not identified with dictatorship nor a democracy (Dahl, 1971). According to Dahl's descriptions, a polyarchy is a state that has certain procedures which today representing main conditions for following democratic principles. Dahl argues that a democracy is an ideal type of regime that no country has ever achieved and that a democracy is a system that is completely responsive to all its citizens (Robinson, William, 1996). A democracy has minimal requirements, such as free elections and providing a base of civil liberties. However, according to Dahl and other political analyst, those conditions are not ideal for creation of ideal democracy. Dahl's analysis showed that democracy must also ensure the participation of citizens in the political process, including other numerous requirements, such as it is for example – the independence of the media. Per Dahl, the state should establish eight requirements to be considered as a polyarchy:

- 1) Freedom of association
- 2) Freedom of expression
- 3) Freedom of vote
- 4) The right to public service
- 5) Competition of politicians for popular support
- 6) Informational plurality
- 7) Free and fair elections
- 8) Institutions depend on election results

Explanation of *polyarchy* can help us to better understand analysis of regimes and how far/close the regime of Turkey and Jordan is to democracy/polyarchy. Dahl also gave an explanation why some states succeeded as polyarchies/democracies and why some of them did not succeed on that path of development?

It is important to be aware that democracies are different and that a democracy is differently functioning in every state. Per definition, a modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives (Philippe et al., 1991). As it is case in every other regime, a democracy depends upon the presence of ruler and what make a democracy different from other regimes is the way how a leader is elected/chosen. In one of the next chapters, I will be focused on description of political leaders in Jordan and Turkey and what is their role in the regime.

3.4. Authoritarianism

After the end of the World War II, the authoritarianism found itself on an intersection at the international arena. A lot of dictatorship collapsed throughout Africa, post-communist Eurasia, as well as Asia and Latin America in the early 1990s. Transitions did not led states to the democracy, indeed, many of countries, especially in Africa and Former Soviet Union, become a combination of electoral competition and authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2010). A combination of unfair media, voting manipulation, abuse of state resources are predispositions for creation of regime known as – competitive authoritarian. Uncomplete path of democratization or transitional democracies, are rated as *hybrid regimes*. As the list of hybrid and undeveloped democracies regimes are pretty much long, this research will use two states as examples, as previously mentioned, Turkey and Jordan, which aim is to find reasons for stagnation in the process of democratization. Per definition, competitive authoritarian regimes representing civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist, although they are used as tools for gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage and vis-à-vis their opponents (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Turkey and Jordan are examples of competitive authoritarianism, actually, hybrid regimes, which representing an intersection of democracy and authoritarianism.⁷

Here is important to mention that competitive authoritarian regimes in comparison with full authoritarianism, are working through constitutional channels, where opposition groups can compete for executive power. As it case in Turkey and Jordan, opposition parties have an opportunity to freely open and work in their offices and recruit candidates. A basic distinction

⁷ *The Democracy Index*, more on a website: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/democracy-countries>, retrieved on 9th of December, 2022

between competitive authoritarianism and democracy is associated with three defining attributes of democracy:

1. Free elections
2. Broad protection of civil liberties
3. A reasonably level playing field.

Elections in democracies are characterized as a free and fair process that is not systematically denied access to the media. On the other side, processes in authoritarian regimes are differently “reduced”, which means that multiparty elections are nonexistent or non-competitive. However, competitive authoritarian regimes fall in between these extremes, because elections in such states are competitive, opposition parties can organize campaigns publicly and opposition candidates are not excluded. The downsides in competitive authoritarian regimes are unfree and unfair voting processes (manipulation of voter lists, ballot-box stuffing, and falsification of lists/results, as was the case in the Dominican Republic in 1994 and Ukraine in 2004).

Civil liberties, in democratic states, which implies, are protected (human rights, such as freedom of speech, press, and movement). In fully authoritarian regimes, basic civil liberties are often violated, which as result offer unprotected media, opposition parties, civic groups, etc. However, in competitive authoritarianism civil liberties are partially respected, which include independent media, free civic, and opposition groups.

An uneven playing field - representing the most common characteristics of competitive authoritarian regimes, which implies competition as a voting process. The playing field is characterized as a) state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends, b) incumbents are systematically favored and c) the opposition is unable to organize and compete in elections (Levitsky & Way, 2010). An uneven playing field especially referring to access to resources, the media, and the law.

To summarize and make some basic distinctions between democracy, competitive authoritarianism, and a fully authoritarian regime, it is important to use into consideration the status of core democratic institutions, the status of opposition, and the level of uncertainty. In democratic regimes, the status of core democratic institutions (elections & civil liberties) is systematically respected. In competitive authoritarianism they exist, although they are violated in favor of the incumbent. In full authoritarianism, democratic institutions are not functioning (or are nonexistent). Regarding the status of opposition, in democratic regimes, competition represents an equal field of opportunity for all sides, while in competitive authoritarianism

major opposition is legal and can compete openly, although they are disadvantaged by incumbent abuse. In full authoritarianism opposition side is banned (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

3.5 Hybrid regime

An explanation of the hybrid regime, actually, *hybrid democracy*, will help us to create a broader picture of a democracy, especially in chosen states, Jordan and Turkey. Although, there are several democracy scales, many of them are showing that Jordan and Turkey are rated as hybrid regimes. Now, we are coming to the point in politics where democracy and authoritarianism are intertwined, although the regime is known as *democratic*. Except Turkey and Jordan, many states are struggling in transition, or reverting to more or less to authoritarianism. Such “unfinished” democracies, also described as “illiberal” or “delegative” or hybrid regimes, constitute ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions and respecting limited civil liberties, with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits (Menocal et al., 2008). In recent years, academics and political analyst have focused on such regime deviations. Some of hybrid regimes are characterized with strong man leadership, populist politics and opaque decision-making process (presidentialism). This kind of leadership has a long tradition in parts of Africa and Latin America.

We have to be aware that hybrid regimes are not transitional phases, actually they are political regimes that manifest a combination of authoritarian and democratic characteristics of domestic politics (Mufti, 2018). As there are numerous definitions of what hybrid regime is, as well as different understandings by political analyst, hybrid regimes are variably understood as diminished subtypes of democracy (Merkel, 2004) or diminished subtypes of authoritarianism (Schedler, 2006), or transitional “situations” that are expected to revert back to either democracy or authoritarianism (Armony & Schamis, 2005; Linz 1973). Some scholars are arguing that hybrid regimes were unable to transition to democracy because, there was a hope that these imperfect democracies would amend their politics (Mariam, 2018). The term semi-authoritarianism was coined by M. Ottaway, which described a regime that displayed characteristics of both democracy and authoritarianism, while A. Schedler introduced a term electoral authoritarianism - a regime in which leaders “hold elections and tolerate some pluralism and interparty competition but violate democratic norms, so severely and systematically that it makes no sense to call them democracies, however qualified”. Political analyst agreed that hybrid regimes should not be clearly viewed as transitional states which are

expecting to become a democratic or authoritarian regimes, rather, hybrid regimes are often quite durable and need to be understood for they truly are and that the terminology used to refer to such regimes should reflect this. Scholars are also focused on the authoritarian durability and find and understand factors that perpetuate hybridity or catalyze a democracy (Mufti, 2018).

3.6 Mechanisms

Hybrid regimes become the field of impact, due to reasons that authoritarian regimes are adopting nominally democratic institutions in order to protect themselves against potential threats (regime and society levels) through five different mechanisms: signaling, information acquisition, patronage distribution, monitoring and credible commitment (Brancati, 2013).

- ❖ **Signaling:** scholars sharing opinion that authoritarian regimes are adopting and using democratic institutions to reveal to their potential opponents the material and coercive strength of the regime (to deter opponents from challenging regime). Signaling, as a mechanism, can be understood as a clever and nonobvious way to show why authoritarian regimes hold voting process and then cheat. Authoritarian regimes that hold elections may last longer, because of their material capacity to win elections by using strategic manipulation (Geddes, 2006).

- ❖ **Information acquisition:** authoritarian regimes construct democratic institutions with an aim to manage sources of societal discontent. Multiparty elections help regimes identify discontent because votes for opposition candidates reveal the constituencies in which regimes have weak support (Brownlee 2007, Magaloni 2008). Scholars arguing that legislatures and multiparty elections are not only ways which can help authoritarian regimes for such purposes, because authoritarian regimes are also focused on other formal and informal institutions, as it is civil society and the media (Milgrom et al. 1990).

- ❖ **Patronage distribution:** scholars arguing that authoritarian regimes are creating and functioning through democratic institutions, in an aim to buy support from political elites and citizens through patronage (Geddes 2006, Lust-Okar 2008, Magaloni 2008, Blydes 2011, Svobik 2012). In states, as it is for example Jordan, where states have a monopoly on financial resources or force, legislative elections strengthen authoritarianism, because regimes distribute patronage to elites and citizens through voting process (Lust-Okar 2008). Survey data showed that in Jordan citizens prefer to

vote for candidates who in their opinion can act effectively on their behalf and with whom they have personal connections (Lust-Okar 2008).

- ❖ **Credible commitment:** Scholars argue that authoritarian regimes adopt democratic institutions because they allow regimes to credibly commit not to expropriate domestic investment. Other scholars found that such regimes are more stable, due to reason that they can maintain the support of key sectors of the political and economic elite by not expropriating their assets (Boix 2003, Wright & Abel Escriba-Folch 2012).

CHAPTER 4

TURKEY (historical background & description of the regime)

Turkey, officially the Republic of Türkiye, with its specific position, represents a unique fusion of different cultures and traditions. Per general knowledge, Turkey is a democratic, secular, and parliamentary government, based on the 1982 constitution. Turkish policy is divided into legislative, executive, and judicial establishments. The administrative system is composed of 76 provinces, which are divided into districts and sub-districts (Metz, 1995). The Republic of Turkey is officially established in 1923, by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The new state represented a successor of the Ottoman Empire, which is still functioning within its borders. The creation of modern Turkey was established by officials and intellectuals of the Osmanli State, which were educated in the Osmanli State's secularist and traditionalist schools. It is important to mention their educational background because of their ideas and ideals during the political engagement. Looking back, Kemal A. by applying a Westernized way of society, used excellent timing and planning. Reforms made by K. Atatürk were a revolution from above, not below, as it is explained: the revolution was made for the people despite the people, which means that reforms were directed to create a Westernized society (Edemir, 2007). With all changes that brought about the new constitution, politics during history were deviant. Analyzing Turkish history cannot clearly be defined which political side the state belongs to. Precisely, having a democratic regime, including all its characteristics (voting, freedom, human rights) political analysts have observed the application of authoritarian characteristics in different branches of domestic and foreign policy.

