DINO ABAZOVIĆ
(RE-)THINKING SOCIETY, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Published writings 2004-2024

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Sarajevo, 2024

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Foreword

As precisely explained by Kaori Fujimoto, "[w]riting in a second language has connected me to the world I was once afraid of and taught me to fully embrace my imperfection."

Living and working in a relatively small country within the contemporary academic universe, with almost no, or at best very limited access to the databases of published knowledge, without recent books in domestic libraries, and with few colleagues to provide critical reviews after reading drafts, it is no surprise I was supposed to be afraid too.

However, a growing interest by international scholars for themes about Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly due to the sinister end of XX Century, opened the door for possibilities and some of us dared to give them a try.

In front of you is a selection (or an almost complete edition) of my published journal papers and book chapters stretching over the past two decades (2004 - 2024).

The opening study *Ethno-Mobilization and the Organized Production of Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Conscious Preparations* was compiled during 2009 within the framework of the European Union FP6 project "Human and Minority Rights in the Life Cycle of Ethnic Conflicts" (MIRICO), implemented by the University of Gratz. I was the academic coordinator and lead author while affiliated authors were Nerzuk Curak, Zarije Seizovic, Nermina Sacic and Sead Turcalo.

The second chapter is the paper titled *Public Education and Social Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia* and published in Stover, E. – Weinstein, H. (eds.): MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY – JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY, Cambridge University Press (2004). It was a result of joint research efforts by Sarah Warshauer Freedman, Dinka Corkalo, Naomi Levy, Bronwyn Leebaw, Dean Ajdukovic, Dino Djipa, and Harvey M. Weinstein and myself.

During 2006, Sarah Warshauer Freedman and I wrote *Growing up During the Balkan Wars of the 1990s* for the edited volume "GLOBAL

PERSPECTIVES ON YOUTH CONFLICT AND RESILIENCE",
published by the Oxford University Press, and edited by Colette Daiute,
Zeynep Beykont, Craig Higson-Smith, and Larry Nucci.

Next chapter in this volume, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ten Years After
Dayton*, was prepared for and published in the European Yearbook of
Minority Issues, Vol 5, 2005/06, Koninklijke Brill NV, Netherlands in 2007.

Together with Asim Mujkic I coedited a volume titled "A SHORT
INTRODUCTION IN THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL WILL: Case
study of Bosnia and Herzegovina", published by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
Sarajevo in 2015. *Sociological Monstrosity of Political Will in Bosnia and
Herzegovina* is a chapter prepared for that edited volume.

*Rethinking Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics: The Case of Bosnia and
Herzegovina* is a paper published once again in the European Yearbook of
Minority Issues, Vol 7, 2007/08, Koninklijke Brill NV, Netherlands in 2010
as a sign of continued cooperation with this distinguished publisher.

Ivan Cvitkovic and myself prepared the chapter entitled *Religion and
Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Illustrations From the Postwar and Post-
Socialist Transition* published in Radeljić,B. – Topić, M (eds.): RELIGION
IN THE POSTYUGOSLAV CONTEXT, Lexington Books, USA (2015)

Religious Nationalism in the Western Balkans is a revised version of the paper
presented at the conference "Neo-Nationalism and Religion in Europe"
(September 6– 8, 2018) at the Berlin Institute for Public Theology. This
conference was organized in cooperation with and funded by the European
Academy on Religion and Society (EARS) and the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung
für Wis- senschaftsförderung. The volume "RELIGION AND NEO-
NATIONALISM" edited by Florian Höhne and Torsten Meireis yielded
from this conference and has been published by Nomos in 2020.

Ammicht-Quinn R. - Babić, M. - Grozdanov Z. – Ross S. – Wacker M.
edited an issue of Concilium (International Journal of Theology) entitled
„Religion and Identity in Post-Conflict Societies". The paper *Religious and
Political Identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina* is part of it published in 2015.

The volume I edited with Mitja Velikonja entitled "POST-YUGOSLAVIA. NEW CULTURAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES" (Palgrave MacMillan, 2014) was a result of a project that was carried out during the academic year 2011/12 by the theme group "The Real and the Imagined in Contemporary Balkans" at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies (NIAS). The chapter *Reconciliation, Ethnopolitics and Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina* appears in the edited volume.

Historicizing the Secularization Debate: A Helpful Illustration from Bosnia and Herzegovina is the fourth chapter in the edited volume "RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, STATE, AND LAW: NATIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES". Editors are Joseph Marko, Maximilian Lakitsch, Franz Winter, Wolfgang Weirer, and Kerstin Wonisch, published by Brill in 2023.

Bosnia and Herzegovina - Country Overview was originally written by Klaus Buchenau. Invited by editors I revised the article for the new edition of the WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES, VOLUME 2: COUNTRY ENTRIES, Thomas Riggs & Company and Gale Publishing, USA in 2013.

Religoius Claims During the War and Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina was published as a part of special issue of Borderlands e-Journal, Vol 14. No1., in 2015.

Finally, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Religion, Peace and Conflict Country Profile* is available as an online edition prepared for United States Institute of Peace in 2024.

Aleksandar Hemon, one of the most acclaimed contemporary Bosnian writers mentioned in one of his interviews that "writing is searching for a form that does not exist yet. You can do whatever you want as long as you know what you are doing." Despite academic guidelines regarding strict forms and frameworks for writing papers or chapters, and without the possibility of doing whatever I want, I have strived to come up with innovative avenues of demonstrating what I was doing.

Once again, Hemon is right when he claims that "[t]he concept of a pure language can exist only in a monolingual mind, where the complexities of the world can be reduced to the simplicity of a dot. In a multilingual mind, on the other hand, there is constant chatter among various possibilities,

because inside it, language is nothing if not endless negotiation."

I would not be so pretentious as to consider myself multilingual, but I hope efforts towards it from a bilingual position count.

In conclusion, I vaguely record someone arriving at an idea of conducting research in the importance of spouses for numerous books written throughout the history of publishing. To the best of my knowledge no one has yet done so. My hope is, once that research is done, this book will be on the list as well, since it is dedicated to my wife Mia! And she knows for sure that it is not only because of that.

Sarajevo, April 2024.

Ethno-Mobilization and the Organized Production of Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Conscious Preparations

Introduction

In simple words, ethno-mobilization could be defined as "closing ranks" within a single national corps in order to achieve a certain goal or perform some extraordinary work, most frequently for the purpose of "organizing defence from an enemy", i.e. removing the causes of vulnerability.[1] It means bringing members of one ethnic group in a state of readiness, mobility, which should be a prerequisite for the performance of other actions and/or an obstacle and barrier to the sudden or unannounced "attack" by another, "opposing," ethnic group or groups.

Ethno-mobilization can be commissioned by various stakeholders that may be internal (within one nation/state, one ethnic group) or external (those that act from outside, from outside territory of a single state or a single ethnic group).[2] Also, ethno-mobilization is a phenomenon that may have either a latent or manifest nature – it may be conducted under the name of affirming the nation (ethnicity), but with the purpose of

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1   The very term "mobilization" is primarily of military origin and it means "transition of the nation's armed forces from peace-time status into mobile status and reaching full battle readiness" (Bratoljub Klaić, *Veliki rječnik stranih riječi,* Zora, Zagreb, 1972.). The same dictionary describes a broader sense of the term "mobilization" as "attracting certain groups of population [...] to perform some tasks that are required by the current circumstances", and "put in motion (for instance, popular masses) for the purpose of performing some extraordinary work". The term "ethno-mobilization" would mark the last case: "mobilizing masses for the purpose of performing some extraordinary work, which would, in the eve of war in former Yugoslavia, be defense of jeopardized nation (in the broadest meaning of the word).

2   One should emphasize right in the beginning the distinction between the terms *national group and ethnic group.* In the western countries, the national interest means interest of the whole nation (state), therefore the national interest is equal to the state interest, while here, the notion national interest describes the interest of one of three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs), and this is in fact, viewed from the prism of international public law and international relations, interest of the ethnic group (ethnic (not national!) interest).

creating the mindset among the members of the particular ethnic group that assumes the necessity of homogenization (latent) or it may directly and openly agitate and set the goal of ideologically and politically homogenizing members of a single nation as a necessity (manifest). Those who conduct mobilization may belong to various categories of people (such as politicians, members of the military, intellectuals, "ordinary" people, etc.) and they typically make up a very small percentage of an ethnic group. Still, one would not be wrong to define ethno-mobilization as essentially (although this view may be considered reductionistic) and without regards to political correctness, a strategy of the political elite that entices ethnic nationalism among citizens. Causes of ethnic mobilization may vary – political, social economic, legal, etc. Ethno- mobilization is in most part organized through the media where the individuals/porte-paroles of an ethnic group openly criticize the other ethnic group/s, while defining their group as the one opposing the other group.

The subject of this analysis will be the various causes and reasons of ethno- mobilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina during late 1980s and early 1990s (legal, political, social, ethnic, poleomological…), which has had a fundamental effect on the creation of conditions for conflict generation.

The various causes of ethno-mobilization are mutually inseparable, so an approach to studying ethno-mobilization as a primary origin of the conflict that was the basis of the dissolution of Yugoslavia will be polyvalent, but at the same time also holistic. A symbiosis of the gradual analytical layering of facts and of the comprehensive synthesis of reasons will lead us to the goals we had set: an interdisciplinary report on the pre-war generation of conflict as a condition for beginning of the conflict[3] in BiH.

In this context, it is completely clear that any consideration of causes of ethno-mobilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina necessarily requires the inclusion of an analysis of the external influences on ethno-mobilization

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3   The term "conflict" is here used as genus proximum of war (armed conflict), in accordance with the newly promoted *Conflict Resolution Theory* that marks the different forms of conflict (wars, aggression of one country at another, and similar destructive sociological occurrences) by generic and axiological neutral term „conflict" for the purpose of creating conditions for analyzing them by scientific methods, in accordance with the principle sine ira et studia. Unfortunately, the theory of conflict resolution has been replaced by the practice of so-called „*conflict management"*. This practice, as a form of resolving (finalizing) war in former Yugoslavia, has obviously inspired uninformed, biased, ineffective and uninterested international community that had, marked by the discourse of hyper-objectivity, succeeded in „conflict management" to this date, maintaining in BiH situation of neither war nor peace.

and radical ethno-homogenization in BiH, beginning firstly with influences by the neighbouring countries of Serbia and Croatia. However, before we attempt to define the key political conflicts that were brewing in Yugoslavia (1989-1992), one must develop an insight into possible *causes* of unresolved conflicts within the Yugoslav community. According to our insights, the following factors were at work there: the weakened legitimacy of Yugoslavia; conflict between pro-European and pro- Eastern political orientations; "happening of peoples" – conflict generation by media; triumph of the nationalistic spectacle; the formal dissolution of Yugoslavia; the reflection of political conflicts on BiH; exposure to the media from Serbia; and authoritarian political culture. In this research, when establishing a stratification of the factors of conflicts, we are primarily interested in those among them that are most closely related to BiH, as well as in the subjects who developed such factors by representing them as real and objective, beyond any political artificiality. This process of "infecting" Bosnia and Herzegovina with *realities of evil* was possible, first of all, because of the over-arching contagious Argus at that time (late eighties and early nineties) still called Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA). This militaristic Leviathan concentrated its weapons and men in BiH with the intention to produce fear in supporters of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina in an organized way, thus affirming itself as a force in its own capacity and as an (in)transparent Serbian ethno-national force.

In terms of "masking" the Serbian essence of the JNA, the position of the member of the Academy Mihajlo Markovic, ideologist of the Milošević's SPS, is very illustrative. He stated:

> Formation of a Serbian army would be catastrophic policy, because it would bring Serbia in position of committing aggression against another republic, it would mean that it is conquering that territory, with its own army. Much wiser is the strategic decision to put that defence of Serbia into the hands of the Yugoslav Peoples Army, because only that army, Army of Yugoslavia, which still exists and whose affirmation and strivings and existence we have been trying to prove all the time, it is the only army that had legitimacy to move all over Yugoslav territory. This will prevent judgment against Serbia as a country that has committed invasion,

as would most certainly be the case if the opposition happened to be in power at that time.[4]

In fact, the JNA was determining the political framework in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that is why we agrue that it was a force of its own, one of the political entities most responsible for organizing and conscientiously generating violence in BiH as a method of survival in the "truncated" Yugoslav federation. In such an environment, processes have been progressing on the political field that have lead to tectonic disturbances in the lives of the BiH people.

Causes of Ethno-Mobilization
Description of the General Situation

The prominent issue in the former Yugoslav Federation (and most certainly in present-day BiH) concerned nationalities. Their unsuccessful resolutions lead to the intensification of the international conflict and *in ultima linea,* to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Emerging Serbian nationalism, whose *ressentiment* was trengthened and encouraged by the authoritarian regime that served as its legal framework, was certainly the most aggressive and had no comparison in the Balkans.

In the 1980s, some republics of the Yugoslav Federation had already started countering Serb hegemony and unitarism. Contrary to the centralistic concept of government promoted in Belgrade, in Slovenia a campaign started to reaffirm the interests of Slovenians at the legal and the political level. The campaign was primarily aimed at implementing several reforms to promote civil society and various reforms that should have resulted in immediate economic-political benefit for the participating states, but no longer to the Federation as a whole. The advocates of political decentralization, which was supposed to end in the transformation of former Yugoslavia into a confederate type of country, began to become increasingly involved in conflicts with the authoritarian-centralistic and non-democratic politics of Belgrade, personified by Slobodan Milosevic,

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4   Sonja Biserko (ed.), *Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere 1* (Helsinški komitet za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Beograd, 2006), 274.

at that time a highly positioned party (and later governmental) official.

In 1987, the Serbian government, under Milosevic's centralistic regime, started implementing repressive measures in Kosovo. In 1990, in the first multi-party elections in the former Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic was elected President of Serbia, and his factual position of the "ruler of Serbia" received an adequate legal basis.[5] In September of the same year, a new Constitution of Serbia was adopted under which the Kosovo and Vojvodina governments were placed under direct influence of the government in Belgrade and Milosevic's ultra-nationalistic politics. These politics were strongly characterized by denial and the violation of the civil rights and freedoms of Albanians from Kosovo, while the repressive measures implemented by the regime had important resonance, particularly from the early to late 80s in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Ethnic polarization within the borders of the Republic began largely on the principle "one state - one nation". The only republic that did not fit into this pattern due to its specific demographic structure was BiH.

After winning the first multi-party elections in Croatia, former general of JNA Dr. Franjo Tuđman had been developing very controversial politics towards BiH both before and during the war. In his meetings with Milosevic in Karadjordjevo and Tikves, he allegedly attempted to split BiH, in spite of his declarative abstention from interference in the internal matters of BiH during the stage of pre- war *build-up* of the conflict. Still, the engagement of the Croatian Army in BiH, from the point of international public law, established Croatia and Serbia as "co- aggressors on BiH"[6]. The context in which the Tudjman's politics towards BiH were formed was the following: the clear wish of the Serb population of BiH to join Serbia i.e. Yugoslavia, and the Muslim (Bosniak) insistence on the concept of a unified BiH in "AVNOJ borders" have both contributed to the shift in his politics from merging Central Bosnia, Herzegovina and Posavina with Croatia, to the broadest decentralization of BiH (naturally, assuming that BiH survived as an independent country). In short, Croats in BiH, according to the ideas

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5   In these elections, liberal currents of then communists won; they were characterized by reforming orientation both in domain of economy and law and politics. The same year, the elections in BiH were held (18 November 1990).

6   Admission by late general of Croatian Army, Janko Bobetko, in his book *Sve moje bitke (All my Battles)*, where he describes how he commanded in the actions on the southern front (Herzegovina front). The Hague indictment against Bobetko followed some chapters of the book.

of Franjo Tudjman, had to choose between the option of dividing BiH into three national states, the option of internally reorganizing BiH into a confederation of three national states, and the option of union between the two countries where one would be the Muslim-Croatian "entity" later realized in the form of the Federation of BiH.

After the implementation of election results in 1990, a series of meetings were held between presidents of the then Yugoslav republics win which attempts were made to find solutions for the future legal organization of Yugoslavia. Serbia and Montenegro favoured a unitaristic-centralistic organization that would characterize the official politics of those countries until the Montenegrins expressed a desire for separation, which happened in 2006 when they received international recognition; Slovenia and Croatia lobbied for a confederate organization of the country, and later became champions of the block for independence. When the Croatian president was to take over the functions of the Presidency of SFRY, representatives of Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina obstructed the process, and after the declaration of a state of national emergency in March 1991, from 1991 to 27 April 2003 the Presidency operated in this incomplete form (only Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo). Meetings of the Presidents of the Yugoslav Republic that happened in the first half of 1991 failed, and this accelerated dissolution of Yugoslavia. In November 1991, the so-called Badinter's commission was formed[7] with the task of determining conditions each of the Republics of the SFRY had to meet to be recognized by the European Union. The Commission was supposed to present its report on 15 January 1992.

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7   The commission got the name after its chair, French judge Robert Badinter; it was formed by the European Community. Its full name was *Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia* (English abbreviation being used is *"the Badinter Commission"*).

Fertile Ground for Ethno-Mobilization

National identity is certainly one of the most important kinds of collective identity, providing a meaningful and comprehensible picture of the social world we live in. National identities also fulfil more intimate, internal functions for individuals in communities, providing a social link connecting individuals and classes through a catalogue of shared values, symbols and traditions. When one notes that the idea of a nation in Eastern Europe is somewhat different to that of a Western one, it becomes clear why the lack of a national identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina served as a fertilizer for cultivating war in 1992. As Smith explains, "Historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology are components of the standard Western model of a nation." On the other hand, in Eastern Europe a nation is closely connected to ethnicity and "an individual is bound to their nation organically and is forever stamped by it."[8] Without this unifying thread people in Bosnia were left with multiculturalism as the only, however odd and insecure, binding agent.

Bosnia and Herzegovina inherited the key characteristic of multi-ethnicity from Yugoslavia. However, where Yugoslavia was a federal state, Bosnia and Herzegovina has always been considered a truly multicultural Republic by the majority of its own population, sometimes referred to as a mini-Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, this multiculturalism and the absence of a national identity would be the final undoing of Bosnia. The complex issue of nationalities that never allowed Yugoslavia to be at complete peace with itself was further complicated in Bosnia. In a nutshell, Bosnia was a republic, and today a country without a people, without Bosnians. While all other Republics had a fairly simple situation where majority living in Croatia were Croats, Serbs in Serbia, Slovenes in Slovenia and Macedonians in Macedonia, in Bosnia Serbs and Croats lived together with Muslims. The question of national identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina sparked an ongoing debate without ever being solved.

Being Bosnian was never a Constitutional option for the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout its existence within the Yugoslav Federation and after its dissolution. Looking at facts it could be argued

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8   Anthony Smith, *National identity* (London, Penguin Books, 1991), 11

that this state of affairs was intentional, as some leading party members "mainly Serb…even during consultations about the future state structure of Yugoslavia were intending to stop equal positioning of Bosnia as a federal Republic."[9] According to Miroslav Krleza "The whole nation and her culture were silenced".[10] And further, as Noel Malcolm confirms:

> Party members were put under pressure to declare themselves as one or the other. An analyses of Party officials with Muslim names in the first (1956) Yugoslav *Who's Who* shows that 17% declared themselves as Croats and 62 % as Serbs – a sign, among other things, which way the wind was blowing in Bosnian political life at this time.[11]

Keeping in mind the notion of nationality in Eastern Europe it is easy to understand how this sort of classification enabled Serbs and Croats living in Bosnia to feel emotionally attached to their *true* mother countries and as Yugoslavia disintegrated align with Serbia and Croatia and claim parts of Bosnian territory. Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, having no mother country elsewhere, were the only people truly interested in maintaining Bosnian state and its borders. This wrongly led to perception of Bosnia as a Muslim country. Since the very creation of Yugoslavia, Muslim people in Bosnia and Herzegovina could only declare themselves as either Serb, Croat or stay undecided, which actually meant that they had not decided yet "whether to call themselves Serbs or Croats".[12] Only in 1971 and 1974 did being Muslim and Yugoslav, respectively, become an option. The population was further set apart by the fact that Muslims are a religious group, and Serbs and Croats are ethnic ones. Thus, the Bosnian (nation) has consequently been mistaken for (and misrepresented by) the three ethnicities, very often referred to as "nations".

Although formally all republics had equal status within Yugoslavia, in practice perceptions and actions pointed to a long-term plan whose aim was to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina divided. In addition, in the period between the end of WWII and the eruption of war in 1992, Serbs

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9   Philip J. Cohen, *Srpski tajni rat: propaganda i manipulacija historijom* (Ljiljan, Sarajevo, 1996)
10 Ibid.
11 Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: a Short History* (London, Macmillan, 1994), 197
12 Ibid, 197

outnumbered other nationalities in the higher official posts in Bosnia, including the Communist party, military (52%), police (39,57), ministries (39%), and the educational (45,50%), legal (43,65%) and information systems (TANJUG 74,53%)[13]

The already insecure situation within the Republic and the development of events in neighbouring countries including the rise of Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman in late 1980's with obvious nationalistic policies caused a feeling of unrest in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the one hand people wanted to believe that the specific nature of their country would withstand the wave of nationalism and "even in May 1990 the majority of the Bosnian population was not in favour of national parties, considering them a threat".[14] On the other, voices from the past of their divided country were becoming clearer and clearer. Ilija Garasanin's "Nacertanije" from 1844, Stevan Moljevic's "Homogenous Serbia" from 1941 and the most recent SANU Memorandum from 1986 were all documents whose vision of Greater Serbia included most or all of Bosnia and Herzegovina territory.

Instead of uniting the population under the term Bosnian, division was the chosen policy, thus creating a fertile ground for hostilities, prejudices and disconnect, and severely hindering their capacities to emotionally bond with their homeland and each other.

Anachronous Populist Concept "Nation-Party-State"

The clear trend of creating (single) national states on the territory of former Yugoslavia has logically resulted in Serbia losing economic and political primacy in the former Yugoslav federation. Since the institutional, legal and political organization of former Yugoslav federation guaranteed a large degree of independence to the republics (and also autonomous provinces within Serbia), the intellectual leaders of Serbian peoples, having considered SFRY their "own" country and being aware that many Serbs live in other republics, felt the broad decentralization as a direct attack on Serbian national being and as subjecting their own to the

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13 Mirsad D. Abazovic, *Kadrovski rat za BiH* (Savez logoraša BiH, Sarajevo, 1999).

14 Keith Doubt, *Sociologija nakon Bosne* (Buybook, Sarajevo, 2003), 65

interests of other national corps. The constitutional "right to separation"[15], which was given to all Yugoslav peoples, was a thorn in the side of Serbian nationalistic, conservative and destructive political elites. Since the Serbian nationalistic forces wanted to avoid formal establishment of new states on the territory of former Yugoslavia at any cost, they intensively laboured to prevent the dissolution of the former Yugoslav federation, or, in reality, to round up the territories with a majority Serb population and unify them in a single country. This was a centuries' long dream of the so-called "Greater Serbia", which was to include large parts of (SR) Croatia and (SR) Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to become a bloody epilogue and failure of what is in political terms considered imaginary integral Yugoslavism. As a political idea and practice "Integral Yugoslavism" exploited a manifest form of the latent Serb desire to have "Greater Serbia", since in that union of, declaratively "equal peoples and nationalities"[16], the majority of population were Serbs, so ideologists of the "Greater Serbia" found SFRY to be a suitable transitional organizational form where they were "more equal" than the others.[17]

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15 Constitution of SFRY (1974), Fundamental Principles, I. "The Yugoslav Constitution, adopted in 1974, devoted substantial powers to Yugoslavia's six republics, giving each a central bank and, separate police, education and judicial systems", Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (Penguin Books, BBC Books, London, 1996) 34.

16 Constitution of Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) provided for equality of all citizens (Article 154), stating that „all citizens are equal as to their rights and duties, regardless of their nationality, race, gender, language, religion, education or social status". This was so-called *non-discrimination clause.* The same wording could be found in Article 161 Constitution of Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH). Practically, there was always a sharp "discrepancy between the norm and reality". Government of BiH submitted request for recognition of sovereignty and independence (December 1991). In its Decision expressing wish to be recognized, the Government included results of 1991 census, according to which, at the time, in BiH lived 17.27 % of Croats, 43.74 % of Moslems and 31.33 % of Serbs (the same percentages are indicated in *Unfinished Peace, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans,* Aspen Institute Berlin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1996, p. 32). Therefore, it is worth mentioning that Republika Srpska created by Annex 4 to *General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP)*, colloquially known as *Dayton Peace Accords,* encompassed 49 % of the BiH territory.

17 An illustration of "equality" between the most numerous peoples and other Yugoslav peoples is the piece of information presented by Dr. Omer Ibrahimagic, who used to be a judge in the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia before the war. He says that "in 28 years of existence of that court (Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia), the presidents were a Macedonian and a Slovenian for one year each, while during the remaining 26 years the function of the President was performed by Serbs from Croatia, or Montenegrins, or Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, or, obviously, Serbs from Serbia", Omer Ibrahimagić, "Agresija ili građanski rat", *Bosna i Bošnjaci izmedu agresije i mira* (Rijaset islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, El Kalem, Sarajevo

The concept of "national states", based on already prepared national programs,[18] inevitably led to the emergence of nationalism[19], which resulted in the most radical ethno-mobilization and inter-national armed conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia, during which genocide and the most cruel crimes against humanity, violations of laws and customs of war and of the Geneva conventions and an entire range of other crimes were committed.

Political Parties

The establishment of national parties – *Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* (HDZ), *Stranka demokratske akcije* (SDA) and *Srpska demokratska stranka* (SDS) - upon a manifestly ethno-nationalistic basis meant a definite breakdown of the political structure of BiH along national lines. Political pluralism was understood in BiH not as a conglomerate of various political programs and ideas but as a national-political pluralism where one party automatically meant one religion, one nation, and political and territorial exclusivity and hegemony on at least one part of BiH. As such, it inevitably finalized ethnic divisions in a society as fragile as BiH's was before the war. Let us see how the keeper of the single-party system, the League of Communists of BiH (*Savez komunista Bosne i Hercegovine*) behaved.

SK BiH opposed the idea of establishing new parties and a multi-party system because, as the leader of communist BiH at the time - Nijaz Durakovic - put it: "the multi-party system… in our circumstances would end up with nationalistic parties. You may say that we already have something like that. But is it really wise to legalize a practice that we consider bad and a cause of many misfortunes".[20] In agreement with Durakovic's position at that time was his counter-candidate in elections for President of CK SK BiH Dževad Tašić because "[...] we have had some

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1998), 199.

18 E.g.. *Memorandum by Serbian Academy of Science and Arts* (Memomardnum Srpske akademije nauka i umjetnosti) and *Contributions for Slovenian National Program* (Prilozi za slovenski nacionalni program).

19 This was about the so-called "competitive nationalisms", among which the most unscrupulous, the "*trigger*", was the Serbian nationalism, of Slobodan Milošević, followed by the so called "induced nationalisms".

20 Fahrudin Đapo and Tihomir Loza, "Nijaz Duraković: Navijam za Tašića, Dževad Tašić: Glasam za Durakovića", *Nasi dani*, 18 August 1989, 16.

tragic experiences with multiple parties both in BiH and in the country as a whole. Before the war (World War II) we had 28 of them, and all but one was more or less nationally oriented. That one was the KPJ".[21] A very different opinion on political pluralism was expressed by the member of the Presidency of thr CK SK BiH Desimir Međović, who thought it was the strongest "guarantor of radical transformation, very much thanks to the "danger" that will come into being because of competition"[22] and for that reason he was in favour of multi-party system:

> SK has to have an active attitude towards multi-party system, it must not only open the door to such processes, but encourage them, not take them as a duty imposed from outside. If a transformation of the SK were at all possible, then it would be only possible in the situation of competition where the SK will be forced to make some changes and achieve political efficiency.[23]

After the termination of the 14th extraordinary congress of SKJ, where the decision was made to terminate the monopoly of the League of Communists, CK SK BiH decided to allow a multi-party system under two important conditions. The first condition was that the emerging parties not be based on national or religious grounds (Article 4 of the Law on Association of Citizens - *Zakon o udruživanju građana*), and that the newly established parties recognize the territorial integrity of the Republic of BiH and its even standing with the other Yugoslav republics. Also, the activities of parties established outside BiH were restricted, so according to the Article 8 of the *Law on Association of Citizens*, they would have to be registered with the BiH Republic bodies. All these were attempts to establish a multi-party system on positive reduction premises, with the goal of preventing conflicts in BiH that might lead to the disappearance of the country.

Nevertheless, after the prohibition on establishing nationalist parties, the "Constitution Court, on its own initiative", began a procedure to "examine compliance with constitution of that article"[24]and by that, claims Kasim

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21 Ibid.

22 *Oslobođenje,* 25 October 1989.

23 Vlastimir Mijović, „Strah od otvorenih vrata", *Danas,* 6 February 1990, 16.

24 Fahrudin Đapo „Bosna kao Švajcarska" *Naši dani*, No. 993, 11 May 1990,11.

Trnka, at that time President of the Constitutional Court of SR BiH, "expressed suspicion on the basis of many arguments for the suspicion. […] I want to emphasize that the decision to examine constitutionality of this article was made by the Constitutional Court unanimously".[25]Nijaz Duraković adds the following concerning establishing nationalistic parties:

> I actually think that the issue of nationalistic party – yes or no is in fact artificial and that such legislative solutions should be strived for that would prohibit only the parties that threaten sovereignty and integrity of BiH. I do not see any particular problem in emerging purely Croat, Muslim or Serb parties provided that they agree on democratic values on which BiH and SFRY are based. However, this certainly is not the case with the parties that think of BiH as artificial and octroyed creation and that threaten its sovereignty by flirting with their "spare" homelands.[26]

This direction-seeking on the part of League of Communists of BiH is put in context by some authors in the following way: "Incapacity and lack of readiness among the leaders of BiH communists to take active role in establishing political pluralism, and later on, their attempts to prohibit formation of nationalist parties, actually results with it promoting "nationalism as its main alternative".[27]Still, the question of whether the spiral of violence would have reached this deadly crescendo if there had been no ethno-national parties and if the multi-party system had remained in the framework of political organization on basis of social interests, still remains open: Public exposition of buried political eschatologies, penetration onto the political level of exclusive nationalist ideologies has offered those ideologies a historical opportunity to ethicize and nationalize communist ideology, which has transformed from supra-national into a particularly national ideology. This "*unexpected deal*" between the nationalists and communists, and *conceptual closeness between the nationalism and communism*[28] enabled the political registration of ethno-

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25 Ibid.

26 Marinko Čulić, "Strah od muslimansko-hrvatske koalicije", *Danas,* 12 June 1990, 17.

27 Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla: Uspon, kriza i pad Četvrte Jugoslavije* (Samizdat B92, Beograd, 2003), 47.

28 Nenad Dimitrijević, *Slučaj Jugoslavija: socijalizam, nacionalizam, posledice* (Samizdat B92, Beograd, 2001), 73.

nationalist and nationalist parties in the multi-national political space of BiH. Through the form of partisan political organization, the space for political pluralism expanded, so the "democracy flourished" and made some positive progress also outside of institutions and parties, but there was also a "flourishing of masses"[29], a populist rising of nationalist flags all over Yugoslavia. A peak of *negative democracy* was achieved in BiH by the legislative *institutionalization of ethnicity*[30] through the constitution of political parties on a solely ethnic basis.

In the purest understanding of democracy as the most desirable organization of a political community of people, prohibiting a mono-ethnic partisan organization is not appropriate. However, the following question deserves to be asked: If the majority of political, economic, cultural, social, historical and other parameters pointed (in advance) to the conclusion that the legalization and political establishment of ethnic parties was a key to open conflicts, was the suspension of democracy in that case really revolutionary violence that should be prohibited, or a reasonable provision of conditions for the subsequent development of delayed democracy? In the case of BiH, regardless of how anti-democratic it may appear, the formalization of democracy was one of the provisions that enabled the "forging of war"[31] in BiH. This forging institutionally began in the first multi-party parliamentary assembly of the Socialist Republic of BiH, which was formed after the first multi-party elections (1990). The elections marked the end of a monistic political order. It was hoped that they had created preconditions for the development of multi-party democracy as a legitimate form of organization and parliamentary assemblies as the fora for conflicts of political interest, where parliamentary battles would take place in form of desirable expressions of politics. However, democracy made a wrong turn, and it can be concluded that postulating mono-ethnic multi-party democracy was among the important conditions that constituted what we may call a 'promised land of BiH war'.[32] Counting on already profiled mindsets, and with assistance of lascivious nationalist-

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29 Mirko Kovač, Cvjetanje mase (Bosanska knjiga, Sarajevo, 1997)

30 Florian Bieber, Institucionaliziranje etničnosti. Postignuća i neuspjesi nakon ratova u Bosni i Hercegovini, na Kosovu i u Makedoniji (Međunarodni forum Bosna, Sarajevo, 2004)

31 Mark Thompson, *Kovanje rata* (Article XIX. Naklada Jesenski i Turk i Hrvatsko sociološko društvo, Zagreb, 1995)

32 Nerzuk Ćurak, *Obnova bosanskih utopija: Politologija, politička filozofija i sociologija dejtonske države i društva* (Synopsis, Sarajevo-Zagreb, 2006), 17-18.

religious rhetoric, the nationalist parties were triumphant in the first multi-party elections. SK BiH- SDP was heavily defeated, receiving only 13% of the votes. The Reformers[33] got 8%, while the other parties (DSS, MBO, Liberals) combined received only 4.6 %.

This result was made possible by the consensus of the nationalist parties to bring down communism and communists from positions of power. In addition, the election campaign was more than dirty[34]. Firstly, the religious dignitaries of all three confessions, who had been laying dormant for a long time when it came to political issues, became involved. There were cases of burning ballot boxes, adding votes, dead men voting, etc. The election victory of the right-oriented parties in the region also affected the electorate. Inter-partisan divisions between the SK BiH SDP and DSS (Democratic Union of Socialists), and SK BiH SDP and Union of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for BiH also contributed generally to the defeat of the left.

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33 Ante Markovic from Konjic was leading the reformists. He was the prime Minister of SFRJ from 16 March 1989 to 20 December 1991. He started an ambitious economic reform in 1989 which included stabilization of currency and privatization. This turned Markovic into one of the most popular politicians in the history of Yugoslavia. Markovic owed his popularity to his contemporary style of a western politician. He also maintained his popularity by staying out of conflicts within the Communist Union of Yugoslavia and because he actively mediated in the conflicts between the republics. However, his programme of reforms was soon sabotaged by the government lead by Slobodan Milosevic, while the federal government was further weakened by independence movements in Slovenia and Croatia. Durng the last few months of his mandate Markovic attempted to find a compromise between these two republics and also Serbia and Monte Negro who were demanding that Yugoslavia remain a centralized state. Unfortunately, his efforts were in vain despite the support from the new democratic government in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. This was due to the fact that JNA, who was meant to be his biggest ally, aligned with Milosevic and Serb nationalistc leaders.

34 In the first multi-party elections in BiH, which were held in 1990, what dominated the political posters was mostly the national/ethnic rhetoric. "Apart from the leaders' photographs, with emphasized characteristics, the only constant were the symbols and graphics of the parties, particularly the nationalist ones that have, lacking the rational arguments and knowledge, counted on the lascive nationalistic rhetoric, on already profiled mental (national) constructs, mythomanic national interpretations… With poor composition, little creativity and limited marketing, they followed the line of lesser resistance and stroke at the most subtle human feelings related to the forms and shapes of primary identification through nation and religion". (Besim Spahić, *Izazovi političkog marketinga deset godina poslija kao i prije deset godina* (Compact-E, Sarajevo, 2000), 130.

National(istic) "Political Pluralism"

The first party to register with the courts was the Party of Democratic Action - *Stranka demokratske akcije* (SDA). Contrary to the Croatian (HDZ, August 1990) and Serb (SDS, July 1991) parties that were registered later on, this party avoided the nationalist attribution, although its program favoured Muslims, defining itself as a party of the "Muslim-historical circle". Alija Izetbegovic, Adil Zulfikarpasic and Muhamed Filipovic were the leaders of this party and at the time were considered to be the ones to bring about change. Alija Izetbegovic was sentenced to 14 years in prison by the communists in a dubious trial in 1983. In the meantime, his book "Islam between East and West" was published in the US. After five years in prison in Foca, Izetbegovic was freed in 1988. During his time in prison his writings "Notes from Prison 1983 – 1988" were circulated outside and later published. As a political prisoner he gained public sympathy, especially with Muslims. Adil-bey Zulfikarpasic gained popularity in a similar way, and as an immigrant who left Bosnia in 1946 he was welcomed back with huge media attention as a successful businessman in 1990. Together with Alija Izetbegovic he formed the SDA and became vice president. Muhamed Filipovic was respected as an academic, philosopher, theorist and one of the most influential historians in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The founding assembly of the SDA was held on 26 May 1990 in the Sarajevo hotel Holiday Inn. Interestingly, among the guests was Dalibor Brozović who came on behalf of the HDZ and used the opportunity to say that the "Croatian border will be defended on the river Drina".[35] From the media reports it can be seen that the internal split followed immediately after the foundation of the SDA BiH. Muhamed Filipovic and Adil Zulfikarpašić left the SDA and form the Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO) explaining that the SDA was too religious. The split occurred after the rally in Velika, held on 15 September 1990, which was full of religious iconography (many green flags with crescent, turbans on people's heads, cries like "Long live Saddam Hussein", etc.) Such rallies served the Serb politics of the time well by convincing their followers that "Islamic

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35 About the Croatian myth "border on the river Drina" that has existed in the radical Croatian circles, see more in: Ivo Goldstein: "Granica na Drini – znacenje i razvoj mitologema", in the Compendium: *Historical Myths in the Balkans* (Institute of History, Sarajevo, 2003), 109 -139.

fundamentalism" was dangerous, and that that was why they should fight for the idea of staying within Yugoslavia. It was not a coincidence that the internal conflict in the SDA happened in Velika Kladusa because that affair acquired characteristics of Muslim national expression. Since Fikret Abdic, the undisputable leader of the Cazin Krajina at that time possessed some undoubted charm, this had to be put to good use in order to make the SDA more massive. He had great public support after he realized his life and business vision by becoming the director of Agricultural Union in Velika Kladusa. He helped build "Agrokomerc", one of the most powerful agricultural and business empires in the whole former Yugoslavia in the midst of the poor Cazin Krajina. Later it will become apparent that the dubious "Agrokomerc" affair, which would last three years during the 1980s, was politically used against Hamdija Pozderac and his position as the head of Commission for the revision of the Constitution of SFRJ.[36] Fikret Abdić was arrested and accused of counter revolutionary threats to the constitutional framework of the SFRJ according to Article 114 of the Criminal Law of the SFRJ[37]. Being imprisoned and spreading word of Greater Serbia and the weakening foundations of socialism all made Fikret Abdic into a Muslim and media hero between 1987 and 1990. His political fame peaked after he left prison and especially on 15 September 1991 when he organized the biggest Muslim people's assembly in Velika Kladusa announcing his joining the SDA. In the election for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fikret Abdic, as a Bosniak representative, claimed the most votes[38].

Interestingly, during the election rallies of the SDA the "Muslim intellectuals" or "Young Muslims" *(Mladi Muslimani)*, who had been tried on several occasions, were not really in the spotlight. Only after the elections did a group of people who had been unjustly sentenced by the communist

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36 Hamdija Pozderac was a member of presidency of SFRJ towards the end of his political career. When he was about to become the President he was urged to resign (due to Agrocemorec affair) and withdraw from the political scene in Yugoslavia where he spent most of his working career. He died in April 1988 in Kosevo hospital in Sarajevo under unresolved circumstances.

37 He was charged with issuing shares without financial worth 400 million dollars. Since public was used to accept such things without critical judgment they readily accepted this media campaign well led by the Belgrade magazine Borba whose journalist apparently uncoverd the affair.

38 Although a rightful President by the number of recieved votes he leaves the position to Alija Izetbegovic. Instead of leading the party he returns to Cazinska Krajina intending to keep his peace and ensure reastablishment of Agrokomerc.

court of the former Yugoslavia for verbal delict (crime) in 1983 take leading positions in the parties. (Maybe the plan of distribution of party, and later government functions to the "Young Muslims" never existed, but the *post festum* analysis shows that after they had won power, almost all former convicts had leading functions in the party or in government bodies).

While the SDA was busy dealing with their internal conflicts, the distribution of government functions, and the organization of election rallies, the leaders of the SDS worked actively to destroy the social-political system of SR BiH of the time[39]. Before the elections were held and the SDS leaders were elected to the government, the Bosnian Serbs gathered around the SDS had been working on setting up parallel Serbian government bodies. It was systematic and well organized preparation for the possible of division of BiH and its annexation to Serbia. The assembly of Serbian people was the first political body formed by the leaders of the Bosniak Serbs as a parallel body to the political institutions of SR BiH at the republic level.

SDS gathered already affirmed public figures: Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević and others. Radovan Karadžić[40] worked as a psychiatrist in the Kosevo hospital in Sarajevo. In 1989 he participated in establishment of SDS in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He had great support from the Serb public as he advocated the protection of Serb interests wherever they lived. Biljana Plavšić[41] already had a distinguished scientific career teaching Biology at the Faculty of Natural Science and Mathematics in Sarajevo. She was a member of SDS since its foundation in 1990, when she also became a member of the Presidency of the Republic Bosnia and

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39 "[…] You can not break apart whole Yugoslavia and leave Bosnia and Herzegovina innocent. If Yugoslavia is changing its constitutional status, so has to do Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the western Herzegovina would be allowed to remain in Yugoslavia to the extent it wants, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the extent it wants, and that principle would apply to other parts of the Republic", said Radovan Karadzic, then president of the SDS, in his statement to Tanjug. Reported by *Oslobođenje*, 02 March, 1992, 2.

40 Radovan Karadžić, together with Ratko Mladić, his superior and commander of his Army, is the most wanted war criminal in the world, accused of genocide against non Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of ordering ethnic cleansing

41 On 7 April 1992 she left the Presidency and joined political leadership of Republika Srpska. Biljana Plavšić, together with radovan Karadzic and Momcilo Krjisnik was a leader of Bosnian Serbs during the war in BiH. From 1992 to 1996 she was the vice President of Republika Srpska. Everyone will remember her arrival to Bijeljina at the beginning of war when she greeted Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan by kissing him and congratulating him on the massacre he commited on Bosniaks in Bijeljina.

Herzegovina. Nikola Koljević was a university professor and an interpreter. During the first multi-party elections he was elected a Serb member of Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[42] Stjepan Kljuic, a prominent journalist, worked on establishing HDZ BiH. Mate Boban also joins HDZ BiH and very quickly contacted the head of HDZ in Zagreb.[43] He held public speeches for the Croatian population "warning" them of the "imminent danger" of Islamic fundamentalism endeavouring to turn Croats against Bosniaks.

> **"** During the whole of 1991, leaders of Bosnian Serbs were implementing the policy of "regionalization", i.e. they organized areas where Serbs were relative majority using for that purpose the concept of "union of municipalities". Having initiated formation of regional governments throughout the BiH, the SDS has started preparing rather early to take *de facto* power in the end on the parts of the territory of BiH inhabited by Serbs. Many of such preparations were done in conspiracy and secretly.[44]

The core of power of the rebel (illegitimate ethnic regionalization has already represented the rebellion against the legal system of BiH) Bosnian Serbs included from as early as July 1991 Radovan Karadzic, President of the SDS and its undisputed leader; Momčilo Krajišnik – representative of the SDS in the Assembly of SRBiH and vice president of the Party, and Karadžić's closest associates; and also Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević, SDS representatives in the collective Presidency of SRBiH and top level leaders. The same people had their functions "guaranteed" in the so-called Serbian Republic of BiH. The so-called National Security Council comprised Karadžić, Koljević, Krajišnik, Plavšić and others …, then there was the so-called three-member presidency: Karadžić, Koljević and Plavšić,

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42　In April 1992 he left the Presidency and during the war against BiH he was the vice President of Republika Srpska.

43　President of Republic of Croatia Franjo Tudjman trusts him with sesession and formation of Croat municipalities in BiH as independent from bh government in Sarajevo as possible. In February 1992 he becomes the head of HDZ through a dubious proceedure in place of the legal President Stjepan Kljuic. In Grude, on 18 November 1991 Mate Boban establishes a Croatian community Herzeg-Bosnia an autonomous territorial unit within BiH, aparently in order to better defend against Serb agression.

44　Patrick J. Treanor, "Rukovodstvo bosanskih Srba 1990-1992", (3 July 2002) 4, at www.un.org, 16.

and extended presidency: Karadžić, Đerić, Koljević and Plavšić[45].

On 24 October 1991, the so-called Assembly of Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted, outside of the institutions of the state and contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of BiH at the time, a decision to organize a referendum. The question was: "Do you agree with the decision made by Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 24 October 1991 that the Serbian people should remain in the common country of Yugoslavia, together with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem?"[46]

As well as being contrary to the Constitution, the referendum question prejudiced solutions to the Yugoslav crisis in the direction of creating the Greater Serbia. Under the name of fighting for the preservation of Yugoslavia, the real goal was to implement the hegemonic nationalist concept of the so-called ultimate solution and round up the ethnic borders. This was a political act that had brought much insecurity and confusion to the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When the Presidency of SR BiH reacted to its lack of wisdom and lack of legal grounds, the opinions of members of the Presidency of the SR BiH Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević were separated – suggesting existence of ideological split in political institutions of government of BiH.

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45 Before that, on 14 October 1991, „in the memorable exchange between the Serb leader radovan Karadzic and the Muslim Bosniak leader Alija Izetbegovic [...], Karadžić for the first time used the explicit threat of extermination: Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia into hell, and do not think that you will not perhaps lead the Muslim people into annihilation, because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is war", *Unfinished Peace, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans* (Aspen Institute Berlin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1996), 34.

46 The slogan of this plebiscite was: "All Serbs in a Single State" (*Oslobođenje*, 6 November 1991), 5.

Unity of the Army and (Serbian) Peoples

Throughout the former Yugoslavia, the Serb peoples were systematically armed so that they would, in the manner of a typical *blitzkrieg* physically connect the "Serbian territories" and politically unite them and place under rule of the political leadership of the then Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia and Belgrade – Slobodan Milosević personally. Of course, the Serbian peoples were told, in the manner of skilful ideological and political manipulation, that they would be "defenders" from the upcoming separatist and nationalistic concept of the former Yugoslavia.

In mid to late 1980s, Serbian expansionistic and nationalistic politics achieved their peak, while the Serbian media were trying in every way to convince the national and international public that the Serbs in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were persecuted and deprived of their rights since they were not majority in those parts of former Yugoslavia.

The politics of Serbian government has clearly sided with the extreme forces of Croatian and BiH Serbs by providing them with political and material support, announcing the later "transformation" of the legitimate armed forces of the Federation of that time into an almost mono-national army that would place itself in the exclusive service of protecting the interests of the Serbian population in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.[47]In their newsletter *Narodna Armija (NA)*, the Army reported on elections

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47 Complying by orders of its top commanders, and with material assistance of the Serb Democratic Party of BiH, the Yugoslav National Army has formed and equipped in military terms the so-called Army of the Republika Srpska, and many para(military) formations of Bosnian Serbs and filled them with adequate commanding cadres, placing them under their immediate control and command. This has been directly admitted by then Minister of Defense of SFRY and head of the Headquarters of the JNA, General Colonel Veljko Kadijević who said, when speaking on achievements of the JNA: "In Croatia, in cooperation with the Serb people, *it liberated Srpska Krajina* and forced Croatia to accept the Vans' peace plan; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, first the JNA, and then the army of the Republika Srpska, which was helped to their feet by the JNA, assisted in *liberation of Serb territories,* […]*,* thus creating the basis for establishing three armies: Yugoslav Army, Army of the Republika Srpska, and Army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina. Having in mind internal and international situation, this was done in a *very well organized way.* This was a very important task. The JNA leaders made it a priority", (see Veljko Kadijević, *Moje viđenje raspada*, Beograd, 1993. navedeno prema, Arije Nejer, Ratni *zločini – brutalnost, genocid, terror i borba za pravdu*, Samizdat B92, Beograd, 2002., p. 158.) Mobilization of the Bosnian Serbs into the JNA was seen by General Kadijevic as a thing "of vital importance" for the JNA, because, as he writes, "the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by their geographic position and size, is one of the key factors for establishing a joint state of all Serbs (Kadijević, *op.cit.*, 144).

in BiH with a warning of "homogenization of Bosnia and Herzegovina population and its classification under national flags"[48]. The first serious conflicts of interest between the Army and parts of the Government in BiH, the SDA and HDZ happened after the decision by the Presidency of BiH dated 7 August 1991 to send the privates from BiH to serve the army only on the territories of BiH and Macedonia, and a set of decisions on delaying sending the privates into the JNA. Texts in the *NA* included the following titles: *"Doko (then Minister of Defence of BiH) is Pushing His Own Agenda"[49], "SDA in Action Against the JNA – Dangerous Calls)"[50], "Mobilization on Target of the Parties"[51]* where they emphasize that the "unified armed forces are not in the interest of the party leaders of the SDA and the HDZ", and that the "Sabotage in BiH is helped by Croatia".[52] Warnings were repeated that the "mobilization is not supported by the Party of Democratic Action and irresponsible municipal secretariats for national defence"[53/54]. The paper regularly featured texts against the HDZ BiH and the SDA accusing them of encouraging an anti-army attitude[55], and criticizing members of the SDA such as Irfan Ajanović, then vice-president of the Assembly of SFRY, who had "as a faithful member of the SDA BiH, in a forest of green-white flags tied in knots with the HDSZ, fiercely attacked Serbian leaders and the JNA as major culprits for Yugoslav crisis, strongly advocating independent Herzeg-Bosnia and autonomy of Sandžak within Serbia".[56] With increasing frequency, the Army accused members of the HDZ and the SDA of seeking the suspension of federal

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48 Z. Dervišević, „Nade u razumna rješenja, *Narodna armija*, 25 October 1990, 17.

49 *Id.*, „Doko tjera po svome", *Narodna armija*, 22 August 1991, 17.

50 M. Sinanović, „SDA u akciji protiv JNA: Opasni pozivi", *Narodna armija*, 22 August 1991, 17.

51 Mladen Marjanović, „Mobilizacija na nišanu stranaka", *Narodna armija*, 22 August 1991, 20.

52 *Ibid,* 20-21.

53 Radovan Karadžić, SDS leader, in his statement to the "Politika" from Belgrade, says "Concerning the Serbian response to mobilization exercises, Serbs in BiH will not allow JNA be humiliated by anybody and defeated on Bosnian mountains. We shall not be blamed for disturbed national balance in that Army because others are throwing away their arms and not response when called", *Politika*, July 12 1991.

54 M. Marjanović, „U kandžama SDA", *Narodna armija*, 24 August 1991, 20.

55 *See* Čedomir Pešut, „Podsticanje antiarmijskog raspoloženja u Hercegovini: HDZ zastrašuje pučanstvo", *Narodna armija*, 28 August 1991, 19 and Z. Dervišević, „Ispolitizirano regrutno pitanje: U režiji lidera SDA i HDZ", *Narodna armija*, 31 August 1991, 17.

56 M. Milutinović and D. Glišić, „Kad obraz ne crveni", *Narodna armija*, 18 September 1991, 17 and D. Glišić, „Pion u razbijanju Jugoslavije", *Narodna armija*, 2 Oktober 1991, 28.

regulations[57], and that, on their orders, the Ministry of Defence of BiH "in a planned way caused chaos and anti-army campaign, attributing all kinds of things to the JNA..."[58]. In October 1991 the JNA units in BiH were put on the status of highest battle readiness in order to "prevent expansion of civil war on BiH "[59], and there was much talk of *winds of war* around Velež and accusations against Republic of Croatia that they were pulling the threads in "a transparent game of extremist members of the SDA and the HDZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the members of JNA on those territories "[60].

Military leaders justified the mobilization of units of the Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Tuzla corps and the arrival of reserve forces from Serbia and Montenegro to the territory of BiH by their desire to prevent inter-national conflicts[61], while in fact the goal was to prevent any attempt for Bosnia and Herzegovina to gain independence. The reservists immediately began to create fear among the local population, as illustrated by the statement of the then head of the Centre of Security Services *(Centar službi bezbjednosti* CSB) Mostar Viktor Stajkic, who claimed that they "registered over thirty violations of the reservists a day", mostly cases of using firearms and opening fire".[62] Besides preventing international conflicts, some high officials in the JNA, like General Major Milan Torbica, commander of the Uzice corps (in his interview to Slobodna Bosna – authors' remark) justify their arrival to Herzegovina by claiming the prevention genocide "of Serbian people, which had reached horrifying levels in '41 and '42, and is planned again by the HDZ, but also by the Headquarters".[63] Along the line of mythomaniacal history of the "*slaughtered nation*", the "reservists of the JNA became particularly unruly in that area during the following two months.

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57 Z. Dervišević, „Zakuvali Predsjedništvo, Vlada i ministarstvo", *Narodna armija*, 18 September 1991, 18.

58 Nenad Todović, „Svjesno izazivanje haosa", *Narodna armija*, 5 October 1991, 43.

59 „`Neka saznanja´ - nikakva saznanja", *Narodna armija*, 2 October 1991, 17.

60 N. Stevanović, „Bosni prete belajem", *Narodna armija*, 2 October 1991, 16.

61 "The SDS leaders in BiH supported mobilization by the JNA, while the HDZ and SDA (at different times and different levels) ignored it or opposed it. On 30 September 1991, Presidency of BiH declared the mobilization that had been ordered by the JNA the day before illegal, demanding replacement of Nikola Uzelac, Commander of the Banja Luka Corps, who had issued the order", Biserko, *op.cit.* note 4, 186).

62 Adisa Busuladzic, „Počnite već jednom", *Slobodna Bosna,* 28 November 1991, 3.

63 Suzana Jotanović, „Ježim se od neobrijanih ljudi", *Slobodna Bosna*, 26 December 1991, 5.

They took part in armed conflicts with local police and members of the Croatian paramilitary forces, and they terrorized Muslims and Croats. In October 1991, the JNA forces and members of the Serbian TO attacked the village of Ravno in the hills above Dubrovnik and killed a number of its inhabitants and burned many houses there. In November 1991, the JNA reservists stationed in Mostar paraded through Sarajevo shooting into the air. The behaviour of the JNA in BiH in the fall 1991 confirmed the concerns of many non–Serbs that the JNA had become a pro-Serbian force,[64/65] "that had, *in the very eve of war, kept 68% of its 140,000 soldiers stationed in BiH".*[66]

Articles in the NA about Bosnia and Herzegovina became more intense in late 1991 and early 1992, when it became completely clear that BiH wanted to become an independent and sovereign state. They published texts on provocations of JNA members[67], reports from the "insecure bank of the lower Neretva"[68] where over 16,000 extremist members of the HDZ were organized in "paramilitary units, while in other parts of the Republic the formations were named such titles as "Handzar Division", "Seventh Ustasha Regiment", "First Muslim Detachment in the Islamic Republic of BiH" […] Throughout BiH there are agents, saboteurs and terrorists of the Croatian intelligence service at work, and the Ustasha cannons are hitting Serb settlements in BiH"[69].

The *NA,* as the official newsletter of the Yugoslav Peoples Army, represented a media instrument of integrative Serb national feeling

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64 As a counterpart to the single-national Army of Bosnian Serbs, a multi-national Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine* – ARBiH) was created from the units of the Territorial Defense (TO) and *ad hoc* formed units of pro- Bosnian oriented citizens of BiH. During the war, put at many different temptations, first in battles against the JNA and the forces of Bosnian Serbs and volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro, and then split and exhausted by its internal divide and one-year long war with the Croatian Defense Council (*Hrvatsko vijeće obrane* – HVO), the ARBiH failed the test of multi-ethnic military force and it fell to the process of "nationalization", loosing its "multi" component for the sake of favorizing and putting forth only one its part – the Muslim (Bosniak) part. Although it emerged from the war as partly non-single national, the ARBiH would certainly not successfully pass all the tests of concept of a secular, multi- ethnic army.

65 Sonja Biserko (ed.), *op.cit,* note 4, 186.

66 Suzan Vudvord, Balkanska tragedija: Haos i disolucija nakon Hladnog rata (Filip Višnjić, Beograd, 1997), 255.

67 D. Glišić, „Prociciranje pripadnika JNA", *Narodna armija*, 30 December 1991, 28.

68 Milan Mijalković, „Dolina puna naboja", *Narodna armija*, 9 January 1992, 8.

69 *Ibid*, 8.

(Serbship) as Yugoslav national feeling (Yugoslavship) with the purpose of preventing the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The analysis of writings in this influential media outlet suggest the radical use of the Peoples Army as the *spin* tool in creating conditions to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from leaving Milošević's Yugoslavia by the use of force. At the same time, one should mention that in the same way as Milošević needed the JNA, the JNA also needed Milošević, not only as a political leader, but also as a means of achieving Army interests in terms of retaining the privileged position the military elite had enjoyed during the time of Tito's communism.

Nevertheless, not only the JNA was in charge of creating an artificial crisis and regressive ethno-mobilization. In the area of internal affairs, a very similar role was played by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, which, through special operations of the National Security Service of Serbia (*Služba državne bezbjednosti* - SDB) operated on the territory of BiH: Slowly, the preparations were being made in Bosnia and Herzegovina too. In November 1989, Bosnia was shaken by a police affair. SDB of Serbia evacuated the Serb population from municipalities Srebrenica and Bratunac under the pretence that this evacuation was made under the pressure of Muslim fundamentalists. For the first time, the SDB of one republic enganged in "secret works" in another Republic. There was a polarization, and conflicts in the top government of BiH and in Belgrade-Sarajevo relations. The leader of the Bosnian communists was compared in the Serb press with removed Albanian leaders, and there was a sort of *"Kosovization"* of BiH in progress"[70].

The first among BiH officials to react to the operations of the SDB Serbia was the secretary to the Presidency of CK SKBiH Ivan Cvitković, who believed it was a "scenario for destabilization of SR Bosne i Hercegovine".[71] He also accused the nationalists of "encouraging many affairs, large and small, in particular municipalities so that the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be kept busy resolving them and thus prevented from taking equal part in resolving crucial problems of our country [...]"[72]. Two days later Cvitković presented the view of the Presidency of the CK SKBIH, according to which the operations of the SDB of Serbia on the

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70 Sonja Biserko (ed.), *op. cit.* note 4, 65.

71 „Na djelu igre oko BiH", *Oslobođenje*, 18 October 1989, 2. (News –TANJUG).

72 Ibid.

territory of BiH "*represented an attack against sovereignty of BiH*".[73] The opinions of officials of the SK BiH on this action were divided[74], and the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs (*Savezni sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove -* SSUP) in their report said that "*SDB of Serbia had not exceeded their authority*".[75]

This case was read as the "Kosovization of the neighborhood"[76], and the Belgrade press countered with titles such as "The secretary is inventing spies?"[77], and with the opinion that "some Bosnia and Herzegovina politicians have in haste and without arguments accused the Service of national security of Serbia of violating sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina by acting without authorization on its territory".[78]

Clearly, the aim of the Serb political leaders was to involve the JNA and federation militia (through secret and special operations) in the BiH conflicts. This was justified by the concern for Yugoslavia, its political and territorial integrity and sovereignty, and by the necessity to fight against the "fascist" government in Croatia and "fundamentalist" government"[79] in Bosnia and Herzegovina [80]. Still, no matter what the real causes of Serbian expansionism to Bosnia and Herzegovina were, which may generally be listed under the title of *negative freedom* (others are not important when

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73 E. Habul, "Atak na suverenitet BiH", *Oslobođenje,* 20 October 1989, 3.

74 Branko Ekart, member of the Presidency of SRBiH, and President of the Council for Protection of Constitutional Order, says "The fact that the RSUP of SR Serbia has not operated on the territory of SR BiH is not disputed, and in this part it has not violated the existing rules on operation of those agencies "(„E.H. „Miješanja nije bilo", Oslobođenje, 19 October 1989, 3.

75 „SDB nije prekoračila ovlašćenja", *Oslobođenje*, 25 October 1989. 1 (News – TANJUG).

76 R.I. „Kosovizacija komšiluka", *Oslobođenje,* 24 October 1989, 3.

77 B. Andrejić „Sekretar izmišlja špijune", *Borba*, 20 October 1989 in: *Oslobođjenje,* 21 October 1989, 13,

78 Željko Vuković, „Sve je dozvoljeno", *Večernje novosti*, 20 October 1989, in *Oslobođjenje,* 21 October 1989, 13.

