



UNIVERSITY OF SARAJEVO
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

**THE BILATERAL RELATIONS OF ITALY AND THE
UNITED STATES DURING COLD WAR WITH A SPECIAL
FOCUS ON THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM**

– Master's thesis –

Candidate:
Karić Amina
Index number: 1169/II-PIR

Mentor
prof. dr. Mujagić Nermina

Sarajevo, November 2023

2023

Karić Amina

The Bilateral Relations of Italy and the United States During Cold War
with a Special Focus on the Italian Political System



**FAKULTET
POLITIČKIH
NAUKA**
UNIVERZITET U SARAJEVU
MCMXLIX

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

**THE BILATERAL RELATIONS OF ITALY AND THE
UNITED STATES DURING COLD WAR WITH A SPECIAL
FOCUS ON THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM**

– Master's thesis –

Candidate:

Karić Amina

Index number: 1169/II-PIR

Mentor

prof. dr. Mujagić Nermina

Sarajevo, November 2023

Contents

List of Abbreviations.....	4
Introduction.....	5
1. Theoretical-Methodological Framework of the Research	7
1.1. Research Problem and Topic	8
1.1.1. Research Problem	8
1.1.2. Research Topic	10
1.2. Research Goals	10
1.2.1. Scientific Goals	10
1.2.2. Social Goals.....	11
1.3. Research Assumptions.....	11
1.3.1. Main Hypothesis.....	11
1.3.2. Corollary Hypotheses	11
2. Development of Bilateral Relations Between the United States and Italy	12
2.1. Transformation Process from Fascism to Democracy.....	13
2.2. The Intervention of the United States on the Italian Economic Crisis	16
2.3. The Role of the United States in the Restauration of Italo-British Bilateral Relations.....	20
2.4. The Italian Marginalization in Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy	24
2.4.1. The Loss of Italian Sovereignty	25
3. Relations of the Christian Democratic Party with the United States	27
3.1. The United States, the Christian Democratic Party and the Expansion of Communism	28
3.2. Goals and Ideas of the Christian Democratic Party for Foreign Affairs	30
3.3. The Opening of the Christian Democratic Party to the Moderate Left.....	37
4. Media Awareness in the Area of Bilateral Relations Between the United States and Italy.....	42
4.1. Media Perceptions of the Establishment of Gladio	43
4.2. Media Perceptions of the Events of the “Lead Years”	49
4.3. Media Perceptions of the Kidnapping and Murder of Prime Minister Aldo Moro	52
4.4. The Relations Between Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and the P2 Masonic Lodge	56
5. The Role of Craxi and Andreotti in the Italo-American Bilateral Relations	59
5.1. Political Strategies of Bettino Craxi and Giulio Andreotti during Craxi's Government	60

5.2. The Achille Lauro Affair	66
5.2.1. The Sigonella Crisis.....	73
5.3. Political Events in Italy from the Achille Lauro Affair Until the End of the Cold War	77
Conclusion	82
Bibliography.....	88

List of Abbreviations

P2 – Propaganda Due (Masonic lodge)

SIFAR – Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate (Italian military secret services)

UNRRA – United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

US – United States

Introduction

This paper will first be based on the analysis of the theoretical-methodological framework, which will first begin with the definition and elaborated explanation of the main problem, subject, goals, most important theories, the system of hypotheses that are intended to be verified in the research, and finally the methods that will be use in research. Segments will be extracted from the main problem that will serve to better familiarize with the topic, and will help in analyzing individual questions that lead to the refutation or confirmation of the main and secondary hypothesis. All chapters in the paper will be supported by facts collected from other scientific works that are based on the study of individual segments of the topic that this paper deals with, and after the presented facts, an attempt will be made to provide a critical explanation of them in order to reach the final conclusion.

The second part of the paper "Development of bilateral relations between the United States of America and Italy" will focus on the reasons and circumstances that contributed to the establishment of this relationship. The advantages and disadvantages of the Italian political system, the political image of the parties in the Republic of Italy, and their role in directing bilateral relations will be analyzed. A special focus will be placed on how currents on the Italian political scene are divided and how they react to the stimuli caused by the Cold War. An overview of how the United States of America is experiencing changes in the Italian political scene will also be given.

The third part of the paper, entitled "Relations of the Christian Democratic Party with the United States of America", will analyze the common goals that unite the Christian Democratic Party and the United States of America. The interests of the United States of America in the events on the Italian political scene will be considered and analyzed in detail, and an attempt will be made to understand why the United States of America was afraid of the influence of communist currents in the territory of the Republic of Italy, such as the Red Brigades. On the other hand, the state and positions of the Democratic Christian Party will be analyzed. The nature of the interests represented by this party in bilateral relations between the United States of America and the Republic of Italy will be analyzed. The focus will also be on the instruments used to reduce the danger of communist influence in the Republic of Italy.

In the fourth part of the paper, "Availability of information to the media in the field of bilateral relations between the United States of America and the Republic of Italy", it will be reviewed how much the media was actually aware of the events during the Lead Years, and what

motivated the communist factions to radical behavior. First of all, it will be discussed in more detail about the media perception of Operation Gladio, and about the action of the United States of America through the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. How much the media was aware of the relationship between the secret service, the Christian Democratic Party and the leaders of the United States of America will be analyzed in more detail. In this context, the statements of Giulio Andreotti will be analyzed regarding the secret organizations and networks of his associates, the most famous of whom is Licio Gelli, who was one of the main figures of the Masonic lodge, which the Prime Minister Andreotti used in moments of crisis.

In the next chapter, "The role of Bettino Craxi and Giulio Andreotti in the bilateral relations between the Republic of Italy and the United States of America", the political activities of Giulio Andreotti and Bettino Craxi as prime ministers will be compared, and how they perceived the role of the United States of America. In particular, it will be analyzed how Craxi's view of this bilateral relationship changed from the period when Craxi was the secretary of the Socialist Party to his appointment as prime minister. In this context, the focus will be on his ideas related to the positioning of the American Pershing II missile. A comparison of the political actions and decisions of Bettino Craxi and Giulio Andreotti during the Sigonella crisis, in the context of bilateral and diplomatic relations between the United States of America and the Republic of Italy, will be of crucial importance.

The last part of the paper, "Concluding considerations and recommendations", indicates the final results of the research. In the concluding part, arguments will be presented that will prove or disprove the set hypotheses, as well as recommendations. At the end of the paper, a list of used literature, a list of illustrations and data related to this research will be given.

1. Theoretical-Methodological Framework of the Research

Given that the topic of this research is really broad and comprehensive, the goal of the first chapter is to narrow down and specify the topic of study of this work, and therefore this chapter, focused on the theoretical and methodological part, will focus on providing a detailed description regarding the research topic, the research problem, and determining research goals. A concrete definition of the main research problem and research topic will help to build and clarify the main and auxiliary hypothesis.

In the second chapter, an attempt will be made to clarify the situations and events that contributed to the creation of the subjects and research problems of this paper. In order to better understand the situation under which a certain problem arose, it is necessary to clarify it and support it with argued facts from other works on a similar topic of study.

In the third chapter, we will go deeper into the nature of the relationship between the main actors of this subject and the research problem, we will holistically look at their relationship from the initial phase to its climax, which will critically examine and argue their common points, as well as the positions in which diverge, in order to more clearly establish the very nature of their mutual relationship.

The fourth chapter will analyze the public image and opinion about the research subject, in order to create a complete picture regarding the events that shaped the period of the research subject, which will create a clearer and more objective opinion about the research subject and problem.

The fifth chapter will focus on the analysis of the role of individual actors, their mutual relationship, and the analysis of their actions and relationships will be correlated with the events related to the subject and problem of the research.

The sixth, last chapter will look at the final conclusions and correlate them with the main hypothesis, in order to confirm or refute it.

1.1. Research Problem and Topic

In the subject and problem of the research, an effort will be made to narrow down the entire topic in terms of scope. The research topic represents a focus on a certain period that will be covered in this work, and the segment that will be elaborated in the work will be emphasized, in this case it is the development of bilateral relations between the United States of America and Italy during the Cold War.

In the research problem, it will be stated why the relationship between the United States of America and Italy during the Cold War is an important problem for research, and the significance of this problem will be presented and explained in one paragraph through the key events that influenced and directed in which direction these relationships to form.

1.1.1. Research Problem

The development of bilateral relations between the United States of America and the Republic of Italy reached its peak during the period of the Cold War and the First Republic. In this period, cooperation between the Italian party actors and the United States of America is crucial. The Christian Democratic Party shared extremely similar views with the United States of America, in the sense that they saw the Communist Party as a serious threat regarding the spread of communism in the West. The closeness of the Christian Democratic Party and the United States of America was not only based on politics, however: the first one also planned to receive subsidies from the United States of America in order to avoid the consequences of the Cold War, and this motive was all the more reason to support the United States of America in terms of anti-communist policy. The United States of America believed that the communist currents were the most dominant in Italy, and that the right-wing Christian Democratic Party had the power to suppress them, due to its extremely high position on the Italian political scene, and good coordination with key Italian institutions and the secret service. Special credit for strengthening bilateral relations between these two countries goes to the then leader of the Christian Democratic Party, Alcide de Gasperi, who in 1947 traveled on an official visit to the United States of America with the aim of securing economic aid to Italy. The period of the Lead Years, which began in the 70s of the last Century, represented a point of contention between the Communist Party and the Christian Democratic Party, and this period can be said to represent the peak of radical communist politics and the activities of communist factions such as the Red

Brigades. It can be said that the Lead Years were an equally great period of risk both for the United States of America and for the Christian Democratic Party. One of the turning points of this period was the assassination of the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, Aldo Moro. This key moment unites the Christian Democratic current and the United States of America to act unitedly against the radical communist policy, using international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which the American pro-Western view dominated. One of the most famous instruments used in the fight against communist currents is Operation Gladio, which operated under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Controversies about this organization became public thanks to the then Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, who represented the interests of the Christian Democratic Party. Andreotti used various instruments to minimize communist influence, one of the most famous being the Masonic lodge. At the end of the Lead Years, the focus and orientation of the Socialist and Communist Party of Italy changes, and they try to distance themselves from the communist factions and Soviet influence, thus getting closer to the American influence. For this period of the party's activity, it is extremely important to analyze the political decisions of Bettino Craxi, which were increasingly in the hands of the United States of America, and the best example of this was his initiative to position the Pershing II missile in the Republic of Italy. But Craxi's political decisions were not always in favor of the United States of America, and one of the best examples is the Crisis in Sigonella, which represents the highest point in the tightening of Italian-American diplomatic relations. It can be said that the Crisis in Sigonella represented an event of international proportions, which is supported by the fact that the Italian cruiser Achille Lauro was captured and attacked by Palestinian terrorists. In order for the cruiser not to be destroyed, the terrorists demanded that the Palestinian terrorists captured in the Israeli camp be freed in return. Craxi advocated the idea that terrorists should be tried by the Italian judiciary. The turning point that intensified the tensions and disagreements between Reagan and Craxi was the decision to release the leader of the Palestine Liberation Front. This case represents a backbone in the field of bilateral and diplomatic relations between the Republic of Italy and the United States of America, which supported the Republic of Italy in overcoming the challenges brought about by the Cold War.

1.1.2. Research Topic

In the master's thesis entitled "The Bilateral Relations of Italy and the United States During Cold War with a Special Focus on the Italian Political System", the development of bilateral relations between the United States of America and the Republic of Italy during the Cold War was considered and the First Republic will be explored, especially in depth to investigate what is the basis of the cohesion of the interests of the United States of America and the Christian Democratic Party.

After that, the public's opinion about the events and the existence of secret organizations will be reviewed, in order to analyze another dimension, and form a judgment about why certain events happened, and who was ultimately responsible for them.

1.2. Research Goals

The goals of the research will try to define how this research can contribute to scientific progress and development, and it will be explained how this work will contribute to the social good.

1.2.1. Scientific Goals

1. To identify and analyze the key forms of political relations between the Republic of Italy and the United States of America during the period of the Cold War and the First Republic.
2. To identify and analyze the key political actors of the Republic of Italy in relation to the United States of America during the selected time period.
3. To identify and analyze how the political focus of the two most dominant parties of the Republic of Italy changed in terms of bilateral relations with the United States of America from the beginning to the end of the First Republic.
4. To analyze the views of Giulio Andreotti and Bettino Craxi on the importance of more intensive bilateral relations with the United States of America.

1.2.2. Social Goals

1. To provide more complete examples of historical interactions between Italy and the United States of America to Italian decision makers.

1.3. Research Assumptions

The main hypothesis and the collateral hypothesis have the task of questioning the topic and problem of the research, thereby directing the direction in which the focus of the work will be, and in the conclusion, efforts will be made to confirm or refute these assumptions.

1.3.1. Main Hypothesis

The United States played an active role in shaping Italian politics, both domestically and internationally, even throughout covert methods of influence.

1.3.2. Corollary Hypotheses

1. The Communist Party of the Republic of Italy slowed down the relationship with the United States of America, while the Italian Christian Democratic Party participated in strengthening the same relationship.
2. The attempt to obtain subsidies was the main reason for the search for American influence at the political level.
3. The media were excluded from the events and interaction of political actors in the field of bilateral relations between the Republic of Italy and the United States of America.

2. Development of Bilateral Relations Between the United States and Italy

This chapter will review the circumstances that led to the interaction and relationship between the United States of America and Italy, especially in the context of the Second World War, at the beginning of which Italy was on the side of the Axis Powers, while in the final years of the war it transitioned to the side of the Allies. Under these circumstances, the reasons that led to the Italian capitulation in 1943 will be looked at more generally, and how and with what level of trust the United States of America viewed Italy after its exit from the Axis Powers.

After the period of capitulation, the Italian leaders remained unprotected, and it was necessary to get out of this situation with as little damage as possible, but this was not an easy task, because Italy remained the aggressor in the eyes of the Western countries, and the country that provided open support the Nazi regime. In order to turn the situation to their advantage, this period will require a series of performances and transformations on the part of the Italian leaders, in order to ensure a safer future for the country and a significantly better position in the field of foreign policy and international relations. The solution to the economic problems and the compromising situation caused by its actions in the Second World War is visible in the form of more intensive cooperation with the United States of America, but the intensity of these relations will initially be much lower due to the different priorities of the United States of America in terms of foreign political relations.

The last years of the Second World War will be marked by the role of the United States of America as a power responsible for preserving order and stability of relations between the allied countries, while the first years after the war will significantly affect the overlap of interests between the United States of America and Italy, due to the change in the foreign political scene caused by the Cold War.

This chapter will primarily be based on the positive effects of these relations, which begin with American support regarding the transformation of the Italian political system after the capitulation, and the role of the United States of America in building communication and trust between Italy and other federal countries, and the economic empowerment of Italy after the economic weakening caused by wartime circumstances. However, it is also necessary to look at the negative side and possible shortcomings that this relationship brings to Italian foreign and domestic policy, and what was the reaction and position of the Italian leaders regarding these shortcomings.

The focus of this chapter will refer exclusively to the period after the capitulation and the Italian transition, as a starting point for the establishment of relations between the United States of America and Italy, and its economic empowerment under the auspices of the United States of America, while the relations between these two countries in the context of the Cold War will be more detailed analyzed in the following chapters.

2.1. Transformation Process from Fascism to Democracy

The period after the capitulation represents the starting point of the transformation of the Italian political regime, which was caused by a sudden change of ideologies. The Italian leaders who were used to the fascist style of conducting politics, in this period had a very confused view in terms of the application of new patterns both in the field of foreign and domestic policy. This period of armistice is extremely turbulent, and it is permeated by increasingly frequent unrest within the Italian political system, revolutionary charges, and the desire to transition from the old system to the new political system (Nuti, L. 2022). After the Italian capitulation in 1943, the situation in the country became more and more unstable, which is mostly reflected in extremely poor economic development and general poverty, which forced the country to seek help from larger powers, but the main prerequisite was based on the break of continuity with the old political system and ideology, which would prove that the country stands for new values and that it is ready to cooperate with former opponents. Namely, it is noticeable that Italian problems in the field of foreign and domestic policy are linked, have common roots that are reflected in the financial consequences caused by the war, and the main task in the field of domestic policy is to strengthen the Italian economy, but this strengthening is impossible without the help of a strong foreign policy partner. Therefore, it was first necessary to look at the entire situation in which the country found itself, and to analyze in detail its relations with European states, looking back at their positions and viewpoints during the Second World War. Italy held a middle position in international relations with the allied countries, meaning that it was seen as a defeated country, but it still enjoyed the benefits of privileged relations with the victorious countries, which saw it as a country in need of help and protection in the case of extreme economic instability and crisis (Sotiropoulos, D. A. 2014). Italy, thanks to the move to change its role in the war, which in a certain respect was forced, preserved partially stable relations with the allies, but the question arises as to how firm the other allies were regarding

the Italian issue, and whether and in what way some dominant powers like Great Britain influenced their perception of Italy within international relations.

Italian leaders were aware that they would not be able to find a common language with Great Britain, which was considered one of the most powerful and dominant European countries, and they saw salvation in strengthening relations with the United States of America, which after the end of the war gained a stronger voice in the matter activities in the field of international relations. In a way, the United States of America can be identified with the role of arbitrator or judge in international disputes, both because of its financial power and because of the values on which it is based, and it represented a model for European countries, and if initially its purpose and way of leadership saw politics in a very different way. It should be noted that the events of that time on the international scene equally shaped the interests and behavior of both the United States of America and Italy itself.

After the fall of the Italian fascist regime, the new state leaders tried to join the advancing American hegemony, whose strength they strongly identified with the strength of the Italian hegemony, which was reflected in practical action in the closeness of General Marshal Pietro Badoglio to the United States of America, and in the efforts of the provisional government to South to improve its status, becoming equal in terms of relations with other Western democracies, eventually gaining the status of a full ally (Brogi, A. 2002). Italy tried to find the most effective solution for its survival, and this was reflected in imitating the moves of other Western countries and adopting American values. It can be noted that, in basic terms, the Italian problem did not significantly differ from the problems of other European countries, regardless of their roles during the war. And the allies also tried to recover economically, and they saw their solid background in strong and intense relations with the United States of America. But there were many limitations to the solution of the Italian problem, it can be said that the economic weakness perceived Italy as a weak country that could not make significant decisions in the field of foreign policy and international relations, but at the same time its war past made dialogue with European countries more and more difficult, which was largely reflected in the state of internal politics.

One of the reasons for the much more direct and intense connection between the United States of America and Italy is the ethnic factor, which was reflected in the connection of the Italians who migrated to the United States of America with the position and situation in which their native country was located, and after the transfer of Italy to the allied foreign and Italian declarations of war on Germany, could act more freely in terms of lobbying and conducting campaigns, which would result in a more active role of the United States of America in terms

of more intensive relations with Italy, and support for the Italian request to acquire a full ally (Luconi, S. 2012). It can be said that the numerous Italian communities in the United States of America represented a significant part of the American voting population, whose demands had to be met in order for the current government and top American leaders to continue to have the support of the citizens and remain in power. This factor is one of the reasons that prevailed in terms of the absence of future conflicts, and the strong relationship between the United States of America, however far American interests were initially from Italian ones. The reasons for the Italian interest in changing the status lay in the strengthening of state legitimacy, which is particularly visible in the agendas and programs of the Italian parties that regained dominance after the capitulation period (Brogi, A. 2002). It can be said that the Italian transition process progressed successfully, which is especially visible in the course of the then current Italian parties, which were moving away from the infamous fascist past every day, and tried to appropriate new values and present them to citizens as the only and true values, which they should adhere to if they want to contribute to prosperity and a more stable internal and external policy of the country. The turning point of the intensification of Italian-American relations can be placed in the period of the last years of the war, when there was a certain high risk of the coming revolution, and in the post-war period, the backbone of which was the transition from the monarchical to the republican regime, and the elections of 1948 (Nutti, L. 2022). The United States of America represented a mentor in the implementation of the democratization of Italy, whereby the United States of America tried through various mechanisms to prepare the foundations for the construction of new democratic institutions, and together with Italian leaders and parties to work on educating the population about the advantages of the democratic system, so that the initial protests had a minimum effect on the stability of the new regime. The common interests of these two countries overlapped in the area of occupation policy, as well as in the direction of post-war policy, but the further strength of the intensity of these relations will not only depend on the spectrum of interests of the United States of America, but also on the global foreign policy order (Nutti, L. 2002a). In this period, there are still no clear indications of the Cold War, and the United States of America, even if it was the dominant power, could not completely independently decide in which direction foreign policy issues should be resolved without consulting with the dominant Western allies.

2.2. The Intervention of the United States on the Italian Economic Crisis

In the context of Italy's intermediate position within international relations with the allied countries, it was emphasized that despite the benefits in terms of relations with the allied countries, Italy in the post-war period did not receive any form of financial support from those countries, even if they viewed it as a country that needed financial support help (Sotiropoulos, D. A. 2014). The post-war period represents the recovery phase of countries and their economies exhausted by war events, and it can be said that most of the Allies were focused on strengthening their own economic image and rebuilding the state and its institutions, so that the Italian economic issue fell into a completely secondary plan.

During the last period of the Second World War, the competence of the Allied military government did not refer to economic reforms, but was mainly based on the focus of local administration, and the return of its control to the hands of the Italian political elite, which were under intensive supervision by the Allied Control Commission, and the main cause of inflation during the last years of the war lay in the ineffective financing of the occupied territories (Raftopoulos, R. 2009). The allied military government was focused on the establishment of a stable state order at all levels of government, which would be stable and maintained even after the war period, but the further course of events showed that the establishment of a stable order was determined by a strong economic picture of the country and a more elaborate financial plan country.

The period of the first indications of intervention by the United States of America in the issue of renewed Italian economic construction was extremely visible in the summer of 1944, but the United States of America was mainly based on general proposals related to policies that would increase the level of well-being, and thus create a favorable climate for building a solid democratic system (Raftopoulos, R. 2009). During the last years of the war period, the United States of America had a superficial understanding of the Italian situation, it can even be said that they had no interest in meddling deeper in European issues, but this lack of interest was also the result of deeper foreign political circumstances. Their primary goal was to find the most effective way to stop the war as efficiently and quickly as possible.