4.1 Somewhere-in-between (Turkey case)

The political party that president of Turkey leads, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, with promise that a Turkey will become a more tolerant and inclusive state. As it is stated, their "political brand" is focusing on stability, economic prosperity and good governance. In just over a decade, the Republic of Turkey has introduced many changes regarding domestic and foreign policy. From the period of promising political liberalization to the fast-approaching one-man rule, Turkish government dealing with different challenges. The complex political story begins in 2014, when Erdogan was elected as a president and supported by tens of millions citizens (about the half of population). AK party, the Justice and Development Party (Turkish: *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) is a political party which is self-

describing as conservative-democrat and it is one of two major parties in Turkey today (second one is Republican People's Party). Since 2017, the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a chairman of AKP. It is important to mention that AKP today is the largest party in the Grand National Assembly, with 285 out of 600 seats, having won 42.6% of votes in 2018 Turkish parliamentary election.⁸ The party has a strong support from the conservative tradition of Turkey and on the other side, the party denies it is Islamist.⁹ Through its political path the AKP tried to expand political freedoms and progressively pushed the military out of politics. Restrictions on wearing the headscarf were rolled back and also, regarding acknowledgments of diversity in Turkey (where previously diversity and minority rights traditionally has been seen as akin to treason), the AK party created important path for acknowledgment Kurdish identity, as well as to respond to some grievances of Turkey's non-Muslim communities. This way of acting managed to promote the AK party and raise it to an even "higher level" (in the eyes of voters/citizens).

However, analyst arguing that even in its most "progressive" phase, the AKP never freed itself from Turkey's extraordinarily illiberal nationalist way of thinking and activity¹⁰. Later, the AKP lost their enthusiasm for deep democratic reforms and it looks like that they were not aware, nor ready to ultimately get rid of all traditional Turkish ways of functioning. As time went on, it was possible to notice that for AKP, the rights of its own pious base were always priority (for example – the right of women to wear the headscarf in state institutions & outreach to non-Muslims burnished the AKP's international reputation without fundamentally changing the dynamics of domestic politics). Now, it is possible to include such examples in box of mechanisms that state or party are using to slow down democratization, due to fact that AKP was functioning within nationalist tradition that interwove Islam and Turkishness. Secularism in Turkey has never been true "secularism", as it is stated: in a sense of maintaining state neutrality towards religion. The analysis will be more focused on the politics that is more centralized around one man, leader - Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has consolidated power around his person in a way that no Turkish political president has done (since Ataturk).

⁸ *Erdogan returns as ruling AKP party chief*, more on the website:

<https://www.dw.com/en/erdogan-returns-as-ruling-akp-party-chief-after-referendum-win/a-38922017>, retrieved on 22nd of December, 2022

⁹ *Turkey: AKP's Hidden Agenda or a Different Vision of Secularism*, more on the website:

<http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/en/turkey-akp-s-hidden-agenda-or-different-vision-secularism>, retrieved on the 22nd of December, 2022

¹⁰ *Report – «Erdogan as Autocrat: A Very Turkish Tragedy»*, more on the website:

https://pomed.org/avada_portfolio/pomed-report-erdogan-as-autocrat-a-very-turkish-tragedy/?print=print, retrieved on 23rd of December, 2022

Democratic voting is still present in Turkey, although they are not undertaken on a level playing field, as well as the fact that nearly all of the broadcast media has come under the effective control of the government, which is some indicator that the democratic regime in Turkey is not functioning well. In May 2013, when the massive anti-AKP “Gezi Park” erupted, television news ignored this huge event, where millions of Turks protested. A similar event was lead up to the 2016 referendum, opposition party leaders and rallies have been attacked by AKP supporters. ¹¹

Turkish president, Erdogan, is still the most important person in the AKP, his charisma and political talent helping him to stay on the throne for more than a decade. AKP, per some analysis, represents something like an extension of Erdogan’s ambition and vision. Some crucial changes started immediately when Erdogan became the president of Turkey in 2014, which was reflected in changes in domestic politics specifically, as well as in Turkish foreign policy. When Ahmet Davutoglu become prime minister in August 2014, changes were reflected in role exchanges, which meant that all real power resided with President Erdogan. Davutoglu was disappointed by the decision and the limits of his power, which resulted that his resigned (or was pushed out) in May 2016. Also, changes have affected other politicians, which resulted that only individuals with proven loyalty have been retained in politics. ¹²

Although the AK party is described as an Islamist party in some of the media, party officials denied such statements. AKP, with the president of a state, favors a strong centralized leadership, which analysts widely described as Neo - Ottomans, an ideology that promoted renewed Turkish political engagement in the former territories of its predecessor state, although the party’s leadership rejected these ratings.¹³ Turkey started to representing the unique zone of democratic liberalism in the East, outside the Western powers. AK party was motivated to develop and accept democratic changes. However, today, Turkey with its leading party AK and its president, became the prime example of democratic backsliding. Previously, Turkish president Erdogan advocated for freedom of the press and speech, including the creation of the path to the European Union. Erdogan was making reforms in Turkey’s justice system and the

¹¹ Report – «Erdogan as Autocrat: Avery Turkish Tragedy», more on the website: https://pomed.org/avada_portfolio/pomed-report-erdogan-as-autocrat-a-very-turkish-tragedy/?print=print, retrived on 23rd of December, 2022

¹² *ibid.*

¹³ *Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism*, more on the website: <https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22209> retrived on 24th of December, 2022

military's role in the government to meet the Western criteria. Erdogan's power and specific attitude were shown in 2017 with the referendum, which institutionalized Turkey's government into a one-man system, subsuming the role of the Prime Minister into that of a president, which gave Erdogan "freedom" to monopolize executive power, including his role over the legislature and the judiciary. The economic rise and development during his time greatly had an influence on his popularity.¹⁴

It is possible to mark off three important years in Turkish modern history that have a great impact on its regime (emergence of Turkey's hybrid regime). Using in consideration a period from the early 2000s, three dates have played a major role in modern Turkish politics: 2001, 2002 and 2007. The 9/11 attacks have an influence on Turkish policy towards free-market economies, which aim was to open a dialogue and cooperation with liberal societies of the Western World. In 2002, AKP achieved an impressive electoral victory in parliamentary elections, which brought reforms in the field of conservative movements. In 2007, a significant reversal occurs again – the AKP's government managed to control all state structures in Turkey, which as a result led to creation of the hybrid competitive authoritarian regime. To sum up, Turkish policy after 9/11 was desirably prepared for the new movements and cooperation with the USA and the Western World diplomacy, economy and engagement in the war against terrorism (Stelgias, 2015, p. 201). If we look to Levitsky and Way's definitions, the competitive authoritarian regimes are civil regimes in which democratic institutions are widely seen as means to gain power. However, deeper analysis showed that although (for example in Jordan & Turkey) the state is functioning through democratic institutions, at the end competition between parties/leaders is real, but unfair. According Levitsky & Way, important characteristic of hybrid regime is the absence of non-elected "tutelary" authorities (military establishment, monarchy or religious institutions), which limit the powers exercised by the government. This characteristic completely belongs to Turkish regime. (Levitsky et al, 2010, p.5). If we looking back, since its political start, the AKP's government worked to reduce the influence on the Turkish military establishment in politics. These reforms were related to the EU requirements, which caused changes in many institutional fields, including the fact that the Turkish military has lost its formal/institutional mechanisms.

¹⁴ Rise of Erdogan and Democratic erosion in Turkey, more on the website: <https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/05/17/rise-of-erdogan-and-democratic-erosion-in-turkey/> retrived on 25th of December, 2022

After changes in the field of military establishment, the decline of the traditional Kemalist bureaucracy, the AKP's aim was to focus on civil liberties and create more democratic state. For example, apart from the Kurds, other mainly religious groups in Turkey have also been recognized (Onis & Ziya, 2013, p. 103-122). On the way to creating a stable democracy in Turkey, we must also mention the other side of the story which will help to unify the topics of this work and reach quality conclusions. On which steps did Turkish democracy fall and how did it remain vacuumed as a "hybrid" regime?

Analyzing civil liberties, according to the Human Rights Watch Organization, the AKP has showed intolerance of political opposition. As it is stated: *“in 2013, police violently dispersed campaigners staging a peaceful sit-in protest against a plan to build a shopping mall on Istanbul's Taksim Gezi Park. The government failed to uphold human rights. In 2014, the government has kept the same tough stance on peaceful demonstrations by Kurds following the crisis in northern Syria. The Human Rights Watch Report underlines that the government's response to the protests in Istanbul and anti-government protest in other cities demonstrated its intolerance of the right to peaceful assembly and free expression”*¹⁵

Violation of civil liberties is not the only example that can be assigned to the regime weaknesses. Analyses showed that there are a lot of suspicions in their electoral processes. Although voting process in Turkey is considered as “free and fair”, there are some procedures that are opening doubt on the ostensible fairness of the electoral process. Analysis – according to the official numbers of the YSK, showed a lot of deviation in Turkish voting processes, which was numerically approved. However, the Turkish Statistics Institution (TUIK) in 2008 destroyed all records used for “address-based voter registry” – less than a year after it was made public. Despite objections from political parties, the agency destroyed all data (Toker, 2014). The 2014 presidential election can be used as a good case-study, which can help us to understand how uneven political competition was functioning in Turkey. Before 2014, the opposition accused the AKP of using its powers to deny equal political time, while promoting Erdogan and the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in the Europe (OSCE) agreed with this. OSCE's office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights stated that the public promotion of the other candidates had been limited, which was affected by legal restrictions on freedom of expression, including Internet and media independence (i.e. state-owned TRT). OSCE is not the only international organization that criticized Erdogan's presidential campaign.

¹⁵ *World report 2014: Turkey*, more on the website: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/turkey> retrieved on 17th of January, 2023

The presidential elections in 2014 can be used as a good example where opposition parties use democratic institutions to compete for power, although it favors the AKP's government, which as the conclusion has democratic voting process, but it is unfair (Stelgias, 2015).

4.2 Causes and mechanisms applied in Turkey

As previously mentioned from the AKP's rule and Erdogan presidential era it is possible to notice crucial changes in the state. From the desire of pure democratic creation to the period of hybrid democracy. AKP's has a specific and important influence on the establishment of the hybrid competitive authoritarian regime in Turkey, by using its total control of the state institution and services. In 2010, Constitutional Amendments, the AKP changes the Constitutional Court fundamentally, which meant that the President of the Republic has right to nominate its own candidates for Constitutional Court membership. Judicial reform packages brought changes known as omnibus bill, which amended 16 laws including Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Law of Military Service. With all these changes in different fields of the state, the government gradually established the AKP's control over all important state structures.