79 The "fundamentalism" is in Serbia, but also in most Western-European countries and the US, exclusively put in the context of Muslim faith, which is not right, because the "return to the roots" (fundament – basis, root) etc. may be a characteristic of any religion, including Orthodox, Catholicism, Buddhism, etc.

80 The role of JNA in the beginning was to remain "between warring parties", but later, as soon as the possible defeat of the Serb forces would come to sight, they would obviously and openly side with them. Technically, JNA made it possible to the Serb rebel forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to keep the territories won by force. After this "help" by the JNA, the Serb paramilitary forces would penetrate the "liberated" territory and finished the occupation by "ethnic cleansing" that has, most frequently, exhausted in executions or deports of non-Serb civilians to prison camps.

creating a state, only we are important, so anything is allowed), it was difficult to distinguish such metaphysical components from legal and other causes of the ethno-mobilization of Serbs (including the Serbs in BiH) because all these conditions, like in a pandemonium, are extensively interwoven. In any case, the Serbs viewed the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the process of creating new states on its territory (both of which were acts of legal nature, or more precisely, these were legally relevant facts of international public law) as the beginning of the end of the Serb supremacy that had been evident in the SFRY. From the point of view of a Serb nationalist, the dissolution of the former country also meant the dissolution of the "unified Serb national corps" – that had, until then, lived in a single country, divided into several smaller national corps that would, in the new circumstances, have the status of national minorities.[81] Serbian politicians did not want that to happen because it would, in their opinion, divide them as the largest population in the Western Balkans that had lived in a single state, into some smaller groups that would not be in the same country. Such a development was directly opposed to the ideology of "Greater Serbia" and its main postulate "All Serbs in One Country". However, one may conclude quite confidently that the Serbian national corps was the "biggest victim" of ethno-mobilization, both in terms of the intensity of its subjection to it, and in terms of the lethal consequences the Yugoslav conflict had on the national being and that are still felt today. As for the "victims" in the real meaning of the word, one may say that the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) were the most vulnerable and mostly physically harmed national corps during the conflict: they suffered displacement within and outside of BiH, and physical destruction by means of genocide, which was confirmed in the verdict of the Hague Tribunal of the Republika Srpska Army General Radislav Krstić.[82]

One major document that had encouraged pan-Serbian ethno-mobilization was the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts from 1986[83] that presented Serbs as a "threatened nation"

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81 Croats might have raised the same issue but they did not – at least not to the extent of promoting motto "All Croats in single state!" Nevertheless, manifest and/or latent politics of Dr. Franjo Tuđman followed the said pattern.

82 Paragraph 599 of the Trial Chamber judgment in *Krstić case*, states that the Trial Panel "[c]oncludes that the *indictment has succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that they had committed genocide against Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, in July 1995,* […]"

83 *See* Tilman Zülch, *Etničko čišćenje" - zločin za "Veliku Srbiju"*(Dokumentacija Društva za ugrožene narode, Bosanski kulturni centar, Sarajevo 1995), 30. Creators of the Memorandum

deprived of their civil and political rights and called for a reaffirmation of Serb interests in the former Yugoslavia. This Memorandum was presented as a "broad and radical analysis of the position of Serbs in Yugoslavia" and it described the "anti-Serbian coalition" made by Slovenia, Croatia and the leadership of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.[84] In addition to being the starting paradigm for the ethno-mobilization of "all Serbs' for the creation of the "Great Serbia", the Memorandum [...] prepared the ground for violence, as its implementation entailed territorial expansion and ethnic exclusivity. This must have threatened the basic security or even existence of other Yugoslav Peoples. [...] Thanks to Slobodan Milošević, a strong Serbian communist on the rise, the ruling communists forged an alliance with the Serbian non- communist nationalists and with the Serbian Orthodox Church, the *Red-Brown- Black symbiosis* that ensured the initial momentum and structure of the Serbian nationalism.[85]

As an introduction to the analysis of the role of religious communities in conflict generation and ethno-mobilization in BiH, one should mention that the process of ethno-mobilization of Serbs had for its ideological weft liturgical (ethno- confessional) nationalism, mixed with the blunt falsification of history and mythologized presentations and projections of a heavenly or chosen people, while in Croatian politics, this was instead an image of Croatia as the frontline of Christianity and civilization in the Balkans. Both concepts have lead to horrible consequences and suffering from which not even national corps of ideologists and creators of war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were spared.

All these processes and developments should have resulted in a "Great Serbia" and "Large Croatia", but what it practically meant was the bloody division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the obliteration of its statehood and national legal continuity. In addition, the disappearance of Bosnia

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claimed that "to no other nation in Yugoslavia was their cultural and spiritual identity denied as much as to the Serbs". (sic!). A consensus was reached when voting on the Memorandum since not a single member of the Academy spoke against this document. It is interesting to mention that each republic in the former Yugoslavia has been finding arguments that it had been exploited by the others, so this "comedy of wrong perceptions" lasted until the dissolution of the common state.

84 Robert Thomas, *Serbia under Milošević: Politics in the 1990s*, (Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, London, 1999), 41.

85 Norman Cigar, *Uloga srpskih orijentalista u opravdanju genocida nad muslimanima Balkana* (Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava – Bosanski Kulturni Centar, Sarajevo 2000), 20.

and Herzegovina as a country would mean the disappearance of its Muslim (Bosniak) national component as a constituent component of BiH statehood. Unfortunately for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the defensive attitude of the Bosniak religious-ethnic ideology joined the other two secularized religious narratives, and the Islamic Community was used as a spiritual logistic for transforming an aggressive war against Bosnia and Herzegovina into an inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflict. However, one should always emphasize that the internal conflicts in BiH are a consequence of aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, not a natural content of the BiH ethnic misunderstanding based on centuries-long hatred, as seen by former rector of the Sarajevo University, politologist Mr. Nenad Kecmanovic in his political analysis for the *Nova srpska politicka misao* and the *NIN*.[86]

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86 See in: Nenad Kecmanović, interview: „BiH je tamnica naroda" (Nova srpska politička misao"at: http://www.nspm.org.yu/koment2006/2006_kecman_tamnica.htm and Nenad Kecmanović, „Demokratija i protektorat u Bosni i Hercegovini" (Nova srpska politička misao), at:http://www.nspm.org.yu/komentari2005/2005_kecmanovic_ogr_dem.htm

Religious Communities and Conflict Generation
Serbian Orthodox Church
(Srpska pravoslavna crkva - SPC)

The previous chapters show that the religious communities intervened in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in different ways. This research paper will confine itself to the role of religious communities in conflict generation. It will predominantly deal with the SPC, which occupied the public space the most intensely of all churches during pre-conflict ethno-mobilization. The famous action of carrying the remnants of the Emperor Lazarus through Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1988 and 1989 to mark the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo Battle was reported by media as the *event of the day* and it was used for purpose of homogenizing the Serb people in Yugoslavia.

Croatian historian Dušan Bilandžić thinks that in this "ritual/religious way, the SPC… took part in developing movement for "Great Serbia". It has, in a way that was little known in other peoples, renewed the syntagm of "Heavenly Serbia", what fit and combined well with other paroles, yelling and battle cries in mass media, rallies and religious rites…"[87] He also emphasizes that the transportation of the remnants of Emperor Lazarus through Bosnia and Herzegovina helped create the war psychosis. When bringing the remnants of the Emperor Lazarus through towns and villages, the episcopes read their epistles focusing on the term "heavenly people" and "heavenly Serbia". So for instance, episcope of Sabac and Valjevo Jovan included in his epistle a part on "heavenly Serbia". He states: "From Prince Lazarus and Kosovo, Serbs had been, first of all, creating the "heavenly Serbia" which has until now certainly grown into the largest heavenly state. If we only take the innocent victims of this last war (1941-45), millions and millions of Serbian men and women, children and the weak, were killed or tortured most terribly, or thrown into pits or caves by Ustasha villains, then we can see how large must be the empire in heaven".[88] He continues: "Saint prince Lazarus was designated as a symbol of Serb

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87 Dušan Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest* (Golden marketing, Zagreb, 1999), at: http://www.hercegbosna.org/ostalo/raspad.html .

88 Radmilo Radić, „Crkva i 'Srpsko pitanje'", in Nebojša Popov (ed.), *Srpska strana rata: Trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju, I deo* (Samizdat B92, Beograd, 2002), 313.

martyrdom and ruler of the "Heavenly Serbia", the heavenly kingdom reserved for the righteous Serbs who had lived and died for cross and homeland".[89]

Bayford connects the rehabilitation of vladika Nikolaj Velimirović, renown for his anti-western and anti-modernistic views that incorporates the "anti-Jewish insults"[90] with the revitalization of the myth of the Serbian people as martyrs.

The above quotes show that the "Serbian Orthodox Church took active part in mobilizing the Serbian people; it went among people with the remnants of prince Lazarus, going from one town to another, with in detail elaborated religious and nationalist behavior, because the Serbs are "heavenly sole" and God's only chosen envoys. The church procession and the carrying of the remnants of Prince Lazarus Hrebljanović were part of the preparations for marking the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo Battle (1389). In parallel with the ceremony in Kosovo, there was also an event organized near church Lazarus in Dalmatian Kosovo (1989), which also served the purpose of rehabilitating Chetnik movement".[91] A similar celebration was organized in Knežina near Sokolac by a memorial service for the heroes fallen in the Kosovo battle. The ceremony was dominated by "orthodox, communist and royalist symbols and messages such as: "Milošević, Serbian Obilić", "Long live Yugoslavia – Municipality Serbian Orthodox Gacko."[92]

The SPC established a link with the Serbian political leaders and, in coordination with the leaders of Serbia and Serbian intellectual circles gathered around Dobrica Ćosić, it began preaching the idea of all Serbs in Yugoslavia being threatened. This was also confirmed by the St. Vitus' Day's "Proposal of church/national program" published in 1989 that read:

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89 Jovan Bayford, *Potiskivanje i poricanje antisemitizma: Sećanje na vladiku Nikolaja Velimirovića u savremenoj srpskoj pravoslavnoj kulturi* (Helsinški komitet za ljudska prava Srbija, Beograd, 2005), 73.

90 Ibid.

91 Sonja Biserko (ed.), *op. cit.* note 4, 42.

92 Tihomir Loza, „Knežina 89: Simbioza simbola", *Naši dani*, 26 May 1989, 14-17.

" […] The fact remains that during the last two years, there has been some warming up in relations between the Serbian church and Serbian politics - changes like that have not happened in the half-century since the war. For the time, we could not expect more. But we must not stop here. One should not be afraid and avoid the Church that has over centuries remained the most stabile pillar of the Serb people. Now as before, the Serb Church will not partner with the state or have a share in political power. That is foreign to its spiritual meaning. And even though it is not specifically in favor of any socio-political system in the world, it can not be completely apolitical… That is why we are proposing to political leaders of Serbia, who act under the program of creating a democratic European state, to return to the Church its role which it had been unjustly and by force deprived of and thus fill the gap that had occurred by its neglect in society. Because there is no strong country without a strong Church![93]

The SPC's involvement in politics was seen by the distinguished theological publicist Mirko Đorđević as problematic because the "church went back to history, to the terrible misunderstandings, divisions and conflicts from the World War II…"[94] Đorđević, also notices that the same route by which the remnants of the emperor Lazarus were carried was later followed by the JNA, and social psychologist Dr. Jovan Beyford thinks that this event had marked the "territories they considered Serbian" following the logic "where the Serbian bones are, that is Serbian land…"[95]

In the newsletter of the SPC, Muslims were shown as uncivilized, retrograde and "genetically bad people who accepted Islam, and now, generation after generation, this gene is simply condensed. It is getting worse and worse, expresses itself very simply, dictates such method of thinking and behavior. This is already in the genes".[96]

The SPC began to pay full attention to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the homogenization of Serbs in that republic in May 1990, when at the session of the Assembly of the SPC they "make a decision and sends

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93 *Glas crkve* No. 3 in: Sonja Biserko (ed), *op. cit.* note 4, 166-167.

94 Documentary film "Serbian Orthodox Church and dissolution of Yugoslavia" (Helsinki Committee for Human rights of Serbia, Beograd, 2006)

95 Ibid.

96 Sonja Biserko, *op. cit.* note 4, 41.

a request to the responsible agencies to recover from pits the remnants of the Serbs killed in the World War II and to have them properly buried".[97]

In the SPC media, the Muslims, particularly Bosnian Muslims, were depicted as Islamic fundamentalists and a threat to Serbs. The SPC Priest from BiH, Dragomir Ubiparipović, said that the Serbs had become known in the recent decades as a "target of sudden pressure of fundamentalist Islam. […] The new, edited "Načertanije" must set clear and undisputable borders of the Serbian state and it must defend our people who live in other countries..."[98]

A special role in developing the image of Muslims as Islamic fundamentalists was taken by Serb Orientalists, and above all by Miroljub Jeftić. Jeftić argued as follows: "… Yugoslav Muslims are Islamic Fundamentalists that are nothing but reflection of darkness from past […] Islam is opposing any legal relation, tolerance, dialogue and coexistence […] in Yugoslav conditions, each Muslim is Islamic Fundamentalist because, even if they were not religious, they certainly belong to the secular Islamic Fundamentalism or Communist Islam […]."[99]

> SPC openly offers a projection of ideal Serbian state because "Serbship without orthodox faith, as it had been said before, is not possible, it is just an abstraction", and then "therefore, for Serbs to live in a Serbian country some conditions have to be met. If the national government and the leaders of the country are not orthodox, i.e. if they do not have spiritual connections with the Serbian Orthodox Church, if they do not come to services, do not take communion, if they do not celebrate their baptismal celebration, do not receive the priest for the purpose to consecrate the water, or even refuse to cross, then they can not be legitimate representatives of the Serbs. And if such people rule Serbia, Serbs can not consider them their own, just like the Turks have ruled Serbia for long time, and that never meant they were Serbian statesmen… Fortunately, there are Serbian lands with all features of Serbian state. Those are Srpska Republika Krajina and Srpska

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97 note 88, 322.

98 *Glas Crkve* 1991 in: Mirsad Abazović, *Kadrovski rat za BiH*   (Savez logoraša Bosne i Hercegovine – CID, Sarajevo, 1999), 108.

99 Mirsad Abazović, *op.cit.* note 13, 105-106.

Republika BiH. In those countries, the flag, coat of arms and anthem are Serbian and Orthodox. Their highest leaders come to religious services, celebrate their baptism, introduce religion in their service; write Cyrillic in administration, accept their priests as spiritual leaders, not as opponents. But he time will show whether Serbia and Montenegro would become Serbian countries would become one day.[100]

Islamic Religious Community
(Islamska vjerska zajednica-IVZ)

In 1990, the IVZ got its new Reis-l-ulema,[101] Jakub ef. Selimoski - a Macedonian Muslim. This represented the first time that someone outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina became the religious leader of Muslims in Yugoslavia.

Selimoski had presented opinions based on which one could conclude that the Muslims were for a unified Yugoslavia. In his interview for the weekly *Danas* from Zagreb, immediately after being elected Reisu-l-ulema, he said: "Concerning Muslims and Islamic Community, we can only be in favor of Yugoslavia, the AVNOJ Yugoslavia where all of us are equal, regardless of nationality or faith. Today, Muslims live and work in all Republic and all Provinces throughout Yugoslavia, and that is why we consider Yugoslavia our only homeland."[102]

Selimoski repeated similar statements during the first Congress of the SDA, although stressing that the "SDA is a legitimate representative of Muslim people"[103] because it confirms that the "Muslim people should live on equal footing alongside the two other constitutive people in BiH, and at the same time peacefuly look for a certain form of Yugoslav community where all will be equal."[104]

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100 *Pravoslavlje* no. 608, 1992. in: Sonja Biserko *op. cit.* note 4, 268-269.

101 Reisu-l-ulema is the title highest religion leader of the Bosnian Muslims.

102 Mustafa Mujagić, „Mi smo muslimani", *Danas*, 6 March 1990, 12.

103 „SDA – Politički predstavnik muslimana", *Preporod*, 1 December 1991, 3.

104 Ibid, 3.

He also criticized positions of Franjo Tuđman and Vuk Drašković, who offered them the "return to the grandfathers' faith", to the "mother nation", seeking "historical rights" because "that would result in national cataclysm and fratricide".[105]. At the dawn of the war that was to start against Bosnia and Herzegovina, Reisu–l-ulema Selimoski recognised that religious leaders "have surrendered the initiative to the nationalistic passions of certain leaders and they have, in turn, not only usurped democracy, but completely disabled it."[106]

Selimoski was in favor of multi-party system because, in his opinion, it was obvious that "the single partisan system was not an expression of human strivings, because a single-face and uniformity are foreign to human nature. Therefore, I am in favor of establishing new forms of expressing various interests and joining the European and world processes of cooperation and bringing the peoples together."[107]

Just before the war in the former Yugoslavia, the Muslim political elite gathered around Alija Izetbegovic replaced Jakub Selimoski through an unpleasant procedure. Izebegovic brought Mustafa ef. Ceric to the leading position in the Islamic Community in BiH, a postiong which, both then and today, regularly performed the function of a reis.

Much like other religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Islamic religious community drew near "its own national party," the SDA, according to reis Selimoski, and the president of Mešihat[108] of IVZ in BiH Salih ef. Čolaković. At the first Congress of the SDA, ef. Čolaković said that the "Islamic community should support every cultural, economic and political programme in the interest of the Muslim people, on condition that this programme is in line with Islamic tradition."[109]

He also stressed that the SDA programme Declaration "contains elements close to islamic teachings,"[110] but stated that "certain individuals found it necessary to improvise things I never advocated," concluding that he was

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105 Mustafa Mujagić, „Mi smo muslimani", *Danas*, 6 March 1990, 11.

106 Salih Smajlović and Ismet Bušatlić, „Islam nudi mir", *Preporod*, 1 April 1992, 12.

107 Mustafa Mujagić, „Mi smo muslimani", Danas, 6 March 1990, 13.

108 Within former SFRJ Rijaset was the highest executive organ of the Islamic community, while one among Mesihats was responsible for Muslims in BiH, Slovenia and Croatia.

109 Orhan Bajraktarević, „Islamska zajednica nije filijala nijedne političke stranke", *Preporod*, 15 December 1991. 8.

110 Ibid.

only speaking of individials from the party[111] "whom I have told a long time ago that I will not allow the IVZ to become a subsidary of a political party".[112]

The Islamic publication *Preporod* included topics about the possibility of genocide on Muslim and others. A good example of this is a text titled "Possibility of genocide on Muslim and our other people, during the Yugoslav crisis and war" which calls for a trial of Draža Mihajlović for his crimes on the Muslim people during WWII. The article also warned of the possibility of the worst kind of civil war if the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina escalated.[113] *Preporod* called the JNA "Serb, hegemonisitc and partly nazi-fascist pro-cetnik army,"[114] and warned that the Army was causing international conflicts."[115]

The IVZ worked hard to mobilize Muslims just before the referendum, calling on other people as well to take part because "Bosnia is the country with a thousand year old tradition finaly ready to take its place in the international arena of free countries."[116]

Mešihat of the IVZ headed by ef. Čolaković dismissed accusations that it was planning to create an Islamic Bosnian Republic. They stressed that a civil state was the best solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina but warned that it was not fair

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111 It is important to note that Colakovic's conflict with other members of SDA starts after he fires almost all the journalists working at Preporod in March 1991, including Džemaludin Latić (today a professor at the Islamic Theological Faculty in Sarajevo, op. a.) and Mustafa Spahić [today an imam and a teacher at Gazi-Husrevbegova medresa in Sarajevo]. After this they start working for the official SDA publication „Muslimanski glas", and from one issue to another they confront Colakovic nad the leadership of Mesihat covering BiH (*Cf. Muslimanski glas*, 26 July 1991, 2 August 1991 and 9. august 1991.)

112 Orhan Bajraktarević, „Islamska zajednica nije filijala nijedne političke stranke", *Preporod*, 15 December 1991, 8

113 Adnan Bešlagić, „Pretpostavke mogućeg genocida nad Muslimanima, kao i drugim našim narodima, u jugoslovenskoj krizi i ratu", *Preporod*, 15 December 1991, 19.

114 F.Š., „Dva oka u glavi – JNA i Srbija", *Preporod*, 15 December 1991, 19.

115 K.S., „Armija izaziva međunacionalne sukobe", *Preporod*, 1 October 20.

116 Poruka predsjednika Mešihata IZ BiH Salih ef. Čolakovića povodom referendumskog izjašnjavanja, *Preporod*, 15 February, 2.

" […] to deny Bosnia something that both serbia and Croatia have claimed a long time ago. The right to a country and freedom does not only apply to those greater in numbers. This is especially unfair towards the Muslim people to whom Bosnia is the only homeland and country. Only our people will be endangered if a free and independent Bosnia is not created or if Bosnia becomes a colony of Serbia and Croatia".[117]

Following atempts to reformulate the referendum question by HDZ BiH *Preporod* warned that (see Catholic Church in BiH op. S.T.) the "Serb-Croat coalition is possible and says that national threads of independent Bosnia are being pulled from Belgrade and Zagreb thanks to puppets from national parties in Croatia and Serbia."[118]

Roman-Catholic Church
(Rimokatolička crkva – RKC)

It is important to note that the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be separated from the Catholic Church in Croatia, as actions of Catholic clerics in this neighboring country had immediate impact and influence on clerics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also very important to note that contrary to the SPC, the RKC was extremely poorly represented in the state media in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia. Due to this fact, it mostly communicated through its own religious publications.

Croatian bishops sent the first messages pointing to nationalistic tensions in Yugoslavia and threats to the Croatian people in October 1989, warning about "[…] programmed psychological terrorism, placing collective blame on the Croatian people, accusing them of genocide, and the Catholic Church as the main perpetrator and cause of gernocide."[119]

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117 Ibid.

118 Feljko Šekov, „Dokle će nas varati", *Preporod*, 15 February 1992, 3.

119 Velimir Blažević (ed.), *Katolička crkva i rat u Bosni i Hercegovini : dokumenti o stavovima i zauzimanju Katoličke crkve za mir i poštivanje ljudskih prava i građanskih sloboda i za očuvanje države BIH (1989-1996)* (Svjetlo riječi, Sarajevo, 1998), 14.

Glas koncila, a popular religious paper published by the Catholic Church in Croatia and available in other parts of Yugoslavia, attempted to separate the Church from the Ustasha's crimes during WWII. "The atempts to separate the Church fropm Ustasha are obvious. However, although the crimes commited are scrutinised, what *Glas koncila* is missing is a conscience about the historical responsibility for the crimes."[120]

In the early 1990s *Glas koncila* began its campaign against the former state portraying it as a negative experience,[121] and stressing the dominance of the Serb people in Yugoslavia, and accusing them of attempts to destroy Catholisicm.

From the very beginning, the strongest in Yugoslavia considered the state their chance to destroy Islam and Catholisicm and establish an Orthodox creed, or that during the past seventy years as hatred among peoples has grown, western catholic part only weakened and what was staretd by the Turks it is now continuing in Yugoslavia. (GK, 35/2.9.1990.) What is clear is "broadening of serb and orthodox borders because Serbs are behaving like conquerers and Serbian Orthodox Church is trying to turn all Yugoslav believers into Serbs. (GK, 35/2.9.1990.) It is stressed that Croatian Catholic Church has never acted in this manner.[122]

Catholic Church was making efforts to mobilize Catholics and Croats to participate in the first multy-party elections in Bosnia and Hezegovina[123] Bishops stated that "the Church does not command which party to vote for"[124] but it recommends "voting maturely with a Christian conscience and individual beliefs for that party that guarantees the best political, social and economic programme. No one should be worried about losing a job or pension if they vote according to their Croatian conscience and beliefs."[125]

Similar messages were sent to all Croats in Yugoslavia. Although clerics

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120 Maja Brkljačić, „'Glas koncila' u predvečerje sloma komunizma: jedno viđenje hrvatskog nacionalnog pitanja Hrvatske katoličke crkve" in: Thomas Bremer (ed.), *Religija, društvo i politika: Kontroverzna tumačenja i približavanje* (Wissenschaftliche Arbeitsgruppe für weltkirchliche Aufgaben der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, Berlin, 2002), 103-116 at 109-110.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid, 112.

123 Blažević, *op.cit.*, note 119, 24.

124 Ibid, 24.

125 Ibid,24-25.

could not be memebers of political parties, they were responsible to "teach people how to actively take part in elecetions and freely vote for the party whose programmes are in line with Christian principles." During this time "Catholic Church [became] closer to HDZ BiH."[126]

The Catholic Church urged Catholic Croats to take part in the referendum in 1992 and to cast their votes for an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Franciscans were very active in doing so. However, during this period two opposite currents become apparent within the Catholic clergy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the *Bosna Srebrena* Catholics scrutinized everyone who wished to join the Bosnian territory to one of the neighbouring countries, but in Herzegovina they "openly support[ed] nationalist politicians in BiH"[127]

> [...] Tomilsav Pervan, a leading clergyman from Mostar region, repeats Tudjman's propaganda about Muslims intending to create an Islamic state. He states that "there is no freedom of speech, democracy or freedom of religion in islamic countries" and in Bobanovo in Herzegovina another clerk Vinko Mikolic adds that Bosnian government is "just like the Turkish aggressors".[128]

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126 Dino Abazović,"Za naciju i Boga": sociološko određenje religijskog nacionalizma (Magistrat, Sarajevo, 2006), 90.

127 Ibid, 91.

128 Ibid.

Ethno-Intellectuals:

Friends of the Nations are Preparing for Violence

What was happening in the political and social arena during 1987 in the former Yugoslavia offers contradicting meanings of the word elite. Although contemporary political literature considers this to describe a certain caste of people – the highly intelligent, the best, the chosen, the most capable and at the same time those chosen by the people, by the voters based on their talents - in this region it has proven to mean also the self-chosen elites. It was through visions, god's will, roots, a historical mission or party will that they came to believe that they possesed the necessary talents to rule. In the socialist system entering elites was conditioned by the Communist party membership. The old regime tried to control many social organizations. Of special interest were humanist unions: writers' unions, philosophers' unions, sociologists' unions, artists' unions, Academies of Science and Arts. During difficult times and the crisis of the communist regime they gave support to the communist regime and at times they were the catalyst for the dissatisfaction of the public at large. Charismatic power and a charismatic leader was the basic core of the political system in the former Yugoslavia. As Max Weber demonstrated, this kind of system is more capable of self-destruction than political systems based on traditional or rational principles. This sort of system, in which a charismatic leader is a basic source of stability like Tito was in the former Yugoslavia, hides the lack of basic consensus. After Tito's death this absence became obvious.

The revolutions in Europe in 1989 and the global fall of communism marked the foundation of pluralistic societies. Intellectual elites had a prominent influence on these events as "they were traditionally considered leaders in Eastern Europe".[129] This acceptance of intellectuals as leaders often enabled them to take over the positions of communists, and in this way to assume political responsibility. A number of intellectuals offered various visions of the how the new social structure would function. However, what started as a battle for democracy ended up being a battle for ethno-mobilization. Writers' unions in all republics of the former Yugoslavia began fighting for the democratisation of society through their

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129 Duško Radosavljević, *Elite i transformacija: slučajevi Poljske, Mađarske i Srbije* (Novi Sad, Ilida, 2001), 54.

own social engagements. According to Radosavljevic, the Writers' Union of Serbia was, in a way, an ideological organization founded and controlled by the official policy as much as was required by the government. Problems caused by some members of UKS that immediately affected the government were not problems of the UKS. Changes started taking place after Tito's death. A number of events including the trial of poet Gojko Djogo, the banning of the show "Golubnjaca" in theatres in Novi Sad, the banning of Nebojša Popov's book "Social conflicts – a challenge to sociology", and athe political pursuits of Alija Izetbegović in BiH, Vladimir Šeks in Croatia, Vojislav Šešelj in BiH Adem Demaci in Kosovo, Dobroslav Paraga in Croatia would facilitate the mobilization of intellectuals in the fight for a free spirit, which was one of conditions for the establishment of a democratic society. However, the denial of the Yugoslav communist government became the denial of the idea of a Yugoslav political and state community.

The UKS organised public protests in support to poet Djogo. The UKS Assembly asked the government to renounce the judgment of April 1983 as, in their opinion, it violated artististic freedom. While the trial to Djoga was in process, a Committee for Artists' Freedoms was formed. They were very active, especially in their reactions to political pursuits. According to Radosavljević these activities were more a reaction to events than an expression of the UKS's political affiliation. However, in May 1987 the UKS organised protests against the status of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo, aligning in support of the public state policy. "We are moving away from the situation where the writers were defending their profession to the general standpoint on the defence of our own, Serb people."[130] Although it looked as though this political involvement of the writers had democracy for its aim, things suddenly took a more dangerous route.

The UKS started a number of public activities, usually covering topics related to Kosovo and the status of Serbs living there. A text by Dobrica Cosic was published in "Knjizevne novine" on 1 June 1987, in an attempt to define the Serb question by stressing that along with the question of Yugoslavia it could only be solved through changes to the 1974 Constitution. It also stated that the Serbs were in the most difficult position among the people in Yugoslavia. In 1985, the SANU Assembly made the decision to formulate a memorandum stressing all economic, social, political, scientific

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130 Ibid, 70.

and cultural programmes that would lead to overcoming the general crisis in Yugoslavia. This controversial and contradictory text is based on the Serb political programme – "All Serbs in one state". During one of the SANU meetings Radovan Samardzic said, "Our science and SANU are responsible for this opportunity for change. Today, this intellectual engagement is classified through the strategy of wars in former Yugoslavia and strategy that stopped establishment of democracy in Serbia."[131]

Norman Cigar has analyzed tens of publications, books and articles written by Serb orientalists and concludes that they are "closely connected to political context and political aims." "Instead of promoting peaceful coexistence and solutions Serb orientalists added oil to the fire and increased fear and hatred among Serbs. Long before the real break up of Yugoslavia these scientists formulated stereotypes about Muslims as foreign, inferior and threatening factor."[132] Cigar has aslo analyzed many texts by Aleksandar Popović, Darko Tanasković, Miroljub Jevtić, Neda Todorov. In this context Muslims are portrayed as "contradictory to the pragmatic west", a "delusioned", people "who have nothing in common with European civilization", and thus are "a threat to modern civilization". "Islam is against equal communication, tolerance and community", they state, "Islam is an aggressive religion".

Territorial appetites and the production of fear were ever present. Ethno-intellectuals participated in the assemblies of national parties. On one occasion, Milorad Ekmecic explained the crisis in Slovenia by adding that "it is only a matter of days and special circumstances when the conflict in Sarajevo will begin." At a Congress of Serb intellectuals Gojko Đogo stated, "Serbs cannot give up their centuries long dream: to live in one country. That idea has no price." Intellectuals' worries for their nation, her subservient status, development and future were a basic justification for the beginning of the war.

The role of ethnic intellectuals and media in ethno-mobilization processes in BiH was extremely negative because the citizens of BiH were exposed to media and intellectual terror from neighbouring countries, as well as from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Clubs and fora of Muslim, Croat, and Serb intellectuals flourished. Members of the civil community warned that the

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131 Ibid, 73.

132 Norman Cigar, *Uloga srpskih orijentalista u opravdanju genocida na Muslimanima Balkana* (Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo, 2000), 23

attribute of ethnicity was not appropriate for an intellectual, but it was in vain. Perhaps the best illustration of this was given by Miodrag Živanović[133] in his comment in the *Oslobođenje*:

> **"** The very term 'Muslim, Serb or Croat intellectual' is *contradictio in adjecto* as far as logic is concerned, and in a political sense, this means nothing but reducing the intellectuals to serve only one nation, only narrow nationalist interest, or even worse, the daily interests of political party that in that way represents the so-called national interest: it is not a nation that is in jeopardy, - it is everything that is intellectual and spiritual. As a consequence, there was threat to constitutional establishment – whatever that establishment was. Institutions of para-government were established (the leading position in this process was assumed by the SDS, but it is not beyond imagination that the SDA and the HDZ would follow) basing such actions on the thesis that the nation is the only and exclusive constituent of social relations and the only area of human confirmation. True, the nation has its undisputed moral, cultural and other values, but it is certainly too narrow a space for the breadth of human thinking and working. This is, in fact, an overall reduction. This means the narrowing of mine, and the lives of other people… the SDS organizes a referendum of Serb people, whether they are for or against Yugoslavia. Formally and legally, this national referendum is contrary to Constitution, but a bigger problem lies in the fact that this referendum does not provide for anything common (as declared by the SDS leaders), but quite the contrary: we are divided along ethnic lines. What if similar referenda were organized by political parties of Muslim and Croat peoples in BiH, and if their decision were contrary to the decision made by Serbs? Would that not separate us […]"?[134]

Živanović's concerns were realized. Many citizens of BiH were ideologically divided. This was at the same time a message to international community that these territories "by their nature are incapable of democratic development of the Western-European type."(Bibo)

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133 Miodrag Živanović is Professor of Philosophy at Universitiy Banja Luka.

134 *Oslobođenje*, 7 November 1991, 3.

Media Hate-Speech

Media from neighboring countries (Serbia and Croatia) used "speech of hatred" thereby becoming accomplices and pure executors of nationalistic politics in these areas, and contributing to the to inflammation of war against BiH. The research shows that the media were not only the classic means of propaganda for winning power, but also the strongest weapon of national mobilization of the popular masses in the Balkans. In the early 1980s in the Yugoslav capital Belgrade, the laws on freedom of information (that corresponded to international conventions on freedom of information), including the Law on Basics of the System of Public Information, Republic Law on Public Information and the Criminal Code, all *prohibited inciting national, religious intolerance and undermining good international relations"* (underlined by authors). Nevertheless, these became dead letter because the regime lead by Slobodan Milošević, had put the institutions and elements of the information system of Serbia into the service of nationalist oligarchies, *with the purpose of extensive teaching of hatred* and preparing the people for war. Similarly, but in a milder and less aggressive form, the same thing happened in the information system of Croatia.

Print Media

Regarding the media influence of the neighbors on BiH, it is little known that the enflaming of hatred was helped by the informative configuration of the system in the former SFRY and the *level of exposure of Bosnia and Herzegovina's people to the media* from neighboring Serbia and Croatia. Milošević's, but also Tuđman's broadcasting, spilled over the borders of Serbia and Montenegro. *Politika* from Belgrade found its place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly in those parts inhabited by Serbs, and the Croatian *Vjesnik* had a grateful market, particularly in western Herzegovina. The *Oslobodenje* from Bosnia and Herzegovina had circulation of 70,000, and it sold well in Sarajevo, Zenica, Travnik; but there were parts of BiH where it was almost not sold at all.

Electronic Media

A similar picture can be seen in case of radio and TV systems. Signals of the radio systems of SR Serbia and SR Croatia covered large parts of BiH. The first program of Radio Sarajevo had "unclear" frequency, so it could only be heard with difficulty. TV signals from Serbia covered eastern Bosnia, while the TV signals from Croatia covered northern and western Bosnia and western Herzegovina. The area in BiH around the river Drina was poorly covered by signals of TV SA. This configuration of information system in SFRY already suggested *the large possibilities of informative, i.e. propaganda action of information systems of Serbia and Montenegro on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.* At the same time, these data show that the *"defensive power" of the information system of BiH* was very poor. Furthermore, this shows the domination of mass media policies from neighboring countries over BiH media.[135] Compared to TV Belgrade and TV Zagreb, TV SA was in an inferior position. While the other two had a "clear" program concept: nation, national state on the principles of natural and historical rights, emphasizing historical injustices or current threats, TV SA did not have such a concept and it could not have it. Only the peoples in BiH: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats had their common, national information system. Still, the experience showed that the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were more exposed to "their own" *national* information systems, the centers of which were in Belgrade and Zagreb respectively. All those were the keys for the change of opinion that opened the door of ethno-mobilization and violence.

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135 Muhamed Nuhić, *Riječ – slika, zločin* (Press centar AR BiH, Sarajevo, 1994), 53-67.

Referenda for Independence and Mutual Recognition of Yugoslav Republics

In the midst of ethno-mobilization and threats to wipe BiH off the geo-political map of the world, the German Chancellor at the time Hans Dietrich Genscher said that the report of the Badinter Commission would not oblige Germany, and that it would unilaterally recognize Croatia. Not waiting for the results of the Badinter Commission, which was supposed to make a complete report on situation of human rights in the Republics of the former Yugoslavia, Gensher "announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Zagreb and Ljubljana on 23 December."[136] Later, the American national secretary accused Germany that its "early" recognition of Croatia did not contribute to "good results', but instead "added oil to the fire".[137] This position resulted from awareness of the fact that the demands for recognition of independence from the Yugoslav republic would at the same time serve as appropriate protection of national minorities and control of their own borders, and at that time, this was a problem for Croatia. In its report the Commission had mentioned conditions Croatia could not meet. Of four republics that wanted international recognition (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia), the Commission recommended only the recognition of Slovenia and Macedonia. One of the recognition conditions for Bosnia and Herzegovina was organization of a referendum.[138] The referendum was held on 29 February and 1 March, and 2,061,932 of a total of 2,073,568 voting citizens, or 99.44% voted for a sovereign and independent BiH, a state of equal citizens between the peoples of BiH – Muslims, Serbs, Croats and other nations living in it.

Ethno-mobilization was already in progress, and it had some direct reflection on participation in the referendum and its result: most Bosnian Serbs abstained from voting, while the majority of Muslims and Croats voted for independence. The Bosnian Serbs saw this fact as an "unprincipled coalition" and it signified the end of illusion that they

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136 Daniele Conversi, *German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia* (The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 1998), 13.

137 Ibid, 40.

138 Opinion of the *Badinter's Commission* 3 and 11.

would ever want to live in a country where they would consitiute, as they felt, national minority. BiH leaving Yugoslavia appeared to the political leadership of Bosnian Serbs to give them a legitimate demand for the part of the territory of BiH inhabited mostly by Serbs to be separated from BiH. The only fact they had forgotten was that the Srpska Republika Bosna i Hercegovina (and later Republika Srpska) had never been a state in its full capacity. Although, *stricto sensu,* during the warring conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina only the Government of (Republic) Bosnia and Herzegovina was an internationally recognized government, the Republika Srpska (which had from the aspect of international law a status of para-state creation, and its army a status of rebelling forces), as well as the leadership of Bosnian Croats of the self-proclaimed Croat Republic Herzeg Bosnia (with the same status of "state" and "army") had *de facto* exclusive control over large territories of BiH through their single-national armed forces and civilian administration.

International recognition of BiH followed on 6 April 1992 and after that, the Presidency of BiH passed a Decision to proclaim imminent war danger, and on 20 June 1992, the Decision on Proclaiming a State of War.

In a referendum held in December 1990, Slovenia "decided to disassociate" from Yugoslavia within six months. Croatia did the same in a referendum held in May 1991, while Macedonia organized a referendum in September 1991, and then passed a new constitution in November 1991, under which this republic too had 'disassociated' from Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its Memorandum of 14 October 1991 (the so-called *Letter of Intention*, "Official Gazette of SR BiH" No. 32/91) conditioned its stay in Yugoslavia on Croatia and Serbia staying too."[139]

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[139] Omer Ibrahimagić, *Državno-pravni razvitak Bosne i Hercegovine* (Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca, Sarajevo 1998), 133.

Internal Legal and Political Decomposition of
Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srpska Republika Bosna i Hercegovina) was proclaimed on 9 January 1992, and its constitution was proclaimed on 28 February of the same year. The Constitution clearly said that the new creation had the strong intention of becoming a sovereign and independent state of the Serb people who lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of what other parts of BiH and other peoples living in the self-proclaimed republic of Serbian peoples, or for that matter, thought about it.

In Article 1, the Constitution said it was a "state of the Serbian people and all other citizens" and that the "territory of the Republic is unified, inseparable and inalienable". This fact represented a new split of the country (following example of the SFRY), where, within one creation that did not really have its real name until the Dayton Constitution, one "Federation" and one "Republic" emerged whose capacity was recognized later in the layman form of an "entity", but also a limited international-legal subjectivity. "Atypical solution that can hardly be recognized by theory of law (and practice) is seen in the following (i) normally, it is not usual that a "federation" is a part of a country. "Federation" is a union of states, or rather a form of administrative-territorial-political organization of a complex state that "covers" two or more "states'.[140]

Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna (HZHB) – later, ever since 28 August 1993, a self proclaimed Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna (HRHB) – which was established on 18 November, was a Croatian counterpart of the para-state organization within the up to then unified BiH within its AVNOJ borders. The ultra-right element of the HDZ proclaimed HZHB as a separate economic and political, cultural and ethno- territorial unit on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After establishing this creation, they wanted to achieve an ethnically clean area by expelling the non- Croat population. The HVO took control over the municipal government, removing local non-Croat political leaders and maximally marginalizing

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140 Zarije Seizović, „Bh enititeti: države u državi i/li pravno-teorijska enigma: Daytonsko *ad hoc* priznanje limitiranih međunarodnopravnih subjektiviteta bh entitetima", *Pravna misao*, no. 9-12, Sarajevo, 1998), 62.

their influence on political circumstances in this part of BiH. Media imposed ideas of Large Croatia, and Croatian heraldic symbols became a usual sight in all municipalities under HVO control. The Community had a very well organized and developed para-state structure that has, informally, continued to exist within the established Federation of BiH. The Community was at the same time a reaction and a copy of the politics of the Bosnian Serbs who wanted to create their ethnically clean territory. The animosity of both groups towards the Bosniaks contributed to the gradual, but very visible ethno-mobilization of Bosniaks and to ethno-religious radicalization of a part of the intellectual and military and political circles.

Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) had two political and legal solutions for this extremely unfavourable institutional, legal and political situation: the first one was to attempt with full strength to preserve the territorial integrity and independence of BiH as the only guarantor of their survival, and second, to accept the establishment of a mini-ethnic community with a majority Bosniak (Islamic) population. The latter would be the most intensive form of ethno-mobilization, but it would at the same time signify its end because gathering on the basis of religion/nation would loose is point because "the others" would probably not be there any more. Bosniaks opted for the first solution, but, having found themselves "between a rock and a hard place" (politics of national exclusivities of Serbia and Croatia), with an incompetent, and essentially anti-Bosnian elite, which inevitably led to the reaffirmation of their own nation, and ultimately their own nationalism, but at the same time, they kept emphasizing their unconditional desire to preserve BiH as a state, its multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious social substrate, being fully aware of the fact that the sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only possible state framework for full affirmation of their civil, national, national/confessional identity, and the only guarantor of their survival on the territory of the Balkans. Still, it was *ketmen* policy, hypocrisy and insincerity, because objectively viewed, by acceding to a mono-ethnic mobilization of Bosniak masses, by accepting the negotiations on the ethnic division of BiH, and finally, by forming a nationalist party (SDA), the political elite of Bosniak people sent a message of their own immaturity, and their undeveloped attitude towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is a horrifying handicap of Bosniak policy from which it never fully recovered.

Conclusion

From what has been said above, one may conclude that ethno-mobilization in BiH was "collateral damage" i.e. the by-product of already made nationalist homogenization in Serbia and Croatia, which means that the ethno-mobilization of Serbian and Croatian national corps in BiH was induced by identical processes in the eastern and western neighbours respectively, while the ethno-mobilization of Bosniaks, in turn, was caused by the ethno-homogenization of Bosnian Serbs and Croats. The missing link for creating proper political foundations for the disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina was Bosniak ethno-mobilization. This is the reason why the formation of national political parties is the primary cause of the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina. This materialized within the first multi- party Parliament of BiH, which was formed after the first multi-party elections (1990). Everyone hoped that these elections would mark the end of a single party system and the beginning of a multi-party democracy as a form of Parliamentary Assembly that would become an arena of interest driven political conflict.[141]

In Bosnia and Herzegovina the development of democracy based on an unrestricted right to form national political parties turned into a geopolitical request of two states. This is one of the main causes of war against BiH and the *volens-nolens* defeat of democracy. For this reason, the Parliament of BiH is the key factor and cause of the production of violence in the few years immediately before the war.

Ethnic issues dominated conflicts in the Bosnian Parliament regardless whether topics covered forest protection or vital national interests. This complete domination of ethnic issues of the Bosnian Assembly agenda is a result of the victory of the three national parties that formed the majority of the Parliament. Apart from the SDA, SDS and HDZ, Ante Markovic's

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141 Unfrotunately, interest based political conflict founded on pluralistic principle that binds desicion making and power with the premise that „there is no unique elitist power, but each new decision is created through new coalitions between the powerful" (Grdešić, 1995) was missing, and a new „decision making model" was created (ibid) only interested in „fundamental decisions which allow research of the possibilty to realise an already established aim". (ibid). This way of desicion making within the BiH Parliament lead striaght to war, because all things fundamental are by default in opposition to each other as each and every fundamental belief was based on some myth or another and not political in nature thus negating the very idea of a Parliament as an arena where politcal arguments can lead to a decision in the best interest of the citizens without prejudice.

reformist party – Reformists Union of Yugoslavia for BiH (SRSJ za BiH) and the communists lead by Durakovic Socialist Democratic Party (SDP), later Socialdemocrats also had a very significant role within the Parliament. Other parties were irrelevant when it came to making history.

Before the communists had time to recover from losing the elections, the three national parties formed a silent and non-transparent coalition that carried on ruling the Bosnian Parliament. Their aim was to destroy the left political idea, which the nationalistic elites portrayed as the biggest evil. Use of hate speech aimed at the leftist political parties within the BiH Parliament marked a new and dangerous rhetoric of negating the Other. Its aim was a new BiH Parliament based on a coalition between the three ethnic parties, which would urge representatives of other parties to enter the realm of ethnicity because this was a new era and people needed to know who was who.

The artificial creation of hatred and fear of the Other culminated in 1991, despite the fact that members of Parliament who produced it drank coffee together during Assembly sessions breaks while their nationalistic politics entered the homes of uninformed citizens through their TV screens. The main question that quietly but quickly came to the top of the agenda in Parliament was that of the further political and historical existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As the question of the legal status of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina became a strategic parliamentary question, a constitution of two super party blocks took over from the constitution of party politics: on one side were the members of Parliament who voted for independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina upon realising that the dissolution of Yugoslavia was imminent, and on the other were representatives of SDS who voted against the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina even if it meant war. An interesting fact is that a great number of Markovic's reformists went to the Serb block either openly or by borrowing the status of an independent representative. This is how the ideological conflict within the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina became uncontrollable and the open political conflict *pro et contra* Bosnia and Herzegovina entered a critical phase. In 1991 and 1992 Parliament meetings ended in between days, which added to the drama of the historical moment in both a realistic and symbolic political field.

The national political parties, SDA, HDZ and SDS, became masters of the Parliament and their "friendly doctrine of unfriendliness" made it impossible to create conditions for any reasonable idea leading towards an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina to be discussed within the Parliament. However, since the parliamentary conflicts were orchestrated through nationalistic ideologies an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina did not suit the SDS, HDZ or SDA as without a war, primarily generated from Belgrade and secondarily by Tudjman, all three nationalistic parties would cease to exist.

The inability of SDA's leader Izetbegovic to create an independent BiH without a war materialized through the planned aggression from Belgrade with aim to destroy BiH as a state and the geopolitical entity and her socio-cultural identity[142], and later Tudjman's attempt through his puppet pseudo government in BiH trying to re-create Croatian Banovina.[143]

One has to stress that the attempts from Belgrade and Zagreb had a relative impact, and that the responsibility of the SDA and Izetbegovic cannot be forgotten. This responsibility comes from SDA's political and cultural ignorance towards BiH and the irrational, unskilful and unrealistic vision this party had about BiH.

Izetbegovic announced that BiH would follow Slovenia and Croatia on the road to independence after Markovic's reformists and other, smaller parties were destroyed, marking the height of the ideological conflict. This was obvious after the parliamentary vote for a referendum as one of the largest democratic frameworks confirming the wish of citizens of BiH for an independent state.

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142 These objective parameteres are historicaly generated as Serb nationalism did not enter BiH from a third dimension but from a historical source of terriorial expansionism, which by it nature does not tolerate ethnic factor: «... when the ideology of historical rights does not apply because territorial intentions conflict with non Serb people, then the Serb ideology calls upon the ethnic principle, which does not mean anything else but panserbism: non Serbs are pronounced ethnically Serb, and these are aparently their roots, and only through the unfortunate historical events they became either albanised, muslimised... (Esad Zgodić, *Ideologija nacionalnog mesijanstva,* (VKBI, Sarajevo, 1999), 206.

143 "Tuđman will not forever mimic the expansionist motives of Croats (as opposed to Milošević, op. N. Ć.). Quite the opposite, he will clearly present them. This he will do through two classics of imperial politics: historical rights and ethnic principle. From this he will deduce the politics of negating Bosniak national identity as well as the politics of negating BiH as an independent state." (Zgodić, ibid: 196) Tuđman saw BiH as an essential part of Croatia and concluded that:"Croatia has a right to Bosnia and Herzegovina based on historical community and geopolitical whole." (Tuđman, Zgodić, *op. cit,* note 136, 197.).

Karadzic's SDS, acting as a satellite from Belgrade, tried to stop even the slightest thought of a referendum. Karadzic sent a clear message to Muslims in BiH at the Parliament Assembly on 14 October 1991[144]

> What you are doing is not good. This is what you want for Bosnia and Hezegovina. It is the same road to hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia took. Do not think for a moment that you will not go to hell and Muslim people most likely to oblivion because Muslim people cannot defend themselves if a war starts.[145]This message unified Serbs as well as Bosnians and Croats in BiH, and, in addition to the Serb expansionist politics as an outside influence, was a conscious preparation within for the war. Karadzic played the card of Otherness, bringing an apocalyptic tone into the Parliament. This was calculated as he only had personal interest at heart: "What interest? What prize for creating fear? What social or political advantage? Do they want to scare us? Do they want to please us? How? Do they want to blackmail us? Is it contradictory? What interests and what aim do they want to achieve by their proclamations of an oncoming or already started war?"[146]

However, despite this apocalyptic tone based on the force of the Yugoslav People's Army, Bosnia and Herzegovina organized a referendum on 29 February and 1 March 1992 which was successful as 64% of citizens able to vote came out to do so and 99.44% of them voted for an independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Everything was legally correct, but politically a war over Bosnia and Herzegovina was created within the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Representatives of the Serb political block left the Assembly of BiH in January 1992 after a referendum was voted for and created an illegal Serb para-Assembly. This puppet association made the decision to ignore the Assembly of BiH, calling it a "Muslim- Croat

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144 Bosniak as a national category was not in use even during Tito's rule, but Mulsims were a Constitutional nationality. In 1993 Muslims in BiH choose the name Bosniak themselves which becomes a Constitutional category no more contradictory other than within Serb political right which negates national existence of Bosniaks altogether.

145 News agency SENSE, (videozapis, 2004)

146 Jacques Derrida, *O apokaliptičkom tonu usvojenom nedavno u filosofiji* (Oktoih, Podgorica, 1995)

Assembly." After the Badinter Commission established that there was a real, non-doubtful possibility for Bosnia and Herzegiovina to become an independent state, the road towards international recognition was open.[147] After the European Community recognised Slovenia and Croatia it did so with Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 April 1992, which was followed by the recognition of the USA on 7 April 1992, leaving the door open for Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the UN on 22 May 1992. Cheering in the General Assembly of the UN had not even stopped as war already began raging across Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parliamentary production of war against Bosnia and Herzegovina had stopped and the real war against Bosnia and Herzegovina had started.

The experience of nationalism indicates the fact that "national homogenization [...] will remain the main obstacle to the political and economic integration of BiH society and play an important part in continued processes of disintegration throughout the country, while the national identity will, as it appears, soon become the only mode of identification of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina".[148] This is, first of all, a result of violence generated during the nineties, with the purpose of creating an image of BiH as a country without its own identity, as a false country. "Masters of darkness" have largely succeeded in this intention. In a heterogeneous country like BiH, after the introduction of multi-party system, the "inter-ethnic brotherhood", although disputed by nationalist parties, was in practice supported by the very same parties, first through mutual congratulations on their founding assemblies, then by tying together the flags of nationalist parties through election campaigns, etc. How this *co-ethnic brotherhood* was in its core "false", "hypocritical", "existentially seductive", treacherous towards the citizens in BiH was made evident in

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147 A good analyses of political conflicts within the Bosnian Parliament can be found in the context of international recognition of BiH in - Kasim Begić (1997): Bosnia and Herzegovina from Vance's mission to Dayton, Sarajevo, Bosnian book, book full of facts about political conflicts of that time including the referendum confrotation within the BiH Parliament published by Ivan Markešić (2004): Kako smo sačuvali Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Sarajevo, HNV BiH, Synopsis, Sarajevo-Zagreb.

148 Zarije Seizović, "Human Rights Protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the Framework of the Dayton Peace Accords with Special View to Non-Discrimination Policy", a paper written within the VI summer school "Post Communist Transition and European Integration Processes", organized by the *Instituto per l'Europa Centro-Orientale e Balcanica – International Network Europe and the Balkans* and the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Italy in Cervia , 4-16 September 2000.

the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which tens of thousands of innocent civilians, women and children, were killed. *Was it worth it?*

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Public education and social reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia

Throughout history, governments of all political stripes have used historyand literature curricula to reinforce national ideologies and identities.The promulgation of official memory through the school system can be an effective form of propaganda. The educational setting can become a conduit for the government or leaders' views, presenting political ideas and beliefs as either "correct" or "incorrect." Textbooks and curricula can be used to justify or deny past state crimes, create revisionist history, present on-going injustices as natural, or perpetuate attitudes that replicate the conditions under which injustices are committed. Where school systems remain segregated and unequal, education can be manipulated to perpetuate inequalities that are a legacy of past conflicts, dispossession, or repression.

If public education can function to inflame hatreds, mobilize for war, and teach acceptance of injustice, it can be used also as a powerful tool for the cultivation of peace, democratic change, and respect for others. This premise has been a prominent focus of the United Nations (UN) Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), as well as numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) throughout the Balkans and in conflict zones around the world. If children living in divided societies can come together in the schools, this contact can be used to help them question the prejudices and stereotypes in their surrounding environment.[1] Where authoritarianism in the classroom fosters blind obedience and militarism, such attitudes might be transformed by educational reforms that promote critical thinking, democratic principles, and the examination of competing views and perspectives. Similarly, if incommensurable conceptions of justice and interpretations of traumatic historical events have fueled conflict and mistrust, so schools might alternatively provide an arena for examining the past in a

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1   Gordon Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Publishing, 1988). According to Allport, the "contact hypothesis" operates if there are common goals, intergroup cooperation, institutional support, and equality of status.

constructive manner.

Such aspirations notwithstanding, education reform in societies after ethnic conflict poses very serious challenges, and children are often caught in the middle of competing ideologies. To begin with, those in power may resist reforms that promote democratic values. For example, in BiH, the Dayton Accords devolved authority over education to the leadership that was in power during the war. The OHR often struggled to implement educational reforms against the wishes of the elected leaders, who advocated divisive school structures and curricular decisions. In addition, reforms that emphasize democratic approaches may actually fuel intergroup hatreds if they are implemented without the active consultation and participation of the local community. For example, when open debate encourages the expression of alternative and competing viewpoints, parents or local authorities may see this as a provocative attack on the resolution that terminated the conflict. Parental resistance might then encourage antagonistic or even violent confrontations both in and out of the classrooms. This has been particularly true when "outsiders," such as the UN, assume the role of a custodial government in post-war countries and, with the best of intentions, compel educational systems to adopt democratic reforms, with little regard for local traditions and culture. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in Croatia and BiH, where internationals and NGOs have devoted a tremendous amount of attention to *ad hoc* educational programs in conflict resolution, human rights, democracy, and civic education, while paying less attention to local attitudes about the role of schools in the process of social reconstruction.

One of the first steps often undertaken is to remove from curricular materials any stereotypes of ethnicity or descriptions of aggression on the part of any group. In 1998, under pressure from the international community, the Sarajevo Education Working Group carried out a textbook review as part of the process of encouraging refugee returns under the Sarajevo Declaration. Leaked reports indicated bland and inaccurate text that obfuscated the facts of the war. The communities summarily rejected the proposed textbook reform, although there may have been some distortions exaggerated by the media.[2] The push to integrate schools across ethnic lines did not solicit the cooperation of parents and teachers, and led to resistance and sabotage that was reflected in the behavior of the children. Focusing solely on curricular material or on

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2   See Ann Low-Beer, "Politics, School Textbooks and Cultural Identity: The Struggle in Bosnia and Hercegovina," *Paradigm* 2:3 (2001) for a good discussion of the educational structure in all of BiH.

which ethnic group occupies a particular building reflects a unidimensional view of important problems.

In 2000, we launched a series of studies to try to understand what role, if any, public education could play in social reconstruction in Croatia and BiH. We had two questions: what do communities think about the role schools should play in creating a memory of the past through curriculum? And, second, how do they want the schools organized to deliver that curriculum? Our premise was that a better understanding of the aspirations and experiences of those most immediately affected by the education system is a critical component of effective education reform. Over the course of three years, we solicited the views of parents, teachers, students, and administrators in two of the most ethnically divided cities of the former Yugoslavia – Vukovar (Croatia) and Mostar (BiH) – on a wide range of issues, including interethnic relations in schools, the teaching of history, school integration, curricula development, and national identity. Our research team, which consisted of scholars from BiH, Croatia, and the United States, conducted one large-scale survey and one qualitative interview and focus group study in the two cities. The surveys centered on the sixth and eighth grades of elementary school and the second year of secondary school. The interviews and focus groups centered on the second year of secondary school. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the sample for the surveys, interviews and focus groups, by national group, and location.

Table 1 *Survey, interview and focus group subjects[3]*

Town	Language Program	Subject Type	Survey	Interviews	Focus[4] Groups	Total[5]
Mostar	Bosnian	Students	285	2	–	287
		Parents	261	2	–	263
		Teachers	26	6	–	32
	Croatian	Students	274	2	20	296
		Parents	389	1	11	401
		Teachers	40	6	10	56
Vukovar	Croatian	Students	345	2	9	356
		Parents	483	2	9	494
		Teachers	50	6	9	65
	Serbian	Students	373	2	15	390
		Parents	470	1	15	486
		Teachers	45	6	4	55

3   The teachers were mostly those who teach the "national" group of subjects (particularly national language and literature, history, geography, music and art) and/or religion, ethics, or democracy and human rights. The principals, their deputies, and pedagogues who were in charge of curriculum were also part of the teacher sample.

Educational systems in BiH and Croatia

Before presenting the findings of our studies, we offer a brief introduction to the educational systems of BiH and Croatia, beginning with the organization of the school system in post-war BiH and specifically in the city of Mostar which, prior to the 1991 war, was a multi-ethnic community made up primarily of Bosniaks and Croats with a significant Serb minority (see the description of Mostar in the introductory chapter to this volume). Following the signing of the Dayton Accords in December 1995, the newly decentralized educational system in BiH allowed cantons to establish their own education ministries and, if desired, to set standards, and to develop separate curricula and textbooks.[6] This decentralized system did not, however, foster an atmosphere of cooperation and coordination among the cantonal ministries.

The schools of Mostar are almost entirely segregated. Bosniak children attend schools on the east side of the city, while Croat children attend schools on the west side. Although, in theory, the cantonal education ministry is supposed to supervise the administration of local schools, in practice, administrators of each ethnic group supervise the schools on their side. Until 2002, this separation was accomplished by having a Croat Minister of Education and a Bosniak Deputy Minister who acted as Minister for the Bosniak schools. The Minister's and Deputy Minister's offices and parallel administrations were staffed by members of their respective national groups and were housed in separate locations. Schools in Mostar also use different curricula. Bosniak schools use the curricula developed by the Bosniak pedagogical institute in Mostar, which is based on a framework developed by the Bosnian Federal Education Ministry. Croat schools use curricula from the state of Croatia, modified by the Institute of Education in West Mostar, the institution that most closely parallels the Bosniak Pedagogical Institute. After the first BiH-run elections in fall 2002, the OHR annulled these parallel systems of administration but left the separate curricula in place.

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4   At the time of the writing of this chapter, the teachers in the Bosnian language schools were on strike. These data had not yet been collected.