After the process of capitulation of the countries that belonged to the Axis Powers, and the final stop of the war, the culprits were sanctioned and defeated, and the United States of America considered the best solution to follow the development of future events from a distance, and to get involved only if the culprit does not respect the peace terms, and does not behave in

accordance with the given sanctions. Germany, which was the main initiator and culprit of the Second World War, was placed under American and Soviet supervision, while the United States of America saw in Italy a penitent with extremely high potential, and tried to express its commitment in terms of general recommendations for the welfare of the country. But the American recommendations could not have any far-reaching results because Italy's fate also depends on European countries, and therefore the Italian government expected more direct help from the United States of America in terms of work to establish a dialogue with European countries. The Italian leaders made all their efforts so that the country would go through the transformation process as painlessly as possible, and they tried to put a lot of effort into changing the image of the country, but there was still no closer cooperation and dialogue between European countries, and Italian involvement in the problems of international importance is still reduced to a minimum. The beginning of a stronger and more intensive relationship with the United States of America, which was not based only on mere recommendations, was focused on finding the most effective possible solution to the problem of the economic crisis that followed the last years of the war, which seriously threatened the security aspect of the country, and was also the cause and problems in the field of foreign and domestic policy. At the beginning, the United States of America took a superficial view of the Italian issue, they were not aware of how deep and extensive the Italian problem actually is, how much this issue affects the country on many levels, and how much it could affect the ambitions of the United States of America in Europe. It can be noted that the United States of America simply enjoyed the state of Italian inferiority, while the plan for its recovery was placed on the sidelines, while the issues of Great Britain and Germany were placed in the main context (Brogi, A. 2002). The Italian inferior attitude at the time, which did not question American hegemonic power, suited the United States of America. Aware of Italy's position, American leaders saw Italy as a pawn suitable for pursuing their own interests in Europe. The more the Italian government showed how necessary it is for American help in solving the most important national issues, the more the United States of America distanced itself from the Italian problem, and focused its attention on solving the problems between Great Britain and Germany, and on maintaining a favorable climate for the post-war order. It is noticeable that American interests in the Italian question have changed from year to year, and it can be correlated with international events of exceptional importance for American interests.

The United States viewed Italy as an important actor in promoting Western values, and it was not in their interest to risk the country falling under hostile Soviet influence. As international events followed, American goals changed, and American foreign policy shaped by isolationism

became more and more open. The year 1945 was marked by American guidelines that related to Italy's opening to the global economy, but the biggest problem in carrying out these guidelines was related to the reluctance and delay of the United States of America to send aid to Italy in the form of basic means of living, and to find a strong and a stable partner with whom one could discuss economic renewal (Raftopoulos, R. 2009). The United States of America still did not have a clearly defined policy regarding Europe, and especially Italy, and in accordance with the policy of isolationism, they believed that the problem would resolve itself. Even if the American intervention was more powerful than mere recommendations, American officials procrastinated on dealing with the central financial issue and establishing a dialogue with European countries.

The main reason for the delay and the lack of American interests in providing economic and social assistance is evident in the lack of a reliable interlocutor and a stable central political figure who could lead a concrete dialogue with the United States of America on economic issues (Sotiropoulos, D. A. 2014). The United States of America needed an objective and impartial view of the Italian economic situation and its cause in a strong central political figure, whose interests in foreign policy issues and international relations would overlap with the interests of the United States of America, and who would be in charge of implementing American visions in the field of internal Italian politics.

At the end of 1946, the interest of the United States of America in the issue of the Italian economic crisis remains as low, but a glimmer of hope for a change in the outcome comes with the establishment of the first De Gasperi government at the end of 1945, which is much more persistent in demanding aid from the United States of America, which ultimately point results in the UNRRA aid program led by American leaders who supported the principles of Keynesianism (Raftopoulos, R. 2009). With this act, an attempt was made to recover the weak Italian economy destroyed during the war, and to try to open the Italian economy more and more to the global financial market, which actually fell under the basic guidelines that the United States of America imposed on Italian political leaders who advocated American financial intervention. However, an important emphasis is placed on the financial empowerment of the financial sector, but on the condition that the government has an important role and center of gravity in the public and financial aspects of the country, which actually represents the basis of the Keynesian current that guided American officials.

In the first phase, UNRRA aid was allocated to Italian state agencies, and in the second phase, the distribution of aid to the population and businesses would follow, which would ultimately result in the launch of a lira fund that would draw finance for reconstruction projects

(Sotiropoulos, D. A. 2014). The UNRRA aid had multiple goals, which included strengthening the entire Italian market, and providing assistance to the most vulnerable sections of the population, in order to ultimately lead to the final economic empowerment of the country and the stabilization of the Italian currency on the market. But the main obstacle appeared in the form of the Italian political leadership, which was exclusively oriented to the private aspect and self-interest, and their principles significantly conflicted with the principles of the Keynesian leaders (Raftopoulos, R. 2009). Italian leaders were guided by double values, asking for help from the United States of America and international organizations in which they are the most dominant, in order to strengthen the economy and ensure the basic needs of the population, but the goal was to redirect subsidies to empower the private sector and influential capitalists, which would to the rift between the public and private sectors. The connection between internal and external political and economic political action is striking, best reflected in the example of intensified international economic intervention after the electoral defeat of the communists in 1948 (Raftopoulos, R. 2009). This example shows how useful economic instruments are when a great power wants to achieve its aspirations and goals, and they are often used in the black and white strategy, in order to force a certain country to take actions that may not be in the interest of its focus. The reason for the American intervention regarding the financial empowerment of Italy was based on the fact that the United States of America decided to intervene due to the awareness of the risks that the coming Cold War brings with it, and that it was necessary to keep Italy under control so that a communist government would not be formed in the country (Sotiropoulos, D.A. 2014). From this it can be seen that the United States used a combination of hard and soft power to cut off any emerging communication between the Soviet Union and Italy. By comparing the Italian GDP at the very end of the war in 1945, and in 1938, the year before the start of the Second World War, it can be concluded that the GDP was 38% lower, and a significantly low rate of industrial production was also noticeable, which is a significant obstacle for economic and industrial development represented extremely destroyed and damaged public infrastructure (Bianchi, N., & Giorcelli, M. 2021). Damaged public infrastructure hindered the connection and opening of the Italian economy to the global world economy.

Reason for optimism regarding the acquisition of funds for the reconstruction of public infrastructure appeared in 1947, when the Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in his speech held at Harvard on June 5, 1947, guaranteed an aid program aimed at restoring and increasing the economic development of Europe, and in accordance with the circumstances this program approved by the Congress of the United States of America in March 1948 (Bianchi, N., &

Giorcelli, M. 2021). Marshall's guarantee meant a lot for the recovery of the Italian economy, which would also solve problems that were closely related to economic issues, such as unemployment problems and the danger of a high poverty rate. Italy was supported with three categories of aid: financial support, subsidies in kind and loans, but above all the United States of America had to do a detailed analysis of the Italian economy and the war consequences that left traces on it, and after that the American Economic Cooperation Administration and the Italian government jointly worked out an annual program, which represented a template for disbursing the funds guaranteed in the Marshall Plan (Bianchi, N., & Giorcelli, M. 2021). A detailed analysis of the Italian economic picture was necessary in order to prove that Italy belongs to the group of countries for which the aid is intended, and the economic shortcomings were elaborated in more detail, in order to make and elaborate a plan for their recovery, but the current question about the interests of the United States of America still remains countries that they wanted to achieve through the Marshall Plan.

2.3. The Role of the United States in the Restauration of Italo-British Bilateral Relations

The period of the last years of the Second World War was marked by the plans of Soviet diplomats on the distribution of jurisdiction over European countries, of which the most intense degree of Soviet influence would be present in the area of Eastern Europe, with the intention of future expansion to the rest of Europe, while Italy would fall under the jurisdiction of the Western Allies, but The United States of America was preparing for a gradual withdrawal from Europe, with the exception of Germany, which would mean that Italy would remain under British jurisdiction (Aga-Rossi, E. 2007). It is noticeable that this Soviet plan slightly supervised the contours of the future Cold War, but the United States of America did not take Soviet aspirations seriously in this period, and intended to withdraw after the established peace in order to leave European countries to gradually develop independently, understanding that the focus interest is not in the territory of Europe, but that it is necessary to deal with its internal problems.

President Roosevelt's foreign policy beliefs were based on the fact that in the future the world will be organized on the basis of free enterprise and an open market, and the Soviet Union will be forced to deviate from its ideas, and he believed that Eastern Europe was also strong enough to fight for these questions (Aga-Rossi, E. 2007). This reasoning of the United States of America

about the intensity of intervention in the territory of Europe was disastrous for Italy, especially since Italy has not yet established stable relations with the other allied countries, of which the relationship with Britain was the most sensitive, due to the fact that Britain still sees Italy as fascist inferior country. Badoglio was one of the first Italian leaders to publicly demand the tutelage of the United States of America, citing the arguments that Italy was a pawn of German policy during the war, and at all costs he tries to avoid the scenario of American isolationism and British domination over the fate of Italy (Brogi, A. 2002). Badoglio was aware of the current situation in the field of foreign policy relations between the other allied countries and Italy, focusing mostly on the Italian-British relationship, and the consequences that British conduct of foreign policy could have on the development of the country's domestic and foreign policy, which would be the best mirrors in slowing down more significant changes in the field of foreign policy that would be beneficial for the country, and his main mission was to respond to the United States of America from the policy of isolationism, and to motivate them to more intensive and serious cooperation, with which Italy will regain its credibility, and maximally reduce all restrictions on acting in the international sphere.

Great Britain had a hardline attitude towards relations with Italy, and skillfully tried to maintain Italy's marginal position. In the period between 1942 and 1943, the main creators of the post-war solution for Italy were Antony Eden at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was reflected in the criminal policy, by reducing Italy to the level of a minor nation, and Britain should exhaust all strategic, political and territorial benefits from relations with Italy, which was best reflected in the imposition of a peace agreement in which a provision on the demilitarization of Italy would be incorporated, and the redistribution of its territory in favor of British pretensions, but all of this was partially invested after the capitulation (Varsori, A. 2004). After the capitulation, Great Britain partially softened its expansionist policy towards Italy, but it still remained the view of Italy as a subordinate country obliged to submit to British hegemonic interests. Badoglio's government seemed extremely inefficient in terms of carrying out the allied military efforts, and therefore they returned to punitive policies (Varsori, A. 2004). It can be said that the intensity of the Italian-British relationship varied over the years, which largely depended on the lukewarm approach of the monarchy and Badoglio's government, which further enraged the hegemonic-minded British political elite. One of the more important reasons why the Italian-British dialogue did not move from the deadlock lies not only in the uninterested and lukewarm engagement of the United States of America, but also in the Badoglio government's poor approach to foreign policy allied issues.

It was not the goal of the United States of America to leave Italy's destiny to Great Britain, which it would treat as a hegemonic power, trying to preserve the Italian monarchy (Brogi, A. 2002). The United States of America had a really complex task of harmonizing British wishes with Italian needs, and communication with Great Britain regarding the Italian problem proceeded very cautiously, but there was no compromise in sight, and there was a fear that communication with Great Britain was going into a vicious circle. Washington tried extremely hard to achieve a different relationship between Great Britain and Italy, which would be based on partnership, cooperation and a certain form of 'mentorship' by Great Britain, which would thus take on the task of educating Italy about Western democratic values. But the British intention was to maintain the Italian monarchy, which would actually become one of the main obstacles in Italy's opening to the west, which would basically be contradictory to American interests.

The United States of America openly opposed the British plans because they were opponents of the hegemonic British policy, which they perceived as some kind of threat to their involvement in Europe. Therefore, the United States of America tried to present to Great Britain the Italian progress, but also the problems that the country is currently facing, in order to make a rational decision regarding the Italian problem. This American positive attitude can best be read in the form of the engagement of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations towards the country, which was based on President Roosevelt's attempt to convince Prime Minister Churchill to change Italian ideological values, so that the end result would be a more conciliatory allied policy towards the Republic of Italy can be seen as the beginning more intense relations and more serious policy of the United States of America towards Italy (Nuti, L. 2022). Washington, after delaying engagement in dialogue with Great Britain for a long time, is trying to provide Prime Minister Churchill with a series of well-founded arguments for the intensification of Italian-British relations, trusting in his objectivity in the field of foreign policy. President Roosevelt was aware of the imminent withdrawal of the United States of America from the area of Europe, and for that reason he tried to resolve the Italian issue as efficiently as possible, which would be left to the jurisdiction of Great Britain (Aga-Rossi, E. 2007). And if the United States of America tried until the last moment to postpone the resolution of the Italian problem and the dialogue between European countries, they are finally tackling the problem, but the question arises whether it is too late to start a concrete dialogue with Great Britain. The United States of America, aware of its departure, tries to face the problem at the last moment, which aims to present the United States of America as a savior, and a country that managed to solve post-war conflict issues on the soil of Europe.

With this move, one can gain an insight that Washington is trying to solve the Italian question only superficially. But the question arises, if and when stronger and more intense Italian-British relations were to be established, whether they would continue to function after the departure of the United States of America from the European foreign policy scene, and whether Britain would completely give up its hegemonic pretensions in regarding the Italian question. The United States of America tried to advocate for the minimization of the consequences of the Second World War, which were best depicted in terms of the relationship between the winning and losing European countries, but the intensity of this commitment determined the direction in which American interests flow, and it can be said that they were very changeable character.

The best example of American commitment can be seen in the efforts of American Admiral Stone, who was the head of the Allied Control Commission, to give Italy a new chance, so that Italy would not feel the punitive consequences, but British General Harold Alexander was aware that the British government was comfortable with a subordinate Italian role, which was best seen in the decision to revise the peace conditions for the country after five years, which would leave Italy in constant uncertainty regarding its wartime past, but he knew that it was a very ineffective instrument that could not keep the Italian question out of the game forever (Brogi, A. 2002). The views of British General Alexander in correspondence with Admiral Stone best illustrate how Britain perceives Italy, and therefore symbolize the ineffective communication between Washington and Great Britain about the Italian problem.

Uncertainty was Britain's best weapon in this matter, but not the most effective because it was necessary to revise the peace terms. With this move, Britain was delaying the confrontation with the Italian issue, but it was a matter of time how long it would be able to continue to do so in view of the strengthening of Italian-American relations, and the insistence of the United States of America on a concrete move regarding the final reconciliation in the field of the peace process. The basic prerequisite for strengthening and promoting post-war politics and Western values was a solid relationship between European countries, and erasing the differences between the winning and losing sides, which was an extremely complex process, especially due to the fact that the withdrawal of the United States of America from European soil is happening every day, was getting closer, and a stable relationship between European countries was of key importance in order to control the situation more efficiently, and thereby avoid a new potential threat. In order to prove its loyalty to the United States of America, Italy committed itself to the daily application of the Atlantic Charter, on the construction of which the entire Italian policy would be based, and accordingly it was ordered to terminate all the contracts that the fascist government had signed with Eastern European governments (Brogi, A. 2002) The last years of

the war and the post-war period were marked by constant Italian moral proof, work on strengthening relations with the United States of America. The United States of America saw extremely great potential in the Republic of Italy, and was guided by the fact that it is possible to make a new ally out of a strong opponent, by giving it support and providing a dose of credibility in rebuilding its identity.

2.4. The Italian Marginalization in Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy

Regarding the analysis of Italy's foreign policy, he explains that there were different theories as to why Italy has an insufficiently efficient and developed foreign policy, the most well-founded of which was that the United States of America is trying to bring under its control and reshape Italian foreign policy, to which the Italian political elite agrees without argument, and he also looks back on the fact that the period of the early post-war years was the right moment when Italian political leaders could do something about greater autonomy and sovereignty in making foreign policy decisions (Nuti, L. 2011). Italian leaders possessed minimal readiness to create the country's foreign policy, it is possible to come to the conclusion that fear governed the elites who were in charge of foreign policy and international relations, and it can be said that the punitive foreign policy towards Italy truly bore fruit, because of this that the country and its leaders were convinced of the country's minor status, which resulted in unquestioning acceptance of the conditions and rules created by major Western powers such as the United States of America and Britain.

In the period of the first post-war years, the country was extremely focused on economic issues, thus putting foreign policy issues in the background, which the United States of America used to play the carrot and stick game with the help of the economy and intervention. The style of foreign policy that Italy most often used was the use of passive diplomacy, thus taking the steps that small countries usually take, but in addition it strongly advocated a policy of presence, which meant that it demanded to be formally seen as a large European power, and to be present at current international meetings (Brogi, A. 2002). As much as Italy had limited powers on the international scene, it strove to realize the greatest possible interests in terms of foreign policy and bilateral relations with other Western countries that declared themselves allies during the Second World War. And if she was often brought before a *fait accompli* in which she was forced to use passive diplomacy, she was also aware that the field of foreign policy and diplomacy is based on formality, which means that a high-quality and thorough presentation was needed,

with which she would showed itself to be more successful and stable than its current situation through the skillful use of the presence policy, which would not be classified in the same group with subordinate countries, which would make the efforts of Western countries in portraying Italy as a minor country unsuccessful.

Italian diplomacy is based on four variables: subordination, interdependence, integration and autonomy, and its flow was mainly between subordination to a hegemonic power and a weak attempt at autonomy (Nuti, L. 2002a). The Italian political elite was extremely confused when forming its own foreign policy position, schizophrenically striving for free action in the field of foreign political relations, while at the same time being guided by the drive for survival, thus accepting a negative consequence in terms of foreign political relations with the United States of America, which was reflected in the fact that Italy did not have the capacity to balance foreign policy, which was best observed in an extremely obedient style of conducting foreign policy or in an extremely freer style of foreign policy, which was under the strict supervision of the United States of America, and constant pressure and threats to the extent that the way of conducting foreign policy was to the detriment of the United States of America.

The foreign policy situation with regard to the Italian question changed abruptly from the middle of 1946, when a sudden pessimism prevailed regarding the outcome of the mild consequences of the peace agreement for Italy, and the Paris Peace Treaty produced an even deeper and stronger marginalization of Italy in the field of international relations, which was best reflected in regarding territorial issues, where pre-fascist colonies were taken from Italy, and it was prevented by the loss of Trieste, which indicates that the influence of the United States of America in terms of formulating peace provisions for Italy was extremely limited (Nuti, L. 2011). The Paris Peace Treaty is a product of the punitive policy and aspirations that Britain cultivated during the Second World War, and it is noticeable that the British view on the Italian issue largely shaped and unified the view of the other allied countries, which left the United States of America with its hands tied on the issue what kind of interventions regarding the rewriting of the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty.

2.4.1. The Loss of Italian Sovereignty

Economic intervention by the United States of America has its positive and negative sides, which are most often reflected in the level of the country's sovereignty, but opinions on the

issue of the country's sovereignty are divided. A large group of Italian scientists believe that in the process of state reconstruction, Italian leaders had an extremely high degree of autonomy and independence from international pressures, especially from the United States of America, and that the development process was actually based on a compromise of harmonized ideas and the rejection of contradictory items (Raftopoulos, R. 2009). But looking at these claims, the question arises according to which criteria and standards acceptable ideas are formed and those that do not fit into the ideal scenario are rejected. It is also necessary to define to what extent the Italian leaders actually identified with the fundamental principles of compromise, and it is also important to take into account the circumstances under which they accepted certain ideas.

It can be seen that the American government overestimated the necessity of its influence on Italian politics, from which it follows that the American focus was exclusively based on the implementation of the Marshall Plan, which leads to the unwanted effect of dependence on the economic aid of the United States of America, which ultimately resulted in the reduction of sovereignty countries (Aga-Rossi, E. 2007). The United States of America was well aware of the post-war situation in European countries, especially the decline of the Italian economy, and it can be said that they tried to play a double game in which they would fight for the Italian question by offering various concessions to European countries, while they expected the Italian leaders to after discussion, they accept ideas that would exclusively benefit United America. Italian leaders always imagined alternative outcomes when analyzing bilateral relations with the United States of America, there was a fear of increasing dependence on the United States of America, while on the other hand their financial subsidies were more than necessary (Brogi, A. 2002).

The transformation of the American approach to foreign policy from isolationism to full inclusion can be seen as well-thought-out moves whose main purpose is to create the dependence and necessity of European countries on the United States of America. The more disinterested and slow the United States showed in solving the Italian problem, the more implacable and aggressive the Italian leaders became in seeking American help. Italy's economic growth led to the country's lack of interest in Soviet solutions, which would make the provision of Soviet support to Italy significantly impossible, which made American involvement increasingly necessary in terms of internal politics (Nutti, L. 2011). The United States, taught by various examples of the dangers of low economic development in terms of the strengthening of communist influence in other regions such as the Middle East, offered financial aid to Europe in order to minimize at the outset any Soviet plans that would involve the economic inferiority of European countries, of which as the key battlefield, Italy was the most

prominent, and in that way they co-opted and attracted to themselves the Italian political elite that would implement American ideas both in the country's internal and external policy.

3. Relations of the Christian Democratic Party with the United States

In this chapter, a more detailed focus will be on the period from 1947, when the existence of the Cold War was officially established, and therefore the focus of the chapter itself will be on the importance of Italy as a battlefield in this war. The core and perspective of the Cold War will be viewed from two angles of interest: the United States of America and Italy.

Special emphasis will be placed on the interests of the Christian Democratic Party, in order to see to what extent the interests of the American political elite overlap with the interests of the leaders of this party, and what recipe the Christian Democratic Party can offer in terms of minimizing the political influence of the Communist Party of Italy. Behind this follows the question of what degree of autonomy the Christian Democratic Party had in its work, and to what extent this party used the communist threat to obtain financial subsidies from the United States of America. It can be said that De Gasperi was a key figure in terms of strengthening relations with the United States of America, and therefore it is necessary to take a deeper look at his leadership style and the way his government fought against the communist threat. It is noticeable that the Christian Democratic Party represented a party that was in the solid spectrum of the right, and the program of its work consisted of Christian principles that should find their place in the republican system shaped by democratic values. Therefore, the strong connection and cooperation between the Holy See and the Christian Democratic Party was more than expected, especially with regard to solving the communist issue in Italy, but in addition to the Vatican, this party also relied on cooperation with key figures from the fascist period, but their relationship with this party will be analyzed more thoroughly in the next chapter in the context of the significance of Operation Gladio.