Through reforms applied to the MGK, the AKP actually achieved a degree of cooperation with the military establishment in terms of executive decision-making. The same consequence happened with judicial community, which means that AKP's government has power on the Constitutional Court (Stelgias, 2015). Apart from the mechanisms through which government has an influence on institutions (judicial and military), according to Levitsky & Way, strong political parties are an important characteristic of competitive authoritarian regimes. The government must retain and exercise power through democratic institutions and consequently strong political parties win elections, which represent often hard-fought battles in this political regime (Levitsky et al, 2010, p.63). As it is the case in Turkey, in the last 12 years, the AKP has won important victories in all elections. The fact is that Erdogan's leadership and the AKAP managed to combine successfully the state and the party strength in a single, victorious political strategy. The AKP contributed to the rise of Anatolia's middle class, which opened the door for the re-interpretation of religious teachings and the principles of nationalism in order to make them more congruent with the requirements of a higher social, economic and cultural status. Some authors have defined this as the emergence of the "non-Western forms of modernity", which can be also observed in Malaysia, Iran, Morocco, as well as in Turkey. (Yilmaz, 2008). Hybrid competitive authoritarian regime in Turkey is helping Turkish middle class to redefine

cultural and socio-economic relations through political paths. The limited democratization of the previous undemocratic regime was the necessary precondition, which by Steglias, lead to the evolution of Turkey's middle class to a new ruling elite. The middle class in Turkey transformed the undemocratic political framework of the state to a hybrid competitive authoritarian regime (Steglias, 2015).

CHAPTER 5

JORDAN

The internal pressures and advocacy for changes open debates about reforms in many Arab countries. Electoral processes, women's participation and the rise of political parties have emerged as central issues in domestic political reform agendas. Today, as a result, it is possible to see reforms in Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait, as well as introducing some reforms in Jordan and Morocco. As the first United Nations Development Program, Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) in 2002, which was prepared by Arab scholars and experts, defined three main issues in the region: deficits in knowledge, freedom, and women's empowerment. By focusing on the topic related to the introducing changes in voting processes, women's inclusion and political parties, it is important to mention that they were directly related to countries: Egypt, Yemen and Jordan.¹⁶ Using in consideration a definition and general explanation of Jordan's domestic politics, we can see that Jordan is actually a monarchy in which the king plays a dominant role in politics, although the parliament's lower house is elected and there are numerous suspicions regarding electoral system. The monarch is also the chief executive and commander in chief of the armed forces. The cabinet is responsible before the elected House of Deputies, which, along with Senate, constitutes the legislative branch of the government, while the judicial branch is an independent branch.¹⁷ Actually, broader definitions explains that Jordan is a constitutional monarchy that practices democracy, which respects human rights and the media. There are numerous explanations of the domestic politics in Jordan that can help us to create our own opinion, and create a picture of "democracy". In Jordan, dissidents can be detained and tortured, although, as it is stated, they do not "disappear". In comparison with other states in the region, citizens of Jordan enjoy much independence and freedom.

Reforms in 2015, brought some crucial changes, which including the reduction of number of seats in the House of Representatives from 150 to 130; the new law allowed multiple votes for open proportional lists, replacing the old single-vote system. In 2016, the opposition National

¹⁶ *Building Democracy in Jordan*, more on the website: <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/building-democracy-in-jordan.pdf> , retrieved on the 7th of January, 2023

¹⁷ *Jordan's current government*, more on the website: <https://international.visitjordan.com/page/10/Current-Government> , retrieved on the 7th of January, 2023

Coalition for Reform, an alliance of Islamist, tribal, nationalist and Christian figures, won only 15 seats.¹⁸ In which fields democratic development has been cut short? The history showed a lot of examples, as it was case when the monarch has suspended a Parliament and postponed elections. In November, 2009 King Abdullah II dissolved Parliament two years before the completion of its term. The Parliament had been characterized as ineffective. In the next year, in November 2010, new elections were boycotted by the IAF (Islamic Action Front), which for them was rated as unfair. As a result, the elections led to a victory of pro-government candidates. Analysis showed that from 1993, when the one-person one-vote system was introduced, citizens are giving their vote to support a relative or a member of their own tribe/clan, which was a cause for a weakening of political parties. In 2012, minor amendments of the electoral law were introduced, which, unfortunately did not brought changes for the elections in the next year, 2013.

The National Democratic Institute (NDI – which participated in an international observation mission) reported that the election process had significantly improved; the registration, voting and counting of voted. Also, the National Democratic institute reported that the electoral law remained unsuccessful, which refers to an unequal size of districts and an electoral system that amplifies tribal and familial elations limit the development of a truly national legislative body.¹⁹ In Jordan there are about 30 registered political parties which most of them are ideologically difficult to differentiate. The only effective party with the clear ideology and nationally accepted is the Islamic Action Front (IAF). Since the short-lived governments were unresponsive to any substantial reforms as demanded by the opposition, the political situation in the state stagnated. In the period between 2011 and 2013, when the state tried to include political and economic reforms, it witnessed a series of cabinet reshuffles. The King replaced Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit with Awn al-Khasawneh, a former judge at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which wanted to introduce liberal reforms, denounce corruption and announce the end of intelligence services' interference in public affairs. Unfortunately, the new election law did not allow for a strong and representative legislature, which was a reason

¹⁸ *Politics of Jordan*, more on the website: <https://fanack.com/jordan/politics-of-jordan/> , retrieved on the 7th of January, 2023

¹⁹ *Preliminary statement, Jordan January, 2013*, more on the website: https://fanack.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/archive/user_upload/Documenten/Links/Jordan/Jordan-International-Mission-Prelim-Statement-012413-ENG.pdf retrieved on the 21st of January, 2023

to be turned down by the opposition. Fayez al-Tarawneh replaced Al-Khasawneh and came with more conservative ideas.²⁰

It is important to mention that one of the most significant success representing a traditional supporters of the throne (Tribal East Bank Jordanians) are included as voicing opposition. East Bank Jordanians are working in the government administration, army and dominate the secret services. However, focusing on material demands and railing against corruption, many stood against the King and openly joined the protests of the Muslim Brotherhood (Islamic Action Front). Outside pressures on Jordan to implement reforms on the regime, notably diminished due to developments in neighboring Syria, which consequently awakening the desire for peace and stability in Jordan, rather than introducing democratic reforms. Geographically, Jordan's neighboring states: Israel, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt representing "volatility" and its armed forces have often been rated as the most capable in the region.²¹

5.1 Political conditions in Jordan

I will use in consideration several aspects from which a democracy can be analyzed, including women's participation in public life (freedom), political parties and voting process. Although, there are numerous aspects from which the regime can be analyzed, here is important to find mechanisms through which democracy is trying to achieve success and vice versa. In recent years, Jordan has seen important achievements regarding women's rights, including their status in society, public life, workplace, education and politics etc. Women have recently got seats in Parliament, provisions related to divorce initiated by the wife, male polygamy, as well as the raising of the legal age of marriage.²²

From the 1955, Jordan has active political parties and parliamentary elections. A new Political Parties Law was issued in 1992, which represented the rise of new political parties, although the nation returned to the old political parties. They have participated in three parliamentary elections (in 1993, 1997 and 2003), however, they have not been able to play their role in

²⁰ *Politics of Jordan*, more on the website: <https://fanack.com/jordan/politics-of-jordan/>, retrieved on the 7th of January, 2023

²¹ *Politics of Jordan*, more on the website: <https://fanack.com/jordan/politics-of-jordan/>, retrieved on the 7th of January, 2023

²² Building democracy in Jordan, more on the website: <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/building-democracy-in-jordan.pdf>, retrieved on the 8th of January, 2023

democratic transformation and being politically active. The Political Parties Law from 1992, grants the minister of the interior the power to announce the setting up of the party if he finds that the application has satisfied all the provisions of law. In a comparison with the previous political period, the law gives parties the opportunity to resort to the judiciary to challenge a decision by the minister of the interior if he fails to announce the formation of any political party. The Political Parties Law from 1992 brought a lot of benefits for the creation of the more democratic regime in Jordan, which was rated as the period of democratic openness and transitional stage from an era in which the state completely dominated political life. After the Political Parties Law was issued, ideological parties that had previously been illegal as Arab nationalist, leftist and Islamist were licensed. Political parties in Jordan do not practice democracy internally, within the party structures, which open some suspicions regarding other democratic processes. The Committee on Political Parties has stated that there cannot be democracy without effective political parties, which will bring numerous recommendations for effective state. Reforms on political parties was one of the main paths and initiatives that reflected the state's desire to improve political party life and democratic transformation. Political development and desire to create a democracy in Jordan, require numerous reforms in the field of educational institutions, civil society groups, political parties, the national legislature as well as in many other branches.²³

5.2 Government & electoral processes

Regimes that combine democratic features with authoritarian practices placing them in a 'grey zone' between closed authoritarianism and liberal democracy are called 'hybrid' regimes (Wigell & Mikael, 2008, p.230-250). In Jordan, the legal framework for elections is unstable, which consequences are seen in candidate registration, which is reportedly easier in some pro government areas, as well as in cases where major changes are often introduced weeks before polling day, hindering campaign efforts. Elections in Jordan are administered by the Independent Election Commission (IEC), which reported irregularities. IEC members are appointed by royal decree and the positive side is that IEC generally receive positive reviews from international monitors in terms of technical management.²⁴ Political parties based on ethnicity, race, gender or religion are banned in Jordan, which is a result of process where

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Freedom House: Jordan, more on the webiste: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/jordan/freedom-world/2022>, retrieved on the 31st of January, 2023

parties have to receive an approval from the Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs. The electoral system favors tribally affiliated independents over political parties. When we are talking about a realistic opportunity for the opposition in Jordan and their chance to gain power through elections, unfortunately, the political system limits the ability of any party-based opposition to make significant gains. In Jordan, overrepresentation of rural voters led the IAF and its ally the Islah Alliance to win a combined 8.7 percent of lower house seats (election in the November, 2020). The constitutional authority of the monarchy cannot “allow” the opposition force to win control of the executive branch by democratic means alone.²⁵

While the hybrid regime represents an intricate chain features of democracy and authoritarianism, exactly in Jordan’s case it is possible to see how voters and candidates are free from overt threats or violence, they still remain heavily influence by tribal affiliations and the state-sponsored patronage networks. There are suspicions that the Jordanian intelligence is influencing electoral processes. Characteristic of hybrid regime is also that citizens are enjoying freedom, but partially. Jordanian citizens are and can be politically active, although their participation is constrained by the fact that many important positions are appointed rather than elected. Analyzing citizen’s opportunity and free will in Jordan, it is important to stand out that women have equal political rights, which means that female candidates have seats in parliament and subnational councils. However, cultural prejudices in Jordan remain an obstacle to women’s full participation in politics. In November, 2020 no women won parliamentary seats beyond the 15-seat quota. Except women’s political participation, nine lower-house seats are reserved for Christians and three are reserved for ethnic Circassians and Chechens together, although Christians are not permitted to contest unreserved seats. As Palestinians (citizens of Palestinian origin) representing a majority of the overall population, they remain politically underrepresented. When it comes to the corruption, Jordanian government has undertaken efforts to combat widespread corruption. Unfortunately, successful prosecutions are historically rare, especially of high-ranking officials. Discussion about access-to-information in Jordan is a topic full of suspicions, because an access-to-information laws are vague, lack of procedural detail, and contain sweeping exceptions. In Jordan, officials are not obliged to share their income and assets publically. On the other side, the National Assembly does not exercise effective oversight of the government’s budget and when activists and journalist are trying to investigate state or royal finances, they are very often arrested.²⁶