5   It is likely that subjects were included in more than one sample.

6   Ibid.

The OHR and the Council of Europe have worked to remove material that is offensive to other national groups from all textbooks in BiH. In 1999, when new textbooks could not be prepared, it ordered the blackening-out of offensive material in existing textbooks, an exercise that was fraught with controversy. In many schools, students were given the task of marking out the offending passages, which only served to highlight the material. In July 2002, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) assumed the OHR's former role in education. By fall of 2003, the OSCE had brokered agreements with the local ministries that led to the introduction of new, inoffen- sive textbooks and a common core curriculum. In an important and symbolic move, the OSCE also mandated the integration of the old Mostar Gymnasium, the premier institution for secondary education pre-war. By working at both the curricular and institutional level, signif- icant steps were taken toward an integrated, non-ethnically based school system.

Unlike in BiH, Croatia has had little international involvement in its education system since the end of the war. It is highly centralized, and all primary and secondary education is regulated by the Ministry of Education and Sport (MoES), which struggles to balance the conflicting agendas of local political leaders, especially in regions experiencing continuing tensions.[7] The MoES is responsible for drafting legislation, defining the curriculum for all schools, approving textbooks, appointing head teachers, approving the number of pupils and school budgets, and settling all expenditures except those met by local authorities. Simultaneously, the MoES must balance the often conflicting imperatives of meeting the needs of state-building and honoring minority rights by educating minor- ity youth in accordance with the standards of the European Union.

Minority schooling is regulated by a set of laws allowing for three different options for minority education. The first option, which is practiced by some Italians and Hungarians, offers separate schooling that is fully in the language of the minority. The second option involves separate courses in "national" subjects for minority students taught in their mother tongue (eg. Serbian) but with the remainder of the instruction in the Croatian language. These students attend the regular Croatian classes for all non-national subjects. The final option for minority education offers courses as

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7   Vedrana Spajic-Vrkas, "Visions, Provisions and Reality: Political Changes and Education for Democratic Citizenship in Croatia," *Cambridge Journal of Edu- cation* 33:1 (2003): 33–51.

an additional school activity. Minority students attend the regular schools in the Croatian language but have additional classes in their mother tongue relevant to their cultural heritage.

The Erdut agreement, signed by the Croatian government and Croatian Serb representatives in 1995, created a different form of separate schooling for Serb children living in the Vukovar region.[8] The agreement was facilitated by the international community with the political purpose of ensuring the protection of Serb minority rights, and was mandated for a period of five years. During this period the Croatian MoES and Serb representatives agreed that Croat and Serb children could go to schools with joint administrations but be taught separately in different languages. This practice frequently has led to Serb and Croat students attending classes in separate shifts or in different locations. Further, the Erdut agreement placed a moratorium on teaching about the recent war in Serb language programs, but that moratorium is now being lifted, and Serbs were to receive new textbooks and begin learning about the war in fall 2003.[9] However, these plans have not materialized.

Attitudes toward controversial issues

In this chapter, we present survey results related to the issues of school integration and history education.[10] We compare the responses of parents, teachers, and students of each national group in each town (Table 2). For the interviews and focus groups, we examine all discussions about school integration and teaching about the past.

8   See Global IDP Database, "UNTAES Agreements for the Danube Region Provide the Protection of the Serb Minority" (2000). Available on the World Wide Web at http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/ 1c963eb504904cde41256782007493b8/6083d813ce17671ec 1256993003597f1?OpenDocument

9   Drago Hedl, "Croatia: Painful History Lessons," *Balkan Crisis Report* 432 (May 23, 2003). London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Available on World Wide Web at http://www.iwpr.net/index. pl?archive/bcr3/bcr3 200305 432 2 eng.txt.

10   When the survey results were analyzed, factor analyses yielded a number of scales about varied issues related to schooling. Those results will be published separately.

Table 2 *Survey Results*[11]

Town	National Group	Subject Type	School Integration[12]	History
Vukovar	Croats	Students	1.89 (.72)	2.91 (1.23)
		Parents	2.43 (1.01)	2.72 (1.27)
		Teachers	2.83 (.80)	3.25 (1.06)
		S/P/T F-test	47.31***	5.31**
	Serbs	Students	2.22 (.73)	3.61 (.78)
		Parents	2.78 (.79)	3.79 (.62)
		Teachers	2.28 (.69)	3.84 (.56)
		S/P/T F-test	56.92***	7.78***
	T-tests Croat vs. Serbs	Students	–6.17***	–9.25***
		Parents	-5.92***	-16.54***
		Teachers	3.45**	–3.64***
Mostar	Bosniaks	Students	2.87 (.64)	3.39 (.92)
		Parents	3.26 (.60)	3.42 (.94)
		Teachers	3.52 (.25)	3.15 (1.19)
		S/P/T F-test	31.56***	.9253
	Croats	Students	2.56 (.70)	3.29 (1.12)
		Parents	2.54 (.79)	3.60 (.85)
		Teachers	3.14 (.51)	3.75 (.63)
		S/P/T F-test	11.56	9.79***
	T-tests Croat vs. Serbs	Students	5.35***	1.13
		Parents	12.02***	–2.52*
		Teachers	3.03**	–2.65**

Table entries are mean scores with standard deviations in parentheses.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

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11 The history scores are based upon a single item, whereas the school integration scores are based upon a scale computed by averaging scores from eight items dealing with school integration. All survey items indicate the level with which a subject agreed or disagreed with a given statement, and were scored between 1 (strongly disagree) and 4 (strongly agree). Thus a score of 2.5 represents the neutral point. Survey items are available upon request.

School integration

The surveys reveal that the youth of all national groups in both Mostar and Vukovar are less in favor of school integration than adults. The only exception is Croat youth in Mostar, who respond neutrally, like their parents. The Bosniak youth, although less enthusiastic than their parents or teachers, are the only young people clearly in favor of school integration. The Croat students in Vukovar are more strongly opposed to integration than any group in either town.

The different national groups in these two towns have set themselves in opposition over the issue of school integration. In Vukovar, Serbs are less opposed to integration than Croats, with the exception of the teachers, and Croat teachers are less opposed than Serb teachers. The teachers' responses could be explained by the fact that many Serb teachers report fears that their jobs will be threatened if the schools are integrated.

In the Mostar surveys, the Bosniak groups all favor integration. While none of the Croat groups oppose integration, their opinions are significantly less positive than those of the Bosniaks. On the whole, the citizens of Mostar tend to think more favorably about school integration than the citizens of Vukovar. Significantly, while the old Mostar Gymnasium is set to be integrated (albeit under external pressure), there is no movement on issues of school integration in Vukovar.

When we looked to the qualitative data, we found that many objections to school integration were grounded in two basic, but related, fears: fear of conflict and of loss of identity. In Vukovar, the fear of renewed conflict permeates much of the discussion, although there is also evidence that Serb adults, and especially Serb leaders, fear a loss of their culture and traditions. In Mostar, the Croats, who are least in favor of school integration, are motivated primarily by the threats to their identity.

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12 The school integration scale reported here is different from those produced in the separate factor analyses of each town's data, as these analyses produced scales that did not include identical items. Rather than use two different scales with empirical bases, we chose to construct a single scale with a theoretical basis to increase comparability between the two towns' data.

Fear of conflict in Vukovar

Although more in favor of integration than Vukovar's Croats, the Serbs expressed reservations. They voiced strong fears that integration of the schools would lead to increased violence. The students seemed more afraid than the adults, which perhaps explains why they were more opposed to integration. As one Serb student put it: "The war may be almost forgotten in other parts of the country, but not here. I think that there would be a lot of conflicts [in integrated schools and classrooms]. I mean, there are conflicts even now when schools are divided." He explained that he did not feel safe around Croat youth because he could not trust responsible adults to intervene to stop youth violence. He described how he watched a teacher stand by when his younger brother got into a fight with a Croat student. Serb students blamed politicians, the media, and others in the community for inflaming an already tense cross-national situation. They felt powerless to make changes themselves and thought change would take a substantial amount of time.

These fears are not entirely unfounded. The majority of Croat youth in the surveys and focus groups said clearly and unequivocally that they wanted their schools and classes to remain segregated. They voiced a strong dislike of Serbs and a desire not to be forced to associate with them. One student commented: "As far as I'm concerned, . . . let them go elsewhere. I don't care." Croat boys in one focus group voiced even more negative attitudes than individual Croat students did in their interviews.[13] It is clear from the field notes and transcripts that this was a difficult group, because the boys often seemed not to take the task seriously and may have been purposefully provocative. Also, peer pressure to express negative feelings about Serb youth was palpable. For example, one of the boys said: "Children should be taught from the beginning to hate Serbs . . . We saw in the war what they are like. These are not people at all [others laugh]. Well yes, like animals for what they have done." One way of interpreting these data is that the boys were deliberately provoking the group leader and did not mean what they said. Another reading based on the findings from the surveys and individual interviews recognizes that they were being provocative, but that the emotions expressed in the focus group,

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13 Despite repeated attempts, we were unable to recruit Croat girls to participate in a focus group.

though extreme, easily could have had some basis in reality.[14] Croat adults also confirmed that a great deal of hostility toward Serbs still prevailed among Croat youth. "Most [Croat] pupils hate Serbs," a Croat teacher said. Another explained: "Children are strictly separating and distancing themselves from one another here. It seems as if those differences are irreconcilable . . . The wounds are still very, very fresh." Like their Serb counterparts, Croat students feared that integrated schools would lead to increased conflict. A Croat student, who said he avoided Serbs whenever possible, had this to say: "[Segregated schools] work for me, and I think that it should stay like that, because if we go to the same schools, there might be national conflicts. There are already conflicts in the streets, and if we were together in the schools, it would probably be even worse." While Serbs fear the hatred of their Croat neighbors in the present, the Croats base their fear on memories of what happened in Vukovar during the war.[15] Croats feel that they cannot trust Serb residents because many of them participated in war crimes during the armed takeover of the town. "Before the war, our parents were normal with the Serbs," said a Croat student. "Nobody was insisting on 'Serb–Croat' relations. They all sang together and did things together. But, as the war started, they cheated us . . . and we simply started to kill each other." In this story, the student sees no motivation for the Serbs' perceived betrayal; rather, the killing simply happened. And it happened suddenly. The possibility of sudden and unmotivated violence leaves the storyteller feeling profoundly unsafe.[16]

In spite of the students' fears of one another, there seemed to be some openness to the possibility of changing opinions. For the Croats, the openings are more evident in individual interviews than in the focus groups, suggesting that it is social pressure more than individual opinions that pose stumbling-blocks. One student said that he preferred segregated schools, but he would accept a change in policy: "If I must, I would adjust." He even suggested, "Maybe we should try [integrated schools]." The Serbs were even more optimistic, as one student explained:

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14 In the surveys, the Croat boys hold the most negative attitudes toward school integration of any group (1.78). Another survey item asked students whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement, "It is not important to me what the national background of my friends is." The Croat boys were the only group that, on average, disagreed with the statement.

15 See Stover, Chapter 5 this book

16 See Ajdukovic and Corkalo, Chapter 14 this book, for a fuller explanation of issues of trust and betrayal.

> I believe that if children went to school together, after some time, everyone would meet everyone else, and they would become friends. There wouldn't be any problems in the long run.

Both sides in Vukovar think the other wants the schools to remain segregated, and each makes assumptions about the reasoning of the other group. One of the reasons for Serb resistance to integration cited frequently by Croats was everyday Serbs' unwillingness to accept Vukovar as part of Croatia and a corresponding reluctance to identify with the state of Croatia. One mother explained that even though Serbs have lived in Vukovar for many years, they should be treated as an immigrant group that must become part of a new country to survive.

Some, like this Croat teacher, expressed even more strongly their assumption that Serbs did not want to identify with the state of Croatia:

> Since this is the Croatian state, please listen to the lectures in the Croatian language. . . And if you want to go, then please go. No one will stop you! ... If you don't want to [study in the Croatian language], then please cross [the border] – it is not far away.

These assumptions on the part of Croats about Serb students' views may be based on the public positions of Serb political leaders, given the lack of daily contact across groups. However, our data suggest that ordinary Serbs' views do not uniformly support the views of their leaders. This finding suggests the possibility of an opening where accurate information might influence misguided belief. While the Serbs say they want to maintain their cultural and linguistic rights, they see this as compatible with a desire to identify with the state of Croatia. In addition, Serb youth express more interest in identifying with the Croatian state than their parents do. In what might be surprising to their Croat neighbors, Serb students discussed the importance of learning the Croatian language and Croatian history, and the fact that they had chosen to live in Croatia, not Serbia. Serb girls in a focus group repeated the sentiments of some of their Croat neighbors, but substitute "I" and "we" for "they." One girl said: "If I don't want to learn . . . according to their program, we can simply go. Why should we live here if it doesn't suit us? We can always go to Serbia." Other students made such remarks as, "We are, after all, citizens of this state, and I can, as much as I want, wish the best for Serbia, but I still live here."

Fear of losing one's national identity in Mostar

While the survey revealed very little opposition to school integration in Mostar, it did show that Bosniaks were more positive about it than Croats. The interviews and focus groups also demonstrated that integration is divisive. While most Croats we spoke to in Mostar said they did not object to students of different nationalities attending school together, they were quick to assert that members of each group had a right to learn in their mother tongue. The qualitative data reveal that the willingness of Croats to accept integrated schools is predicated on the assumption that Croat students would have the option to attend schools taught in their language. One administrator said, "Anyone can come to the school who wants to, but they must respect the school rules. If it's a school using the Croatian language, they must respect the Croatian language." He went on to say that "the school must be national." The interviews and focus groups reveal that language is a significant stumbling-block to integration, and often is used by the Croats as a proxy for opposing school integration in Mostar.

Underlying the language issue is the fear on the part of Croats in Mostar that if they cave into pressures to assimilate, they will lose their national identity. "It is true we feel pressure to assimilate," said a Croat teacher. "And we fear that the Croatian language will suffer or be lost in the process. So we have every right to request schooling in the Croatian language." Another teacher exclaimed, "Language is a part of the being, part of the identity of a people!"

In their focus group, Croat girls said they thought segregation was absurd but feared that integration would inevitably lead to curricular biases against Croats. "I think it's stupid the way we all have different textbooks," said one of the participants. "We all learn different things, but we're all living in the same state." However, she feared that new books produced in BiH would be biased against Croats:

> Songs would be banned, Croatian patriotic songs about the Croatian homeland, about our people. They'd be banned. Why? We need to celebrate who we are. And for sure we'd have to read and learn some of theirs over there, but they wouldn't learn ours.

This student then said: "I personally wouldn't learn Bosnian or Serbian." Another agreed: "Nor would I." A third chimed in: "I'd only learn Croatian. It's my language. I know we live in BiH, and that we're together, but what's mine is mine." Although segregation seems absurd to them, these girls favor it because they cannot envision a workable integrated school system.

Like Croats in Mostar, Bosniaks often revealed internal contradictions in their thinking. Many Bosniaks said they favored Croats having a right to their language and culture and at the same time maintained that the Croatian and Bosnian languages were not very different; thus, language issues should not pose a problem in regard to school integration. Although they did not seem to see Croats' language rights as a threat to state-building in BiH, they said they wanted a united BiH. They did not want a divided country that allowed a separate Serb Republic or any other kind of separatism. One teacher put it this way: "We must build a single state, a single monolithic society, a uniform society." This teacher saw some measure of Croat assimilation and identification with the state of BiH as integral to that process.

The Bosniaks talked with enthusiasm about both the promise and the inevitability of school integration. One student said: "I think everyone is looking forward to the day when we'll all go to school together." Bosniak parents seemed to feel similarly, recalling the days of their youth with nostalgia and associating its integrated ways with a more civilized, modern, European way of life. One of the teachers offered a striking metaphor of interdependence:

> Like the tree that we seed on the other side, it doesn't choose between Bosniaks' and Croats' water, but simply grows. So the student shouldn't just take the knowledge that is related to his nationality.

The Bosniaks were so serious in their desires for integration that many voiced concrete and sometimes carefully thought-out plans for how to integrate the schools. One of the students had attended an event held by a Norwegian NGO on the topic of school integration and from that experience developed a vision for linking students from both sides of the river. One of the parents was attempting to secure funds to begin a private, integrated, technology-rich international school for students

from all national groups. One of the school administrators discussed his plan for phasing in integrated schools, first with students in the same school but separate classes, then with half of the teachers from each side teaching students from the other side, then putting the students together for extracurricular activities, and finally moving to fully integrated classes taught by a fully integrated teaching staff.

Teaching history

Survey respondents in both Vukovar and Mostar agreed that history should be taught in ways that are not offensive to any ethnic group. However, there were significant differences between groups about how strongly they agreed (Table 11.2). In every community, except the Bosniaks in Mostar, teachers were the most positive. In Vukovar, Serbs agreed more strongly than Croats. In Mostar, Croat adults agreed more strongly than Bosniak adults, while there was no significant difference between students.

According to the interviews and focus groups, two fears underlie opinions about teaching history. One is the fear that the past will be forgotten. The other is the fear that the way schools officially promote remembering will be inconsistent with the beliefs of some groups and will cause more problems. Vukovar Serbs insisted that history contains multiple truths, depending on one's experiences and point of view. They feared that if a Croatian version of history were introduced into the schools, Serbs would be vilified. This fear explains why surveys revealed that Serbs preferred inoffensive versions of the past. But what they really wanted was to forget the past. Meanwhile, the Croats tended to be more conflicted about remembering and forgetting. Although they recognized that Serbs have their version of the past, most considered the Serb version to be wrong. They seemed less concerned than their Serb neighbors about the importance of an inoffensive version of history, mainly because they were confident that the Croatian version would be the one taught.

In Mostar, the Bosniaks wanted their truth told; they did not want it forgotten. The Croats, on the other hand, expressed concern that their perspective might not be included in new versions of the history curriculum. Although they did not want to forget the past, they worried

about how a single curriculum could harmonize the views of the different groups. Most thought it could be done, but some disagreed.

Fears of forgetting and remembering in Vukovar

Most Serbs in Vukovar resisted any mention of the recent war in the history curriculum, since they feared they would become scapegoats. A Serb teacher explained: "It is well known that winners always write history [laughter]. So I'm afraid that . . . [whatever curriculum is developed] would insist too much on blame and guilt."

The Serbs talked a great deal about wanting to forget the past. Some things, a teacher insisted, "should be forgotten as soon as possible." In response to a question asking whether children should be taught about the recent war, another said:

> The best thing to do, if only it was possible, would be to erase [everything about the past] so that all people, from the youngest to the oldest ones, can forget all about it. Grant God that we start living a normal life again.

The Serbs also called for adopting a future-oriented position. The adults, especially, feared that talking about the past would create more "splits" within their already divided city.

The Serbs did not think there was a clear truth about who was a victim and who was an aggressor. A student explained that every side has its own explanation and that what really happened is unknowable:

> Every side has their own explanation as to why the war started. One side claims this, the other that, and it's up to you who you will believe. I don't know. We cannot know why, how, or who fired the first shot.

A Serb mother, while trying to allow for a middle ground between the different truths, eventually doubted the possibility of compromise:

> **″** You know what, everybody has his or her truth. And they are all truths for the one who interprets the truth. However, the truth is somewhere in the middle. I do not know. Now that, too, is debatable. Very debatable.

Another mother noted the limitations of objectivity:

> **″** I think that our brains are not that universal to understand what is actually most correct . . . I don't know what universal truth is. So how could anyone else know?

Serbs, fearing that the Croat version of the war might be forced on their children, expressed anxiety that the new textbooks scheduled for 2003 would have an anti-Serb slant and would blame the war on the Serbs. Indeed, many Serbs felt that Croats blamed them personally for what happened – a burden they were unwilling to assume. A student explained his lack of interest in learning about the recent war and his desire to blame others in the community:

> **″** We shouldn't talk about [the recent war in school]. We should forget everything that was . . . Why should we pay for the mistakes that, I don't know, our politicians, people in high places, have made?

The Croats voiced multiple opinions about remembering the past but were more in favor than the Serbs of teaching the history of the war. They were unconcerned whether what was taught was offensive to Serbs. While most Croats recognized that there were different versions of what happened, many teachers and every parent we interviewed said that "the truth," meaning their truth, should be taught. One teacher, when asked what should be taught, said:

> **″** The truth and nothing but the truth. [The Serbs] should learn what it was like. They should learn that Croatia was a victim that suffered and lost the most, that it was attacked by the aggressor, the then Serbia, with the help of the then Yugoslav army which was disintegrating.

Some Croat teachers disagreed, saying that the war should not be taught in school, because what happened was too complicated for young people to understand, and that young people should not be burdened. They also noted that many young people already knew about the war, both from first-hand experience and from what they learned at home and in the community. All of the Croat students with whom we spoke said that the war should be addressed in schools, and many discussed their resentment of the adults' unwillingness to talk about past events.[17]

Fears of forgetting and remembering in Mostar

The Bosniaks in Mostar, like the Croats in Vukovar, tended to think of themselves as the primary victims of the war. This view led them to stress the importance of keeping the memory of what happened alive, as they feared the past would be forgotten. One teacher went as far as to say that he would teach about the war, even if it were illegal to do so:

> I will tell you, I am free enough to talk about this to my children, regardless of whether I am legally bound to remain silent about history. If I am legally obligated not to talk, I will not stay quiet, because history is universal, and everyone should be aware of these facts. The law shouldn't prevent professors from teaching their pupils about truth and values.

Most of the Bosniak students stressed the importance of learning about the war. As one explained:

> I think the people should know all that and remember it, so future generations don't forget … It should never be forgotten. It's always in the subconscious and children should know about it too.

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17 For a fuller discussion of this tension between the youth and adults in Vukovar, see Sarah W. Freedman and Dino Abazovic, "Growing up during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s." In C. Daiute, Z. Beykont, G. Higson-Smith, and L. Nucci (eds.), *Global Perspectives on Youth Conflict and Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, in press).

In talking about what parents want their children to be taught about the war, one teacher said:

> Children know who the aggressor on BiH was, who the perpetrators are, [and] what the reasons are for that, why the crimes were committed, why their dearest suffered so much, their close relatives hurt. Parents simply want that memory not to be erased, because it is the same crime, perhaps even bigger, to forget as it is to commit the crime.

Although they recognized the fact that other perspectives exist, many Bosniaks spoke about wanting their truth told. Teachers feared that changes in textbooks could contradict the Bosniak point of view. They mentioned the fact that the word "aggression" had been blackened out as part of the removal of offensive material. One teacher asked, "What other expression [could] replace it?" Such talk is consistent with the find- ings in the survey, in which nearly a quarter of the Bosniak teachers were unconcerned about offending others when teaching history.

Many teachers were apprehensive about whether multiple truths could be reconciled. They thought their version was the most correct, and they found validation from the international community. One history teacher invoked the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as proof:

> If the International Tribunal in The Hague said that there was aggression on my country, then I cannot say to my pupil, "Wait a minute. I don't know if it was like that, or if it was not."... All in all, we should tell the truth to children.

Like the Bosniaks, Mostar's Croats also wanted the history of the war taught. However, they tended to believe that they should be entitled to teach a Croatian version of events. They were less likely than the Bosniaks to think of their perspective as the single, objective truth. Ironically, in Mostar, nearly everybody with whom we spoke, regardless of national affiliation, noted that there are multiple versions of past events, and that objectivity is elusive.

Some Croats felt that each national group should be entitled to teach

its own version of the recent war. One school administrator said that the international community's efforts to create "unitarianism [*sic*] in history" were detrimental to BiH's ability to "survive . . . as a democratic, pluralistic, equal state of all three constituent peoples." A Croat teacher felt that any effort at harmonization would be impossible because it would necessarily discriminate against one of the groups:

> All three sides claim that they are the winner. So now, history should tell the truth, and here would be needed three truths. And these three truths no one can unite, meaning that it would always mean that someone would claim that [his truth] is endangered.

Most, however, while noting the difficulty in doing so, thought that harmonizing the various perspectives within one, unified curriculum was important. Many said that the task of reconciling the different versions should fall to those who could attain some measure of objectivity, although they differed on who that might be. The majority felt that, with the passage of time, historical objectivity could be achieved. A history teacher said, "We need a little time to go by before we historians know that the truth could be written about [the past war]." Others thought that it would be unnecessary to wait for such objectivity, that experts, whether historians or politicians, should be able to harmonize the curriculum. One Croat teacher appealed to a higher authority, saying: "It's hard now to satisfy everyone . . . I think that there must be some higher authority that will say what is needed and how."

Croat students tended to think differently from their teachers and parents about the recent past; they expressed feelings of wanting to learn about the war, with less concern about offending other groups. One student noted that the extent to which the war is currently mentioned is not satisfactory, saying that teachers present facts and figures without "really talking about it to us." Another student recommended that students research the war as a school project. In envisioning this project, she said: "It should be considered from all three points of view, and the Internet should be used, to see how other countries saw this war."

Tensions about school integration
and the teaching of history

School integration and the teaching of history have presented school administrators in Mostar and Vukovar with two dilemmas. Underlying each of these dilemmas are tensions between equally desirable but conflicting goals – supporting ethnic culture and language, and developing a common identity. While these tensions are not easily resolved, we propose that a more thorough understanding of these dilemmas as they manifest themselves in each city can generate critical insights that will be useful in evaluating the promise and pitfalls of post-war educational reforms.

School integration and conflicts in social identity

At times of ethnic conflict, the only security often lies in a strong sense of belonging to one's own group. In the midst of chaos, identification with the group offers an illusion that survival is possible. For many, in the face of threat, circling the wagons becomes the only choice. When the conflict ends, the barriers that have been erected are not easily demolished. A tension exists, then, between a state's need to inculcate a state identity among its citizenry so as to foster peaceful coexistence and the importance of upholding cultural rights that will enable national groups to preserve their identities. Tensions arise because minorities and national groups fear that the promotion of a unified state identity will involve forced assimilation and the subsequent denial of their histories, literatures, languages, and cultural practices. Given the close relationship between social identity and culture, the schools can become a battleground in which the possibility of a common civic identity is challenged. While it may be important to establish and protect separate group rights, over-protection resulting in segregated schools and separate languages might lead to hostile separatism that can hinder the development of a common state identity and undermine the legitimacy of shared institutions. Efforts to integrate schools must address these fears and the conflicting imperatives that underlie them.

In BiH, where there are three constituent peoples, this tension between

state and national group identity challenges efforts to protect the rights of all citizens. National groups, such as the Croats in Mostar or the Serbs in the Republika Srpska may identify more powerfully with (respectively) Croatia and Serbia, the states that embody their group origin. Indeed, current stalemates in the process of forming a multi-national state have even led some to question the very viability of the state of BiH.[18] In Croatia, this tension poses a severe challenge for efforts to develop a state identity that is inclusive of minority national groups that live within its borders, particularly of Serbs. The problem for Croatia is that education policies for national minorities make no distinction between the groups. It is hard, indeed, for the Serbs, who may constitute some 200,000 people, to be equated with the Hungarians, who constitute some 15,000. Furthermore, the Serb population has recently fought and lost a war. It can perceive this equation as a denial of its heritage and experience and, thus, as a threat. How to assure minority rights and respond to the spe- cific needs of a vanquished group poses a unique challenge for Croatia, and the stakes are high.

The morass of social identity politics is further confounded by the processes of normal child development. In Eriksonian terms (see Weinstein and Stover, Introduction, in this volume), the challenge of adolescence lies in forming a secure individual identity in the context of peer relationships. The school setting can be a battleground, a forum for teasing, bullying, forming fast friendships, sexuality, codes of dress, experimentation, and moral development. In these critical years, school experiences mold how young people see themselves and how they see others. If ethnic group identification is the most important dimension of who a person is, and if stereotyping becomes the modus operandi for defining people, then the future of the country will assuredly exclude tolerance and integration, and a new generation of bigots will emerge. However, it is similarly dangerous to suppress ethnic group identification altogether. For schools and for the state, the dilemma is how to promote the development of multiple identities. School integration, then, involves far more than mixing people together across ethnic lines. Post-conflict societies will not achieve any form of reconciliation unless the schools as systems of influence on individual and social development are included in the processes of societal change.

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18 Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003).

History, education, and memory

In a recent book, *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies*,[19] Alexandra Barahona de Brito and colleagues write: "Memory is a struggle over power and who gets to decide the future." Citizens of the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia were brought up with an official history that blurred the events of the Second World War – in particular, the actions of Tito's Partizans.[20] There is a profound mistrust of historical documentation as evidence. Historiography more likely reflected choices about the best light to place on events or how to use the culture, traditions, and experiences of specific groups to create the myth of "Brotherhood and Unity." Yet the opportunity exists for schools to provide a forum to combat falsification or amnesia. In the classroom, suffering can be acknowledged and the origins and consequences of past events can be debated and analyzed. Schools must confront the dilemma of deciding which is the lesser of two evils. On the one hand, when there is no consensus on the circumstances or causes of past conflicts, dwelling on the past can be divisive and open to manipulation. On the other hand, attempts to leave the past behind, without any public acknowledgment of responsibility, can be equally problematic. If past crimes are not examined and acknowledged, people may become more vulnerable to manipulative rhetoric and more prone to suspicions and fears.

The greatest challenge facing public education in Croatia and BiH today is the development of unified history curricula that will be appropriate for children of all national groups. These curricula must deal with the facts surrounding the recent wars and with the history of ethnic relations in each country. This task is made even more difficult by the multiple and incongruous perspectives held by the different groups living within each state. While it might be possible to design history curricula taught through multiple perspectives that elicit active student participation, the Communist legacy in the field of education is strong both in Croatia and BiH. As such, there is another barrier to change: the predominant

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19 Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez, and Paloma Aguilar, *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 38.

20 In a June 2000 interview, a former Yugoslav Communist Party official in Mostar told one of the authors: "There were attempts of pushing away, pushing aside some events. I was not only the witness but also the actor, the protagonist of some of these activities. We did not allow these events to be turned into myths, for the sake of reconciliation and life itself."

pedagogy in both countries is didactic and authoritarian, with little room given to discussion. Students commonly expect to learn a singular, unitary "truth" from their teachers. Challenge, debate, and analysis are discouraged and could be seen as provocative. If there can be only one "official" truth regarding past events, the particular memories of each sub-group will be either denied or repressed. When one side's heroes are considered another side's war criminals, a unitary telling of history that is inoffensive to all groups necessarily will be incomplete.

Conclusions

In spite of their differences, there are important similarities between the Serbs and Croats of Vukovar and the Bosniaks and Croats of Mostar. These similarities provide a foundation that can contribute to reconstructing the societies of these towns. In Vukovar, members of both groups have lingering fears of the other brought on by the war, leading to profound distrust. They fear violence among the youth if the schools are integrated; they care about the education of the youth; they care about preserving their language and culture but also want to be responsible citizens of Croatia; they blame politicians for maintaining and encouraging segregated schools; and finally, members of both groups feel powerless to make change.

In Mostar, members of both groups favor integrated schools and classrooms; they believe that the other group has a right to its own language and culture; and they want to be part of modern Europe, with its prospects for economic advancement. Most importantly, members of neither group feel overtly hostile toward members of the other group.

Based on these findings, we offer the following suggestions.

Vukovar

To make progress with respect to social reconstruction and resolving dilemmas about the school in Vukovar, the Serbs and Croats through public debate and their elected representatives need to reach a consensus on what the concept of minority rights entails. Croats believe Serbs deserve minority rights, but the data suggest that they think these rights can be satisfied by simply allowing the Serbs to live in Croatia and to preserve their culture on their own without interference from the state. Serbs want their culture to be recognized and in some cases supported by the state. Such a consensus is integral to finding a common ground on the structure of public education.

Further, in order for integration to succeed, a series of confidence- and trust-building exercises at the local level must be organized to help the Serb and Croat populations learn to work together. These are needed for parents, teachers, and students, and should consider the different experiences of each group. These exercises might be led by NGOs (domestic or international) or by specially trained teachers from each ethnic group. Additionally, any plan for integration needs to include ensuring the safety of students. Our interviews suggest strongly that violence remains just below the surface and that students feel unsafe. Adults must take responsibility for the safety of the youth.

A curriculum could be developed to support students in recognizing the importance of tolerance and human rights, and their own barriers to achieving those goals in Vukovar. Such a curriculum would need to include democratic content as well as democratic ways of teaching, such as holding debates in the classroom and the community. The implementation of such a curriculum has implications for teacher education as well as for student learning. Finally, the effects of any new history curriculum that is introduced will need to be closely monitored. It will be important to see how the teachers, students, and parents respond to new textbooks, and to examine what actually is taught and learned.

Mostar

Schools and classrooms in Mostar should be integrated in a timely fashion. Our findings reveal that while the Bosniaks are ready for integration, Croat youth are neutral on the issue of school integration, but their peer culture fosters an anti-integration stance. It would be helpful to build on the neutral or positive orientation of the youth before the peer culture pushes these predispositions in a negative direction.

As part of plans for school and classroom integration, work must be done with the Croat community to help its members feel secure about fostering a Croat national identity outside of school as well as in integrated schools and classrooms. One approach to helping the Croat community feel more secure might involve consultation with educational lin- guists about options for maintaining a home language in an integrated school system, for example through examining successful programs used in other multi-lingual countries that could serve as models for Mostar schools. Further, increased opportunities for contact are needed that are designed specifically to help break down negative stereotypes. Given the geographic separation for most Bosniaks and Croats, the two groups have few opportunities to interact.

Finally, a curriculum for teaching history could be developed in ways that teach students to explore multiple perspectives and to interpret historical sources. Such a curriculum would need to include attention to critical thinking and democratic methods of teaching. It also would have implications for teacher education.

Schools in these two cities have become lightning rods for the political and ethnic conflicts that permeate the larger society. As critical settings for socializing the youth during an important developmental period, the conflicts have intense consequences. Finding solutions assumes special urgency.

Growing up During the Balkan Wars of the 1990s[1]

Overview

The youth today in Bosnia/ Herzegovina and Croatia have grown up during times of war and chronic unrest. Since the youth will determine the future of the countries in the still unstable Balkan region, it is critical to understand how their experiences of past violence might be related to the role they will play in the reconstruction of their society. For the past two years, we have been studying 14-16 year olds in these countries. Our research is part of a larger project called "Communities in Crisis" that focuses on understanding the contributions of varied social institutions to resuscitating societies after mass atrocity (Stover & Weinstein, in progress). With parallel studies in the Balkans and Rwanda, one of the main goals of the "Communities in Crisis" project is to encourage transnational coalition-building among researchers and activists around re-conceptualizing issues of justice, development, and social reconstruction. "Communities in Crisis" has established partnerships between U.C. Berkeley researchers and universities and non-governmental organizations in Rwanda and the Balkans. The project is particularly interested in helping close gaps between international and local perspectives on how to respond to genocide or ethnic cleansing and how to deal with the aftermath of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. A major goal is to inform community members affected in the wars and international policy-makers who determine which responses are appropriate in situations of mass violence.

Theoretical Frame

The "Communities in Crisis" project has designed its studies according to an ecological framework. This framework posits that many interacting factors lead to civil destruction and the processes of social reconstruction (see Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002). It draws from the work of Bronfenbrenner (1979), Sarason (1972), and Kelly (1968) and assumes that we can say little about universals and instead will learn more from paying particular attention to context. The design of the "Communities in Crisis" project focuses on how multiple levels of society and varied social institutions interact both during genocide and ethnic cleansing and during the aftermath of these events. Fletcher and Weinstein, for example, studied local understandings and attitudes toward the International Criminal Tribunals and other local systems of justice. They found that criminal trials, although necessary, are insufficient for social repair and that for many people they are relatively unimportant. They suggest that singling out intellectual authors and perpetrators of atrocities as the trials do still leaves the task of resuscitating society to broader initiatives in rule of law, humanitarian assistance, democracy building and economic development.

This ecological framework is closely related to the socio-historical theories of Lev Vygotsky (1978) and Mikhail Bakhtin and his whole school, including Medvedev and Voloshinov (Bakhtin, 1981; Bakhtin/Medvedev, 1978[2]; Voloshinov in Morris, 1994). Most helpful to understanding how the youth understand and are affected by violence in their societies is the Bakhtinian concept of "ideological becoming" (see Freedman & Ball, in press). Freedman and Ball explain that "In Bakhtinian writings 'ideological becoming' refers to how we develop our way of viewing the world, our system of ideas, what Bakhtin calls an ideological self." The development of ideologies, according to Bakhtin and his circle, is part of the development of the whole person. It includes the development of that complex of ideas and concepts that lead to a belief system. In the Balkans, how the youth develop their ideologies is intertwined with how

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2   The question of the authorship of this work is disputed although according to Morson (personal communication), it is now widely believed that this text was written by Medvedev. When we refer to it here, we will use Bakhtin/Medvedev since this is the authorship ascribed to the text from which we quote.

they understand and are affected by the violence that surrounds them. As is the case with an ecological framework, Bakhtinian theory is concerned with individual growth as it occurs within a social and historical context, with how the individual influences the social world, and with how the social world influences the individual.

Bakhtin gives the voices of others, their discourse, a central role in his theory of how people develop their ideologies. He posits that we learn and grow as we interact with and assimilate into our consciousness the voices of those who surround us. According to Bakhtin, we struggle to assimilate two distinct categories of discourse: (a) authoritative discourse and (b) internally persuasive discourse. Bakhtin (1981) defines authoritative discourse as:

> the word of the fathers. Its authority was already *acknowledged* in the past. It is a *prior* discourse. It is therefore not a question of choosing it among other possible discourses that are its equal. It is given [it sounds] in lofty spheres, not those of familiar contact. . . . . for example, the authority of religious dogma, or of acknowledged scientific truth or of a currently fashionable book. . . . The authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our own; it binds us, quite independent of any power it might have to persuade us internally; we encounter it with its authority already fused to it. (1981, p. 342-343)

According to Bakhtin, we develop our ideologies in part as we decide which aspects of the authoritative discourses that surround us to assimilate. Morson (in press) explains that authoritarian and authoritative are not the same. Wertsch (2002) discusses the relationship between authoritarian and authoritative discourse in societies with authoritarian governments, a state of affairs familiar in the Balkans. He provides examples of how everyday people struggle against authoritarianism in private if not in public.

Internally persuasive discourse, the second category of discourse which we interact with to develop our ideologies, includes everyday discourses. According to Bakhtin, internally persuasive discourse is "denied all privilege, backed by no authority at all, and is frequently not even acknowledged in society" (1981, p. 342). Freedman and Ball explain:

> It is what each person thinks for himself or herself, what ultimately is persuasive to the individual. As we form our own ideas, we come into contact with the discourses of others, and those discourses enter our consciousness much as authoritative discourse does. The discourse of others too influences the ways we think, and contributes to forming what ultimately is internally persuasive for us. But unlike its authoritative cousin, internally persuasive discourse is subject to change and is constantly interacting with our ever-evolving ideologies.

For the 14-16-year olds whom we studied, the development of ideologies is intertwined with the development of identity. Adolescence is a critical time when young people are defining who they are, both as individuals and as members of social groups (see discussion on identity development in Stover and Weinstein, in press). It also is a critical period for the development of thought about conflictual intergroup relations (Hoffman & Blitzman, 1996) and has been found to be the most impressionable developmental period for the development of collective memory (Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997). We look at the youth's experiences of past and ongoing political violence and unrest in the context of this broader ecological and socio-historical framework. We consider how the wars and the social structures that remain in the aftermath of the wars might affect these youth as they develop into adults who will ultimately shape their society.

Past Research

Although there is a research literature on youth who have experienced war or who have grown up in politically unstable environments, little is known about the potential consequences for a nation when its adolescents come of age in a postwar society characterized by chronic conflict and ongoing violence. Although it is not possible to determine exact social consequences, it is possible to gain an understanding of the youth that might help one anticipate possible consequences.

Some researchers have tried to determine the amount and types of clinically diagnosable psychological abnormality among young people who grow up with war. They have relied on self-reports and some information about the youth from the points of view of their mothers. These studies

have found that around 40% of the population exhibit measurable psychological abnormalities, mostly some type of anxiety, aggression, or depression (Cairnes & Dawes, 1996; Punamaki, 1996). The amount of difficulty children experience has been found to be related to their specific wartime experiences, with separation from and lack of support from families and exposure to multiple types of trauma (witnessing violent acts, loss of loved ones and the like) putting them at increased risk (Garbarino & Kostelny, 1996; Macksoud & Aber, 1996; Cairnes, 1996). It also has been found that youth in these very difficult contexts may have reserves of resilience (Garbarino & Kostelny, 1996; Garmazey & Rutter, 1985). It seems important to ask whether one has to exhibit diagnosable abnormalities to have been scarred in ways that matter, whether one can show some resilience but still have lingering difficulties coping. Few studies have looked beyond symptoms, to the attitudes and feelings that drive the youth's decision-making or the interactions that from day to day shape their development.

We are also attempting to review research from the Balkans on the specific effects of the wars on the youth. However, we have found very little that has been written. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) issued its *Report on Human Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina* in 2002. Included is a chapter on youth and the "brain drain"; between January, 1996 and March, 2001, 92,000 young people left BiH and 62% of those left would emigrate if they had the chance (pp. 41-42). The youth of BiH suffer from extraordinarily high rates of unemployment in BiH; 34.8% of 19-24 year-olds, 13.4% of 25-49 year-olds, and only 9.7% of 50-60 year-olds are unemployed (p. 36). Since the wars, there also has been a shift in the percentage of students who continue their education past the primary years. Before the wars, 80% went on to secondary school; in 2000-2001 only 56% enrolled in secondary school (p. 39). It was also the case that 58.5% of the population believed that the educational system was corrupt (pp. 26-27).

The Study

We have gathered data on 14-16 year-olds who are enrolled in secondary school in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia. These teenagers were five to eight years old during the height of the Balkan wars and have strong memories of that time. They also live with, still need to depend on, and are influenced by many adults whose identities were shaped by wartime experiences.

We do not focus on youth who themselves behave violently so much as on those who have experienced and continue to experience societal violence. Some of these young people lived through the wars, feared for their lives, and witnessed or were victims of horrible atrocities. Some lost parents or other close relatives or have been raised by deeply scarred adults who may have been victims or perpetrators of the atrocities themselves. Some of the children were sent away during the wars or left with their families and now have returned to a society that is vastly different from the one they remembered. Some have been displaced from their homes and communities. All live in an unstable society where many of the same tensions that led to the wars remain palpable.

We have worked with local research teams in the new countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia to conduct 78 interviews and 13 focus groups with young people, their teachers, and their parents.[3] We have centered our work on two of the most highly-conflicted cities in these countries -- Mostar in BiH populated by Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Bosnian Croats who live on separate sides of the river that divides the town and who rarely cross from one side to the other, and Vukovar in Croatia, where Croatian Serbs and Croats live separate lives in spite of the fact that their neighborhoods are integrated.

To learn about how the youth respond to ongoing tensions and violence in the society, we situate our work in the schools. The schools in the Balkans are a critical social space where many of the tensions within the larger society are replicated. The schools also provide a grand stage where

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3   The design called for 80 interviews and 20 focus groups. Seven focus groups remain to be collected; there have been delays because of teachers' strikes at the schools. Two parent interviews have not been held because it has not yet been possible to arrange them; we still hope to collect these interviews.

young people can try on different identities, define the groups they will affiliate with, and in this process play out their responses to the traumas experienced by themselves and the adults who surround them, most especially their parents and their teachers.

We hope to use our study to discover not only the difficulties the youth face but also the kinds of social structures needed to nurture this generation. Through considering issues related to schooling, we examine how the schools as an institution might contribute to the mechanisms of social repair and support the capacities of the youth for resilience. Towards this end, we examine ways teachers, parents, and students think the schools approach issues related to the healing of the youth. The society expects the schools to play a crucial role in their healing process, albeit not the only role.

Through our interviews and focus groups, we seek to find out what role the schools do and should play--from the points of view of the students who attend them, the teachers who work in them and the parents who depend on them. In addition to schools, we also explore what other supports young people, their parents, and their teachers feel that the youth need.

We turn next to our analysis of the interviews and focus groups to understand varied points of view about the effects of past and continuing violence and instability on the youth of Mostar and Vukovar. The findings reported in this second part remain preliminary since we have transcribed, translated into English, and analyzed most but not all of the interview and focus group data and since we still have to collect two interviews, five focus groups on the east side of Mostar, and two focus groups in Vukovar.

The Setting

Until the early 1990s Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs were part of one nation state called Yugoslavia. The breakup of Yugoslavia led to wars in the region and ultimately to the creation of five new nation states: (a) Bosnia and Herzegovina which consists of two parts, the Federation of Bosnians and Croats and the Republika Srpska; (b) Republic of Croatia; (c) Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo is also part of this Republic); (d)

Republic of Slovenia; and (e) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. These newly separate nations are working hard to create their separate identities. This process remains tense, and one of the main reasons is that the division of land did not neatly give each nationalist group a country. Rather a situation now exists where populations, which have been deeply traumatized by the acts of their neighbors who belong to different groups, must find ways to coexist again inside these new states.

Both towns in which we are working--Mostar in BiH and Vukovar in Croatia--are deeply divided along national lines. In Mostar the Croats live mostly on the west side of the Neretva River while Bosniaks live mostly on the east side. The famous Ottoman bridge, the Stari Most, built in 1566, linked the two sides of town before it was destroyed by shelling during the wars of the 1990s. The bridge still has not been rebuilt, and its ruins serve as a constant reminder to the world of the division of the population and of the physical, social, and psychological destruction of the recent wars.

Vukovar sits on Croatia's border with Serbia. Clearly visible across the Danube River is Serbian land. Many of the Serbs who live in Vukovar moved there in the 1930s and after to work in the Borovo shoe factory. The factory was bombed during the war, an act which effectively destroyed the economy of Vukovar.

The shifting population in Vukovar since the war tells an interesting story:

Year	Total	Croats	Serbs	Germans	Hungarians	Others
1990	44639	21065	14425	94	694	8361
		47,2%	32,3%	0,2%	1,5%	18,8%
2001	31670	18199	10412	58	387	2614
		57,46%	32,88%	0,18%	1,22%	8,25%

(From: http://www.vukovar.hr>http://www.vukovar.hr)

The total population has declined substantially, indicating a great deal of flight from and lack of return to the region. The numbers affiliating as Croats has increased proportional to the population, while the number of others, that is those who do not self-identify with any national group,

has significantly declined. This shift seems to signal a climate that pushes "others," to affiliate as Croats; these others may be children of mixed marriages or people who choose not to affiliate with a national group in the past. The Serb population has held steady, perhaps indicating that they still want to hold their ground inasmuch as is possible. Similar figures are not available for Mostar since there has been no census for Bosnia since 1991. It also must be noted that many people who were displaced during the wars have returned to both Mostar and Vukovar, but many also have never returned. And some of the people who populate these towns today were displaced from other parts of Croatia or BiH and made these towns their new homes.

In both Mostar and Vukovar the physical damage offers a constant reminder of the recent wars; many buildings are scarred by the pock marks of mortar shells while others sit in ruins. In these towns, besides bad memories and other more tangible effects of the wars, the citizens continue to feel ongoing mistrust across national groups and live with deep divisions stemming from past brutalities. The people also are affected by the fact that much of the Balkan region suffers from an ailing economy. The future offers the youth few opportunities. An active drug trade flourishes on the thriving black market, and many of the youth seek the escape provided by drugs or alcohol.

In Mostar and Vukovar, most young people who belong to one national group have little opportunity to meet young people from other national groups. The schools, along with most other social institutions, are segregated by nationality. In a society where coffee is central to social life, even the cafés are segregated along national lines. In Mostar, the schools on the east side are for the Bosniak population and those on the west side for the Croats. There are a few students who cross from one side to the other for specialist training, but they remain rare exceptions to the rule. Although Croats and Serbs live side-by-side in Vukovar's neighborhoods, children go to segregated schools or to the same school but in separate shifts. Neighbors of different national groups have little to do with one another.

The students, their parents and their teachers describe a context of ongoing volatility and violence. The tensions are especially high in Vukovar. A young Croatian girl in Vukovar explains that "there is always some fight, provocations of each others." When asked where specifically, she recalls an

incident that happened just a few months before in a Vukovar school:

> 🙶 Well, outside the school. I know one incident in Manual school in Borovo Naselje, where the police have to intervene. It was rough fight in-between Serbs and Croats. It was a group fight. It all started with provocations, though I don't know who started first. Mostly everyone has something what he/she went through, what troubles him. The temperaments are high.

Another Croatian girl in Vukovar explains how verbal exchanges lead to physical conflict:

> 🙶 I have a lot of friends who go to school to Borovo and there are fights and arguments between Serbian and Croatian students all the time there. There are Serbs in the bus when we go to school so we abuse each other verbally. They tell us we are Ustashe, and we tell them they are Chetniks and so on.[4] My friends in Borovo always fight with them, they start abusing each other, and then they arrange to have a brawl. They beat the hell out of each other, and sometimes the police get involved. It shouldn't be like this, but there is always someone wanting to start a fight.

A Serb boy from Vukovar relays yet another example:

> 🙶 The war might be almost forgotten in other parts of the country but not here. . . . My younger brother goes to school in Jankovci. There was a school festivity and some students were playing football

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4   The terms Ustashe and Chetniks make reference to World War II groups and refer a shameful national past. The Ustashe were a Croatian nationalist terrorist organization which came to power after Croatia was established as a state to serve the Germans during World War II; the Ustashe brutally murdered many Jews and Serbs. To call any Croat other than the most radical nationalist a Ustasha is a grave insult.

The Chetniks were armed bands of Serbs who were royalists and against the Tito partisans; by the end of World War II their numbers had diminished and their leader was captured and executed in 1946. To call any Serb who other than the most radical nationalists a Chetnik is also a grave insult.

when a group of students came and they started provoking them or the other way around. I'm not sure who was provoking whom, but anyway they started arguing. A teacher came and instead of trying to reason with them to stop arguing he was just standing there watching them. . . . It happens that you go somewhere with your friends and you meet a group of young people of different ethnic belonging and then you start arguing or you don't, depending on the situation, or you just pass each other by and talk behind each other's back.

In Mostar, one of the Croatian boys reports similar types of violence when youth of different national groups meet:

> In the place, the surroundings I live in, there aren't any tensions, but we do have some in the crowd I socialize with. . .We get together on a Friday evening and go to the park. That's the central place in Mostar, say. And ahh, Muslims come from the right bank and we quarrel. And finally it turns into a battle and we take revenge on each other.

In a Mostar focus group of Croatian boys, one says that if the schools were integrated there would be violence, "A worse conflict would break out and then in the political sense, then the politicians would stir things up again here and there." These boys go on to express resentment about the international community's attempts to impose integration; one explains that Mostar's Croats want to solve their own problelms in their own way. Another expresses his fear of violence if local people were left to solve their own problems, saying "Our police aren't competent for that."

In a Mostar focus group of Croatian girls, the following discussion shows less overt violence, but significant tensions nonetheless:

> The moment you hear a name like Amir or Samir, it's like, ciao. We avoid them and all that. It's both for our own sakes and because it's a small town and everyone knows everyone. And everyone would say, look, she was with that Muslim yesterday, and this and that.

The Youth of Mostar and Vukovar Responding to Violence and Chronic Unrest

From the interviews and the focus groups that we have analyzed so far, we have found that the youth suffer from a general sense of depression and apathy. These symptoms may not always be clinically significant, and these same youth simultaneously show some resilience, yet their malaise permeates the culture. We also found that regardless of their national affiliation or where they live, the youth feel abandoned by the adults who are responsible for them, both parents and teachers. Many adults seem barely able to take care of themselves; they have little ability to meet the needs of a generation of needy youth. Finally, the youth do not know how to heal or how to think about a positive future. With the exception of the Vukovar Serbs who simply want to forget the recent past, the youth are conflicted about whether it would be best to forget the past or to remember it and also about whether they will ever be able to forgive others for what happened. The youth do not tend to talk in terms of themselves or the adults in their community taking responsibility for any of the events of the recent past. Regardless of national group, people do not tend to carry the guilt of being a perpetrator; rather they tend to identify as victims. Perpetrators are the "other." One of the Croat teachers in Vukovar showed his anger with how the "others" characterized themselves and showed no understanding of his experiences: "They were victims, victim, victim, as if we weren't. . . there are thousands of them like that. . . they want to accuse us as an entire nation" This teachers' words could have been uttered by any of the people we interviewed, regardless of location or national affiliation.

Pervasive Apathy

Adults characterize the youth as a quiet and serious generation who had to grow up before their time. A Serb mother from Vukovar explains:

> Children carry deep wounds. First of all, children live among ruins. The moment you get out of your house you become aware of where you live. These wounds won't disappear. We are not even aware of how deep the wounds are. . . . But I think the wounds inflicted in the post-war period go even deeper because they are constantly being told that they are guilty for something, guilty, guilty.

A Bosnian father from Mostar describes psychological symptoms that his children exhibited during the war. They were afraid to sleep alone and generally were fearful, locking doors and the like. He describes these symptoms as better now but with some effects still lingering. A Croatian teacher from Mostar describes students today as "a little nervous," carrying bitterness about the past, carrying burdens. In the focus group of Croatian teachers from Mostar another teacher described this generation as suffering from "some kind of inner discontent," and then went on to say, "They are empty. They wait." In a focus group in Mostar, one of the Croatian students expressed his fear for the future, given the characteristics of the youth, "We can't make a modern society when we are so withdrawn, so introverted."

Regardless of their past experiences, as a group young people in both Mostar and Vukovar have little hope for their futures. Consistent with the findings of the UNDP report for Bosnia and Herzegovian, many say they want to leave the region to escape what they view as severe limits on what they could accomplish with their lives at home. The economic depression exacerbates the youth's psychological problems and their feelings of apathy. Although the economy of Croatia as a country is stronger than the economy for BiH, the Vukovar economy is seriously depressed. A Serb student who lives in Vukovar reveals her hopelessness:

> 77 In Croatia . . . as soon as you get your degree you can go straight to an employment agency. In other words, you will be unemployed. When you think of the unemployment rates you ask yourself: Why do I bother going to school at all? . . . Without college you are nobody, which means you have to go to Osijek [a larger town in the region with a university] or someplace else. That means further expenses, and when you finish college, you can't find a job, and you're still a burden to your parents who have to support you untill they die. And when they die, you are finished because you are used to depending on them. It's like with wild animals--if you take a wild animal and take care of it for some time and then let it go, it wouldn't survive because it wouldn't be able to take care of itself.

This student, like many of her peers, sees no way to become a functioning adult in the culture. A Croatian student from Vukovar sees no better future:

> 77 There are more and more people with higher education, and is harder every day to find a job. . . . There are lots of unemployed people; also those [are] young people. I think that even with some advanced school and faculty it will be hard also to find a job.

These feelings of despair about the future came up in Mostar as well. They were voiced less often in the Mostar interviews than in the Vukovar interviews or than in the Mostar focus groups, in part because some of the students were not asked the question which often elicited such talk about whether the schools were preparing them well for the future. However, as the 2002 UNDP report shows, the problem is certainly grave in BiH generally and likely is worse in Mostar than the rest of the country. In a focus group of Croatian girls from Mostar, at the end of a discussion about the pros and cons of having integrated schools, one student concluded that the society is sick and the youth are the victims:

> 77 I think that we're the main losers, we young people. . . . Half of our young people are leaving. No one's staying here. No one, because we really don't have any rights at all. We can't enroll in a single university in America. It's impossible to get. You can't get a job or anything.

In this same group, when asked what policy-makers could do to help reconstruct the society, a student emphasized that foremost they need jobs:

> After you graduate from secondary school or university, like, there's no where to get a job. We simply don't have any opportunities. I think they [policy-makers] should bring in something new, so young people have somewhere to work, or whatever. The way it is now, they simply tell us that even if you've got a university degree or you graduated from secondary school, all those years you go to school, that with all that education, you can't even find a job washing glasses in a cafe. There's no more jobs like that, even. Never mind doing something else.

In a focus group of Croation boys from Mostar the moderator asked outright, "Do you want to go abroad when you finish school?" Three students immediately replied that they did. One explained that he would leave because universities in other countries are recognized as superior:

> We'll know a lot more than from another university, but the problem is that our university isn't recognized at all. We'll go abroad for ten years to be recognized and only then. While someone who's from, I don't know, America, he's already recognized.

Others pointed to the low salaries and lack of job opportunity in Bosnia-Herzegovina as their reasons:

> S1: For example, if we graduate from medical school, you go to Germany and you get an apartment, a job, a salary, I mean just get your degree. I mean, they see you are qualified, and you get everything, but here when you graduate you get a miserable 500 marks and what can you do with that.
>
> S2: And those who graduate here mostly go abroad because there's no jobs here.
>
> Moderator: Your reasons for going abroad are mainly to get a job.
>
> S1: Financial.

Moderator: Is there anyone here who wouldn't go if the opportunity arose?

S3: There aren't any

S4: Very few.

A Bosnian student from Mostar explained in his interview:

> I want to graduate from secondary school and if possible to go abroad to study, because here, I don't know, it's not what I want. I want to be someone and something, as they say.

In the Mostar interviews some of the despair seemed to be related to the students' beliefs that opportunities come not because of merit but because of connections, a finding also consistent with the UNDP report. Because we interviewed students who had gained admission to secondary school, they had some connections, but they still saw the unfairness of the system and also feared that others with better connections would get ahead of them unfairly. In the focus group of Croatian boys from Mostar, one student explained the despair around university admission:

> However much you've learned, there's not much chance you'll be able to enroll in university. Everything is through connections now, who you know. Some get in with bad marks, 3s or 2s, but the one who has really worked to enroll at university, it's a waste of time his having studied. There's nothing to be gained from it when he can't enroll in that faculty. The ones who've found some connection are always the ones who get a place. They'll get in before you do even if you've really spent all those years working hard on your education.

Croatian teachers in Mostar saw that the students felt that connections matter more than achievement and commented that such views led to a the lack of work ethic:

> **"** It's hard to remold a child who comes to you in second grade grade [US 10th grade equivalent] of secondary school and so on, and says, "I'm not bothered. I'm not going to study. I'll be all right. I'll get by through connections." . . . . And I hear that quite a lot, not just from one or two pupils. . . . So that's the view of practically fifty percent of them in fourth grade [US 12th grade equivalent].

These teachers also discussed the difficulty of teaching when the job outlook for students is so uncertain:

> **"** I really marvel how many young people are coming here to study at university in Mostar when they don't know what their prospects are. They don't know what their future is. . . . As long as people aren't getting enough jobs, until everyone does his own job, I think it will be very hard for young people . . .   All of us who work with final year secondary schoolers, we take them through the school year: "Study this at university, go on, and so on," and they have said to me several times, "That's all very nice to hear, but what are our prospects? What is our future?"

Abandoned by Adults

The youth in both Mostar and Vukovar, regardless of their national affiliation, feel that the adults in their lives, both parents and teachers, do not understand the trauma they experienced during the war or their problems today. The youth feel abandoned by most of these adults because they do not want to talk to the youth about wartime experiences, and they do not recognize the youth's pain. The youth portray the adults as incapable of giving them the attention and guidance that they need. Some say that their parents think they were too little to remember very much and that their parents think that they themselves are the ones who really suffered most in the wars. A Bosniak student from Mostar reports:

> ❞ Lately the teachers have been saying we [the teachers] are the last generation that suffered from the war and we [the students] hardly remember the war. But in fact that's not true, that we hardly remember it. We remember everything and we suffer from it too. I think it's pointless to say we don't remember the war.

This student recalls how her schooling was interrupted during the war:

> ❞ S: During the war, we didn't have classes and we finished first grade in two weeks in a basement, and second grade too. We went during summer for two or three months. I can't remember. I mean, classes were suspended during winter, and during those offensives.
>
> I: So how long was that break?
>
> S: Well, we skipped about six months or a year. I began first grade, I mean, I'd just started school and then classes were suspended, and it was the next summer that classes began.

A Croat student from Mostar explains that her parents avoid talking with her about difficult subjects related to the recent past:

> ❞ They avoid the subject too at home. I don't know, when I ask Dad something, "Can you explain it to me?" It's "Come on, why are you interested in that, why are you talking about that at home?"

This student explains her view that parents in the community generally are abdicating their responsibilities toward their children and that as a result many youth are in trouble:

> ❞ S: They [parents] are preoccupied with themselves. I don't know. They do take account of us, but there are plenty of people in the grade, you can see from their parents that they [the parents] are not much interested. That they aren't interested, but think "They [my children] go to school. What can I do with them now?" But maybe it's not marks that are the most important, [but] how we are in society. I think that's it. I don't know. There are plenty who are on the wrong path, in my grade. Their parents don't see it. . . .

I: And how can you tell that those pupils are on the wrong path? How can you tell that their parents don't care?

S: Well, the form-mistress herself told us. Once there were a few of us left and we talked about it. She said she'd warned them. . . . There's quite a lot of them who smoke grass, who drink lots of alcohol, even in class. And the parents don't do anything. Then the teacher notices everyone. But the parents don't pay much attention, "If they're like that at home, what can we do?"