Special emphasis will be placed on the formation of the Western Union, after which the next step was the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, and it will be considered whether these international events helped to improve the status of the country within the Western bloc, and what position the Christian Democratic Party had on this matter, and how the Catholic population, as the majority support of the party, shaped the views of the Christian Democrats on these events. The central theme of this chapter, in addition to the communist issue, is how

the Christian Democratic Party and De Gasperi's governments have changed since the beginning of the Cold War, which parties they cooperated with, and how their perception of the right has changed in relation to internal and external political circumstances.

The American attitude towards the Christian Democratic Party and its moves in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy can best be seen through the extremely anti-leftist views of the American ambassador to Italy, Clara Booth Luce, who tried to curb any relationship between the left and the Christian Democratic Party, thus limiting the trajectory and autonomy of the party. But Luce cannot be considered one of the main factors that defined the American foreign policy towards Italy, it also varied a lot from the different views of the American presidents at the time, but one constant remained unchanged, and it was reflected in the equal strength of the suppression of the Soviet and communist influence.

3.1. The United States, the Christian Democratic Party and the Expansion of Communism

The United States of America was initially superficially focused on the post-war economic recovery of the country, which resulted in the fact that they were initially unaware of how much the Soviet influence actually was a huge threat to post-war Western politics and the stability of European countries. Regarding the indisputable importance of the Italian battlefield, one can add a thesis on the geopolitical aspect, which underlines the Italian border defects with regard to the Italian-Yugoslav border, as a vulnerable point that would enable a possible Soviet penetration on the territory of Italy, thus emphasizing the priority of stronger relations between the United States of America and Italy (Bernardi, E. 2006) Italy represented a buffer zone between the Soviet and Western blocs, and therefore American intervention was necessary in terms of strengthening the Italian borders, and a more thorough analysis of the Italian geopolitical situation, in order to turn possible shortcomings into advantages of the country, but in addition to the geopolitical issue, more attention should have been paid to the internal political situation and the activities of the Communist Party of Italy. The danger of the strengthening of the Communist Party of Italy was reflected in the form of the formation of paramilitary groups, which had strong support from the Soviet Union, which came through a joint mediator - Yugoslavia. (Bernardi, E. 2006). Italian left-wing parties, which were mainly supported by the Soviet Union, and other communist factions could operate unhindered in Italy, resisting the government and fundamental institutions through their paramilitary organizations,

thus strengthening their position on the international scene, and eventually united with communist branches in other countries of Europe, which would cause the collapse of the Western bloc.

In order to avoid this scenario, the United States of America worked to deepen its role in Europe, motivated European countries to intensive cooperation, which made the Republic of Italy a strategic battlefield in the fight against communism (Nuti L. 2022). Washington initially underestimated the power of the Soviet Union, but became aware of the danger when the power of left-wing parties in Europe began to grow more and more thanks to the organizational power and coordination by the Soviet Union, which led to increasing tensions and interference of the left in internal issues that also reflected on foreign policy. The problem of a strong and dominant left interfering in internal politics was the most visible in the Italian political system. The United States of America took the strengthening of the Communist Party of Italy too seriously, leaving nothing to chance, they tried to react as efficiently as possible in order to counterbalance the communist factions, which would slow down further communist expansion within Italy, and ensure distancing between the Soviet and Western-oriented countries.

No matter how strong and indestructible the United States of America was, they could not control the situation in all European countries at the same time, and they needed partners in the form of right-wing parties, which are well aware of the state of internal politics of European countries, and have the capacity to oppose the leftist currents, and thus keep the situation under control. The solution regarding opposing the paramilitary forces of the Communist Party of Italy lay in the plan of the Minister of the Interior Scelba, which was based on the defense of the party leadership and its followers, by forming their own paramilitary organizations that consisted of former groups of white partisans. and Catholic volunteer forces that served military duty (Bernardi, E. 2006). The Christian Democratic Party tried to respond to the Communist Party in kind, investing large financial resources in arming the party and mobilizing its followers in paramilitary formations, which led to an aggressive charge in the country.

The Truman administration tried to strengthen the activity of Italian political parties with subsidies, which would result in minimizing the influence of the Communist Party of Italy, and removing any communist influence in the Government of the Republic of Italy (Nuti L. 2022). The United States of America analyzed in detail all the influential political parties in the country, their agendas and goals, and thereby observed the mechanisms and factions used by the Soviet Union to reach European countries. It was noticeable that the Communist Party of Italy is becoming stronger and more aggressive, which is greatly contributed by funding from Moscow.

The key goal was to weaken the Communist Party and prevent Communist Party factions from sabotaging the work of the government.

De Gasperi, who was a key actor in the direction of foreign policy, holding the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Prime Minister, was aware of the fact that the Communist Party and the Christian Democratic Party were extremely different, and that Togliatti's solution of a coalition between three mass parties was impossible, and that the presence of the communist party in the government led to differences and disagreements in deciding on foreign and domestic policy items (Aga-Rossi, E. 2007). The United States imposed the minimization of communist influence in the Italian government as the first task of De Gasperi and the Christian Democratic Party, and completely rejected any form of cooperation with the Communist Party and its leaders not only because of the obvious ideological difference, but also because the positions The Communist Party significantly set back the situation in the field of internal politics, which further reflected on issues in the field of foreign policy, such as integration into the global economic system.

3.2. Goals and Ideas of the Christian Democratic Party for Foreign Affairs

The goal of suppressing the power of the Communist Party could be achieved by connecting with parties that share Western political, ideological and economic values. The Christian Democratic Party proved to be the ideal prototype of a party that would perfectly coordinate with the United States of America in suppressing communism in the Republic of Italy, due to its useful contacts and connections, which had the capacity to strongly oppose the Communist Party, but also this party also reversed the situation in its benefit, using excessive American concern to extract as many concessions as possible from the United States of America in terms of economic subsidies, promotion and support of foreign policy goals (Nuti L. 2022). It can be said that the Christian Democratic Party was guided by the bias of survival, leaning towards the influence of a stronger ally. This party managed to penetrate into the very essence of the American way of conducting foreign policy, and it used the same method used by the United States of America, and it was reflected in overemphasizing the danger of the situation, hasty action. This method was intended for the Christian Democratic Party to maintain the most important role in the American struggle against communist influences, and thus to gain benefits from the United States of America, both in terms of issues important to the state, as well as means for its own benefit.

For the survival of the Christian Democratic Party on the Italian political scene, cooperation with the Vatican, which shared identical views with this party, was of key importance, and by using simplifications, an attempt was made to present the differences between Western and socialist values to the citizens in the most graphic way possible (Miller, J.E. 1983). The best way to gather the support of the citizenry was reflected in strong and graphic propaganda, which tried to put pressure on the citizenry using the fear of different values, thus shaping bipolar attitudes. As the Soviet Union itself had indestructible propaganda, it was not at all an easy task for the Western Bloc and the Christian Democratic Party. The mechanism in which the United States of America provided financial support to the Christian Democratic Party, while the Vatican provided spiritual support and directed the citizens to Western values using religious dogma, was carefully worked out.

Holistically speaking, the intervention by the United States of America in Italian domestic politics took place in three main phases: the first phase lasted from January to May 1947, and was characterized by abundant financing of De Gasperi's Christian Democratic Party and its agenda, the second phase lasted from May to December 1947, and represented the fulfillment of De Gasperi's promises, which were reflected in the minimization of communist influence in the government and frequent economic reforms, while the last phase was reflected in the dominance of the Communist Party, and direct action and secret operations by the United States of America (Miller, J. E. 1983). Washington carefully worked out a plan and strategy to minimize communism in the form of left-wing factions with the Christian Democratic Party. The main goal was to expel the left from all state apparatuses, in which the Christian Democratic Party eventually succeeded, but the left was still not eliminated as a danger, and it had to be weakened and defeated in an indirect and more covert way, which was reflected in the numerous secret operations that were created by Washington, and the main role in them was played by the Christian Democratic Party with its contacts and secret organizations consisting of the highest political and military actors.

De Gasperi's trip to the United States of America, and maintaining a close relationship with President Truman, helped the leader of the Christian Democratic Party to get in touch with actors who are key in the field of monetary affairs, and thus obtain the necessary assistance for the country, while at the same time this meant constant interference of the United States of America in the internal politics of the Republic of Italy (Aga-Rossi, E. 2007).

The problem of Italian sovereignty still remained a problematic issue, even if now the situation on the international scene has changed significantly. All European countries were focused on the fight against communism and the Soviet Union, so they moved further and further away

from post-war tensions. The United States of America was more involved than ever in European politics, which led to the imposition of the way Italian internal politics would be organized, which had to be in line with American goals and interests. There was extremely little freedom and creativity for the Italian leaders to organize the direction of Italian domestic politics as they saw fit.

It is possible to see that during De Gasperi's stay in the United States of America, there was a certain amount of mistrust on the part of the American government that the Christian Democratic Party led by Gaspari would solve the problems, but upcoming international events such as the crisis in Turkey and Greece supported De Gasperi's claims, and the United States of America promised to provide economic assistance to European countries fighting against communism, which was especially true for Italy, which was among the countries that needed financial assistance in reviving the economy in order to fight against the danger in the form of communism (Miller, J. E. 1983). Washington tried to help European countries in the fight against left-wing parties, whose main goal was to create internal inter-party tensions that could significantly threaten the stability of institutions, and thus produce large-scale crises.

The struggle of the Christian Democratic Party against the Communist Party was becoming more and more uncertain and complicated every day, which significantly affected the work of the government, which did not have a unified view but experienced a gradual internal split. But in addition to the huge American subsidies, De Gasperi's government did not have the capacity and ability to start the reform process, so the American aid did not have a significant effect (Miller, J.E 1983). Even if the Christian Democratic Party received large amounts of financial resources from Washington, it still did not form a clear plan to oust the Communist Party from the government. The question arises as to what was the real priority of the Christian Democratic Party, and whether it used the subsidies for its personal strengthening and not for the transformation and reform of state institutions.

The constant ineffectiveness of De Gasperi's government raised suspicions in Washington, and Marshall especially insisted that the quality and manner of using financial subsidies and political assistance to form and strengthen democratic pro-American forces in Italy be analyzed (Miller, J.E 1983). The United States expected faster and more efficient reaction to the communist problem than De Gasperi, but since no significant changes were visible, and requests for subsidies were increasing, Marshall therefore considered it appropriate to analyze the way in which the Christian Democratic Party disposes of American aid, and where it actually originated a standstill in the execution of the fundamental task of cleaning institutions from the influence of left-wing factions. But at the same time, De Gasperi addresses President Truman

in a letter, in which he describes the extent and consequences of the Italian internal crisis, and asks for a solution in the form of the formation of an American-Italian committee that would find a way out of this situation (Aga-Rossi, E. 2007). It can be said that De Gasperi was extremely exhausted by the Italian crisis, and was powerless to immediately respond to all American demands, the most prominent of which was the formation of an anti-communist government, and therefore tries to describe to President Truman in as much detail as possible the problems he is dealing with, and rationally he sees the solution in the formation of a committee that could assess the entire situation on the spot, and come to a certain solution that would help in suppressing the crisis and at the same time be favorable to American interests.

After addressing President Truman, Secretary of State Marshall decides to consult with the Ambassador of United States of America in Rome, James Dumm, regarding current issues such as the control of important municipalities by Italian communist factions, the election victory of the communists in Sicily, and in accordance with these events, they consider scenarios related to the government, which are reflected in the removal of the communists from the government and the departure of De Gasperi from the head of the government, but Dumm answers that the only rational move is to continue providing aid, so that the communists do not use poverty and hunger as a basis for their further expansion (Aga- Rossi, E. 2007). In this period, the communist factions were united more than ever, and they tried to use the bad economic situation as an argument against the Christian Democratic Party, which was also noticed by the American ambassador Dumm, who therefore considered it impossible to take major steps in the reorganization and transformation of institutions, while bigger and more serious problems in the country, which would lead to mass disobedience and uprising, are not solved. Washington decides to use pressure as a means to motivate De Gasperi and the Christian Democrats to take a concrete step, or further use of a lukewarm policy will be seen as cooperation with the communists, and the ultimate consequence would be the expulsion of the Christian Democratic Party from the government (Aga-Rossi, E. 2007). The United States is using its most effective foreign policy carrot and stick tactics to prevent further delays. In the talks between Ambassadors Dunn, Marshall and De Gasperi, an attempt was made to assess the overall situation in the field of Italian domestic politics, and De Gasperi declared that he would do everything to bring about economic recovery, but that the center of gravity of the Communist Party was equally necessary in the government, as would have been democratic in character, but Marshall remained committed to his aspirations for a completely non-communist government, which resulted in the approval of a memorandum describing American activities to support an anti-communist government (Miller, J.E 1983). De Gasperi believed that even if

he disagreed with the left in most matters, its participation in the government was necessary in order to really establish a true government, but Washington's position remained categorical. And if the participation of the left in the government produced dissensions and blockages, it was of great importance to hear the views of the left, so that the right, led by the Christian Democratic Party, could anticipate the moves of the communist factions, and not be isolated in a bubble of like-minded people, which would make it impossible to predict and react to the moves of the left.

But in the end, De Gasperi decided to take the American side, and the memorandum tried to plan in detail the most effective way to oppose it as a direct and pressing threat. The ousting of the Communist Party from the government can be seen as a dictate by the United States of America to De Gasperi and the Christian Democratic Party as a price for financial assistance, but the actions of the Christian Democrats and De Gasperi can also be viewed from the perspective of the circumstances at the time, which were conditioned by the internal crisis and by losing the consensus of the Christian Democratic Party (Aga-Rossi, E. 2007). De Gasperi tried at all costs to have Washington as a powerful ally during the internal crisis, but it can be said that American pressure was a secondary factor in this case, while the initial focus was placed on the drive for the country's survival.

The signing of the agreement on the implementation of the post-war Bretton Woods monetary system by the Italian government aimed to reduce inflation and the deficit in the country, but this also entailed the issue of expelling the left from the government (Diodato, E., & Niglia, F. 2017). De Gasperi focused his political goals above all on the economic recovery of the country, and the fight against inflation, which had an impact on multifaceted factors, and on the quality of life in the country, and therefore the formation of a new government without communists was a rational move, which would focus on an end to blockades, and challenges in the field of internal politics would be solved more efficiently.

Faced with advantages and consequences, De Gasperi finally on 5/31/1947. decided to form a new non-communist government, which would consist of the left and liberal technocrats, whose most important representative was Central Bank Governor Luigi Einaudi, who was appointed Minister of the Budget and Deputy Prime Minister (Diodato, E., & Niglia, F. 2017). The new government consisted of close currents, the orthodox right and the centralist faction, whose common goal was the economic recovery of the country.

The formation of the new government was followed by an invitation from Washington to a conference in Paris, which was to be held in July 1947, which represented a significant step in

the process of the country's recovery and regulation of its internal policy, while the approval of the peace treaty at the end of the month meant significant progress in the field foreign policies after the Second World War (Diodato, E., & Niglia, F. 2017). The peace treaty meant reaching the ultimate goal for which the country had been fighting since 1943, and it represents integration into the Western system, which would speed up the country's economic development and thus Italy would have much more open communication with European countries, and on the international scene was viewed from a different angle, and ranked side by side with other large and stronger countries.

The following year was marked by the Italian election campaign, which was exclusively focused on the subject of the Cold War and its causes, and the campaign of the Christian Democratic Party was more than accepted by the citizens, which resulted in this party dominantly winning the elections, and one of the most significant steps that took place during the government of this party is the signing of the Atlantic Treaty, which this party initially viewed as an obligation imposed by Europe (Diodato, E., & Niglia, F. 2017). In its election campaign and political agenda, the Christian Democratic Party overemphasized the fear of communist influence on the part of Moscow, and emphasized the consequences that a possible scenario of the victory of communism could have on internal Italian politics, and how it could be disastrous for Italian relations with the United States of America and European countries, and permanently violate the provisions of the peace treaty.

The electoral dominance of the Christian Democratic Party marks the beginning of a new stage for the Catholic world, where it was very necessary to define the concept of the role of national leadership, and therefore it was inevitable to clarify the fundamental orientation that the government decided to assume in its leadership, since the leadership itself had to deal with conflicting opinions in the field of economic and foreign policy (Formigoni, G. 1985). The complete electoral dominance of the Christian Democrats meant a distinct advantage of the Catholic population on the internal and external political scene, and thus the newly formed government was faced with the task of defining a universal path that would suit both the Christian Democrats and the liberal technocrats, so as not to repeat the cardinal mistakes of the past far-reaching consequences for the organization of the state. It can be said that the Holy See, and the Catholic population represented by magazines like "La Civiltà Cattolica" firmly shaped the pre-election and political agenda of the Christian Democratic Party, giving the conflict a religious note, and giving a strong undertone to the religious differences between Western countries and the Soviet Union (Trincia, L. 1987). Catholic circles were convinced that by turning the focus of the conflict from the political and economic sphere to the religious one,

they would achieve more aggressive and faster results in eradicating communism from the Italian political scene. They calculated that by trying to simplify the problem and its cause, they would win over the masses of the people, which they partially succeeded in doing, but the religious sphere only represented a secondary segment of the conflict, which could not solve all internal political issues.

The victory of the Christian Democratic Party in the elections of 1948 was not only the product of a strong election campaign, but was marked by strong support from Washington, which was reflected in a covert operation carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency (Nuti L. 2022). The United States of America and the Christian Democratic Party decided to join forces, using indirect channels and contacts to strengthen the position of the Christian Democratic current in the country, and this option was the most effective in order to avoid possible sabotage by the Communist Party. It can be said that the Marshall Plan was finally defined by the formation of the Western Union, whose members were Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries, which represented the first stage towards the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, to which the United States of America and Canada would join (Formigoni, G. 1985).

The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty was an extremely complex and comprehensive process that required the definition of the relationship between Western countries and their inclusion in the Western Bloc, which was a significant weight and a response to the influence of the Soviet Union in Europe, but the Western Bloc did not precisely define the aspect of security, but rather was a union of Western countries that share common ideological values. The Atlantic Treaty represents a kind of upgrade of the Western Union, the goal of which was to create a security mechanism that would bring together European states in terms of military and security partnership and cooperation under the auspices of the United States of America, but the Christian Democratic Party initially did not recognize the benefits of this pact, and on this saw the contract as a scenario imposed by Europe, in which, as in earlier scenarios, Italian sovereignty is threatened.

Regarding Italy's accession to the Western Bloc and the North Atlantic Treaty, it can be said that a great debate has opened in the circles of the Christian left, which previously did not discuss much about foreign policy, but tried to follow a safer path, counting on American help (Formigoni, G. 1985). It can be said that Italy saw the Atlantic Treaty as an instrument for intensifying relations with the United States of America, which is best reflected in the period of tension where Italy tries to play the role of a mediator, but if it continues with strained relations, it will side with Washington rather than to the side of Paris (Nuti L. 2022). Regarding Italy's accession to the Western Bloc and the North Atlantic Treaty, it can be said that a great debate

has opened in the circles of the Christian left, which previously did not discuss much about foreign policy, but tried to follow a safer path, counting on American help (Formigoni, G. 1985). The Christian left believed that the most correct way was not to get too involved in questioning American decisions, but considered that it was best to try to follow current events, and reshape their views in accordance with them in order to survive on the political scene as long as possible with the support of strong allies.

3.3. The Opening of the Christian Democratic Party to the Moderate Left

The next elections held in 1953 showed a somewhat worse election result for the Christian Democratic Party, which failed to achieve an absolute majority, which showed that its election campaign, which was based on the main principles of the previous election campaign, whose roots stemmed from general Cold War politics, and with the reforms of the electoral law, it did not realize its full potential (Nutti, L. 2002b). These elections did not destroy the reputation of the Christian Democratic Party to a large extent, it still had a large number of supporters, but the cause of the worse results can be reflected in the lack of a more creative and diverse pre-election campaign, which would have looked at current problems in the field of internal and external politics in a different way and offered more alternative solutions than those presented in the Cold War policy. With the reforms of the electoral law, the party tried to remain focused on the field of internal politics, but defining the electoral law could not completely solve all internal problems, which contained an economic-ideological nature. These election results dealt a big blow to the optimistic expectations of the United States of America regarding the results of the Christian Democratic-centrist coalition, while the right represented by monarchists and neo-fascists achieved an increased number of votes, while the Communist Party and the Socialist Party ran separately and won 35% of the vote, which did not change their position much compared to the previous elections (Del Pero, M. 2004). Although Washington was quite disappointed with these results, it was necessary to find a new solution by which the Christian Democratic Party would continue to maintain its dominance on the Italian political scene.

According to these election results, there were two scenarios: to form a coalition with the monarchists and neo-fascists or to decide to open to the right, thus taking advantage of the distance between the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, which was reflected in separate candidacies. The cause of the distance between the Socialist and Communist parties was reflected in the concern of Pietro Nenni, the leader of the Socialist Party, that continued

cooperation with the Communist Party could relegate the Socialist Party to the background, and all opposition merits would be attributed to the Communist Party, while the Socialists would remain in the shadows, and therefore, they considered that a reasonable alternative would be to find new partners (Nutti, L. 2002b). By separating the entire Italian right, the Communist Party would lose its intensity, which would make it less effective in disrupting internal politics and sabotaging the work of the right. The centrist coalition somehow managed to survive in the House of Representatives, but failed to dominate, while it achieved much better results in the Senate, but these results, regardless of everything, failed to help De Gasperi's survival on the political scene, the end of which was the product of marginalization within the party itself, which resented him for his lack of ability to create a new government (Del Pero, M. 2004).