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

5.3 Civil Liberties

Analyzing civil liberties, freedom of expression and belief, then back to the descriptions of hybrid regime, it is possible to notice that freedom is present in Jordan, although there are numerous deviations with “limited freedoms”. The media’s law is restrictive and vague. For example, various statutes penalize defamation, criticism of the king or state institutions and content with a lack of objectivity. Government gag orders and informal instructions to media outlets are common, which as a result very often is arresting journalists. For example, in march 2020, during COVID-19 pandemic, journalists faced severe restrictions where the Government halted the publication of all newspapers for two weeks. The Government explained the case as an aim to spread the panic. In recent years, except such cases, the Government has also restricted media coverage of political issues. Looking on the religious freedoms, Islam is the state religion, which is reflected in cases such as where the government monitors sermons at mosques for political, sectarian or extremist content and the government is responsible for issuing themes and texts. Christian groups are recognized in Jordan as religious denominations or associations and atheists and agnostics are required to list a religious affiliation on government documents. Unrecognized religious groups are dealing with disadvantages stemming from their lack of legal status. In Jordan, open discussions about politics, the monarchy or religion and security issues are inhibited by the threat of punishment. Such paths are controlled by the telecommunications law, that requires companies to enable the tracking of private communications upon the issuance of a court order, as well as authorities can order surveillance of people suspected of terrorism. What is really weird and where the freedom is abandoned is suspicion that many Jordanians believe that government agents routinely listen to their phone calls and control their online activities. Regarding online activities, the cybercrime brought legislation where is stated that internet users will be responsible and punished for online comments (defamation) with fines or prison terms. For example, in 2020 and 2021 several activists were arrested due to social media posts where they have criticized government. Also, in 2021, an application Clubhouse (the social media) was shut down, which was criticized as an attempt to limit free expression. Also, restrictions for other social media apps are very often praxis in Jordan.

In Jordan free assembly is limited, which means that any demonstrations or event should be announced earlier and approved by authorities. From earlier experiences it is known that security forces can engage in violent confrontations with protesters. One of the latest’s examples was in 2020, when the government restricted the right to assemble in response to the

ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, even after other measures were rolled back in June 2020. In this event, several dozen protesters were arrested in an Amman demonstration and some of them were physically attacked by police, while other were pressured to sign pledges promising to refrain from further activity accompanied by fines. When it comes to NGOs and internal organizations, it is important to mention that the ministry of Social Development has a full power to supervise NGOs operations (the Ministry can control their registration, foreign funding, as well as to disband organizations). In Jordan, NGOs members must be vetted by state security officials.²⁷

5.4 Rule of Law & Refugees

The King has a power to appoints the entire Constitutional Court and the chair of the Judicial Council, which means that the judiciary's independence in Jordan is limited. Interesting is that police can hold suspects for up to six months without filling formal charges. Talking about rule of law, it is possible to notice numerous limitations, as it is that authorities often ignore procedural safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention, holding citizens incommunicado or beyond legal time limits. During trial, criminal defendants have a low chance for a defense. In Jordanian jail, torture and mistreatment (beatings, abuse) are present, and prison conditions are rated as very poor. When it comes to the women's rights and equality, in Jordan, women are dealing with discrimination in law. During testimony, women are not equal to men's (per Sheria courts). Women's discrimination is also present in many other social life and cases. LGBT+ population did not get their rights and very often this population is dealing with the threat of violence, while authorities have denied registration to NGOs that are supporting equal rights for LGBT+ population. As a Jordan represent a boundary for refugees, they are dealing with the lack access to work permits and very often they are forced to continue working informally. Especially Syrian refugees have forcibly transferred to areas where they are at risk of refoulement (Rukban camp).²⁸ Jordanians of Palestinian origin are often excluded from jobs in the public sector and security forces. Per statistics from 2021, available by The Office of the Un High Commissioner for Refugees, there are 759,745 refugees in Jordan, which 672,599 of them are coming from Syria. Analyzing generally freedom of movement, Jordanians enjoy freedom of movement (domestic and international), while migrants and refugees are dealing

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ *Why Jordan won't alleviate the Rukban crisis*, more on the website:

<https://www.mei.edu/publications/why-jordan-wont-alleviate-rukban-crisis>, retrieved on the 2nd of February, 2023

with impediments to travel. Children of Jordanian mothers and non-Jordanian fathers have issues with accessing jobs, education and health care (otherwise, they should possess a special identity card, which is difficult to obtain).

The legal framework in Jordan is supporting property rights for their citizens, although women are not enjoying equal rights in this field. Per Sharia law, women do not have equal access to property. In the field of private business, it is possible to notice corruption and abuse of the political or other connections. The marriages between Muslim woman and non-Muslim men is not recognized by the government. Such cases are influenced by the country's conservative culture and specific laws. Divorce processes are handled by religious courts and women are not allowed to pass citizenship onto their children. One of the newest changes in the law is that the parliament has adopted laws that better regulate the processing of domestic violence complaints, as well as abolishment a penal code provision allowing rapist to avoid punishment by marrying their victims.²⁹ According to the Article 5/B of the Law of Political Parties of 2015 (Law 39), political parties “cannot be formed on religious, sectarian, ethnic, or faction basis, or discriminatory basis caused by gender or origin”, while the IAC (Islamic Action Front) has a clear pro-Islam social, economic and political agenda, as the Jordan's largest political party. The IAC cannot exclude non-Muslim members from its membership or organizing committees. Recently, the COVID-19 experience in Jordan showed that the state is able to enforce compliance, while at the same time it has elucidated the limits of the state's ability to distribute services. UNICEF data showed that branches as health care, including WASH – water, sanitation and hygiene in Jordan have been disrupted and dealing with issues.³⁰ Discussing effective power to govern in Jordan means put in focus the constitution that enshrines freedom of association for all Jordanians “within the limits of the law” (Article 16), which means that legislation is essential in giving the constitutional stipulation life. For example, in 2020 Jordan had one of the most comprehensive lockdown policies in the world.

Analyzing freedom and citizen's will, it is important to mention one of the recent examples when the syndicate and the Ministry of Education began protesting in July 2020 against the government's failure to implement an agreed pay increase, which as a result the state authorities

²⁹ *UN Women: Jordanian Parliament abolishes law that allowed rapists to avoid prosecution by marrying their victims*, more on the website: <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/8/news-jordanian-parliament-abolishes-law-that-allowed-rapists-to-avoid-prosecution>, retrieved on the 2nd of February, 2023

³⁰ *Jordan Country Report 2022*, more on the website: <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/JOR>, retrieved on the 12th of February, 2023

responded by raiding syndicate offices, arresting 13 board members and liquidating the syndicate. In the same year, during COVID-19 pandemic, the general manager and news director of Roya TV, Fares Sayegh and Mohamad al-Khalidi were arrested after a program aired on the station which included laborers who criticized the government's lockdown. Generally, the path of Jordanian democracy development is difficult to predict, as it depends on different factors, including foreign policies toward Jordan. The balance of power in the region is being contested, with a Saudi-led coalition challenging Iranian and Turkish influence. As it is stated: "Jordan has endeavored to navigate a middle path", which is influenced by personal relationship between King Abdullah II and Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, because they are not close, which potentially can cause problems for Jordan.³¹

³¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER 6

THE PATH THAT LEADS (led) TO AUTHORITARIANISM in MENA region

One of the last researches showed that Turkey is among top 3 countries with steepest decline in liberal democracy index.

		CHANGE	LDI 2010	LDI 2020	REGIME TYPE 2010	REGIME TYPE 2020
1	Poland	-0.34	0.83	0.49	Liberal Democracy	Electoral Democracy
2	Hungary	-0.32	0.68	0.37	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Autocracy
3	Turkey	-0.29	0.40	0.11	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Autocracy
4	Brazil	-0.28	0.79	0.51	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Democracy
5	Serbia	-0.27	0.51	0.24	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Autocracy
6	Benin	-0.26	0.55	0.29	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Autocracy
7	India	-0.23	0.57	0.34	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Autocracy
8	Mauritius	-0.23	0.73	0.50	Liberal Democracy	Electoral Democracy
9	Bolivia	-0.18	0.41	0.231	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Autocracy
10	Thailand	-0.17	0.34	0.17	Electoral Autocracy	Closed Autocracy

*Table 1: Top-10 autocratizing countries, 2010-2020*³²

As previously mentioned in numerous examples, Republic of Turkey is turning to autocratization and per statistics, it belongs among the countries that “autocratized” the most. The report was prepared with the contribution of more than 3.500 scholars, including other country experts, where were measured hundreds of different attributes of democracy. Interesting, report showed that in the process of “autocratization” brought notable commonalities. As stated in report: “Media and academic freedoms, and civil society, are typically repressed first. Alongside that, ruling governments often engage in polarization by official disinformation campaigns disseminated via social media and by increasing disrespect for counterarguments from political opponents. Only then are formal institutions such as the quality of elections undermined in a further step towards autocracy. Freedom of expression and the media make 8 of the 10 indicators declining in the greatest number of countries over the

³² *Top 10 autocratizing countries 2010-2020 according to V-Dem Institute, more on the website:*

https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/m277jl/top_10_autocratizing_countries_20102020_according/, retrieved on the 6th of February, 2023

past 10 years.”³³ An analysis showed that the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2020 is down to the levels around 1990. Probably, the path for authorization was raised step by step. Limited freedoms in different fields of life, suspicions about electoral processes and other causes, are creating the authoritarian picture of states. Except Turkey and Jordan, the number of democratizing countries is also dwindling, down almost by half in comparison with the period of 10 years ago and now 16 that are home to 4% of the global population. According to the report, electoral and closed autocracies occupy 68% of the world’s population, while liberal democracies is decreasing to 32, with a population of 14%. Electoral democracies are present in 60 nations, with 19% of the population.³⁴




Table 2: Middle East & Central Asia, democracy index³⁵

Statistics where democracy is measured actually trying to represent political circumstances under which people are living all around the world. Circumstances are interpreted as “free” and “not free” conditions, where democracy lies on one end and authoritarianism on the other. The

³³ Turkey among top 3 countries with steepest decline in liberal democracy indeks: report, more on the website: <https://stockholmcf.org/turkey-among-top-3-countries-with-steepest-decline-in-liberal-democracy-index-report/>, retrieved on the 6th of February, 2023