By the end of the interview, this student concluded and was able to articulate that she suffered because she lacked adult guidance. She suggests that the schools might do a better job, in guiding the youth.

Since we are still too young to understand everything somehow. They don't talk about it [tensions across different national groups] much, and parents the same, they perhaps don't pay enough attention to it. So we don't get enough guidance on that."

At the end of the interview she again called for more guidance:

I: Do you want to add anything to what you've said?

S: Well, I don't know, in school maybe they should bring in someone to give us a bit more guidance about how we should behave towards those other groups. And in class for the teachers to pay a bit more attention to us.

Another Croatian student from Mostar explained the importance of talk and communication, across generations and across ethnic divides:

I think that it would be the best that the society and authority organize different seminars for young people, that there they talk openly. With a dialogue, and not some lectures. . . . In the state and in the world, it is best to organize seminars, and public, maybe discussions. Ahhh, maybe some debates, maybe some dialogue between younger and older. Or mixed [ethnicities].

Similarly, a Croatian student from Vukovar expressed her need for more talk in school about the recent wars:

> We should learn about the causes of the war and how disputes should be resolved in order to avoid wars. We should be educated about these things. The older ones know what the war was about, but younger generations don't know anything about how this war came about, what were its causes. I believe we should talk about it more.

This student praises one teacher who is an exception in that he talks about the past:

> Unlike other teachers, who just don't care, this teacher encourages us to be people of character and integrity. I think he is very special. He doesn't ask us to cram historical facts, but instead tells us interesting stories related to the topic we are dealing with, so that we always learn something new. He talked about the war, about the devastated villages and terrible things that happened during the war. He talks to us whereas other teachers are not that eager.

In the Croatian teachers focus group in Mostar, one of the teachers essentially shirked responsibility for responding to the students' needs: "With the times as they are, I think teachers aren't in a position, they aren't to blame that is for being unable to offer what school should offer." This teacher may also feel paralyzed because most teachers were used to working in a communist system where they were told exactly what to do and where they knew exactly what to expect. Another teacher explained that the schools did not teach moral values because the society does not function according to moral values:

> When you teach him, say, respect, that's not welcome anywhere these days. If he's to be honest, realistic, sincere. That doesn't do you any good these days. Everything's back to front these days. It's a real snafu. It does you no good these days to do what God commanded. That doesn't open any doors these days. Who wants

an honest trader these days. I don't know for sure. When everyone is based only on how to cheat the other fellow first, who can earn the most the quickest. I mean, it's all very practical and that's life, but there's school too.

A third teacher recognized that the students, caught in this bind, want to escape but don't know how:

> When you talk with them a whole lot of them see the only way out is to go abroad, but it's all vague, nebulous. Nothing is, like, clear to them nor do they know exactly what they want. They only know that they want to get away from this.

This same teacher reveals her feelings of inadequacy:

> We all bear some scars about which, we aren't sure, I personally am not sure I'll ever wholly overcome them. Honestly speaking.

These scars, which she also describes as a "loss of identity," she felt, came from the bad things she and her generation learned about Croats in the Yugoslav school system.

Some parents report talking to their children about the war, although they find it painful; they also say that they hold back because they feel a need to try to protect their children. A Serb parent from Vukovar says in her interview that she does not want to talk about the past:

> Terrible things happed in Vukovar, horrible things. It's very difficult to answer why they happened because everyone has their own opinion about that. And.... I don't want to talk about it because it has a very negative effect on me. I have been through a lot and my children have been though a lot only because we are Serbs. That was a dreadful time and I really don't want to talk about it.

This parents continued by saying that she talks to her children and thinks they are doing well psychologically but she also says she does not talk to them about politics because she wants to protect them:

> **"** We talk to our children a lot at home so that I believe my children to be quite healthy. We have been trying not to burden them, we don't talk about politics at home so that we are trying to protect them as much as we can. I believe that, considering the situation, my children fared well.

Another Vukovar parent, this one a Croat, also claimed that her children were fine because she protected them by pretending that all was fine. She embeds this information in her story of what happened to her family during the war:

> **"** [In] August 1991 we had to leave Vukovar. I had two small children. My older son, who we have been talking about, was six years old at that time. He didn't start school that year because we thought things would settle down and we would return to Vukovar. Nobody expected that it was going to last so long and that by the time we return to Vukovar my son will be almost a grown up. I believe that all that shouldn't have happened. . . . That summer when we left Vukovar, in which fighting was still going on, sociologists and psychologists came to visit us and talk to us, the refugees, in all the places we were living at the time. We always had guilty feelings, because we knew there were people suffering in Vukovar, so we didn't want to talk or laugh thinking that if those people couldn't laugh we wouldn't either. We did our best to hide our feelings from our children. My husband was in the prisoner's camp, and in the daytime I was pretending that everything was all right. I was smiling, spending time with my children. Everybody asked me: "How do you manage to do that?" But nobody knows what my nights were like. I used to smoke a pack of cigarettes a day. I didn't sleep at night. But I never let my children feel that. That's why I don't think my children experience any severe trauma. They know what happened and have their own attitude towards ethnicity issues, but, as I said, we tried to protect them as much as we could.

Sadly, many parents find themselves in an impossible situation given

the realities of daily life in their and their children's worlds. Particularly poignant are the words of a mother who lives in Vukovar but is neither Serb nor Croat. She is married to a Serb, though, and her children, who go to a Serb school, find that they fit nowhere. When they ask her what nationality they are, she doesn't want to answer because she doesn't want them to think in these terms. However, her inability to answer them paralyzes her in trying to help them navigate the world in which they live. She explains:

> I feel very unpleasant when my son asks, "What am I, mum? Tell me." Mum is in very stupid position "what to say to you what are you?!" I say, "Well darling when you grow up, you decide what you are. I can't tell you this moment. And that is the least important thing for me. Be a man. It isn't important what you are."

However, her son faces traumatic experiences in his life that make her answer unsatisfactory. He was on a handball team that was mostly Croatian. His mother recounts an incident he experienced:

> After three or four trainings he comes home and says, "I'm not going there any more." And I say, "Why darling? Why you are not going?" He says, "Nobody will tell me that I'm Serbian pig." I say, " Who told you that?" He says, "Well some kid there." I say, "Darling, he is still very young. He doesn't know what he is saying. It doesn't matter. Don't pay attention. Go if you like to." But then you have group pressure of children his age. I check when it happens, on training or before that. It happens before that, so when there is no adult around. Kids like to hang around, to play football or something like that, and this way children act imprudently, which leaves marks on other children. . . . It seems to me that they are too young and that they are carrying burden of that what they are.

There are no right or wrong answers in such situations. The problem is with the society as a whole. A mini-war continues, with children as both perpetrators and victims at the same time and with adults too often left in situations where they find themselves powerless to protect their children.

This same parent also explains that the adults are a big part of the problem. When asked about needed programs for students, she shifts the focus from solely the students to the need for adult education as well:

> I think that it is necessary to work a lot on education of us grown ups, because it is hard to restructure some of our ways of thinking. It means to educate grown people to act humane, tolerant, because with our behavior we affect other people. . . . Life style is something very important and so are the models that we see.

Indeed, the special case of children of mixed marriages cannot be ignored because the numbers are significant, especially in Mostar, even more than in Vukovar. One of the students we interviewed in Mostar when asked what her nationality was, replied, "I don't know exactly." The interviewer then asked, "What do you put in forms? You must have seen that question. As I understand your parents are different nationalities." The student then replies, "My father is Muslim; my mother is Serb. Nationality is Bosnian, I don't know!" In Bosnia and Herzegovina some people tend to refer to themselves as Bosnians, a supra-national identity. Although there may be other reasons, in most cases it is children from so-called mixed marriages or those who oppose national identification based on religious origins. Furthermore, Bosnian identity is often related to the statehood (citizenship), as a clear and strong demonstration against the all-prevailing national divisions in the country.

The inability of the adults and children to communicate may be partially related to a generation gap in attitudes about the "other." In both Mostar and Vukovar for all national groups, there is some evidence that the youth are less tolerant than their parents or teachers (Adjukovic et al., in progress-a, in progress-b; Bilalic & Djipa, 2002). Whatever the situation for adults and youth, however, the children of mixed marriages seem to be caught in some kind of no-man's land.

Paralysis about Moving On–Tensions Surrounding Forgetting and Forgiving

Except for the Vukovar Serb students who want only to forget, students are conflicted about whether it would be best to try to remember the past or to forget it. They have varied opinions and some even want both to remember and to forget. The youth and many of the adults also connect forgetting to forgiving. Some say they can forget but not necessarily forgive, which means they aren't really forgetting; others say they can forgive but not forget, which may mean that they are not really forgiving. None say they can forgive and forget. The youth's ambivalence and confusion seems to mimic the confusion of the adults in their community around these same issues.

One of the Bosniak students from Mostar voiced contradictory views in the same interview. At first he says he could forget and that forgiving was up to the person: "What's past is past. It can be forgotten now, but forgiven as someone wants." Then later this same student says the past could and should never be forgotten:

> It would be a good thing for everyone to know what had happened, since it's not some small thing that can be forgotten, is it. . . . During the war I experienced all sorts of things, and I can't say now, well, that's that, I'll forget it. I can't. It'll always be there. It's engraved into me.

Another Bosniak student from Mostar offered a different point of view:

> We don't forget, but we forgive easily. And no reasonable person thinks that children are to blame for anything. We were children during the war.

The fact that they were children and therefore not responsible opens a way for this student to forgive others in his/her generation.

The attitudes of these students contrasts with those of the adults in their community who do not think in terms of forgiving or forgetting. Their focus is solely on remembering. A Bosniak teacher represents this point of view:

> " Parents are not far away from that [violence]. Their child knows who was the aggressor on B&H, who are the perpetrators, what are the reasons for that, why the crimes were committed, why their dearest suffered so much, their close relatives were hurt. Parents simply want that memory not to be erased, because it is the same crime, perhaps even bigger, to forget as it is to commit the crime.

A Bosniak father explains that he has written about his memories of the war so as never to forget them, but he is somewhat conflicted, thinking aloud that perhaps it would be better to forget:

> " I have seen so many dirty things that following every war. In a certain moment I decided to put everything on paper, but it is better to forget. All that is bad and ugly. Simply in order to calm down.

However, at the end of his thought, he concludes that children should be taught about the events that transpired so those events are not forgotten from one generation to the next:

> " I think that children shouldn't be overloaded, but I don't think that it should be forgotten. I can't forget what they did to me.

Another parent reiterates this message, of needing to move on but not to forget: "Regardless of everything that has happened, we have to move on. But not forgetting what happened, absolutely not!"

The Croat students in Mostar voice opinions that are similar to those of their Bosniak neighbors. A Croat student in Mostar thinks the recent past should not be taught to those who experienced the war " because it brings back bad memories for some people and they have some trauma. " However, this student feels some of the same conflicts as his Bosniak peers as he also gives reasons the past should be taught, "so that we remember and understand why there was that war, why it shouldn't happen again." Another Croat student in Mostar also expressed fears of creating trauma by talking about recent past, especially for those students who experienced loss of close family members: "It's hard for them to talk about it . . . Then some people could feel hurt.

Croats adults in Mostar, however, have different ideas about forgiving and forgetting than the Bosniak adults. They are much more interested in forgetting, and they talk about the importance of forgiving and being forgiven. As one parent explains:

> To live together, we have to respect one another. We have to forget what happened. . . . You can't forget, but some things must be forgiven and should be.

A school director says something similar, although the focus is not on being forgiven but on forgiving others:

> We can forgive if he has done wrong, and he himself acknowledge that he has done wrong, and normally through discussion, through common living, go towards a common goal.

She continues by recognizing the special difficulties those who faced serious trauma have forgetting but then explaining that "It should be forgotten, but it takes time." Another Croat teacher similarly wants simply to forget: "simply to forget as much as possible, as much as one can forget."

In Vukovar, as is the case in Mostar, the students voice internal conflicts about forgetting. However, the Croat students show very negative feelings toward the Serbs and cannot help but voice their feelings of blame and resentment and their lack of tolerance of them as a group. This negativity is much stronger than anything voiced by either Bosniaks or Croats in Mostar or by the Serbs in Vukovar.

A Croatian student from Vukovar at first says that the past should be forgotten but recognizes that in the current separatist political climate of Vukovar, that forgetting is very difficult:

> I think that what happened should be forgotten, but again we can't separate from them [Serbs]. Everything should be like before. And they with that are segregating themselves. Croatians have their story. Serbians theirs. So the politic is present.

Later in the interview the student says emphatically that the past should not be forgotten and implies that it cannot be forgiven. Still this student seeks some way to go forward:

> 🔊 It should not be forgotten what had happened, but still we should go forward . . . . They are Serbs... because they have done all that... I think that it cannot be forgotten [Said to justify view that Serbs should learn in Croatian, with only national subjects in Serbian]

Another Croatian student from Vukovar cannot think of either forgetting or forgiving. This students' grandparents were killed during the siege of Vukovar, and she lived as a refugee in a neighboring village. Also her family home was destroyed and has not been rebuilt.

> 🔊 I have friends who are not Croatian. I don't have Serbian friends, though. There is a girl in my class who is half Serbian, I don't socialize with her much. She speaks Croatian and all. She doesn't stand out. I have no reason to have Serbian friends. There are enough of others. . . . As for the Serbs, I don't want to have anything to do with them. I don't need them in my life. A friend of mine, who is Croatian, made friends with a Serbian guy on the bus. My friend speaks Croatian and the other guy speaks Serbian when they talk to each other. I think this is O.K. But, not everyone can get along that well. . . . Nobody socializes with the Serbs. If someone is half Serbian, they would have both Serbian and Croatian friends. And these friends might start socializing among each other because this person connects them in a way. I don't socialize with the Serbs because I can't be friends with someone who is fighting with my friends. Besides, there are no places where we can meet each other anyway. They have their pubs and we have ours. If the schools were separated too, the division would be complete. Anyway, we stick with our own. They don't need us and we don't need them.

This student considers the schools as integrated but the only thing that is integrated is that Serbs and Croats share school administrations and may even use the same building but at different times of day. For some subjects they may even share teachers.

The Croat adults do not want to remember bad things about Croats but they do want to remember the bad things that happened to Croats. One teacher explains:

> " I don't think that children shouldn't know what happened in first and second world war. Also I don't think that some questions about Ustashe* should be mentioned… ustashe this, ustashe that… I think that those are stupidities… but, well… I say that those things concerning Croatian war they should know, but I think that they know it very well, regardless of how much they learn from history, at least still this generations, and future generations, how much would be forget I don't know. This generation who grow up after exiled… who are not young anymore probably asked themselves - why we grow up in one hotel room – and for sure one or two parents if they are alive, explained them why they live in hotel room or camps.

Another teacher, who is a theologian, talks a lot about forgiving but goes on to say why the Croats cannot forgive the Serbs; he sets as a condition of forgiveness that the Serbs apologize for their past deeds:

> " Words that encourage forgiveness and reconciliation have no effect if the vision of the very essence of forgiveness doesn't exist. What I mean is that those who are responsible for what we had to go through in the last eight, nine years should apologize for what they have done and create conditions for healthy relationships in this area. I don't know how to put it differently. If somebody has hurt me I can forgive that person so that I can have my peace of mind but in order to achieve peaceful coexistence the other side has to show the goodwill.

Like the students, this teacher uses strong language to characterize the culpability of the Serbs:

> " I wouldn't be able to sleep at nigh if I knew that I had hurt someone, stolen from someone, destroyed someone's life. I think we should be far more humble then we are. The unscrupulousness of the Serbs, their way of presenting things, their statements are not conducive to creating new, democratic, open relationships.

Meanwhile, like the Croats in Mostar, the Serbs in Vukovar, both students and parents, want only to forget. A Serb student in Vukovar only wants to forget. When asked what he thinks students should learn about the recent war in Croatia, he responds:

> We shouldn't learn anything about the recent war. . . . These things are meaningless to me. It's pointless to discuss about who is a criminal, about the tribunal. We should . . . forget about these things.

A teacher, when asked what he thinks parents want their children to learn about the recent war says he thinks they want it all to go away, for life to return to what it was before the war:

> I'm not sure what the parents think about it, but they might wish that none of that ever happened. Before the war there were many mixed marriages in this region. People didn't pay that much attention to ethnic belonging. We'll see what happens in ten or fifteen years. I've heard that two people of diffrent ethnic belonging got married recently which was inconceivable only a few yeras ago.

A mother says that she thinks the focus on teaching history is exaggerated and that she doesn't think so much emphasis should be put on History. She explains, "I'm not saying we should forget the past but I believe the existing attitude towards history is exeggarated."

Regardless of the official curriculum in the schools and people's opinions about it, there also is evidence of a hidden curriculum that is meant to influence what the youth remember and that may negatively influence social reconstruction. For example, in the Mostar interviews, one Bosnian student from a mixed marriage was asked what he thought about the educational system in BiH. In the course of her response he revealed that "Some professors respect that system, while other professors are totally opposite. Some still lecture in accordance with national programs." He later mentions that some professors sometimes discuss other nationalities. When the interviewer asked what these professors say, this student replied:

> Well, maybe when one mentions other nationalities, he/she says a lot of insults and bad things, one mentions them in some ugly way, it is done to a neighbor nations, while for others it is normal. I think that it should be taught about all national groups equally, not only the ones that you got in contact with, and then speak about them with hatred. Not the whole nation committed war crimes. Individuals did it. You shouldn't judge the whole nation by act of individuals. Some professors haven't realized that yet.

Another Bosnian student from a mixed marriage explains that particular national literatures are favored: "In some subjects it can still be sensed, we study these poets and not others."

A Croat teacher in Mostar explained resistance to a new textbook for Croats in BiH, which teaches Croats that they are Bosnians. However, this teacher says that really she and her colleagues are teaching the students that they are Croats, that "casually we are mentioning Croatia, isn't it. We are working on Croatian on the side."

Similarly in Vukovar, a Croat student, when asked generally about the system of education in Croatia, explained, "It depends on the school, not on what the government decides. Some schools observe the rules and some don't." Although the Croat students say their teachers avoid teaching history and avoid talking about politics, this same student when asked about the way various ethnic groups and ethnicity are presented in school revealed,

> We didn't exactly learn about it since these things are not in the textbooks, but we talked about it. . . .We talked about ethnic groups in Introduction to State and Law. For instance, we talked about how Serbs, when they finish their schools, find jobs in Vukovar before we do.

Another Croat student, who went to a different school, after saying he was taught nothing about the recent past in school, went on to provide a full narration of what happened during the war in Vukovar and then to say he learned about it in history class:

> **"** I: What do you think happened during the war?
>
> S: In Vukovar what happened? Some say there were massive robberies, houses burned. I don't know. I wasn't there. But . . . when I came here after the war in 1998, everything was destroyed--roads, houses, for sure they were torn down. And most probably that is what happened… When my dad left Vukovar, he couldn't take all the things. What he left, we didn't find it when we returned. Now, who took it? I don't know. It could be anybody. I think that more than necessary was destroyed. Well in war you shoot but in Vukovar you rarely could find any house that wasn't destroyed. Serbian houses stayed, but Croatian did not. Rare are my friends who have a façade on their houses. . . On my houses only three walls were not crushed down. I don't know what happened.
>
> I: What do you think happened? Why did that happen?
>
> S: They taught us that it happened because when [the country] was Yugoslavia, Croatia was giving all to the country. Croats, Croatia in general, had a small influence on politics and other things. And when Croatia wanted independence, Yugoslavia didn't like it. And when we declared independence, they started war. They wanted to win the territory by force and that was it. I think that is the cause of it, probably…
>
> I: When you say teach you… is it through some lectures or?
>
> S: Well, aah… we learned in school, in history.

It appears that the educators are trying to observe the official curriculum but that as human beings, their own agendas bubble to the surface. Sometimes intentionally and sometimes unintentionally, teachers are presenting and modeling attitudes about the other and promoting varied versions of the recent past. When there is an official void, the opportunity arises for teachers to promote their own permutations of the events. Sometimes these become the central discussion in the classroom; sometimes they are only asides, but potentially meaningful and influential asides nevertheless. These personal agendas ultimately become the stuff of a hidden curriculum and feeds into the memories of the youth.

With respect to forgiving and foretting, the situation in Vukovar and

Mostar differ in a some ways but are similar in others. The Serbian adults and the youth from Vukovar and the Croat adults from Mostar all felt that the past contained nothing but painful memories. They simply wanted to forget it and move on. They were not interested in taking responsibility; they just wanted it all not to have happened. The Croats in Vukovar, by contrast, were angry. They wanted to be able to forgive but felt that the Serbs would have to take responsibility for their deeds first. They wanted an apology before they could think about moving on. Unfortunately, however, the Serbs were too busy just trying to move on. Ironically, the Vukovar Croats we interviewed wanted to forget bad memories from their past during World War II as well. In Mostar, the youth from both sides seemed much more ready to broker a peace with their neighbors but the adults seemed to stand in their way, especially the Croat adults. The schools in neither town seemed to be helping much. The absence of an official curriculum for dealing with the recent past and the existence of a hidden curriculum seem in many ways to work against reconciliation.

Conclusion

The design of our work allowed us to gain some understanding of the points of view of parents, teachers, and youth on issues related to how the violence of the recent wars and their aftermath affected the youth. Further, it allowed us to examine the youth in relation to their participation in schools and in relation to how a range of social forces affect them. In Bakhtin's terms these social forces include both the authoritative discourses in the official world of the communities in which they live and also the internally persuasive discourses of their peers and other everyday people. Both types of discourses meet in the schools.

The economy and the constant tension between national groups seems to lead to a great deal of distress and ultimately to an overwhelming sense of apathy. Every national group considers itself victimized by the situation in which they live. This general apathy and culture of victimization translates into a kind of apathy that works against the building of a democratic society. If people are apathetic about politics, they will not vote and democratic processes cannot be built.

The youth seem paralyzed about how to handle their experiences, whether to forgive and then if they want to forgive, whether they think it best to forget or to remember. Only the Vukovar Serbs are certain that they do not want to remember. These tensions around forgiving and forgetting surface in other Communities in Crisis work in the Balkans with other populations (see Biro et al, in press; Stover and Weinstein, in process).

The youth need adult support, but they have difficulty getting the kind of support they need. There are isolated teachers who talk to the youth in ways that they find helpful and there are isolated parents who are attempting to help the youth navigate very rough social waters.

Our design and therefore our explanations are consistent with an ecological and socio-historical theory which points to how social forces interact and how different members of a culture affect one another. Our goal is not to stop with these depressing findings but to use them to recommend more positive directions for the future. Everything we have learned points to the fact that this culture of victimization is destructive. Further, the youth need to be able to talk to adults about their experiences. Several young people praised programs sponsored by NGOs from other countries that allowed them the occasional opportunity to talk; they wanted more such programs. Since the adults within the culture have difficulty providing these opportunities, it would be good for the international community to consider ways of providing additional opportunities for the youth but equally important to offer programs for adults that would support them in being able to talk to the youth about their experiences and the youth's experiences of the recent past.

The tensions surrounding curriculum that would address these issues, namely a general absence of a history curriculum, seem related to the paralysis we found around adult's reluctance to officially discuss the past and the tensions around forgetting and forgiving. We believe that developing a history curriculum is necessary to working through some of the problems the youth face. These notions of forgiving and forgetting may lead to context-bound and grounded ways to talk about historical memory and ultimately to give youth the guidance they call for as they develop their ideologies.

Finally, we think that the schools will have to be integrated at some point in the near future, to give the youth an opportunity to get to know and learn about people across national lines. But integration too will need to

be accompanied by programs that will support both the youth and the adults in managing the transition. Otherwise, integration will only beget more violence.

All in all, the youth of the Balkans have much to overcome but through their talk and the talk of their parents and teachers, we are able to learn something about the kinds of support that could make their futures brighter. We have recently gathered some new data that show that life in Mostar may be improving for some people in some pockets of the town. The ethnographer for the Communities in Crisis project, in his most recent report, writes about changes he is seeing. He found that some young people, now in their 30s, are beginning to be able to talk about the war. When he asked about this change, one young woman explained that some people are beginning new lives and leaving the recent past behind them:

> I asked Maja how she explains the fact that everybody started talking about the war all of a sudden, discussing events about which they had kept silent for ten years. "People have started new lives. So, now, they can talk about their previous ones," she concluded. (Mostar Ethnographer's Report 4, 2003)

Also, ceremonies were held in Mostar to mark the beginning of the reconstruction of the old Ottoman bridge; the reconstruction is scheduled for completion by the end of 2003, ten years after its destruction.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ten Years After Dayton

Introduction

There is always something paradoxical about Bosnia and Herzegovina, so one would not make a mistake to state that post-conflict period in this country, as time goes by, rather resembles the pre-war then some peace-ruling and prosperous one. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) of 1995 established Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state comprised of two entities, each with a high degree of autonomy: the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The chief civilian peace implementation agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Office of the High Representative (OHR): DPA "designated the High Representative to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement on behalf of the international community."[1]

Although it was a compromise that brought the war to an end and established a kind of peace, DPA has contributed greatly to the creation of a fertile soil for political interventions with the 'ethno-national' prefix. In the salmagundi of legal systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina–some legal experts claims that during the past ten years at least six incompatible legal systems have been in force in the country[2]–the national-ethnic, (pseudo) collective element has acquired complete primacy over the civic one. The constitutional patriotism simply does not exist as a concept.

The exceptionally high level of mechanisms for the protection of human rights that are built into the system is inversely proportionate to the level of their implementation, and the DPA efficiency in stopping the war and mass atrocities has been, and still is, inversely proportionate to its efficiency in setting up democratic state institutions. An illuminating indicator in that respect is the fact that the formerly strongest opponents to the DPA are today its greatest protectors and supporters.

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1   For further information about the OHR, see <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/>.

2   Ahmed Žilić, "Constituent people and/or minorities in Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina", paper presented at the symposium on the Status of Constituent Peoples and Minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, September 2001, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In this article I will argue that current political and social structure tailored by DPA neither contributes to the establishment of mutual trust and interethnic cooperation, nor to fostering reconciliation and the formation of a common state identity, but on the contrary, it prevents the effective state reconstruction and nation-building. Special attention will be paid to so-called international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its role to developments in the context of post-conflict society.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: (Un-) Civil Society

Processes of an all-prevailing ethnocentrism, currently in their final (malignant) phase, rapidly rampaged in 1991-92, almost immediately after the first free, democratic, multiparty elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These processes subjected all developments, social agents, actions, norms, and values, to the one single 'highest' referential category, the category of ethnicity. The result was the emergence of ethnocracy instead of democracy. Three national, more exactly, nationalistic parties triumphed in the elections in 1990, thanks to their offer of an alternative ideology as a replacement of the previously dominant communist ideology.[3]

One rigid ideology was thus replaced by an even worse one, a nationalistic, chauvinistic, and xenophobic ideology, including elements of fascism. The dissolution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been accompanied by the independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its recognition in accordance with the international law at the beginning of 1992. Sadly, mentioned developments resulted not only in war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they also led to crimes against humanity and genocide.

Even though already in 1996 general elections in the country has been held–in a way it was a sign of the establishment of a functioning democracy and viable civil society– the wartime *ressentiment* played a more significant role then many would expect.

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3   It seems that, at least in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Adam Michnik is right when argues about nationalism as a final phase of communism, kind of a final attempt of providing social basis for dictatorship. See more in Adam Michnik, "Nationalism", 58(4) *SSR* (1991), 557-564.

" Unfortunately the wartime conditions gave access to accentuated authoritarian powers to the nationalistic successors to the communist party. During the armed conflict, the three nationalistic parties in Bosnia […] constructed still more authoritarian power structures through their monopoly on violence and control of informal economic activities. A key element to this power was the continuation of the 'nomenklatura' system, an all-pervasive infiltration of public institutions by party personnel ensured subordination of the institutions to the parties, eliminating effectively the separation of powers irrespective of what the constitution may provide and undermining the significance of the electoral process.[4]

So, in post-conflict period in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as I have argued already elsewhere,[5] we are still witnessing the endurance of three key political, administrative, economic, and cultural centres that reveal the incompatibility of models of institutionalizing ethnic differences. Thus, Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar, the three centres, are decidedly active, independent of one another and aspiring in their specific way to be the paradigm for the potential evolution of the situation towards a final solution of the so-called 'Bosnian problem'.

But, before entering into more profound overview of the situation that Bosnia and Herzegovina is faced with today, let me recall the words of Adrian Karatnycky, the Freedom House President, while reviewing the 2001 Annual Report: "democracy has been significantly more successful in mono-ethnic societies than in ethnically divided and multiethnic societies."[6] Moreover, Donald Horowitz observed that "democracy has progressed furthers in those East European countries that have the fewest serious ethnic cleavages (Hungary, Czech Republic, and Poland) and progressed more slowly or not at all in those that are deeply divided

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4   The Danish Center for Human Rights, "Making Justice Work: Scoping for Institutional Support to Ministries of Justice – Bosnia and Herzegovina", Final report, DFID, October 2002, 6-7.

5   Dino Abazović, "Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar – Case Study", final papers project: Institutionalizing Ethnic Diversity in (Post-) Conflict Situations: The Role of Human Rights and Minority Protection in South-East Europe, ETC Graz, 2002.

6   Quoted in M. Steven Fish and Robin S. Brooks, "Does Diversity Hurt Democracy?", (15)1 *Journal of Democracy,* (2004), 154-166.

(Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and of course the former Yugoslavia)."[7] As M. Steven Fish and Robin S. Brooks show this is not a new approach within the contemporary political science writings, since "a number of eminent political scientists have seen diverse societies as disadvantaged when it comes to democratization."[8]

However, it would be oversimplification if one considered present Bosnia and Herzegovina simply as an ethnically divided society. Its very recent history (1991-1995) –portrayed by one of the most horrible wars and mass atrocities in Europe since the World War II–clearly indicates its specific character. Additionally, in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina:

> [t]he institutionalization of ethnic power-sharing on state level on the basis of territorial strongholds of nationalist forces in the Entities prevailed over the civic principle so that almost every aspect of state and society became seen through the ethnic lens. This, however, did not contribute to establish mutual trust and interethnic co-operation and foster reconciliation and the formation of a common state identity, but prevented effective state reconstruction and nation-building.[9]

What greatly contributed to such a non-wishful scenario has been a status of the highly underdeveloped civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[10]

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7   *Ibid.*, 154.

8   *Ibid.*

9   Joseph Marko, "Bosnia and Herzegovina – Multi-ethnic or multinational?", in Council of Europe (ed.), *Societies in Conflict: The Contribution of Law and Democracy to Conflict Resolution* (Science and Technique of Democracy No. 29, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2000), 92-118.

10 "Yugoslavian communism had a number of characteristics that enabled the development of emancipatory politics within its single-party state, whose dimensions and levels of influence significantly exceeded those of the remnants of the political poverty of the *bona fide* socialism. On the other hand, local governing groups have accepted the liberal salvage of capitalism, reorganizing themselves so that they can ensure their authority within the new settings of marginal liberal capitalism. They have formed a ruling coalition which was legitimised through nationalistic ideologies – and the real result was the establishment of the identity communities within the states of ethnic majorities. The rest we know – the darkness of nineties, the bloody post-Yugoslav transition. This is where civil society was really established […] Alternative cultures and alternative politics which were pushed to the edge, institutionally dislodged, financially ruined and ideologically defamed by the new rulers using the new identity consensus, tried to defend themselves with ideologies and practices of a civil society, in other words using liberal jargon and civil-social self-organization. To a certain extent they were caught in a trap:

It is more or less acknowledged that a number of attempts have been made to define a civil society and, as is the case with many other contemporary phenomena, all these theories have found their purpose in various reflections or empirical research across the world. It is for this reason that I will start from the standpoint offered by Jeffrey C. Alexander in his binary discourse of a civil society, where a civil society is determined as a society's subsystem analytically and to a certain extent empirically separated from the spheres of political, economic and religious life.

> Civil society is a sphere of solidarity in which abstract universalism and particularistic versions of community are tensely intertwined. It is both a normative and real concept […] Civil society depends on the resources, or inputs from these other spheres, from political life, from economic institutions, from broad cultural discussions, from territorial organisation, and from primordiality […] Civil society is constituted by its own distinctive structure of elites, not only by functional oligarchies that control the legal and communication systems, but by those that exercise power and identity through voluntary organisations ('dignitaries' or 'public servants') and social movements ('mouvements intellectuels')."[11]

Whatsoever, the reason why I find this theory suitable for grasping the Bosnia and Herzegovina context is that a binary discourse becomes apparent on three levels: social motives, social relations and social institutions. According to Alexander there are characteristic symbolic codes and their counter codes on all these levels. Regarding the level of social motives or urges, democracy depends on self-control and individual initiative, and the individuals within a democratic surrounding recognize each other according to symbolic codes, for example, activism and autonomy, and not passivity and dependence. Other axiomatic qualities fall within a binary discourse such as rationality, reasonableness, calmness, self-control, realism, while their counter (democratic) codes include irrationality,

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they tried to save themselves using exactly the tools that were destroying them." Translated by the author from Rastko Močnik, "Civilno društvo i alternativne kulture", ZaMirZINE, March 2005, at <http://www.zamirzine.net/article.php3?id_article=1929>.

11   Jeffery C.Alexander, "The Binary Discourse of Civil Society", in Steven Seidman and Jeffrey C. Alexander (eds.), *The New Social Theory Reader* (Routledge, London and New York, 2001), 193-194.

hysteria, excitement, passion, madness.

The level of social relations is an immediate consequence of individual behaviour, where individuals nurturing democratic symbolic codes are able to develop open social relations based on trust, honesty, honour, truthfulness. Individuals who follow counter codes of social motives are in relations characterized by secrecy, suspicion, calculation, greed, and conspiracy.

Consequently, the discourse structures of social institutions can be characterized by democratic or counter-democratic symbolic codes: on the one hand there are institutions based on the rule of law, equality, inclusiveness, impersonality, and contractual relations, while on the other, there are arbitrary, power-based, hierarchical, personalized and ascription loyalty-based institutions.

It should not be a hard task to recognize the appropriate symbolic codes that fit the post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. If we, for example, understand civil society within the reduced prism of non-government organizations, which is actually quite common in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seems that the main function of non-governmental organizations is, almost paradoxically, the maintenance of already very appalling situation, considering that the state will not or cannot fulfil its own functions. Needless to say, none of the non-governmental organizations work with this goal in mind, and the situation they are in reflects on the fact that the state hardly functions–individuals are left with no other choice but to organize themselves in this way in order to alleviate the consequences of such a situation. In addition, if we take into account the fact that majority of non-governmental sector gets its funding from foreign donors, and as time goes by strategies of local actors are basically donor-driven and have a little to do with the real circumstances and needs, the situation becomes even more pessimistic. All the more, as the so-called 'international community'[12] in Bosnia and Herzegovina keeps insisting

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12 I would like to explain why I am using prefix 'so-called' by giving reference to John B. Allcock: "I dislike the term 'international community', because the configuration of state and non-state structures to which it normally refers does not possess the attributes that sociologists normally understand by the word 'community'. Nevertheless, the potential replacements that I have encountered for it are invariably either equally misleading, or far more clumsy. Under protest, therefore, I continue to use it here in the fervent hope that something better might be devised soon." John B. Allcock, "Come Back, Dayton: All is Forgiven", in Christophe Solioz and Tobias K. Vogel (eds.), *Dayton and Beyond: Perspectives on the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2004), 25-36, at 26.

that non-governmental organizations are the central segment of civil society regarding 'non-political' action aimed at situation change.[13]

All of the above outlines rather sufficient basis for certain assumptions about the findings in the case that one would undertake empirical study on 'open society index'[14] for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Having said 'assumptions' I am referring to the lack of empirical data too, since, unfortunately, I am not aware of the results of any empirical studies of this kind in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Still, for such an index of society openness one should need to examine the following dependent variables: (a) rights of the minorities and marginalized groups, (b) educational system, (c) rule of law, (d) economic freedoms and entrepreneurship, and (e) media and democratic nature of political judgments.

Until 2000 there was no substantial return of refugees and locally displaced persons to their places of origin, particularly not in the areas where they would be factually considered as minority (ethnical, religious, linguistic etc.). The results of ethnic cleansing and homogenization on the entity levels remained so strong in the post-conflict period while there was not so much 'political willingness' to overcome hard problems of human insecurity in the wider sense of the meaning. For those who despite all the barriers decided to return (and *de facto* to become a minority), problems of everyday life become irresolvable. Therefore, the results of the ethnic cleansing have not been reversed to the significant extent. As Nowak rightly argues,

> [t]he systematic policies of discrimination against those ethnic/religious groups who had remained as minorities in their pre-war homes during the armed conflicts or who attempted to return were designed to reinforce the ethnic/religious division of the country. These policies applied to all areas of private and public life, such as

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13 See more in Sevima Sali-Terzić, "Civil Society", in Žarko Papić (ed.), *International Politics of Aid to the Countries of Eastern Europe: Lessons (Not) Learnt in BiH* (Muller, Sarajevo, 2001), 175-193.

14 A basic methodological framework for determining an 'open society index' has been developed by the Croatian sociologist Aleksandar Štulhofer, "Indeks društvene otvorenosti: teorijska koncepcija, metodologija i mjerenje", u Simona Goldstein (ed.): *Otvorenost društva: Hrvatska 2005,* Institut Otvoreno Društvo, Zagreb.

job opportunities, the housing market, infrastructure (electricity, water supply etc.), education, social security, pensions etc.[15]

Educational system until today remains politically influenced in accordance with a segregation principle in schooling structures, and as such Bosnia and Herzegovina is probably the only country in Europe that does not have the state law on education. The basis for segregation is founded in the right to 'mother-tongue' instructions as well as in reluctance to achieve compromise on 'national group of subjects' where problems of educating in history plays pivotal role. All in all,

> [t]ensions arise because minorities and national groups fear that the promotion of a unified state identity will involve forced assimilation and the subsequent denial of their histories, literatures, languages, and cultural practices. Given the close relationship between social identity and culture, the schools can become a battleground in which the possibility of a common civic identity is challenged. While it may be important to establish and protect separate group rights, over-protection resulting in segregated schools and separate languages might lead to hostile separatism that can hinder the development of a common state identity and undermine the legitimacy of shared institutions. [...] In BiH, where there are three constituent peoples, this tension between state and national group identity challenges efforts to protect the rights of all citizens. [...] If ethnic group identification is the most important dimension of who a person is, and if stereotyping becomes the modus operandi for defining people, then the future of the country will assuredly exclude tolerance and integration, and a new generation of bigots will emerge.[16]

According to the International Crisis Group report of 2002 "[t]he law does not yet rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What prevails instead are nationally defined politics, inconsistency in the application of law, corrupt

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15 Manfred Nowak, "Has Dayton Failed?", in Solioz and Vogel (eds.), *op.cit.* note 12, 45-58, at 46.

16 Sarah Warshauer Freedman *at al.,* "Public education and social reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia", in Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (eds.), *My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity,* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 226-247, at 242.

and incompetent courts, a fragmented judicial space, half-baked or half-implemented reforms, and sheer negligence. Bosnia is, in short, a land where respect for and confidence in the law and its defenders is weak."[17] Although dated four years ago, situation remains as described in all aspects, but to the level of corruption that has been drastically diminished.

Despite all efforts of a number of domestic and regional entrepreneurs, economic sphere is in many aspects fragmented, proper legal preconditions for functional joint economic space are not fulfilled, and there are no major foreign investments.

Media still suffer from dubious professional standards (with an exception of a few printed media) very much influenced by political oligarchies. Like in many other fields, division along ethno-national lines is clearly visible in media field too.

Finally, instead of speaking about democratic one should speak about ethnocratic nature of political judgments.

International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
A Prologue for Critique

Ten years after the Dayton Peace Agreement the strategies and involvements of the so-called international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be theoretically viewed as the artefacts dependent and based on the rational choice theory.[18] Although quite 'popular' in analyzing different phenomena of collectiveness too, the rational choice theory suffers serious limitations if used in explaining and understanding the ethnic relations.[19]

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17 ICG, "Courting Disaster: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia & Herzegovina", Europe Report No. 127, 25 March 2002, at <http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1497&l=1>.

18 "Rational choice theory is based on the simple assumption that human beings are rational and self-interest motivated in their everyday actions. The notion that individuals tend to behave as rational and egoistic creatures also includes assumptions that their actions are predominantly intentional as well as that they have a stable and relatively consistent set of preferences." Siniša Malešević, "Rational Choice Theory and the Sociology of Ethnic Relations: A Critique", (2)25 *ERS* (2002), 193-213.

19 I find Malešević very correct in pointing that "[…] although RCT [rational choice theory] is presented as a successful explanatory alternative to post-essentialist criticisms of social science,

Indeed, one of the major problems with applying the rational choice theory model in a complex multiethnic setting falls under a *post hoc* type of reasoning–firstly presupposing the individual rationality and then explaining the results by referring to that rationality. Thus, the strategies for reconstructing Bosnia and Herzegovina have been built without seriously taking into account its historical, cultural and political particulars.[20]

Moreover, the crucial involvements of international community can be subsumed under the aegis of paternalism and interventionism, and that is a more or less common attribute for the mandates of all High Representatives.[21]

Already in December 1997, in order to accelerate the process of implementation of the DPA, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)[22] decided to emphasize the authority of the OHR. Therefore, the High Representative was encouraged to use his final authority in making binding decisions on removals and suspensions, including actions against persons holding public offices or other officials. Since then, the High Representative has removed from office or suspended more than one hundred persons,[23] from local party leaders to a member of the State Presidency. Many official positions were affected, among others, mayors, governors, deputy

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its sociological and epistemological value is very limited. Since the main postulates of the theory are tautological and explanatory deficient for a serious sociological analysis, it is argued that RCT is not able to provide what promises to be a full explanation of social life. Equally so, rational choice approach has little value for the understanding and explanation of ethnic relations". *Ibid.,* at 194.

20 One of the most popular anecdotes among local population is about conversation between two international workers that accidentally met in Sarajevo. The fist one, person that has worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina for many years asks the second one how long he has been in the country and what he has been doing. The second person replies that he has arrived just yesterday and that he leaves the country tomorrow, while the reason for visit is work on his book about Bosnia and Herzegovina. Asked about the title of the book, 'author' answered: "Bosnia: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow".

21 This statement does not include the actual High Representative, Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, due to two basic reasons: firstly, he is still in the early phase of his mandate, and secondly, so far he was very hesitant in using his powers.

22 Following the successful negotiation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995, a Peace Implementation Conference was held in London on 8-9 December 1995, to mobilize international support for the Agreement. The meeting resulted in the establishment of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). The PIC comprises 55 countries and agencies that support the peace process in different ways–by assisting it financially, providing troops for SFOR, or directly running operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are also a fluctuating number of observers. See more at <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/#pic>.

23 See <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/archive.asp>.

ministers, ministers and prime-ministers at all levels, the president of an entity, the heads of entities' secret services, judges, civil servants, company managers, etc.

Did these actions of the High Representative include elements of lustration[24] and disqualification? The answer obviously has to be affirmative, but in a limited sense; it was a case-by-case approach personally affecting some individuals, but there was no structural process of lustration and disqualification. The institutions, as such, were neither affected nor structurally changed. And what can be said about a cathartic effect of these actions? It was equal to none.

Any kind of lustration-like measure is interpreted from the narrow, closed-minded position of ethno-politicians, and interpreted as intentional, unnecessary and unjustifiable.

An additional problem with respect to performance like these is the problem of (lacking) transparency. The reform of the judicial sector can be used as an illuminating example.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, alongside the (de-)certification processes of police officers[25] and the removal practices performed by the High Representative, the lustration-like issues are most visible in the field of the judicial system. The reappointments of judges and prosecutors under the umbrella of the reform of the judiciary are the only processes that involve the examination of the former employment and other records of individuals for the purposes of the decision on hiring or firing them.

As a consequence of the decisions of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils of Bosnia and Herzegovina (formerly Independent Judicial Commission),[26] approximately 500 judges and prosecutors will stay

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24 See more about lustration in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Dino Abazović, "Public Debates on the Past: Effects on Democratic Structures – Lessons from the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina", in Magarditsch Hatschikjan, Dušan Reljić, and Nenad Šebek (eds.), *Disclosing Hidden History: Lustration in the Western Balkans* (CDRSEE Thessalonica, CPDD Belgrade, Belgrade, 2005), 130-134.

25 This was performed by the International Police Task Force (IPTF) within UNMIBH (presently European Police Mission, EUPM).

26 The Independent Judicial Commission (IJC) was the lead agency for judicial reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina; its first mandate was by the HR at the beginning of 2001--see more at <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/judicialrdec/default.asp?content_id=69>. Since May 2004, the institution that regulates many of the most important affairs of the judiciary is the High and Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils of Bosnia and Herzegovina; see <http://www.hjpc.ba/intro/?cid=246,1,1>.

jobless. But the justifications of the decisions are not publicly announced or elaborated. The public is informed only about reappointed candidates, while there is no information about those rejected. Partly due to that kind of practice, there have been more and more speculations about the process of reappointments in the local media, and it has become a topic on the agenda of politicians, too. The main feature taken into account in those considerations is the ethnic affiliation of the selected candidates. In a certain way, the insufficient transparency in the work of the international community representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed to that kind of understanding amongst the public. Another reason of uneasiness is the fact that the strategy supported by the international community continues with addressing mainly the consequences, while causes are often completely disregarded.

Finally, when it comes to the issue of local involvement in all these interventions, a very illuminating assessment has been provided by the team of the Danish Center for Human Rights which had been asked to analyze the challenges of the reform of the judiciary system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In its final report it stated:

> Apart from the concrete changes, which have taken place, the entire atmosphere between the domestic agencies and the IC [international community] also tends to change although in a more indefinable manner. It seems as if the IC at previous stages in the post-Dayton support to B-H sought to apply a rather sincere notion of partnership with their domestic counterparts. In the field of legal drafting, for instance, the international advisors spent hundreds of hours of consultation with the legal drafters in the domestic agencies. Today, the worlds are more or less apart. The team is obviously not in a position to unpack the reasons behind this change of mindset. But one can imagine a combination of two variables: disappointment and lack of results. Unfortunately, relations based on powers and authorities have replaced the notion of partnership. A highly unsustainable scenario.[27]

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27 The Danish Center for Human Rights, *op.cit.* note 8, 12.

The activities of the exponents of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, be they the representatives of governmental, intergovernmental or non-governmental institutions, specialist agencies, institutions created for particular purposes in conformity with the Dayton-tailored state, military and police organizations, or the think-tank mob, are astonishingly poorly coordinated, and the most superficial analysis of those activities suggest what one might call the 'too late' syndrome. Despite the fact that there were no legal or other formal obstacles, almost every decision of major importance for the stabilization or advancement of the country has been made several years too late (for example, the decision on the constituent status of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the decision on the implementation of that decision, the decision to reform the judiciary, or the decision to extend the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the future government of state). Then again, though certain other major decisions were not so long awaited, their enforcement has been put off again and again into some uncertain future, which is worse (one thinks above all of the arrest and trial of persons suspected of committing war crimes).

Many different sectors, e.g. public administration, are a blatant example of what I have called 'passing the buck'.[28] Everything that domestic decision-makers do not know how to do or do not want to do is 'proclaimed' by them to fall within the jurisdiction of the international community in the country. The excuses and pretexts they put forward are generally along the lines of the 'sensitivity' and 'complexity' of the issue, but in principle what is at stake is the necessity of taking unpopular steps that would be viewed with hostility within the homogenized electorate that votes for them on the basis on protecting their own monoethnic interests. The international community, too, faced with issues on which there is no broad-based consensus among its key actors, 'delegates' responsibility to the domestic authorities. Without disputing the fact that responsibility should always ultimately, and increasingly, lie with the domestic authorities, issues of crucial importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina remain unresolved because of this very 'buck-passing' and, as a result of this practice, fall somewhere between two stools.

As Marko rightly argues, "[o]ne of the lessons to be learned from the example of B-H is that the overemphasis on democratization is wrong.

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28 Abazović, *op.cit.* note 4, 11.

If elections come to early without the necessary preconditions, i.e. free media throughout the country and a re-established civil society - instead of ethnic pillarisation of the population, the nationalist elites are reinforced and democratically legitimised."[29]

Instead of Conclusion

What needs to be advocated in Bosnia and Herzegovina is (re-) institutionalization of public sphere and justification of public policies. I agree with Jean L. Cohen that:

> the ability to reconcile identity and difference, universality and particularity, will depend not only on the proper safeguards for the multiplicity of different voices in public space ('voice') but very much on 'bringing the private back in', even if on this level, too, both universal norms and the defense of particular identities will inevitably reappear. At the very last, some of the fundamental preconditions for building and defending different, unique identities will depend on maintaining the necessary political and legal protection of privacy."[30]

Still, as Carol C. Gould noticed,

> [i]t has become a commonplace in political theory to criticize liberalism for its abstract universality and its abstract individualism, in which differences other then those of political opinion are ignored or overridden and assigned to the private sphere. But the alternative theoretical framework in which differences would be adequately recognized and effectively taken into account in the public domain remains undeveloped and problematic. Some basic questions arise here: what differences ought to be recognized, and

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29 Marko, *op.cit.* note 8.

30 I borrow this term from Jean L. Cohen, "Equality, Difference, Public Representation", in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference, Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996), 187-217, at 191.

why these rather then others?[31]

In case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to DPA, there is no single doubt in answering to the first question: ethnic and religious differences, then a couple of blank places, and then all other differences!

Considering the second question, it is not my intention to say that there was no necessity at all in Dayton for recognizing these differences, but problem occurred with an uncritical application as well as with understanding this part of the DPA.

The best example I can use is Annex IV of DPA, generally known as the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Until beginning of 2000 and the landmark decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it had been generally accepted that equality of the groups was the same as equality of individuals through non-discrimination.

Therefore, the Constitutional Court pointed out that "[e]quality of the three constituent peoples requires equality of the groups as such whereas the mix of the ethnic principle with the non-ethnic principle of *citoyennete* in the compromise formula should avoid that special collective rights violate individual rights by definition. It thus follows that individual non-discrimination does not substitute equality of groups."[32]

However, subsequent amendments of the Entity Constitutions during 2002 (imposed by the High Representative) extended the ethnicization of the political system, increased its complexity, as well as increased the predominance of ethnicity in the political system.[33]

Lastly, the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina failed, by just two votes, in April 2006 to reach the two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives to pass constitutional amendments that would be a first step in the necessary (constitutional) reform process.

Be this as it may, one very useful "tool" for moving forward is the European integration process. Statements about the fact how majority of country population is for EU integration–as well as that this is one of the very few common things that Bosnians and Herzegovinians agree upon–

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31 Carol C. Gould, "Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences", in Benhabib (ed.), *op.cit.* note 27, 171-186, at 171.

32 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. U98/5 III, 1 July 2000, para. 71.

33 More about this in Florian Bieber, "Towards Better Governance with More Complexity?", in Solioz and Vogel (eds.), *op.cit.* note 12, 74-87.

become kind of mantra in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And that is without taking into account the lack of empirical support for such a claim as well as harder evidence than just nominal politicians' statements in domestic media.

No matter what, needs for changes are obviously recognized and future in Europe has been considered as "dreamland". Therefore it is of vital importance to work towards shift of perspective, namely, that requirements from Brussels are understood as internal necessities, and that European values are values of Bosnia and Herzegovina too.

Sociological Monstrosity of Political Will in Bosnia and Herzegovina

> «*State in which nothing exists between 'hypertrophied State' and 'infinite number of unorganized individuals', constitutes a veritable sociological monstrosity, for collective activity is always too complex to be able to be expressed through the single organ – that of the State.*»[1]
>
> *E. Durkheim*

Introduction

It is certainly paradoxical that, not only in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "political will" is mainly written about and analyzed when it is not present i.e. when it is inactive or non-existent, thus creating a rather narrow frame of reference in terms of definition of what "political will" actually is. But I believe that, in the Bosnian context, the more important thing is what Mujkić described in relation to the aforementioned paradox - "... there is no such thing as the 'absence of political will', i.e. the 'situation' in political life which we tend to superficially describe as the 'absence of political will' is nothing but another manifestation of political will itself."(Mujkić, 2014 :??)

So, if we are to discuss Bosnia and Herzegovina today andprovided that we want/desire to do so in order to make a step forward by questioning the "political will" along the line, requires, in Bosnian context, a new understanding of old concepts and processes, i.e. in the manner they were elaborated in certain theoretical frame of references of modern sociological

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1 "*Društvo u kojem nema ničega između 'hipertrofirane države' i 'beskrajnogbroja neorganiziranih pojedinaca', prava je sociološka čudovišnost, jer kolektivna aktivnost je isuviše kompleksna da bi se mogla izraziti samo jednim organom – državnim*"; "*The division of labour in society*", Free Press Glencoe, p. 11; see also "*Professional Ethics and Civil morals*", Rotledge Kegan Paul 1957, pp. 20-23. (cited in: *Robert Pinker: "Socijalna teorija i socijalna politika"*, Hrestomatija, FPN Sarajevo, 2000)

thought. These essential concepts and processes are ideology, ethnicity (nation and nationalism) and the specific social capital.[2]

Some theoretical frame of reference that I have in mind are those arising from the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Rogers Brubaker, Michael Foley and Bob Edwards. I will attempt to do it in the form of initial points for consideration.

If we start from the premise that Adam Michnik is correct in saying that nationalism is the last word of communism, a final attempt to find a social basis for dictatorship (Michnik, 1991),

"then this political hypothesis sees nationalism not as a remote inheritance of historical conflicts and structural distrust, but as a purely residual phenomenon, essentially communist determined[3], a form of authoritarianism that emerged because of communist socialization". (Mundjiu-Pipidi, 2004:62).

However, that which significant number of authors refer to when using the term "communism" did not have/leave the same intensity and consequences in societies, nor the nationalism had the same form, results and fate in post-communist European countries. For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even the declaration of independence[4] was not an event of symbolic significance comparable to the withdrawal of the Soviet army from the countries of the former Eastern Bloc -in those countries, the communism was tied to foreign occupation, while, in BiH for example, we do not have a suitable equivalent. Of course, if we analyze the change of the ruling ideological paradigm, the debacle of SKBiH-SDP (political party which was the successor of the League of Communists) at the elections was not nearly as strong symbolic event compared with the said withdrawal of the army from the countries under former Soviet domination. However, regardless of whether Michnik was right or wrong, the first hard fact is that

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2   I have already discussedthese concepts and processes in other publications, in different texts and for different reasons. Surprising is the author's realization that even though the reasons forwriting these texts were not related to the problem of "political will", re-reading, pondering, and combining the main theses of these earlier texts hopefullyproduced adequate sociological insight in conjunction with a given theme –problem of "political will" in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3   I believe it is more adequate to use the term *socialism*, not *communism* as it used not only by Michink, but also Alina Mundjiu-Pippidi whose work I refer to here.

4   Here, I refer to the understanding of independence in the period between the first multiparty elections and the outbreak of the war of aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina - although that time period is relatively short, it should not be ignored!

one ideology - communist ideology or the ideology of the former socialist regime (whatever term is used to characterize it) gave way, or was replaced by the ideology of nationalism.

Therefore, in the model of analyzing the nationalism in the former Yugoslav republics, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also in countries that were under Soviet domination, it is perfectly correct for Alina Mundjiu-Pippidi to say that "due to its positive association with political fatalism ... [nationalism] emerges as a substitute ideology, a form of distinctive political identity ". (Mundjiu-Pippidi, 2004: 81)

Furthermore, we need to determine how this distinctive political identity, symbolic power, ultimately a symbolic violence against identity, came to be associated with ideology as concepts. Question formulated in this manner represents the starting point when discussing *doxa* (or ideology) in Bourdieu's work.

According to him, doxa means accepting many things that people do not really know about, and, even though it implies practical knowledge people do not have the "tools" to understand their experience and talk about it (Burdieu, 1999). Therefore, those who are under the domination accept much more than we believe them to do, but also much more than they are themselves aware of.

According to Bourdieu, it is therefore extremely important not to succumb to the scholastic bias - which we are all exposed to, according to him - that is, to think that the problem can be solved only through awareness; according to him that is and will not be possible because

> ,, ...symbolic domination is more problematic, resistance is more difficult since it is something you absorb like air, something you don't feel pressured by, it is everywhere and nowhere and to escape from that is very difficult…" (Bourdieu, 1999:270)

It is even more difficult, if we think about ethnicity and nation in terms of substantial groups or entities, which is present to a high degree in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and not only in Bosnia).

Therefore I believe that Rogers Brubaker is right in believing that we have to think about ethnicity and nationality in terms of practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frameworks, organizational

routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent events. (Brubaker, 2002).

Since rationalization, ethnicization and nationalization are political, social and psychological processes, Brubaker, accordingly, insists on considering groupness as a contextual fluctuating variable rather than a group, as it has so far mostly been the case in social research.

Of course, the above frames of reference are not the only possible ones, and probably are not even appropriate approaches in all aspects - but, if nothing else, I offer this as an attempted appeal to leave the old paradigms which, apart from description, apparently do not offer much else.

Issue of accountability

Furthermore, in the (post-)conflict society, such as that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, discussing the concept of "political will" primarily entails the narrative on virtually all segments of this society. This, at the same time, inevitably leads to a related concept - "accountability", since even the extremely simplified descriptions of everyday phenomena that surround us, as well as the processes which we participate in, are sufficient only to conclude that "accountability" does not actually exist here.

Therefore, it is advisable to initially force ourselves to recognize that we are discussing something that is non-existent and absent, ergo, to recognize another paradox – to discuss the concept based on that which it is not, i.e. whose basis it has been negatively defined on.

If we are to, say, follow the tradition of stylistic exercises and replace the term "accountability" with "state", would we get the same result? Here, the state is still out of context, therefore it is obvious where it is absent and where it should be, or it is contextualized by its determination as repression and coercion. In simple terms, you can have as much accountability as you have the state.

Therefore, not much needs to be said about institutions, including the state, which the accountability, at least theoretically, rests with and where such action is implied in itself, while we need to say more about our relationship with the (non-)accountability, and (un-)accountability.

Also, seemingly equally important to me is an almost specifically Bosnian phenomenon - "transfer of accountability".

Speaking of philosophical and moral aspect of accountability, Žarko Puhovski says the following:

> " The complexity of this issue can be seen on a daily basis in almost anecdotal manner, merely by reading our newspapers,in which, at least once per week, one can find phrases such as: *the responsible authorities had no response* or *the responsible authorities refused to provide an answer*. Once again, it is linguistically and logically clear that one who refuses to give an answer is not responsible, as well as the one who cannot or may not be held accountable since he, for example, enjoys immunity. By definition, which they are likely to dislike, members of the parliament are irresponsible because they may not be held accountable, and the accountability is essentially a communicational relationship. In this case, we can say that: those who should be held accountable by virtue of their formal position are in fact not accountable, so they refuse to answer the question".[5]

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we are, at the same time, faced with the practice of "transfer of accountability". I refer to the practice by which everything that local decision makers do not know about, do not want to do or will not do, they "proclaim it to be" the sphere of responsibility of the international community in BiH. Justifications mostly refer to "sensitivity" and "complexity" of an issue, while in principle this entails obligatory taking of unpopular actions that would be negatively interpreted within homogenized and ethnicized electorate that votes for them based on the principle of the protection of their own (mono)national interests. Also, the so-called international community "delegates" responsibility to

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5   "Koliko je to pitanje kompleksno, može se pokazati na dnevnoj razini gotovo anegdotalno tako da se pogledaju novine kod nas u kojima se barem jednom tjedno nalaze formulacije tipa: *odgovorni nisu imali odgovora* ili *odgovorni su odbili odgovoriti*. Opet je jezično i logično jasno da onaj tko odbija odgovoriti nije odgovoran, kao što nije odgovoran ni onaj kojega se ne može ili ne smije pozvati na odgovornost jer, recimo, ima imunitet. Po definiciji, što se njima valjda ne bi sviđalo, zastupnici u parlamentu su neodgovorni jer ih se ne može pozvati na odgovornost, a odgovornost bitno jest komunikacijski odnos. Ovdje se hoće reći otprilike sljedeće: oni koji bi trebali biti odgovorni po svojoj formalnoj poziciji zapravo to nisu pa ne odgovaraju na pitanje"; Puhovski, Žarko: *«Filozofijsko-moralni aspekt zapovjedne odgovornosti»,* Zarez, issue no. 53, 12.04.2001, Zagreb

the domestic authorities when faced with issues in relation to which there is no broad consensus among its key stakeholders.[6] One might describe this as a "levitating" accountability!