The internal conflict between the Christian Democrats meant an uncertain period regarding the future path of the party, which represented an opportunity for the communists to exploit the weak points of the Christian Democrats, thus giving them a strong blow. The Christian Democrats saw a temporary solution in the formation of a minority government of a temporary character, and in the reorganization of the party itself, using state interventionism, which would enable the party to regain its former power (Del Pero, M. 2004). party in order to strengthen from within, and overcome a period of vulnerability, but for long-term survival, a longer-term plan was needed. After looking at the advantages and disadvantages of alliances with the left and the right, the Christian Democratic Party realized that the main problem of the monarchists was that they were limited exclusively to the south, and they largely lacked unity, while the main disadvantage of the socialists was that they sympathized with the Soviet Union and were very close connection with the Communist Party, which was reflected in the joint dominance in trade unions and city administrations (Del Pero, M. 2004). The monarchists, even if they belonged to the left, represented an extremely unstable option, which could not bring any long-term security to the Christian Democrats, nor could it shake the Communist Party. The only advantage of this partnership would be that Washington would be satisfied with the coalition. Cooperation with the socialists, despite its flaws, was a much more rational option, which would have dealt an unexpected blow to the Communist Party. The post-election period left behind the question of how to overcome the problem of insecurity in the long run, and how to strengthen the internal structure of the party, which needs a leader as strong as De Gasperi was, from which arose the need to create a coalition to form a new government. and as a feasible solution, an opening towards the left regarding the cooperation of the Christian Democratic Party and the Italian Socialist Party, led by Pietro Nenni, was imposed (Nutti, L. 2002b).

It can be seen that after the election, a new period is coming for the Christian Democratic Party, which is trying to get closer to the mildly oriented left, whose political agendas overlap in some points, thus making it impossible for the Communist Party to achieve dominance, as well as support in other branches of leftist parties. The decision to move closer to the right could leave behind inevitable consequences for Italian-American relations, and it was up to the Christian Democrats to find the most convincing arguments by which Washington would accept the opening to the left. At the beginning, the Christian Democratic Party was cautious about how it would establish a partnership with the Socialists, the very attempt to establish a partnership between these two somewhat opposing parties represented a long-term process, and both parties were aware that this partnership would bring with it certain risks, Christian Democrats could risk the support of Washington, and the socialists would have to restructure their ideological foundations, and could lose a significant number of voters (Nuti, L. 2002b). Both parties did not want to be satisfied with the current situation, but the risk after establishing the partnership was more than great, and should not be underestimated. It is noticeable that at the beginning of the talks about the alliance, both parties were quite cautious, and it was more than necessary to analyze each other in terms of ideological foundations, political agendas, and it was necessary to see how they would behave if they were left without benefits from Washington and the loss support from left-wing voters.

The final move after a long period of negotiations took place in 1963, with the entry of the Socialist Party into a coalition with the Christian Democratic Party, after the Socialists severed any connection with the Communist Party, but this coalition government was still cautiously watched in Washington, and was torn between political leadership of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy (Nuti, L. 2002b). The Socialist Party had to create a new image, which was based on distancing itself from the communist core and the Communist Party, in order to prove the credibility of the new coalition in the eyes of the United States of America, but the United States of America was divided between two doctrines and two opposite styles of political leadership. Therefore, it is noticeable that Washington did not have a unified view on the issue of this coalition, which meant a certain uncertainty and sluggishness regarding concrete action. The focus of American foreign policy towards Italy during the period of President Eisenhower was reflected in the opposition to any dialogue between the Christian Democratic Party and the Socialists, which was based on distrust towards Nenni and the Socialist Party regarding their neutrality in conducting foreign affairs, while during the Kennedy administration the administration was divided into two currents: those who wanted to give space to Italy, without

interfering in its politics, while the second current strongly opposed the opening to the left, but this division lasted until 1963, when the first group won (Nutti, L. 2002b).

Eisenhower's administration was extremely strict about opening up to the socialists, it did not distinguish between left-wing currents, it believed that cooperation with the socialists, even if they belonged to a milder right, would mean the loss of credibility and reputation of the United States of America, as the greatest power that is fighting against the communist threat. It can be seen that during the period of President Kennedy's rule, there was greater openness and greater space for discussion between the part of the administration that continued to follow the Eisenhower principle and the part of the administration that was more liberal-minded, thus advocating a policy of non-intervention. One of the most important political figures from the Eisenhower period was the American ambassador to Italy, Clare Booth Luce, who advocated a coalition with monarchists and neo-fascist Atlantic sectors, the most prominent of which was the Movimento Sociale Italiano (Del Pero, M. 2019). Ambassador Luce's views did not depart from Eisenhower's doctrine, and were based on the fact that cooperation with the extreme right and fascist-oriented parties is a more desirable and much safer path than cooperation with the moderate and centrist left. The Eisenhower administration was blinded by the direct fight against the communists, and did not analyze the option of creating a conflict within the left, which was hinted at already in the elections, which would actually weaken the Communist Party, thus giving the communists a very strong blow, which would project increasing insecurity and distrust within the Italian left.

It is especially important to look at the political position of Luce, who as an ambassador could not voluntarily create her own political choices, even if she possessed a strong ideological line, but only implemented the directives created by the Eisenhower administration (Nutti, L. 2002b). It is obvious that Luce was given much more importance than it was in reality. The ambassador's role was more of a ceremonial role, dealing with the establishment and nurturing of relations between these two countries, and she did not have the power to form and significantly influence foreign policy. It can be said that Luce was actually a puppet of the Eisenhower administration, who carried out the administration's pre-planned political moves on the ground. Luce was an extremely big sympathizer of Pella's government and its nationalist political leadership, which simultaneously cooled relations with the Christian Democratic Party, and found in De Gasperi the culprit for the party's bad results, but the weakening of Pella's government and the radical right in it created a pessimistic image of the Italian politics (Del Pero, M. 2004). Luce increasingly lost confidence in the Christian Democratic Party, believing that the party was losing its reputation more and more, which would turn it into a centrist party that is not strong

enough to fight the communists, and she placed her hopes in the radical right, but she too she showed no progress, but lost more and more popularity, which left Luce in a hopeless situation regarding the party on which to rely. Ambassador Luce's political views were strongly shaped by the opinion of her acquaintance and associate, Indro Montanelli, who was a journalist for the leading newspaper "Corriere della Sera" and a spokesman for an informal group of bureaucrats and industrialists, whose views were largely based on those of Mussolini, and it can be said that he believed that the main shortcoming of the Italian bureaucracy was that it was not based on religious dogma, but was too selective and democratized without any moral influence, and that a strong leader was needed to effectively direct the Italian people who he is not able to take care of himself (Mariano, M. 2005). Montanelli and other prominent personalities who came from fascist circles believed that there is a lack of moral values in Italian democracy, and that the previous government was focused on filling the form with pragmatic solutions, without analyzing how correct they are, and whether it spoils their reputation and deviates from fundamental values. They also look at Italian politics through the prism of leadership, which must be in the hands of a central figure who will direct the conduct of foreign and domestic policy in the right way.

Its main idea was Italian modernization, which was reflected in the opening to the free market, but the Christian Democratic Party was very cautious regarding this capitalist issue, and thus got the impression that a scenario that would look more and more like the New Deal could be played out, while the government's aspiration to strengthen the economic picture and reduce social changes and inequalities was in contrast to the diffusionist model of the Eisenhower administration (Mariano, M. 2005). Christian Democratic caution and the lack of direct expression of views on basic capitalist principles created in Luce doubts about Christian Democratic advocacy for Western values, and thus she believed more and more in the credibility of fascist views on the Italian economy, but even the fascists did not have the capacity to find a solution that would solve current shortcomings, but only relied on ideological theoretical frameworks that are not efficient enough to make a concrete change in a practical sense. The paternalistic and aggressive anti-communist political patterns used by Luce to weaken the influence of leftist unions by denying American support to companies that did nothing against leftist influences did not bear fruit, and Luce was replaced by James Zellerbach at the end of 1956, whose moves did not deviate from the Eisenhower doctrine (Mariano, M. 2005). From this it follows that the main shortcoming of Luce's political moves was that she relied too much on the claims of fascist and hard-right positions, which were driven by mere ideology, without a pragmatic view, which would have reduced the communist influence much earlier. Luce

superficially observed the political situation at the time, following strongly anti-communist principles, and distrusting the Christian Democratic Party, which actually played the card of internal discord among the left.

4. Media Awareness in the Area of Bilateral Relations Between the United States and Italy

A much more intense relationship between Italy and the United States of America is noticeable in terms of the fight against the domination of the rapidly growing communism, which is taking on an increasingly aggressive and unscrupulous form of struggle and competition for bare power and influence both in Italy and in Europe. This struggle is played out within the framework of internal politics between the Christian Democratic Party, supported by the United States of America, and the Communist Party of Italy, which is financed and shaped with suitable values by the Soviet Union.

The United States of America is increasingly trying to imitate the Soviet way of fighting, which was based on a firm and organized mobilization of party sympathizers, whose task was to fight against the right-oriented Italian political elite and attempts to fit communist values and principles within state institutions. This struggle by its character does not have only militaristic elements and features, but was shaped by the use of secret intervention operations, whose plans and information about organizational structures were available exclusively to the right-oriented political elite and its main patron - the United States of America. Even if secret operations were often linked to the right and the United States of America, the left also had its own channels and means to carry out secret operations, but the question arises by which criteria the degree of success of the secret organizations of the left and right differed. These operations required extensive analysis in the field of the country's internal politics and international relations, in order to create a favorable situation for the creation of unpredictable and unstable situations, which were accompanied by numerous incidents. But these incidents did not only harm the opposing side, but also harmed the very foundations of a strong and stable state and its democratic potential. Such scenarios were characteristic of the period of the 70s of the last century, better known as the period of "Lead Years", which represented a bloody struggle between the paramilitary communist formations "Brigate Rosse" and leftist factions supported by the back of Washington.

During this decade, the most diverse means were used, such as protests, a fierce campaign embodied in strong propaganda material, numerous kidnappings and assassinations, the most significant of which was the kidnapping and murder of the then prime minister of Italy, Aldo Moro, initiated by the communist formation "Brigate Rosse". But in order to better understand the very concept and meaning of secret operations, it is necessary to go back to the period of the late 50s, when the secret formation Gladio was formed, which aimed to carry out the fight against communism at the level of Europe, thus motivating right-wing European factions to unite in an alliance with the United States of America and its intelligence agency. The existence of these operations and formations has been the subject of mere speculation, and the question arises as to how much actual access to this information was available to the media. It is also necessary to understand the views and attitudes of citizens on this issue, and to determine what citizens identified with the "possible" existence of these operations. Special emphasis will be placed on the Christian Democratic Prime Minister Andreotti, who possessed a strictly precisely organized secret organization made up of various elements and factions, the most numerous of which were fascist and clerical factions. It is essential to analyze the degree of importance and the role played by the Italian mafia in this secret organization. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to understand the role of these secret formations and their influence on Italian and domestic politics through the prism of the media.

4.1. Media Perceptions of the Establishment of Gladio

The Gladio formation was one of the best-kept secrets during the Cold War, which lasted and kept away from the public eye for over forty years, but was discovered in the 90s thanks to the confession of the then Christian Democratic Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, during a parliamentary debate on terrorism in Italy, thus causing a sensation, both in the country and on the international world scene (Riste, O. 2014). This formation was of key importance both for the Italian political scene and for the international political scene, and was disclosed a few years after the very end of the Cold War, when there was no relevant threat, and its disclosure had the purpose of putting the spotlight on the Italian a policy that was characterized by a pronounced sensationalist approach, which of exceptional importance included the role of the media in the formation of political attitudes.

Prime Minister Andreotti stated that the Italian branch of the organization was created on November 26, 1956, by an agreement between SIFAR (the Italian secret service) and the Central

Intelligence Agency, and that the organization was called "Stay Behind" on a global level, while the Italian branch was named "Gladio" (Pacini, G. 2007). This organization was of a hierarchical type, and consisted of two levels: the global level, which had the goal of sharing secret information between the countries of the Western bloc, and the level which was at the state level and dealt with threats within the state itself, such as the Communist Party, and civil organizations and various movements that were in charge of implementing the goals of the Communist Party on the ground.

Reports indicate that the Gladio formation essentially represented a secret network of resistance, whose main purpose was to pre-empt the enemy in his intention to occupy, and it achieved this thanks to activities that included: gathering information, a diverse spectrum of sabotage, propaganda speech and material, and guerrilla warfare against enemy troops (Pacini, G. 2007). The Gladio formation was involved in all spheres of life, both political and public, and was also used by many civil and religious organizations, in order to penetrate into the segment of private life, for the purpose of more efficient mobilization of guerilla units whose purpose was to provide protection of the country both from internal dissident guerilla formations, as well as from the influence of border countries that were in close contact and communication with the Soviet Union.

The release of this news to the public entailed a series of expected moves, the most important of which was the official statement of the North Atlantic Organization on this matter, while the governments of European countries, one after another, began to recognize the establishment of similar formations in their countries as well (Nuti, L. 2007). The public now, after a long time, had a deeper insight into the very meaning of the Cold War, many events in the then context became much clearer. The media became much more active regarding this topic, considering that only a small part of the truth has surfaced, and that the journalist's task is to dig deeper into this phenomenon, which ultimately resulted in the publication of numerous newspaper articles and books, and an investigation was launched into this formation, which resulted in the formation of a series of court proceedings, but in the end none of them resulted in a guilty verdict (Pacini, G. 2007). This development of events aims to indicate the degree of autonomy of the country and its institutions both at the level of internal and international relations, and it can be said that Italy is still in fear of the American reaction even if the Cold War has long passed, but part of the cause also lies in the degree of corruption of the Italian institutions, whose goal was to protect the involved Italian leaders at the expense of the damage caused by the significant damage to fundamental human rights and security.

The report of the results of the official investigation conducted by the Italian parliament revealed that similar formations existed in Austria, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey and Greece, and that these formations were partially cooperating with each other, while some relied exclusively on bilateral relations with Great Britain or the United States of America (Nuti, L. 2007). This conclusion gives the impression that as much as these organizations operated on similar principles, they were also different, and therefore sometimes there could be certain complications due to the different form of cooperation, but their stability was still preserved by cooperation with Great Britain and the United States of America.

The Gladio formation consisted of the main actors who were the intelligence services of the countries that were involved in the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America, which gave guidelines on how to weaken and destroy left-wing movements and groups (Riste, O. 2014). This operation became a huge channel for the flow of information from different countries about communist organizations, which was used to analyze and monitor their behavior on local political scenes, and in this way, it would be much easier to understand the situation from their perspective, which would make it much easier to notice the weaknesses of communist organizations and faction.

After the information about the Gladio formation was presented, condemnations came from many quarters primarily because the truth about this organization was hidden from parliament, but on the other hand there were defenders of these moves, the most famous of whom was the then president Francesco Cossiga, who at the time before the formation of the organization held the position of undersecretary of defense, and therefore had the opportunity to become more familiar with the formation of the organization, its basic tasks, which in his opinion were not illegal (Ferraresi, F., & Castagna, J. 1992). In defense of this organization, President Cossiga cited the then historical context, which was shaped by the civil war, and that the formation of an organization of this nature was necessary in order to defend the country, and that the situation does not make sense to be observed in the current context, but needs to be analyzed and considered the situation at that time (Ferraresi, F., & Castagna, J. 1992). The Cold War period represented an unscrupulous struggle between two opposing ideological sides, in which the most diverse means were used, which were often on the border of legitimacy, and therefore in the context of that time, the concept of legitimacy was subjectively shaped from the perspective of both ideological sides. In order to better analyze the criterion of legitimacy, it is necessary to find universal principles that correspond to both the past and the present context. The president's unconditional defense of this organization contributed to the minimization of public dialogue

on this issue, and all those who had a different opinion than the desired one were publicly ridiculed, also the president led an extremely aggressive policy based on threats to the Committee on Terrorism in regarding the extension of his mandate (Ferraresi, F., & Castagna, J. 1992).

By unilaterally imposing a “preferred opinion” on this issue, the discussion in the public is reduced, which makes it difficult to reach a comprehensive critical and objective opinion, and the president, with his aggressively driven policy, tries to restrain institutions that could critically assess the extent to which there has been a violation of legitimacy, which violates basic democratic principles. The development and ideas for the establishment of the Italian secret organization were significantly shaped by the sequence of events of the Second World War, in which the civil conflict between the anti-fascists and Mussolini's supporters, whose factions had already established their own secret organizations, took a special place (Riste, O. 2014). The then partisan secret organizations in the area of northwestern Italy were focused on suppressing the risk of Yugoslav penetration on Italian soil, and after the signing of the Italian peace treaty, this secret formation was officially declared an auxiliary unit of the Italian Army Headquarters, and this unit was under constant supervision and influence British and American intelligence agencies (Riste, O. 2014).

Chronologically, clearer indications for the establishment of the formation appear as early as 1951, by the head of the Italian military intelligence service, Umberto Broccoli, who writes a note to the Chief of Defense Staff, Efisi Marras, about the effects of intelligence operations under enemy occupation, in which he advocates the idea of forming a network whose the purpose would be to provide assistance to those forces that remained behind the lines during the invasion period, and to provide information on the state of the areas under enemy occupation (Nuti, L. 2007). It can be said that the original idea was for the local intelligence agencies to provide assistance to the military forces that were on the occupied ground, carefully following the enemy's moves and hinting at the direction of future enemy actions.

Broccoli states in the report that in other NATO members such organizations have been present for a long time, and that there are open intentions of Washington to form organizations of this character in the area of the northeastern part of Italy, and he emphasizes the extreme importance of a timely reaction, to the extent that the country wants to maintain its sovereignty in the matter of forming of intelligence organizations (Nuti L. 2007) The influence of the United States of America was not reflected equally on foreign and domestic Italian policy, which in addition to its positive aspects also had its negative aspects, which were reflected in the limited degree of autonomy in the conduct of foreign and domestic policy, from which it followed that the

opinions of the Italian leaders were always divided and lukewarm, as there was a great degree of apprehension that a more aggressive rebellion could significantly damage these relations.

The question of the degree of autonomy was also present with regard to the organization of secret intelligence organizations, but an effort was made to find a solution that did not defy American interests, but was aligned with Washington's aspirations. In order to realize this idea, it was necessary to send seven officers to Great Britain for training in the secret service department, which would take temporary steps to ensure a stronger and more stable connection with the United States of America (Nuti L. 2007). The formation of a secret organization required serious and thorough preparations, which were reflected in the detailed training of officers in Great Britain, so that the secret organization would be as compatible as possible with the member organizations of the North Atlantic Treaty, and thus be much closer to the rank of the American intelligence organization. Cooperation with Britain was extremely unsuccessful, but this did not discourage further initiative in the creation of the organization, and the structure of the organization began to be carefully planned, assigning Felice Santini as the general coordinator of the nascent organization, while other officers were appointed to the intelligence affairs sectors, concealment, propaganda, communications, encryption and exfiltration, and it further resulted that each of these six officers had to mobilize a number of 200 agents from the local area by 1953 (Nuti L. 2007). These leaders had the task of selecting the most suitable agents for different departments, so that the organization would have developed capacities in different areas of activity, and would thus be able to effectively predict the moves and secret activities of the adversary.

The "Solo" plan, which was initiated by General De Lorenzo, who was in the position of SIFAR director, and shortly after the head of the Carabinieri, becomes a point of contention in the discussion to what extent the Gladio formation was connected to this plan, which by its very nature initiated numerous violations of a military, civil and criminal nature (Ferraresi, F., & Castagna, J. 1992). The purpose of this plan can be interpreted in different ways, but it is undeniable that this plan represents a key point in the analysis of the activities and character of the Gladio formation, and that it was thoroughly researched and used in disputes as a means of proving the level of ethics of this formation. According to the official documents published by the Committee on Terrorism regarding the events of 1964, the connection between the Gladio formation and Operation Solo was shrouded in secrecy and was not visible at first glance, but the issue related to the storage of Gladio's weapons in the Carabinieri squads, with given the influence of De Lorenzo in the secret service and the armed forces, it leads to increasing controversy that these Gladio weapons were assigned to the civilian forces that carried out the

activities of Operation Solo (Ferraesi, F., & Castagna, J. 1992). This formation had the task of providing weapons reserves for all activities in the field of internal politics, which would have as their basic goal to weaken the left-wing factions, and from the above example it can be concluded that thanks to the influence of key figures of the Gladio formation in various state organizations and institutions, data on the activities of the formation and its actions in various operations were permanently unavailable to the public and the media. In the broader context of analyzing this formation, it is necessary to look at the role of the United States of America, which, as Nuti states, related to financial support and the provision of training to the Italian secret service in terms of concealment methods, but despite its important role and indispensable assistance, the United States of America provided a certain amount autonomy to the extent that the Italian secret service believed that a certain problem could be solved in another way (Nuti L. 2007).

The United States of America played the role of a mentor regarding the formation of the Italian arm of the "Stay Behind" organization, and tried to ensure that the Italian Gladio formation did not deviate to any extent from the other organizations of the Western bloc countries that were included in the "Stay Behind" organization. The relationship between the United States of America and the Italian secret service was not only based on the direction towards a common goal, but it was a network in which mutual trust was built, plans for further activities were forged, and work was done to preserve secret information, from this the United States of America in this relationship, cannot fully see it in its hegemonic role, but in the role of a partner country, whose duty was to coordinate and establish a balance between the countries of the Western bloc in order to achieve priority tasks as efficiently as possible. Even today, the public is not familiar with the complete way of functioning of the "Stay Behind" organization, and there is almost no archival material about the bodies created under NATO, which had the role of mentors and advisors to the network of "Stay Behind" organizations. ', even their names remain unknown, and archival material that still exists is very difficult to find, due to the fact that they are under the protection of the intelligence agencies of countries that used to be members of the Western bloc, and some material is also in the CIA archive (Riste, O. 2014). The question is what is the current perception of the member countries, and especially Italy, on this issue, and to what extent is the state autonomous in relation to the secret service. But this issue is a much more complex international problem, which is wrong to look at from the point of view of an individual country, but it is necessary to look at it on a holistic level, as a mechanism created by the United States of America and North Atlantic international organizations, such as NATO, and the will the actions of certain states are strictly limited by the

inviolability and survival of this organization, and the hegemonic nature of the United States of America, which uses a variety of means to condition the state to desirable behavior, which raises the question of whether Italy and the other countries of the Western bloc have true autonomy to determine their own moves in the field of foreign policy and international problems.