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Mapped: The State of Global Democracy in 2022, more on the website: <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/mapped-the-state-of-global-democracy-2022/>, retrieved on the 7th of February, 2023

map above is created by Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), which approved that the state of democracy is at its lowest point since the index began in 2006. Per EIU, some of the main characteristics of hybrid regimes are: electoral fraud or irregularities occur regularly; pressure is applied to political opposition; corruption is widespread and rule of law tends to be weak; the media is pressured and their freedom of expression is limited; different issues in the functioning of governance. While, authoritarian regimes are characterized as regimes where: political pluralism is nonexistent or limited; citizens are ruled by absolute monarchies or dictatorship; abuses of civil liberties; the media is state owned or controlled by the ruling regime; voting processes are not fair and free; criticism of the government is censored.³⁶ Focusing on the Middle East and North Africa, it is possible to notice that this region is classified as the region of authoritarian regimes. The MENA's overall democracy score is now lower than it was before the start of the Arab Spring in 2010. In the region of the Middle East, per statistic, there are no countries that are full democracies, only Israel (7.97) and Cyprus (7.43) are rated as "flawed democracies", while Turkey, Georgia, Armenia and Pakistan are rated as hybrid regimes. The rest of states in the region belonging to the group of authoritarian regimes.³⁷

One of the latest statistics showed that only 8% of the Earth's population is under full democracy. Democracy index 2022 represents an annual classification of 167 countries of the world, compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, which is based on the development of democracy. The research included 60 indicators, grouped into 5 categories: elections and pluralism, civil liberties, government activity, political engagement of the population, and political culture. The research showed that in the group of "last democratic states" in the world belonging: Russia – 2.28, Venezuela – 2.23, Burundi 2.13, Uzbekistan – 2.12, Saudi Arabia – 2.08, Libya – 2.06, Iran – 1.96, Yemen – 1.95, Syria – 1.43, Afghanistan 0.32, etc.³⁸

As the regime has an influence on economy development and social life, one of the researches showed that Arabs believe that the economy is weak under democracy. In the research about 23 000 people were interviewed in nine countries and the Palestinian territories for BBC New Arabic by the Arab Barometer network, where most of them agreed with the statement that an economy is weak under a democracy. The findings come just over a decade after the Arab

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Democracy Index 2022: only 8% of the Earth's population live under full democracy, more on the website: <https://mezha.media/en/2023/02/02/democracy-index-2022-only-8-of-the-earth-s-population-lives-under-full-democracy/>, retrieved on the 10th of February, 2023

Spring protests. After Arab Spring, call for a democracy, only one of all states remained a democracy (Tunisia). The survey between 2021 and 2022 showed that there has been a regional shift in views on democracy since the last survey in 2018/19. According to the EIU Democracy Index, the Middle East and North Africa is the lowest ranked of all regions covered in the index, where Israel is rated as flawed democracy, while Tunisia and Morocco are classed as hybrid regimes and rest of the states in region belong to the authoritarian regime group. In seven states and the Palestinian territories, more than half of respondents to the Arab Barometer survey agree with the statement that their country needs a leader who can “bend the rules”. In Jordan and Sudan, a sizable proportion of people disagreeing with the statement. After Arab Spring, only Tunisia managed to form a democratic government, although it appears to be slipping back to authoritarian rule under President Saied. EIU democracy Index from 2021 showed that Tunis fell 21 places in the rankings and has been reclassified as a hybrid regime rather than a flawed democracy. "Now, unfortunately, for Tunisia, it's reverting to authoritarianism, or what we call democratic backsliding, which is a trend across the world today," says Amaney Jamal, co-founder of Arab Barometer and dean of the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs.³⁹

According to the research, the economic situation represented as the most pressing challenge for seven countries and the Palestinian territories, ahead corruption, instability and the spread of COVID-19. In Iraq and in Libya the economic situation is not seen as the most crucial issue.⁴⁰

³⁹ Arabs believe economy is weak under democracy, more on the website: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-62001426>, retrieved on the 13th of February, 2023

⁴⁰ Ibid.




Table 3: People more interested in effective government than the form it takes ⁴¹

The U.S. government-funded advocacy organization and per freedom indices, reported that the Middle Eastern and North African states with the highest scores are: Israel, Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait. Iraq, Iran and Egypt are rated as “not free” states by the Freedom House (2017-2021), while remaining countries of the Middle East are rated as authoritarian regimes. ⁴² Looking back, after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, many of the empire’s former territories fell under the rule of European countries under League of Nations mandates, which means that the first independent government emerged from the Ottoman Empire were established by European powers. After that, during the Cold War, the United States and the USSR competed for allies in the region, which as a result for the U.S. had supported dictatorship contrary to its stated democratic principles. The Eisenhower Doctrine from the 1957 brought the policy which aim was American promotion of democracy in the MENA region (for example, 1958 Lebanon crisis). Later, from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the USA’s focus was on the real promotion of a democracy in the region,

⁴¹ Arab barometer, more on the website: <https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/>, retrieved on the 13th of February, 2023

⁴² Iraq: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report, more on the website: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/iraq/freedom-world/2021>, retrieved on the 17th of February, 2023

which was reflected in spreading invasions in specific states (Pratt, 2007). Some analysts arguing that the democracy cannot be imposed from outside, while some believe that the democracy can be established only through force and the help from the U.S. ⁴³ Recent academic critics have rated intervention in the MENA region as a failure, which is possible to see on a scale of democratization (established by Transparency International) where Iraq and Afghanistan are two of the worst-ranked states in the world (Myanmar and Somalia surpassed in corruption). ⁴⁴

Rank ↕	Country ↕	Aggregate score ↕	Freedom rating ↕	Political rights ↕	Civil liberties ↕	Regime type ↕
1	 Israel	78	2.5	2	3	Free
2	 Lebanon	45	4.5	5	4	Partly free
3	 Jordan	37	5	5	5	Partly free
4	 Kuwait	36	5	5	5	Partly free
5	 Iraq	32	5.5	5	6	Not free
6	 Turkey	31	5.5	5	6	Not free
7	 Qatar	25	5.5	6	5	Not free
8	 Palestine (West Bank)	25	6	7	5	Not free
9	 Oman	23	5.5	6	5	Not free
10	 Egypt	22	6	6	6	Not free
11	 Iran	18	6	6	6	Not free
12	 United Arab Emirates	17	6.5	7	6	Not free
13	 Bahrain	12	6.5	7	6	Not free
14	 Palestine (Gaza Strip)	11	6.5	7	6	Not free
15	 Yemen	11	6.5	7	6	Not free
16	 Libya	9	6.5	7	6	Not free
17	 Saudi Arabia	7	7	7	7	Not free
18	 Syria	0	7	7	7	Not free

Table 4: cFreedom in the World 2019 – Middle East ⁴⁵

⁴³ Democracy in the Middle East can only be established by force, more on the website: <https://www.memri.org/tv>, retrived on the 17th of February, 2023

⁴⁴ Did the wars bring democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq?, more on the website: <https://web.archive.org/web/20110703093122/http://costsofwar.org/article/did-wars-bring-democracy-afghanistan-and-iraq>, retrieved on the 17th of February, 2023

⁴⁵ Freedomhouse.org, more on the website: https://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=342&year=2008, retrieved on the 17th of February, 2023

Today, a number of republics in MENA region, regularly hold elections, although, these are not full-multiparty systems and in these states citizens are not allowed to choose between multiple candidates for the presidential elections. For example, the constitution of Egypt has given the president a virtual monopoly over the decision making process, devoting 30 articles to presidential prerogatives. Yemen, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority are also partly accepting this ideology are characterized as states that are more democratic than other that do so. Absolute monarchy is common in the MENA region, as it is for example Saudi Arabia and several other kingdoms in the region. The endurance of authoritarian states in the MENA region is notable in comparison to the rest of the world (Parsi, 2009). MENA region is also characterized with numerous constitutional monarchy states, where states employ a parliamentary system in which the monarch may have strictly ceremonial duties or reserve powers.

The Middle Eastern countries with Constitutional monarchies are generally considered democratic, as it is for example Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Bahrain. In 1979, the Iranian Revolution brought an electoral system which is functioning as a limited democracy in practice. Some elections in Iran satisfies free and democratic election criteria (for example city councils). In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party represents a moderate democratic Islamist party which is compared to Christian Democracy in Europe with its moderate ideology. Some of changes, or the desire for potential changes in the MENA region is possible to find in the movement, so called Arab Spring. In 2011, a Tunisian fruit seller Mohamed B. doused himself in petrol and set himself on fire outside in protest against local police officials who had seized his fruit cart. Precisely, the protest beginning in December, 2010 brought about the overthrow of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments, while Libya was brought into a 6-month civil war, which resulted in the end of Gaddafi's rule.

The uprising in Syria led to full-scale civil war, while Bahrain and Yemen also experienced uprisings. In Egypt, Mohamed Morsi was sworn and removed from office in July 2013. Many other states in MENA region desired for democratic changes, including: Algeria, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, Yemen, Kuwait, Turkey etc. Interestingly, research confirms that people in Islamic societies supporting democracy (Huang, 2005, p.110). At the very beginning of the Arab Spring, one question frequently asked – was the Arab World ready for democracy? The Arab public systematically dismantled decades of oppressive silence overnight, which means that the question for analyst was an absurd and rather it should look like: whether the rest of the world was ready to support them? Other than geographic proximity and a common history of

living under dictatorship, the Middle Eastern uprising had very little in common. A desire for changes and the chant: “The people want the downfall of the regime”. A desire for changes, sense of optimism that the democracy will bring freedoms in the Middle East, unfortunately brought wars where dictatorships and monarchies spent years and years at war against their own populations. Looking today, in 2023 it is possible to say that the cycle of conflict is far from the end. Ongoing economic difficulties in Lebanon and Iraq showed that the citizen’s desire for democratic change is still burning strongly. Statistics are saying that the economic and sociopolitical factors that triggered the Arab Spring uprisings are significantly worse than they were in 2011.

To conclude the topic of Arab Spring uprisings, the present situation in the region is still burning. The Middle East now finds itself in the state of flux that Karl Marx described as permanent revolution. This phenomenon is explained as a desire of people that is only growing and it is never fulfilled. The situation in the MENA region after Arab Spring cannot be described as status quo, as probably a dictatorship in the region will never be the same as it was before 2011, although it is impossible to predict the future of regimes’ development in this region.⁴⁶

While commenting on regimes’ development in the MENA region, researchers are mentioning reasons for the lack of democratization, including that a strong civil society is required to produce leaders and mobilize the public around democratic duties, but in order for such a civil society to flourish, a democratic environment and process allowing freedom of expression and order is required in the first place. This theory is also supporting the intervention of outside countries, as it is U.S. for example. Schnabel argues that democratization development should come from below and above, which means that in a case that the pressure from below is present, it will be pointless if the political leadership is opposed to reform, while top-down reform is not a fruitful endeavor if the political culture in society is not developed (Schnabel, 2003, p.35). Other analysts argue that independent, nongovernmental associations help foster a participatory form of governance.