If we have the "responsible authorities" in a particular society which are not accountable, or do not want to be held accountable (it is necessary to emphasize the moral aspect of such practice along with its political and legal aspects,), as well as an entire class of privileged elite which enjoys all the benefits of this situation, we have to ask ourselves what about those who, in Durkheimian terms, represent an endless number of unorganized individuals who accept this as if this situation does not concern them i.e. as if it happens to someone else and, of course, elsewhere.

Here, we can offer only indications needed for understanding Bosnian post-war phenomenology of the individual and provide a framework for further considerations.

From the viewpoint of individuals, significant number of them are in the phase which I describe as "victimization" stage, in which, from the perspective of the victim or an aggrieved party, all these negative phenomena are justified simply as the results of the war. The dominating discourse is based on fatalistic resignation to the outcomes of war i.e. the reasons for total inaction are to be found in the recent past in the form of violent intervention against the individual's knowledge and will, and, considering where he finds himself now, he is in a hopeless situation. There is no future different from the present which is characterized by extreme passivity.

The next phase which I will mention here is the "addiction" stage. It involves individuals who, due to specific circumstances, (e.g. continued education, employment, various forms of social engagement) managed to leave the "victimization" stage. These are the individuals who fully see their potential efforts and commitment as depending on "someone" or "something", but not on themselves. Unlike the individuals described in relation to the previous phase, the individuals at the "addiction" stage can be activated, but only through the persistent external stimuli based on authority - political, religious or financial authority, to name a few. The future exists, but it depends on others.

Minorities, i.e. those who are not even at the "victimization" or "addiction" stage face the consequences of social disorganization and

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6   See more in Abazović, 2003.

unsuccessfully try to become part of critical mass that will, for a start, expose as fatal the dominant, perverted value system.

If we try to abstract the phenomenon of activism at higher level than the individual according to the criterion of coverage, at the group level, for example, we face the primordial types of collective consciousness based on ethno-confessional elements and determinants in our country, but I think it is another topic which is, in any case, present to a more significant degree in various elaborations - from newspaper articles to scholarly works. Yet, systematic approach to the phenomenon, which is most often found in contemporary theories of organization and organizational behavior is simply not applicable in our context.

Social capital?

Let us take a look at the situation in the field of theory of "social capital". It is commonplace for most of definitions of "social capital" to be primarily focused on relations in society, which actually produce some benefits both for the individual and the community. Although we cannot use the relevant literature to identify a clear, unambiguous and integral opinion on what social capital actually means, we do not have generally accepted common ground that would incorporate different approaches to the definition of social capital as well.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the individual "definitions" are operationalized depending on individual studies and a researcher's disciplined approach i.e. the depth and level of analysis of a specific community. However, it is certain that the social capital is multidimensional and it has to be conceptualized in this manner in order for it to have some explanatory value.

However, in all studies of social capital it is clear that it is always about the different society networks i.e. about the connections that exist between individuals holding similar worldviews, yet they also bridge the differences among those holding opposing worldviews, including the norms themselves as well as reciprocity. However, regardless of whether we look at social capital from the point of view of individuals or the community concerned, it is important to realize that we can primarily observe something almost

at the level of a rule, stating that - social capital is about information, influences, solidarity, and that is what is available to stakeholders of socially networked relationships in the community.

Although I cannot offer a detailed analysis of the main insights from the rather wide range of approaches to the study of social capital on this occasion, it seems necessary and practical to provide at least a reminder regarding the "sources", i.e. previous perspectives of studying social capital in the form of enormous contribution of three authors in the first place - Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam. We mention Burdieu due to his sociological understanding of social capital through its immanent critical theory of society and the role of elites; Coleman, a sociologist who studied the phenomenon through the prism of rational choice theory and established strong links between it and economic relations; and finally Putnam, because of politological discourse on social capital through civic engagement and involvement.

Indeed, today's Bosnia and Herzegovina offers an almost ideal-typical setup for basic research into social capital (and a lot more, of course) which is presented in theoretical and empirical manner.

With regard to this, it is necessary to draw particular attention to the work of Michael Foley and Bob Edwards, who are, among others, recognized for the theoretical framing of applicative research into social capital in specific societies. Foley and Edwards are among the first to point out the very important aspect that must be taken into account with regard to research into social capital - according to them, generalized approach to social trust is irrelevant, simply because the conceptualization of social capital is directly dependant on the social context. For a society such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, this is a highly important insight and one must not lose sight of it.

In the existing studies and research into social capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina we can start from the first and primary finding- Bosnia and Herzegovina has an unusually low level of social trust compared to other countries in the region and Europe (in BiH only about 10 percent of people think that people may be trusted; in Serbia this percentage is just over 13 percent, in Slovenia over 17 percent, while in the Scandinavian countries it amounts to slightly below or above 60 percent). This (in)directly confirms Putnam's thesis from the book "*Making Democracy Work*" which says that societies with low social capital are governed by the least successful governments, with high levels of corruption and inefficiency.

In any case, the study of social capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as the one conducted by the UNDP Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is primarily reflected in the exact indicators of interpersonal trust as an expression of social support, integration and level of social cohesion. The collected and analyzed data supported by information obtained from the focus groups shouldbe, and, in my opinion, undoubtedly is of an interest to the professional community and general public, but also to those who make decisions, at least in informative manner, about the way in which the things are going on "between us".

Here are some illustrative examples: people in BiH believe that the most significant level of social tension in the country is the one between the rich and the poor (88%), followed by tensions between the management and workers (86%), and only then between different ethnicities (79%). Today, unlike in 2005 (again, according to the exact indicators from the research the UNDP conducted in BiH), one can see a large drop in the perception of the importance of the wartime events, along with a significant change in terms of responses - from "very important, I will never forget it" to "it is important, but I went on with my life". To put it simply, BiH experiences some other major fault lines, apart from those of religious and ethnic nature. Respondents indicated that they spend much time with members of their own ethnic group, but they did not indicate a significant level of trust with regard to the members of their own ethnic groups, unless they are their family members or close friends. There is no difference among the respondents, regardless of whether they are Bosniaks, Serbs or Croats.

Given the very low level of social "inclusion" – e.g. the rate of membership in associations is 17.5%, mostly in political parties (sic!), followed by sports, art associations and unions. Considering that the number of those who describe themselves as active members is even lower (i.e. 10.5%), the resultant "exclusionary" social capital is most evident in the fact that 95% of respondents say that having "personal connections" is always or sometimes useful for gaining access to basic social services, and 85% of them consider "personal connections" as the only way to get a job. What is particularly worrying is the fact that more young people believe that personal connections are more important to gaining access to services than it is the case with the elderly. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the respondents from the FBiH and RS, the respondents in the Brčko District demonstrated less belief in the benefits of having "personal connections".

Although the research showed that BiH society is dominated by strong familial/kinship ties, lack of broader social ties constitutes an important dimension of poverty and social exclusion (so, 13.6% of respondents are unable to provide adequate heating in their homes, vacation away from home cannot be afforded by 61.7% of them, while a meal including meat, chicken or fish on every second day is unattainable for 31.3% of respondents). Generally, groups that are more likely to be affected by social isolation are internally displaced persons, minority returnees, the elderly, women from rural areas and people with lower level of education.

So, "given the low levels of social trust, the fragmentation of the social sphere and high levels of social exclusion, the analysis of social capital in BiH is, therefore, opportune at the current time for three reasons: Firstly, attempts to foster the rebuilding of multiethnic and diverse communities would benefit greatly from a more thorough understanding of the degradation of social solidarity. Secondly, social capital research involves the analysis of both formal and informal networks. In terms of formal networks or associations, such research can shed valuable light on the functioning and effectiveness of civil society in BiH. At the same time, informal social networks – comprising family, relatives, friends, neighbours and acquaintances can have negative consequences for society at large, in particular where they encourage nepotistic and clientelistic relations. Thirdly, while BiH has seen steady levels of economic growth in the past few years, the economic benefits of this growth have been distributed unequally. The concept of social capital provides an innovative way of approaching poverty reduction through shifting the focus away from a deficit (or discriminatory) model of disadvantage in which the poor or excluded are seen as largely responsible for their conditions. Instead, overcoming poverty is understood to be, in part, as the overcoming of a lack of immediate support networks or network poverty" ("*The Ties That Bind* ", 2009: 19).

While in other "happier" and better organized societies and countries a research of this type is specifically focused on studying levels of optimism, satisfaction with life, perception of governmental institutions and political participation as fundamental dimensions of social capital (extremely low rate of respondents reported that they contacted representatives of the authorities for any reason, and even when this was the case, it took place at the local level and for "personal reasons" or for the purpose of gaining

information), judging by domestic policies, authorities and ourselves, social capital in BiH will, for quite a while, remain solely at the level of a specific set of informal values or norms among group members that allow for the cooperation between them .

Finally, it is once again evident from the provided analysis and the resulting data that, if we take social capital seriously, the network of societal relationships which determine behavior of individuals and thus affect the economic development can hopefully result in what Roland Inglehart determines as its basic function - culture of trust and tolerance, in which the extensive networks of voluntary associations develop and emerge.

The extensive networks of voluntary associations of such kind represent an indispensable element in creating a social milieu that requires and entails responsibility – and corresponding climate of active and resulting "political will".

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Rethinking Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Introduction

In the last two decades in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H), there has been an evident process of resurgence of religions, or the return of religion to public life, its transfer from the 'invisible' (private) into the observable/public sphere, and therefore the de-privatization of religion *par excellence.* Religious renewal and the revitalization of religion is, above all, present here as a 'desecularization' of the public space and life, and all relevant indicators point towards a significant revitalization of the position and role of religion in the society of B-H (increased participation in religious activities, the underlining of religious affiliation, the presence of religious communities in political and public life, as well as in media, the role of religious communities in a legitimizing system, in the education system, etc.).[1] Not surprisingly, because in the process of ethnonational differentiation among the domicile B-H population through history the religions and confessions played a key role, the majority of B-H peoples consider religion and confessions as a strongpoint for determining the identity, as well as the individual and collective consciousness—its own, as well as of the members of group-others. However, in the post-communist transition (from the 1990s), religion becomes not only a socially suitable, but socially favored as well. It becomes important to visit churches/mosques and to display (but not

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1   However, as the retreat of institutional religions in some states in the so-called West is not synonymous to the retreat of religion, neither does the revitalization of religion in the public sphere necessarily imply an increase of personal religiousness and spiritualization of personal life. unfortunately, there are too few empiric researches/surveys in Bosnia and Herzegovina that would contribute to a more precise presentation and understanding of the above-mentioned assertions and processes. See more in Dino Abazović, "Secularism and Secularization in Today's Public Discourse (the Bosnian example)—from Non-reli- gious Perspective" in *Religion and Secular State*: *Role and Meaning of Religion in a Secu- lar Society from Muslim, Christian and Jewish Perspectives* (European Abrahamic Forum Zurich, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Sarajevo, Inter-religious Institute in Bosnia and Herzegovina Sarajevo, Zurich and Sarajevo, 2008).

to confirm) ones own religiousness, in par- ticular if one is aiming to be politically suitable in the frame of political (so-called national) parties and institutions.

The role of religion and religious institutions in the pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict period in the states of former Yugoslavia, although still under-researched, needs to be taken into account in order to understand problems of nation and state-building processes, in particular in cases such as B-H. Moreover it should be kept in mind that

> [b]y treating religion as important source of political legitimacy as well as by acting as national, political first-class instances of legitimization, all three religious com- munities [in former Yugoslavia–Serbian orthodox Church, Catholic Church and the Islamic community] provided and has been providing the respective nationalis- tic strategies with additional legitimacy. And that legitimacy has been very particu- lar one since it has been legitimacy of national nature 'from above', the legitimacy of sanctified nature. In this way all of the dominant nationalistic strategies acted under the certain 'sacred canopy'.[2]

Here, I will discuss this, as much as it is unquestionable that historical subjectiv- ity in B-H has not produced the nominal sameness of territory and nation. Rather, national plurality and what is awkward is an aggressive and radical ethno-confessional mobilization that is permanently used as the primary tool for political legitimacy and de-legitimacy.

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2   Srdjan vrcan, "Faith and State: the Exemplary Case of Former Yugoslavia", 23 *Transeu- ropeennes* (2003), 51–63, at 56.

Some useful Theoretical Insights

The introductory part of the summer 2002 edition of university of virginia's *The Hedgehog Review*, which focused on the relationship between religion and globalization, indicates the two views that immediately come to mind:

> First, there is the way in which globalization flattens out cultural differences, erodes local customs and beliefs, and spreads a secular, capitalist way of life that is at odds with religions of all sorts. At the same time, there is the way in which religion serves as the source of globalization's greatest resistance and as a haven for those standing in opposition to its ubiquitous yet often subtle power. In both of these views, the relationship between religion and globalization is antagonistic–one of struggle and conflict.[3]

Five years later or so, the reminder sounds very fresh, and in some parts of the world, more actual then ever.

Surely, at the beginning of the new millennium, one of the key issues within social sciences and humanities has been the 'resurgence', or revival of religion, particularly in the context of religious influence over politics. Although the role of religion had been previously discussed in relation to contemporary social processes and devel- opments, e.g., conditions in the Middle East, parts of Africa, South-East Asia or the Indian subcontinent, the political revival of religions in the West forced many thinkers and researchers to swiftly ask new questions as well as to reconceptualize prevailing theoretical frameworks.

One of the reasons why earlier that has not been the case could be that "except the occasional act of terrorism, religion does not inspire such violence in contemporary democracies. So it is not surprising that relatively few political theorists have thought hard about the relationship of religious-based belief to fundamental political values and structure".[4] However, the post-9/11 hysteria (with and without inverted commas) is

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3   "Introduction", 2(4) *The Hedgehog Review* (Summer 2002), 5.

4   A. P. Martinich, "Religion, Fanaticism, and Liberalism"*,* 81 *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* (2000), 409–425, at 409.

reshaping scholarly works as much as it is reshaping the 'global village'.

Within that context, one could easily identify all-prevailing themes such as reli- gion and violence, religion and politics, re-debating secularization, and inevitably the new variation on 'the clash of civilizations' thesis.

But at the same time it seems that the old questions keep occurring as well, clearly signifying the importance of rethinking given answers that are taken for granted.[5] For example, when you say religion, what are you referring to?!

If one consider Martin Marty's statement correct about "what 'religion' means", or more precisely, accept the view that "scholars will never agree on the definition of religion", then there is no reason to be surprised when one realizes that Marty's attempt to show how closely intertwined religion and politics are ends up demolishing any theoretical basis for separating the two.

> Martin Marty gives a list of five 'features' that mark a religion. He then proceeds to show how 'politics' displays all five of the same features. Religion focuses our ulti- mate concern, and so does politics. Religion builds community, and so does politics. Religion appeals to myth and symbol, and politics 'mimics' this appeal in devotion to the lag, war memorials, and so on. Religion uses rites and ceremonies […] and '[p]olitics also depends on rites and ceremonies,' even in avowedly secular nations. Religions require followers to behave Marty *offers* in certain ways, and '[p]olitics and governments also demand certain behaviours.' Five defining features of 'religion,' and shows how 'politics' fits all five.[6]

Moreover it is a case considering the recent debates about the secular and secularization, about the ideology of secularism and secularization process.

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5 One of these questions within the sociology of religion I find very relevant, but to the best of my knowledge has still been insufficiently addressed, is about the relation of discipline to, as Kieran Flanagan spells it out, its distant relative, theology. or, better put, how about the return of theology in social sciences and humanities in general! See more in Kieran Flanagan, "The Return of Theology: Sociology's Distant Relative", in Richard K. Fenn (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Sociology of Religion* (Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 432–445.

6 Cited from William Cavanaugh, "Does Religion Cause violence?", lecture held at the university of Western Australia, 29 May 2006, at <http://www.catholicanarchy.org/cav- anaugh/Cavanaugh%20-%20Does%20Religion%20Cause%20violence.pdf>.

As pointed out by Peter L. Berger, the former has tied itself too exclusively to a rather simplistic read- ing of the sociological theory of secularization, which thinks that the more modern we become, the less religious we would become. In one of his recent interviews, Peter L. Berger argues: "What I did not understand when I started out–my god, it's now almost forty years ago–is that what has changed is not necessarily the *what* of belief but the *how* of belief ".[7]

Accordingly, Talal Asad is right in showing that "secular […] is neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it (that is, it is not the latest phase of a sacred origin) nor a simple break from it (that is, it is not the opposite, an essence that excludes the sacred)."[8] Asad takes "the secular to be a concept to bring together certain behaviours, knowledge, and sensibilities in modern life".[9]

On other side, Daniele Harvieu-Leger'sr[10] explanation of religious eclipse and resurgence points that modernity exhibits continuity but also transformations in the forms of believing (the functional process) even while traditional beliefs (substantive contents) are being widely discarded; according to Harvieu-Leger, memory and tradition are the grounds of legitimacy and the means of articulation of specifically reli- gious beliefs and believing.

And that is all the more evident given that the secular nation-state is less and less successful in resisting globalization; more exactly, there is less and less of a solid ground to form a worthy basis for national (collective) identity.

Conflict and post-conflict societies, especially those that are multi-confessional, are conducive to the processes of revival of religiosity.

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7   Charles T. Mathewes, "An interview with Peter Berger", 8(1-2) *The Hedgehog Review* (2006), 153.

8   Talal Asad, *Formation of Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford university Press, Stanford, 2003), 25.

9   *Ibid.*

10 Danielle Harvieu-Leger, *Religion as a Chain of Memory* (Rutgers university Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 2000).

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Symbiosis of Ethnic and Confessional

In the process of ethnonational differentiation among the domicile B-H population, religions and confessions played a key role, thus, till now, the majority of B-H peoples consider religion and confessions a strongpoint for determining identity and the individual and collective consciousness–its own as well as of the others. As much as it should not be questionable the fact that historical subjectivity in B-H has not produced the nominal equivalence of territory and nation, but instead ethnonational plurality, what is awkward is the aggressive and radical ethno-confessional mobilization that is permanently used as primary tools for political legitimacy and de-legitimacy.

In the relatively recent past, during the period of 1946 to 1990, religion happened to be the only source of counterculture in the so-called communist era that had aneffect on every social stratum (in contrast to the explicit political opposition that was restricted to the narrow circle of intellectuals in the field of human and social sciences). Since that time, there has been no other agency of comparable size undertaking the role of preserving and transmitting national cultures and basic values.

Therefore, in the period of the domination of socialist regimes in multi-confessional societies of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), under the overwhelming influence of the dominant politics (the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, i.e., the Communist union of Yugoslavia) the place and role of religion in current socio-political matters was, at the very least, understood dichotomously–primarily in an ideological manner, in which religion was completely negatively perceived as a tradionalistic, anachronistic, and retrograde phenomena incompatible with the new progressive "thought of the epoch", and the religious leadership was seen almost exclu- sively as clerical and anti-revolutionary, and the second, culturally historical manner, in which religion is a fact, in close relationship with the national being and the feelings of the South Slavic peoples.

However, in general, the relations between the state and the religious communities in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was well elaborated by Paul Mojzes when he classified the following developing stages of these relations: the period of radical limitation of religious freedoms, from 1945 to 1953; the stage of gradual abolition of

the prohibition, from 1953 to 1965; the stage of considerable liberalization of relations, from 1965 to 1971; newly established selective limitations of freedom, from 1971 to 1982; the stage on the brink of complete religious freedom, from 1982 to 1989; and finally, the period of the 'grand transformation', from 1989 to 1992.[11]

It is well known that, especially during the first period of regulation of social relations, immediately following the end of World War II, i.e., the first two decades of Yugoslav socialism, there were indications of processes in which the practical atheiza- tion of the society was ideologically favoured and forced as a kind of officially desirable world view, and atheism as a position was used to express loyalty to the political system.

What can be said about that society is that there was a form of secularization as a exhorted and hastened phenomena, not primarily formed as a response to the social and cultural level of development, which was the case in Western societies, but that was basically a process forced by a political imperative that had a significant political role of stabilizing the newly established social system.[12]

That practically formed two kinds (types) of cultures:

> [M]utually quite distanced, one being systemic and atheistic which did not use institutional means to just support itself, but often to impose itself, which resulted in its hegemony in culture, and the other, being outside the system, but legal, which efficiently embedded itself into the private sphere with no significant public and social events.[13]

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11 Paul Mojzes, "The Role of Religious Communities in the Development of Civil Society in Yugoslavia, 1945-92", in Jill Irvine, Melissa Bokovoy and Carol Lilly (eds.), *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1945-92* (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1997).

12 It needs to be pointed out that the forced secularization did not only occur in societies that were under the rule of the so-called communist–socialist ideologies; Nicholas J. Demer- ath reminds us of the forced secularization as the result of imperial politics of Britain in India, of the forced secularization of Japan after WWII (prohibition of the state Shinto religion), especially under the influence of the uSA, of Ben-gurion's politics in Israel, of the politics of Kemal Attaturk in Turkey, etc., as well as of the open question of the so-called diffusing secularization as the by-product of globalization (which is one way of forcing the change of lifestyle and culture of the so-called indigenous peoples around the world). See Nicholas J. Demerath, "Secularziation Extended: From Religious 'Myth' to Cultural Commonplace", in Richard K. Fenn (ed.), *op.cit.* note 5.

13 Mirko Blagojević, "Savremena (de)sekularizacija srpskog društva", in Dragoljub Đorđević (ed.), *Muke sa svetim* (Niški kulturni centar, Niš, 2007), 112.

However, the process of forced atheization of the Yugoslav socialist society was sig- nificantly less violent than in other countries in which the atheization of the purely Soviet type was carried out.

As shown in the situation of modernity elsewhere, in the socialist type of regulation of social relations on a social level, the state takes over many of the roles of religious communities, whereas on the personal level, nationalism does the same thing as religion. It is therefore important to see that, at first, the process of national emancipation of peoples in the SFRY, meant a hidden religious emancipation, especially considering the famous symbiotic link between religion and nation in these areas, so that the spreading of national freedoms also meant the spreading of religious freedoms, which is characteristic for later periods of the development of state and faith relations in the former state.

Still, the beginning of the crisis in the SFRY (when it became evident that the country's socialism, facing failures in the economic and social area. will not realize the idea of socialism as true humanism) happened at the same time as the political and social changes in Eastern and Central Europe, with the difference that, in SFRY, religion at the beginning of the 1990's was recognized and more significantly used as valuable political capital. In the ideological vacuum of post-socialism, the revitalization of religion, as such, did not occur, but religion was all over again understood as a political fact, but now in changed circumstances. The new understanding is, unfortunately, also particular–by forcing confessional (collective) identities, religion is oriented and reduced to ethnicity, and not to its universal characteristics, features and mission, and it becomes the means for the political legitimization of the new order.

What contributed to such a development is that

> [R]eligion in communist Yugoslavia was privatized but not as an individual matter but as collective one [...] the privatization of religion in the former Yugoslavia was forced by a communist and anti-nationalist platform, which [...] institutionalized the collectivistic religion in the only sphere it was permitted to – in the private life of the believers, and not in the public sphere, where collective religiousness was conceptually always placed.[14]

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14 Slavica Jakelić, "Sekularizacija: teorijski i povijesni aspekti", in Milan vukomanović and

That is another reason for the ever-present tendency to put the sign of equality between the confessional and ethnic self-identification of most of the population i.e. for the pure "reduction" of religion to nation and vice versa.

Forced or not, secularization can bring about the retreat of visible and institutional religion i.e. there can be a decrease in institutional religiousness, but that should not be interpreted as a retreat of religion *per se* – what remains to be researched is what happens when it is the other way around?

Ethnopolitical Mobilization Based (Also) on Religion

The peculiar aspect of post-socialist transition in B-H is the relationship between religious communities and ethnopoliticians, which has been also, to some degree, the case in the entire region of South-East Europe. Some of the authors from the region accentuate that very nexus (of religion and politics) as a key social determinant of the process of transition. Accordingly, Srdjan vrcan showed that unlike in other countries in Eastern and Central Europe, religion and religiously acquired attributes are outstanding political factors in South-Eastern Europe, whereas at the same time, politics is being reshaped as an exceptional religious fact.[15]

> [T]he fading of the nation-state and the disillusionment with old forms of secular nationalism have produced both the opportunity for new nationalisms and the need for them. The opportunity has arisen because the old orders seem so weak; and the need for national identity persists because no single alternative form of social cohesion and affiliation has yet appeared to dominate public life the way the nation-state did in the twentieth century […] In the contemporary political climate, therefore, religious and ethnic nationalism has provided a solution to the perceived insufficiencies of Western-style secular politics. As secular ties

Milorad Vučelić (eds.) *Religijski dijalog – drama razumevanja* (BoŠ, Beograd, 2003), 75–76.

15 Srdjan Vrcan, *Vjera u vrtlozima tranzicije* (Dalmatinska akcija, Split, 2001).

have begun to unravel in the post-Soviet and post-colonial era, local leaders have searched for new anchors to ground their social identities and political loyalties.[16]

Accordingly, it is interesting to notice that the early post-socialist period in B-H has been characterized by powerful "nationalization of the sacral" and "sacralisation of the national." In other words, national political ideologies have requested (and have been granted) the support of religious doctrines in order to legitimize new establishments. There were no exceptions with all three major religious communities (the Islamic community, Roman Catholic Church, and Serbian orthodox Church). Such interdependence ('symbiosis') of new ruling elites and religious leadership resulted in an understanding that solving 'religiousissues' can be done in the field of politics, whereas the position of religious institutions in politics becomes more and more central. Certainly, at the level of individuals, confession remains to be the main element of national being. Ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, by reifying confessional groups, treat the largest ethnical groups in B-H (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks) as substantial things in-a-world!

This argument is based on Rogers Brubaker's explanation of reductionism in collectivists' understanding of (ethnic) groups as primordial and natural, therefore a point of reference that cannot be ignored, instead of studying (ethnic) groups as social, cultural and political project. According to Brubaker there is a (problem with the)

> tendency to take groups for granted in the study of ethnicity, race and nationhood […] the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as a basic constituents of social life, chief protago- nists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis.[17]

Here it is very important to point out that "when religion cannot be completely affirmed socially, it tends to lean on the nation and cover itself

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16 Mark Juergensmeyer, "Religious Terror and Secular State", global and Intl. Study Program Paper 22 (2004), 5, at <http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=102 6&context=gis>.

17 Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Harvard university Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004), 164.

in a cloak of nationality".[18] So, contrary to the expectations of the political elites, religion became an even more sig- nificant (key) factor of national self-identification of the Bosnian population.

Be that as it may, today, the Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats in B-H are an example of how ethnical identity can be based on confession even in modern and modernizing societies, but again only as a kind of communitarianism of an ethnopolitical type. The supranational identity in B-H has never been, and is not, even today, articulated as a politically relevant postulate without being understood as anti-national at the same time.

The social reality of B-H is marked, prior to all, by ethnopolitics,[19] and that poli- tics is basically about politicizing ritual spaces and religious activities as a tool for mobilization. The understanding of ethnicity–confessional relations rest on the prin- ciple that every change of ethnic identity based on confessional identity is fatal for the ongoing nation-building processes, despite the fact that religions traditionally present in B-H (Christianity and Islam) are universal by its doctrine and teaching–cannot be reduced to particular collective identities such as ethnic identity.

> **"** It is of central importance the fact that ethnicization is re-establishment of political sphere over all others, and solutions have been looked out in politics, no matter whether it is appropriate or not. From that moment political programs are oriented towards ethnicity and ethnicisized nation instead of citizens' identity, so ideas, aims and the future are mobilized and interpreted in the line of ethnical imperative […] Societies basically loose ability to define its goals according to material civil criteria and communication by any other means but based on discourse of ethnicity and personal loyalty.[20]

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18 Esad Ćimić, *Iskušenja zajedništva* (DID, Sarajevo, 2005), 22.

19 I used a term 'ethnopolitics' in a sense that Asim Mujkić suggested to describe "such ethnic-polities [...] in a community characterized by the political priority of the ethnic group(s) over the individual that is implemented through democratic self-legislation, and a community characterized by the political priority of the ethnic group's right to self-deter- mination over the citizen's right to self-determination where the citizen's membership in a political community is determined by her or his membership in ethnic community, *Eth- nopolis*. […] the political narrative and practice intended to justify this ethnically-based social construct, [is] *ethnopolitics*". Asim Mujkić, "We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis", 1(14) *Constellations* (2007), 112–128, at 116.

20 György Schöpflin, "Civilno društvo i nacionalitet", in vukašin Pavlović (ed.), *Potisnuto civilno društvo* (Eko Centar, Beograd,1995), 164.

The bottom line is that the ethnopolitics in B-H result in a creation of conditions in which processes of building supra-national identity, inclusive to all ethnic and confessional identities, seems to be impossible.

Concluding Remarks

The everyday lives of B-H citizens are overwhelmed by 'ethno-religious hints'; their worldview is channeled in ethnic terms. Ethnic issues enter their homes and persistently follow each and every communication between members of the B-H population, even the most benign. one can conclude that the ethnopolitical order in B-H is based on the political production and maintenance of the entire array of differences. There is no room for a citizen in such a network, especially not for his or her rights and freedoms. This is true to such devastating dimensions that the lack of individual freedoms and rights almost cannot even be posed as a problem. Somewhere along the way towards ethnopolitical supremacy, a citizen has been lost, and this is no longer even a problem.[21]

Still, in multi-confessional and ethnically plural communities, the religious identity not only could, but it should, be categorically differentiated from ethnic identity.

> Religious identity is a matter of shared theology, ritual, belief. Ethnic identity is a matter of common ancestry, descent, history, language, culture and also (though not necessarily) religion. If we do not distinguish the two identities from each other then we cannot hope to demarcate ethnic from religious conflict. The danger of such intellectual confusion is that, by undermining the legitimacy of religion as an instrument of peace, its inherent potential for conflict resolution will be seriously compromised.[22]

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21 For more-detailed elaboration on ethno-political structuring of Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Asim Mujkić, Zarije Seizović and Dino Abazović, "The Role of Human and Minority Rights in the Process of Reconstruction and Reconciliation for State and Nation-Building: Bosnia and Herzegovina; Country Specific Report", MIRICo Country Specific Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008), at <http://www.eurac.edu/NR/rdonlyres/BD177D76- 1FEA-4131-9DE6-5A681818BF53/0/20_BiH.pdf>.

22 William F. S. Miles, "Political para-theology: rethinking religion, politics and democ- racy", 3(17) *Third World Quarterly* (1996), 525–535, at 533.

If that is not the case, one is hard pressed to recognize the critical distinction between religious revolts against the state, which are truly inspired from theology, and pseudo-religious ones, in which religion is merely a referent for group identity.

Religion and Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Illustrations From the Postwar and Post-Socialist Transition

Introduction

"Bosnia. A small country, a large word", wrote the Bosnian Franciscan Ljubo Hrgić in his *Dnevnici* (Diaries) (Hrgić, 2005:167). The tragedy of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the turn of the millennia did not (only) lie in its peoples but their leaderships that mislead rather than lead them. And they lead them to war (1991-1995) that destroyed whatever common consciousness Bosnia and Herzegovina had. It kept disappearing for years in the conflict of "national interests". One world was disappearing, and the other kept failing to be born. Old illusions disappeared, and there were no builders to build new (common) ones. What remained are the ruins of factories, sports fields, bridges, and worst of all, people. The war pushed Bosnia and Herzegovina into the chasm of political, moral, but also intellectual havoc. A proverb says: '*In the Balkans, one cannot come to this world and leave it from the same country.*

Almost twenty years after the end of the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina still did not overcome the gap "created by hatred, too often lead by misinterpretation and the destructive abuse of religion" (Kuzmič, 2006:66). This paper shall focus on the relationship between religion and politics, in terms of results of interaction between political decision-makers and organized religion. In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, certain stake holders of key political and societal processes just keep failing to understand that the times of "autochthonous" nations and nations' "historical missions" belong to the past. Hence the ongoing disputes about Bosnia and Herzegovina, and within it. To quote the words of friar Ljubo from 1936: "And my Bosnia? Bosnia does not belong to anyone! Bosnia should be its own, since they see her as someone else's, as a land

the possessor of which is unknown. A sad land!" (Hrgić, 2005:110). This largely applies to today as well!

It would be a (over)simplification if one considered Bosnia and Herzegovina simply an ethnically divided society. Its very recent history (1991-1995) -- portrayed by one of the most horrible war and mass atrocities in Europe since the WWII -- clearly indicates its specific character. But for the purpose of this paper Bosnia-Herzegovinian post-conflict period emerges as more significant when it comes to its democratic potential for the association processes e.g. to the European Union.

The Dayton Peace Accord, a "compromise" that brought the war to an end and established a kind of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has contributed greatly to the creation of fertile soil for political intervention with the prefix "ethno-national". Therefore it is useful to briefly analyse the effects of the constitutional and institutional compromises in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The politico-institutional structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina presently is that of a state comprised of two entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska), each with a very high level of autonomy. In itself, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprises 10 cantons. The town of Brčko, which was the subject of international arbitration, now has the status of a district and is still under direct supervision of a special international envoy.

As the current state' infrastructure was established through an international agreement, for the purpose of implementation and particularly in view of maintaining peace, "Office of the High Representative (OHR) is an *ad hoc* international institution responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the accord [...] The High Representative, who is also EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is working with the people and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions." Other international organisations "was originally intended at facilitating the domestic decision-making process by insuring adequate security for citizens (SFOR, IPTF), creating the economic framework for successful governance (EU, UN) and by promoting democratic and more tolerant institutions and processes (OSCE)." (Bieber, 2002:213)

The complex structures of state organisation of BiH can (irrespective of international interventionism aimed at achieving peace) ultimately be subsumed under those models which contemporary sources define as consociational.

In order to accommodate conflict, stabilisation and democratic development, key elements of consociationalisim – a grand coalition, proportionality, mutual veto and segmental autonomy (Lijphart, 1977) – have already been implemented. The post-Dayton BiH must therefore be considered a form of consociational democracy.

As we have alredy elaborated elsewhere, as far as BiH is concenred, things are quite clear – *a grand coalition* is determined by election legislation (and results of all the elections thus far) and the process of establishment of the executive comprising key parties and based on the principle of ethnic representation, *proportionality* is simply the three-member Presidency, as well as election of members of Parliament (following ethnic and entity criteria, let alone the House of Peoples), composition of the Court of BiH, etc.; the mechanism of protection of vital national interest used in parliamentary practice is, in effect, the *mutual veto,* and finally, the *segmental autonomy* is reflected, first and foremost, through institutions and policies (in the widest sense) of entity structures of the state, i.e. through cantons of the Federation BiH (five with majority Bosniak population, three with majority Croat population and two so-called mixed cantons).

However, law still does not rule in this country. There are too many examples of inconsistencies in the application of law, judicial space partly remains fragmented, reforms are not fully implemented and confidence in law and its defenders is still rather week.

Despite all effort of a number of domestic and regional entrepreneurs, economic sphere is in many aspects disjointed, proper legal preconditions for functional joint economic space are not fulfilled, and there are no major foreign investments.

Media still suffers from dubious professional standards (with exception of a few printed media) very much influenced by political oligarchies. Like in majority of other fields, division along ethno-national lines is clearly visible in media field too.

All in all, so-called post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina fits into very basic criteria to be considered as democracy (multiparty system and free

elections) but in its nature it is an illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 2003). The regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina is democratically elected, but often in routine manner ignores its constitutional obligations, and even worse, deprives its fellow citizens of basic human rights. Besides free and fair elections, according to Zakaria, to be considered as "liberal democracy" political system should be characterized by separation of powers, rule of law, protection of basic rights as free speech, freedom of association, religion and private property too. Unfortunately, Bosnia and Herzegovina doest not count on positive side of continuum it that respect.

It is worth noting that a related debate about consociational representation was triggered by the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of *Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2011* (Applications No. 27996/06 and 34836/06 of 22 December 2009.) In brief, as Hodžić and Stojanović have noted, "the judgment ... established that there is systemic constitutional discrimination of all persons not belonging to the constituent peoples on account of their inability to stand as candidates for positions in the Presidency of BiH and the House of Peoples of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly, has posed a veritable challenge not only to Bosnia's constitutional system, but also to the theory and practice of constitutional engineering in divided societies. " (Hodžić and Stojanović, 2001:15)

All in all, "the institutionalization of ethnic power-sharing on state level on the basis of territorial strongholds of nationalist forces in the Entities prevailed over the civic principle so that almost every aspect of state and society became seen through the ethnic lens. This, however, did not contribute to establish mutual trust and interethnic co-operation and foster reconciliation and the formation of a common state identity, but prevented effective state reconstruction and nation-building" (Marko, 2000).

If political settings of Bosnia and Herzegovina is unambiguous, the current relationship between religion and politics is not so specific. In recent, repeated, discussions about the role of religion in public space, Jurgen Habermas (2011) primarily focused on the need for a new understanding of the "political", indicating also the problem of the

peculiar revival of the "political theology" understood in Carl Schmitt's terms. Namely, Habermas recalls Schmitt's concept which is an existentialist version of interpretation, i.e. continuance with the common essentialist characteristics of the traditional concept of the "political". Simply put, the collective identity is no longer defined in the legal terms of a sovereign state but in the ethno-national concept of political romanticism. The common features of the ancestors, tradition, and language cannot ensure the social cohesion solely based on the assumed organic nature – therefore, the political leadership must continuously mobilize the nation against the internal and foreign enemies. In this regard, religion can be used as an additional reservoir of legitimacy of such policies.

Although there was a radical change in the twentieth century in the link between state and religious communities that does not in any case mean that there have been radical changes in the relation of religion – religious community – politics. It seems that in many parts of the world, in one way or another, there still is an influence of religions and religious communities on political life. It is especially evident for certain religions and religious cultures (Middle East, Asia, Africa, Latin America, but also some European countries). There was only a shift of the sphere of influence of religious communities on politics. Today it is more pronounced, say, in discussions about working on Sundays, same-sex marriages, abortion, homosexuality, sexual freedoms, euthanasia etc. (particularly in terms of legal regulations of the above matters). That certainly does not mean that there exists no "classical" influence of religious communities on political life. Especially when it comes to national identity!

After radical social changes, new models of relations have been designed for the states to apply to religious communities. There have beenstrays, such as the situation of today's so-called post-socialist states or „states in transition". Definitely, the characteristics of a given society most affect the relationship between the state and religious communities.

The Context of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The specificity of the social and political milieu of Bosnia and Herzegovina is particularly reflected in the ethnic and confessional population structure. What is often mentioned as general knowledge of history of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the role of religion in the process of primary (self-) determination of its dominant ethnicities. Historical subjectivity of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not achieve a singular nominality of space and nation, but traditional componency of its peoples; there never formed a single nation, but national pluralism, i.e. national triality. In the process of national differentiation of domicile population, religions and confessions in fact played a key role ("faith" is what in BiH connects externally and disconnects internally), and even today most people find religion and confession the strongholds for determining their identity, as well as individual and collective consciousness – both of themselves and of the others.

Unlike the previous social and political order of the socialist type (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia - SFRY), where we had "theisms with no public roles" (Vrcan, 2001), today we are witnesses of an established system, primarily ethno-political in its nature, with theisms of highly significant public roles. It is a separate question to what extent have the representatives of organized religions been and still are ready to respond to equally high expectations set before them.

In any case, according to the latest available population census data (1991), Bosnia and Herzegovina was populated by 43.3 % ethnic Muslims, (today called Bosniaks); 31.2 % Serbs; 17.4 % Croats plus other nationalities (Roma, Albanians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Italians, Checks, Poles, Germans, Jews, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Turks, etc.). In terms of confessional belonging, majority were Muslims (42.7 %), then Orthodox Christians (29.3 %), and Roman Catholics (13.6 %). Why is the religious/confessional self-identification so high in Bosnia and Herzegovina (95 % of the population stated in the 1991 censusthat they have religious/confessional self-identification)? Is it due to religious and confessional pluralism (Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics and others) that the populations strongly affiliates to religious self-identity and participates in religious activities? However, we find similar processes

(high degree of religious self-identification) also in the dominantly uni-confessional states (Croatia, Poland, Ireland…) where the "confessional competition" is not as strong as in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

One of the possible answers is that the religious and confessional identity is pretentiously represented as the "powerful identity", not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but in contemporary society in general. Is it all really true? For hundreds of years Bosnia and Herzegovina was home to three stable religious identities (Jewish-Christian-Islamic) and four confessional identities (Jewish, Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Islamic). Disputes are lead not about the identities, but about their place and role in the state that (legally) claims it is secular. Of course, there exists no state in which all of its citizens have a common belief, a shared worldview, but the neutrality of the state with regard to the question of a worldview is essential. But how can it be achieved? A democratic state is the one in which citizens are equal; a state neutral towards religion; where freedoms exist for all religious communities; and where tolerance and separation of religion and politics are the path to guarantee and equality of citizens.

The politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina bases its links to religion upon historical symbiosis of ethnicity and confessions in this region. Namely, even today, most people in Bosnia and Herzegovina fail in making the key distinction between the ethnic/national and confessional identity, enabling thus political decision-makers to apply the feudal imperialistic conception matrix, written about by Olivier Abel (2005), according to which each community and each territory has its religion and every individual belongs to the community first and only then to the political space.

Additional confusion is created by the determination of the political space in the context of politics and religion. Nominally and legally, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is secular, but the basic principles of such an order are often completely misinterpreted and as such articulated in the public space. Unlike the social and political set up of the relation between the state and religious communities in the socialist period, where the first period was marked by ideologically forceful and compulsory imposition of atheisation upon society, and the one after that by dominantly political and state protected rigid secularism, present time abounds in examples of clericalism and privileged positions of organized religion of dominant religious communities in the public space.

Both in the previous and current period the concept of the secular is interpreted quite particularly and, to say the least, wrongly. This, of course, is not the case only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is therefore noteworthy to quote Charles Taylor who, in his fascinating book *The Secular Age* (2007), warns us that we think that secularism (or *laïcité*) has something to do with the relationship between state and religion, which is true in part, but in fact it is about a democratic state having the right response to diversity. Indeed, Talal Asad (2003) even claims that the secular is not in opposition to religion; the secular is an epistemological category. A completely different issue is secularism which is certainly a political doctrine. Part of the problem, in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well, is that the secular is wrongly understood as something in the continuum with the religious (or the last phase of something sacral), i.e. something opposing the sacral and negating it, which of course is not the case. Therefore, those who indicate that secularization today should be a way of life with the postmodern revival of religion in the public space, in the most democratic manner, are right.

However, it is noteworthy that Taylor and other others in their deliberations assume a very important prior element – democracy itself. In this regard, speaking about secularization obviously assumes a social framework of the consolidated and stable democracy that Bosnia and Herzegovina most certainly is not. The installment of consociation arrangements by the Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Peace Accords) resulted in an active political system dominated by the negative consensus of ethno-political elites in power, supremacy of the collective over individual rights, including violation of human rights as part of the system.

Finally, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is not about the personal relationship with the Supernatural, it is about political community —"End of religiousness for oneself, rise of religion for the other. Religion thus becomes a matter of state" (Onfre, 2005:255).

What we have witnessed over the last twenty years or so is that religion also became a solid political fact in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the position of organized religion in the public sphere significantly changed. Putting Bosnia and Herzegovina to the side, the turn of the centuries was marked by the globally strong processes of religious revivalism, or the reawakening of the religious where it seemed not to be the case in a given period in the so-called West.

What are then the relevant sociological characteristics of Bosnia and Herzegovina society in terms of relations with religious communities and the emerging circumstances?

First: The role of religious communities in the "collapse" of the previous system for which they received credibility of the governing structures. In addition, the ruling politics needed them to justify their own credibility. Therefore, in the beginning of the 90's, three "leading" religious communities (Catholic Church, Serbian Orthodox Church, and Islamic Community) and three ruling political (national) parties (Croatian Democratic Union - HDZ, Serbian Democratic Party - SDS, and Party of Democratic Action - SDA) found a common interest. Before the first multi-party elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1990), the three religious communities, treating religion as an important source of political legitimacy, and acting as national, politically legitimizing instances of the first order, supplied the respective national/nationalistic political strategies with additional legitimacy (Vrcan, 2001). It is difficult to avoid the impression that it will be possible to shape the relations of the state and religious communities even without taking into account the roles that the three religious communities respectively played in the recent war. One may not forget the fact that the three religious communities in the post-socialist period did not build their identities individually, but in close cooperation with the three leading national parties (i.e. state administrative authorities in three areas controlled by three party armies).

Second: Multi-confessionality. The relationship and the historical experience of these religious communities towards the state differ. They varied and vary from those that would like to seize control over the state power (or to have everything in the state according to their views) to those on the opposite pole not wishing to have anything to do with the state, negating also its symbols (flag, coat of arms, oath...). Between the extremes we can find the "in between" viewpoints about the relation of religious communities and state. One should not forget wartime and postwar influx of new religious missions and organization from Islamic and other countries on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the arrival of missionaries with various roles from the West and the East. All of the above should be taken into account when searching for a model in which the state will determine its relations towards religious communities.

Third: Pluralism of political parties. Some of the political parties drafted their programs close to the principles of the religious community their supporters belong to. By taking sides with such political parties (with due respect to some recent minor departures), the religious community (-ies) abandoned the rule that its members can belong to different political movements and parties, and have the same faith (which is the basis for their uniting in the community). Politics (and political parties) always strived to achieve legitimacy. Often it proved to be (and seems to apply to today as well) that legitimacy is given through support of the confession. Even Max Weber pointed to the typology of relations between "politics and church" emphasizing the close linkage of governing political and religious institutions in the society. Weber excluded the possibility of a ruling party selecting a model of relations that would lead to confrontation. For the functioning of the state this would prove to be a failure. Therefore, most common solutions are compromises acceptable to both the ruling politics and the religious community. Weber's analysis of the ideal types leaves out a type of separation of religious communities and the state, the type we shall later come back to.

Fourth: Religisation of politics and politicization of religion, visible from the actions of religious leaders in war and postwar periods. This process was supported by sacralization of nation and nationalization of religious community. Thus, nation(s) emerge(s) as one of the factors influencing the relations of the state and religious community (-ies) in this region. There is no doubt that dominant religious communities in the Balkans encourage – as is visible in the behavior of their leadership – the formation of nation states. This is linked to the so-called "awakening of nations", strengthening national consciousness, adjusting the manner of organizing religious community to the manner of organizing state structure (following the recognition of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bishops' Conference of BiH was established, Re-establishing Assembly of the Islamic Community of BiH was held…). The awareness of the deeper rootedness of (the three) religious communities in (the three) nations was built, as well as awareness that national culture, and particularly national politics cannot survive without it. That is why it is necessary to equate nation and religious community, as well as national belonging and confessional belonging.

Fifth: The existing status in the state built by the three religious communities in the areas controlled during the war by three armies. Each of them almost built a status of state confession in those areas, and the remaining two areas ended in position of "minority" (if at all). Therefore, in some areas Eid and Christmas tacitly became state holidays (non-working days, some places in BiH even longer school breaks).

Sixth: The return, revitalization of religion in post-socialist societies. Sociologists argue whether the return to religion, that also affected Bosnia and Herzegovina, was the result of an increased number of believers or a freer and desirable expression of religious feelings. Data that sporadically appear show that it is both. True, they are more inclined to support the thesis of a freer sociological expression of religious feelings. It seems to us also of a social desirability of the religious. If we can say that atheism was desired in the previous system, and theism undesired, is not the same absurdity applicable today: undesired atheism and socially desired theism. In addition, the return to religion happened through "neo-politicization" of religion and "neo-clericalization" of politics (Metz, 2004.). In fact, the last decade of the twentieth century did not see the rise of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but its defeat: wading, slurring, and underrating the religious differences of the other. How else can we mark this but as defeat of true religion and genuine devoutness? Many of those with areligious worldview, or non-church religiousness, observed the Church/religious community from the "outside". After 1990, they came close to it and got to know it from the "inside". The question is whether this Church/religious community they have come to know, conservative and somewhat greedy for privileges (re-appropriation of nationalized property, religious education in school, and support to respective national parties...) will be liked by many? Will there occur even greater disappointment and distancing from the religious communities?

Religion and Political Elections

In a state with more than one religious and confessional identities, that are (or have been) in conflicts, disputes on religious symbols are not in shortage. Religious symbols represent symbols used to express a common belonging. One could say that generally two symbols stand out: religious and national symbols. People treat these symbols in a specific way. The religious symbol serves as more than an expression of religious identity, it also acquires characteristics of cultural identity. Therefore there will be a higher-degree unison in the defense of Christian or Islamic symbol than the number of practicing believers among them. The moment they became symbols of certain identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they became the means to protect national identity and thus also the motive for disputes and conflicts. In short, in this region, similar to the Polish example as presented by Genevieve Zubrzycki (2006), religious symbols were first profaned and then resacralized, but as national symbols of the first instance. Religious symbols are also part of the elections decorum.

The overall situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina could have been affected by the lack of security (once the Yugoslav identity started falling apart); increased unemployment; crisis of morality; confession shifted from the "private-legal" to the "public" status in the society; religion had been deprivatized; political and other elites started declaring publicly they are believers, they rushed to the houses of worship. Devoutness became a comprising part of grace, new "1990 type" of devoutness emerged (fall of socialism and first multi-party elections). It also encouraged "everyday" citizens to publicly declare their religiousness. Confessions turned to the struggle for national rights; problems of devoutness and religion were increasingly present in the media. Are those correct when claims that only the attitude towards confession changed, and not the content of religiousness (it remains "folklore religiousness")?

Why is it essential to have in mind national and confessional affiliation of the population when political elections are subject to sociological analysis? Primarily, due to the role that confession in Bosnia and Herzegovina played in the emergence and development of the national consciousness. As long as there are nationally marked political parties, we should count on religious and confessional factor when elections happen. It is another

thing that in the circumstances as the ones in Bosnia and Herzegovina, national or confessional bases of social life can hardly be effective. Post-socialist return to religion and nation happened in mutual support: hence the strong religious/confessional nationalisms. The return to nation was not the return to it as a secular formation. The return to nation went through "religious roots" (A. Smith, 1998). It lead to the mutual linkage of religions/confessions and nationalisms. In the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina many things can mark identity – even food and drinks.

Organized religion may affect the elections policy through the use of religious symbols (cross, rosary, masbaha/tespih...), photographs of religious community leaders, fragments from the "Holy scripts" and similar elements found in election posters and messages. There are also the pre-election campaignspeeches by religious leaders in which they suggest to believers, most often indirectly, to vote for a specific party. We globally find such examples of using religion and religious communities in party confrontations, or using them as tools of political mobilization, particularly before the elections. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the support is given to "one's own" candidates. Candidates also count on the votes of their communities. To some, especially at the local level, closeness to religious community brings elections points. Candidates for the parliament can also look for support in the religious groups. Many of them only remember their religion in times of elections. In religiously plural societies, such as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which three religious identities dominate (Muslim, Orthodox Christians, Catholics) linked to the three national identities (Bosniak, Serbian, Croatian), there is a clear tendency for more support to be given to religious and national political parties, than those classified as "secular". This is how it came to use of religion and religious communities by supporters of national parties. Generally, research shows, in this region voter of national parties and parties of the rightist political spectrum are the most religious (Vrcan, 2001).

The three confessions (Islamic, Christian Orthodox, and Catholic) are the most influential institutions in the society. This is common knowledge to the leaders of national parties and political elites and they are therefore careful not to provoke any hard feelings among the leaders of those confessions, ingratiating themselves with them in all possible ways. Religious elites have their favorites among the political parties (of course, always "our" national party). Both the state and the political parties have

their "religious policies" (all formally advocate religious freedoms but in practice there are huge differences in the application of this principle). Are the analysts right when they say that, in times of socialism, confessions were an "open force", while today they represent conservative political force?

"In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have three traditional religions dominated by non-democratic tradition, i.e. tradition of monarchist, despotic, feudal societies. And now problems arise with these communities in the democratic environment. Religions have the tasks of advocating democracy, but cannot witness it and thus defend themselves saying that they are such by the divine order, and that is not true", says Bosnian Franciscan Ivo Marković (2006:29).

The problem is that political pluralism was introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina as national/confessional pluralism. Its essence was constituted by three national parties (SDA, SDS, HDZ), each with strong support of "it's own" confession (SDA – Islamic Community; SDS – Serbian Orthodox Church; HDZ – Roman Catholic Church). And until desacralization and secularization of the nation is done, until we return to the principle of secularity in society, traditional religious bases producing election votes will not weaken.

Religion – Religious Community – Politics!

Has the monopoly of religious truth in politics come to an end, at least in Western European societies? Can religious communities in the Balkans, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina for that matter, get used to such a fact that would distance them from politics and "bring them back" into the "religious sphere"? Political and spiritual influence of religious communities is correlated. Whenever the political influence of religious communities increases, their spiritual influence decreases. And *vice versa*! In the politically "illiterate" societies, in those not having a developed political culture of citizenship, there is a higher possibility for the religious community to influence politics. Religious communities have always inclined towards certain political tendencies. They had not been, apart for exemptions, politically neutral. This "mutual instrumentalization

of religion and politics did not and does not produce anything but the wasteland for freedoms and equality" (Pena-Ruiz, 2004:193). Religious communities have very often identified with an obsolete politics, which made them little sensitive to the sufferings of citizens. What is important for contemporary times is that religious communities may not "fight with the means of political power" (Metz, 2004:23).

There are also those that introduce religious principles into the "political sphere" and those that introduce the principles of the political into the "religious space". In this model, the religious interest becomes secondary and the political interest is predominant. Religious communities (either Christian or Islamic) historically failed to repel (and discard) the challenge of manipulation of religion and religious communities for the political purpose. Today we also have "political believers", yesterday's communists that have put on new clothes, changed the symbols (instead of red five-pointed star now they have a cross or the crescent) but they have not changed. They were ideological in thoughts and still are, and therefore we call them "political believers". They need religion and religious community not because of faith but because of their political promotion.

In post-socialist countries in which legal regulation of relations with religious communities took place, it greatly expressed the requests and interests of the religious leadership rather than the interests of the state. This was evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the discussions about introducing religious education in public schools (private schools are a different topic, even those organized by religious communities). This, and the state of affairs in practice, proved that the state does not have clear goals in the policy towards religion(s) and religious community (-ies). If it is the goal of the state to build a multi-confessional society then it should be in its interest to develop the consciousness for such a society with the students of public schools. But multi-confessionality means "understanding" the other. Should not a student then learn as much as possible about the religious culture, customs, holidays of the "other", for the sake of his/her relationship and (co)existence with this "other", and learn about religion somewhere else. But it seems that the state cares to satisfy the interests of the religious community and to teach religion and not religions in the school (with a range of other possibilities). As if the state has the goal to strengthen the confessional identification of the population and not create conditions for an authentic multi-confessionality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Was it not

possible, instead of religious education, to introduce a subject that would develop the feelings of pluralism, interculturality, respect for worldviews other and different than "mine" (a subject that could have been called "What I need to know about religions", "History of religions" or similar). The question is: which of the two solutions would be more adequate to the development of tolerance and democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina? It is expected that the religious education in schools in multi-confessional environments will prove to be a bad choice for the religious community, particularly in an area where it is "minority", and even worse for the state.

What are the known sociological models of relations between the state and religious communities? However the state regulates relations with religious communities, it must care not to jeopardize anyone's religious freedom - because freedom of religion is one of the basic human rights and freedoms. Every person should be free not only to manifest the religion he/she wants, but also to spread it and change it, naturally without coercion of any sort. It is unacceptable, as is the practice in some post-socialist states, to limit the freedom to manifest and spread religion by the number of its followers (if there are fewer followers than the state prescribed – all activities shall be prohibited!). If there exists a single follower of a religion, he/she must have the freedom of action. Otherwise the state cannot claim to guarantee the freedom of religion. All religions and religious communities must be equal before the law but also in practice. Any legal or actual differences between citizens conditioned by their religious beliefs are unacceptable.

Religious tolerance and citizens' equality have become the "sanctity" of the modern world. Supporter of any confession, especially when in position of the "minority", needs more than tolerance. He/she expects to be accepted, respected, and acknowledged regardless the fact that he/she belongs to "minority" community. Do we need to repeat that in the postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina, members of all confessions in at least two (out of three) of its demographic parts found themselves in the status of "minority"!? Social cohesion and reintegration of the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina will greatly depend upon the behavior and attitude towards "minority". It is difficult to foresee the future development of therelationship: state - religious community. Probably, both the state and religious communities will have to adjust to the changes of the twenty first century that we mark as the path to the "new", "open", "civil" society.

On the global stage, ultra-modern does not mean less religious, as

Jean-Paul Willaime claims, but differently religious as ultra-modernity appears as secularized modernity where secularization applies to the secularizing forces themselves. Daniele Harvieu-Leger (2003), considering secularization as a specific European characteristic, pointed out that for a long time there was a (wrongful) belief that decrease of religious practice means parallel decrease of representation of religious belief (caused primarily by the technical rationalism and affirmation of the autonomy of individuals). According to Harvieu-Leger, deregulation of institutional religion in European countries (individualization of faith that results in the personal credo and individualization of religious practice without significant influence of religious community structures) did not mean that religious traditions have simultaneously lost their cultural relevance in the European society.

In fact, the conventional religious traditions started serving as a special repository of meaning available to individuals to use them subjectively and diversely. However, in modern Europe, religious identity has rapidly become a matter of personal choice, most vividly portrayed by the phrase „believing without belonging" (Davie, 2005), which is not surprising as the Europe we see today had been forged in the fires of religious wars. The contemporary (liberal) democratic societies show that it is not about opposition or anti-religious secularization anymore, but about secularization as political commitment that emerges as the reality of life in a multi-religious world. The lucky paradox of secularization, according to ŽeljkoMardešić (2007), lies in the fact that it weakens the political nature of religion, opening at the same time free space for strengthening the religiousness of religion whether outside or within the religious institutions themselves.

Finally, aware of the importance of this issue for contemporary processes, the institutions of the European Union (more precisely its then president Romano Prodi) initiated in the beginning of 2002 the establishment of an expert group (*Reflection Group on the Spiritual and Cultural Dimensions of Europe*)to deliberate topics related to the spiritual and cultural dimension of Europe through a range of seminars, conferences, and thematic discussions. The group focused especially on the questions of how can spiritual, religious, and cultural values is important factors in the function of future unity of Europe. A number of important finding have been stated in the 2004 Final Report of the Group, but particularly significant here is

to emphasize that the „European cultural space cannot be defined in the opposition to national cultures... European culture cannot be defined in opposition to a particular religion (such as Islam)..."Considering thus as an exceptionally important issue of the public role of religion, regardless that it seems that modernization and secularization are inseparable processes in Europe, the conclusion is that public life is unimaginable without religion. But this objective importance that religious beliefs have in maintenance of communities should be supported and developed in a way to serve as a positive factor of cohesion in the new Europe. However, the risks of such a „policy" may not be neglected, as the space might open for an „invasion" of the public sphere by religious institutions, as well as religion being abused to justify ethnic conflicts.

The emergence of religion in the public sphere is thus also defined as *deprivatization* and this process is considered key for the period from the eighties until today. Jose Casanova lists four global events as illustrations supporting the deprivatization thesis: Islamic Revolution in Iran, „Solidarity" movement in Poland, role of Catholicism in the Sandinista Revolution, and in other political conflicts in Latin America, and strengthening of the Protestant fundamentalism as a political force in the USA. In short, according to Casanova (and we find similar claims among some other authors such as Peter L. Berger or Peter Haynes) deprivatization is reflected in the fact that "...religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of secularization had reserved for them. Social movements have appeared which either are religious in nature or are challenging in the name of religion the legitimacy and autonomy of the primary secular spheres, the state and market economy... Religions throughout the world are entering the public sphere and the arena of political contestation not only to defend their traditional turf, as they have done in the past, but also to participate it the very struggles to define and set the modern boundaries between the private and public spheres, between system and life-world, between legality and morality, between individual and society, between family, civil society, and state, between nations, states, civilizations, and the world system." (Casanova, 1994:5-6)

Steve Bruce (1996), who is, along with Brian Wilson and Karel Dobbelaere, one of the last „guardians of the secularization thesis", also distinguishes situations in which modernity does not undermine religion; when he assigns important social roles to religion – these are situations of cultural defense and cultural transition. According to him, cultural defense emerges when two or more communities are in conflict, and their supporters have different religious traditions (Protestants and Catholics in Ireland; Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks in former Yugoslavia). That is when religious identity can attain social importance and serve as an invitation to ethnic unity and pride. A similar situation happens when one community is dominated by another (of different religion or „without" religion) and the religious institution takes the role of defender of culture and identity of the people under domination. While in situations of cultural transition, religious institutions have the role of helping people deal with the changes they face.