4.2. Media Perceptions of the Events of the “Lead Years”

The period of the "Years of Lead" ("Anni di Piombo") represents an extremely complex period full of instability at the level of the domestic political scene, and it was largely shaped by the sequence of events of the Cold War. Contemporary Italian historiography referred to the 70s as a period of comprehensive reconstruction of the republican period, which sought to lead to an extremely radical transformation of the political-institutional order (Giovagnoli, A. 2010). The period of the "Lead Years" itself represents an attempt to fill the holes that arose from the capitulation of Italy until the beginning of the Cold War, and under this attempt to fill, it is considered that the best thing to do is to start with the transformation of the institutional system, so that the country can find its "third way", which was not based on cooperation with the West. The focus is on this discontinuity between the fascist and post-fascist regimes, stating that it was best illustrated during the 70s in terms of the country's poor economic picture, accompanied by constant recession, the addition of a radical line to social struggles, and a pronounced crisis of ideological and cultural hegemony. (Giovagnoli, A. 2010). The economic weakness shaped by the recession had been present since the end of the Second World War, but cooperation with the United States of America helped to partially stabilize the economic picture, but this intervention was conditional on the unconditional support of the American position, which in the internal political sphere produced radical conflicts and polarization between right and left, which also resulted in a confused view of ideological direction.

In the period of the 90s, numerous autobiographies and memoirs of the actors of that time who were perceived as terrorists were published, the topic of political violence began to be discussed more and more, but the attention of the authors of the publications at that time was focused exclusively on the "red" terrorism of the left, while the right-wing terrorism was largely avoided, and very little literature was published on the topic of right-wing terrorism (Armani, B. 2010). After the end of the Cold War, the public begins to think critically about the events that shaped the struggle between the left and the right, and brings them into context with the foreign policy situation at the time. The particularly stormy decade of the 70s was shaped by

protests and terrorist attacks on both sides, but the public is increasingly trying to present the image of the left as the main culprit for the events of that time, in which many civilian casualties occurred, while the terrorist actions of the right are viewed from another angle, without a sufficient measure of objectivity. However, in order to reveal the cause of the overemphasis of the role of the left in terrorist attacks during the "Years of Lead" in literature and newspaper articles published in the period after the Cold War, special attention should be paid to the correlation between the narrower interests of the then government and events such as the assassination of the then of the right-wing Prime Minister Aldo Moro.

The causes should be sought in the discontinuity that was based on the cultural, political and generational level, and that the violence of the 1970s did not arise from one thing, but rather the various movements of the 1960s represented a prelude to a period of violence, which can best be shown by the example of massacres in Milan, in Piazza di Fontana, organized by right-wing paramilitary formations, which took place at the end of the 60s (Armani, B. 2010). The combination of external political and internal factors resulted in gradual instability within the state, and it is impossible to observe this period through the prism of left-wing terror only, but this period should be seen as a cause-and-effect sequence of events, where one side reacted to the attacks of the other side with the same measure, which resulted in a large number of civilian victims and social trauma. The massacre in Piazza Fontana was the starting point for the secret organization of left-wing paramilitary factions and the political opposition, which resulted in the formation of the Red Brigades paramilitary organization, which began with frequent trends of kidnappings and assassinations of officials who belonged to the right wing, in retaliation for the assassination in Piazza Fontana, when a large number of left-wing officials were killed, including the left-wing anarchist and revolutionary Giuseppe Pinelli (Henninger, M. 2006). Left-wing paramilitary organizations believed that only an aggressive approach, shaped by terrorist activity, could have a more significant impact on a sudden and more concrete change in internal and external policy, and they chose top left-wing politicians as the target group of their terrorist actions, so that their terrorist actions would be taken seriously, and created a solid reputation for these paramilitary organizations.

The Red Brigades were formed in 1970 by diverse student and labor movements that were current in the 60s, whose main preoccupation was the creation of a leftist-oriented state, which would break the alliances and relations of Italian institutions with the United States of America and other countries of the Western bloc (Sundquist, V. H. 2010). The Red Brigades represented a paramilitary organization of right-wing parties and the Communist Party of Italy, whose method of mobilization was based on gathering and uniting ideologically like-minded people

from the area of workers' circles, who were surrounded by bad working conditions, limited rights, and longed for concrete collective action that would transform the political system and reduced the influence of the right. The gradual focus of the change in terrorist tactics, which was initially based on the destruction of the property of trade union leaders, is visible, which gradually switches to open terrorist attacks on trade union headquarters, with which this paramilitary organization tried to consolidate its military and political activities along a multinational framework, in an effort to justify and legitimizes its defensive tactics against the right (Sundquist, V. H. 2010). It can be noted that with the gradual strengthening of this organization, the targeted focus of action shifts from workers' circles to institutional circles, but the core of the struggle remains focused in the foundations of the communist idea of the fight against capitalism and all institutions and organizations that represented the idea of capitalism, of which the Christian Democratic Party stands out the most. The party and its activities. The organization "Gruppi d'Azione Partigiana" (GAP) was based on the belief that a right-wing coup is the only realistic scenario, and that change at the internal level is possible only through rural guerrilla movements, but this paramilitary organization significantly weakened after the death of its leader Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, and joined the Red Brigades, which contributed to the greater number of this organization, but this caused more and more instability regarding the activities of the Red Brigades, especially after Feltrinelli's death, which brought with it more and more police investigations regarding the activities of the Red Brigades (Henninger, M. 2006). This period represents a major turning point in the activities of the Red Brigade, which results in a different view of the right, and forced by the new situation and circumstances regarding the increasing number of police investigations, the Red Brigades decide on different means and ways of achieving their revolutionary goals.

At the beginning of April 1974, the Red Brigades abducted judge Mario Sossio, which changed the target group against which the violence was perpetrated, and now moved from violence against the central actors of the state, instead of against the powerful within factory and industrial circles, which resulted in attracting media attention to the organization itself, as an essential link in terms of considerable influence and pressure on the government (Henninger, M. 2006). One can get the impression that the media image and perception were extremely important to the Red Brigades, and they combined their aggressive and terrorist activities with propaganda activities, which in a way resembled the mechanism of the right. A turnaround in the intensity of violence and terrorism occurred in 1974, when right-wing terrorism came to the fore, which is most noticeable in the example of bombings at protests against neo-fascist violence in Brescia, and on the train during the journey from Rome to Munich, and by placing

informers in the ranks of the Red Brigade, but in the following years there is a renewed dominance of terrorist attacks and kidnappings by the Red Brigade on political leaders and media personalities (Henninger, M. 2006). Constant terrorist attacks from both sides produced increasing instability at the state level in terms of the normal functioning of state institutions, and it can be said that the events after 1974 represent a prelude to the peak of the unstable political situation, caused by the kidnapping and murder of the Christian Democratic Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades.

4.3. Media Perceptions of the Kidnapping and Murder of Prime Minister Aldo Moro

The kidnapping and murder of the president of the Christian Democratic Party, Aldo Moro, became one of the most controversial events in the country in the 1970s, generating numerous public and media debates regarding conspiracy theories about the motive for his murder. One of the most famous theories was that the Red Brigades had the background and support from the dominant powers, and that the main principals were actually the secret services, the most prominent of which were the American CIA, the Soviet KGB, German and Israeli intelligence organizations, the Gladio formation and masonic lodges that had an extremely dominant influence in Italy, and it can be said that these theories are still relevant today, as evidenced by debates in the literature between advocates and opponents of these theories (Hof, T. 2013). Conspiracy theories about the Moro's fate really had a profound effect on the collective perception of the citizenry, and it can be said that they left behind a certain kind of trauma. These theories should be taken with a grain of salt, in order to see as objectively as possible the connection between the Communist Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the paramilitary formations on both sides, the Italian secret service and the Gladio formation. The United States of America or the Soviet Union could influence most effectively directly through secret formations, while the parties performed political tasks at the state level. The influence of other secret services of the Western Bloc countries could have been directed at the Stay Behind formation or at NATO itself, but before any further conclusions, the individual positions of the United States of America and the Soviet Union should be taken into account, and compared with the actions of the Red Brigades at the time.

Senator Andreatta for the Catholic newspaper L'Avvenire confirmed the theory that the Red Brigades are directed by the Soviet Union with other communist countries, but in further statements the senator denied these claims, while another source of doubt about the existence

of support from external forces is based on letters from Moro himself, which he directed to the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party, the Pope and his family, alluding to the fact that there may be some provision by the United States of America, which calls for passivity on the part of the Christian Democratic Party and the government (Hof, T. 2013). These cases cast even more doubt on the responsibility of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, and therefore the point of view of the American and Soviet services on this event should not be underestimated. It is obvious that the United States of America did not get involved in a sufficient way in the rescue of Moro itself, seeing it as a tool that is no longer functional to contribute to their Cold War interests, and what was expected from the United States of America was to work on the external image of the right, which was to remain blameless, showing no weakness before the enemy. In this way, the continuity of the right's dominance would be maintained, which would signal to the Communist Party that their terrorist tactics cannot cause deeper changes and instability within the party system.

Moro was abducted on the day when he was supposed to be present at the parliamentary debate related to the vote of confidence in the newly formed minority government, and that Moro's abduction contributed to the fact that the government, without too long procedures, received the confidence of the Senate and the House of Representatives (Moss, D. 1981) Moro The kidnapping accelerated the formation of the executive power, in which the Christian Democratic Party and the Communist Party had the most dominant influence, in order to harmonize the coordination between institutions at all levels of government in order to find Moro as quickly as possible, but as time went on, instability in the country became more and more grew, which had direct consequences on the activities of the Communist Party in the government. The underlying motive was to prevent the Communist Party of Italy from becoming an integral part of the government (Heywood, P. 2009). In order to see this thesis in its entirety, it is necessary to examine what were the aspirations and goals of the Communist Party and the Red Brigades, to what extent they overlapped, and it is also necessary to take into account the fact that the Christian Democratic Party from the beginning of the "Lead Years" tried to portray the left as the culprit for internal instability, while in the sphere of foreign policy and international relations, the survival and financing of the Christian Democratic Party largely depended on the Cold War and the interests of the United States of America.

The course of events during the Moro's abduction is analyzed by phases, and first looks at the initial phase of Moro's interrogation and trial by the court established by the Red Brigades, where he pleaded guilty to all counts of the indictment, which were related to his function and activities within the Christian Democratic Party, and the outcome of his confession resulted in

a death sentence without the possibility of pardon or exchange for imprisoned terrorists (Moss, D. 1981).

As a paramilitary organization, the Red Brigades did not trust the state and state institutions, and they established their own courts in which state leaders of opposing ideological backgrounds would be questioned. The question arises to what extent these courts were objective, and it can be assumed that Moro's confession was coerced by threats, intimidation and terrorist activities, but it also cannot be claimed that Moro was innocent on all counts of the indictment, and it can be assumed that he was aware of his outcome, trying to expose himself while protecting the interests of the Christian Democratic Party.

The second phase was reflected in the "false" announcement to the public that Moro was officially dead, but three days later the spokesmen of the Red Brigades rejected the previous statement, and in support submitted photos that proved that Moro was still alive, and that he could to be spared if the communist prisoners were released, but the government refused this concession, thus Moro's fate was forever sealed (Moss, D. 1981). The Red Brigades left Moro's fate in the hands of the government, presided over by Giulio Andreotti, and the question arises as to what kind of relationship there was between these two leaders, and whether Moro actually had enemies within the Christian Democratic Party itself. One possible scenario is that Andreotti was already aware that he could not do much to spare Moro's life, and it was inevitable to preserve the reputation of the party in order to survive in the future by refusing to submit to the enemy, thus making Moro collateral damage.

Andreotti, regarding the abduction of Moro and his letters, appeared extremely calm and restrained, and made a statement that he was aware of possible theories, and that the security services would act in accordance with all possible scenarios, and that all indications that suggest about Moro's current condition (Hof, T. 2013). At first glance, Andreotti's behavior seemed unusual, especially as it concerned the fate of the supreme leader of the party that Andreotti himself represented. It can be said that he was extremely aware of Moro's situation, and that he knew current information about Moro's current condition, thanks to his close connection with the secret service and other non-state secret organizations, and due to his pragmatism, he judged that the best not to interfere so that the party would not lose its influence, and also did not want to resent external actors such as the United States of America.

Moro's letter addressed to the Minister of the Interior, Francesco Cossiga, is particularly interesting, in which he believes that the government should take all possible measures to secure his release, and mentions the convening of the National Council of Christian Democrats,

whereby he equates his role as a state with the survival of the state (*raison d'Etat*), and in the conditions of captivity behaves as dignified as when he held his state office without any hindrance, not allowing his political career to be seen as finished (Heywood, P. 2009). Moro believed that the party could do much more for him, and that it was necessary for the party's actions to correspond directly with the level of seriousness of the situation, because the fate of the party and the state depended on his fate, but it seems that the party buried Moro even before he was killed. One of the reasons for not doing anything about his abduction is his decision from 1964, Moro's decision to place the Socialist Party directly in the government, but the United States of America was strongly against that idea, and shied away from any cooperation with any part of the left. (Heywood, P. 2009). This fact supports the theory that the United States of America prohibited the Christian Democratic Party from taking any concrete steps regarding the work on the Moro's case, because of his potential intentions to get closer to the soft left, which was against the American Cold War policy.

The end result of the Moro affair was reflected in the termination of support for the Christian Democratic government by the Communist Party in 1979, as well as the rupture of their relations, and events on the international scene are increasingly beginning to indicate that the Cold War has entered a new phase, thus reviving interest in Moro's case from by various theoreticians and scientists outside Italy, who were classified in the fields that dealt with the study of terrorism (Hof, T. 2013). Moro's case not only left a mark inside the country, but scientists outside the country tried to provide answers to some fundamental questions regarding this case, and also to answer the various theories that were present among citizens and Italian academic circles. The American journalist Clarie Sterling carefully processed and analyzed this case in the 80s, and came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was fully responsible for the situation, which became a generally accepted theory throughout Italy, especially by right-wing and fascist circles (Hof, T. 2013). This development of events and the attempt to shape public opinion within the country shows how much Italy was tied to the position of the United States of America in all areas of political and public life, by showing a high level of non-autonomy in terms of shaping public opinion within its own territory. The reports of the parliamentary commission for the investigation of the murder of Aldo Moro concluded that there was no foreign influence regarding the development of the Moro case, but that the responsibility for this case lies with the domestic culprits (Hof, T. 2013). Even if the official report absolved foreign powers of any responsibility, the Moro case is still not fully clarified, and a great deal of space has been left for discussions on the topic of a different spectrum of conspiracy theories, which still remains one of the biggest wounds of Italian society.

4.4. The Relations Between Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and the P2 Masonic Lodge

The murder of Prime Minister Moro sparked many discussions and attempts to find the cause of his death inside and outside the country, but since the external factor was eliminated, the question arose whether the culprit was within the state apparatus or whether the secret service was responsible for it. Later investigations into Moro's murder established that the main actor who encouraged the passivity of the government and other state bodies regarding Moro's fate was the Italian Masonic lodge P2, whose organization and depth of foundation remain a mystery to this day, but thanks to the problem of the government in which it is present irregularity regarding the relative autonomy of party government, thus causing conflict between politics and administration, organizations such as P2 have much more free space to interfere in the work of state bodies (De Felice, F. 1989). This thesis hints at the connection of government leaders with secret organizations, which they can manage in order to realize their own interest and the interest of the party they represent.

The work of this organization was well known within the political environment, but also within the security bodies themselves, but the awareness of this organization as a problem that strikes at the foundations of statehood appeared very late, at the height of the investigation aimed at discovering the perpetrators of the murder of the banker Sindona, whereby the government carried out a deeper investigation into this organization, which also established a parliamentary commission, whose task was to analyze the connection of this organization with different cases (De Felice, F. 1989). It can be said that the government leaders themselves were to blame for delaying the investigation into the activities of the Masonic lodge P2, but the increasingly frequent assassinations of political leaders and personalities from the media sphere pushed the government against the wall, and thus bodies were established that will carefully analyze the past current assassinations, but the question arises whether these bodies are impartial and objective enough to make the most just decision, regardless of whether it affects the reputation of the party or a state leader.

Many assassinations and riots, such as the massacre in Bologna in 1980, could have been prevented if more efficient actions had been taken after Moro's death, but due to the lodge's strong connection with the Italian political-institutional system, which included some basic components such as the entanglement between politics and the economy, the frequent privatization of public segment and the concealment of the private segment, which results in a rift between the government and control that is reflected in the bureaucratic apparatus and the

public economy (De Felice, F. 1989). As the stability of the Italian political system was closely linked to economic stability, which was partly unstable in those years, which resulted in the privatization of many public goods, this resulted in a favorable climate for the stabilization of the position of secret organizations and their more aggressive action in terms of planning assassinations and creating a climate full of instability, which could have been prevented by an objective judgment after More's death.

The very proof of the recognition of the connection between the Masonic lodge and state authorities was given by Senator Cossiga himself at the trial for the crime of association, where during his testimony he vehemently denied that he had any knowledge of the Masonic lodge until 1981, but at the same time he mentioned his meetings with Licio Gelli, who was one of the most famous faces of P2, and he explained in his own way that this lodge consisted of supreme powers in different sectors, but their common characteristic was that they were representatives of pro-American and pro-Atlantic attitudes (Cesqui, E. 1998). Is it not more than a coincidence that Moro addressed his letters most often to Francesco Cossiga, whose passive actions could indicate that Cossiga was previously informed about the existence and structure of this Masonic lodge, and from this it can be concluded that there was a certain network which connected the government and other state bodies with the Christian Democratic Party, the Italian secret service, the Masonic lodge P2, and with the Gladio formation that operated within the framework of the pro-Atlantic organization "Stay Behind", which confirms the thesis of previous theories during Moro's case that the outcome at that time it was not only a matter of domestic affairs, but also shaped by pressure from the United States of America and the countries of the Western bloc in order to firmly maintain the Cold War order.

The relationship between Giulio Andreotti and Licio Gelli was based on the fact that Gelli was in charge of receiving orders and carrying them out from Andreotti, as evidenced by a recording of a telephone call recorded by investigators, which took place between Sindona's confidante Bordoni and his lawyer Guizzi, where the lawyer clearly asks what role Gelli played within the political scene, whether he was a lieutenant protecting a supreme leader or a key figure in the P2 hierarchy, to which Bordoni replies that he was in charge all along of concealing Andreotti, who in fact was the main figure of the Masonic lodge P2 (Guarino, M., & Raugei, F. 2006). Namely, Andreotti above all cared about an unsullied political reputation in the public, and therefore his behavior and lifestyle were shaped by Christian Democratic values. But as a political being and a supreme official, who is guided by a realistic theory of survival on the political scene, Andreotti strove to create a favorable climate for the realization of his personal interests, and only later the interests of the party to the extent that they overlapped with his

personal interests. Creating a favorable climate included the elimination of political opponents and other actions that were treated as criminal and socially unacceptable actions, and for such a plan he needed the right hand that he saw in Licio Gelli, who in the past had one of the key roles during fascism, which helped even after the fall of the fascist regime to create and maintain the foundations for the firm and stable operation of secret organizations. Andreotti was not a person who liked to expose himself publicly, but acted from the sidelines, ordering Gelli in which direction the Masonic lodge P2 should act in terms of creating the most favorable political order between political parties and individual political actors within the parties. Gelli exploited the inefficiency of state bodies and secret services in order to provide a favorable climate and support to Andreotti, who advocated reforms on the political scene, which aimed to turn the secret services into extended arms and subordinate organizations to the Masonic organization P2 (Guarino, M., & Raugei, F. 2006). Andreotti used his political position to create an increasing destabilization of state bodies, and especially of secret state organizations, in order to create a hybrid system that would have two contradictory sides, that is, one that would stand for the idea of justice, the common good and respect for the law, while the second will be in the shadow of the first, and will try to create situations that would eliminate political opponents and establish an order that is in the interest of the ruling elite.

The very face of state institutions and legality will have the purpose of covering up the responsibilities of secret organizations that are a symbol of the other face. The origin of the Masonic lodge P2 itself is linked to the beginning of the 70s, when Licio Gelli formed a network of the most famous actors of the financial scene, the most prominent of whom were the banker Michele Sindona, Roberto Calvi who held the position of president of the Ambrosiano bank, and the financier Umberto Ortolani, who, by joining the Christian Democratic Party, established extremely strong relations with Andreotti, but the banker Sindona more directly introduces and promotes Andreotti within the financial world in 1973, in order to improve his reputation within the financial world, but in return Sindona had to pay enormous amounts of subsidies to the Christian Democratic Party so that Andreotti and later remained his political patron (Guarino, M., & Raugei, F. 2006). It can be said that Gelli tried to form an organization that would exclusively refer to the financial aspect, but in order for the organization to fulfill its goals more effectively, it was of crucial importance to introduce a powerful person from the world of politics into the network.

As the Sindona banker was experiencing a kind of crisis on the financial scene, he sought help in party circles, no more and no less than the Christian Democratic Party, which was the most dominant party in the country at the time, thus opening up space for Andreotti, who could turn

the situation to his advantage, offering Sindona help, but in return Sindona had to invest significant funds in the development of the party, which automatically makes Andreotti more and more tied to the secret Masonic lodge, using a combination of political and financial influence to climb the ladder of this secret organization that operated behind the front of the state, and thus combined legitimate power with secret illegitimate power, which made the Christian Democratic Party even more autonomous within the Italian political scene, while Andreotti became the main creator of the Italian internal and external political scene.

5. The Role of Craxi and Andreotti in the Italo-American Bilateral Relations

In this chapter, special focus will be placed on the analysis of the leadership styles of Bettino Craxi, who headed the Italian Socialist Party, and Giulio Andreotti, who headed the Christian Democratic Party. Both of these leaders were in a surveying position, and it is therefore very important to compare their political steps in the field of internal and foreign policy, and to put a special context on the intensity of their relations with the political leadership of the United States of America.