These assumptions are based on the work of Alexis de Tocqueville and Robert Putnam. In this thought is also included the lack of horizontal voluntary association as the reason for the persistence of authoritarianism in the MENA region (Casero, 2003, p.45). Other analysts are

⁴⁶ Betrayed by their leaders, failed by the West, Arabs still want Democracy, more on the website: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/17/betrayed-by-their-leaders-failed-by-the-west-arabs-still-want-democracy/>, retrieved on the 18th of February, 2023

focused on economy and they are arguing that the lack of a market-driven economy in MENA region undermines the capacity to create a power and an individual autonomy that helps promotion of democracy (Bellin, Eva, 2005, p. 21). As the citizen's freedom and engagement representing main and most important indicators for the democracy development, some of analysts are focused on the relationship of the state towards their citizens (Korany, 1998, p. 8). Poverty, limited freedoms, low literacy rates are indicators of a democracy improvement in the state, as the survival becomes a higher priority. Using in consideration that, some of analysts stated that Islam is an explanation for the region's failure to democratization. Leaving citizen's point of view aside, some of analysts believe that the democracy failure is influenced by the power of the state. Belin argues that democratic transition is possible only when the state's coercive apparatus lacks the will or capacity to crush opponents. States in the MENA region have proven their power and capacity to crush opponents and authoritarianism, especially, showed its will to crush reform initiatives. Over past decades many states in the MENA region have been directly involved in some form of international conflict. Research are suggesting that conflict involvement has direct influence on state's path for democratic development (Brynen et al.,1995, p. 285).

The Arab Spring showed a desire of citizens to protect their basic human rights, respect and dignity in their nations. As mentioned previously, the chain of the Arab Spring is still developing, examples are movements in Lebanon and in Iraq in 2019, Sudan's toppling of Omar al-Bashir's dictatorship in 2019, Tunisian's rejection of the illegal usurpation of President Kais Saied. The question is, at which level is the MENA region on the scale of the democracy development? Or, better question is at which level is the MENA region on the scale of authoritarian development? Let's see reasons for which the MENA region in the future should be rated as the authoritarian region. The Arab Spring uprisings in the MENA region per some analyst only thickened the authoritarianism plot. Through the history, using examples in South-Western Europe in the 1960s, in Latin America in 1970s and in Eastern Europe in the 1980s and '90s a desire for a transformation was going hard, which resulted in the early 2000s, revealing a proliferation of "uncertain regimes", "semi-democratic regimes", "competitive authoritarianism", "façade democracy" or "illiberal democracy", which can be used as facts for caution in the MENA region. The new-old authoritarian regimes of the Middle East reasserted themselves in at least three innovative ways: 1) by appearing to embody change while crushing it; 2) by securing international support for, or tolerance of, their campaigns; 3) by, more insidiously, sowing doubts amongst their populations about the need for, and value

democracy.⁴⁷ In Syria, Bashar al Assad continued to claim to be the candidate for a “new democratic Syria”, during the widespread murderous repression of this opponents and a developed civil war (presidential elections in 2014 & parliamentary elections in 2016). In Turkey, president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan jeopardized the promised political change and transition that was expected in the near future and regime changes. In 2017, president Erdogan, with the new referendum, expanded his own presidential powers in the name of democracy. Expanded presidential powers are used as a tool for legitimization of specified constitutional changes.⁴⁸

Two waves of potential changes in the MENA region faded away, the first one started in 2011 – the Arab Spring and the second wave emerged first in Sudan in December 2018, reaching Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon over the following year. In these years of uprisings, in Sudan and Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon presidents and prime ministers resigned out of necessity. Why a desire for the democracy development faded away? Analysts argued that there are several reasons for this. Monarchical regimes in the Gulf, as well as in Jordan and Morocco proved robust. Ten years after Arab Spring movement, it is difficult to find any substantial and progressive transformation. The authoritarianism remains the main feature of politics in the region today. Egypt is a de facto military dictatorship, the Moroccan regime has cracked down repeatedly on social movements; in Libya political violence is still present, while a procedural democracy in Tunis is nowadays collapsing. Analyst concluded that there are three main factors that caused the “pause” in democracy development in the MENA region.

The first is **the role of the state**, which means that the state structures should perform well, work along the lines of modern bureaucracy that Max Weber identified, and are regarded as the sole legitimate political entity within the territorial boundaries by citizens. For example, in Libya “sultanistic” organization of the state was not a good starting point, while Tunisia and Morocco had the greatest potential to democratize. In the period of 2014 till 2020, Tunisia has suffered from a bureaucracy that has persistently scored at the bottom of rankings on state employees’ efficiency among democratic states.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Reinventing Authoritarianism in the Middle East, more on the website: <https://globalchallenges.ch/issue/2/reinventing-authoritarianism-middle-east/>, retrieved on the 21st of February, 2023

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ A cold authoritarian wind sweeps over the Middle East and North Africa, more on the website: <https://www.resetdoc.org/story/a-cold-authoritarian-wind-sweeps-over-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/>, retrieved on the 28th of February, 2023

The second reason is **economic development**, due to reason that economic development is often positively associated with democratization development and stability. More developed states tend to be more complex and articulated, which means that these societies are favoring the emergence of a political system that is based on pluralism and consensus, such as it is the liberal democracy. Analyzing all states in the North Africa from this point of view, Tunisia scored at the top. Unfortunately, pandemic COVID-19 caused the crisis in its economy, jeopardizing Tunisian two main sources, tourism and small to medium enterprises that work as subcontractors for European firms in the textile and mechanic sectors, encouraging anti-democratic solutions.⁵⁰

Third reason represents **the international community** and its influence. From the 1980s the European Union and the U.S. started promoting the spread of liberal democracy abroad as a powerful institutional instrument to boost their economic and political interests. Non-democratic states are essentially dependent on the financial and military support from outside, as it is the European Union and North American states. The international context is less favorable for the emergence and consolidation of new democracies today than it was the case a few decades ago, as it was possible to see in the MENA region, where an authoritarianism has back on the stage.⁵¹

Why today we have unfinished democracies in the MENA region and does an authoritarianism is back? Regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria and Yemen only dutifully created the appearance of reform, rather than its substance. Some of analyst argue that democratization here was “defensive” and “managed”, which was not resulted into creation of a democracy, but rather to prevent its emergence. As it is stated: “*Regime opponents found themselves ensnared in what political scientist Daniel Brumberg called an ‘endless transition.’ This endless transition was always going to be a dangerous proposition, particularly in the long run. If a transition was promised and never came, Arabs were bound to grow impatient.*”⁵²

There is no reason to believe that people in the Middle East are any different from the rest of humanity in preferring freedom and the rule of law to dictatorship, although the last decade showed some the naivety of those who hoped that a regime change would take root easily.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² The struggle for Middle East Democracy, more on the website:

<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-struggle-for-middle-east-democracy/>, retrieved on the 1st of March, 2023

During the Egyptian revolution, some 26% of the population was illiterate. However, positively, the example of Asian countries, as it is South Korea and Taiwan showed that a period of rapid economic, educational and institutional development under an autocratic regime can establish the conditions that make a transition to democracy more likely to succeed.⁵³ The rise of authoritarianism found reasons in unresolvable questions of identity and legitimacy with political unrest, religious intolerance and rentier structures of economy as the main feature of their structure in the region.⁵⁴

⁵³ The discontents of Middle East democracy, more on the website:
<https://www.ft.com/content/32e38722-9685-4916-a160-5142f5d26c3e>, retrieved on the 1st of March, 2023

⁵⁴ The failure of democracy in the Middle East, more on the website:
<https://cssame.nchu.edu.tw/2020/05/18/the-failure-of-democracy-in-the-middle-east/>,
retrieved on the 1st of March, 2023

CHAPTER 7

WHAT MAKES THEM SIMILAR (Jordan & Turkey)

As there are numerous crucial differences between political structures and historical path of Jordan and Turkey, what today makes them similar and why both states can be grouped into same field of analysis is the reason that they are rated as *hybrid regimes*. Jordan is parliamentary monarchy, while Turkey is parliamentary republic. On the scale of quality of life, an indicator for political stability, Jordan scored 57, while Turkey 32. Indicator of civil rights showed 46 for Jordan and 35 for Turkey.⁵⁵ The scale of economic and political stability – indicators to long term-stability – identifies whole series of criteria for political consistency, from which assessments of political stability and government effectiveness are made. Political stability has the highest priority here. Indicators for legal system and civil rights are directly led by the rule of law. Political stability does not help if it comes from dictatorial principles and if citizens have no influence.⁵⁶ Both states are majority two Sunni Muslim nations and sharing a strong historic tie. With a high score of 70, Jordan representing a hierarchical society, which means that citizens are accepting a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and which needs no further justification, related to inherent inequalities and popular centralization. Jordan is rated as “collectivistic” society, which is evident in a close, long-term commitment to the member “group”, which can be a family, extended family or extended relationships. Turkey scores high on the dimension of “power distance” scores 66, adding features to Turkish style as: dependent, hierarchical, superiors often inaccessible and the ideal boss is a father figure. The power in Turkey is centralized and managers relying on their rulers. Similar as Jordan, on the scale of individualism, Turkey scored 37, which is rated as collectivistic society.⁵⁷ It is important to be aware that there are numerous indicators while measuring democracy and all of these background structures are creating the regime. Jordanian case representing the duality of the effectiveness of the political process as a result of a procedural elections, while the voting process (with its limitations) promises future possibilities. Partial democratic measures in Jordan have consisted conflicting elements for change, as the voting process have a desire for transformation toward democracy under Jordanian constitutional monarchy. The root for

⁵⁵ World Dana, more on the website: <https://www.worlddata.info/country-comparison.php?country1=JOR&country2=TUR>, retrieved on the 6th of March, 2023

⁵⁶ *World data*, more on the website: <https://www.worlddata.info/quality-of-life.php>, retrieved on the 6th of March, 2023

⁵⁷ Country comparison: Jordan & Turkey, more on the website: <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/jordan,turkey/>, retrieved on the 7th of March, 2023

transformation desire started with elections in 1989, including the king's willingness to deal with opposition demands, such as the dissolution of the parliament, a new election that can create a more credible parliament compared to previous ones. Analyst arguing that many of the reforms and changes the king has agreed upon could very well be tactical maneuvers to absorb protests of the lack of democracy and that previous experiences shows the king could undertake measures to delay the democratization process. The democratic methods implemented in Jordan have deepened primordial tribalism in Jordanian society, which led to division that grows at the expense of shared citizenship (Declan, 2015). As Jordan, Turkey is a two-sided coin, where liberal values coexist with practices that have nothing to do with modern liberal political systems. Modern Turkey seems to have another important competitive authoritarian future, which can be represented through enjoying a reasonably fair level of political competition between the government and the opposition.