Be that as it may, contemporary scientific discourse on religion in the modern world inclines towards the thesis that religion will most probably continue to play an important role in the construction of the world's future. Therefore, ŽeljkoMardešić is right: „What to say in the end... Not much. However, one should hope that times to come will not keep bringing the choice between two extremes: to accept the sacred driven mad by fear of the profane or consent to the indifferent profane that has forgotten about the sacred. Certainly, this gives no choice at all; it gives us great misfortune and new slavery for humankind. That is why pluralism of worldviews and dialogue of religions become the last hope of belief in a better tomorrow." (Mardešić, 2007:38)

Finally, the shift from religion by inheritance to religion by choice prevents the revival of "political theology" within Schmitt's frame of friend-enemy distinction, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere. And, of course, whoever neglects the influence of religion on politics (and *vice versa* in Bosnia and Herzegovina) is wrong.

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Religious Nationalism in the Western Balkans

" At the end of twentieth century, people spoke as if the Balkans had existed forever. However, two hundred years earlier, they had not yet come into being. It was not the Balkans but 'Rumeli' that the Ottomans ruled, the formerly 'Roman' lands that they had conquered from Constantinople. The Sultan's educated Christian Orthodox subjects referred to themselves as 'Romans' ('Romaioi'), or more simply as 'Christians.' To Westerners, familiar with classical regional terms such as Macedonia, Epirus, Dacia and Moesia, the term 'Balkan' conveyed little. 'My expectations were raised,' wrote one traveller in 1854, 'by hearing that we are about to cross *Balkan*; but I discovered ere long that this high-sounding title denotes only a ridge which divides the waters, or a mountain pass, without its being a necessary consequence that it offers grand or romantic scenery.'" (2007, *xxv*)

The above cited passage from Mark Mazower's *Short history of the Balkans* is an illustrative example of the initial argument that the very definition of the "Balkans" implies a great deal of things but should by no means be understood as clear and self-evident; neither could what would be designated as its "Western" part be understood as clear. However, this is not a unique uncertainty in history – the situation has been even more complex in other cases, for example, during the period when "Turkey in Europe" (yet another commonly and frequently used syntagma for that designated part of European territory) needed to be renamed due to political reasons – in particular after the end of the war known as the "First Balkan War" (1912-1913).

As a matter of fact, the end of the First Balkan war was *de facto* the end of the Ottoman rule in Europe, so since then the space between the Adriatic and the Black Sea has been termed "the Balkans", or "Balkan Peninsula", and started to be in official use in political and diplomatic circles of the European capitals, alongside scholarly works, journals and newspapers.

"The Balkans" firstly included Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. Not much later, the *terminus technicus* included Albania as well, and then all variants of Yugoslavia – finally, after the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, it included Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, and sometimes Slovenia too.

In the new millennium one can observe a new turn-out, again either due to geopolitical reasons or reasons of "political correctness", so in the official diplomatic and political communication linked to present-day European Union, there is almost no "the Balkans" [1], but South-Eastern Europe instead.

Be that as it may, as Amila Buturovic argues,

> … from the very start 'the Balkans' was more than a geographical concept. The term, unlike its predecessors, was loaded with negative connotations – of violence, savagery, primitivism – to an extent for which it is hard to find a parallel. 'Why savage Europe?' asked the journalist Harry de Windt in his 1907 book. 'Because … the term accurately describes the wild and lawless countries between the Adriatic and Black Seas'." (Buturovic 2006, 351)

I cannot go into a more detailed explication of the semantics and contextuality in terms of terminology, especially not in terms of geography and geopolitics, but I think it is necessary to give insight into the problem, namely because Maria Todorova's (1997) most powerful point concerning the Wars of Yugoslav Succession (the late Twentieth Century) is one about terminology as well:

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1 *The Imagining the Balkans* (1997) is a well-known work of Maria Todorova concerning the history of the Balkans that deals with the region's inconsistent (but usually negative) image inside Western culture, in which she develops a theory of *Balkanism.* Brief outline of a major Todorova argument is as follows – "The central idea … is that there is a discourse, which I term *Balkanism*, that creates a stereotype of the Balkans, and politics is significantly and organically intertwined with this discourse. When confronted with this idea, people may feel somewhat uneasy, especially on the political scene ..." (Todorova 1999).

> 🙶 "These wars brought back *Balkanism* with a vengeance. Even though it was only the Yugoslavs who were involved in the war, journalists called them Balkan wars and restored the term 'Balkanization' to its unfortunate preeminence. But Todorova persuasively argues that these wars, rather than invoking processes that are unique to the Balkans – 'these people have been fighting each other for hundreds of years' – constitute instead the ultimate Europeanization of the peninsula. Homogenization has been a basic theme of European history, not just in post-French Revolutionary times, but from the crusades, the *reconquista*, the expulsion of Jews from England, and so forth." (Stokes 1997)

That I have discussed the terminological problem of the later part of this chapter title, does by no means imply that the former – religious nationalism – were unambiguous or less complex. Accordingly, the explication that follows will focus precisely on the phenomenon of "religious nationalism", that is, contextualization through the discussion of the situation in the societies and the states in the Western Balkans, or Balkan Peninsula, or South-Eastern Europe …

All these societies, regardless of their state structure and character of government, in the relatively recent past, have been marked with a religious pluralism, sometimes in greater ratio (e.g. Kingdom of SHS, First and Second Yugoslavia, Albania) or to a lesser extent (e.g. Turkey and Greece).[2]

Religious pluralism is prior to all a consequence of the general *modus operandi* of the Ottomans that ruled over the conquered territories, and it has been all about the division of the population according to the *millet* system. The *Millet* system separated populations based on the subjects' religious affiliation. No other characteristics has been used, be that ethnic, linguistic or any other specifics, but the religion. However, although in the first period of Ottoman rule the religious affiliation of the population was almost completely in the line with its (sometime earlier, and sometime later, differentiated) ethno-national composition, this was not necessarily reflected in the difference of social status – e.g. both the military and the

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2 Certainly, after the dissolution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the former territory of a religiously heterogeneous population was split into the territories of the successor states, so today situation is that states are either homogeneous (Slovenia, Montenegro, Croatia, Kosovo) or heterogeneous (Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Serbia).

feudal elite in the first period of governance were equally Christians and Muslims, as it was the case with their subordinates, that were, *rayah* (tax-paying lower class) (Bugarel 2004).

Only in the later period of the Ottomans' rule, and certainly when it comes to large landowners, the majority of these landowners were Muslims, while the lower class were Christians (both Orthodox and Catholic). But it is more important to point out here that the *millet* system was not related to the territorialisation of the population, but to the economic and social structure (and above all to the collection of taxes). In political terms, religious identity has become an important element during the second part of the Ottoman rule period, when a national idea is strongly articulated among the population, above all among the Slavs (Malcolm 1994, Ramet 1996, Allcock 2000, Mazower 2003, Bugarel 2004). National awakening ultimately aimed at liberation from the Ottoman rules and at exercising rights to have independent states.

However, even in the immediate aftermath of the liberation from the Ottomans, and especially when the Treaty of Berlin allowed the Austria-Hungary Empire to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was a specific shift in political relations based on religious identities, but with a clear and consistent respect for the legacy of the previous period. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, already after the Annexation in 1910, Austria-Hungary adopted the country's first Constitution (modelled according to Moravia Agreement), which introduced into the province's political life a system of proportional representation of the "three main denominations" (31 seats in parliament were reserved for Orthodox MPs, 24 for Muslim MPs and 16 for Catholic MPs). It is extremely important to note here that religious identities are now used not only for the purpose of recognizing religious rights and freedoms, but also as a criterion for securing collective rights as such (ethnic/national prior to all). Other minority groups (except Jews[3]) are not granted collective rights unless they are based on religion[4]!

Be that as it may, in the abundant noteworthy literature that investigates the specificities of the historical periods through which the region has

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3   The Jews also had two seats reserved in Parliament. It is interesting to note that seats in Parliament – as "persons of rank – *virilists*" – were granted to Grand Mufti of Bosnia, Sarajevo and Mostar Muftis, four bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Archbishop of the Archbishopric of the Roman Catholic Church and two Roman Catholic Diocesan bishops, two Provincials of Franciscan Order in BiH, and Sephardic Rabbi from Sarajevo.

4   E.g. linguistic minorities like Ukrainian or Roma people.

evolved, the religious affiliation of the population appears as a constant in the analysis, regardless of the author's scholarly approach or the disciplinary orientation and foundation of the text. This scholarly attention for religion is not unusual, given the place and role that the religious consciousnesses and identity, and subsequently the religious institutions, played in the process of national differentiation of the indigenous peoples. However, exponents of political power in different periods have also inherently insisted upon religions' societal role in forming national identites, and through various mechanisms of institutionalization contributed to the preservation of this continuum.[5]

Ultimately, this use of religious identities in the formation of ethno-national identities was a result of political implications of the development of ethno-religious identities, which begun as early as the pre-Ottoman and Ottoman rule, but this time with exceptions between the Christian and Muslim populations, respectively, in accordance with the specifics of understanding the relationship between religions-nations.

Indeed, when it comes to the relationship between religions and nation, some religions are, by the criterion of ethnicity, entirely ethnic/national religions. To put it simply, their God(s) is/are only the God(s) of that people/nation. Even though this is much disputed for good reasons, Jewish religion has often been understood as an ethnic religion.. Ethnic religions are an expression of the collective folk spirit too, in which case the religious and national communities are congruent. Religion and nation are identical, and no distinction is made between belonging to a religious community and belonging to a national community (of course, not all Jews are practicing believers). The long history of the Jewish people is vivid

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5   Furthermore, one should not overlook the fact that during this period of "national awakening" religious institutions were often perceived as landowners and/or collaborators by oppressive and exploitative elites, so that ecclesial hierarchies were also extremely unpopular among peasants and poorer sections of the urban population. Also, religious leadership had little in common with the modern urban middle class, whose nationalism was often inspired by influences from the West, especially European secular nationalism. The difference between popular religious sentiment and attachment to religious traditions (especially among the rural population) and the extent to which religious leadership was understood in the role of "leadership" with respect to the nation and the national issue are noticeable (Allcock 2000). Political parties also included anti-clerical sentiment (e.g. socialists led by Svetozar Markovic, membership of the Radical Union – Radical Party in Serbia, circles gathered around the Croatian Peasant Party, or the Macedonian VMRO Party), as well as open clashes between the clergy and the government (as in the case of the Serbian Orthodox Church); the Church and the Government of Serbia about the signing of the concordat with the Vatican.

testimony to how religion plays a significant role in one peculiar history – in its beginnings, it was a specific history of awakening among tribes of belonging to one community. Still, the designation of the Jewish people as the "chosen people"[6] is illustrative. However, the great paradox of Jewish history is that a people who provided the model of a nation-state to the modern world, lived without it for almost two millennia.

Unlike ethnic religions, Christianity is a universal religion because it transcends the boundaries of tribes and peoples and gathers adherents regardless of their racial, national and social affiliation. With its branches – Catholic (Western Christianity), Orthodoxy (Eastern Christianity) and Protestantism, it is the world's largest religion when it comes to numbers of followers. It is a less "common knowledge" that Christians often see themselves as "chosen" as well, and the term "chosen people" is also mentioned in the New Testament.[7] But even the self-concept of being a "chosen people" the idea of border transcending unity in faith does not eliminate, for example, the specificity and diversity of approaches towards the modern political concept of nation. It can be argued that the Catholic model fosters universality, but not universality that will deny peoples' national identity; Orthodoxy fosters a model of "ethnic" Christianity, which is closely linked to one nation (in that model, the interests of the

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6   Even though the narrative of "chosen people" is far too 'famous' and highlighted, a number of authors points out the fact that in the Hebrew Bible there are very few places explicitly speaking about "chosenness". The most quoted passages in this regard are from Deuteronomy and Book of Amos – "The Lord did not set his affection on you and choose you because you were more numerous than other peoples, for you were the fewest of all peoples" (Deut. 7:7); "for you are a people holy to the Lord your God. Out of all the peoples on the face of the earth, the Lord has chosen you to be his treasured possession." (Deut. 14:2); "You only have I chosen of all the families of the earth; therefore I will punish you for all your sins" (Amos 3:2). The concept of "chosenness" was not only characteristic of the Jewish tribes, this tradition was also present in some other peoples, but it was first brought into the context of monotheism and salvation with Judaism.

7   "But you are a chosen people, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God's special possession, that you may declare the praises of him who called you out of darkness into his wonderful light. Once you were not a people, but now you are the people of God; once you had not received mercy, but now you have received mercy." (1 Peter 2:9-10) Yet, in Christianity, every nation has considered to be a potentially chosen (Rom. 3: 29-30), and Christian universality does not abolish the specificity of any nation. Nevertheless, Christian universalism is most visible in the New Testament, the Book of Galatians: "So in Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith, for all of you who were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus." (Gal. 3:26-28)

Church and the nation are often very similar); and the Protestant models are more inclined towards universality, but historically often negatively related to national symbols.

Islam is also a universal religion, a supranational religion, and the ideal and desired form of community is the *ummah*. Given that the Qur'anic verses in which the word *ummah* is found are so diverse, many authors believe that its meaning cannot be easily demarcated. However, most agree that it is certain that there are everywhere national, linguistic or national communities who are subject to the divine plan of salvation.[8] By the teachings of Islam, until the early twentieth century, the tendency in Muslim communities has been more anti-national since Islam does not prefer the nation, but it only tolerates it.

Overall, in universal religions, a religious group always represents a broader group than a national one. Thus, a member of the religious group "we" can be a member of the group "they" from the nation's point of view.

But one should not neglect, that in certain societies religious communities are structured in a way that their universal vision is extremely narrowed due to specific socio-political circumstances, and even universal religions sometimes trun into ethnic/national religions.

For the Western Balkans,

> never it was possible to determine precisely how faith is a matter of one's experience and spiritual need for a relationship with the sacred, with God, with transcendence, and from where – the object and means of collectivistic identification, always in the most active and intimate relationship with politics and ideology, subject to manipulation and instrumentalization, occasionally with the most dire consequences" (Lovrenović 2002, 330)

Indeed, religious communities (and religion) were the most important sources of resistance to the former socialist regimes and had an impact on almost all social structures (institutional and cognitive), so that there was

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8 In Qur'an – "O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted." (Al-Hujurat, 13)

no other power[9] of approximate size and effect to that. At the same time religious communities were also a source of preservation and transmission of national cultures and their immanent values.

But on the global scene, as Mark Juergensmeyer argues,

> [t]he fading of the nation-state and the disillusionment with old forms of secular nationalism have produced both the opportunity for new nationalisms and the need for them. The opportunity has arisen because the old orders seem so weak; and the need for national identity persists because no single alternative form of social cohesion and affiliation has yet appeared to dominate public life the way the nation-state did in the twentieth century. … In the increasing absence of any other demarcation of national loyalty and commitment, these old staples – religion, ethnicity and traditional culture – have become resources for national identification." (Juergensmeyer 2004, 5)

Thus, the political revitalization of religion, not only in post-socialist countries but also in the West, has been the very topic in scholarly work now for some time, especially after September 11, 2001 and the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.

In addition, the presence of religious nationalism results in the insistence on a symbiosis of the political and the religious, on nationalizing the religion that precedes the sacralization of politics, a reminiscence of the pre-political era, when religious establishment invoked the right to govern the state because religion was an essential (or sole) element for its establishment.

Religious nationalism is a form of modernist paradigm and is most commonly used as a substitute for (post-) civic or (post-) ethnic nationalism. It seeks to take the place and role of any secular nationalism because the despair and disappointment caused by such nationalism (secular) is too great and unbearable for the bearers and supporters of religious nationalism.

The key elements for its constitution are the politicization of religion and the sacralization of politics; the supremacy of the collective over the

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9   In this sense, eventual political opposition, small and closed intellectual circles within the humanities and social sciences, or political dissidents, did not have nearly as strong significance and influence as religious communities.

individual and aggressive distinction in relation to others; totalitarianism and extremism; an alternative vision of the social order; radical change in the place and role of members in society.

The new paradigm offered by religious nationalism calls for "more", "purer", "inclusive" and "timeless" forms of collective grounding, legitimation and commitment, but in a concrete social context.

According to Friedland (2001) religious nationalism is a special form of collective representation and a new ontology of power. Making religion the exclusive basic of national collective identity is a form of politicized religion and religious politics (whereby politics is considered a religious obligation), with the aim of re-arranging social relations on pseudo-religious grounds and functions.

> Religious nationalism grows out of modernity's institutional heterologies. Religious nationalism extends the institutional logic of religion into the domain of the democratic nation-state, deriving authority from an absolute divine writ, not the subjective aggregations of the demos; pushing toward redemption, not progress; locating agency in a disciplined self-bound to God, not a sacralized, self-interested monad; constituting society not through the abstract, disembodied individual of the market but through the erotic and gendered flesh of the family. Religious nationalism posits an institutionally specific substance of the social, neither the procedures of reason nor the play of self-interest, but rather the communal solidarities of faith"(Friedland 2001, 142).

In a certain way religious nationalists act as fundamentalist movements that offer a religious revelation based, universal, absolute, comprehensive recipe for the radical transformation of social, cultural, economic and political relations between structures and institutions. However, the qualitative distinction is that fundamentalist movements are universal in their doctrine, that is, they are oriented towards each individual member of a religion, regardless of his place of residence, ethnic origin, citizenship or the language he or she speaks. Religious nationalists, however, are particular, that is, their doctrine concerns a very specific community, and applies only to those who have, , other common characteristics of identity in addition to religious affiliations – and above all, the same ethnic origin.

It can be said that religious nationalism is in fact one of the most current responses to modern secular individualism in the contemporary nation-state.

Religious nationalists are aware of the significance of a process, which could be named globalization in the broadest sense, a process that redefines not only individual but also collective identities Out of this awareness, religious nationalists mobilize their engergy and their adherents in defense of these collective identities. Through their elaboration of the situation they seek to challenge the sustainability of the positive impression that secular society and the modern nation-state can secure a moral bond that unites the community, or that they have an ideological force that will sustain a state fraught with ethnic, economic and military failures (Juergensmeyer 2003).

As the failure of the nation-state to resist the onslaught of globalization is increasingly apparent, the rhetoric of religious nationalists is becoming more acceptable to the masses. The growing uncertainty about determining what constitutes a valid basis for national identity is also in favour of religious nationalists who offer their answers ready for digesting.

In the Western Balkans, "the seeds of Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian religiosity were not stamped out under communist rule, even among so-called secularized masses; but neither were they nurtured. Scattered and left untended, they were eventually planted in the crude soil of ethnonationalism." (Appleby 2002, 71) As I have argued elsewhere (Abazović 2015), during the war 1991-1995, politicized and ethnicized religion became a powerful tool for mobilization against 'ethnic enemies', particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although many scholars who have worked on the armed conflict in Yugoslavia do not consider it a religious conflict, collapsing religious and ethnic identities and involvement of religious institutions and their leadership in the war made various sites – including religious ones – targets of actual and symbolic violence.

In post-war period,

> it is of central importance that ethnicization restores the primacy of the political sphere over all others, that solutions are sought in politics, whether appropriate or not. From that moment on, political programs tend to be oriented towards an ethnic and

ethnicized nation rather than a civic identity, so that ideas, goals and the future are mobilized and interpreted in accordance with the imperatives of ethnicity ... Societies are practically losing the ability to define their goals according to material civic criteria and communication by any means other than discourse on identity and personal loyalty." (Schöpflin 1995, 164)

Thus, ethnopolitics is in stark contrast to the processes, which in theory are referred to as the civic nationalism, that is, ethnopolitics is a state of inability to build a (supra-) national identity inclusive of different affiliations. Therefore, ethnonationalists here are the first echelon to recruit religious nationalists.

Religious nationalists understand the relation between nations-religions on the principle that any change of national as well as religious identity is interpreted as destructive to the nation, although the dominant religions in the Western Balkans are universal.

At the same time, religious nationalists oppose modern (secular) nationalism and national movements, which in their theoretical and ideological settings insist on the dominance of (supra-) national over other identities and affiliations (e.g. religious or local). Therefore, religious nationalism is positively correlated with processes that prevent the creation of a common state identity, that is, the identity that arises from assimilation as civic inclusion.

Religious nationalism is also positively correlated with the interchange of political and religious products and goods in transitional societies. "... Religions and religious institutions enter this exchange primarily with their very significant, historically accumulated 'symbolic and cultural capital' .... political institutions, in turn, enter this exchange primarily with their 'capital of power and influence'." (Vrcan 1999, 51) Therefore, in the "naked public square", clerics and leaders who use religious reasoning primarily to win or maintain power, may also be called "political para-theologians" (Miles 1996, 526). What is important to emphasize is that "persons who are based in religion-inspired political activism anyway deny the possibility that meaningful distinction between politics and religion can be made at all, since political neutrality, for example, legitimizes the suffering of the oppressed." (Miles 1996, 528)

Political para-theologians ask their adherents to act non-religiously, and often anti-religiously, to achieve their goals. Still, religious arguments are used as arguments to reinforce the demands for political action.

Therefore, in order to truly achieve the functionality of multi-religious societies in the political field, one of the first interventions is the necessary re-institutionalization of public space, but with the previously necessary demystification of ethnic and religious irrationalities[10], especially if they are the product of the ideology of religious nationalism.

In doing so, Rogers Brubaker's call for a rethinking of ethnicity seems, at least from a sociological perspective, extremely plausible:

> ... thinking of ethnicity, race and nation not in terms of substantial groups or entities but in terms of *practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent events*. It means thinking of *ethnicization*, *racialization* and *nationalization* as political, social, cultural and psychological *processes*. And it means taking as a basic analytical category not the 'group' as an entity but *groupness* as a contextually fluctuating conceptual variable." (Brubaker 2002, 167-8)

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10 "Indeed, perhaps the basic insight into a thematic assembly covered by the notion of the people is the absence of any logical consistency in the self-identification of members of a people: sometimes it is the origin, sometimes the language, sometimes the customs, sometimes the religion, and sometimes it is a political organization (which ... leads to overlap with the concept of nation." (Molnar 1997, 1)

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Religious and Political Identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In this article I examine problematical aspects of the present transitional phase in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with an emphasis on religious revival and the specific nexus of ethnic and political interpretations of the historic part played by religion in forming the dominant ethnic groups in the country. Some attention is also given to the phenomenon of religious nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Introduction

In any description or discussion of the West Balkans, it is essential not to forget the following: 'It has never been possible to confirm with any degree of accuracy the extent to which faith is a question of individual experience, and a matter of experiences of spiritual need in relation to the sacred, Godor transcendence. lt has also proved impossible to decide when it became open to use by a collectivist form of identification, always with a fully active and close relation to politics and ideology, while remaining vulnerable to manipulation and instrumentalization, sometimes with the most disastrous results.'

In fact, it is a commonplace of historical circumstances that religion of ali things is the absolutely indisputable *differentia specifica*, or characteristic aspect, of the collective identities of the resident population, and that denominational identities have proved to be the decisive factor in the development of the ethnic-national/collective identities that are still dominant today in Bosnia and Herzegovina. How much influence and what significance in context are still to be ascribed to religion in society remains debatable. From a sociological viewpoint, however, the emphasis is on the influence of an organized religion, or of actual religious communities, on

other autonomous and semi-autonomous spheres of social life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, that may be over the last two decades we have certainly observed religion becoming an incontrovertible political fact in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and change it the position of organized religion.

Compared with the previous phase of a basic order of social relations dominated by a situation of 'theisms without any function' from now on we also have a 'theism with exceptionally important public functions. If we exclude Bosnia and Herzegovina for the moment, the start of the new century has been characterized by a universally notable process of religious reawakening or awakening of religious sentiments, whichhas occurred in the very environment from which it seemed absent at a certain stage: that is, in the 'West'.

Religion and nationalism

At this point. it is necessary to recall certain essential theoretical approaches to the interpretation of religion and nationalism that will help readers to understand my own thinking on the present topic.

As Peter Van Der Veer and Hartmuth Lehman remark in their introduction to the symposium *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*, ('Western') social theory often made a preliminary a priori ideological distinction between the nationalist and the religious imagination. In the past, such arguments maintained that nationalism formed part of justifiable modern political reality. lt was taken for granted that nationalism was 'secular', ali the more so since it was assumed to evolve as part of the process of secularization and modernization. As far as these and similar views are concerned, religion is politically relevant only in countries in the underdeveloped world, which was also the case in the Western world at a certain time in the past. lf, however, religion appears in a political context in the modem world, it is called 'fundamentalism'.

Therefore it is important to note, according to Van Der Veer and Lehmann, that the 'nation' and 'religion' have entered relevant theory as universal categories of Western modernity, and that their universality is

located mainly in the history of Western expansionism.

Even thou in the past theoretical approaches to relations between the modern nation and the modern State (with a few exceptions) ignored the influence and role of religion, attitudes have changed in recent years. Accordingly, the symposium question emphasizes the fact that nationalism does indeed determine the future and redemption of humanity to a considerable degree. But this would seem to dispense with an essential aspect of the real aims of redemption or conquest of the future._ We also have to ask if it is appropriate (as the symposium would seem to imply) to interpret nationalism not as a substitute religion but as an authentic form of religion.

Secularization and fixation on religion

One way to understand why any such approach to this question was formulated acknowledge the results of early secularization even at the time when the first European national States were founded. This process should be seen as a secularization of concepts of the (Judaeo-Christian) tradition of belief, or as its 'translation' into a vernacular form. The relevant literature refers most often to concepts such as the Chosen People, the Promised Land, messianism and fraternity (fraternity in the sense of communio sanctorum [communion of saints]) as notions that operated subsequently in accordance with the new understanding of a proto national group. Moreover, in the same historical perspective, the attendant implementation and extension of religious freedom was considered to be a possible method of conflict avoidance, while any restriction of religious freedom was viewed as a source of conflict But here too we are faced with a characteristic paradox: perhaps 'religions' were used more in order to provoke conflicts, rather than as means of resolving them. One thing is almost certain: from a historical viewpoint, the freedom to exercise religion and religious freedom is an exception and never the rule.

However that may be, religions played a central role in the shaping of many European national identities (and this was the case not only in former Yugoslavia but in Poland, Ireland, Britain and Greece), and we are now experiencing an updating of Cari Schmitt's argument about a

common structure of theological and political concepts. The process accords with Schmitt's assertion that: 'All important concepts of modem state theory are secularized theological concepts. Not only because of their historical development at a time when they were transferred from theology to the theory of the State, where for instance almighty God become the omnipotent lawgiver, but also because of their systematic structure, an avowal that is necessary for a sociological understanding of these concepts. An exception in jurisprudence is equivalent to a miracle theology. An awareness of these equivalences is absolutely necessary ary to decide exactly how philosophical ideas evolved by way of the State in past centuries.'

In fact, Schmitt's arguments especially were also addressed in the most recent debates about religion in public discussion, especially in the dialogue between Charles Taylor and Jürgen Habermas. In the present respect, however, it seems more apposite to consider Taylor's call for a 'radical redefinition of secularism' and his objection to Habermas's 'fixation on religion', a position which in Taylor's opinion Habermas shares with John Rawls and others. According to Taylor, there is no reason to identify the position of religion in public opinion as a 'special case', although he concedes that this had long been the case as the result of a whole series of historical suasions. ln bis view, there is no reason to treat religion separately from other, non-religious world-views when seeking to define the question of state neutrality.

Liberal public opinion

There is certainly no doubt of the relevance here of Habermas's entirely cogent insistence that we should focus mainly on public opinion in modem liberal societies. Nevertheless, it is also important to take into account those critics who remind us that the very same liberal societies exclude people who are different, as well as certain types of claim, from serious consideration. From the earliest days, in fact, liberal public opinion excluded such categories as women, the impecunious or religious minorities.

Therefore I think that Talal Asad is right to assert with regard to this kind of criticism of liberal democracy that public opinion not merely offers

no more than a forum for rational debate, but an area of exclusion. Of course, we should not forget that (liberal) public opinion is an area that is unavoidably (not only unpredictably) articulated from a power basis. For this very reason 'an organized religion will often demand a public role, and attribute its necessity to the fact that society has taken the wrong path, and needs an injection of religious values to return to the strait and narrow way. Religion will try to'deprivatize' itself so that it is entitled to a voice in current debates about social and political tendencies. The aim is to become a major factor in political deliberalization, and to make sure that voice of religion is taken into consideration'.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, in contradistinction to the period when we were subject to the previous basic form of socio-political order of a Socialist mold,(in Tito's Yugoslavia) when the customary situation featured the abovementioned theisms without any public role, we are now witnessing the establishment of what is essentially a more ethnic-political system, and to the enjoyment of an unusually important public role by the said theisms. It is a quite different question of how far the representatives of organized religion were, and still are, prepared to meet the expectations facing them.

Religion, politics and symbols

I have argued elsewhere that it is most important for politics and its relations with religion, just as Genevieve Zubrzycki showed with regard to Poland, that political institutions and symbols should not be sacralized here and become the objects of religious adulation. Instead, the tendency has been rather for religious symbols to be secularized and re-sacralized as national symbols. That gives ethnic-national politics the opportunity to mobilize a great number of followers by using religious arguments which, however, are advanced primarily to achieve extra-religious ends.

The opening up of religion in the direction of public opinion is also qualified as deprivatization, and this process has proved decisive from the 1980s to the present day. Even Steve Bruce, who is among the last 'defenders of the secularization thesis', also recognizes occasions when modernity does not undermine religion but may allocate important social

roles to religion. Such cases concern situations of cultural defence and cultural change.

Cultural defense occurs when two or more communities come into conflict and their members are heirs to different religious traditions (Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland; Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks in former Yugoslavia). Then the social significance of religious identity may become more important, and evoke a call for ethnic unity and pride. The situation is similar when one community dominates another (with another religion or 'none'), so that in such cases the religious institution assumes the role of defender of the culture and identity of the dominated citizens. In situations of cultural change, religious institutions come to play supportive role on behalf of people, in order to come to terms with the changes they have to face.

In fact, religious communities (and religion) were the main sources of resistance to the former Socialist regime and influenced almost all social structures (institutional and cognitive). In this sense, nothing else had anything like so great and effective a power, so that in addition to all other outcomes it also constituted an area of reference for the preservation and transmission of national cultures and their concomitant values.

At the same time (as Mark Juergensmeyer observed), on a global stage that saw the 'downfall of national Staes and the   disillusionment of old forms of secular nationalism, we experienced the opening up of both the opportunity for new nationalisms and the need for them ...In the modern political climate, religious and ethnic nationalisms duly offered solutions to repair the supposed inadequacies of Western-style secular politics. Since secular references began to grow weaker in the post-Soviet and post-colonial era, local leaders began to search for new berths for their social identities and political loyalties.'

Religious nationalism and ethnicization

In the Western Balkans, all the abovementioned tendencies came to a head in a form of religious nationalism. This particular nationalism 'evolved from modem institutional heterologies ... and extended the institutional logic of religion in the area of a democratic national State, by deriving its authority from God's absolute commandment and not by the subjective generation of the people themselves'.

Religious nationalism is a special form of collective presentation and a new ontology of power. Since religion is selected as the exclusive basis of the national collective identity, this is a form of politicized religion and 'religionized' politics (in which politics is conceived of as a religious duty). The aim pursued is a re-ordering of social relations on the basis of pseudo-religious elements and functions.

Religious nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina think of the relationship between nation and denomination almost in the sense that any change in the national identity (which is taken as equivalent to the denominational identity) is interpreted as a humiliation for the nation. But no account is taken here of the fact that by their very nature, the dominant religions to which the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina belong are universal, and therefore not particular. But religious nationalists are particular: that is, their doctrine is a matter of the quite definite, actual community, and relates only to those who possess not only the religious but other common characteristics of that identity – which means above all the same ethnic origin (Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats). We might say that religious nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is actually one of the most up-to-date responses to modern secular individualism in the modern nation State.

At the same time, the representatives of religious nationalism oppose modern (secular) nationalism and national movements, whose theoretical and ideological principles insists on the dominance of the (supra) national over and above other identities and affiliations (such as those of a denominational or historical nature). Therefore, religious nationalism is positively related to its predecessors that opposed the creation of a common state identity: that is, of an identity achieved by assimilation as inclusion and involvement as citizens of civil society.

Furthermore, it is 'of central importance that ethnicization once again establishes the precedence of the political over all other spheres, so at solutions are looked for in the political realm, whether that is appropriate at this point or not. From this moment on, an attempt is made to determine political programs in accordance with the ethnic and ethnicized nation rather than in line with tbe civil identity so that ideas, goals and future are mobilized and interpreted in conformity with the imperatives of ethnicity

> ❞ ... This means that societies almost lose the capability of defining their goals on the basis of material civil criteria, and of communicating in any other way than by talking about ethnicity and a personal loyalty.' And in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnicity is constructed definitively (everything else may be a matter for dispute, but not thts) on the basis of one's denomination.

Finally, to ensure that a functionality of multiethnic and multidenominational society is achieved in the political field, one of the first interventions must involve a necessary reinstitutionalization of the public realm, but only after an essential demystification of ethnic and denominational (ir)rationalities, especially when they result from religious nationalisms.

Reconciliation, Ethnopolitics and Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Introduction

So much has been written about Bosnia-Herzegovina that almost every aspect of its very recent past has been discussed from various perspectives and in different disciplinary approaches. At the moment, it is important to note that the political system of Bosnia-Herzegovina is highly complex institutionally. This is one of the results of the political negotiations that led to the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA, 1995), which endorsed consociational mechanisms of power-sharing that trade individual human rights and liberties for nominal equality among (ethnic) groups.[1] The state is underperforming economically, there is a perpetual political crisis and progress toward membership in the European Union (EU) – so often understood as the final destination of the "transitional journey" – is almost non-existent. The key findings of the EU 2011 Progress Report on Bosnia-Herzegovina emphasize, although in a diplomatic manner, that the overall pace of reforms has been very limited.[2] The majority of efforts by international and domestic actors to mitigate the consequences of the war at the level of social relations have been insufficient, largely because many of the roots of the conflict still prevail, in a variety of new and old forms. Consequently, a predominant *ethnicization* of all aspects of social and political life is one of the crucial issues that have not yet been adequately addressed.

1   It is worth noting that a related debate about consociational representation was triggered by the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci v. Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2011 (Applications No. 27996/06 and 34836/06 of December 22, 2009). In brief, as Hodžić and Stojanović have noted, "the judgment … established that there is systemic constitutional discrimination of all persons not belonging to the constituent peoples on account of their inability to stand as candidates for positions in the Presidency of BiH and the House of Peoples of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly, has posed a veritable challenge not only to Bosnia's constitutional system, but also to the theory and practice of constitutional engineering in divided societies." (2011, 15)

2   The full text of the EU 2011 Progress Report on Bosnia-Herzegovina can be accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/ package/ba_rapport_2011_En.pdf

More than 16 years since the war ended, Bosnian-Herzegovinan society is still struggling to find a means of reconstruction that would result in a solid base and prospect for a better life. As time goes by it becomes ever clearer that the political and institutional design of Dayton-tailored Bosnia-Herzegovina do not contribute to the vital processes society needs, such as the mending of broken social relationships and the rebuilding of interethnic confidence. As McMahon some time ago observed:

> these solutions cannot create the country envisioned by the peace agreement because the existing institutional framework prevents them from doing so. Nation-building efforts in Bosnia, as currently conceived, cannot reintegrate the country or transform its society because such strategies are, in fact, at odds with the country's governing structure. (2004–2005, 583)

The very Peace Agreement was also "a masterful diplomatic creation precisely because of its imprecision, allowing all sides, including the international community, to claim some kind of victory" (Pajić, 2001, 49). At its core, it relies on fundamental contradictions. Declaring a unified state of Bosnia-Herzegovina while recognizing two antagonistic entities, proclaiming democracy while entrenching ethnically based institutional structures and reaffirming individual rights while legitimizing ethnic majoritarianism, from the outset raised serious concerns as to which political concept in Bosnia-Herzegovina would prevail.

The condition at the level of the state is such that the concept of power-sharing does not function within the restrictions of (*proportional*) ethnic representation – as it has not for many years. Instead of a positive consensus on cooperation in order to rebuild institutions, there is a negative consensus, which is manifested through the systemic blockage on the implementation of decisions necessary for restoration, social reconstruction, and political reconciliation. The situation for the last 16 years or so has been better defined as "absence of war" than by "peace" itself. Bosnia-Herzegovina as constructed by DPA[3] has revealed itself to be an ineffective creation based

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3   The politico-institutional structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina presently is that of a state comprised of two entities (the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska), each with a very high level of autonomy. In itself, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina comprises 10 cantons. The town of Brčko, which was the subject of international arbitration, now has the status of a district and is still under direct supervision of a special international envoy.

on the constant re-generation of crisis that encourages the accumulation of political power by ethnonationalist elites.

All in all, its own past and present is one of the most difficult dilemmas society in Bosnia-Herzegovina has faced. So the questions arise: is the issue of reconciliation something that is "naturally" of the utmost relevance to the society's future? And what reconciliation means, what kind of reconciliation the Bosnian-Herzegovinan population, its leadership and state institution envisage?

In this chapter, I argue that reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to be approached as *political reconciliation* of the society that struggles with issues of justice in the aftermath of war crimes. Secondly, I explore the ambiguous role of two crucial sets of actors who do (or do not) influence the process of reconciliation: the ethno-political elites and respective religious leaders.

The notion of reconciliation I am advocating is both descriptive, and to a certain extent, normative. Following Colleen Murphy,[4]"at its most general level, the goal of processes of political reconciliation is to cultivate a political relationships" (2010, 28) which can express reciprocity and respect for moral agency, or reciprocal agency. Therefore, by accepting Murphy's main argument, I concur that the focus should be on society-wide political reconciliation, since this is considered critical for the successful consolidation of new democracies and for sustaining peace generally. Accordingly:

> the rebuilding of political relationships through processes of reconciliation cultivates forms of interaction premised on the equal respect for individuals and their agency; a commitment to the reciprocal sharing of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation; and an institutional structure is based on rule of law and on political, economic, and social institutions in which all individuals have a genuine opportunity to participate. (Murphy, 2010, 34)

To tackle the problem of social reconstruction and reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I argue that one must attend to the political and social

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4   The conception of political reconciliation I am using here and after is largely based on work of Colleen Murphy (2010, 28).

context induced and maintained by ethnic and religious symbiosis, as well as to the nexus that has arisen between ethno-political elites and religious actors in the past two decades. Further, "a primary concern of policies of political reconciliation should be ending injustice and oppression, and addressing the conditions that facilitate and support injustice and oppression" (Murphy, 2010, 11).

The Legacy of War and Ethno-Religious Politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The proliferation of ethno-politics has been spurred on not only by the legal reasoning of the Dayton Peace Accords and the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Annex IV of DPA), but also by processes that began in the late 1980s, when the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (the former Yugoslavia) was on the brink of dissolution.

As socialist Yugoslavia dissolved, the mobilizing discourse of the emerging nations was articulated in ethno-religious, rather than democratic-political, terms. At the same time, religious communities were seen as the guardians of national heritage and values. Together, these two processes provided institutional, ideological and symbolic support to new ethno-political entrepreneurs. Genevieve Zubrzycki has analyzed the mechanisms by which religious symbols become sacralized and has argued that such symbols garner consensual support only in specific politico-structural contexts. To a much larger degree than in the Polish case, where "it was not political institutions and symbols that were sacralized and became the object of religious devotion ... but religious symbols that were first secularized and then *resacralized as national*"(2006, 219), in the former Yugoslavia, and particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, religion has become a hard political fact.[5]

During the socialist period, when the multi-confessional societies of the former Yugoslavia were under the influence of principal politics (the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, i.e., the League of Communist of Yugoslavia), the place and role of religion in socio-political matters was

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5   See Vrcan (2001); Velikonja (2003); Perica (2004); Abazović (2006).

understood dichotomously. Ideologically, religion was perceived as a traditionalistic, anachronous, and retrograde phenomenon incompatible with the new progressive "thought of the epoch," and the religious leadership was seen almost exclusively as anti-revolutionary. At the same time, religion was understood culturally and historically, in relation to the national beings and feelings of the South Slavic peoples.

But, as I have argued elsewhere (Abazović, 2010), the early post-socialist period in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been characterized by two powerful and related processes: a "*nationalization of the sacral*" and a "*sacralization of the national.*" In other words, ethno-national political ideologies have demanded (and have been granted) the support of organized religious doctrines in order to legitimize new establishments. There have been no exceptions within the three major religious communities (the Islamic Community, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Serbian Orthodox Church). Various reasons have made such a development viable, but two reasons have been ideologically and historically essential. First, during the so-called communist period of 1946–1990, the religious communities were self-represented as the only considerable-size source of counterculture that had significant effect to every social stratum. The second has to do with the process of ethno-national differentiation among the domicile Bosnian-Herzegovinan population. That is, religions and confessions have become a crucial *differentia specifica*, and the majority of peoples consider religion and confession as the marker of the ultimate Self-Other dichotomy,[6] as well as for the structuring of individual and collective consciousness.

Religion in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not confined to religious leaders or official expressions, but is also manifested in local traditions and customs, family rituals, practical rites, private narratives and personal affiliations to (religious) community, with or without specific doctrinal knowledge.[7] Nonetheless, religion is always a social phenomenon, and it manifests at different levels: on the individual level – as a spirituality of life, a matter of personal identity and worldview; on the collective level – as a faith-based community, with its doctrinal teachings, moral norms, symbols, rituals,

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6   Like in Dubravka Žarkov's analysis of gender and ethnicity, I also "perceive ethnicity in a similar way ... as a relation and category of *power*, always concerned with living individuals or communities, but, never *reducible to them*" (2007, 12).

7   Belief, knowledge, experience, practice and consequences are helpful in determining the types of religiosity for different cases, and certainly these differ from one individual to other, but no matter how exactly religion is practiced, its effect is always real.

practices; and on the level of institutions – as relevant bodies that include leadership and specific types of hierarchy.

After the collapse of socialism religion was revitalized, as it came to be understood as a political fact – religion was politicized through ethnicization. As this occurred, the "understanding" of religion has, unfortunately, narrowed: religion has been oriented and reduced to ethnicity, rather than to its immanent universal characteristics, features and mission, thus, ethnic and religious identities collapsed into each other. As a result, confessional (collective) identities have been encouraged and religion also has become the means for the political legitimization of the new order. On the level of everyday life, this has been possible because, as R. Scott Appleby has argued:

> the seeds of Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian religiosity were not stamped out under communist rule, even among so-called secularized masses; but neither were they nurtured. Scattered and left untended, they were eventually planted in the crude soil of ethnonationalism. (2002, 71)

During the war, politicized and ethnicized, religion becomes a powerful tool for mobilization against "ethnic enemies." Although many scholars who have worked on the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia do not consider them religious conflicts,[8] collapsing religious and ethnic identities and involvement of religious institutions and its leadership in the war made religious sites targets of actual and symbolic violence. Paul Mojzes (1998) argues that during the Bosnian war the generalized charge of fundamentalism was being used fairly indiscriminately to describe the position of rival faiths, which is an appropriate designation of some extremism in each group, but it's not a truthful presentation of the overall community. Indeed, there are a number of examples that religious leaders at

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8   Milan Vukomanović underlines a basic fact that only those wars which are fought over religious problems and issues should be considered as religious ones; still, the war has had a certain religious dimension, for it was waged not only among people, but also against sacred spaces, houses of worship, cemeteries and other religious sites, many of which were completely destroyed. All of the parties in the war employed religious symbols in their ethno-national/ political mobilization and military efforts. One study (Grbo, 1996) that encompassed just a third of the Bosnian-Herzegovinan territory showed that 705 sacred objects were demolished and damaged during the conflict. Out of that number, 435 were Islamic, 146 Catholic, 117 Serb-Orthodox and 7 Jewish.

all levels of hierarchy, as well as various other religious actors on numerous occasions, condemned the violence and requested peace. But these voices have been silenced!

The consequences of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina were devastating – as an outcome of massive ethnic cleansing during the armed conflict, nearly one and a half million Bosnians and Herzegovinans have been recorded as refugees and internally displaced persons. Today the death toll after the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991–1995) is generally estimated at around 102,000[9] persons: around 55,000 of those killed were civilians,[10] while just over 47,000 were soldiers.

Presently, the everyday lives of the majority of Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens are overwhelmed by "ethnic modes," their worldview channelled in ethnic terms. Despite a level of the individual attachment to their ethnic group – and certainly many do not define themselves in exclusively ethnic terms – the institutional and political milieu makes every individual fully aware of the real effects of being ethnically marked by their social surroundings.[11] Ethnic issues enter citizens' homes, and persistently follow each and every communication, even the most benign, among members of the population. One can conclude that the post-war-ethnopolitical order in Bosnia-Herzegovina is based on the political production and maintenance of an entire network of differences. There is no room for a citizen in such a network, especially not for his or her individual rights and freedoms. This is true to such a shattering degree that the lack of individual freedoms and rights almost cannot be posed as a problem. Somewhere along the way towards ethno-political supremacy the individual citizen got lost, and this is no longer even considered a problem. Even if something

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9   See more in Tabeau and Bijak (2005).

10 In one of his essays Marko-Atila Hoare suggests that the most striking fact to emerge from the study of the Research and Documentation Centre Sarajevois that 83 percent of civilian deaths in the Bosnian war were Muslims (Bosniaks). He notes the fact that Muslims were only one of the three principal Bosnian nationalities that suffered higher civilian than military casualties. But the point Hoare would like to emphasize is that he "make[s] these observations by way of a preliminary, in response to those who enjoy playing the numbers game with regard to the Bosnian genocide. Whether 100,000 or 200,000 died in the Bosnian war should have no bearing on our recognition that this was a terrible crime, or on whether we consider what happened to have been genocide. But if numbers cannot be used to confirm or deny a genocide, they can tell us a lot about when, where and how most of the killing occurred, who were the principal perpetrators and who were the principal victims." For detailed discussion see more in Marko-Atila Hoare (2008).

11 For an anthropological perspective on this see Stefansson (2010).

does not announce itself as a problem, however, this does not mean it is not, in fact, a problem. In this case, I would argue with Amy Gutmann, "the political authority of a group ... does not justify the oppression of individuals within the group" (2003, 53–54).

Consequently, in Bosnia-Herzegovina ethno-politics should be understood as the result of ethno-religious nationalism, its political narratives and practices that are used as a tool to justify ethnicallybased social constructions and institutions.[12] The ethno-politics in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a set of political circumstances and praxis in which each person's citizenship is predetermined by his or her kinship, which is to say by his or her belonging to a specific community of supposedly shared origin. The subversive mechanism of ethno-politics consists in enacting *ethnos as demos* and substantiating, to paraphrase Etienne Balibar (2003), an imaginary community of membership and filiations that is the collective subject of representation, decision-making and rights. As a result, the functions of representation and decision-making, as well as the establishment of the legal framework, are permeated by discrimination on the basis of kinship.

The issues of transitional justice

Thus, to understand the current socio-political dynamics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is not enough to see it as a war-torn, post-conflict, disoriented society entrapped in so-called transition. Its specific societal processes must be attended to, in particular the pervasive social tensions around different ways of dealing with the past, where denial, silence/silencing and drive to confront it are among the prominent ones. Unsurprisingly, in recent scholarly works this tension has been addressed mainly under the "aegis" of transitional justice. The concept of transitional justice for Bosnia-Herzegovina is commonly approached as it is in the analysis of many other war-torn societies, post-dictatorships, "new democracies," and "regimes in transitions." In this context, it has been analyzed in relation to problems of truthseeking, truthtelling, retribution, restoration, and, finally, reconciliation.

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12 For a better overview of ethno-politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina see Mujkić (2007).

Here, as it is elsewhere, transitional justice is connected to a slew of other major issues, including problems of injustice, gross human rights violations, and (war) crimes committed in the past. In this case, however, discussions about what models of transitional justice are appropriate must take into account the deep divisions that still exist in the society of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where peoples are alienated from state institutions and in particular from institutions of justice. According to the relevant literature, there are at least seven different options open to new democracies:

> amnesia or inaction; pardons; full amnesty; prosecution and trials (either domestic or international); lustration (disqualifying collaborators from public office); publicity (the opening of the Stasi files in Germany is the key example here); conditional amnesty or truth commissions. (Allen, 2004, 4)

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, public opinion about these different models appears, at first glance, to be highly polarized, for intense debates about the worthiness and applicability of various models regularly appear in the print media.[13] What is striking about this case, however, is that this polarization is not actually widespread. This is because, although there is notable divergence of opinion among experts, the vast majority of the population seems to be chronically unwilling to engage publically in discussion about reconciliation. In a way, the public discourse about transitional justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina is affected by the fact that, as a society, Bosnia-Herzegovina:

> Suffer[s] from a deficit of truth – factual knowledge about past atrocities is lacking, officials resist acknowledging the existence of such events (even when this is a matter of widespread knowledge), and victims seek acknowledgment of their suffering. (Allen, 2004, 5)

Although one should not lose sight of the needs and perspectives of the victims in any discourse about reconciliation, the process of political

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13 It is important to notice that one model of transitional justice does not necessarily exclude others. In other words, two or more models are often implemented at the same time in a given situation, just like it is a case in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

reconciliation itself is not solely victim-oriented, for it encompasses other societal actors and agents in post-conflict societies and societies recovering from repressive rule. The victim-centered concepts of reconciliation can be subsumed under the theories of reconciliation as forgiveness, a legitimate – and quite common – theoretical approach. In this context, Mark R. Amstutz conceives political forgiveness:

> as an interactive process in which the burdens of past wrongdoings are repaired, resulting in the healing of human relationships. To be successful, forgiveness depends upon a number of core elements, including consensus about wrongdoing, remorse and repentance, renunciation of vengeance, cultivation of empathy and mitigation or cancellation of deserved penalty. (2006, 157)

But unlike theory, practice is much more problematic. Regrettably enough, none of the abovementioned core elements of reconciliation sufficiently come to life in the Bosnia-Herzegovina society. And as time goes by, the politics of denial precludes the possibility of consensus building about wrongdoings. Remorse and repentance have been understood as weakness, the renunciation of vengeance as (not necessarily authentic) politically correct speech, and the cultivation of empathy as meaninglessly abstract to those in need. The mitigation or cancellation of penalties being considered "just," meanwhile, is perceived as being out of the question.

Taken as a whole, the official discourse of the ruling ethno-political elites is, thus, in service to the maintenance of what Dubravka Ugrešić (2012) addresses as the "confiscation of memories," or the practice of the manipulation of the past[14]– either by a blatant politics of denial, or by a one-sided victimization. And for the victims, it is not solely about the factual truth; it is a problem of societal acknowledgement of the truth,

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[14] "The authorities in our post-Yugoslav countries abundantly manipulate the past. The past usually only serves for a manipulation. Those in power deal with exhuming and burying corpses, every minute they drag one out when it is needed and every minute they bury another one if it is needed. The most frightening is that the intelligentsia, that should be both the filter and the arbiter, most often puts itself into service of the authorities resulting in the blossoming of the practice of erecting memorials and demolishing them; a practice of publishing slurred textbooks (where in one environment there is one valid historical truth and in another environment a different one)" (from an interview with Dubravka Ugrešić, "Neko će morati da ukloni ruševine," available at http://pescanik.net/2012/01/neko-ce-morati-da-ukloni-rusevine/).

acknowledgement as a need for human dignity. To cite Giorgio Agamben, it is about the testimony that "guarantees not the factual truth of the statement safeguarded in the archive, but rather its unarchivability, its exteriority with respect to the archive – that is, the necessity by which, as the existence of language, it escapes both memory and forgetting." (1999, 158)

The feelings among the victims of having been humiliated are intensified not merely when faced with the rejection of recognition about what has happened, but typically when the interpretation of the already established facts have been deliberately distorted to achieve political goals and rationalize injustices. Therefore, Alan J. Torrance is right when he insists that:

> in contexts such as Rwanda and Bosnia (let alone in the aftermath of the Holocaust) ... one cannot help but ask about the propriety of the word *reconciliation*, let alone the language of "forgiveness" in the political realm. Given the unthinkable atrocities, the scenes of mass murder, rape, and gratuitous violence, and the sustained pillaging of burning of homes, one must ask whether talk of forgiveness and reconciliation does not border on the grotesque where survivors are stalked by events that are unthinkable for us, unforgettable for them. (2006, 59)

In discussing issues of restorative justice, political forgiveness and the possibility for reconciliation Amstutz contrasted backward-looking retributive justice, which focuses on the legal prosecution and punishment of offenders, with restorative justice, an approach that emphasizes truth telling, moral accountability and reconciliation.

> Although retribution, the prevalent state practice in confronting collective wrongdoing, is an effective strategy for implementing legal justice, it does not necessarily contribute to the healing of victims, the restoration of community life, and most importantly, the consolidation of right-based democracy. (2006, 152–153)

The discussion about retributive justice is to a certain extent relevant for the Bosnian-Herzegovinan social context. The International Court

of Justice (ICJ) rulings from February 2007 effectively determined the character of war to be international, and yet, "despite the evidence of widespread killings, rape and torture elsewhere during the Bosnian war, especially in detention centres, the judges ruled that the criteria for genocide were met only in Srebrenica."[15]

Already in 1993 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the United Nations in response to mass atrocities then taking place in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.[16] Beyond a reasonable doubt, the ICTY has established crucial facts related to crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, and its judgments could contribute to create a historical record, to combat denial and prevent attempts at revisionism. As a part of the "completion strategy," ICTY has transferred cases against intermediate and lower-level accused to Bosnian-Herzegovinan, Serbian and Croatian national jurisdictions. In addition, domestic prosecutors and courts have also initiated cases, with or without involvement by the ICTY.[17]

The continued importance of the ICTY and its work, as well as the work of domestic/national courts, should not, however, preclude a reassessment of the notion that retributive justice lessens the needs of victims. In broader social and political terms, war crimes trials have not made a visible contribution to launching a process that would normalize relations among different ethnic groups. The findings of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Special Report *Facing the*

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15 Max Arthur, "Court: Serbia Failed to Prevent Genocide," San Francisco Chronicle, Monday, February 26, 2007.

16 In official documents, the ICTY lists the following achievements, among others: holding leaders accountable, bringing justice to victims, giving victims a voice and establishing the facts. Up to this point, the ICTY has indicted 161 persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and has concluded proceedings for 126 defendants. The proceedings for 35 more accused persons are ongoing. As of early last year, 4,000 witnesses had told their stories in court. See more at http://www.icty.org

17 Based on the National War Crimes Prosecution Strategy, adopted in late 2008 by the Council of Ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, currently there are more than 1200 ongoing cases before the courts in Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Court of BiH, 10 Cantonal Courts in Federation of BiH, 5 District Courts in Republika Srpska, and the Basic Court of Brcko District of BiH). The basic objective of the Strategy is to prosecute the most complex and top priority cases within the seven years and other war crime cases within 15 years of the time of the adoption of the Strategy. For more info see http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?jezik=e

Past and Access to Justice from a Public Perspective[18] (2011) shows that nearly all NGOs and victims' associations from all over the country have expressed their dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the trials, claiming that the victims' needs were not sufficiently met through formal court proceedings. The research also shows that the burden of the past most often arises from an imprecise and incomplete knowledge about the past, since the majority of the respondents consider that it is still necessary to shed light on all the facts of the 1992–1995 war, which remain vague ever since the war ended. A prevailing public opinion is that the level and scope of attention and support, which the government institutions and the society as a whole have been giving to victims, are insufficient and uncoordinated.[19] Despite of the ongoing court cases, a number of nongovernmental organizations have expressed concern in their numerous public statements and reports that the victims of crimes committed during the 1992–1995 war and their relatives are still being denied access to truth, justice and reparation.[20]

Obviously there is a specific ambiguity in place since the overwhelming majority of citizens also demand a solution through the criminal justice system, and at the same time, public confidence is low in any of the criminal justice mechanisms in place.[21] Already in late 2005, a decade after the war ended, the UNDP in Bosnia-Herzegovina published its Early Warning System Special Report entitled *Justice and Truth in BiH: Public Perception.*

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18 United Nation Development Program in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNDP in BiH): "Facing the Past and Access to Justice from Public Perspective: Special Report," Sarajevo (2011); the Report represents a comprehensive analysis of the findings of the public opinion poll; the full text of report is available at http://www.undp.ba/upload/publications/Facing%20the%20Past%20 and%20Access%20to%20Justice.pdf

19 UNDP Report "Facing with the Past ... " (2011, 12).

20 One of the very recent reports by the Amnesty International, from March 2012 focuses on the survivors of wartime rape. The Reports' conclusion is: "Successive governments in BiH have failed to acknowledge the rights of civilian victims of wartime sexual violence and provide them with access to justice, truth and reparation. Consequently, those local authorities responsible for providing services, even to a limited extent, are woefully under-resourced and ill-equipped to address these women's needs ... Almost two decades after the end of the conflict, Amnesty International finds itself once again having to call on the state and entity authorities in BiH to fulfill their international legal obligations to address the survivors' suffering and guarantee them access to swift justice and full reparation." Amnesty International, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: old crimes, same suffering: no justice for survivors of wartime rape in North-East Bosnia-Herzegovina," p. 12. The full text of report is available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/ asset/EUR63/002/2012/en/ f688b1c8–1fa2–46ba-ae26–0b6ec344401f/eur630022012en.pdf

21 UNDP Report (2005); the full text is available at http://www.undp.ba/upload/ publications/ Justice&Truth%20in%20BH%20English.pdf

The report has been part of the UNDP's contribution to the debate about transitional justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Demands for criminal justice and law public confidence in courts is one of Report's central conclusions.

Accordingly, Boris Buden (2012), speaking about the regional notion of justice, contends:

> This does in no way imply that I do not support the Hague Tribunal. On the contrary! The very existence and actions of that Court are the best evidence that our nations are, in a political and even more so in a moral sense, phantoms of a sort. By demonstrating themselves incompetent to prosecute their own war criminals, they have lost, in my opinion, their historical justification. What good is nation without justice? What do I have in common with the people who view notorious criminals as heroes?[22]

Many – if not all – mechanisms of transitional justice, based on attributing individual guilt, have been "reinterpreted within and folded into dominant ethno-political narratives about collective guilt and innocence" (Eastmond, 2010, 8) by dominant ethno-political entrepreneurs. In addition, there is a very low level of social trust in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a highly fragmented social sphere and a high level of social exclusion. Therefore:

> societal exclusion or discrimination on the basis of social identity is of fundamental concern because of how such exclusion or discrimination restricts what individuals are free to do or become in their relations with others. That is, the fundamental normative concern in the context of reconciliation is not with misrecognition or the absence of recognition itself; rather, it is with the ramification of such exclusion or misrecognition. (Murphy, 2010, 35)

How, then, to balance the desire to rebuild society by restoring proper social relations (*ergo* political reconciliation) against the widespread belief that "reconciliation-as-forgiveness" is ethically unacceptable, since it leaves the majority of perpetuators unpunished, and at the same time victims needs are not sufficiently met?

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22 Interview with Boris Buden available at http://pescanik.net/2012/04/intervju-sa-borisom-budenom/

The first step is to unconditionally, truthfully, and straightforwardly argue that forgiveness can be and should be distinguishable from justification and excuse. The next is to comprehend, as Murphy has claimed, that reconciliation-as-forgiveness is just one out of several different conceptions about reconciliation. Others are reconciliation as creation and stabilization of normative expectation and trust; reconciliation as a political value; and reconciliation as the constituting of a political community.

In that respect, the crucial question for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina is how to reconstitute Bosnia-Herzegovina as a political community rather than as ethno-religious communities. In other words, how to re-assert the right of its citizens not to be discriminated against in public and political life on the basis of ethno-religious principles? How to break out of the imposed context of "ethnic equality" and demand an "ethic equality"[23] in which everyone is endowed with the same human dignity and freedom of choice concerning matters of public and private interest, self-development, and group affiliation? Or not to be affiliate with a group at all? Individuals have every right to make religious or ethnic affiliation the cornerstone of their personal identities and to align themselves with communities defined in these terms, but this does not mean that this is the only legitimate view of identity or that it should be imposed on others, especially in the political realm. Finally, as Marita Eastmond pointed out:

> [The] key point made is that, given the everyday problems of people in post-war settings, reconciliation with former enemies may not be seen as a primary concern. The theme permeating post-war life in BiH was rather the striving for a sense of normality – not so much by consciously engaging in inter-ethnic reconciliation, as by invoking and practicing widely shared norms such as those of economic security and neighborhood sociality. (2010, 12)

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23 For more on this, see Mujkić, Abazović and Seizović (2008).