From the previous chapter, we can come to the conclusion that Andreotti had extremely intense relations with the United States of America, both because of the events in the country and the organization of secret organizations, as well as because of the close relationship between the Christian Democratic Party and the United States of America since the time of De Gasperi, when this country was one of the biggest financiers of the country and the party itself. For Craxi can be said to come from the mild political left, which has on several occasions closely cooperated with the Christian Democratic right, especially regarding the formation of coalitions for the government. The United States did not favor cooperation with any form of the left, for fear that it would encourage the Soviet Union to act more aggressively, and this begs the question of what attitude the United States had toward the prime ministerial leadership of Bettino Craxi. This issue will be discussed in detail in the context of an international terrorist event in which Italy and the United States were the main actors - the "Sigonella Crisis".

It can be said that this case caused strained diplomatic relations between the United States of America, and that Bettino Craxi was the main actor who was ready to make more drastic moves, even at the cost of tightening relations with the United States of America or possible sanctions. One of the more important data is that during this crisis Giulio Andreotti was much more in

touch with foreign policy and international relations, and it is necessary to examine in what way Andreotti influenced the shaping of the American position on this issue, and to what extent American and Christian Democratic interests overlapped in the mid-80s, when that crisis occurred.

It can be noted that Craxi was very aware of the dominance over Italy by the United States of America since its capitulation during the Second World War, and that Italy would never be able to take an independent step in terms of more autonomous decision-making in the sphere of foreign and domestic policy, especially because of the financial dependence of the country on the part of the United States of America, which the Christian Democratic Party increasingly strengthened.

The crisis in Sigonella represents the peak of relations and a kind of turning point between the United States of America and Italy, and therefore also depicts the peak of the Cold War period. This chapter will also focus on the relations between Christian Democrats and Socialists after this crisis until the end of the Cold War, which will also examine the intensity of the influence of the United States of America at the level of the country and at the level of the parties, so that at the end of this chapter a holistic view of one a period that had multiple global effects, and what outcome the end of the Cold War brought for Italy.

This chapter will ultimately provide an answer to the main hypothesis that the United States of America has largely shaped the foreign and domestic Italian policy, and will also confirm or refute the thesis that the Christian Democratic Party is strengthening bilateral relations with the United States of America, while the left led by the Communist Party worked to weaken those relations. In order to get an answer to the auxiliary hypothesis of immediate importance, it will be necessary to carefully analyze the order of Craxi's decisions during the peak period of his power, and then compare them with the principles of the Italian Socialist Party, in order to see the level of deviation, and to see from a better angle the nuances of the Italian left.

5.1. Political Strategies of Bettino Craxi and Giulio Andreotti during Craxi's Government

The Christian Democratic Party was one of the most dominant parties in the country in terms of strength at all levels of government, and was especially known for the longest prime ministerial mandates and dominance in terms of forming governments, so it is unusual to

imagine that the left would have the strength to achieve dominance within Italian politics scenes.

One of the main reasons for pushing Bettino Craxi into the prime ministerial position was that the Christian Democratic Party was fed up with the constant dominance of the prime ministerial position, which was also noticeable during Aldo Moro's time, who was more and more persistent in establishing a dialogue between the different currents within the party, in order to create a favorable climate within the party shaped by a unified opinion on the issue of an alliance with the Communist Party, in order to work on solving pressing issues such as the rise of terrorism and the economic crisis, thus this aspiration resulted in thoughts of allowing the Communist Party to participate in government (Guizzi, V. 1985). For a long time, the Christian Democratic Party was persistent in terms of political dominance, both because of the interests of the United States of America, and in terms of the stability of the country, because most of the subsidies to the country were sent by the United States of America. But during his mandate, Moro himself realizes that the Christian Democratic Party is too weak in terms of establishing both economic and political balance within the country, and with that he tries to reach a compromise with the left, and at most with the Communist Party. But it was an extremely thorny path, primarily because the Christian Democratic Party itself consisted of leaders with fragmented political views, but even if theoretically there was support from the Party, the United States of America would be a staunch opponent of this idea. It can be said that in fact the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party did not want to work on eradicating these two fundamental problems, both because of the interests of the secret organizations of which they are members, as well as because of the secure support from the United States of America, and joint projects in terms of security aspects such as the Gladio formation. After Moro's death, there was a stratification and instability of the Christian Democratic Party to manage the internal politics of the country, which resulted in the formation of a government in 1978, which consisted of communists and liberals headed by Andreotti and the Christian Democratic Party, but this government fell into a crisis due to the aggressive policy of the communists and of the Christian Democrats, and the solution was overseen by the entry of the Socialists onto the scene, and the formation of Spadolini's government, which is known for the fact that it was headed by a non-Christian Prime Minister (Guizzi, V. 1985).

The Christian Democratic Party could not afford a period of instability, especially because it was controlled by the United States of America, and had to be careful not to jeopardize Cold War plans on the ground of a country shaped by American interests.

After Moro's death, his aspirations were fulfilled, which were reflected in the formation of a government dominated by the Communist and Democratic parties, and with this act it was considered that stability in the country would be achieved by some middle way by listening to and respecting the Christian Democratic problems, but both parties could not to reach a compromise because of their aggressive way of conducting politics, but it is not exclusive that the United States of America had their hands involved so that this government would not survive, and the communists were replaced by a milder version of the right-wing socialists, with whom the Christian Democratic Party had a stable relationship during De Gasperi's time Cooperation.

Craxi was appointed head of the party by sheer coincidence, the result of a deal created by a 'forty-year-old' against an older leader, and he used this opportunity to strengthen the Socialist Party, working on how to free the Socialist Party from the circle of dependence on the Christian Democratic Party within the framework of the right and Communist Party within the framework of the left, and in accordance with this effort, he worked on the restructuring and reshaping of the party and the rejection of previous positions and projects in which the party was involved, but still retaining the note of leftist politics in the plans for the 1979 election campaign (Guizzi, V. 1985).

Craxi simply aspired to rebuild the identity of the Socialist Party, which would not rely exclusively on the Communist Party, nor would it depend on whether the Christian Democratic Party would invite it to cooperate, seeing it as a lesser evil. Craxi hoped that he would achieve his goals to the end, and that the Socialist Party would have an independent political agenda from the rest of the left, and that it would not be viewed by identification with the Communist Party, but these ideas were extremely difficult to turn into action, especially because the Socialist Party was used to moving and thinking within a left-wing framework.

The Socialists did not excel in the election results, but Craxi's party plans made a strong impression on President Sandro Pertini, who invited him to try to form a government, but that attempt was unsuccessful, but Craxi continued to work on building the party's identity, and at the same time starting the reform project of the main state institutions at all levels of government, this time counting on the support of the Communist Party in terms of ideas such as the direct election of the President of the Republic, and precisely defined competences and demarcations as far as the roles of state power can reach, which mostly related to the judiciary (Guizzi, V. 1985). The reason for the unsuccessful formation of Craxi's government lies in the fact that the socialists still did not have the capacity to act independently, regardless of all the restructuring steps that Craxi took so far so that the Socialist Party could finally find its path,

and Craxi remains convinced that together with the Communist Party he can work on problems that created instability within the country, and also contributed to the firm dominance of the Christian Democratic Party at the expense of the left. It was necessary to clarify in detail the field of activity of each organ separately, in order to create a well-established path of coordination between the organs, and to prevent the judiciary from exceeding its powers.

During the Craxi government, great focus was placed on the problem of finding an appropriate way to make the decision-making process of the executive as efficient as possible, and that Craxi was able to face the problems within the executive related to the relentless struggle between workers and capitalists regarding distribution of subsidies that are based on social welfare (Hine, D. 1986). Craxi's government tried to focus exclusively on the problems faced by the executive power, such as regulating relations in the field of internal politics between workers and capitalists, who tried to get as many subsidies as possible through the state, without looking at the real situation in the country, and to the interest of other actors.

Craxi was the leader who presided over the government that had the longest and most stable lifespan, unlike any other government throughout Italian history, and during his tenure he faced issues such as frequent bickering between coalition parties over party appointments to high bureaucratic positions within public sector, and it can be said that during his mandate, in addition to the disagreements of the coalition parties, there were controversies related to the Social Democratic Minister of Finance Pietro Longo and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Giulio Andreotti, which resulted in a devastating outcome for Craxi and his party, who were on the side Longo, while Andreotti emerged as the winner from this case, but he was still denied the opportunity to advance to the position of President of the Republic, and ended up in a lower political position (Hine, D. 1986). Even if Craxi held the position of Prime Minister firmly and stably, in the end he did not have enough capacity and arguments to stand up for the protection of the position of the leader of his party, and this time the Democratic Christian Party and Andreotti used their dominant position to get out with as few possible consequences as possible which could harm the image of the Party, but in a way this outcome can be considered a personal defeat for Andreotti, who was prevented from advancing to the supreme political position of President of the Republic. The author states that Craxi's mandate was accompanied by major controversies at the international level surrounding the Achille Lauro case, which had consequences both domestically and internationally, which further exhausted Craxi, and he was ready to resign, but he did not get given the green light by the President of the Republic of Cossiga, and was eventually forced to head the government during the 1984 European

Parliament campaign, the 1985 Italian regional assembly campaign, and the 1985 wage indexation referendum (Hine, D. 1986).

The case of Achille Lauro represents a focal point in the relations between the United States of America and Italy, in which Craxi with the Socialist Party played a major role, but the question arises whether the consequences would have been milder if Andreotti had not been sanctioned as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and if The Democratic Party achieved its continuous dominance. Craxi decided to take a risk, bringing Italy's relationship with the United States of America to the brink of stability, after which he was met with consequences to which he was not ready to respond, and he considered the best solution to permanently withdraw from the political scene, but President Cossiga persistently refused Craxi's resignation and the question arises, what were Cossiga's motives for the survival of Craxi on the political scene.

Craxi managed to survive on the political scene holding the office of minister and surveyor without previous experience, thanks to his talent and reflexivity in terms of traditional political skills such as political skills of manipulation, who constantly tried to mitigate differences by using the instrument of sharing various concessions, privileges, and in the end, he was skilled at taking the right steps at the right time, but at the same time, Craxi made the opposite moves to those who aligned themselves with the cautious management of traditional politics, and often with his controversies and polemics, he tried to stay in the center as long as possible public discussions (Hine, D. 1986). In essence, Craxi was a rational and realistic politician, who had a shrewd knowledge of the characters of the government officials he was surrounded by, and therefore knew how to deal with them in order to get the desired concession at the right time, and thereby stay in power as long as possible, but In essence, Craxi was not an ideal politician, precisely because of his impulsiveness, which was a product of his desire for publicity and building the image of the dominant Socialist Party, modeled after the Christian Democratic Party. Giulio Andreotti was a high-ranking leader who built his career both on the prefectural and ministerial positions, the most famous of which was the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, which he held at the time of the biggest diplomatic crises in the country. Andreotti was not the type of politician who built his image on media popularity, he was always measured when it came to expressing his political opinions in public, and he made many political moves behind the scenes, using secret organizations, in which he was a particularly dominant figure.

As already mentioned, Andreotti did not want to be the central topic of the media space, but he left behind several interviews and three books that provide a holistic view of Andreotti's view of Italian foreign and domestic politics. Thus, in one of the interviews, Andreotti states that he fully agreed with Craxi's decisions regarding the "Achille Lauro" affair, and states that Egypt

would not take any steps regarding the fate of the ship, in the event of a scenario in which Italy and he further detains the Egyptian plane, after the arrest of the hijackers, and with regard to the "Sigonella" affair, maintains a pro-American course, saying that the United States of America had no intention of threatening Italian sovereignty in any way, and supports his claim with Reagan's apology to Craxi, a few days after the event in Sigonella, and further states that this apology was a condition for the attendance of Craxi and Andreotti at the preparatory meeting of the first Regan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva (Foppiani O., & Andreotti, G.2001). As much as they had different political views, Craxi and Andreotti acted in concert in crisis foreign policy and diplomatic periods, but in Andreotti's interview there is a very striking defense of the United States of America regarding this crisis, while, unlike Andreotti, Craxi openly expressed his concern about the actions of the United States of the American States on the issue of Italian sovereignty.

Andreotti viewed the field of foreign policy in such a way that it is necessary to engage in an attempt to overcome the historical difficulties that have affected the country at the internal level, which would lead to the transfer of the Italian personality to the international level, thus Italy would be considered a stable country, whose internal and external politics cannot be disturbed by any international changes and crises (Vedovato, G. 1977). Andreotti was guided by the opinion that Italy can compete with other international actors, regardless of its traumatic past, which caused a crisis in the field of internal and foreign policy, and that it has now become a formed and stable country that forms partnerships with other international actors, and that provides support to other countries in crisis management. Andreotti tries to support the idea of the unity of Europe, and also wants to incorporate European values at the internal level of the country, and also advocates the principle of economic and financial solidarity on the territory of Europe (Vedovato, G. 1977). In terms of foreign policy, Andreotti mostly focuses on the economic aspect, and in accordance with the goal of financial aid, he advocates the unity and uniqueness of European countries, and it can be said that Andreotti continued to encourage the same model of foreign policy moves as his predecessors from the Christian Democratic Party, such as it was the survey by Alcide De Gasperi. With regard to the situation regarding the unification of Germany and the question of the liberal economic turn under Reagan, Andreotti believed that Reagan was responsible for the weakening and fall of the Soviet Union, and that he was also responsible for the liberalization of the political systems of the countries that belonged to the Soviet Union, while for the question of unification It is of key importance for Germany that the future Germany be included in the program of the North Atlantic Alliance, and be part of the European Community, which would contribute to the stronger construction

of the European identity, and make a discontinuity with its Nazi past (Foppiani O., & Andreotti, G.2001). Analyzing the leadership styles of Bettino Craxi and Giulio Andreotti, who were the leading figures of the Christian Democratic and Socialist Parties, a certain overlap can be observed in terms of foreign policy, especially in terms of attitudes on the "Achille Lauro" affair, European issues and events at the end of the Cold War and the transformation of the old order into the new, but the main point of divergence was regarding the role of the United States of America on Italian foreign policy and its sovereignty.

5.2. The Achille Lauro Affair

It can be said that the relations between Italy and the United States of America were gradually built, from the beginning of the Italian capitulation and the transition from a fascist to a democratic regime, and this relationship was significantly transformed thanks to the circumstances of the Cold War, in which the attitude of the United States of America towards Italy changed from isolationist foreign policy management to a stable and strong partnership, which were further strengthened by economic subsidies and the Marshall Plan. The "Achille Lauro" terrorist affair, which happened in the mid-eighties of the last century, was enough to instantly destroy the long-standing partnership between the United States of America and Italy, and therefore the different perception of the interests of these two countries in the Middle East is emphasized as the center of the problem, especially in the context of the Palestine Liberation Organization (Piason, F. J. 1986). And if at first glance the United States of America and Italy were very strong allies, these countries essentially did not share the same views in the sphere of foreign and domestic politics. Namely, after the capitulation, Italy was a vulnerable and unstable country, which often had bad relations with other Western countries, and the bias of survival forced it to seek help from the United States of America, but the request for help from the United States of America turned into a form of dependence, which was intensified by the Cold War, and encouraged by the Christian Democratic Party in order to solve the internal economic crisis and instability in an instant way, but this dependence brought with it side effects, the most dominant of which was the interference of the United States of America in the Italian internal affairs policy, which was complained about and warned by many Italian leaders.

As a point of divergence between the views of the United States of America and Italy regarding the issue of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the author takes the Venice Declaration of the European Community from 1980, which gives guidelines to member states regarding their

behavior towards the Middle East, which treats it as an area of vital strategic and economic importance. significance, but the Italian perception of this declaration was not in accordance with this fundamental perception, which also reflected the position of the United States of America, which became most visible in 1985 during the "Achille Lauro" crisis (Piason, F. J. 1986). Italy did not feel connected to the Middle Eastern and Palestinian issues, and for this claim it is possible to find a diverse spectrum of factors, of which the different cultural basis, not considering the Middle Eastern countries as essential allies that will improve the country's position on the foreign policy scene, but on the other hand the Middle East was the focus of interest of the United States of America, and any confrontation with the interests of the United States of America could turn into hostility or sanctions against the country. It can also be noted that Italy had a completely neutral attitude towards the Middle Eastern countries, but they were viewed by Italy as an instrument that could finally resist the long series of subordination of Italy to the interests of the United States of America.

There are controversies as to whether the case of "Achille Lauro" can be classified as a misdemeanor in the field of piracy, but the hijacking of a cruise ship does not belong to a case of piracy because the Palestinian special forces boarded the cruise ship, before it started sailing, and the deed was done due to political colored motives and not for private gain, but the author also touches on the field of terrorism at the same time, and draws attention to the fact that at that time there was a legal deficiency and gap within the field of international law, which regulated only maritime piracy, while maritime terrorism was not defined or sanctioned at all (Ronzitti, N. 2010). It can be said that the case of "Achille Lauro" contributed to the fact that the international scene begins to perceive the very concept and essence of terrorism differently, which before this case were very narrowly analyzed legally, and that the term terrorism was not considered maritime terrorism, but actually perceived terrorism through the eyes of traditional terrorism, and maritime law was exclusively responsible for defining and sanctioning piracy, which became much less common after this case.

This case resulted in filling the legal gap with the adoption of the Convention for the Suppression of Illegal Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation in 1988, which was implemented thanks to the International Organization for Migration, supported by Austria, Egypt and Italy (Ronzitti, N. 2010). The cooperation of European and Middle Eastern countries resulted in the creation of the Convention, the task of which would be to predict all possible scenarios based on previous experiences, in order to preserve the safety of navigation, and it is also important to emphasize the contribution in this area, which was provided by the country itself, and thus strengthened its position on the international scene.

The "Achille Lauro" or "Sigonella Crisis" foreign policy affair began when an Italian-owned cruise ship was captured by the Palestine Liberation Front, which was a branch of the Palestine Liberation Organization, while sailing on the route from Alexandria to Port Said (Halberstam, M. 1988). It can be said that the choice of the cruiser Achilla Lauro by the Palestine Liberation Front was a mere coincidence, this organization did not primarily target Italy, but wanted to attract the attention of the United States of America, which was the policy maker in the Middle East, especially regarding the Palestinian issue.

The hijackers boarded the ship in Genoa, pretending to be tourists, and terrorized the crew and passengers, keeping them hostage until Israel met the condition of releasing 50 Palestinian prisoners, and threatened to blow up the ship if any intervention was attempted in in terms of rescue (Halberstam, M.1988). Taught by past experience with regard to developments and negotiations in the Middle East regarding the Palestinian issue, these organizations believed that the internal problem could be solved by violent extremist and terrorist attacks, rather than negotiations. The eighties of the last century can be described as the fertile years of the flowering of Middle Eastern terrorism, where the growth of extremist Islamist parties and paramilitary formations was recorded on the regional scene. With this act, they believed that the European countries and the United States of America would animate Israel to fulfill the demands as soon as possible in order to spare the suffering of a large number of European and American citizens that happened on the ship.

But their demands were followed by passivity, which resulted in the members of this organization shooting the American Jew Leon Klinghoffer and disposing of his body by throwing it into the sea (Halberstam, M.1988). With this act, they wanted to stimulate American anger and reaction to the murder of an American citizen, because both negative publicity and reaction were much more effective towards achieving the goal than threats that are taken with a grain of salt and create passivity. In order to explain the "Achille Lauro" case more vividly and methodologically, the events are divided into four categories: the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship "Achille Lauro", which made this hijacking unusual precisely because until then ships were almost never hijacked, which automatically made all important international actors into the case, of which the United States of America stands out the most (Piason, F. J. 1986). The aim of the attack was precisely this unexpectedness, the Palestine Liberation Front played on the card of fear of an unknown scenario, and thus counted that the international scene would quickly comply with their interests. The cause of passivity after the issuance of conditions by the Palestine Liberation Front lay in the fact that the Italian government believed that the solution to this situation could be found in the method of diplomatic negotiation, and therefore

Italy sought to bring together the United States of America, Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Israel, Tunisia, and finally the Palestinian Liberal Organization (Piason, F. J. 1986). The Italian government believed that the other Middle Eastern countries, especially Israel, would manage to find a compromise with the Palestinian Liberal Organization, but the problem was of a much deeper nature to be solved by mere negotiation, and it was expected that the hijacking of the cruise ship could result in fatalities. It can also be said that this was more of an American problem than an Italian one, and it was expected that the United States of America would react more violently to the new situation.

The Italian government received support from the Middle Eastern countries and the United States in condemning the terrorist act on the cruise ship, but the United States did not want to negotiate, but wanted to take direct action, if necessary, as unofficial news spread about the possible murder of two American citizens (Piason, F. J. 1986). The Italian government wanted to encourage the Middle Eastern countries to have a unified attitude regarding this event, so that the terrorists from the Palestine Liberation Front would remain unprotected and vulnerable, and would not be able to set any conditions.

But the situation changed dramatically, when the United States of America received information about new American victims, and they believed that the situation could drastically get out of control if they did not react in time. The United States of America felt that it would be necessary to organize a meeting with government experts who are trained to act in terrorist situations and a working group in charge of terrorist incidents, in order to consider all possible options, and finally crystallize the American position on this issue, which read that it is necessary for the American government to send a team that would provide urgent support to Rome, in order to help the American embassy in Italy, for the reason that the ship belonged to Italy, and that intervention by the Pentagon is not excluded (Bohn, M. K. 2004). An important point in this American attitude is that the United States of America was aware that the ship was owned by Italy, and was ready to provide assistance, but their perception of the situation at that time was visibly different.

Regarding the Italian position on the abduction, there was a split between the opinion of the Minister of Defense Giovanni Spadolini, who believed that the situation could only be solved by military intervention, while Craxi believed that a diplomatic approach was the only realistic solution (Bohn, M. K. 2004). This rift on the Italian side showed indecision regarding taking concrete action, which additionally caused a certain type of anger on the part of the United States of America, but the issue could not be resolved by unilateral American intervention,

precisely because of the law on international maritime law, which gave priority Italy, and thus this situation could develop into a stumbling block for Italian-American relations.