The research is saying that in the past 10 years, gender equality and LGBTQ rights have been increasingly under attack in Turkey. Rainbow Europe Map in 2021 published by the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA)- Europe, showed that Turkey was on the 48th place among 49 states regarding the human rights of LGBT people.⁵⁸ The situation in Jordan is very similar, although the homosexuality is not illegal under the Penal Code in Jordan, societal discrimination is widespread. 97% of Jordanians believe that homosexuality should not be accepted by society (Pew poll from 2013). Under Sharia law LGBT+ population can have consequences of stigmatization and harassment, as they are forced to leave Jordan due to negative public attitudes, police mistreatment and fear of their family harming them.⁵⁹

Turkey is seen as secular democracy in the Muslim world, although the reality is presenting the state that is dealing with a crisis of civil rights and liberties under a third term of the pro-Islamic AKP government. Turkey is divided over issues of minority and human rights, freedom of speech and autonomy of media and academia, while the government maintains a discourse on political reform (including constitutional amendments).⁶⁰ The new Human Rights Action Plan

⁵⁸ Rainbow Europe Map and Indeks 2021, more on the website: <https://ilga-europe.org/report/rainbow-europe-2021/>, retrieved on the 9th of March, 2023

⁵⁹ Jordan LGBT Resources, more on the website: <https://www.amerainternational.org/jordan-lgbti-resources/>, retrieved on the 9th of March, 2023

⁶⁰ Turkey under the AKP: Are civil liberties safe?, more on the website: <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/turkey-under-the-akp-are-civil-liberties-safe/>, retrieved on the 9th of March, 2023

and two Judicial Reform Packages were unsuccessful and failed to correct deep flaws in the judiciary. ⁶¹ Using in consideration the period from reinstatement of democracy in 1983, the post-coup, pre-AKP and today, it is possible to conclude that the cleanest elections in Turkey's history according to V-Dem, and a subsequent decline following the coming to power of the AKP was in 2014. ⁶² Currently, it is really difficult to predict Jordan's and Turkey's path regarding regime development, although previously mentioned violence of freedoms in both states are they repairing and strengthen the pillars of authoritarianism.

⁶¹ Amnesty International: Turkey, more on the website:

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/>,
retrieved on the 10th of March, 2023

⁶² The reversal of (what little) liberal democracy (there ever was) in Turkey, more on the website: <https://erikmeyersson.com/2016/10/04/the-reversal-of-what-little-liberal-democracy-there-ever-was-in-turkey/>, retrieved on the 13th of March, 2023

CHAPTER 8

THE DREAM OF DEMOCRACY IN MENA REGION

Developments through the history, wars, new constitutions, new leaders, as well as citizen's movements and protests are some of factors that are creating regime changes, including its influence on domestic and foreign politics. What we can also observe as an influence on the potential change in the regime and what could give hope for a democracy, specifically in this cases, are factors divided on internal and external pressures. External factors are including peaceful pressure, democracy assistance, sanctions and aid, while internal factors are referring to the authoritarian development, free values and civil society (Hama, 2022). Political analyst, Larry Diamond, argued that peaceful pressure, as an external factor, can have an influence on a nation to move towards a more democratic development, as it was i.e. the case when the U.S. with its president Bill Clinton, through peaceful way, used pressure against authoritarian states to change their political orientation. There are some examples as is the case when the U.S. imposed sanctions on Serbian President Milosevic, which affected Serbia's economy (Diamond, 2008:116). Diamond also included *democracy assistance* as an external factor that can have an influence on democracy development, as Western countries are offering support for authoritarian states in an aim to promote democratic values.

Today, it is possible to mention several potential ways through which Turkey could strengthen its democratic path. How the EU handles issues in Turkey is a reflection of the EU's identity, which means that if the EU wants to be seen as an organization that stands for democratic values, it must stand up for them in Turkey: "When the EU sidelines these values in favor of other interests, it sends a message to not only Erdoğan but also to other authoritarian leaders that the EU is willing to bend its principles".⁶³ Except the European Union, it is stated that the U.S. should be more focused on human rights and democracy in Turkey, referring on all diplomatic engagements with Turkey, support and solidarity for organizations and institutions in Turkey to defend human rights and strengthening democracy. The pressure from outside, including the EU and U.S. engagement, means focus on the rule of law and judicial independence, as well as focus on key rights issues as women's and LGBTQ+ rights, especially following Erdogan's 2021 decision to withdraw Turkey from the Istanbul convention.⁶⁴

⁶³ Policy Brief – Supporting Democracy and Human rights in Turkey: Can the United States and European Union do more?, more on the website: <https://pomed.org/publication/policy-brief-supporting-democracy-and-human-rights-in-turkey-can-the-united-states-and-europe-do-more/>, retrieved on the 21st of March, 2023

⁶⁴ *ibid.*

While Jordan has made important progress in the field of democracy development, challenges persist. King Abdullah II in 2011 launched a political reform process, which aim was to include citizens more in decision-making processes, as well to increase transparency and accountability at all levels of government. Analyzing from today, 12 years after, it is possible to see that citizens' participation in Jordan in decision-making field is unfortunately, limited. Using in consideration foreign aid in Jordan, it is important to mention USAID, which is cooperating with the Government of Jordan to advance the King's vision for democratic development. USAID is promoting a more stable, secure and democratic values in Jordan, including the path of strengthening the partnership between the state and its citizens, while bolstering civil society.⁶⁵ Except USAID, UNDP's partnership with the EU making an influential contribution in Jordan, regarding democratization. In the period between 2017-2020, UNDP implemented the Decentralization and Local Development Support Programme, which aim was supporting the adoption of regulatory framework pertaining to decentralization and strengthen the capacities of the governorate-based structures in strategic planning, as well as budget analysis and monitoring.⁶⁶ Through these, previously mentioned examples, it is possible to see the foreign desire to create democratic paths in Turkey and Jordan. An aim of international actors can be found in their desire to create a more stable territory for cooperation, peace, stability and security. Foreign investments and citizen's desire (especially trough the movements) are examples that are there exist conditions and positive docks for democracy. However, here is possible to include negative sides of foreign engagement, as the Western form of democracy was proven to be a failure when it was "installed" in a state by external forces as was proven in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. It is stated that the reason can be find in the Western notion of democracy, which does not take into consideration the Eastern nature and character of the Middle Eastern way of life, except Turkey. Another example where the West failed to "implement" democracy and support masses' hopes during Arab Spring, is Syria,

⁶⁵ Democracy, Human Rights & Governance, more on the website: <https://www.usaid.gov/jordan/democracy-human-rights-and-governance>, retrieved on the 21st of March, 2023

⁶⁶ Supporting democratic governance and strenghtening transparency and accountability of local institutions in Jordan, more on the website: <https://www.undp.org/jordan/projects/supporting-democratic-governance-and-strengthening-transparency-and-accountability-local-institutions-jordan>, retrieved on the 22nd of March, 2023

which ended up as a complex human tragedy, included the raise of extremists groups.⁶⁷ The complex picture of regimes in the Middle East are helping us to understand different ways of causes that have had an influence on the regime as it is today. Foreign and domestic desires are clear and open, although it seems, with all the above examples, that countries want to stagnate, which means - returning to an authoritarian regime. It is impossible to say that there is no literature regarding perspectives of democracy in MENA region, rather to say the lack of the literature, as in the last decades, the Middle East has been studied only as a part of the conflict and peace literature, oil and economies or Arab-Israeli conflict. Posusney arguing that most of the studies that examined democracy and democratization in the Middle East have focused on cultural and economic factors, which upon identification, were used to test other theories and elaborate on previous findings and conclusions (Posusney, 2004, p. 127-138). Certain factors display their importance for democratization in the MENA region, which can be explained through the reason of global political participation in Jordan and Turkey, as examples with high democracy level and its absence in the most sets of configurations with low level of democracy. It is stated that one of the reasons why Turkey is on the good way, is because of its global participation and integration within the international community, as relations with the EU and NATO, which has led to the democratic consolidation in the state.⁶⁸ Using in consideration other MENA region states, for them it is stated that democracy is, therefore *possible but not necessary*, and as such other factors will decide whether it takes place. The tendency is to view political liberalization as a substitute for, not a stage toward democratization.

⁶⁷ The West's dream of "enlightened democracy" in the Middle East, more on the website: <https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/12/29/the-wests-dream-of-enlightened-democracy-in-the-middle-east>, retrieved on the 25th of March, 2023

⁶⁸ Different paths to democracy in the MENA region: A configurational comparative analysis, more on the website: <https://www.longdom.org/open-access/different-paths-to-democracy-in-the-mena-region-a-configurational-comparative-analysis-36502.html>, retrieved on the 25th of March, 2023

CHAPTER 9

RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS

This part is structured in the way that it presents analyses and comments on research questions, as well as approving or denying hypotheses, which means that there will be also included comments and various opinions from other books and articles.

RQ1: What are the reasons why states are stagnating in democracy development and continue functioning under hybrid regimes?

As we are already familiar with the fact that there are different types of regimes, including democratic and authoritarian, we should be aware of the hybrid regime as the type of regime that is functioning and have its unique characteristics. Hybrid regimes, as somewhere-in-between, are “workable” regime types and states are living and functioning so many years under that governance, with functional domestic and foreign policy, which in the end means that is acceptable for them. We have to be aware that hybrid regimes are not transitional phases they are political regimes that manifest a combination of authoritarian and democratic characteristics of domestic politics (Mufti, 2018). Although, as our previous examples showed, citizens are usually dissatisfied with their governance, which is reflected through disrespect of human rights. Some scholars are arguing that hybrid regimes were unable to transition to democracy because, there was a hope that these imperfect democracies would amend their politics (Mariam, 2018). Accepting functionality and life under a hybrid regime as something usual is one of the reasons why states are stagnating in democracy development. It is important to mention other reasons, such as mechanisms that states are implementing to “prevent” democracy development, as was previously shown in Jordanian and Turkey cases (through human rights violence, absence of full freedom, partial freedom, citizen dissatisfaction, and inequality). Mechanisms are described in detail (p.18) and are divided into several groups: signaling, information acquisition, patronage distribution, monitoring, and credible commitment (Brancati, 2013). However, if we use consideration specifically MENA region, it is possible to discuss several reasons why states are stagnating in the democracy development; Huntington argues that there is a big difference between religions in favoring democracy and some scholars have argued that Islam is an undemocratic religion, but these views are based on the acts and traditions of the Middle Eastern communities and not based on religion doctrines. The elements of the Arabic culture and patriarchal-tribal mentality are obstacles to pluralistic and democratic societies (Sharbi, 1988). Another element is the economy, as some scholars

argued that economic equality and standard of living are prerequisites for democracy to flourish in any society. One more important element on fostering democracy is political institutions, as this element focuses on how the political structure of the country is designed. Specifically, in the MENA region, there is almost an absence of political parties in many of the states in the monarchies of the GULF, while other states have faced a cracked down of opposition parties who monopolized the political sphere of the states and transferred the country into a competitive authoritarian regime.

Here is also included importance of international intervention, as a final element that facilitates a democratization path. As it is already known, some international organizations, as for example NATO and EU, require member states to democratize institutions. However, in some states there was zero intervention in supporting oppositions, funding civil society, or criticizing government such as the gulf countries. Bellin attributes the maintenance of Middle East authoritarianism to Western foreign policy (Bellin, 2012, p.127-149). Analysis of the regimes in the Middle East is built on the concept of “exceptionalism”, as the approach argues that the low level of democracy in the MENA region related to the fact that this region is internationally exceptional. As conclusion, Bellin confirmed that one factor cannot explain the stagnation of democracy development in the region and that only a combination of factors can explain it. For example, resistance to democratization in Syria is not the same as it is in Yemen or Saudi Arabia, as historical, economic and cultural factors may have been of greater influence in some cases while have zero impact in others.⁶⁹ “Hybrid regimes are steady enough and enduring because they are profiting from the mechanism of market, from partially free society. That’s a reason why such regimes are hard to destroy and transform rapidly. Nevertheless, there is no the heart of hearts of hybrid regimes that's why real stability in it hungers for it. The reason of all above mentioned lies in a mechanism of decision taking fully described and examined by David Easton.”⁷⁰

RQ2: How choosing to functioning under authoritarian regime represents threats to democracy?