So, what's religion got to do with it?

Ugo Vlaisavljević has rightly observed that, "if a religious doctrine, its norms and values, way of understanding and behavior is the soil in which the ethnic Self is imbedded, then religion appears as the main source of legitimization in politics." This is certainly the case for Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the result that "religion, in which all the capital of ethnic symbols and meanings has been invested, plays an important role in politics in the period of ethnic renewal, regardless of whether ecclesial authorities have agreed to it or not." (2003, 102)

Yet another issue that comes into play in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the definition of "the nation." Jürgen Habermas's critique of Karl Schmitt is theoretically relevant here. Habermas argues that the problem with Schmitt (and others) is that the constituent power of the nation is understood to be a concrete and organic collectivity, rather than a legal framework.[24] Habermas writes:

> This existentialist version [of Karl Schmitt] continues to share essential features with the traditional concept of "the political." Certainly, the collective identity of the people is no longer defined in the legal terms of a sovereign state, but in the ethnonational concepts of political romanticism instead. However, the shared features of descent, tradition, and language cannot ensure the social cohesion of the collective by their supposed organic nature alone. Rather, the political leadership must continually mobilize the nation against external or internal enemies. (2011, 31)

Although the armed violence has ended, the conflict is not over in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, a number of options are available for its management and settlement, including those that consider religion a potentially valuable, but critically underutilized peace-building tool. Still, in spite of numerous efforts by "Western" governmental and

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24 For Karl Schmitt, according to Habermas, "national membership is determined by common race, belief, common destiny, and tradition – in other words, by ascriptive features." Thus, Habermas continues, "Schmitt shares a collective and plebiscitary conception of democracy that is directed against the egalitarian conception of human rights and against a deliberative conception of politics" (2011, 31).

nongovernmental organizations engaged in conflict resolution and peace-building – including interreligious dialogue that encompass expatriate and domestic religious communities and faith-based organizations – the overall results and achievements have been very limited thus far. Indeed, when it comes to the value of religious communities and truth commissions for transitional justice, Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to constitute a negative case. In this respect, according to Daniel Philpott (2007), the experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina is akin to that of Ireland and Poland and contrasts sharply with that of Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Peru and Germany, where religious leaders and communities have exercised an important influence on transitional justice.[25] He gives two reasons for the success of the religious communities in these countries:

> First, they shaped the decision for truth commissions through speaking out publicly, lobbying and sometimes even organizing efforts to investigate past injustices themselves. Second, they shaped the actual functioning of truth commissions by influencing the selection of commissioners, sometimes actually serving as commissioners, providing logistical support for organizing and conducting hearings, locating and supporting victims and witnesses and providing counseling in the wake of hearings. (2007, 101)

Bosnia-Herzegovina's position as a negative case could be due to religious leaders' ambivalent role during the war, or the insufficient ecumenical and interreligious structures that conspired to limit the organized religious potential for peacemaking. Whether for these or other reasons, Bosnia-Herzegovina's organized religions have so far chosen the course of "eloquent silence," responding to significant speech acts with silence. Let me briefly address this with three illustrative examples.

Three years ago, two publishers from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (*Ex Libris* and *Synopsis*) jointly printed a translation of the book *Ethics*, an important work by Dietrich Bonhoeffer and a text highly relevant for the

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25 I will not go into an in-depth discussion about the countries mentioned here, but this list begs the question of whether these activities were all successful because they were carried out by Christian churches. Then again, the cases from Poland and Ireland tell a quite different story. Still, the theological understanding of issues such as justice and forgiveness differs in the Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions, and this should be taken into account when addressing the respective perspectives on reconciliation.

entire region. The foreword to the book, entitled "Ethical Concreteness of Revelation: the Incentive for Contextual Reading of the Ethics," was written by the young Bosnian-Herzegovinan theologian Alen Kristić. Although Kristić openly and directly appeals for intra-religious dialogue about the contemporary political situation, he also writes that:

> " after the nationalistic insanity of 1990s, ... if Vukovar, Srebrenica and Sarajevo could happen to us ... who, after all of that, ... can be so narcissistic, so devilishly supercilious, to dare to call himself a Christian? (2009, 1)

Although Kristić's comments were quite provocative, there were no reactions to his argument at all. Silence sometimes speaks more than words, and in this case the silence that followed was quite eloquent indeed.

The second example is a text delivered by a high ranking cleric from Eastern Christianity, which is to say from the "Eastern lung," to quote Pope John Paul II. In a speech opening an international conference on interreligious understanding, Bishop Grigorije of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Zamusko-Hercegovačka and Primorska Bishopric) said:

> " ... some members of religious communities, on all sides, did not find the strength to oppose the general insanity of hatred and war during the crucial moments of religious and ethnical polarization. In order to prevent similar occurrences in the future, we should speak about this and analyze all the aspects of the problem in depth, not avoid it as a subject of conversation, because if we remain silent we will encourage the evil people on all sides to continue using religion and the name of God for hatred and crime. The [religious] community, which shows more honesty and accountability in doing so, will display that is the closest to God.[26]

Although this statement called for response and discussion, there was no significant reaction to it, just an eloquent silence.

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[26] International Conference has been held on December 8–9, 2006 in Trebinje, Bosnia-Herzegovina, organized by IKV Pax Christi, the Netherlands and Forum gradjana Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Shorthand from the conference is available at http://www.forumtz.com/publikacije/stenogramBOS.pdf

Finally, a year ago Adnan Silajdžić, Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies Sarajevo, send the open letter to the Islamic community's official newspaper *Preporod* as a response to the editorial comment written about at that time to a seminar on *The Islamic Discourses in Bosnia-Herzegovina* . According to Silajdžić:

> 🙰 ... it is a time for undertaking some serious research on the quality and status of Bosniaks' religious consciousness at the end of the last millennium and the beginning of the new one ... [D]uring the seminar I said, without excluding myself, that the false and hypocritical communication between professors and [the Islamic] community officeholders paradigmatically marks the absence of personal, lively and intellectually mediated [religious] belief.[27]

Outside of some editorial comments about this Silajdžić statement and a few anonymous posts on the *Preporod* website forum, all in all the response was, again, an eloquent silence.

What do these examples tell us? The institutional capacity (or lack of it) as well as a symbolic capital of the narrator in specific context and about "sensitive" issues does not inevitably influence the hearing. The silence does not necessarily have to mean denial, but can be seen as a practical strategy in confronting the actual problems, or those emerging from the past. However, if a majority of members of religious communities are struggling on a daily basis with past and present injustices, their respective religious leaders have a moral obligation to respond to eloquent – and at times even sinister – silence, and to provide the ambience and space for the witnesses involved to testify. Since, as Giorgio Agamben has noted, "the authority of the witness consists of his [sic] capacity to speak solely in the name of an incapacity to speak – that is, in his or her being a subject," (1999, 158) the religious leaders could help to facilitate the processes of dialogue and help to give witnesses the authority and subjectivity they deserve.

Instead of artificial and fruitless public debates about whether Bosnian-Herzegovinan society is becoming too militantly atheistic or too clerical, which is mostly a case in discussion about the place of religion in contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina, the emphasis should be on the role organized religion plays in social reconstruction. As Philpott has argued:

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27 See Preporod, No. 3/917, year XL.

> 🔢 If right relationship is at the core of the meaning of reconciliation, and if justice means comprehensive right relationship, as it arguably does in the Abrahamic religious traditions, then it follows that reconciliation is indeed itself a conception of justice ... . (2007, 98)[28]

Accordingly, from doctrinal religious sources a distinctive course of action could ensue. Ultimately, it could be argued that this entire debate is about religious authenticity. But then we are left with the underlining question: what does "religious authenticity" mean? Certainly it does not mean the "political religiosity" that often ends in idolatry – or theologically speaking, the worship of false gods like nation and ethnicity, which is surely against the fundamental teachings of the dominant religions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Overemphasizing the potential role of religion is just as precarious as underemphasizing it. Between "*yes*" and "*no*" there are myriad versions of "*possibly*."

It is therefore plausible to think about the role of religion in social reconstruction and reconciliation, as well as of religious authenticity, in terms that

> 🔢 religious reasons does not only depend on cognitive beliefs and their semantic nexus with other beliefs, but on existential beliefs that are rooted in the social dimension of membership, socialization, and prescribed practices. (Habermas, 2011, 62)

The relevant religious communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina might deploy all of their resources – including not only their ritual sites, sacred spaces, educational institutions, faith-based association and organizations, community centers and so on, but also their symbolic capital – in the creation of a forum for the public articulation of needs, a forum that can serve both members of the "in" group of the religious communities and non-members. The more bottom level for such activities – the more

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28 "Jewish perspectives, reconciliation mirrors God's covenant with Israel, to which God is faithful and willing to restore, even after repeated strayings. Christian theologians root reconciliation in God's own reconciliation with humanity through Jesus Christ. In Islamic writings, reconciliation flows from the mercy of Allah (the greatest of Allah's ninety-nine names), his willingness to forgive the repentant and Qur'anic injunctions to reconcile" (Philpott, 2007, 97–98).

beneficial! When it comes to facing the past, intergroup and intragroup dialogues should be fostered in parallel.

Concluding remarks

Bosnia-Herzegovina is faced with a diverse set of issues, but the underlining paradox is that the institutional framework established through the Dayton Peace Accords favors the political options that are the least supportive of its implementation. The design of its political institutions does not encourage cross-ethnic cooperation; rather, it institutionalizes ethnic discrimination. For a new political system to be effective in a society with a sinister past, for it to encourage public deliberation, participatory democracy and representative government, the society must confront that past. This process of confrontation is of the utmost importance, as the introduction of a new regime does not erase the past. This is not to say, however, that "facing the past" should be understood in terms of blame or the assignation of guilt. As Nenad Dimitrijević has argued:

> the principal point of justification should not be condemnation, ascription of guilt, paving the way for official apologies, or even reconciliation. It should rather be understood as the reconstruction of the motivational patterns of a behavior that in the recent past led to a massive violation of human rights and universal moral values. The practical-political objective of such a reflection would be to enable the citizens to regain their recently and severely damaged capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, just and unjust. (2006, 374)

In terms of fostering a process of reconciliation as the restoration of the just political relationship, the religious actors could be some of the crucial actors, given their historical and contextual position within society. Stephen R. Goodwin's asserts that social reconciliation generally lies beyond the structural realm and does not respond to the mechanical manipulation of institutions. He writes, "because reconciliation is a preeminently human endeavour involving the moral and ethical will of individuals and

communities alike, it is most naturally situated in the locus of the personal and relational, not the structural and institutional" (2003, 174). At the individual level, hence as a matter of personal religiosity, this might be true.

But in the face of failures, limits, and retrenchments of the political institutions (state), some sort of establishments should fill the gap. The organized religions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by doing so, can (re-)define their place and role within the wider civil society and recognize that:

> Modern religions have within their power the capacity to resist deadly violence and to do so in the name of the holy. ... communities of faith in which the historical argument about the proper ethical interpretation of the sacred remains vigorous and is sustained through many formal and informal channels, moves its adherents away from narrowly conceived ethnic, nationalistic, and tribal self-definition and toward a more tolerant and nonviolent social presence. (Appleby, 2002, 79)

Significantly enough, there is no better way for religious actors – at the level of institutions and communities – to experience *metanoia*: dealing with their own negative past as reorientation, as a fundamental transformation of outlook and as a redefinition of their (public) position. In particular, since the very relevant critique of the ethnopolitical nature of the current political order and the ethnicization of the society – which is highly discriminatory and leads to regular human rights violations – can inherently come only from those who helped such a scenario come to life. And accordingly only they can be effective in halting the current negative tendencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, the political reconciliation encompasses the reconstruction of both individual and communal identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Historicizing the Secularization Debate: A Helpful Illustration from Bosnia and Herzegovina

Introduction

In his book on the formations of the secular, Talal Asad reminds us that "one old argument about the need to separate religion from politics is that because the former essentially belongs to the domain of faith and passion, rational argument and interest-guided action can have no place in it. The secularist concedes that religious beliefs and sentiments might be acceptable at a personal and private level, but insists that organized religion, being founded on authority and constraint, has always posed a danger to the freedom of the self as well as to the freedom of others. That may be why some enlightened intellectuals are prepared to allow deprivatized religion entry into the public sphere for the purpose of addressing 'the moral conscience' of its audience – but on condition that it leave its coercive powers outside the door and rely only on its powers of persuasion."[1] Asad argues, in a similar manner to Charles Taylor's discussion on the models of secularism, that in liberal democratic societies, citizens who belong to different religious traditions (or to none of them), attempt to persuade one another into accepting different beliefs or simply attempt to reach a consensus regarding their beliefs.

However, recent debates on religion in the public sphere – both local and global – even in so called postsecular times, indicate a need for rethinking the basic concepts founded on either "political theologies" or "new atheisms" as their theoretical and ideological bases. Sociology of religion, in that regard, is long overdue for dedicating a portion of its research to the elaboration of the political sociology of religion as argued by Gustavo Guizzardi[2]. The focal point of that research should not solely rest on

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1   T. Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford: SUP, 2003), 186.

2   In: S. Vrcan, *Vjera u vrtlozima tranzicije* (Split: Slitska akcija, 1999), 238.

sociology of religion in the context of individual beliefs and values but on the issue of consensus. This consensus should not be implied in advance but constructed, not as a kind of fixed contract between peers but rather as a dialectic notion, one that is constantly being (re)created and dissolved between parties with unequal political, cultural, symbolic etc. capitals.

I will proceed to offer some insights into more recent arguments and contributions to the secularization debate[3] and outline the need for a new research agenda, especially when concerning religion in the public sphere, the relationship between organized religion and state institutions and finally, the specificities of multiconfessional societies – a particularly used commonplace when dealing with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Secularization debate in Sociology

Writing about new challenges facing the discipline, Srđan Vrcan pointed to a "specific twist in sociology of religion" manifested in abandoning the practice of using rationalization and secularization of social life[4] as the default explanations and answers to questions regarding the place and role of religion in modern societies.[5] The fact that these questions still persist points us to a conclusion that the explanations and the answers were somewhat lacking

Much like religion, secularization too is a complex phenomenon, thus making the possibility of procuring a singular answer to questions less likely. One will be hard-pressed to find a more contradictory term within sociology of religion than secularization. In essence, *saeculum* (derived from Latin) denotes a temporal order but it also stands for *century* and

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3   I have dealt with this topic in greater detail in several previous books and papers, q.v. D. Abazović, *Bosanskohercegovački muslimani između sekularizacije i desekularizacije* (Sarajevo/ Zagreb: Synopsis, 2004), 19.

4   Initial debates can be found in the works of Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and Karl Marx. Certainly, the very core of the secularization debate also encompasses works of Peter L. Berger, Bryan Wilson, David Martin, Robert Bellah, Andrew Greeley, Thomas Luckmann and others who wrote in the second half (the 60s and 70s) of the previous century. More recently, the phenomenon of secularization is to a great extent present in the works of Steve Bruce, Karel Dobbelaer, Jose Casanova, Mark Chaves, Jeffrey Hadden, Rodney Stark, William Baibridge, Roger Finke, Daniele Hervieu-Leger, Linda Woodhead, Grace Davie.

5   S. Vrcan, *Vjera u vrtlozima tranzicije*, 46.

the world (that which is worldly) which is the root of the understanding of the term as being "contrary" to that which is *religious* – a primarily non-temporal order.[6] However, throughout history, the phenomenon itself has been subject to different interpretations while in the vernacular it is often erroneously explained, with distorted interpretation. Under those ultimately simplified, wrong interpretations, secularization today is understood as an anti-religious process aimed at the destruction of everything religious; in a narrower sense – secularization is thought of as being "anti-Church" or "anticlerical".

Some sociologists, including Ivan Cvitkovic, denote extreme manifestations within society – such as movements to liberate society from any and all religious influence – as "secularism"[7] rather than "secularization", pointing to a need to differentiate the terminology. Finally, it is not infrequent that the term *saeculum* is used as synonymous to the term *laïcité* (French) which is also erroneous, given that the concept of *laïcité* – especially post-revolution and post XVIII century until today – is nothing but a legal-political concept institutionalizing the church-state separation in a republic.

From the sociological perspective, it may be significant to outline that, according to Malcom Hamilton[8], the key question of the secularization debate is defining religion and defining secularization accordingly. In essence, academic papers consider(ed) secularization to entail a decrease in the societal significance of religion, especially in the political realm, education and the public sphere, ergo those processes evolving in modern society through which religious institutions, religious actions and religious worldviews lose their societal significance. Through the process of secularization, societal and cultural domains are being liberated from the

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6   Although the term *secularization* is today most frequently understood as *making something (more) worldly* and is implicitly considered negative when viewed from a religious standpoint, it does not appear redundant to remind that this negative connotation is in fact owed, for the most part, to religion – primarily Christianity – to which it owes its origin. „The Latin word *saecularizatio* existed in the Church Canon *Codex Juris Canonici* and stood for someone's return to the outside world from the community of the convent. In the canonic sense the word *saecularizatio* also indicated the difference between religious clergy (withdrawn from the world) and secular clergy (remaining within the world)." q.v. S. Jakelić, "Sekularizacija i povijesni aspekti", in M. Vukomanović and M. Vučelić (eds.), *Religijski dijalog - drama razumevanja* (Beograd: CEIR, 2003) 62.

7   I. Cvitković, *Sociologija religije* (Sarajevo, DES, 2004), 380.

8   C.f. M. Hamilton, *Sociologija religije* (Beograd: CLIO, 2003).

dominance of religious institutions and symbols. Simplified, secularization entails (entailed) the separation of church and state. There was a long-standing notion that the decrease in religious practice was an indicator of a parallel decrease in the prevalence of religious belief. The adherents of this approach[9] also observed that the combined influence of prolific scientific and technical rationalism, affirmation of individual autonomy and increase in the specialization of activities led to a modern disillusionment and consequently – a definitive loss of plausibility of religious beliefs.

It could be said that the followers of the classic secularization theory mostly approached the phenomenon based on functionalism i.e. on the basis of the functional role religion has (or loses) in the society. The subsequent development of that theory was aimed at determining the multidimensionality of the secularization phenomenon – a refusal to reduce it to micro-perspectives i.e. the individual, personal relationship with religion which is only one dimension of secularization. From an abundance of significant work devoted to the multidimensionality of secularization, I would like to draw attention to the significance of Karl Dobbelaere's[10] principal premises, that the dimensions of secularization operate on the societal level, the level of religious institutions and organizations as well as on an individual level.

In contrast, the opponents of the secularization theory determine themselves within the confines of rational choice theory and the theory of religion[11] (in certain instances also within the theory of religious economy[12]) which focus their research on the revival of religious groups ongoing around the world as well as on a significant religious pluralization. Roger Finke attributes religious pluralism to religious deregulation comparing religious communities (new and existing ones) to market competitors thriving in the opportunities awarded by such deregulation. Those proficient in marketing and successful in specializing their "product" for the audience – (tel)evangelists in the United States being a good example – evoke higher

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9   Evident in the early works of Peter L. Berger, Brian Wilson, David Martin and, in recent times Steve Bruce.

10 K. Dobbelaere, *Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels* (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2002).

11 Religion and Rational Choice Theory – among the founders and most notable representatives of this theory are Rodney Stark, William Bainbridge and Roger Finke.

12 D. Yamane, "Secularization on Trial: In Defense of a Neosecularization Theory", *Journal for Scientific Study of Religion,* 36 (1) (1997) 111.

demand and in turn greater and more devoted participation.[13]

This theory accentuates the mutual competitiveness of traditional and new forms of religiosity in the modern society, i.e. – according to the representatives of this theory who are also postsecularists – it is a matter of increase and approaching rather than decrease and receding of the religious in modern society. The most frequent critique this theory articulates towards classic secularization theory is one of lack of empirical data needed to substantiate the premise of "more modernity – less religion". Lately, some postsecularists went so far as to declare secularization a myth sacralized by sociologists[14] and announce the end of the secularization theory – "secularization R.I.P."[15]

Finally, neosecularists rising to the defense of the secularization theory point out that most of the criticism of the classic secularization theory is in fact a reductionist reading of the theory, i.e. its false interpretation: In essence, as far as today's (neo)secularists are concerned, the question is not whether religion(s) will disappear – it is rather a matter of its (their) transformation. "The neosecularization paradigm emphasizes the centrality of institutional differentiation at the societal level. Data about individual beliefs, practices, and devotions do not discount the differentiation of religion from other institutions such as the economy, the state, education, and the family."[16]

The more recent secularization theory repeatedly points out to a decrease of significance of religious authorities and elites, a decrease in their ability to control societal institutional spheres, while the individual level – that in which specific individuals operate – is to a large extent versatile and can exhibit completely different trends. According to Steve Bruce, most sociologists find that certain characteristics of modern societies make them unconducive to religion, in particular "defragmentation of societies and of social life, the disappearance of the community and the growth of the bureaucracies (national and international), and the increasing rationalization."[17]

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13   R. Finke, „Religious Deregulation: Origins and Consequences", *Journal of Church and State*, 32, (3), Oxford University Press (1990), pp. 609–26

14   J. K. Hadden, "Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory", *Social Forces*, 65 (1987) 587.

15   R. Stark, "Secularization, R.I.P", *Sociology of Religion,* 60 (3) (1999) 249.

16   D. Yamane, Secularization on Trial, 115.

17   S. Bruce, *Religion in Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults* (Oxford, OUP, 1996), 39.

What postsecularists – unlike neosecularists – also overlooked was that secularization is a descriptive rather than a predictive hypothesis. Ole Riis illustrates this arguing that "[…] the central hypothesis of secularization does not directly relate to a personal religious commitment, but to the influence of religion as a public interest. […] Religion becomes a matter of private choice, not a social obligation […] Privatization implies that religion becomes relegated to private sphere. It becomes a source of interpreting and guiding the individual existence rather than of legitimating the social structure and upholding the moral order."[18] When understood in this manner, secularization is not merely a change within society – it is the changing of society itself.

Socio-political conflict – The missing variable

After all, when it comes to modern societies, Philip S. Gorski points out that we could initially – as a sort of principal premise – identify the works of authors who take into consideration primarily the *sociopolitical perspective* where the focus lies on the conflict and competition between religious and nonreligious elites and movements as well as on those oriented towards a *religiocultural perspective* where the focus lies on the relationship between religious and nonreligious values and worldviews – both between different religious traditions as well as in different stages of religious development.[19]

Indeed, according to Gorski, irrespective of multiple differences between theorists of classic secularization and theorists of religious economy, one significant aspect remains quite similar – neither the former nor the latter pay much attention to politics. Thus, Gorski insists that attention be paid to the *sociopolitical conflict* as an important variable in the secularization process and changes in the relationship between religious communities and the state as both a relevant starting point and an end point of the process.[20] It should be reiterated that the *sociopolitical conflict* approach is

18 O. Riis, "Recent Developments in the Study of Religion in Modern Society", *Acta Sociologica,* 36 (1993) 375-376.

19 P. S. Gorski, "Historicizing the Secularization Debate: An Agenda for Research", in M. Dillon (ed.), *The Handbook of Sociology of Religion* (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) 110.

20 *Ibid*. at 115.

not fully developed as is the case with the classic secularization theory or religious economy theory considering that this approach is not founded on a general theory of societal change or social behavior nor is it linked with any particular school or discipline. It is rather an interpretative, interdisciplinary framework derived from sociohistorical research.

Therefrom follows an appropriate call for "historicizing the secularization debate" through "(a) adopting a longer-range (and fully encompassing) historical perspective that extends well beyond the modern era; (b) engaging in a more serious and sustained way with the relevant historical sources and literature, so as to develop a clear sense of the temporal and spatial contours of secularization in all its dimensions; (c) viewing secularization as a contingent outcome of particular events involving particular actors; and (d) being more sensitive to changes in the context and content of religious practice and belief."[21] I hold these points to be relevant and pertinent to the research of secularizing and desecularizing processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina in both a temporal and a spatial perspective.

The issues with the affirmation or loss of position and power, i.e. with political protectionism or pressure on organized religion, present in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the late 19th century until today, were necessarily followed by an uneven approach to regulating or deregulating institutional religion. One consequence of this is that the accent was shifted towards models of individualization of belief which led to individuals independently deciding their personal *credo* providing them with a purpose of existence in accordance with their own opinions, interests, aspirations, and experiences.

However, David Martin has shown that "religious language is embedded in specific angles of vision, specific modes of human association, and in sacred places specifically shaped and informed by the gestures, images, and exclamations of worship. Such sacred places are scattered all over Europe and are part of its unity, and even if you dismiss Christianity as a lingering or malingering tenant, this deposit of faith remains a social presence and stays as a social fact."[22] According to Martin, the normative question can therefore be rephrased to ask how this presence and this fact may or may not be acknowledged in the public realm? This, in my views, equally applies *mutatis mutandis* to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context and the locally immanent religions and religious traditions.

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21 *Ibid.* at 122.

22 D. Martin, "Integration and Fragmentation Pattern of Religion in Europe", in K. Michalski (ed.), *Religion in the New Europe* (Budapest: CEUP, 3006) 64-84, at 65.

Religious and/or political identities and secularization

Past references are constantly being questioned in today's secular and/or postsecular democracies but what is rarely discussed, particularly in BiH, is that the *cuius regio eius religio* principle – after the Peace of Augsburg and later the Peace of Westphalia – is not as Jose Casanova notes, a founding principal of the modern secular democratic state but rather of the modern confessional territorial absolutist state. "Nowhere in Europe did religious conflict lead to the secularization of state and politics, but rather to the confessionalization of the state and to the territorialization of religions and peoples."[23] The problem with predominantly multiconfessional societies within this context is far more complex.

Furthermore, in more recent times and especially from the 1990s onwards, more so than in other parts of Europe, these so-called countries in transition see a "translation" of social religious identities into solidified political identities. In a certain sense, postsecular processes also enhance the creation of religious identities linked with political disputes instead of supporting their merger with various other cultural identifications and practices. It is particularly important to call into question and explore whether here, as a consequence of global events, strong postsecular – even postsovereign – processes in fact predate the never-fully-developed authentic processes of secularization conceived in the prior (Yugoslav) period of social relations (the aspect of forced atheization which was shortly present in the early stages of socialist Yugoslavia aside).

What is evident today is that "political identities can be woven around religious or confessional definitions. Thus, in the course of modern history, confessional allegiances have come to be woven into the sense of identity of certain ethnic, national, class, or regional groups…"[24] Accordingly, in Western Balkans, the senses of belonging to group and confession are fused, and the moral issues of the group's history tend to be coded in religious categories. Such coding is also strongly influenced by and in accordance with what goes on here and now. Danièle Hervieu-Léger[25] sees religious revival

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23 J. Casanova, "Public Religion Revisited", in H. de Vries (ed.), *Religion Beyond a Concept* (Fordham: FUP, 2008) 110.

24 C. Taylor, "The Future of the Religious Past", in H. de Vries (ed.), *Religion Beyond a Concept, Supra*, 193.

25 D. Hervieu-Léger, *Religion as a Chain of Memory* (New Jersey: RUP, 2000).

primarily in the continuity of modernity but also in the transformations of forms of belief (functional process) even when traditional beliefs (their essential contents) are being for the most part rejected; she argues that memory and tradition constitute a basis for legitimacy and a means for articulation for religious convictions and beliefs.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere, such legitimized political identities coded in religious categories, transformed but insistent on the notion that they are a matter of tradition and continuity reveal what is at stake. Antagonisms based on religious identity are growing stronger due largely to the fact that their proponents consider them a tool for religious and identitarian self-confirmation. Simultaneously, religious freedom is understood exclusively as one's own freedom and not that of the other. Consequently, religious freedom is thus misused as *card blanche* for unsanctioned religious practices. [26]

Jean-Paul Willaime points out that "it is exactly in this context of hypersecularisation of European societies that a certain return of the religious is coming into effect, the religious which – for its part – tends to profoundly reconfigure itself both in its relationship towards the truths they claim as well as in its modes of societal existence […]. [C]ompared to secularization as the transfer of the sacralization of the religious to other spheres of activity (economic, political, moral) which corresponds particularly to the phase of secularizing modernity, ultramodernity appears as a secularized modernity where secularization is applied to the secularizing forces themselves."[27] A similar line of thought is held by Željko Mardešić[28] who outlines five stages of secularization: the secularization of religion, the secularization of politics, the secularization of secularization, the delays and adjustments to secularization and the rebellion against secularization.

All things considered, sociologists have the most direct understanding of religion when it is objectified as a social fact in an organizational sense as well as through its followers, ergo not solely on the bases of certain ideas, attitudes, and practices. "To discover how these followers instantiate,

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26 C.f. K. J. Kuschel, *Židovi, Kršćani Muslimani: Podrijetlo i budućnost* (Sarajevo: Svjetlo riječi, 2011) 31 (book originally published in German; citation translated into English from a Bosnian edition).

27 J.P. Willaime, "Ultramoderne rekonfiguracije", *Europski glasnik*, 12 (2007) 102-103 (paper originally pulished in French; citation translated into English from a Croatian edition).

28 Ž. Mardešić, "Religija u postmodernitetu: Nestanak ili povratak svetoga?", in D. Đorđević(ed.), *Muke sasvetim* (Niš: YUNIR, 2007).

repeat, alter, adapt, argue over, and diversify them (to trace their tradition) must surely be a major task. And so too with secularism. We have to discover what people do with and to ideas and practices before we can understand what is involved in the secularization of theological concepts in different times and places."[29]

The separation of organized religion and the state by no means implies mutual disregard. It may be argued that if the process of secularization has so far been successful in any aspect – it was successful precisely in determining the principle of equality and equal rights among different confessions (in a wider sense). This principle is based on their common and concurrent relinquishment of all attempts to reign and figure as a sole proprietor of final truths and ultimate reality.

"So, instead of saying that religion was a conversation-stopper, I should have simply said that citizens of a democracy should try to put off invoking conversation-stoppers as long as possible. We should do our best to keep the conversation going without citing unarguable first principles, either philosophical or religious. If we are sometimes driven to such citation, we should see ourselves as having failed, not as having triumphed."[30]

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29 T. Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 194.

30 R. Rorty*, "Religion in Public Square"*, *Journal of Religious Ethics* 31 (1) (2003) 148-149.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina - Country Overview

Population	3,964,388
Muslim	40 percent
Orthodox Christian	31 percent
Roman Catholic	15 percent
Protestant	4 percent
Other	10 percent

Introduction

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a largely mountainous country located in the west-central part of the Balkan Peninsula, in Southeastern Europe. The population consists of three principal ethnic-religious groups–Bosniaks(Muslim), Serbs (Orthodox Christian), and Croats (Roman Catholic). The first preserved mention of the name "Bosnia" ("Bosona") is in *De Administrando Imperio,* a politico-geographical handbook written by the Byzantine emperor Constantine VII in the mid-tenth Century. From 1918 to the early 1990s Bosnia and Herzegovina was a part of Yugoslavia. Following a declaration of independence in 1992, the country suffered fierce warfare. In 1995 a peace agreement was reached that established two divisions within the country–a Federacija Bosna i Hercegovina (Bosniak-Croat federation) in the central and western areas and Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) in the north and east. There has been no census since the 1992-95 war, as a result of which the ethnic and religious makeup of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina can only be estimated.

The religious makeup of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a product of its history. Until the Ottoman conquest of the fifteenth century, the country was formally considered to be Roman Catholic, with Orthodoxy found only in Herzegovina in the south. Neither Western nor Eastern Christianity managed to penetrate Bosnia and Herzegovina deeply, however, and from the end of the twelfth century sources indicate the existence of a specifically Bosnian church. This situation, among other factors, facilitated conversions to Islam in the early Ottoman period. In addition, Ottoman rule guaranteed

a special legal status to Orthodox Christianity, which helped it spread. The numbers of Catholics, on the other hand, were reduced by flight and by conversion to both Islam and Orthodoxy, although a considerable number survived Ottoman rule without a formal hierarchy. Those who remained developed strong local characteristics under the leadership of the Franciscan order. After the Reconquista of Spain and Portugal, Sephardic Jews settled in such urban centers as Skopje and Salonika, and they are first mentioned in Sarajevo, the national capital, in the second half of the sixteenth century.

Religious Tolerance

Since the nineteenth century religious adherence in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a marker of national identity. Orthodoxy is equated with Serbian nationality and Catholicism with Croatian, while Islam is one of the main pillars of the Bosniak self. This fact made possible the use and misuse of religious symbols in the war of the 1990s, and it continues to be an important obstacle to religious tolerance.

The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, negotiated in the 1995 peace agreement, provides for freedom of religion. The same is true for the constitution of Republika Srpska, the Serb-dominated political entity within the state. As a matter of fact, however, many regions of the country have been ethnically cleansed, and in these areas religious freedom is enjoyed only by the ethnic majority, with significant restrictions for minorities.

Major Religions
- Sunni Islam
- Serbian Orthodox Church

Sunni islam

Date of origin	fifteenth-sixteenth century C.E.
Number of followers	2.16 Million

History

After the Ottoman conquest of 1463, it took almost 150 years for a majority of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina to become Muslim. In contrast to popular assumptions among Serbs and Croats, Islamicization was a mainly nonviolent process. The Ottoman state granted self-administration to the non-Muslim People of the Book, as Christians and Jews were called, even though they were subject to some social and economic discrimination. Thus, most Christians who converted did so for opportunistic motives, and folk Islam retained many traits of the Christian folk religion.

In 1878 Bosnia and Herzegovina was ruled by Austria-Hungary (annexed in 1908), which was ruled by the Habsburg dynasty, a royal family that furnished rulers for many European countries and the Holy Roman Empire. They were strongly identified with Roman Catholicism, and Islam lost its privileged status, causing some 65,000 to 150,000 Muslims to leave the region by the end of World War I. Even before the Habsburg conquest Muslims had lost their status as the majority, giving way to the Orthodox Serbs. In socialist Yugoslavia organized religion as such was repressed, but from the late 1960s Muslims were recognized as a separate nation. Numerically they once again overtook the Serbs. Many Serbs were unwilling to accept Muslim emancipation or dominance, however, and when the Bosnian Muslims and Croats (some minority of Serbs as well) voted for independence from Yugoslavia in 1992, the political leadership in Serbia supported a violent partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the following year the government of Croatia took the same position. Thus, Muslims became the main victims of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the 1992-95 war. In 1993 the legislature in Sarajevo decided to replace the national name *Musliman*, with its religious and national ambiguity, with Bosniak (*Bošnjak*), stressing the transformation of the Bosnian Muslim community into a political and sovereign nation.

Early and Modern Leaders

From the middle of the eighteenth century Bosnia's Muslim elite, though part of the Ottoman establishment, began to show its reserve toward the central rulers. Husein-kapetan Gradaščević, from Gradačac, is often seen as a leading figure of the movement for autonomy, but his revolt in the 1830s failed. During the Habsburg period Mehmed-beg Kapetanović tried to fend off the claims of both Serb and Croats nationalists who argued that the Muslims of Bosnia were actually Serbs or Croats. In the first Yugoslav state, between World Wars I and II, Mehmed Spaho, who maneuvered between Serb and Croat nationalists, was influential in managing to retain benefits for Muslim landowners.

From the 1960s communist functionaries such as Hamdija Pozderac, Atif Purivatra and Džemal Bijedić were successful in strengthening the Muslim position by advocating the establishment of a secular Muslim nation. On the other hand, a minority of religious intellectuals, including Alija Izetbegović wanted to strengthen the Islamic identity of Bosnia's Muslims. In 1990 he founded the Party of Democratic Action, whose religious nationalism determined Muslim politics throughout the decade.

Major Theologians and Authors

Between 1914 and 1931 Džemaludin Čaušević (1870 – 1938), the *reis-ul-ulema* (grand mufti) or leader of the Islamic community, fought against traditionalism and tried to win over his coreligionists for a secular Yugoslav state. He had read the great Muslim modernists and reformers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, and he had visited the Turkey of Kemal Atatürk. Čaušević's main opponents were a group of antimodernist clergymen educated in interwar Cairo. These religious leaders managed to influence such Muslim laymen as Alija Izetbegović (1925 – 2003), the first elected President of the Presidency of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, who advocated Islamic nationalism. Among the prominent theologians in twentieth century are Mehmed Handžić (1906 – 1944) and Husein ef. Đozo (1912 – 1982, one of the founding members of the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, established in 1971) whose works influenced a generations of both, Bosnian Muslim clergymans and laymens.

Houses of Worship and Holy Places

As elsewhere, the Muslim house of worship in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the mosque. The architecture of most of the mosques is the classical Ottoman style, although some new mosques, that were recently built in localities where that previously didn't exist, were built in the so-called international style, like in the other European countries as well as the USA or Australia. The first mosque in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Turhan Emin-bey's Mosque) was built in 1448/9 in village Ustikolina, near city Foca, in southeastern Bosnia. Prior to war 1992 – 1995 there were 1,144 mosques in Bosnia, out of which number only 223 remained intact by the end of war. In terms of architecture, the most significant mosques are Careva (1565) and Ghazi Husrev-bey's (1530) in Sarajevo, Tefterdarijina (1594, demolished in 1993) in Banja Luka, and Karadjoz-bey's (1557) in Mostar. In addition, Bosnian folk Islam is centered around graves (*turbe*s) belonging to Muslim martyrs (*šehid*) or to exceptionally pious men called *evlija*s for their extraordinary powers to prophesy or to perform miracles. Ajvatovica, near Prusac, is a national pilgrimage center that dates to a pre-Islamic water cult, but Islamic authorities stress that Ajvatovica has no great theological significance.

What Is Sacred?

While orthodox Islam does not recognize saints, folk Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina often in a way does so, with *šehids* and *evlija*s seen as mediators between man and God. Popular notions about *šehids* are less specific than in other parts of the Muslim world, and the term can mean any Muslim who has been innocently killed or who has suffered a violent or tragic death. While many local *hodža* (Islamic teachers/imams) support the cults of martyrs and *evlijas*, educated religious functionaries do not approve of the practice, considering it to be a Christian or even pre-Christian influence.

Holidays and Festivals

In the Bosniak-Croat federation there are five official holidays. None, however, is religious, although workers are entitled to four religious holidays each year. For the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most important religious holidays are two Eids (Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha),

the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad and the Muslim New Year (the Day of Hijrah). All these holidays are linked to *Hijrah* calendar, so their date in Gregorian calendar (used in everyday life) is different every year. The Muslim New Year is primarily a holiday of devout urban families. In more recent times, the Muslim New Year is marked in public spaces with appropriate religious and cultural programs.

The Bosnian festival of *mevlud,* which commemorates the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, is celebrated mainly in private homes. There is no standard manner of celebration, although the festivities usually include Qur'anic recitations, traditional performance of songs, and poems honoring the birth and life-path of Muhammad, as well as a large meal. Households may also decide to hold a *mevlud* for other reasons, for example, the birth of a baby, or in connection with moving into a new house. There sometimes are separate *mevlud*s for men and women, but unlike the practice in Turkey there are no formal differences between the festivities. Since the fall of communism purist theologians and laypeople have increasingly criticized the practice of *mevlud.*

Since 1995, by the decision of the Islamic Community, the second day of the Eid-al Fitr was proclaimed the Day of Martyrs (*šehids*). On the Day of Martyrs the highest delegation of the Islamic Community, led by the reis-ul-ulema visits the Martyr Cemetery "Kovači" in Sarajevo where a *Yasin* (surah from Qur'an) is recited for all the martyrs in Bosnia. A *hatma* (the entire Qur'an) is recited in Ghazi Husrev-bey's mosque in Sarajevo.

Mode of Dress

Until the end of the nineteenth century, dress in Bosnia and Herzegovina was as much a marker of social and regional identity as of religious affiliation. It then became Westernized and unified, although some features became markers of national identity. Today elderly Muslim peasant women often wear wide, baggy trousers called *dimije* or a long skirt and a headscarf, but they may dress in a modern style when they go into town. Women wear a headscarf during religious services and the reading of the Qur'an, and since the 1980s this accessory has spread into everyday urban life. The headscarf, together with a skirt and long-sleeved blouse, has come to constitute a new, Arab-influenced Muslim style. Except for white prayer caps during religious ceremonies, Muslim men generally dress in

a Western style. A cap called a *fes* is worn by some members of the older generation.

Dietary Practices

As with dress, dietary practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina are a means of national differentiation, and differences in cooking and eating have sometimes been considered an obstacle to intermarriage. On the other hand, fasting and the prohibition of alcohol are not as strictly observed as in other Muslim countries. It is common for men to drink alcohol, and during the socialist decades many men abandoned the habit of fasting, thus conferring this practice mainly on their wives. However, since the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is common that during the period of the month-long Ramadan (period of fast) the vast majority of men strictly observing the prohibition of alcohol. The prohibition against eating pork is observed by a great majority of Muslims.

Rituals

According to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, to which Bosnian Muslims belong, there are seven categories of ritual action. They range from *farz,* practices that God has commanded and that all believers must therefore perform, to *haram,* that which is forbidden. In many Bosnian villages this system is simplified into two broad categories, distinguishing, on the one hand, between what is *propisano* (prescribed, according to the law) and *obavezno* (obligatory) and, on the other, what is *lijepo* (beautiful) and of *dobra volja* (goodwill).

The most elaborate rituals for Bosnian Muslims are those for marriage and death. The marriage ceremony usually takes place in mosque, or in specially prepared rooms in the premises of local Islamic community, or in the private houses. Ceremony is always led by *hodža.* When takes place in the bridegroom's house, when the bride arrives, her mother-in-law places a loaf of bread under her right arm and the Qur'an under her left, thus symbolizing the key roles of a wife–giving birth to the next generation and maintaining the household's moral and religious values. The marriage ceremony is considered complete only after the two families have acknowledged their new relationship by a ritual exchange of gifts.

Besides the obligatory funeral rites prescribed by the Shariah (Islamic

law), Bosnian women hold domestic commemorations called *tevhid.* While this Arabic term means "praise of the oneness of God," Bosnian folk Islam understands *tevhid* not only as a prayer for the soul of the dead but as a "gift" to the person. Many religious functionaries are opposed to women's *tevhid*s, which may have evolved under dervish influence, and would prefer that they take place only in a mosque and under the leadership of a *hodža.* Still, men, women or both can participate in *tevhid,* but men cannot participate in *tevhid* if women do the leading Qur'anic recital.

Rites of Passage

The timing of Bosnian rites of passage differs for men and women. For example, while in rural areas a boy (*momak*) becomes a man (*čovjek*) by marriage, the situation for a women is different. A girl (*cura*) becomes a bride (*mlada*) by marriage, but only after she has given birth to a child is she considered a woman (*žena*). This used to be reinforced by the fact that in the past many cases a civic marriage is contracted only after the birth of the first child, but this is not a case anymore.

Membership

One becomes a member of the Islamic Community by birth in a family registered in the Community or by voluntarily entering into membership. Not entering into membership in such a manner does not imply not being a Muslim, but only a Muslim can become a member of the Islamic Community. The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina pursues internal mission work but not external growth. It tries to enhance the level of piety and observance among people of Muslim background who abandoned religious practices during the communist decades and among Bosnian youth. Islam uses means such as television, printed media and the Internet, and there are optional classes in religious education in state schools. The number of members if Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to independence is not known, but today, based on membership dues is 672,958 households. Beside in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Islamic Community has its organizational units in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Germany, Australia, North America (US and Canada), Austria, Holland (Benelux Countries), Denmark, Finland, France, Norway and Sweden.

Social Justice

For a Muslim, giving *sadakat al-fitr* (monetary gift) is obligatory during the observation and the celebration of the Eid al-Fitr, and funds collected are used by Islamic Community to help those in need. Helping the poor for Muslim in Bosnia is *tewab,* that is, an act pleasing to God, and Bosniaks, who use the Turkish form *sevap,* follow this practice. During the war of the 1990s and its aftermath numerous charitable organizations from the Muslim world appeared in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not only to underline this attitude and express pan-Islamic solidarity but also to strengthen their respective countries' influence among Bosnian Muslims.

In the folk culture, however, there also exists the opposite tendency. People sometimes see the success, especially material success, of a household to be a result of its devoutness and ascribe poverty to a "weak faith."

Social Aspects

Bosnian Islam is characterized by a relative degree of equality between the sexes, although this has somewhat abated since the 1990s, and by its negative stance toward intermarriage with Christians. As with other Muslims, Bosnians formerly observed the institution of milk kinship, in which people who were breast-fed by the same wet nurse called each other sister or brother "through milk" (*po mlijeku*). Marriage among milk kin was considered as serious a taboo as marrying a blood relative. Unlike Arab Muslim societies, however, Bosnian milk kinship was rarely needed to manage interfamily relations, since polygamy was seldom practiced in Bosnia and marriages between cousins were taboo.

Political Impact

In everyday life as well as in politics, Islamic symbols serve Bosniaks as an expression of collective identity and as a means of self-definition against Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats. On the other hand, the impact of Islam as a guideline for political and social action has lessened. Although in the 1990s there were episodes of Islamism, sometimes supported by organizations from Iran and from Arab countries, since then the influence of radical religious groups seems to have declined.

Controversial Issues

After the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and independence of its Republics, the once unified Islamic Community of Yugoslavia was split. The formal legal status of Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina significantly changed as well. In 1993, during the Renewal Assembly in Sarajevo, the pro-Yugoslav reis-ul-ulema Jakub Selimoski had been ousted, and Mustafa Cerić, considered by many as nationalist Islamist, elected as a new leader of Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. His title was naib-al-reis (the acting reis-ul-ulema) due to feeling that wartime is not suitable period for election a new reis-ul-ulema. Immediately after the war, once proper condition met, the Assembly of Islamic Community confirmed Mustafa Cerić as new reis-ul-ulema. Alija Izetbegović's Party of Democratic Action since the wartime significantly influenced Bosnian Islamic religious institutions, so sacralization of politics and politicization of religion occurs in many ways. Till today in Bosnia and Herzegovina a controversy about the relationship between official Islam, the Bošnjak nation, and party politics has been present. In 2012 Husein Kavazović has been elected as the new reis-ul-ulema.

Cultural Impact

Until the nineteenth century Islam had a great impact on Bosnian architecture and music, even outside the sacred sphere. In the twentieth century socialism marginalized these influences, but in the early 1990s religious and spiritual songs called *ilahija*s and kasidas played an important role in mass mobilization. In the following war many masterpieces of Islamic architecture were destroyed. In contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina the imprint of Islam has again been felt in several fields of culture. Although this has led to a rise in Muslim cultural consciousness, contemporary artists and intellectuals tend to pursue their own individual paths.

Serbian Orthodox Church

Date Of Origin	Thirteenth Century C.E. (Herzegovina) and Fifteenth Century C.E. (Bosnia)
Number Of Followers	1.4 Million

History

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the medieval Serbian empire expanded southwest, and in 1219, the first one to head the Church, St. Sava Nemanjić, was granted the autocephaly, independence for the Church. Apart from existing dioceses and for the sake of more effective organization of the Church, new dioceses were established, which included that of Dabar/Dabar-Bosnia. At that time a Diocese of Hum (later Herzegovina) was created. In Bosnia proper Orthodox Church institutions were mostly established only after the Ottoman conquest in 1463. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Orthodox population grew rapidly because of the conversion of Roman Catholics and from the settlement of Orthodox Serbs and Vlachs from Serbia. In 1557 the Serbian medieval Patriarchate of Peć was reestablished and expanded into Bosnia proper. Because of the cooperation of the Peć patriarch with foreign powers during the Austro-Turkish wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Serb hierarchy lost its credibility with the Ottoman rulers, and in 1766 the patriarchate was abolished.

The patriarch of Constantinople then reintegrated Bosnia and Herzegovina into his jurisdiction, and Greek bishops (whom the people referred as *Fanariots* – after Fanar, quarter of Constantinople) administered the Bosnian bishoprics in a corrupt manner. As an Exarch of Dalmatia, the Bishop of Dabar/Dabar-Bosnia transferred his Episcopal see (official chair of Bishop), for a time, to Rmanj Monastery, on the border of Bosnia and Dalmatia. While performing his ministry, the Bishop of Dabar had his see in other part of Bosnia as well, until the permanently settled in Sarajevo in 1713. The San-Stefano Treaty (1878) on the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish war provided that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be autonomous, but during the same year the Berlin Congress (the meeting

of the leading European Great Powers and Ottoman Empire on Balkans) entrusted Austria-Hungary the mandate over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Greek bishops and metropolitans resigned their sees, and the Habsburg administrators worked out an agreement with the patriarch of Constantinople that gave Vienna the right to nominate bishops (but before that the Patriarchate performed the canonical formalities). Still, the church as a whole became increasingly inclined toward unification with Serbia. When the Habsburg empire collapsed in 1918, the four bishoprics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, and Banja Luka-Bihać) were re-united with the Serbian Orthodox Church. In 1919 the bishops of all areas (including Bosnia and Herzegovina) of the previously abolished Patriarchate of Peć met in Belgrade (Serbia) and proclaimed spiritual and administrative unity of all regional Churches. During World War II, when Bosnia and Herzegovina became a part of Croatia, Serbian Orthodoxy was severely persecuted. In the 1992-95 war the Orthodox Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina mainly supported the Bosnian Serb leadership of Radovan Karadžić (currently detained in International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in Den Hag, accused for war crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims and Croats during war 1992-1995).

Early and Modern Leaders

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Bosnian Serb leaders were torn between Serb nationalism and allegiance to Yugoslavia. Many Orthodox, such as Vaso Pelagić, agitated against Habsburg rule and for the Serbian national cause. In 1918 Vojislav Šola, the leading Serb politician at the time, presented a joint memorandum of Bosnian Serbs and Croats in favor of the creation of Yugoslavia. The Montenegro-born Radovan Karadžić, who was the leader of the Bosnian Serbs in the 1992-95 war, came to be considered one of the principal Serbian war criminals.

Major Theologians and Authors

Bosnia and Herzegovina has proven a much better field for political activists than for theologians. Since 1882 the single Orthodox seminary in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Orthodox Theological Faculty of St. Basil of Ostrog and St. Petar of Dabar-Bosnia, previously settled in Reljevo near Sarajevo, currently in Foča (city in southeastern

Bosnia). Metropolitan Petar Zimonjić of Dabar-Bosnia (1866 – 1941, was canonized and his name was added to the list of other saints of the Serbian people and of Orthodox Church due to fact he refused to collaborate with Nazi regime, and consequently was killed at the beginning of WWII -his body was never found). Atanasije Jevtić, a Serbia-born theologian with expertise in patristics, was bishop of the Zahum-Herzegovina diocese from 1992 to 1999. He is one of the main exponents of anti-Westernism among contemporary Serbian Orthodox.

Houses of Worship and Holy Places

The numbers of religious buildings where religious services are performed are as follow: 914 churches, 26 monasteries and 132 other Serbian Orthodox estates. In Bosnia and Herzegovina sacred buildings serve as markers of ethnic as well as religious presence. For this reason ethnic cleansing during the twentieth century was always connected to the destruction of the enemy's sacred buildings. Orthodox churches and chapels, however, suffered less damage during the 1992-95 war than did Muslim mosques and Catholic churches. Church construction frequently causes political conflict.

What Is Sacred?

Orthodoxy reveres saints, and in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina the saints are pronouncedly Serbian in character. There were differences between the arsenal of saints in medieval Serbia and Bosnia, and in early Ottoman times some prominent personalities of Islamic mysticism were transformed into Orthodox saints. The immigration of Serbs and Vlachs from Serbia caused a shift, however, with the church coming to stress the cults of the medieval Serbian rulers, most of whom had been canonized by the Serbian Orthodox Church. Saint Sava Nemanjić is by far the most revered saint.

Holidays and Festivals

In contrast to the Bosniak-Croat federation, Republika Srpska gives an official status to religious holidays, all of which follow the Orthodox calendar. The greatest holiday (feast-day) of the Church is Easter. Christmas is celebrated on 6-8 January, the Orthodox New Year on 14-15 January,

Epiphany on 19 January, Saint Sava's Day on 27 January, and Saint Vitus's Day (*Vidovdan*) on 28 June. The other holidays are Good Friday and Pentecost. The Serbian Orthodox Church observes the feast-days according to the Julian calendar (as Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Moscow and Georgia, and the Holy Mount of Athos).

A specific feature of Serbian Orthodoxy is the *krsna slava,* the festival of a household patron. The Serbian Orthodox is the only Orthodox Church whose celebrates *slava.* Tradition originates from the very early period of baptism of South Slavs, when members of families considered the Christian Saints, depicted on the icons, as their personal holy patrons. In addition, the early liturgies has been done in Greece language, which people did not speak and understood, but they observed images of Saints on the icons and developed a personal and spiritual relations to them. As with *mevlud* among Muslims, this festival regulates social relationships. A household invites relatives, friends, and neighbors and expects to be invited in return. Other important holidays are dedicated to Saint Elias and Saint George, both of whom formerly appeared in a modified form among Bosnian Muslims.

Mode of Dress

In modern Bosnia and Herzegovina the Orthodox population can hardly be distinguished by dress. In church some women wear a headscarf, but there is no obligation to do so. The *šajkača,* a soldier's cap with a double brim introduced from Serbia, is considered a symbol of Serbdom.

Dietary Practices

Except for fasting, Orthodoxy in Bosnia and Herzegovina has no specific dietary prescriptions. Among the faithful even fasting is not always observed. The plum brandy *šljivovica* is a popular alcoholic drink among Bosnian Serbs.

Rituals

The Holy Liturgy, including confession and the Eucharist, are the central rituals of Orthodoxy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many

people go to church only irregularly, however, and from a social standpoint the most significant rituals are baptism, weddings, *slava*s, and funerals. Before the war of the 1990s, Bosnian Serbs sometimes frequented Muslim faith healers if no one else could help them. Since the war an increasing number of Orthodox have turned to spiritist movements and to other rituals of non-Orthodox origin.

Rites of Passage

Baptisms, weddings, and funerals are important rites of passage among Bosnian Orthodox, although they are observed in traditional ways. Orthodox funerals, however, have turned into occasions for showing off the family's social status, and some graveyards have come to be dominated by pompous gravestones of nouveaux riches who died young.

Membership

While theologically church membership is constituted by baptism, in the popular view Serbs as such are an Orthodox people. Thus, the fear of proselytism by others, long an element of Serbian religious history, is increased by the anxiety that, in converting from Orthodoxy to another faith, a Serb loses his national identity. Today various Protestant denominations have come to be the center of Orthodox criticism on this point, and the Orthodox Church has joined with other traditional faiths in attempting to legislate restrictions against missionary organizations from outside the country.

Social Justice

Orthodoxy identifies with the Serbian people, who in many areas have been poor for centuries. Bosnian Orthodox priests share the lifestyles of the faithful and thus have a close understanding of their social needs. On the oppression of non-Serbs by Serbs, however, Orthodoxy sometimes remains silent. According to the long tradition of idealizing national rulers, the people appreciate Bosnian Serb politicians more for enhancing national territory than for alleviating social needs.

Social Aspects

In rural areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina there formerly was a strong tradition among Serbs of wives being subordinate to their husbands and of sons to their fathers. Although these role models were revived in the national discourse of the 1990s, they were not necessarily transformed into practice. In socialist Yugoslavia the Serb population was generally more tolerant toward religious intermarriage than were Catholics and Muslims, but intermarriage today is extremely rare. As with Muslims, Bosnian Serbs formerly observed the institution of milk kinship, whereby those sharing the same wet nurse were held to be related, but marriage taboos were not as strict.

Political Impact

While the Bosniak-Croat federation has no official religion, Republika Srpska treats Orthodoxy almost as a state religion. Orthodox religious instruction is obligatory for Serb pupils, and attempts to turn it into a voluntary subject have been prevented by the Orthodox hierarchy. There are signs, however, that the church has lost some influence. Under pressures from the international community and the Bosniak-Croat federation, for example, the government of Republika Srpska has significantly reduced its material support for the Orthodox Church. Orthodox bishops from Bosnia and Herzegovina occupy key positions in Serbia and in the diaspora, thus giving a specifically conservative and national note to Serbian Orthodoxy as a whole.

Controversial Issues

The main controversies in Orthodoxy in Bosnia and Herzegovina revolve around the stance toward Western civilization in general, toward ecumenism in particular, as well as around the role of the part of clergy in a war 1992-1995. Pro-Western and ecumenical currents seems to be weaker in Bosnia and Herzegovina than in Serbia, for example. Such matters as birth control, abortion, and divorce are more often discussed in the context of the Serbs' demographic survival than as religious or moral questions. Additional issue is a very recent sex scandal that culminated with the publication of graphic video show the Bishop Vasilije Kačavenda of Tuzla and Zvornik Bishopric engaged in sexual activity with young man.

Previously, some other high-ranking clergyman (e.g. Bishop Pahomije of Vranje, Serbia) has been accused in several occasions for sex-abuses.

Cultural Impact

In general the cultural impact of Orthodoxy in Republika Srpska is even greater than in Serbia itself. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Orthodoxy is perceived as the distinctive and most important quality of Serbian identity, and various types of officially promoted culture are impregnated with Orthodox music and iconography. Unlike Orthodoxy in Habsburg-influenced Croatia and in Vojvodina, in northern Serbia, church architecture and painting in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not have baroque features. Rather, as in Serbia, Serbo-Byzantine and neo-Byzantine models dominate.

Other Religions

The number of Roman Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina has decreased during the twentieth century. An estimate number of adherents in 2007 has been 461,112, living in four dioceses (Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka and Trebinje). For one thing, about half of the Catholic population has left the country since 1992. The vast majority of Catholic population in terms of their ethnic affiliations are Croats (98 %), the rest are Austrians, Polish, Ukrainians, Italians, Slovenes and others. Currently, in 1,078 religious buildings services are offered to Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina archeologists have excavated several ancient buildings from the third and fourth century, which served as Christian oratories. The oldest explicitly mentioned diocese is the Diocese of Trebinje-Mrkanj at the beginning of tenth century. After the Medieval Bosnian Kingdom fell under the Ottoman rule, the Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror granted the Bosnian Franciscans and *ahdname* (Ottoman official charter, official agreement) allowing the Bosnian ecclesiasticals to live in his Empire, in their monasteries, and their churches must not be disturbed. Catholicism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is heterogeneous, the main division being between Franciscans (in 1735 the Vatican established the Vicariate of Bosnia where a Bosnian Franciscan

regularly performed a Bishop's duty, until the 1881) and the secular clergy introduced during the Habsburg period. At the same time there is a division among Franciscans in Bosnia and in Herzegovina that dates to 1844, when Herzegovinian Franciscans split from Bosnian Franciscans. Again, the Vatican established the Vicariate of Herzegovina in 1846 where Herzegovinian Franciscan performed the Bishop's duty. Herzegovinian Franciscans developed in a more nationalist and anti-liberal direction. The Franciscan-led church in Bosnia and Herzegovina, used to being a minority organization in a non-Catholic environment, was prone to subordination and compromise. The Franciscans found ways to coexist with Habsburg authorities, with the Serb-dominated Kingdom of Yugoslavia, with the Ustasha fascist dictatorship during World War II, and with communist rulers after 1945, and they have continued to coexist since the war of the 1990s.

In 1882, however, the Vatican appointed the Zagreb theologian Josip Stadler as a first archbishop of Sarajevo, so an Archdiocese was established with the restored medieval name *Vrhbosanska*. As with many other Catholic clergymen from Croatia, Stadler saw the Franciscan dominance in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an anomaly conditioned by Ottoman rule, and he strove to replace the order by regular clergy subordinated to himself. While Stadler justified his policies as a means of normalization and modernization and saw intervention in political matters as a prerogative of the church, the Franciscans felt that he did not appreciate their historical role in keeping the Catholic faith during centuries of Islamic domination. Thus, since the end of the 19th century, both views have been present in the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the secular clergy stressing the dangers of living in a non-Catholic environment. Alongside Bosnian Franciscans and Herzegovinian Franciscans, religious congregations of pontifical right in Bosnia and Herzegovina are Jesuits, Dominicans, Selesians, Carmelites, Trapists, Sisters of Mercy of St. Vincent, Herzegovinian Franciscan Sisters, Bosnian Franciscan Sisters, Sisters of Adorers of the Blood of Christ, and the Daughters of the Divine Love. There is active Greek-Catholic Vicariate in Bosnia and Herzegovina with ten parishes.