The ship was returned to Egyptian waters on November 9, 1985, and the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Italy would negotiate with the terrorists, and that Egypt would provide all its support in order to resolve the crisis diplomatically (Piason, F. J. 1986). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt believed that the best solution was to solve the problem in a diplomatic way, without tension, and they offered their support related to the details of organizing the negotiations. The first step towards a diplomatic solution was a conversation between the Egyptian leaders Abbas and Hassan, with the full approval of Italy, but the Egyptians were not informed about Abbas's strategy, and they looked at these talks as negotiations, but the goal of these negotiations was that the Palestine Liberation Organization takes all the credit for the successful end of this terrorist attack, and for alleviating the fate of the hijackers as much as possible, which was evident in terms of the conditions set for Italy, the first of which was related to the visit of the ambassadors of Italy, the United States of America, the Western Germany and Great Britain in order to make sure of the condition of the ship, and to ensure safe passage for the hijackers (Bohn, M. K. 2004). The Palestine Liberation Organization wanted to cover up the case, using Egypt's ignorance of their true intentions, which were actually reflected in rescuing the kidnappers, and building the image of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a savior in the eyes of the actors of the international scene.

All four ambassadors arrived in Port Said, and the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the ambassadors to express their countries' positions on the fate of the kidnappers, and after a short consultation with the governments, the Italian and German ambassadors agreed to release the kidnappers, on the condition that they release the hostages and leave the ship, but the British ambassador supported Margaret Thatcher's categorical stance on not negotiating with the kidnappers (Bohn, M. K. 2004). There was still no consensus between ambassadors and governments on the fate of the kidnappers. The Italian side cared about reaching the most favorable solution regarding the fate of the hostages, while the British side argued about the immorality of negotiating with terrorists.

A particularly important event, which shaped the negotiations themselves, was the report of Captain De Rosa, who stated that he and the passengers were fine, but this statement was made under pressure, while one of the kidnappers threatened him with a weapon, but the state of the negotiations was unchanged, American and the British ambassadors considered it immoral to release the kidnappers because of the murders they committed on board, but the Egyptian foreign minister believed that a consensus could be reached with two votes, and gave the

kidnappers the green light to leave the ship without any consequences (Bohn, M. K. 2004). The question is to what extent Italy and West Germany were aware of what was really happening on the ship, and whether the United States could have played a more active role in persuading Italy to change its mind regarding the fate of the kidnappers.

Craxi was completely ignorant of the situation that was happening on the ship, and he was stunned to learn about the murder of the American Leon Klinghoffer, and many theories were spread about who was and how knowledgeable about the situation, from which many believed that Andreotti had insight that a murder had taken place, but that he had released the kidnappers in order to spare the lives of the other passengers and staff, and the case had come to an end (Piason, F.J.1986). This case was under a large magnifying glass by both the domestic and foreign public and media, and therefore different theories began to be formed about the level of knowledge of the highest Italian officials in the events of this case, after the crew was rescued, after which Prime Minister Craxi carried out a detailed conversation with the captain and the crew, in order to find out what really happened in the ship, and whether the Italian decisions were correctly made in accordance with the situation.

Not long after the statement was taken by the crew and a more detailed reference to the events that happened on the ship, an argument and discussion arose between the United States of America, Italy, Egypt, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization on the question of which country is competent to try terrorists for the murder of ship, and on this issue Italy had a clearly crystallized position that the kidnappers should be tried in Italy, because the murder took place on an Italian ship, which was identified with Italian soil, but Israel also claimed the right to be tried on their territory because Jews were killed, but the Egyptian president eased the situation by stating that the kidnappers should be tried in the United States of America or Italy, to which Reagan gave the green light (Bohn, M. K. 2004). After learning about the murder, the states that were the main actors in this case tried to repair the damage they had previously done by jumping to conclusions, which culminated in a big international dispute, which only caused more damage by giving the kidnappers time to hide from the face of justice.

The goal of the actor states was to demonstrate through this problem that they are dominant, and that they have enough capacity and readiness to solve one of the world's biggest problems. This recognition was especially important for the Cold War policy of the United States of America, which would show the Soviet Union that it has firmly established relations with the Middle Eastern countries, and that it firmly maintains control over events on the international scene.

But in order for the parties to come to an agreement and bring about the most suitable solution regarding this issue, it was necessary to thoroughly study the provisions of international law. The case of Achille Lauro directly violates the International Convention of the United Nations regarding the taking of hostages, which is supported by their actions on the ship, and the setting of conditions related to the release of Palestinians from Israeli prison, and in this respect the United States of America and Egypt, as parties to the convention, are obliged to protect convention and punish those who violate it (Gooding, G. V. 1987). According to this provision of the convention, the hijackers should have been directly executed the moment they landed in Egyptian waters, regardless of the detailed record of the facts that happened on board, but it is evident that Egypt tried to alleviate the overall situation, giving space to the hijackers and moderating between of other actor countries in this case, and therefore the question arises as to what was Egypt's motive for this behavior, whether Egypt was really unaware of the gravity of the case or was trying to express sympathy and support for the Palestine Liberation Organization. But it is also necessary to review the positions of the United States of America regarding the provisions of international law, and why they focused exclusively on murder, while ignoring the initial violation of the convention, thus allowing the kidnappers to commit murder.

The first step the United States of America took was to issue an arrest warrant for the hijackers on charges of piracy and hostage-taking, but there was a legal difficulty in that the hijackers were citizens of Lebanon, which was not a signatory, the United States of America remained denied jurisdiction over the fate of the kidnappers in the matter of the Convention on Sanctioning the Holding of Hostages, and the United States of America was left with the only option to claim jurisdiction over the execution of hostages in the matter of the murder of an American citizen (Gooding, G. V. 1987). The United States of America ended up having less and less dominance in terms of jurisdiction over the execution of the hijackers, while Italy had the upper hand in terms of territorial basis. Piason states that Regan tried to convince Craxi through a telephone conversation that Italy hand over the jurisdiction of prosecuting the kidnappers to the United States of America, citing the murder of an American citizen as the reason, but Craxi refuses to do so, and Regan decides that the extradition of the kidnappers will be carried out on the basis of the American-Italian treaty on extradition (Piason, F. J. 1986). Regan's and Craxi's conversation eventually resulted in a compromise regarding the agreement of these two countries that they agree to bring the kidnappers to justice, but even if this decision could be seen as a solution to the case, the second part of this case followed, better known as the "Sigonella Crisis".

5.2.1. The Sigonella Crisis

The crisis in Sigonella represents a kind of denouement of the Achille Lauro affair, which is oriented towards the legal prosecution of the Palestinian kidnappers, and at the same time represents a climax in which Italian-American relations are put to the test, thus this case brings with it uncertainties regarding further diplomatic and political relations between the United States of America and Italy. Liput states that the "Sigonella Crisis" happened on November 10, 1985, when the planes of the United States Navy blocked the way of the Egyptian plane, which forced the Egyptian plane to land at the airport in Sigonella, which was under the ownership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as the United States of America would arrest the kidnappers and bring them to justice on American soil (Liput, A. L. 1985). And if, after Craxi's and Reagan's talks, it was decided that the US-Italian extradition treaty would be taken into account when carrying out the hijackers, the United States of America decided to leave nothing to chance, and decided to intercept the Egyptian plane carrying the hijackers themselves, thereby exercising jurisdiction over the place of trial of the kidnappers, which would set aside Italian jurisdiction over this case.

According to the original plan, the Egyptian government considered that the trial of the kidnappers should be carried out in Tunisia, before the president and the National Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization, but this decision did not have a valid legal position, because the Palestine Liberation Organization was not legally declared as a state, and was therefore the outcome of further events resulted in the Tunisian government making a decision to ban the Egyptian plane from landing on the territory of Tunisia (Liput, A. L. 1985). The Egyptian government did not have the right to unilaterally make a decision related to the jurisdiction of the trial of the kidnappers, and from these events one can clearly see the favoring and favoring of the Palestine Liberation Organization by Egypt, which was also noticeable in the period when a consensus was to be reached between the actor states regarding the release of the kidnappers from responsibility for the attack. But Tunisia preempted Egypt by banning the landing, which put the fate of the hijackers in a rather awkward position. Tunisia was aware that there were no legal grounds to try the kidnappers by the Palestinian Liberal Organization, and it was also not in this country's interest to jeopardize its position within the international scene and test its relationship with the United States of America. The American interception of the Egyptian plane is placed in the second phase of the Achille Lauro case, where Washington informs Craxi via a phone call about the American blocking of the Egyptian plane, and requests permission from him to land the plane at the Sigonella air base, to which Craxi agrees, but only

because of an urgent situation, which could result in the death of passengers if the plane did not land at the base (Piason, F. J. 1986). At the very start, Craxi demarcates the situation, so that there is no ambiguity as to whether Italy complied with American demands. The next day, 11.10. there is a tightening of relations between this country, because the United States partially violated the agreement with Craxi, thus landing two American transport aircraft with an Egyptian plane at the base, instead of the previously agreed upon escort, with which the American military forces surrounded fifty Italian soldiers, thus implementing their plan about bringing the kidnapper to the end (Piason, F. J. 1986). With this act, the United States of America showed disrespect for Italian sovereignty and jurisdiction, and for Prime Minister Craxi himself. Washington was determined to put his plan into action, and they accused Prime Minister Craxi of moral responsibility, to the extent that the kidnapper's life would be endangered, and Italy once again became an American tool in achieving its foreign political goals.

The first step of the American forces after landing was to make phone calls with the Italian leaders, but the Italian leaders were still strongly opposed to any American action, and then the American forces took advantage of the weak centralization of the Italian government in terms of decision-making and invited Andreotti, who was the foreign minister affairs and Spadolini, the Minister of Defense to inform them of their plans to take over the kidnappers (Bohn, M. K. 2004). American forces tried to create a rift within the Italian government, talking to Craxi's dissidents and opponents, Andreotti, who stood outside the Christian Democratic Party, which had strong ties to the United States, and carried out American interests on Italian soil, and the Minister of Defense, Spadolini, who was at odds with Craxi regarding the cause of the Achille Lauro case and its solution, thus trying to bypass Craxi and give him less political importance.

An interesting fact is that Craxi, Andreotti and Spadolini agreed in the segment that this issue is not within the jurisdiction of political resolution, but within the jurisdiction of law, insisting on the fact that the crime was committed on Italian soil, and that even if the Sigonella air base was within the jurisdiction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it was still located on Italian soil (Bohn, M. K. 2004). This was the moment when political opponents united regarding the nature of the problem itself, looking at it objectively within the framework of the principles of international law. The fact is that the American forces underestimated the role of international law, and used the complexity of the case to draw out any connection of the United States of America with this case. The question arises as to what united Craxi and Andreotti, who had a completely different view of the country's foreign policy, whether it was actually the preservation of Italian sovereignty in solving foreign policy problems.

The question also arises as to how Andreotti perceived the opposition to the United States of America, and whether he was aware of the consequences that the cooling of relations with Italy could cause difficulties in the survival of the Christian Democratic Party. After failing to convince Craxi of US jurisdiction, Reagan nevertheless agreed to revert to the original plan based on the extradition of the hijackers under the American-Italian treaty, and accordingly demanded the arrest of the other two Palestinians on board, of whom one was Arafat's right-hand man, while the other was Abbas, who earlier took credit for the release of the ship, but until later was considered one of the main people in charge of planning the hijacking (Piason, F. J. 1986). Reagan had no more arguments with which he could demand American jurisdiction, and therefore decided to act more rationally, including Italy in the process of bringing the hijackers, and focused all his strength and plans on having the hijackers tried for the crimes they were charged with, without regardless of which court will have jurisdiction over their case.

The main difficulty in prosecuting the kidnappers arose because Egypt tried to grant immunity to Abbas and Arafat's aide, arguing that they were protected by Egyptian hospitality, but in the end, they were still transferred to Rome, where they were housed in the Egyptian Cultural Center (Gooding, G. V. 1987). Here, Egypt openly shows its subjectivity and bias, invoking the idea of pan-Arabism, believing that it is Egypt's duty to protect Palestinian interests and to motivate other Middle Eastern countries to do the same. It can be said that Egypt did not take seriously the consequences that could arise from this case, especially in terms of relations with the United States of America, which has provided economic support to Egypt for years. It can be said that Egypt exaggerated its role in the Middle East, thus forming the opinion that the United States of America will "tolerate" Egyptian outbursts, just because Egypt signed an agreement with Israel, and that it will go above and beyond just to maintain status quo in the Middle East.

The first step was to inform Egypt that Italy was now responsible for prosecuting the hijackers, and therefore the court primarily demanded that the hijackers be identified, because they did not carry any documents with them, but Egypt's condition for identification was the release of the plane, and they agreed to the hijackers to be in Italian custody, but that the other two hijackers who are on the plane, can only be questioned by Italian government officials, to which Craxi responded by sending his diplomatic advisor Antonio Badini (Piason, F.J. 1986). Italy had to take the first step, explaining to Egypt the sequence of events, in which it was decided that Italy would have the jurisdiction to prosecute Palestinian terrorists, but Egypt tried to provide help and protection to the four Palestinians at any cost, setting a different set of conditions for Italy. In return, Egypt was supposed to confirm the identity of the Palestinians, which would

begin their questioning and a more detailed investigation of this case. However, the question arises as to why Egypt insisted that the terrorists on the plane be interrogated by a government official, and whether they viewed this condition as a certain way of delaying the apprehension of all four Palestinian terrorists.

Abbas and Badrakkan resolutely refused to get off the plane, relying on guaranteed immunity, and declared themselves as representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, but Egypt abruptly rejected its previous position, stating that Abbas and Badrakkan were on the plane that was supposed to carry out a government mission, and Egypt therefore demanded the withdrawal from Sicily of the plane that was forced to land under the command of the United States of America (Bohn, M. K. 2004). With this move, the Egyptians directly opposed the United States of America, regardless of the possible consequences, and presented the Palestinians as their officials who were supposed to carry out a mission for the Egyptian government, which represents a higher degree of protection than the protection of granting immunity. The question arises as to why Egypt risked its international position, while other Middle Eastern countries stood aside.

The third phase of this conflict was based on Craxi's rejection of Abbas' imprisonment, which represented a good basis for a possible conflict with the United States of America, which can be seen in Regan's personal plea, in which he called for the abandonment of Abbas' release, where Regan touched with the threat of violation relations between the United States of America and Italy, but the Italians were torn between the interests of these two countries, but above all they had to think about the fate of the cruiser Achilla Lauro, which was still in Egyptian hands (Piason, F. J. 1986). This outcome indicated that Italy was cornered, meaning that it was in a dilemma whether to protect its international position or to look at the position of the crew and passengers who were on board.

The question of releasing Abbas led to a rift between Craxi and Spadolini, which resulted in the collapse of the government (Piason, F. J. 1986). Craxi wanted to solve the problem in a peaceful way without confronting any side, but Spadolini was pro-American and strongly demanded the imprisonment of Abbas. The talks between Craxi and Spadolini produced increasing misunderstandings, which put pressure on the government, which did not know how to deal with two opposing currents, and the outcome resulted in the collapse of the government. The collapse of the government was marked as the last stage, in which, after the meeting of the secretariat of the republican party, Spadolini and the other two republican members of the cabinet wrote a letter to Craxi, in which they expressed their desire to resign, but Craxi preempted them by submitting a unilateral resignation, without the right voting and discussion,

but the Christian Democratic Party tried in every way to revive the hybrid coalition (Piason, F. J. 1986).

The United States of America led by Reagan, despite the disagreement regarding the release of Abbas, came to the aid of Italy at a crucial moment when the government collapsed, which allowed Craxi to stay in power, forming a government by the disintegrated coalition (Gooding, G. V. 1987). The United States of America could not risk the instability that would arise in Italy if the government was overthrown, and could have spread to the rest of Europe, which would have given the Soviet Union a tailwind to continue with even more progressive activities, and it can be said that Craxi stayed in power precisely thanks to the Cold War policy.

In the end, it can be said that the United States of America won a victory in forcing Italy to try the hijackers, in which, in a letter to Craxi, Regan expressed his hopes that the Italian government would make every effort to bring the hijackers to justice in a timely manner for all committed acts, which would keep American-Italian relations equally strong and firm (Piason, F. J. 1986).

Craxi realized that it is best for things to remain as they were until now, without causing a deeper crisis at the level of foreign and domestic politics, and to find a compromise with the United States of America regarding this case.

The unraveling happened when the country indicted the kidnappers for murder, kidnapping and possession of weapons, but the process did not stop only with the kidnappers, but thirteen people who were involved in the kidnapping were also indicted, including Abbas and Badrak, who were sentenced to life imprisonment punishments (Gooding, G. V. 1987). Italy complied with American demands, and the kidnappers received rather high sentences, while Abbas, who caused tensions between the United States of America, Italy and Egypt, received a life sentence, which represented a kind of message to the Palestine Liberation Organization that they cannot act against American interests.

5.3. Political Events in Italy from the Achille Lauro Affair Until the End of the Cold War

It can be said that the period of Craxi's tenure as surveyor from the beginning of the 80s until the end of the "Achille Lauro" case was extremely turbulent, especially from the aspect of foreign policy and bilateral relations between Italy and the United States of America. Craxi had

an extremely demanding role compared to the previous Italian surveys, which is best expressed in terms of his efforts to keep together a government that consisted of diametrically opposed political factions and political views, and during the "Achille Lauro" affair he had the role of moderator between the actor countries, in order to reach a compromise on the most important points related to the case, but at the same time he had to defend Italian interests and sovereignty in decision-making, which was an extremely complex task, especially if you take into account the degree of dependence of Italy on the United States of America State.

The crisis of Craxi's government arose in 1987, lasted for four months, and its main features were disagreements within the ruling coalition, which led to a blockage in terms of finding a middle way that would satisfy all parties, and the situation was further aggravated by subjective media reports, which each media company supported the faction it was more sympathetic to (Balboni, E. 1989). Craxi was too exhausted to control the hybrid ruling coalition, which was destroyed during the Sigonella crisis, but thanks to American efforts it managed to survive. This government was essentially focused on achieving factional interests, and was not effectively dedicated to conducting internal and external policy. Also, the end of the 1980s represents the strengthening of Italian populism, which focused on mobilizing the masses with general party rhetoric, and public inter-party blandishment, in which the media itself, which was in charge of creating an external political image, played an important role.

This crisis had many phases, and that it started with the confrontation of the dominant parties, which resulted in a crisis that led to the resignation of the government, but in this case it is important to look at the role of the President of the Republic, who prevented the government from resigning, and returned to the parliament, and in an effort to bring the crisis to an end, the president is using means such as the awarding of benefits and new mandates, but this crisis is characterized by the fact that all parties tried to extract their personal benefit, taking advantage of the president's efforts to maintain the internal stability of the country at all costs (Balboni, E. 1989). The President of the Republic had a symbolic function in the country, while the Prime Minister had the main say in conducting internal and external policy, but the use of wider presidential powers is becoming an unusual phenomenon, which signals how deep the crisis is, and how it is necessary to take some more concrete steps in this matter, without reducing them to a party race for benefits.

The membership of the dominant parties focused more on defending and justifying the actions of their own political party, while the preservation of the coalition was a completely secondary issue, especially because the period of the pre-election campaign was approaching, where the main focus of the campaign was based on the parties taking the main credit for all positive the

results achieved by the government in the period from 1983 to 1987, while the negative results were attributed to the opponents, from which it emerged that the Christian Democratic Party would no longer allow itself to be a subordinate party within the government, and would sabotage any attempt by Craxi to take the main credit in regarding the duration of the government, considering that the Christian Democratic Party was the one that held the government together, and was loyal in respect of the agreements that were signed by the coalition (Bibes, G., & Besson, J. 1989). The election campaign became a battle ground for the survival of the most dominant parties in the government, and in that period the disagreement shaped by party polarization became even more visible.

The Christian Democratic Party became increasingly aggressive about not allowing Craxi and the Socialists electoral dominance, and no longer had the will or strength to maintain a coalition. The coalition could not survive because Craxi did not want to agree to a deal based on him remaining prime minister until the end of his term in exchange for his support for the new Christian Democratic prime minister, this plan was known as the "Staffetta Pact", whose one of the main actors of this plan was the Christian Democratic secretary Ciriaco De Mita (Bibes, G., & Besson, J. 1989). In this case, it is obvious that Craxi was exhausted in holding his office, but he did not want to let the Christian Democratic Party have the main say, which would have made him lose his political reputation among the followers of the Socialist Party, and with this move he would have lost all the positive progress he made during his mandate.

Great controversy regarding this agreement was caused by Craxi's appearance on television on February 17, 1987, where he declared that he was bothered by the misinterpretation of this agreement, and he stated that he sees this agreement as an automatic, mandatory and essential matter, and was followed by a Christian Democratic reaction that demanded clarification of the political meaning of this contract, but the assumption of political responsibility by the Christian Democrats resulted in the splitting of the coalition (Balboni, E. 1989). Craxi was aware of the political weight of this agreement and the outcome that could follow it. The Christian Democrats were quite dissatisfied with his way of interpretation, and they tried to implement the agreement at all costs, but they lacked the political strength to hold diametrically different factions together and motivate them to cooperate. It can be said that the Socialist Party strongly supported the referendum campaign, which would have stopped the blockade of the political situation in the country, which was shaped by the competition between the Communist and Christian Democratic Parties, which would have led to the formation of cross-party alliances (Bibes, G., & Besson, J. 1989). Socialists tried to change the electoral pattern, by forming different cross-party coalitions, which would deal with internal and foreign political issues, and

in this way the left-wing factions would become much closer, but this scenario did not suit the Christian Democratic and Communist Parties, because they were used to constant competition, and they did not provide enough space for left-wing and right-wing parties to better express themselves regarding certain problems.