⁶⁹ Different paths to democracy in the MENA region: a configurational comparative analysis, more on the website: <https://www.longdom.org/open-access/different-paths-to-democracy-in-the-mena-region-a-configurational-comparative-analysis-36502.html>, retrieved on the 10th of April, 2023

⁷⁰ Hybrid authoritarian regimes: Is it a transition to democracy?, more on the website: <https://sgpjournals.mgimo.ru/2018/2018-3/hybrid-authoritarian-regimes>, retrieved on the 12th of April, 2023

Giving an answer to this question may sound very subjective. For some countries, i.e. their governments and rulers, authoritarian regime is favorable and acceptable, however there are parties who think the opposite and longing for democracy (these are the desires of the citizens). However, my analysis will try to present this part neutrally, although the question itself has already defined authoritarianism as a threat. We can try to understand this by taking into consideration the most important thing, which is the freedom of citizens. In previous parts examples showed to what extent citizens' liberties were violated, especially in Jordanian and Turkey's cases. To revoke the voice and freedom of the people means to limit them, and on the other hand, to open the power of those in charge. Arab Spring has brought key challenges in the MENA region that had already existed for some time. Some of these challenges including: high unemployment level, pervasive corruption and lack of transparency; low levels of enterprise creation; for some states – a high dependence on fuel and food imports generating extensive exposure to commodity price volatility. These challenges are structural and interconnected and the best way through which they can be addressed is only through a coordinated and comprehensive strategy, which will include governments, civil society, the private sector, and the international community as well.⁷¹ Using into consideration MENA region as the field of research, here is important to mention *a domino effect*, which is analyzed previously through Arab Spring reforms. This can be understood as the potential threat, which means that changes to better or worse are easily copied from one state to another in region. Comprehension that authoritarian regime is functional and successful in one state, psychologically giving encouragement to other states to try to implement similar ideas.

9.1 Discussion - Research hypotheses

Case studies, Turkey and Jordan approved that democracy hardly succeeds (stagnates) in states where governments display the characteristics of an authoritarian regime. I would add here that states in the process of stagnation are becoming “hybrid regimes” which are accepted not only in the MENA region, but also by all of international actors. Hybrid regimes are functional governments, although their name *hybrid* alludes to something unfinished or a system that has mutated. Somewhere in between, unfinished or in developing process, are some of the characteristics attributed to this regime, but what can be concluded is that these regimes are (specifically in Turkey & Jordan) functional and sustainable, although it is questionable

⁷¹ Opportunities and Challenges in the MENA region, more on the website: <https://www.oecd.org/mena/49036903.pdf>, retrieved on the 24th of April, 2023

whether they really pose a threat to democracy. Research and case studies approved that these regimes are stagnating in democracy development which bring threats to citizen's freedoms.

Based on the government's specific mechanisms, I would rather say *decisions*, it is possible to conclude that these ways of governance representing reasons for the stagnation of democratization. Relying on facts that Turkish and Jordanian governments are directly or indirectly affecting human freedoms and on that path limiting democracy development. Levitsky and Way introduced the concept competitive authoritarianism in order to classify regimes that combine democratic features with authoritarian practices. Competitive authoritarian regime, with its unique way of functioning, is characterized by formal and democratic institutions that are broadly viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. The dominant party rulers are violating those rules, and resort to unfair means to disadvantage the opposition so often and to such an extent that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards of democracy (Levitsky and Way, 2010). That the competitive authoritarianism is not abstract, it is measured through unfair elections, violation of civil liberties and uneven playing field, each having indicators whose evidence mark a country competitive authoritarian. This research dealt with, i.e. it is more focused on human rights, unfair elections, as well as other types of smaller descriptions of events in which the path to the development of democracy is disrupted, and this initiates a return to authoritarianism. The eminent American political theorist R. Dahl introduced the term "polyarchy" in an aim to get a greater criteria of conceptual precision. Dahl pointed out six political institutions of polyarchal democracy comprise elected officials, free, fair, and frequent elections, freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, associational autonomy, and inclusive citizenship. States that are widely referred to as democracies, today, all six exist. For state, to be a democracy, means that is only possible if it possesses all of the mentioned political institutions and that they are mutually inclusive and dependent. Relying on the context of Dahl's most generally accepted procedural minimum of democracy, Turkey and Jordan cannot be classified as democracy, as examples and descriptions of their regimes showed lack of free and fair elections, which must include freedom of expression and alternative sources of information from which citizens can form opinion about candidates/political parties.

Levitsky and Way introduced elements that do not constitute democracy but a competitive authoritarian regime, which means that any of the indicators that compose competitive authoritarianism is sufficient to classify a state competitive authoritarian regime. R. T. Erdogan with its consolidation of power came in the 2017 referendum, which institutionalized Turkey's

government into a one-man system. Decision subsumes the role of the Prime Minister into that of a President, which means allowing R. T. Erdogan to monopolize executive power while also having large influences over the legislature and the judiciary. During 2016 attempted coup, Erdogan strategically used social media to appeal to the citizens and through that way Erdogan successfully manipulated the event to work in his favor to delegitimize his opposition.⁷² According to Freedom House, Turkey's freedom ratings have been declining across all boards. In 2015, Turkey received a score of 58 out of 100 (partly free). In more recent years, the score has been around 30.⁷³

Here is important to be aware that there is no single definition of democracy at large other than the rule by the people, also no consensus has been reached among empiricists on how to measure democracy or what are its measures. However, as previously mentioned, based on analysis, it is possible to make a clear distinction between regimes and their functionality. Arab Spring brought changes in regime structures, although not positively and democratically: a new failed state (Libya), civil war (Syria), unstable states (Egypt and Yemen), and hybrid regimes as well. These examples are helping us to understand that the process of democratization is not easy and requires primarily –desire, time, and flexibility. Coppedge refers to democratization as the process that includes any process contributing to a democratic process, such as becoming more democratic, or the survival or breakdown of democracy (Coppedge, 2012). While Huntington argued that democratization, as the three-serial process consists of the end of the authoritarian regime, installation, and consolidation of the democratic regime (Huntington, 1991). Using into consideration Turkey and Jordan, based on Huntigton analyses, they are still in the first phase - trying to leave authoritarianism (as well as other MENA region states). The part of the literature focuses on the separation between different phases and stages of democratization that can be categorized into three groups: democratic transition, democratic stability, and democratic quality (Munck, 2007). As there are different points of view, the findings showed the impact of different factors on transition in different regions of the world, which include: elite and mass strategies, state and prior types of government, colonial history,

⁷² Rise of Erdogan and Democratic Erosion in Turkey, more on the website: <https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/05/17/rise-of-erdogan-and-democratic-erosion-in-turkey/>, retrieved on the 30th of April, 2023

⁷³ Freedom House: Turkey, more on the website: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2021>, retrieved on the 30th of April, 2023

regional diffusion, membership of international organizations and classes (bourgeoisie, middle class, labor).⁷⁴

It suggests that the MENA region represents a specific region for analysis, although every state is unique, i.e. Turkey's membership in NATO, or its "desire" for the EU. With its complex structure, actually, the authoritarian regime, in comparison with a totalitarian one, encourages its citizens to carry on passive tactics with respect to internal policy, while the totalitarian regime calls for mobilization/citizens participation in political life. Simply, these states, hybrid regimes, representing a specific subtype of autocracy, characterized by the presence of formally democratic institutions.⁷⁵ According to some opinions, hybrid regimes are steady enough and enduring because they are profiting from the mechanism of the market, from a partially free society and these are reasons why hybrid regimes are difficult to "destroy" and transform rapidly. This brings us to the conclusion that we are awaiting the process of transformation in Turkey and Jordan, although there are several possibilities for these states: back to authoritarianism, awaiting transformation (somewhere in between – as currently), or successfully, desired become a full democracy.

There are recommendations on how to make hybrid regimes more stable and transform it to another type of a state:

1. If a state is interacting with western countries, it's more likely to become democratic
2. If it is not integrated enough in international community, there will be more possibility of the regime to implement violence, which include consolidate elites and market control
3. In states where is no internal structure, where usually elites are disunited and bad economy – depend a lot from neighbor powerful state

Accordingly, if a state is imitating democratic mechanisms in its institutes, it is more likely to become true democratic.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Different paths to democracy in the MENA region: a configurational comparative analysis, more on the website: <https://www.longdom.org/open-access/different-paths-to-democracy-in-the-mena-region-a-configurational-comparative-analysis-36502.html>, retrieved on the 30th of April, 2023

⁷⁵ Hybrid authoritarian regimes: Is it a transition to democracy?, more on the website: <https://sgpjournals.mgimo.ru/2018/2018-3/hybrid-authoritarian-regimes>, retrieved on the 30th of April, 2023

⁷⁶ *ibid.*

Being aware that the started path of Turkish desire to be a member of the EU already have had a great impact on the Turkish domestic and foreign policy, although, currently, we can only have an optimistic idea of how Turkey would function as a full member of the EU - we imagine it as a steadily democracy. Turkey, in comparison with Jordan is, geographically closer to the *democratic world* and cooperate more with democracy states. Adding to hypothesis, *the reason for the stagnation of democratization is hidden in the government's specific mechanisms* – is not the only reason, it is just representing a domestic, inner effect, while neighboring states, membership in international community and bilateral and multilateral relations representing external reasons.

9.2 Recommendations for further study

This master thesis aimed to present the importance of understanding the different type of regimes, their way of functionality, and their pros and cons. Based on the previous analyses, relying on historical facts and the literature in the field of democracy, authoritarianism, and regimes in general, I have tried to create a story about threats to human rights – primarily, through the functionality of hybrid regimes are real and present, through examples, political life in Jordan and Turkey.

As there are already different research articles and books written on this topic, there is still a great interest in this field of analysis, which means that further studies can help to develop different analyses, and different points of view and help readers, as well as other researchers to understand regimes, their way of functionality, their past and potential changes in future. An implication for further study on this topic would be to include observations and analysis during and after the transitional period, to see, if would these states be transferred into democratic regimes, would they become authoritarian states, or, in my opinion, most likely – continue as hybrid regimes, somewhere in between, functional as part democratic, part authoritarian. Recommendations can go also in the way that research in this field can be done through different analyses, not just descriptive or through case studies. Different types of analyses can help to create a clear picture of the regime and help in comparison with other states and regimes.

CHAPTER 10

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