In Ottoman times Western Catholic travelers to Bosnia and Herzegovina often described the Franciscans as backward and uneducated and as despotic supervisors of their parishioners' personal lives. Bosnian Croat authors, however, have portrayed them as the only transmitters of Western

civilization into the country. Concerning religious practices, the Franciscans have fought folk religion more vigorously than the Orthodox or Muslim clergy, largely because they were urged to do so by inspectors from Rome, and these policies have not been without results. Among Catholics, for example, the institution of milk kinship was less frequent than among Muslims or Orthodox. In prewar Bosnia and Herzegovina Catholics turned less frequently than did Orthodox to Muslim faith healers. And Catholics are at least as hostile as are Muslims toward intermarriage. Nevertheless, Bosnian Catholics continue to share common practices with Muslims and with Orthodox Christians, including, in some parts of the country, though very rarely, the *slava* celebration. The Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina runs three higher theological educational institutions.

Protestants constitute only a small part of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although their missionary activity has been limited, it has grown. The Christian Baptist Church, The Evangelical Church, The Methodist Church, The Christian Adventists Church, Jehovah's Witnesses, Pentecostal Church of Christ, and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) are present in the country. There also are followers of Krishna Consciousness.

The Jewish community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also small in numbers. The first Jews arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1565 via Salonika (Greece) where some of Sephardi settled after being expelled from Spain in 1492. In 1581 the first Jewish temple was built in Sarajevo. Before 1941 there were Jewish communities in several towns (majority lived in Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Zenica, and Doboj), but they were almost completely extinguished during the Nazi occupation. The Jewish religious organization was reestablished after 1945, but in the 1990s war and its aftermath the community lost about two-thirds of its members by emigration. Today, there are 1,130 Jewish adherents observing its religious duties in three synagogues in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As one of the traditional faiths, it is represented in the Interreligious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, founded in 1997 by representatives of the Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic communities.

<div align="right">Klaus Buchenau</div>

See Also Vol. 1: *Christianity, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam, Roman Catholicism, Sunni Islam*

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Religoius Claims During the War and Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina

Introduction

During the period when the process of disintegration of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was unraveling into aggression, war, and bloodshed, the 'international response' was marked by a lack of unity and determination. David Owen, the EU mediator for SFRY and a prominent figure of international power at this key historical moment, stated that

> …what the Clinton Administration seemed to want until 1994, when they first began asserting themselves positively in the Balkans, was power without responsibility [...] The member states of the European Union and their Foreign Ministers did accept responsibility [...] but they never exercised power (Yannis, 2002, p. 264).

Force did indeed become necessary to put an end to the war, and in late summer 1995 NATO intervened with large-scale air operations (large-scale bombing of the Serbs' army targets), followed with the deployment of approximately 60,000 peacekeeper-soldiers. After intensive negotiations in Dayton, in late 1995 the political leaders of warring sides from Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), and the presidents of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, reached the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP). This compromise led to a cessation of hostilities, gave life to the present state structure of B&H, deemed an 'internationally designed state that exists by international design' (Bose 2005).

However, it should be noted that the position of the International Community (IC) in and around B&H cannot be reduced to the more

or less formal relationships of a protectorate (such as, for example, East Timor or Kosovo). David Chandler, an author indicating the role of 'local consent' for the Agreement, as well as implications arising from it, asserts:

> [r]ather than an external imposition, Dayton formally appears to be a treaty made by the local powers – B&H and its neighbors, Croatia and the rump former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). It was not by UN Security Council resolution but by the coercive fiction of 'local consent' that international actors were invited to oversee Dayton and to install the temporary post-conflict administrative mechanism of the Office of High Representative (OHR). This was an office only 'consistent with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions', not formally run by or directly accountable to the UN (Chandler 2005, p. 337).

A key foci of analyses of conflict settlement in B&H since 1991 until today must include the question of the responsibility of the International Community. However, several general features of the pre- and post-Dayton Bosnia should be considered alongside this frame.

Many considered the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY),Yugoslavia 'en miniature', inhabited mainly by the three peoples; Muslims (today Bosniaks)[1], Serbs, and Croats. Still, historically, neither Bosniaks, Serbs or Croats constituted a significant majority of the overall population, and 15 national minorities intermingled on the entire territory

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1   It is well known that in the SFRY, Muslims, unlike Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Montenegrins and Macedonians – did not obtain the status of Yugoslav people(*Jugoslovenski narod* in term of nation) until 1971. Until then, during official censuses, Muslims had to rely on a wide range of variants and models of self-identification. Accordingly, in the Census from 1948 the offered options were "Muslim – nationally undecided", but "Serb" and "Croat" as well. For those who did not want to declare themselves as Serbs and Croats during the Census in 1953 option was "Yugoslav – nationally undecided". During 1961 Muslims could choose to declare themselves in terms of belonging to ethnic minority group (*narodnost*–"Muslims as ethic group") and finally, in Census from 1971 they could register under the *people/nationality* (Muslims as nationality). After 1993, according to the decision of the Bosniak Assembly (*Svebosnjacki sabor*) held in Sarajevo, the term "Muslims as ethnic group" is no longer used. Instead, the name "Bosniaks" is recognized as the national name, so the term "Muslims" is used solely in the domain of confessional designation. In Bosnian language there is a distinction between *Musliman* with capital M, and *musliman* written in lower case. The first is understood as name for members of ethnic group (which is, in a way, a secularized notion) for that population in B&H, while the latter is used to denote members of Islamic Community, namely practicing believers.

until 1991. Ex-Yugoslav literature perceives B&H as a model multiethnic society, with peaceful interethnic co-existence. The last official census data on B&H dates back to 1991. According to this data, there is an ethnic, not religious map of the country. During this period between 1945-1991, but even more so today, ethnic and religious identities have been empirically conflated.

Based on religious classification, the population in 1991 was distributed as follows[2]: Islamic: 42,7660; Orthodox: 29,3995; Roman-Catholic: 13,5687; Catholic: 3,3195; Serbian: 0,6934; Greek-Catholic: 0,0717; Croatian: 0,0668; Protestant: 0,0416; Islamic-Catholic: 0,0118; Members of Pro-Oriental Cults: 0,0098; Jewish: 0,0052; Old-Catholic: 0,0028; Bosnian Roman-Catholic: 0,0024; Orthodox Serbs: 0,0023; Free Catholic: 0,0017; Orthodox-Catholic: 0,0010; Catholic-Orthodox: 0,0006 Orthodox-Islamic: 0,0005; Macedonian: 0,0004; Islamic Community: 0,0004; Romanian: 0,0003; ZIDRA: 0,0002; Roman-Catholic Muslims: 0,0002; other confessions: 0,0245. There was no municipality in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox were not represented in the composition of the population. The census did not offer specific options in its questionnaire, and citizens were free to provide any answer to the question about their religious affiliation. This resulted in diverse categorization, which was sometimes paradoxical.[3]

The diverse religious makeup of B&H is a product of the region's tumultuous history (Buchenau, 2013). Until the Ottoman conquest of the 15th century, the country was considered to be Christian because of its distinctive Bosnia Church (developed during the medieval period, between the fifth and 15th centuries). Over time it came to be identified as Roman Catholic, with Orthodoxy existing only in Herzegovina, in the south. Neither Western nor Eastern Christianity managed to penetrate B&H deeply, however. This situation, among other factors, facilitated conversions to Islam in the early Ottoman period. In addition, Ottoman rule granted a special legal status to Orthodox Christianity, which further extended its reach. The number of Roman Catholics, however, was reduced

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2   Data from "Statistical Periodic" No. 233, Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 1993.

3   E.g. Islamic-Catholic, Catholic-Orthodox or Orthodox-Islamic!? However, having in mind that numbers of B&H citizens were offspring from bi-religious and bi-national marriages, there is possibility that in such a cases individuals provided answers that reflected different religious and ethnical background of their parents.

by migration and by conversions to both Islam and Orthodoxy. Those who remained were unified under the leadership of the Catholic Church's Franciscan order, which was established in B&H at the beginning of the 18th century.

Religion and ethnicity are closely intertwined in B&H. The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is largely divided along ethnic-religious lines. Since the 19th century religious adherence in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a marker of national identity. Orthodoxy is equated with Serbian nationality and Catholicism with Croatian nationality, while Islam is one of the main pillars of the Bosniak identity.

The commonly accepted fact for B&H among scholars, but population too, is that organized religion played the role of preserving and transmitting ethno-national cultures and values. Still, in other ways, pseudo-religious identification can result in social situations in which religion is merely a referent for group identity. In the process of ethno-national differentiation among the B&H population, religions played a key role. Thus, until now, the majority of B&H peoples considered religion and confessions a fundamental element for determining identity and individual and collective consciousness–both their own community's as well as others (Abazović, 2010). Therefore, historical subjectivities in B&H have not produced the nominal equivalence of territory and nation–'one people on one territory'– but instead ethno-national plurality. This has created aggressive and radical ethno-confessional mobilizations that have been used as primary tools for political legitimacy and de-legitimacy. As a part of nationalistic mobilization in the late 1980s, religious symbols (the crescent of Islam and the two crosses of Catholicism and Orthodoxy) were first secularized and then re-sacralized as national symbols. Religious divisions, in turn, made possible the use and misuse of these religious symbols in the war during the 1990s. Accordingly, the early 1990s, marked by SFRY's process of dissolution, inevitably reflected directly on the territory of B&H.

These nationalists tensions led not only to war, but also to crimes against humanity and genocide. Silber and Little trace the beginning of SFRY's break-up to the rise of Serb nationalism in the 1980s, which Serbian President Slobodan Milošević harnessed to strengthen his control. By the early 1990s some regions with Serb minorities, including those dominated by Croats, openly went to war against Milošević's Yugoslav's People's Army (JNA), while others, such as the B&H territory were quickly swept along

in conflict (Silber & Little 1996, pp. 26-7).

As a consequence of the massive ethnic cleansing during the war, nearly one and half million Bosnians were recorded as refugees and internally displaced persons. The death toll after the war (between 1991-1995) is generally estimated around 102,000; 55,000 civilians and just over 47,000 soldiers (Tabeau & Bijak 2005). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rulings from February 2007 effectively determined the character of the war to be 'international', 'despite the evidence of widespread killings, rape and torture elsewhere during the Bosnian war, especially in detention centres, the judges ruled that the criteria for genocide were met only in Srebrenica'.[4]

One such example of targeted killings occurred in early July 1995. At the UN compound in Potočari/Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serb Army separated more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys from the women, and executed, buried and reburied these men in mass graves. Till today, nearly 7,000 genocide victims have been identified through DNA analysis of body parts recovered from mass graves, and 6,066 have been buried at the Srebrenica – Potočari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide.

The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) negotiated an end to the war in B&H by creating the current structure of B&H, which comprises two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, FB&H and Republika Srpska, each with a high level of autonomy. The FB&H includes 10 cantons –regional political and economic areas. The town of Brčko, which was the subject of international arbitration, now has the status of a district and until 2012 was under the direct supervision of a special international envoy.

As the current state was established through an international agreement, for the purpose of implementation and particularly in view of maintaining peace,

> the Office of the High Representative (OHR) is an *ad hoc* international institution responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the accord […] The High Representative […] is working with the people and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community to ensure that Bosnia

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4 'Highest U.N. court rules Serbia failed to prevent genocide in Bosnia' http://usatoday30. usatoday.com/news/world/2007-02-26-serb-genocide_x.htm

and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.[5]

Other international organizations 'were originally intended at facilitating the domestic decision-making process by insuring adequate security for citizens (SFOR, IPTF), creating the economic framework for successful governance (EU, UN) and by promoting democratic and more tolerant institutions and processes (OSCE), (Bieber 2002, p. 213).

The complex structures of state organization of B&H can (irrespective of international interventionism aimed at achieving peace) ultimately be subsumed under those models that a number of scholars define as consociationalism (Lijphart, 1977).

As I have argued elsewhere (Abazović, 2007), in order to accommodate conflict, stabilization and democratic development, key elements of consociationalism – composed of a grand coalition, proportionality, mutual veto and segmental autonomy – have been implemented. The post-Dayton B&H must therefore be considered a form of consociational democracy since it includes a grand coalition determined by election legislation (and results of all the elections thus far), and the process of establishing an executive branch comprising key parties and based on the principle of ethnic representation. The element of proportionality is simply the three-member state Presidency, as well as election of members of Parliament (following ethnic and entity criteria, let alone the House of Peoples), composition of the Court of B&H, etc. The mechanism of protection of vital national interests used in B&H parliamentary practice is, in effect, the mutual veto. Finally, segmental autonomy is reflected, first and foremost, through institutions and policies (in the widest sense) of entity structures of the state, i.e. through 10 cantons of the FB&H (five with majority Bosniak population, three with majority Croat population and two so called mixed cantons).

During and following the war, borders shifted (and continue to shift), while tension between groups has increased. Religious homogenization has been linked with national homogenization, which in turn influences the rise of religious self-identification. Today in B&H, unimodal environments are present (where one confession is dominating). According to estimates, 45 percent of the population is Bosniak (Muslim), 36 percent is Serb

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5   http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=38519

(Orthodox Christian), and 15 percent is Croat (Roman Catholic).

B&H is today faced with a diverse set of issues, but the underlining paradox is that the institutional framework established through the GFAP favors the political options that are the least supportive of this agreement's implementation. The design of its political institutions does not encourage cross-ethnic cooperation; rather, it institutionalizes ethnic discrimination. In light of failures, limitations, and retrenchments of B&H state institutions, some sort of organized actors should fill the gap. Therefore I will discuss the role of organized religion in (the Islamic Community, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church) in that respect.

During the war, politicized and ethicized religion became a powerful tool for mobilization against 'ethnic enemies' in B&H. Although many scholars who have worked on the armed conflict in B&H do not consider it a religious conflict, collapsing religious and ethnic identities and involvement of religious institutions and its leadership in the war made various sites – including religious ones – targets of actual and symbolic violence. Craig Calhoun argues

> one of the uglier ways in which nationalism gained popular and academic attention in the early 1990s was the Serbian program of 'ethnic cleansing'… the policy of 'ethnic cleansing', like all of nationalism and ethnic politics, depended on social construction of identity, mobilised members of the chosen ethnic group only unevenly, and served the interest of some participants far more than others… Claiming these ethnic solidarities and the identity of Serbs as both ancient and seemingly 'natural', the new ideological mobilisation successfully demanded that its adherents be willing both to kill and to die for their nation (Calhoun 1993, p. 211-2).

However, Roger Brubaker and David D. Laitin rightly point out that 'ethnicity thus remained theoretically exogenous rather than being integrated into key analytical or theoretical concepts' (Brubaker & Laitin 1998, p. 426).

> In the study of ethnicity, ethnic conflict, and nationalism, accounts of *conflict* have not been distinguished sharply from accounts of *violence*. Violence has generally been conceptualized – if only tacitly – as a *degree* of conflict rather than as a *form* of conflict, or indeed as a form of social and political action in its own right.... In the study of collective or political violence, on the other hand, ethnicity figured (until recently) only incidentally and peripherally' (Brubaker & Laitin 1998, p. 425-6).

Following Brubaker and Laitin's insight that we are no longer blind to ethnicity, but we might be blinded by it, in the case of war in B&H, same can be applied to religious identities. Scholars have argued that religion personalizes conflict and provides justification for violence (e.g. Girard 1979; Mojzes 1998; Sells 1998; Juergensmeyer 2004), while the religious/secular dichotomy is incoherent and might produce the 'myth of religious violence' (Cavanaugh 2007, 2009). Interestingly enough, for Cavanaugh one of the main arguments about theoretical misconceptions in researching the religion and violence nexus is that religion-and-violence theorists inevitably undermine their own distinctions, such that 'the problem with [the] argument is that what counts as "absolute" is decided *a priori* and is immune to empirical testing' (Cavanaugh 2007, p. 8). Be that as it may, often there are arguments that the question is not simply one of belief, but of behaviour.

Specific actors' behaviours manifest during the B&H war includes the reliance on traditional religious symbols, the use of traditional religious slogans and salutations, interpretations of political developments in religious terms, denominations of the enemy, and destruction of the enemy's sacred objects, etc. (Velikonja 2003; Abazović 2006). Moe (2006) describes 'religious' characteristics of the war in way that includes, among other, the political mobilisation through mass pilgrimages, mythical narratives and the manipulation of dead bodies, as well as declaring the fought-over territories as holy land of the divinely elected nation.

In his essay on religion and politics, Srdjan Vrcan (2003) writes about the role of religion in the conflicts that marked the disintegration of SFRY in the nineties and across the past century. That role is visible in systematic political mobilization of religious traditions and available religious resources, but also in a political abuse of religious symbolism of all major

religions nationalist political strategies have been in need of additional legitimacy, and those who can provide them with it were major religious institutions. According to Vrcan:

> This legitimacy was a special legitimacy in the form of national legitimacy 'from above' and numinous legitimacy. In such a way, all dominant nationalist strategies acted practically under a certain 'saint patronage' (Vrcan 20032).

Considering the war and crimes committed during the conflict in B&H, Michael Sells reflects on the double role of religion; first as a force to impose an identity on individuals irrespective of an individual's convictions and beliefs, and second to 'direct religion towards institutions, symbols, rituals and ideologies through which violence will be motivated and justified' (Sells 2003, p. 310). Sells furthermore argues that in such situations

> religions, in their ideological manifestations, are traditionally stronger in promoting internal identity, which is opposed to other religions, than in affirming its identity by affirming the identity of others... Their conflict-based paradigms have become reservoirs of power for perpetuating violence, claiming territory and rewriting history by rewriting the textuality of the country itself (Sells 2003, p. 329).

As opposed to pre-war events under the Socialist regime, religious leaders have faced significant changes within the new situation

> From being marginalised, controlled, and even oppressed, they suddenly found themselves courted by politicians, the media, and even academics. It is far to say that most of them were not used to this limelight, and it made most of them prone to being manipulated by all this attention and flattery (Mojses 1998, p. 81).

Mitja Velikonja, using a comparative and socio-historical approach, analysed the importance of religious symbolism in the previous war. Velikonja explored how religious symbols were renewed and 'traditionalized', how

they were 'nationalized' and 'politicized', themost frequently used elements of religious inheritance and how these elements are used for the purpose of military operations and ethnic/confessional cleansing policies (Velikonja 2003). Finally, while contemplating the society-war-religion relationship, Jakov Jukić claimed that 'in order to take all this unexacting, they turn the terrible war into a calming religious ceremony, the fierce and bloody fight into a big holy game of expenditure and destruction – victory into lavish religious holidays, and defeat into inviolable taboos' (Jukić 1995, p. 31 in Ćimić 2005, p. 155).

The ambivalence of organized religion

The way religion was mobilized during the war reshaped/transformed the major organized religious institutions in B&H: the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, and the Islamic community.

The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), according to Ćimić, lost its spiritual dimension due to the fact that it has a programmed tendency to drastically transform the spiritual into the worldly and that it is frequently completely reduced to Serbian nationalism. He outlines how the SOC, as early as the start of the war, even before other social factors, supported the expansion of its own people and state, in order to, allegedly, eliminate historical injustices that it suffered (Ćimić, 2005). The absolutisation of the relation between religion and nation – which has led to the appearance of phrases about the 'Serbian Orthodox people', 'Serbian Orthodox people's individuality', 'Kosovo heroes that have not fought for the faith of religion but faith of nation' - and the question of whether the religion preserved the nation, or the nation preserved Orthodoxy, are some of the key premises in the works of Olivera Milosavljević. Milosavljević (2002) has examined the tradition of nationalism in Serbia, and she notes that the identification of Serbian and Orthodox identity has gone beyond its primary origin, such that, without recognizing the multi-layered nature of Serb identity in modern society it became a characteristic of the tendency for petrifaction of the 'original' nation in religion. Offering a detailed analysis of the relationship between religion and nationalism in Serbia, Milosavljević starts from the premise that the recognized modern tendency – according to which Orthodox religion is equated to Serb identity and

that Serb identity is denied without Orthodox Christianity – stems from a certain part of the Serbs intellectual elite that has never accepted the so-called 'language' theory on the formation of a nation. She writes

> 🙶 The achieved national homogenization, and then also the isolation and closedness of this society have created an even more adequate basis for ideological equalization of the Serbian nation with Orthodox religion, which became its all-determining factor. At the same time, the possibility of the very survival of the Serbian nation without Orthodox religion was negated by interpreting any change of the national identity as the religious identity, fatal for the nation, or maintaining the belief that the Serbian people without Orthodox religion 'can survive in [an] ethnic and physical sense, but it would be then people with a new, different, maybe even foreign identity' (Bogdanović in Milosavljević 2002, p. 52).

One of the key characters in this context is the bishop of Žiča diocese, Nikolaj Velimirović, the creator of the theory of 'Evangelic nationalism.' which includes worshiping Saint Sava (*svetosavlje*) as the national ideology. In addition to Nikolaj Velimirović, the writings of Justin Popović are relevant. Popović is considered a venerated teacher of Orthodox Christianity who is also a representative of the theological and organic thought in Serbia. He insists on the distinction between European man as progeny of historical Catholicism, and Saint Sava as a God-man, a progeny of the ideal Orthodox religion.

However, the religious nationalism of individual theologians and priests of the SOC became fully pronounced only in the 1980s and 1990s, including during the period of war.

Milorad Tomanić called the key originators and generators of extreme nationalism in Serbia a 'Serbian three-petaled flower of a deadly intoxicating odour' (Tomanić 2001, p. 10). According to Tomanić, the first two petals are the Association of Writers of Serbia – UKS, and the Serbian Academy of Science and Art – SANU, and the third petal of the flower is the SOC, especially monks, theologians, professors of the Theological Faculty, and the so-called 'Justinians' (named after the first name of mentioned Justin Popović). The most renowned of them are Atanasije Jevtić, Irinej Bulović, Artemije Radosavljević and Amfilohije Radović.

The leadership of the Serbian Orthodox Church before and during the war was elected at an extraordinary session at the end of 1990, when Pavle, a former bishop,was elected Patriarch. During the same session the bishop Amfilohije Radović was elected to the position of archbishop, and his position was filled by the then dean of the Faculty of Theology, Atanasije Jevtić.

During the ceremony of ordination and enthronement for the bishop in 1991 in Vršac,Serbia, Atanasije Jevtić said:

> " The Serbian people are again on the cross … And that we can say something different than what a young wise Jewish woman said to the malicious and aggressive Muslims: 'We forgive you [for] the fact that you have been killing us, but we cannot forgive you if you force us to kill you...' This is the danger faced today by my crucified people, to a lesser extent here in Banat, but every Orthodox Serb is co-crucified together with the crucified people from Kosovo to Jadovna, especially from Krajina to Borovo [in B&H and Croatia]… And may God give that this crucifixion results in resurrection, not just our resurrection, but also of those who have, allegedly, in the name of Christ fought the cross with three fingers up (Jevtić 1991, in Tomanić 2001, p. 56).

Numerous similar statements can be found in Serbian print media, authored by priests of the SOC. However, I include these words of bishop Atanasije because he declared them during the official church procession of his ordination, an occasion dedicated to spiritual and ritual gathering.

Especially during the war period, some of the SOC priest zealously expressed this religious nationalism. Indeed, the conditions under which religion is revitalized favors simultaneasouly nationalist and any other type of instrumentalization of the church.

The Catholic Church in Croatia was also unable to fight the nationalist instrumentalizations of the Church at the end of the 20th century. In the absence of the general statement that it is unacceptable to use religion in order to morally justify the use of violence, 'religious images and religious leaders will continue to be abused by politicians and generals exercising violence' (Volf 2002, p. 294).

However, the establishment of a new regime after the Republic of Croatia's independence (1991) from SFRY, and especially the war that ensued immediately after in Croatia and in B&H, impacted the proactive role of the Catholic Church. The new political order shifted the manner and content of the Catholic Church's intervention in political and social conflicts in ways that were not consistent with its original principles. This was particularly pronounced in the past century, such that ethnic and religious identity almost fully overlapped as a result of ethno-national mobilization conducted through the experience of war and through the media (Prlenda 2002, p. 140).

Josip Beljan, in a issue of the Catholic journal 'Veritas' from 1992, described the relationship between the Church and the new government in the following way:

> 🙶 Christ's cross is standing next to the Croatian flag. [A] Croatian bishop is standing next to [the] Croatian Prime minister… This was indeed the true war for 'honourable cross and golden freedom', for the return of Christ and freedom to Croatia. The Church is happy to see its people being saved from double slavery– [both] a Serbian and Communist one (Veljan 1992 in Bellamy 2002, p. 47).[6]

While clerics of the Catholic Church have consistently insisted on Catholic ultra-traditionalism on some welfare and social issues (i.e. abortion, reproductive health, and family planning or labor laws), their position on political issues has not been as predictable. The visit of Pope John Paul II to Croatia in 1994 illustrates this variation. The Pope originally intended to visit Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb, but the leadership of the SOC disapproved of his visit to Belgrade. Additionally, UN forces were unable to guarantee his safety during his potential stay in besieged Sarajevo.

Therefore the Pope only visited Croatia and in his speech to youth gathered at Zagreb Hippodrome he stated: 'When a person rejects or neglects God, he/she becomes almost always a worshipper of empty idols. The person starts adoring idols of a nation, race, party and later justifies

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6   Quoted in Bellamy (2002, p. 47). Bellamy takes this reference from Paul Mojzes. It was translated into English and from English translated back to Bosnian and back to English so that minor difference might be present.

hatred, discrimination and force in their name' (John Paul II, 1994).[7]

Many scholars interpreted this statement as a direct critique of the then ruling establishment in Croatia, especially the main political party (Croat Democratic Community, *Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*, HDZ) leadership, and other right-wing oriented politicians in Croatia. Much of the clergy was also supporting the official Croatian political regime at that time. Therefore, the Croatian Cardinal Kuharić quoted the Pope's statement after the Zagreb visit several times. Kuharic's recitation of this quote illustrated the importance of recognizing past mistakes in order to not repeat them. He was particularly concerned about improvement of a bad image which Croatia had in the world. Soon after the Pope's visit to Croatia, the highest ranked clergy of the Catholic Church, although led by the conservative Cardinal Kuharić, in their public addresses accepted the Pope's messages and significantly started with distancing themselves from the ruling politics.

At the beginning of 1990s, the Catholic Church and the ruling Croat national party (Croat Democratic Community of B&H – HDZB&H) began to collaborate more closely. Marko Oršolić, a prominent Bosnian Franciscan monk, in several of his public statements, criticized the link between the Church and Croatian political representatives in B&H. In his 1993 interview for a daily newspaper 'Oslobođenje', Oršolić stated:

> 🙾 When some highly ranked officials of HDZ in B&H came to Sarajevo Cathedral for a Christmas midnight mass, the Cathedral was decorated with coats of arms with red and white chessboard and national emblems, but not those of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (....) [I] really do not understand why we would put this on the candle (since it symbolises faith), this is something ideological (Oršolić 2003, p. 84).

Yet from the start of the war there were divisions among Catholic clerics in B&H. The greatest number of members of the Franciscan order of the Province of Bosna Srebrena (*Bosnia Argentina)* harshly and directly criticized the politics and positions of HDZ. But members of the Franciscan order of the Province of Herzegovina were openly supportive of nationalist Croatian politicians in B&H. One of the the most notorious

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7 http://www.oocities.org/duhovni_velikani/papa_ivan_pavao_ii_u_hrvatskoj_1994.htm

examples of such nurturing activities favouring nationalism is

> 🙶 …Tomislav Pervan, the head of the province of 250 Franciscans in the region of Mostar, who repeated the Tuđman propaganda that the Bosnian Muslims wanted an Islamic state. (....) In the Herzegovinian town Bobanovi (…) the Catholic Church features the large mural behind the altar showing the suffering of the Croat People, with portraits of a World War II Ustashe militiaman, Ranko Boban, hanging nearby. Portraits of the leader of the Ustashe Croatia, Ante Pavelić, one of the most ruthless criminals of the Nazi empire, are displayed in the homes of local Catholic priests (Sells 1998, p. 106).

The conflict between the Herzegovina Franciscan monks and the diocesan bishop of Mostar, a tension that had previously existed, became more evidently 'political' among the clerics in B&H as the war unfolded. This rising friction required a direct declaration from the Vatican about these issues. Remembering the lessons from the Second World War, when the Vatican delayed taking a position against the Nazi regime (Iveković, 2002), and also aware of the collaborative role of some Catholic clergy with Nazi regime during *Nezavisna država Hrvatska* (Independent State of Croatia), the Pope insisted on the separation of Church and state. In several addresses, Pope John Paul II advocated for peace in B&H, which was the position of the Sarajevo-based cardinal Vinko Puljić as well.

Even though the Pope spoke out against racial animosity and violent nationalism in 1994, some authors like Sells believe he could have done more, since 'he did not even once condemn the role of [the] Herzegovina clergy in supporting [the] harsh religious nationalism of paramilitary units of Herceg-Bosna' (Sells 1998, p. 142).

Many scholars emphasize a direct link between the Catholic Church and HDZ in the creation of a nationalist euphoria in Croatia and B&H (Powers 1996; Ramet 1996; Cohen 1998; Mojzes 1998; Sells 1998; Vrcan 2001; Bellamy 2002;). Nevertheless, it needs to be stated that there were differences between the actions of liberal urban (higher ranked) clergy in the Catholic Church and its middle and lower ranked traditionalist (nationalist) clergy in rural areas of Croatia and B&H.

The religious and political representatives of Bosniaks in B&H took an active role in creating a nationalist euphoria in B&H during the post-socialist period. Contrary to the expectations of the [which?] political elites, religion became an even more significant and defining factor of national self-identification of the Bosniaks. This is perhaps because network of established, genuine national institutions were lacking, and with 'religion covered in a veil of nationality', in the time period following the official recognition of the Muslims as nation in B&H – Amin Maalouf presents an insightful illustration:

> Let us stay in Sarajevo and carry out an imaginary survey there. Let us observe a man about 50 whom we see in [the] street. In 1980 or thereabouts he might have said proudly and without hesitation, 'I'm a Yugoslavian!' Questioned more closely, he could have said he was a citizen of the Federal Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, incidentally, that he came from a traditional Muslim family. If you had met the same man twelve years later, when the war was at its height, he might have answered automatically and emphatically: 'I'm a Muslim!' He might even have grown the statutory beard. He would quickly have added that he was a Bosnian, and he would not have been pleased to be reminded of how proudly he once called himself a Yugoslavian. If he was stopped and questioned now, he would say first of all that he was a Bosnian, than that he was a Muslim. He'd tell you he was just on his way to the mosques, but he'd also want to tell you to know that his country is part of Europe and that he hopes it will one day be a member of the Union. How will the same person want to define himself if we meet him in the same place 20 years hence? Which of his affiliation will he put first? The European? The Islamic? The Bosnian? Something else again? The Balkan connection, perhaps? (Maalouf, 2003, p. 13).

Maalouf's insight reflects the situation of many B&H Muslims preceding and during the war. Yet Maalouf's example should have positioned his imaginary subject earlier. At the end of the 1980s, at the peak of the SFRY crisis, the Muslim community also experienced a 'regrouping' of their political forces. A number of Muslim intellectuals, lead by Alija Izetbegović, with the support of some of the *ulema* (Muslims clerics), worked to establish

a political party that was supposed to reflect and represent the political interests of Muslims. When its founders first conceived of it, *Stranka Demokratske Akcije,* SDA (Party for Democratic Action), was defined as the party of the 'Muslim cultural and historical circle', and its SDA leaders planned to represent Muslims from all over SFRY. Yet the dissolution of SFRY led the party to completely shift its focus to B&H.

At the first multi-party elections in B&H in November 1990, SDA won the majority of votes and its leader Alija Izetbegović was elected president of the collective Presidency of B&H.

From the very start of their political activity, those involved with the SDA faced two key problems. The first was how to resist expansionist state projects favoured by the ruling politics in Serbia (and later also Croatia), and second, the internal processes related to the political and religious profiling of Muslims that SDA represented (e.g. at the largely attended SDA pre-election gatherings, its members instrumentalized the religious symbols, so that along with state and party flags one could see the flaunting green flags with crescent and star, or flags with Qur'an verses.).

When the aggression and war in B&H began in1992, response to the anti- B&H and anti-Bosniaks ideologies was the Muslim reciprocation based on ideologized denominationalism as the national ideology.

The Muslim establishment, and specifically the SDA leaders, maintained their elected positions during the war, but also continued to grasp total control of all aspects of governing the state and society. Bougarel (1999) argues that SDA methods of rule led to the duality of the B&H state since official multi-ethnic institutions were circumvented for the sake of parallel networks of party cadre' institutions . According to him, members of the collective Presidency, among them Serbs and Croats, were reduced to purely symbolic figures since the SDA leader Izetbegovic did not allow them to have any real influence. In addition,

> The Bosniak Assembly—made up exclusively from the political and cultural representatives of the Muslim community -- held sessions in parallel with the Bosnian parliament. In the Bosnian Army, 'Muslim brigades', directly financed by SDA's parallel networks, appeared next to the regular units (Bougarel 1999).

During the war and immediately after it, a strong re-Islamization of the national, political and cultural identity occurred among the Bosniak community, which facilitated the construction of a Muslim political identity. The re-Islamization of their national identity was much stronger than the possible attempts to 'nationalize' Islam. As Hastings argues, 'the religious stimulation of nationalism usually looks like pouring the religious influence onto the construction of the nation. The more influential religion is in the latter case, the more accountable it is in the former' (Hastings 2003, p. 165).

However, even in the early postwar situation, religious and political leaders of major B&H communities maintained the ongoing processes of politicization of religion and religionization of politics. Although the roles of organised religious in B&H in the 1990s were different and specific, Vrcan (2001) provides their common sociological characteristics:

> a)they are the only legitimate possessors of the 'final' truths about the meaning of human life (…) b) they are the only ones with acollective memory that defines the permanent, primordial and stable identities, both collective and individual, in contrast to all other identities - temporary, partial, precarious or ephemeral, c)they are the true guardian of the available and reliable crystallisations and sedimentations of the centuries-long collective experience and collective wisdom (…) d) they have the capital of the generally accepted and unquestionable human morality and common sense, and are therefore able to offer a modern gate against the spreading of evil and depravity, characteristic of the modern world that moves away from God, and e) that they are the final guardians of the deepest and most original roots of the authentic and genuine national being (Vrcan 2001, p. 23).

Concluding remarks

In B&H, religion is either considered a source (or resource) of conflict, which desacralisizes religion and sacralizes conflict, or violence is understood as a mechanism to resolve complex inter-religious and interethnic issues. In both lines of thought,religion's role in the B&H was more detrimental than it was productive.

Additionally, the debates about the role of religion and religious communities in the war and its role over the past twenty years are still today considered 'controversial', both within and outside religious communities. This is partly due to the fact that religion is considered a 'special case' in the public domain, because of both historical reasons, and because of a 'culture' of denial about what happened in the near past. The question of the potential healing role of religious institutions and acknowledgement of human suffering versus processes of systematic denial is evident in present-day B&H.

> Denial may be neither a matter of telling the truth nor intentionally telling a lie. The statement is not wholly deliberate, and the status of 'knowledge' about the truth is not wholly clear. There seems to be states of mind, or even whole cultures, in which we know and don't know at the same time" (Cohen, 2001, p. 255).

I draw on the sociological work of Stanley Cohen to argue that no matter whether there is direct denial, denial of meanings, or denial of implications, it is not only past (events) that have been denied, but the present too. Cohen's (2001) insights on the politics of denial aptly apply to the case of B&H. Currently, different groups exercise several forms of denial: literal denial (the event did not happen or is not happening as a means of disputing the truth; the fact or knowledge of the fact is denied); interpretive denial (the fact is accepted, but its meaning or conventional interpretation is contested), and implicatory denial (failure to recognize and acknowledge the significance of implications; the fact is accepted and the conventional interpretation of the facts is accepted, but the psychological or moral significance is disputed). Ethnic expropriation of memories therefore result in different versions of past events.

Yet the question remains: do the people of B&H share a common memory? In the post-conflict period, common memory is under constant destruction by ethno-political elites, thus any shared/collective memory has the potential to become a deeply divided memory within a deeply divided society. Collective memory and history provides individuals with continuity of the past and offers thema common identity that connects communities.

Still, 'collective amnesia' is relevant here, as a condition that allows individuals and communities to continue with life. Thus we must also recognize the process of forgetting. In B&H today, one way of dealing with the past is that everyday citizens are faced with the official standpoint that forgotten is all that works against a particular ethnic social cohesion. Accordingly, public commemoration and memorials related to the war are fragmented, exclusive, and ethnically based. These sites might even be considered 'commemoration from bellow', fulfilling the psychological need of individuals, or 'commemoration from above', which is politically driven and shaped. Religious institutions and their representatives are still highly ambivalent actors in processes of creating memorials.

Conflict and post-conflict societies, particularly if they are characterized by a plurality of confessional groups, are in many ways more suitable for the processes of intensifying religiosity. B&H is, in that sense, an extraordinary case for reviewing such claims. In B&H, there is an evident process of returning to religion over the last two decades. Religious representation has returned to public life, it has crossed from the 'invisible/ (private) into the public sphere, which marks a deprivatisation of religion par excellence. The religious revival and the revitalization of religion are present through the desecularisation of public life, and all relevant indicators point towards a significant revitalization of religion in B&H society. This includes increased participation in religious activities, emphasis on religious affiliation, presence of religious communities in the political and public life as well as in the media, the role of religious communities in the educational system, and so on.

However, just as the retreat of institutional religion in Western Europe is not equal to the retreat of religion, the revitalization of religion in the public sphere in B&H does not necessarily signify the increase in personal religiosity and the spiritualization of personal life. In the ideological vacuum of post-socialism, the revitalization of religion, as such, did not occur,

but religion was again understood as a political fact within transformed circumstances. This new understanding of religion is, unfortunately, also particular to B & H; by enforcing confessional (collective) identities, religion is oriented and reduced to ethnicity, and not to its universal characteristics, features, and mission. It thus becomes the means for the political legitimization of the new political order. In B & H's post-conflict period, faith-based identities were nationalized in such a way that simply reduced them to ethnicities, thus (post-) conflict social reconstruction continues to depend on (non-) intervention of key actors, including the clergy and religious institutions (Abazović, 2014).

B & H's constitution does not include explicit rules mandating the separation of church and religious communities and state, but the Law on the Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities, adopted in 2004, introduced a secular notion of the state. Thus in legal reasoning, the churches and religious communities are separate from the state, and 'the state may not recognize the status of state religion to any religion nor that of state church or religious community to a church or religious community' (Article 14.)[8]

When it comes to the commitment to religious accommodation in B&H, the implementation of the French model of *laicité* reflects experience of the B&H population under the former socialist government. On the other hand, the ethno-religious nationalism today marking B&H politics makes the introduction of this model very unlikely. At the same time, the 'territorial compartmentalization' of freedom of religion with discrimination against 'others' in all spheres of life is the result of the omnipresent ethno-political pressure, which is based on the 'symbiosis' of political parties and religions and their leaders. Individuals must choose to accept the 'ethno- religious' ascription by others, or to become suspect of being a 'traitor' of one's own faith. This choice certainly violates all normative standards of freedom of conscience, religion, and belief.

On the level of everyday life, such a situation has been possible because 'the seeds of Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian religiosity were not stamped out under communist rule, even among so-called secularized masses; but neither were they nurtured. Scattered and left untended, they were eventually planted in the crude soil of ethnonationalism' (Appleby 2002, p. 71).

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8   The Official Gazette of BiH No. 5/04

In multi-confessional and ethnically plural communities, religious identity not only could, but should be categorically differentiated from ethnic identity. Miles (1996), discussing political para-theology, distinguishes between religious identity, as a matter of shared theology, ritual, and belief and ethnic identity as a matter of common ancestry, descent, history, language, culture, and includes the possibly of religion, According to him,

> If we do not distinguish the two identities from each other then we cannot hope to demarcate ethnic from religious conflict. The danger of such intellectual confusion is that, by undermining the legitimacy of religion as an instrument of peace, its inherent potential for conflict resolution will be seriously compromised ' (Miles, 1996, p. 203).

Finally, one thing seems to be certain: regardless of whether religiously- or ethnically- inspired claims are questioned, in the face of failures, limitation, and retrenchments of the state actors, for instance, some sort of institutions should fill the gap between expectation and achievements of everyday citizens. By doing so, religious communities in B&H can (re-) define their place within the society.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina: Religion, Peace and Conflict Country Profile

Bosnia & Herzegovina's (BiH) turbulent post-socialist transition has been fundamentally shaped by the relationship between religious communities and "ethno-politicians" adept at leveraging questions of identity and difference (including religion) for political gain. BIH's three major ethno-religious communities–Bosniak Muslims, Croat Roman Catholics, and Serb Orthodox–have granted varying degrees of legitimacy to these identity-based ideologies. This dynamic was central to the violent conflict BiH experienced in the 1990s, and it continues to be relevant today. In recent years, the politics of religious representation has returned to Bosnian public life, through a trend of increasing emphasis on religious identity, participation in religious activities, and a renewed presence of religion in the country's educational system. Questions of religion and religious identity are thus closely intertwined with rising intercommunal tensions and new threats to stability in Bosnia.

The Religious Landscape

Brief historical overview

The diverse religious makeup of BiH is a product of the region's tumultuous past. Until the Ottoman conquest of the fifteenth century, the country was formally considered to be Christian, because of its distinctive Bosnian Church which emerged during the medieval period. Over time it came to be identified as Roman Catholic, with Orthodoxy existing only in Herzegovina, in the south. However, neither Western nor Eastern Christianity managed to penetrate Bosnia and Herzegovina deeply. This, among other factors, facilitated conversions to Islam in the

early Ottoman period. Sephardic Jews are also recorded as existing in Sarajevo from the second half of the sixteenth century.

In the ideological vacuum that emerged after the socialist era in the Former Yugoslavia, religion was revitalized and came to be understood as a political fact. This has occurred to a much larger extent in BiH than places such as Poland, were Genevieve Zubrzycki argues that 'it was not political institutions and symbols that were sacralized and became the object of religious devotion… but religious symbols that were first secularized and then *resacralized as national.'* The understanding of religion in BiH has narrowed after the wars of the 1990s - religion has been oriented towards and in some respects reduced to ethnicity, rather than being conceived as an immanent and universal set of characteristics, features, and missions. Confessional and collective identities have been encouraged, and religious affiliation has become a way to legitimize new political establishments.

A contributing factor to the increased religious politicization is that religion and socio-political matters were not entirely stamped out by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Under the SFRY, religion was perceived as a traditional phenomenon that was incompatible with new socialist mentalities, and religious leadership was seen as clerical and anti-revolutionary. At the same time, religion was also understood culturally and historically in relation to nationalist feelings of being South Slavic people. For R. Scott Appleby, "the seeds of Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian religiosity were not stamped out under communist rule, even among so-called secularized masses; but neither were they nurtured. Scattered and left untended, they were eventually planted in the crude soil of ethnonationalism."

Demographics
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Historically, religion and ethnicity are closely intertwined in BiH. Bosniaks are predominantly Muslim, Serbs are predominantly Orthodox Christian, and Croats are predominantly Roman Catholic. The population of BiH is largely divided along these ethnic-religious lines. The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP)–commonly known as the Dayton Accords--negotiated an end to the war in BiH (1992-1995) by creating the current structure of BiH, which comprises two entities:

the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), and Republika Srpska (RS), each possessing a high level of autonomy. Today, most Orthodox Christians inhabit RS, while Croat Roman Catholics and Bosniak Muslims are concentrated in FBiH. Religious minorities, such as Jews and Protestants, are concentrated in Sarajevo and other major cities as Banja Luka, Mostar, Tuzla and Brčko.

Based on the last census data, in 2013 BiH has 3,531,159 inhabitants (RS 1,228,423 and FBiH 2,219,220). The majority (96.32 %3) are members of three nations:

- Bosniaks 1,769,592 or 50.11%
- Serbs 1,086,733 or 30.77%
- Croats 544,780 or 15.42%

The confessional structure of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- Muslims make up 71.28%
- Catholics 22.10%.

The confessional structure of Republika Srpska:

- Orthodox 81.39%
- Muslims 14.06%
- Catholics 2.35%.

Other religions, including the Jews, Reformed Christians/Protestants, and members of the new religious movements equal 118.612 or 3,4% of the population. There are in total 38,669 self-declared atheists and agnostics (27,853 atheists and 10,816 agnostics), or in a total of 1.09%.

Muslim (Bosniaks)
Roman Catholic Church (Croats)
Serbian Orthodox Church (Serbs)

Overview of Constitutional Status of Religion:

BiH opted for a constitutional model of 'separation of state and faith,' but with an emphasis on state and church/religious communities' cooperation – often referred to as the 'hybrid' or 'collaborative' model. BiH's constitution does not explicitly mandate the separation of faith and state, but the law on the Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities posits that "the state may not recognize the status of state religion to any religion nor that of state church or religious community to a church or religious community." Article 14 of the Law also stipulates that "[c]hurches and religious communities are separate from the state." The legal framework of state and faith relations incorporates principles of equality in religious communities' rights and obligations, and their independence to define their internal organization. The Law recognizes the status of churches and religious communities as legal persons. Due to this, the state may provide religious communities

with material assistance for healthcare, social, educational, and charitable services, but on the condition that services are provided without discrimination. This law also enables the state to provide pensions, disability, and health insurance for religious personnel.

Additional legal protection of religious freedoms is possible through the signing of concluding agreements between the state and a religious community. More specifically, Article 15 of the Law details that issues of common interest of both the state and religious communities can be addressed through agreement(s) between the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council of Ministers, the governments of the entities, and respective churches and/or the religious communities. Currently, the BiH government has signed treaties with the Holy See and Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC). This agreement between the State and the SOC is a bilateral, inter-state treaty since the headquarters of SOC is in Belgrade, Republic of Serbia.

The basic agreements stipulate that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina guarantees the religious communities the freedom of communication with other religious communities, freedom of religious missions, freedom of religious services, inviolability of official premises and religious facilities, inviolability of property rights, the freedom of possession, printing, publishing and distribution of books, newspapers, magazines and audio-visual materials, the right to establish a radio and television station, access to the media, the freedom to display insignia, flags, attributes and other signs, and similar specific issues related to concrete religious community.

The Islamic Community has approached the Presidency of BiH for something similar, but it is yet to materialize due to contestation around if the agreement should be treated as international or intra-state. This seems to be the source of the disagreement among the representatives of the three-member Presidency of BiH. According to the Bosniak and Croat members, the Islamic Community is 'authentic' and headquartered in BiH and so the agreement should be distinct from agreements with the Catholic Church and Serbian Orthodox Church. The Serb member of the Presidency strongly opposes this logic, suggesting this would favor the Islamic Community and imply the Catholic Church and the SOC were 'non-native' to BiH.

State and Freedom of Religion

Despite certain constitutional measures being implemented to uphold religious freedom, citizens are ultimately forced to accept pre-defined 'ethno-religious' identities, or they are suspected of being a 'traitor' to their own faith. This involuntary selection violates freedom of conscience, religion, and belief. While the European Union Commission's Report on BiH for 2002 emphasized that freedom of thought, conscience, and religion continue to be generally upheld, the Interreligious Council of BiH frequently registers reported acts of vandalism on religious buildings, and to a smaller degree, incidents against religious officials. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported dozens of incidents targeting Muslims and Christians (Catholic, Seventh-day Adventist, and Orthodox). Cases of discrimination, hate speech, and hate crimes on religious grounds continue to occur and incidents targeting religious sites persist, particularly in minority and returnee areas.

Key Religious Actors

- Dr. Husein Kavazović, Reisu-l-ulema of Islamic Community in BiH
- Mr. Hrizostom, Metropolitan of Dabar-Bosna Serbian Orthodox Church
- Dr. Tomo Vukšić, Metropolitan Archbishop of Vrhbosna-Sarajevo
- Roman Catholic Church
- Mr. Jakob Finci, President of Jewish Community in BiH

Religion and Public Life

In the last three decades in BiH, there has been an evident process of resurgence of religion, or the return of religion to public life, its transfer from the "invisible" (private) into the observable/public sphere, therefore the deprivatization of religion *par exellance.* Religious renewal and the revitalization of religion is, above all, present as a "desecularization" of the public space and life, and all relevant indicators point toward a significant revitalization of the position and role of religion in the society of BiH. Among the most relevant indicators are increased participation in religious rituals and other related activities, the underlining of religious affiliation by displaying the symbols and other religious insignias, public salutations

and greetings, but also the presence of religious communities in political and public life, as well as in media and the public education system.

As usual, in public discourse, matters such as the birth control, the abortion, the same sex marriages, the rights of LGBTQ+ and other minorities are more often discussed in the context of the ethno-national demographic survival and/or as a public moral issues, but rather in quasi-theological perspective.

However, generally speaking, religion in BiH is not confined to religious leaders or official expression. Instead, it manifests in local traditions, family rituals, practical rituals, and personal connections to certain communities, irrespective of whether one has specific doctrinal knowledge. Religion is a social phenomenon, and it manifests at different levels: on an individual level – as a spirituality of life, a matter of personal identity and worldview; on a collective level – as a faith-based community, with its doctrinal teachings, moral norms, symbols, rituals, practices; and on the level of institutions – as relevant bodies, including leadership and with a specific type of hierarchy.

Religion by its adherents can be defined as individual faith, and/or as a common culture, as well as and/or discriminatory political ideology. Accordingly, in BiH and Western Balkans, the senses of belonging to group and confession are fused, and the moral issues of the group's history tend to be coded in religious categories. Such coding is also strongly influenced by and in accordance with what goes on here and now.

More precise, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such legitimized political identities coded in religious categories, transformed but insistent on the notion that they are a matter of tradition and continuity reveal what is at stake. Antagonisms based on religious identity are growing stronger due largely to the fact that their proponents consider them a tool for religious and identitarian self-confirmation. Simultaneously, religious freedom is understood exclusively as one's own freedom and not that of the other. Consequently, religious freedom is thus misused as *card blanche* for unsanctioned religious practices.

An outcome of the war in BiH (1992-1995) is that the everyday lives of many citizens have come to be understood in ethnoreligious terms. Massive ethnic cleansing during armed conflict resulted in nearly one and a half million citizens being displaced. The death toll was estimated

at around 102,000 persons: approximately 55,000 of those killed were civilians, while just over 47,000 were soldiers. In the postwar era, religious affiliation has become an important way of maintaining persistent ethnopolitical divisions. The impact of such violence and suffering remains, as ethnic tensions continue to enter citizens' homes and each and every communication. Individual attachment to one's ethnic group is reaffirmed by the actions and rhetoric of surrounding institutional and political groups. Religious nationalism in BiH also insists on a strong connection between the political and the religious. This is reminiscent of a past when the religious establishment invoked the right to govern the state when religion was the essential (or sole) element required to rule. Religious nationalists in BiH have come to believe that any change in national and/or religious identity is destructive to the nation, despite dominant religions in the Western Balkans being present in other contexts.

Interreligious Affairs:

The religious leaders of BiH met in the fall of 1996 and formed a working group of high-level representatives from each church and religious community. The process led to the public declaration of a "Statement of Shared Moral Commitment" on June 1997, which formally established the Inter-religious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina (IRC-BiH). Since then, IRC-BiH has been working on activities implemented by five joint working groups: Legal Experts, Media, Education, Women, and Youth.

Most notably, the Legal Expert Group worked to draft a new law regarding the freedom of religion and the legal status of religious communities and churches in BiH. The Youth Working Group organized a series of inter-religious conflict resolution trainings in numerous cities. The IRC-BiH organized theology students exchange visits, where Muslims visited Orthodox and Catholic students and vice versa. The Media Working Group developed several programs that aimed to spread the IRC-BiH's message of tolerance and peace. The Education Group has been actively involved in developing a comprehensive religious education program for BiH's public school system. They have also drafted and submitted a common view of IRC-BiH principles on the issue of religious education in BiH public schools. The Women's Working Group focused on social problems, such as poverty, education of the poor, women's rights, and fostering cultural

and religious heritage. They have successfully implemented several charity projects to assist poor and displaced families.

Despite this, the increased politicization of religion has seriously challenged the IRC-BiH's arguments and activities. SOC religious leader, Metropolitan Hrizostom of Dabar-Bosnia decided in late January 2023 that SOC would terminate its membership in the IRC-BiH. The main reason for such a decision is the alleged "silence of this body (IRC-BiH) on serious crimes that have been committed against the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina." This decision was prompted by an incident when the tires of two cars with Serbian license plates were punctured in the center of Sarajevo. The Sarajevo police quickly identified and detained the perpetrator, who was found to be a mentally ill person who had just been released from treatment. However, the Metropolitan said this represents a "horrific" act and compared it with "neo-Nazi terror" which he said was carried out against Serbs in Croatia in 1991. Other Orthodox voices in the Bosnian Serb community characterized the incident as the culmination of a pattern of anti-Serbian statements and actions stemming primarily from Bosniak instigators.

International and transnational issues

After the collapse of socialism and Yugoslavia, all dominant religious communities basically lost their monopoly on the exclusive right to be the sole interpreters of religious regulations and the way of organising the religious life of their adherents. This does not mean that the traditionally based organised religious communities are not still unquestionable authorities for the majority of their members, however, the certain foreign influences has been present and somewhat noticeable.

Two religious communities are in particular affected, namely Islamic Community and Serbian Orthodox Church. The new trends in the interpretation of Islam, like in many parts of the world in past few decades, have also appeared in the Wester Balkans and are primarily reflected in conservatism, as well as in the discontinuity regarding the developments of modern Islamic thought. Domestic Islamic scholars and theologians in BiH have shown in their works that the advocates of the new interpretations are (mostly) Bosnians who graduated at theological universities from the Middle East, as well as to a lesser extent the foreign

fighters who remained in BiH after the war. Basically what they promote is recognised as Salafi teaching and worldviews, or insistence on pre-modern positions while interpreting Islam. The ways of spreading such attitudes are mainly through alternative printed and electronic media, especially using the Internet and social networks, but also through translations and publication of literature from the Arabic language (mostly by those authors and books that were not present during the period of socialism). Be that as it may, Muslim communities in the Balkans have strong intellectual locally based traditions that affirms the values of peaceful coexistence in pluralistic and multi-religious societies. Most regional researchers argues that for the vast majority of Muslims in the Balkans, attachment to their local/national communities takes precedence over their identification with a diffusely defined and abstract "global umma". In addition, "radical Islam" in the Balkans lacking both a historical root and a social basis. Finally, one of the crucial elements against radicalisation is internal defence mechanisms based on indigenous traditional Islamic practices and beliefs practiced over the centuries.

Among the Orthodox Christians in Serbia, Montenegro and B&H, the Serbian Orthodox Church is the most trusted institution. Recent surveys confirm that among Orthodox populations there is a strong association between religion and national identity, and that more people in Orthodox-majority countries than Catholic-majority countries support strong church-state ties. From Morrison and Garcevic (2023) analysis of Serbian Orthodox Church is evident the extent of concern over the Serbian Orthodox Church being a channel for Russian influence, that was also underlined by the European Parliament's Resolution of 9 March 2022, in which they expressed dismay at the role of the SOC in promoting Russian interests (emphasising their activities in Serbia, Montenegro and the entity of Republika Srpska in B&H). The symbiosis between the SOC and Russia (and the Russian Orthodox Church) has tangible political outcomes. Russia, of course, supports Serbia's stance on Kosovo and Republika Srpska within the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in B&H, while Moscow provides support for pro-Russian elements in Montenegro, such as the pro-Serbian political coalition Democratic Front. In B&H, the SPC has used its influence to mobilise Bosnian Serbs to support political elites that have explicitly nationalist aims and this has manifested itself in numerous ways, be it tacit support of secessionist rhetorics. Number of SOC clerics,

influenced strongly by ROC, continuously promotes the values of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, presenting them as standing in fundamental contrast to those of the the 'rotten West'.

Religion and Conflict

During the war in BiH, politicized and ethnicized religion became a powerful tool for mobilization against 'ethnic enemies.' Overlapping religious and ethnic identities, paired with the involvement of religious institutions during the war, resulting in various sites – including religious ones – becoming targets of violence. Certain actors utilized traditional religious symbols and slogans, and political developments were interpreted in religious terms. More specifically, the ethno-religious enemy "other" was demonized, and its sacred objects were destroyed. The war's religious characteristics were pervasive: mass pilgrimages, mythical narratives, desecration of bodies, and declarations regarding the divinely ordained ethnonational status of contested territories were powerful tools of political mobilization. Debates on the role of religion and religious communities in the war and over the past three decades are still considered controversial, both within and outside religious communities. This can be attributed to the ongoing historical value placed on religion and a sustained culture of denial about what happened in the near past.

For example, as a consequence of the massive ethnic cleansing during the war, nearly one and half million Bosnians were recorded as refugees and internally displaced persons. The death toll after the war (between 1991-1995) is generally estimated around 102,000: 55,000 civilians and just over 47,000 soldiers. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rulings from February 2007 effectively determined the character of the war to be 'international', 'despite the evidence of widespread killings, rape and torture elsewhere during the Bosnian war, especially in detention centers, the judges ruled that the criteria for genocide were met only in Srebrenica'. One such example of targeted killings occurred in early July 1995. At the UN compound in Potočari/Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serb Army separated more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys from the women, and executed, buried and reburied these men in mass graves. So far nearly 7,000 genocide

victims have been identified through DNA analysis of body parts recovered from mass graves, and 6,721 have been buried at the Srebrenica – Potočari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide.

Religion is either a source or resource of conflict in BiH - religion continues to be desacralized, while conflict is sacralized. While there have been some efforts by religious institutions to perform healing roles and acknowledge human suffering, violence is overwhelmingly understood as a mechanism to resolve complex interreligious and interethnic issues. There have been numerous efforts by 'western' governmental and non-governmental organizations to engage in conflict resolution and peace-building–including interreligious dialogue that includes expatriate and domestic religious communities and faith-based organizations–but overall results and achievements have been very limited thus far.

When it comes to the value of religious communities and truth commissions for transitional justice, BiH seems to constitute a negative case. In this respect, according to Daniel Philpott, the experience of BiH is akin to that of Ireland and Poland and contrasts sharply with that of Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Peru and Germany, where religious leaders and communities have exercised an important influence on transitional justice. BiH position as a negative case could be due to religious leaders ambivalent role during the war, or the insufficient ecumenical and interreligious structures that conspired to limit the organized religious potential for peacemaking. Whether for these or other reasons, Bosnia and Herzegovina's organized religions have so far chosen the course of 'eloquent silence,' responding to significant speech acts with silence.

Conclusion: Looking Ahead

From the 1990s onwards across Europe, so-called countries in transition have experienced a "translation" of social religious identities into solidified political identities. In many ways, these post-socialist processes have caused for religious identities to become linked with political disputes, instead of supporting a merger with various other cultural identifications and practices. Thus, it is important to recognize the

never-fully-developed process of secularization during the existence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during this "post-secular" epoch.

In the post-social era, confessional allegiances have become connected to certain ethnic and national identities in BiH. Political identities have been coded by religious categories; they are transformed but remain insistent on the notion that they are a matter of tradition and continuity. Religious nationalists oppose modern (secular) nationalism in BiH. In contra, national movements by their very nature insist on the dominance of (supra-)national over other identities and affiliations (e.g. religious or local). Therefore, religious nationalism often functions as a barrier to the creation of a common state identity. To truly achieve a functional multi-religious society in the political field, one of the first interventions is the necessary re-institutionalization of public space. To do this, it is necessary to demystify ethnic and religious irrationalities, especially if they are a product of ideology and religious nationalism.

End matter

BiH is faced with a diverse set of issues, but the underlining paradox is that the institutional framework established through the Dayton Peace Agreement favors the political options that are the least supportive of its implementation. The design of its political institutions does not encourage cross-ethnic cooperation; rather, it institutionalizes ethnic discrimination. For a new political system to be effective in a society with a sinister past, for it to encourage public deliberation, participatory democracy, and representative government, the society must confront that past. This process of confrontation is of the utmost importance, as the introduction of a new regime does not erase the past.

In terms of fostering process of reconciliation as the restoration of the just political relationship, the religious actors could be one of the crucial actors, given their historical and contextual position within society Stephen R. Goodwin's asserts that social

reconciliation generally lies beyond the structural realm and does not respond to the mechanical manipulation of institutions.

But in the face of failures, limits, and retrenchments of the political institutions (state), some sort of establishments should fill the gap. The organized religion in BiH, by doing so, can (re-) define their place and role within wider civil society, and as Scot R. Appleby argues, recognize that:

> **"** Modern religions have within their power the capacity to resist deadly violence and to do so in the name of the holy. [...] Communities of faith in which the historical argument about the proper ethical interpretation of the sacred remains vigorous and is sustained through many formal and informal channels, moves its adherents away from narrowly conceived ethnic, nationalistic, and tribal self-definition and toward a more tolerant and nonviolent social presence."

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