After Craxi's resignation, it was necessary to appoint an official from the Christian Democratic Party, in order for the government to function until the end of its mandate, and the choice fell on either De Mita or Arnaldo Forlani, who held the highest positions in the party, but the Christian Democrats unanimously believed that Andreotti was supposed to be prime minister, and President Cossiga appointed him to form a new coalition government, but Andreotti was limited in terms of decision-making due to the upcoming referendums regarding the judiciary and the nuclear energy issue, and regarding the judiciary, he found a solution in the "Rognoni package", which included a law that would regulate the civil liability of judges, while on the nuclear issue he supported a liberal proposal that would stop the construction of power plants, but Craxi was still adamant about holding a referendum, which led Andreotti to withdraw from office, and after Cossiga's failed attempt to return Craxi to the position, centrist Amintore Fanfani was given charge of forming the government (Balboni, E. 1989). Andreotti reluctantly gave up the prime ministership due to the fact that he could not compete with Craxi regarding the burning problems in the field of the judiciary and the construction of nuclear power plants, and decides that he is unable to offer a better solution than those already offered, and thus resigns from office. The question arises as to why Andreotti gave up the position of prime minister so easily, whether he feared that he would face the entire left bloc, which would lead to disagreements on key issues, and the impossibility of forming a government, but also referendums related to the judiciary could have been disastrous for Andreotti in view of his affairs and activities in secret organizations. In this period, the role of the president of the republic comes to the fore, as he tries to form a government from the previous parties that formed the coalition majority, but in the end, he decides on a middle path, choosing a centrist for the task of forming the government.

But in 1989, there is a sudden agreement between Andreotti, Forlani and Craxi regarding the formation of a ruling coalition that will form a government, headed by Andreotti and the socialist Gianni De Michelis, who will be appointed foreign minister, and for this government it can be said that it was faced with global international changes regarding the weakening of the communist system (Varsori, A., & Zaccaria, B. 2018). After various combinations regarding the formation of the ruling coalition, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats decide on an agreement, and manage to form a new ruling coalition, headed by Giulio Andreotti, while the

second most important function will be performed by a Socialist, and this government can be said to be facing to act in accordance with the situations brought about by the change in the world order, which ultimately leads to the fall of communism and the unipolar system led by the dominance of the United States of America.

In terms of foreign policy, drastically important events are taking place, starting with Italy's presidency of the European Community in 1985 (Varsori, A., & Zaccaria, B. 2018). Appointing Italy to this position gives it much greater importance in terms of negotiating issues important for all European countries, and especially for Italy, which also positions the country at the center of the dialogue with the United States of America. In his speeches, Craxi focuses on the state of Europe as a whole, and makes remarks regarding the non-existence of political Europe, which could in the future be an unfinished hybrid creation that taps in place, but at the end of the 80s of the last century, Craxi especially focused to the problems of global political and economic balance, which produced drastic changes in the relations between East and West, and in the context of these changes, he analyzes Europe's attitude towards current events, and sees how slowly Europe reacts to international and foreign policy changes, and therefore insists on a stronger mechanism coordination and unification within Europe itself, and building a unique European identity (Spiri, A. 2013). In view of the intense changes that took place at the end of the 80s, which foreshadowed changes in the international order, Craxi advocated that Italy and other European countries position themselves equally according to the current situation, coordinate their foreign policies, and work on the construction of a common European identity that would prevent the penetration of the crisis on European soil. Craxi was of the opinion that if Europe is united, it can achieve extremely useful dialogue and cooperation with eastern countries that are pro-European oriented in terms of disarmament, peace goals, exchange and cooperation (Spiri, A. 2013). Craxi believed that the Cold War barrier imposed by the United States of America could fall apart any day, and that it is essential for Europe to establish a dialogue with eastern pro-European countries regarding economic and political cooperation, as well as ways to solve pressing foreign policy issues.

Craxi's position regarding the European issue is best seen in terms of De Michelis' political moves during his tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs, where there is a clear commitment to strengthening political and economic relations with Central and Southeastern Europe, which is reflected in the launch of the "Adriatic Initiative" ' aimed at strengthening relations with Yugoslavia and Albania (Varsori, A., & Zaccaria, B. 2018). The end of the 80s was marked by increasing dialogue and the removal of barriers between countries that shared the same continent but belonged to the opposite bloc, which was essentially what the socialists led by

Craxi fought for in terms of foreign policy relations. But this period eventually becomes full of uncertainty and global economic crises, and the United States of America once again proves to be the savior.

Andreotti and De Michelis once again objectively re-examined the Italian position on the reunification of Germany, without thinking about the traumas from the period of fascism and capitulation, and Rome gives the green light for the realization of this issue, but under the condition of preserving the North Atlantic Alliance, and the aspiration for Germany to be formed as a country which is committed to preserving the European ideal (Varsori, A., & Zaccaria, B. 2018). The issue of the unification of Germany becomes one of the most dominant issues in that period, which is equally important for the interests of the United States of America and other European countries, especially Italy, and now Andreotti's government is facing an extremely important decision, which will affect the bilateral relations of the United States of America and of Italy, and Italy's relations with other European countries.

Conclusion

The period of transformation of Italy from a fascist to a democratic system begins in the middle of the Second World War, in the period of capitulation. Italy tries to suppress its fascist past by cooperating with the Allied countries during the Second World War, but it is noticeable that full trust was not created between these countries and Italy.

Italy maintained partially stable relations with the Allied countries, but the worst relationship full of tensions was with Great Britain, which had hegemonic pretensions towards Italy, and the Italian leaders considered improving relations with Great Britain possible if they got close enough to the United States of America, which would moderate the relations between the Allies and Italy as a leading power.

This period is characterized by a period of internal crisis in the state, which does not allow the country to assert itself as a more important actor in the field of foreign policy and international relations that would have the capacity to make important foreign policy decisions. One of the reasons for the strong relationship between the United States of America and Italy could be reflected in the connection of Italians who migrated to the territory of the United States of America with Italy, and Italians in the United States of America tried to lobby so that the United States of America would become more intensively involved and intervene in the Italian issue.

It can be said that the United States of America took a superficial view of the Italian issue, and were of the opinion that after the end of the Second World War, they should withdraw from the European scene, thus leaving the autonomy to European countries to decide their own fate. Italy's inferiority and subordination suited the United States, which gave the United States the power to govern the country in pursuit of its own interests.

The turning point in the intensification of relations between the United States of America and Italy is most visible in 1947, when the Cold War begins, and Secretary of State George C. Marshall guarantees American aid and intervention in terms of strengthening the economic development of Europe, which gives Italy a tailwind in terms of American involvement. in strengthening the state economy, which will no longer be based on recommendations, but on concrete actions.

The United States of America was aware of its imminent withdrawal from European soil, and strives to establish a dialogue between Great Britain and Italy, trying to find a compromise between British wishes and Italian needs, which is most visible in the efforts of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman to convince the British political leadership of a change in Italian values, and the support it provided to the Allied countries.

One of the biggest consequences after the Second World War for the country was the lack of initiative in the creation of the country's foreign policy, which was caused by the economic crisis in the country, which the United States of America used to its advantage, using instruments such as economic interventions, thus playing the carrot and stick game with Italy.

Italy played a particularly important role during the Cold War, especially due to its geopolitical position, as it represented a buffer zone between the Eastern and Western Blocs, and the United States of America sought to additionally protect the Italian-Yugoslavian border in order to minimize the influence of the Soviet Union in Europe.

In order to solve the problem of the dominant Communist Party in the country, which had a solid backing from the Soviet Union, the United States established a strong connection with right-wing parties, the strongest of which was with the Christian Democratic Party, which received extremely large subsidies from the United States of America. The United States put enormous pressure on the Christian Democratic mayor Alcide De Gasperi to minimize the influence of the Communist Party in the government, not only because of the visible ideological difference, but also because the positions of the Communist Party set back the situation in the field of domestic politics, which reflected on the issues in areas of foreign policy, such as integration into the global economic system.

But the Christian Democratic Party managed to turn the tide in their favor by overemphasizing the inherent dangers of left-wing parties in the country, in terms of Cold War politics, which resulted in hasty action by the United States of America, which ultimately resulted in the provision of certain benefits by the United States of America, which were extremely useful for the state and the Christian Democratic Party itself. The United States of America worked out a strategy with the Christian Democratic Party to expel left-wing parties from all state apparatuses, which is being implemented, but the left, led by the Communist Party, remains the dominant danger, and the United States of America and the Christian Democratic Party decide to confront the left using instruments such as secret operations created by Washington, carried out by the Christian Democratic Party using its secret organizations.

The Cold War policy on European soil, created by the United States of America, also had an impact on the creation of the country's internal policy, which was supposed to be in line with American interests, thus limiting Italian sovereignty. This thesis is most visible in terms of the displacement of the Communist Party from the government, and the formation of a new government that consisted of the milder left and technocrats. The Christian Democratic Party won the elections in 1948, thanks to its Cold War campaign, and the signing of the Atlantic Treaty became the most significant foreign policy move during the Christian Democratic mandate. The Christian Democratic Party viewed the Atlantic Treaty as an instrument for intensifying relations with the United States of America, while maintaining relations with European countries to the extent necessary to satisfy the United States of America.

The following elections dealt a major blow to the Christian Democratic Party, while the monarchists achieved a significant advantage in terms of the number of votes, which led the United States of America to consider the idea of a ruling coalition with monarchists and neo-fascists, and this idea was most visible in the actions of the American ambassador to Italy, Clara Booth Luce, who was a symbol and implementer of the Eisenhower doctrine. Ambassador Luce increasingly lost faith in the fact that the Christian Democratic Party could contribute to the final defeat of the left, but the Christian Democrats planned to take advantage of the stratification of the left in order to get closer to the moderate left represented by the socialists and create a ruling coalition with it. This period was also characterized by the transition of the Eisenhower doctrine to the Kennedy doctrine, and the attitude towards this coalition was observed from two different perspectives.

A particularly intense relationship between the United States of America and Italy took place in 1956, when an agreement between the Italian secret service and the Central Intelligence Agency established the Italian wing of the "Stay Behind" organization, which was named

"Gladio". This represents one of the most hidden secrets, which was revealed by the Christian Democratic Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, during the parliamentary debate on the topic of terrorism in Italy. The Gladio formation was present in the political and public sphere, and had an extremely close relationship with civil and religious organizations, in order to mobilize guerrilla units that were supposed to oppose leftist guerrilla formations, and bordering countries that were on the side of the Soviet Union. The basic task of this formation was to supply weapons reserves to all those organizations and activities in the field of internal politics, which were undertaken in order to weaken the communist and leftist factions. Information about this organization is still largely unavailable to the general public, but after Andreotti's recognition in the 90s of the last century, the media continues to work on a deeper investigation of this organization, and a large number of publications have been issued that look at the role of the Gladio organization in different ways in the field foreign and domestic policies of the country.

After the end of the Cold War, the public increasingly focuses on the period of the 70s of the last century, better known as the "Lead Years", which was shaped by protests against events in the field of internal politics, and in this period there were extremely dominant terrorist attacks with both sides, but the publications issued after the Cold War period try to strengthen the opinion about the left as the main culprit of civilian suffering caused by terrorist attacks, until the terrorist actions of the right are not fully understood, and the conclusions on this topic are made without any objectivity. The period of the Years of Lead did not follow suddenly, and the various movements during the 60s can be seen as a prelude to a violent struggle between opposing ideological paramilitary organizations.

This period represents a series of cause-and-effect events, in which one paramilitary faction reacted with the same violent measure to another paramilitary faction, which ultimately resulted in a large number of civilian casualties, which were shaped into a collective social trauma.

A particularly significant terrorist event, which can be placed in this decade, is the kidnapping and murder of the Christian Democratic leader Aldo Moro, which caused a deep crisis in the field of domestic politics, and this case was shaped by various conspiracy theories that accuse the United States of America and the Soviet Union of the tragic outcome, and it can be said that these conspiracies left very pronounced effects on the collective perception of citizens regarding this case. The Christian Democratic Party, which acted passively during Moro's abduction, is also being held responsible, and there was a suspicion that the Christian Democrats did not take any concrete steps in order not to threaten the Cold War interests of the United States of America, but these accusations were rejected by the parliamentary commission that was formed. for the investigation of Moro's murder, stressing that domestic culprits are to blame for this

case, and it can be said that even today there is a significant gap and lack of clarification of this event in the public eye.

The secret Masonic lodge P2, which consisted of the biggest leaders and dignitaries of Italy, including Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, was largely accused of Moro's case, and the effort of the government leaders to leave as few traces as possible of this organization in the public, so as not to there would be investigations, which would affect the political position of many government leaders. In further investigations, especially regarding the murder of the banker Sindona, it was discovered that Andreotti was the head of this organization, while Licio Gelli carried out his orders, and the then senator Francesco Cossiga was associated with this organization and Licio Gelli. The arguments point to the existence of a network that connected the government and other state bodies with the Christian Democratic Party, the Italian secret service, the Masonic lodge P2, and with the Gladio formation that operated within the framework of the pro-Atlantic organization "Stay Behind", which calls into question the objectivity of the verdict regarding More's case.

The 1980s were marked by the dominance of socialists in the ruling coalition, which was under the authority of the Supreme Leader of the Socialist Party and Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, while Andreotti was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, and had a better insight into the foreign policy events of the time. It can be said that Craxi's mandate was accompanied by major international and diplomatic crises, the most significant of which was the "Achille Lauro" case, which occurred in 1985 and was classified as a criminal offense of piracy and a terrorist attack, in which members of the Palestine Liberation Front hijacked a cruise ship with Italian and American citizens on board, and set the condition for the release of several Palestinians from an Israeli prison. This case caused a strained relationship between the United States of America and Italy regarding how to handle the case. Craxi believed that the case should be resolved through diplomacy and negotiations, while the United States of America believed that it should react with intervention. According to international law, Italy had the right to decide how the case would be resolved, because the kidnapping took place on an Italian ship, to which the United States partially agreed, but the problem arises when the United States learns of the murder of an American citizen, and raises the question of how the kidnappers will be tried. Egypt was one of the central actors directing the course of events, and during the conflict it tried to cover up the events on the cruise ship, thus siding with the hijackers and the Palestine Liberation Organization, thus giving immunity to the hijackers.

The United States requested permission for an Egyptian plane with an American escort to land at the Italian Sigonella Air Base, which Craxi granted, but the American plan was actually to

arrest the hijackers so they could be tried in the United States. Italy believed that the United States of America had no jurisdiction to try the kidnappers, and that the kidnappers should be tried on Italian soil. It can be said that Andreotti and Craxi, regardless of their different political opinions, had a unique position regarding this issue.

But this case ended with the reconciliation and softening of diplomatic relations between Italy and the United States of America, which is supported by the fact that President Reagan invited Craxi and Andreotti to the preparatory meeting for the first meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva.

After the end of this case, there was an internal crisis regarding the functioning of the government, which was accompanied by the resignation of Craxi, who did not want to agree to the "Staffetta pact", and this period was marked by a strong political rift between the Christian Democratic and Socialist Parties, and after numerous attempts to form of the ruling coalition, the pronounced actions of the President of the Republic regarding the preservation of the status quo regarding the functioning of the government and the ruling coalition are visible.

But the events of domestic politics were overshadowed by events on the international scene, which appeared in the form of an increasingly certain end of the Cold War. Craxi therefore insists on a united European identity and cooperation between European countries and Italy with eastern pro-European countries, in order to avoid upcoming internal and external political crises. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States of America becomes the only dominant force in international politics, a unipolar system is created, in which the United States of America tries to fundamentally reshape the previous values of the Eastern countries, and the first question to be discussed was the unification of Germany into a single country. It can be said that Italy initially hesitated how to act on this issue, but in the end, it supported the intentions of the United States of America, and it can be said that Andreotti and Craxi had a unique opinion regarding this issue, that the future Germany must represent European values, and that he will try to preserve the North Atlantic Alliance. By resolving the issue of German unification, the last link with the old order is broken, and this issue further strengthens relations and cooperation between Italy and the United States of America.

Bibliography

Books:

1. Bohn, M. K. (2011). *The Achille Lauro hijacking: lessons in the politics and prejudice of terrorism*. Potomac Books, Inc.
2. Brogi, A. (2002). *A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944–1958*. Praeger.
3. Diodato, E., & Niglia, F. (2017). *Italy in international relations: the foreign policy conundrum*. Springer.
4. Guarino, M., & Raugei, F. (2006). *Gli anni del disonore: dal 1965 il potere occulto di Licio Gelli e della Loggia P2 tra affari, scandali e stragi*. Edizioni Dedalo.
5. Nuti, L. (2011). Italian Foreign Policy in the Cold War: A Constant Search for Status. In Carbone, M. (Ed.), *Italy in the Post-Cold War Order: Adaptation, Bipartisanship, Visibility* (pp. 25-46). Lexington Books.
6. Varsori, A., & Zaccaria, B. (2018). *Italy in the International System from Detente to the End of the Cold War*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Articles:

1. Aga-Rossi, E. (2007). De Gasperi e la scelta di campo. *Ventesimo Secolo*, 6(12), 13-39.
2. Armani, B. (2010). La violenza della politica: letture e riletture degli anni Settanta. *Contemporanea*, 13(4), 753-759.
3. Balboni, E. (1989). Who Governs? The Crisis of the Craxi Government and the Role of the President of the Republic. *Italian Politics*, 3, 11–24.
4. Bernardi, E. (2006). La Democrazia cristiana e la guerra fredda: una selezione di documenti inediti (1947-1950). *Ventesimo Secolo*, 5(10), 127–137.
5. Bianchi, N., & Giorcelli, M. (2021). Reconstruction Aid, Public Infrastructure, and Economic Development: The Case of the Marshall Plan in Italy. *The Journal of Economic History*, 83(2), 501-537.
6. Bibes, G., & Besson, J. (1989). The Resurgence of Christian Democracy and the Search for new “Rules of the Game”. *Italian Politics*, 3, 92–106.
7. Cesqui, E. (1998). La P2. 1979: un servizio di informazione nella gestione della transizione. *Studi Storici*, 39(4), 999-1029.

8. De Felice, F. (1989). Doppia lealtà e doppio Stato. *Studi Storici*, 30(3), 493–563.
9. Del Pero, M. (2004). American Pressures and Their Containment in Italy during the Ambassadorship of Clare Boothe Luce, 1953–1956. *Diplomatic History*, 28(3), 407–439.
10. Del Pero, M. (2019). Sovereignty, Democracy and the Risk of Essentialism. Some Reflections on US-Italian Relations during the Cold War. *Histoire Politique*, 38.
11. Ferraresi, F., & Castagna, J. (1992). A secret structure codenamed Gladio. *Italian Politics*, 7, 29–48.
12. Foppiani, O., & Andreotti, G. (2001). I Segreti della Politica Estera: L'Italia e gli Altri – Intervista al Senatore Giulio Andreotti. *Il Politico*, 66(1 (196)), 79–84.
13. Formigoni, G. (1985). La Sinistra Cattolica Italiana e il Patto Atlantico (1948-1949). *Il Politico*, 50(4), 631–668.
14. Giovagnoli, A. (2010). Gli anni Settanta e la storiografia sull'Italia repubblicana. *Contemporanea*, 13(1), 183–195.
15. Gooding, G. V. (1987). Fighting Terrorism in the 1980's: The Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers. *Yale J. Int'l L.*, 12, 158.
16. Guizzi, V. (1985). Craxi's Italy. *Government and Opposition*, 20(2), 166–177.
17. Halberstam, M. (1988). Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety. *The American Journal of International Law*, 82(2), 269–310.
18. Henninger, M. (2006). The postponed revolution: reading Italian insurrectionary leftism as generational conflict. *Italica*, 83(3/4), 629–648.
19. Heywood, P. (2009). The two burials of Aldo Moro: Sovereignty and governmentality in the Anni di Piombo. *The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology*, 29(3), 1–28.
20. Hine, D. (1986). The Craxi Premiership. *Italian Politics*, 1, 105–116.
21. Hof, T. (2013). The Moro Affair – Left-Wing Terrorism and Conspiracy in Italy in the Late 1970s. *Historical Social Research*, 38(1), 232–256.
22. Liput, A. L. (1985). An Analysis of the Achille Lauro Affair: Towards an Effective and Legal Method of Bringing International Terrorists to Justice. *Fordham Int'l LJ*, 9, 328.
23. Luconi, S. (2012). Contested Loyalties: World War II and Italian-Americans' Ethnic Identity. *Italian Americana*, 30(2), 151–167.
24. Mariano, M. (2005). Fear of a Nonwhite Planet: Clare Boothe Luce, Race, and American Foreign Policy. *Prospects*, 29, 373–394.
25. Miller, J. E. (1983). Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948. *Diplomatic History*, 7(1), 35–55.

26. Moss, D. (1981). The kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro. *European Journal of Sociology*, 22(2), 265–295.
27. Nuti, L. (2002). Italy and the Cold War. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 4(3), 3–4.
28. Nuti, L. (2002). The United States, Italy, and the Opening to the Left, 1953–1963. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 4(3), 36–55.
29. Nuti, L. (2007). The Italian ‘Stay-Behind’ Network: The origins of operation ‘Gladio’. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 30(6), 955-980.
30. Nuti, L. (2022). An Overview of US-Italian Relations: The Legacy of the Past. *IAI Papers*, 22(2).
31. Pacini, G. (2007). Le origini dell'operazione Stay Behind, 1943-1956. *Contemporanea*, 10(4), 581-606.
32. Piason, F. J. (1986). Italian foreign policy: the “Achille Lauro” affair. *Italian Politics*, 1, 146–163.
33. Raftopoulos, R. (2009). Italian economic reconstruction and the Marshall Plan: A reassessment. *PIFO Occasional Papers*, 3.
34. Riste, O. (2014). “Stay Behind”: A Clandestine Cold War Phenomenon. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 16(4), 35–59.
35. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2014). International Aid to Southern Europe in the Early Postwar Period: The Cases of Greece and Italy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 656, 22–40.
36. Spiri, A. (2013). Craxi, Benedetto (Bettino). *Ventunesimo Secolo*, 12(32), 85–97.
37. Sundquist, V. H. (2010). Political terrorism: An historical case study of the Italian Red Brigades. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3(3), 53-68.
38. Trincia, L. (1987). “La Civiltà cattolica”, la democrazia “Naturaliter christiana” e la paura del comunismo (1943-1948). *Studi Storici*, 28(2), 505–529.
39. Varsori, A. (2004). La Gran Bretagna e l'Italia di De Gasperi (1945-1953). *Ventunesimo Secolo*, 3(5), 221-246
40. Vedovato, G. (1977). Andreotti e la politica estera. *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, 44(4 (176), 613-615.

Reports:

1. Ronzitti, N. (2010). Maritime Terrorism and Piracy. In *The Law of The Sea and Mediterranean Security* (pp. 12–13). German Marshall Fund of the United States.